[2022] QSC 20
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Queensland
2022-02-24
Davis J
Original judgment source is linked above.
SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - GENERALLY - where the testator made a will in 2015 (the 2015 will) - where the 2015 will was her last will - where the cause of death of the testator included "complications of dementia" - where the testator's solicitor prepared the 2015 will - where the testator's solicitor had discharged various other instructions from the testator - where the testator's solicitor was of the view that the testator interacted with him consistently with having capacity - where medical evidence supported the testator's solicitor's assessment of capacity
SUCCESSION - PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION - GRANTS OF PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WITH WILL ANNEXED - TO WHOM GRANTED - where executors and trustees were nominated in the testator's will - where those executors and trustees renounced - where the applicant for letters of administration is a solicitor experienced in the practice of succession law - where the letters of administration with the will ought to be granted to the applicant
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, followed
Frizzo & Anor v Frizzo & Ors [2011] QSC 107, followed
Read v Carmody, unreported NSWCA, 23 July 1998, followed
1. Mrs Macpherson's capacity to enter into the 2015 will;
2. Mr Klatt's priority to apply for letters of administration.
1. appointed her son, James Jnr, and her granddaughter, Ellie Katharine Macpherson (Ellie), as executors and trustees;
2. on the condition that James Snr survived her, she left her entire estate to him;
3. in the event that James Snr predeceased her, the will provided that after payment of debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, the estate should be divided into 20 equal parts to be distributed as to 10 parts to James Jnr, five parts to Ellie and five parts to William Macpherson, another grandson.
1. It removes the bequest of the residual estate to James Snr. Of course, by the time of the 2015 will, James Snr was deceased.
2. The executors and trustees of the will are nominated as William and Ellie rather than James Jnr and Ellie.
2. Stroke, atrial fibrillation, hypertension, polymyalgia, rheumatica."
"[21] The classic test for testamentary capacity was enunciated in Banks v Goodfellow.[4] The relevant principles were restated by Powell JA in Read v Carmody:
1. The testatrix must be aware, and appreciate the significance, of the act in the law upon which she is about to embark;
2. The testatrix must be aware, at least in general terms, of the nature, extent and value of the estate over which she has a disposing power;
3. The testatrix must be aware of those who may reasonably be thought to have a claim upon her testamentary bounty, and the basis for, and nature of, the claims of such persons;
4. The testatrix must have the ability to evaluate, and discriminate between, the respective strengths of the claims of such persons.[5]
In this last respect, in the words of Banks v Goodfellow, no disorder of the mind should poison her affections or pervert her sense of right, nor any insane delusion influence her will, nor anything else prevent the exercise of her natural faculties."[6]
"[23] Of course, the onus of proving that the testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time she made her will lies on the party propounding that will. It is a question determined on the balance of probabilities, based on the whole of the evidence.[7] A presumption of validity arises where the proponent demonstrates a duly executed will that is rational on its face.[8] The party impugning that will must then displace the prima facie case with 'clear evidence...that the illness of the [testatrix] so affected [her] mental faculties as to make them unequal to the task of disposing of [her] property'.[9] While extreme age or grave illness are circumstances that will attract the vigilant scrutiny of the Court, neither is, of itself, sufficient to establish incapacity. The question always is whether those or other circumstances so affected the testatrix's faculties as to render her unequal to the task of disposing of her property.[10]
[24] If, however, doubt is raised as to the testatrix's mind, memory and understanding, then the Court is thrown back onto an examination of the evidence as a whole to determine whether the proponent has established affirmatively that the testatrix was of sound mind at the time of executing the will.[11] As was said in Worth v Clasohm:
'The effect of a doubt initially is to require a vigilant examination of the whole of the evidence which the parties place before the court; but, that examination having been made, a residual doubt is not enough to defeat the plaintiff's claim for probate unless it is felt by the court to be substantial enough to preclude a belief that the document propounded is the will of a testatrix who possessed sound mind, memory and understanding at the time of its execution.'"[12]
"During these conversations I had no reason to doubt her capacity."
"This it (sic) to certify that in my professional opinion Mrs Macpherson has the capacity to make decisions to manage her own financial and health affairs and that she also had this capacity on 30 September 2014."[13]
"In respose (sic) to your letter of 24th June concerning Mrs Rangipiri Macpherson I can confirm that she attended this surgery from June 2004 until April 2020. Over that time I attended her most frequently and on numerous occasions she discussed her family, her assetts (sic) and the reasoning for her decisions regarding their distribution in her will. It is my opinion that Mrs Macpherson definitely had testamentary capacity to understand and sign her will on 9th October 2015."
Priority to the grant of letters of administration
"603 Priority for letters of administration with the will
(1) The descending order of priority of persons to whom the court may grant letters of administration with the will is as follows -
(a) a trustee of the residuary estate;
(b) a life tenant of any part of the residuary estate;
(c) a remainderman of any part of the residuary estate;
(d) another residuary beneficiary;
(e) a person otherwise entitled to all or part of the residuary estate, by full or partial intestacy;
(f) a specific or pecuniary legatee;
(g) a creditor or person who has acquired the entire beneficial interest under the will;
(h) any one else the court may appoint.
(2) The court may grant letters of administration with the will to any person, in priority to any person mentioned in subrule (1).
(3) If 2 or more persons have the same priority, the order of priority must be decided according to which of them has the greater interest in the estate.
(4) Each applicant must establish the person's priority by providing evidence that each person higher in the order of priority is not entitled to priority because of death, incapacity or renunciation.
(5) A document providing evidence for subrule (4) must be an exhibit to the affidavit in support of the application.
(6) The applicant need not establish priority for a person equal to or lower than the applicant in the order of priority."
1. Michael Karl Klatt be appointed as the administrator of the estate of Rangipiri Macpherson deceased.
2. Subject to the formal requirements of the Registrar, letters of administration with the will of the deceased be granted to Michael Karl Klatt.
3. Pursuant to ss 82 and 90 of the Trusts Act 1973, all property of the deceased shall vest in Michael Karl Klatt as administrator of the estate and be deemed to have so vested on the date of the deceased's death.
4. Pursuant to s 68 of the Succession Act 1981 and s 101 of the Trusts Act 1973, the court fixes the remuneration of Michael Karl Klatt as administrator of the deceased's estate. Such remuneration for professional and non-professional work is to be assessed by an independent cost assessor pursuant to the Supreme Court scale as varied from time to time on the indemnity basis with the fees to be assessed at approximately two monthly intervals and on completion of the administration.
5. Pursuant to s 6 of the Succession Act 1981, Michael Karl Klatt as administrator of the deceased's estate is at liberty to retain Mullins Lawyers to act on his behalf in respect of the administration of the estate with their professional costs and outlays in so acting to be assessed by an independent cost assessor pursuant to the Supreme Court scale as varied from time to time on the indemnity basis and at approximately two monthly intervals and on the completion of the administration.
6. All certificates of title and all other estate documentation and information relevant to the issues remaining outstanding in the estate which are in the possession or control of any party who was served with a copy of the application shall be delivered to Michael Karl Klatt as administrator within fourteen (14) days from the date of these orders.
7. The costs of and incidental to the application be paid out of the estate on the indemnity basis.
8. Michael Karl Klatt shall have liberty to apply.
[2] (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 565.
[4] (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 565.
[5] Read v Carmody (NSWCA, 23 July 1998, unreported; BC9803374), [1998] NSWCA 182 per Powell JA. See also the judgments of Dixon J (as he then was) in Timbury v Coffee [1941] HCA 22; (1941) 66 CLR 277 at 283, [1941] HCA 22; and of Mullins J of this Court in Conroy v Unsworth-Smith [2004] QSC 81 at [97]- [98].
[7] Bailey v Bailey [1924] HCA 21; (1924) 34 CLR 558 at 570, [1924] HCA 21 per Isaacs J, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ concurring.
[8] Timbury v Coffee [1941] HCA 22; (1941) 66 CLR 277 at 283, [1941] HCA 22 per Dixon J; Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698 at 706; Conroy v Unsworth-Smith [2004] QSC 81 at [100]; Re Griffith; Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284 at 295.
[9] Bailey v Bailey [1924] HCA 21; (1924) 34 CLR 558 at 571-2, [1924] HCA 21 per Isaacs J.
[10] See Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698 at 707 and the cases there cited.
[11] Timbury v Coffee [1941] HCA 22; (1941) 66 CLR 277 at 283, [1941] HCA 22 per Dixon J.
[12] Worth v Clasohm [1952] HCA 67; (1952) 86 CLR 439 at 453; [1952] HCA 67 at [18].
[13] The date of revocation of the enduring power of attorney.
(1941) 66 CLR 277
(1924) 34 CLR 558
(1988) 14 NSWLR 698
(1995) 217 ALR 284
(1952) 86 CLR 439