Although, in the Amended Statement of Claim which was filed on behalf of the
Appellant in the proceedings, the attack upon the Will made on 5 February 1993
was based upon the deceased's alleged lack of testamentary capacity - said to be
due to (inter alia) a combination of cognitive defects and overwhelming
emotional distress - and the fact that, so it was alleged, the deceased's execution
of the Will was procured by the undue influence of the Second Respondent - a
concept of which the draftsman of the Amended Statement of Claim, in common
with many members of the legal profession, clearly has little, if any,
comprehension (see, for example, Winter v Crichron!) - and although, on the
hearing of the appeal, counsel for the Appellant seemed determined to assert that
the deceased's alleged lack of testamentary capacity was due to two material -
"non insane - delusions" - on the part of the deceased - the phrase "non insane
delusions" as I have on at least one prior occasion (Shaw v Crichron2) had
occasion to point out, is an oxymoron, while the phrase "insane delusions" is a
tautology - since delusions are pathognomonic of psychosis - in the end, the
question which Brownie J was called upon to determine was whether, by reason
of certain facts which the Appellant sought to establish, and upon which he
sought to rely, it appeared that the deceased at 5 February 1993 no longer retained
testamentary capacity. Bearing in mind that, although seeking to persuade
Brownie J to the view that the deceased no longer had testamentary capacity on
5 February 1993, the Appellant nonetheless sought to propound, and to have a