Freedom of Information Act, 1982 - Sections 3, 4, 11(2), 14, 40(1)(d), 41(1), 55

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, 1975 - Sections 35, 37

Crimes Act, 1914

Telecommunications Act, 1991 - Sections 88, 88(3)(b)

Freedom of Information Amendment Act, 1991 - Section 29

Conway v Rimmer [1968] UKHL 2; (1968) AC 910

Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] FCA 152; (1991) 13 AAR 261

Zalcberg and Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (unreported, 12 June, 1992, Decision No. 8015, Senior Member Gibbs)

Re Costello and Secretary, Department of Transport (1979) 2 ALD 934

Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437; (1984) 6 ALN N257

Wiseman v The Commonwealth (unreported decision of the Full Federal Court dated 24 October, 1989)

On 1 April, 1992, the applicant, Mr Gary John Green, applied for review of a decision of a delegate of the respondent, the Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation ("Telecom") dated 24 January, 1992. As the letter notifying that decision to Mr Green bears a date stamp showing that he received it on 6 February, 1992, it follows that the application was within the time allowed by section 55 of the Freedom of Information Act, 1982 ("the FOI Act").

2. At the hearing, Mr Green was represented by Mr Jones of Counsel and Telecom by Miss Wilson of Counsel. The documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, 1975 ("the AAT Act") were admitted in evidence together with an affidavit of Gary John Green sworn on 6 August, 1992 and two affidavits of Malcolm James Hedges sworn on 4 August, 1992. Access to all of this evidence, together with copies of the documents to which Mr Green had been given access under the FOI Act, was unrestricted. Part of the evidence given by Mr Hedges on behalf of Telecom was also given in an open hearing.

3. Access to the remaining evidence was restricted to members and officers of the Tribunal and to Telecom and its representatives pursuant to section 35 of the AAT Act. Although the order was opposed by Mr Jones, that evidence was given in the absence of Mr Green and his legal representatives. That order was made to ensure that we had available to us evidence which was relevant to our considerations but which otherwise identified the information in the documents claimed to be exempt under the FOI Act. In doing so, we had regard to the principles enunciated by Brennan J. in Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 64; (1979) 2 ALD 33 at pages 55-56 and Woodward J. in News Corporation Ltd and Others v National Companies and Securities Commission [1984] FCA 400; (1984) 57 ALR 550 (Fox, Woodward and Beaumont JJ.). The evidence to which access has been restricted includes copies of the documents, which are the subject of this application, a bundle of documents and part of the oral evidence given by Mr Hedges.

4. The facts leading to the application in this Tribunal were not in dispute and, on the basis of the evidence which we have, we will set out those which we have found. Mr Green had received at his home, a number of telephone calls which he found harassing. Those calls took place between December, 1990 and either April or May, 1991. He contacted the police and advised them that he suspected Mrs Lowy of making the calls. On 16 April, 1991, Mr Green also complained to Telecom which arranged for his calls to be traced. Those calls were traced between 16 April and 22 April, 1991.

"All the documents relating to the recent investigation of

harassing telephone calls being made to Gary Green at telephone number

(075) 312153" (T documents, page 7).

6. On receiving this request, Telecom wrote a letter on 28 October, 1991. In that letter Telecom advised the addressee that it had received a complaint concerning telephone calls of an annoying nature, that it had investigated the source of the calls and had traced an undisclosed number of those calls to a telephone service leased in the addressee's name. Telecom went on to advise the addressee that the complainant had made a request for the results of the investigation under the FOI Act and gave the addressee the opportunity to raise any objections to the release of the information.

7. A response to Telecom's letter was received in November, 1991 and disclosure of any information was objected to. A reason was given in support of the objection. Telecom then reached a decision on Mr Green's request and wrote to his solicitors on 20 November, 1991 identifying the twelve documents it had identified as relating to his request. It identified those documents in the following way:

"Folios 1-2 Nuisance call information sheets.

Folio 3 Request to Southport Exchange to initiate the call trace

facility.

Folio 4 Faxed message to Surfers Paradise Exchange requesting call

traces.

Folio 5 Response from Southport Exchange concerning call traces

Folios 6-10 Computer printouts of call trace data and call trace data.

Folio 11 Minute from Telecom Protective Services to Manager,

Residential Sales.

Folio 12 Letter from Customer Services, Gold Coast to the lessee of

the service to which several calls were traced" (T documents, page

10).

8. Telecom decided that a number of records in those documents was exempt either pursuant to paragraph 40(1)(d) or sub-section 41(1) of the FOI Act. In relation to those claimed to be exempt pursuant to sub-section 41(1), Telecom advised Mr Green:

"After giving full and careful consideration to all of the information

available to me concerning this matter, I have decided to release

eleven documents to you with certain records deleted and to fully

exempt one document against disclosure. I have concluded that, on

balance, it would be unreasonable to disclose the personal details of

two of the lessees of the services to which calls were traced. Folio

12 and the following records are exempted under the provisions of

Section 41(1) of the FOI Act which relates to the unreasonable

disclosure of the personal affairs of an individual.

Folio 1 4 records

Folio 2 15 records

Folio 5 10 records

Folios 8-9 7 records

Folio 10 3 records

Folio 11 3 records, 2 paragraphs

It should be pointed out that the successful call traces at 8.44pm, 17

April 1991 and 12.30am on 18 April 1991 are single call traces. These

records are withheld as it is Telecom's experience that one call is

not sufficient to establish conclusively that the call made was

intended to be a nuisance call.

Information concerning a call made to your telephone service at 6.58pm

on 17 April 1991 is contained in the documents under consideration.

Personal particulars of the lessee of that service are also being

withheld as there is no indication that the call was reported as a

nuisance call.

The associated records are exempted under Section 41(1) of the F.O.I.

Act and are listed below:-

Folio 2 6 records deleted

Folio 5 9 records deleted

Folio 8 1 record deleted

Folio 10 2 records deleted"

(T documents, page 11).

9. On the basis of the evidence of Mr Hedges, we find that a "single call trace" is a call which has been traced on only one occasion during the time during which the investigation has been conducted. In his evidence, Mr Hedges explained that Telecom does not regard a single call which has been traced as a nuisance call as the number could have been called accidentally as a result of mis-dialling a number or because of a technical problem in an exchange causing a connection to be made to a number which the caller had not actually dialled.

10. Telecom then went on to advise Mr Green of those parts of the documents for which it was claiming exemption pursuant to paragraph 40(1)(d) and those, relating to the names of Telecom officers for which it was claiming exemption pursuant to sub-section 41(1). We will not refer to those claims for exemption further for both Mr Jones and Miss Wilson indicated that neither had any interest in pursuing that aspect of the case. The deleted information referred to the names of Telecom officers involved in the matter and to the telephone numbers of public telephone boxes.

11. On 24 January, 1992, Telecom affirmed its original decision and, in relation to the exemption claimed under sub-section 41(1) wrote:

"I appreciate that the receipt of nuisance calls can cause some

anxiety and that in your client's case there are apparently other

matters involving pending court proceedings.

In this instance the Telecom customer to whom the calls were traced

has objected to the disclosure of his/her identity. In the face of

such an objection I consider that I have no option but to refuse your

client access to this information.

As you are aware the Freedom of Information Act contains strong

exemption provisions to protect against the unreasonable disclosure of

information concerning the personal affairs of an individual. Where

an individual is consulted about the circumstances of the proposed

disclosure and subsequently objects on the grounds that disclosure

would be unreasonable then I consider that to override that objection

would be unreasonable" (T documents, page 15).

12. Mr Green has sought access to the material which has been deleted pursuant to sub-section 41(1) as he has been charged with certain offences as a result of certain allegations made by Mrs Lowy with whom he had once enjoyed a warmer relationship. He has been charged in the District Court with one count of stealing on 1 August, 1990 from Mrs Lowy, another count of stealing on 25 January, 1991 from her daughter and two counts of unlawfully assaulting Mrs Lowy and causing her bodily harm one on 25 February, 1990 and the other on 8 December, 1990. He has also been charged under the Crimes Act, 1914 with eight charges of using a telephone to harass Mrs Lowy between 16 December, 1990 and 27 April, 1991. Given the nature of the charges and all of the circumstances, there is a possibility that Mr Green could be imprisoned if found guilty of them.

13. Mr Green believes that Mrs Lowy has been responsible for making harassing telephone calls to him and alleges that she has told him that she has telephoned him. She now denies this, Mr Green has said. He has sought access to the results of Telecom's investigation so that he can test Mrs Lowy's credibility when she gives evidence against him in the court proceedings.

14. Mr Jones submitted that the information sought by Mr Green directly relates to his defence against the criminal charges with which he is faced. He further submitted that to withhold such information would be against the public interest in that it would frustrate the interests of justice. He drew an analogy with crown privilege in relation to which the House of Lords has held in Conway v Rimmer [1968] UKHL 2; (1968) AC 910 that a court has "power to decide whether the public interest in non-disclosure was outweighed by the public interest in seeing that justice was not frustrated by the non-production of evidence" (Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Proceedings, 1992 at para 12-22).

15. In this case, Mr Jones argued, it is in the public interest that any person charged with a criminal offence not be deprived of information genuinely necessary and absolutely vital to the preparation of his defence, that the trial court have available to it all relevant information and that a person not be able to give evidence in a trial which contradicts that given to a government authority or agency.

16. Mr Jones distinguished the cases of Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] FCA 152; (1991) 13 AAR 261 (Lockhart, Jenkinson and Heerey JJ.) and Zalcberg and Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (unreported, 12 June, 1992, Decision No. 8015, Senior Member Gibbs) on their facts and, argued that disclosure of the documents in this case would have current relevance, would have demonstrable relevance to the affairs of government and would serve the public purpose of the FOI Act.

17. On behalf of Telecom, Miss Wilson argued that, in determining whether release of the documents would be unreasonable, regard must be had to the objects of the FOI Act contained in section 3 and referred to Colakovski's case and Zalcberg's case. By virtue of section 88 of the Telecommunications Act, 1991, lessees of telephone services could otherwise expect that their identity and the fact that calls were placed to particular numbers on particular days and at particular times were matters which would be kept confidential. The reason why Mr Green seeks the documents is, Miss Wilson argued, irrelevant. In making this submission, she relied upon sub-section 11(2) of the FOI Act.

18. Miss Wilson went on to make submissions with regard to particular deletions. With regard to those revealing the tracing of single calls, she argued that their release would be an unreasonable disclosure as the call may not have been a nuisance call, it may have been made as a result of mis-dialling or it may have been made as a result of a fault in the exchange leading to the connection of an incorrect number.

19. Finally, Miss Wilson submitted that the information may be available if a subpoena were to be issued to require the documents to be produced in the criminal proceedings. She pointed to paragraph 88(3)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 1991 in support of that submission.

20. At the time that Mr Green lodged his request for access to the documents, sub-section 41 of the FOI Act provided:

"(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this

Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating

to the personal affairs of any person (including a deceased person)".

21. By virtue of section 29 of the Freedom of Information Amendment Act, 1991 ("the amendment Act"), sub-section 41(1) of the Act was amended with effect from 25 October, 1991 so that it read, at the date the original decision was made on 20 November, 1991:

"(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this

Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information

about any person (including a deceased person)".

22. The amendment Act also added a definition of "personal information" to section 4 of the FOI Act and that is that

"'personal information' means information or an opinion (including

information forming part of a database), whether true or not, and

whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose

identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the

information or opinion".

23. To complete the history of legislative amendments, we also refer to the addition of sub-section 11(2) by the amendment Act. That read:

"(2) Subject to this Act, a person's right of access is not

affected by:

(a) any reasons the person gives for seeking access; or

(b) the agency's or Minister's belief as to what are his or her

reasons for seeking access".

24. Both parties prepared their cases on the basis that the information to which Mr Green sought access was personal information. We agree that this is so in relation to the information regarding a lessee's or lessees' telephone number or numbers and his, her or their addresses, as it is information about a person or persons whose identity is either apparent or may be reasonably ascertained within the meaning of sub-section 41(1). So, too, is information about the lessee's name or lessees' names as information, namely that they may have telephoned the number to which the trace is attached, can reasonably be ascertained from the fact they appear on documents relating to a Telecom investigation tracing calls.

25. In reaching that conclusion, we should note that we consider that we must apply section 41 in its amended form as that was the provision in force at the date of the decision although it was not at the date Mr Green lodged his request for access. We do so on the basis of the principles enunciated in Re Costello and Secretary, Department of Transport (1979) 2 ALD 934 at 939-945 (Mr Hall, then Senior Member, Mr C Thompson and Mr Marsh, Members).

26. Having decided that, we must consider whether disclosure would be an unreasonable disclosure of personal information. The only case which we know has considered the meaning of section 41 after the amendments is that of the Tribunal in Zalcberg's case. In that case, the Tribunal considered a number of earlier authorities and found their principles still to be applicable to a consideration under the amended section. The main cases to which the Tribunal referred were Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437; (1984) 6 ALN N257 (Deputy President Hall), Wiseman v The Commonwealth (unreported decision of the Full Federal Court dated 24 October, 1989) and Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] FCA 152; (1991) 13 AAR 261 (Lockhart, Jenkinson and Heerey JJ.).

27. In relation to Wiseman's case, the Tribunal in Zalcberg's case said that it considered that "whether or not disclosure would be unreasonable is a question of fact and degree which calls for a balancing of all the legitimate interests involved" (paragraph 21). The other two cases to which the Tribunal referred expand upon the nature of those competing interests.

28. In the first, Chandra's case,the Tribunal said:

"51. ... (I)t is not every document, the disclosure of which would

involve the disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs

of a person, that is exempt from disclosure under the Act. Exemption

is only attracted if the disclosure would involve the unreasonable

disclosure of information relating to those affairs. Whether a

disclosure is 'unreasonable' requires, in my view, a consideration of

all the circumstances, including the nature of the information that

would be disclosed, the circumstances in which the information was

obtained, the likelihood of the information being information that the

person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent, and

whether the information has any current relevance. Plainly enough

what s41 seeks to do is to provide a ground for preventing

unreasonable invasion of the privacy of third parties.

52. However, consistently with the stated object of the Act (see s3),

it is also necessary in my view to take into consideration the public

interest recognized by the Act in the disclosure of information in

documentary form in the possession of an agency and to weigh that

interest in the balance against the public interest in protecting the

personal privacy of a third party whose personal affairs may be

unreasonably disclosed by granting access to the document" (page

N259).

"This is not an appropriate case in which to examine definitively

the circumstances that may constitute 'the unreasonable disclosure of

information' relating to a person's 'personal affairs' because the

argument before us proceeded on the limited basis outlined previously.

It is sufficient for present purposes to say that 'every person' has a

'legally enforceable right to obtain access' to documents under the

FOI Act (s11). There is no requirement that the person seeking access

have a proprietary or any other interest in documents or the

information contained in them. The object of the Act, as expressed by

s3, is to give the 'Australian community' the right of access to

information in the possession of the Australian Government. What is

'unreasonable' disclosure of information for purposes of s41(1) must

have as its core, public interest considerations. The exemptions

necessary for the protection of 'personal affairs' (s41) and 'business

or professional affairs' (s43) are themselves, in my opinion, public

interest considerations. That is to say, it is not in the public

interest that the personal or business or professional affairs of

persons are necessarily to be disclosed on applications for access to

documents. The exemption from disclosure of such information is not

to protect private rights, rather it is in furtherance of the public

interest that information of this kind is excepted from the general

right of public access, provided the other conditions mentioned in

ss41 and 43 are satisfied. An examination of the other provisions of

Pt IV of the Act concerning exempt documents confirms this approach.

Before parting from the case there is a final observation I wish to

make. The FOI Act is, as its preamble states, 'an Act to give to

members of the public rights of access to official documents of the

government of the Commonwealth and of its agencies'. The object of

the Act is stated in s3 as being to enable Australians to have access,

as far as is possible, to information in the possession of the Federal

Government by making available to the public, information about the

operations of Departments of the Commonwealth and its public

authorities and by creating a general right of access to information

in documentary form in the possession of ministers, departments and

public authorities. But, as s3 itself recognises, there are

limitations upon these rights of the Australian community which are

expressed as being 'necessary for the protection of essential public

interests and the private and business affairs of persons in respect

of whom information is collected and held by departments and public

authorities'" (page 270).

30. Also in Colakovski's case, Heerey J. said at page 273:

"Turning to the criterion of unreasonableness prescribed by the

s41(1) exclusion, it seems to me that attention is directed, amongst

other things, to whether or not the proposed disclosure would serve

the public interest purpose of the legislation, which is to open to

public access, information about government which government holds,

this being information which in truth is held on behalf of the public.

I do not think it is necessary in order to make out the s41(1)

exclusion that there is some particular unfairness, embarrassment or

hardship which would ensure to a person by reason of the disclosure.

Such matters, if present, would doubtless weigh in favour of

exclusion. But if the information disclosed were of no demonstrable

relevance to the affairs of government and was likely to do no more

than excite or satisfy the curiosity of people about the person whose

personal affairs were disclosed, I think disclosure would be

unreasonable" (page 273).

31. In none of these cases is reference made to the person's interest in obtaining access under the FOI Act and it is not one of the factors to which reference is made in deciding whether disclosure is unreasonable. It would, instead, seem to be a factor which is not taken into account. Lockhart J. in Colakovski's case expressly referred to the fact that the right to access under the FOI Act is given to the Australian community by virtue of section 3 and that the exemptions must have at their core public interest considerations. Jenkinson J. reflected that:

"no provision is made in the Act for restricting dissemination of

information contained in a document to which access is granted. I say

nothing as to whether in this case the use of such a provisions, if it

had existed, might have been appropriate. But is it not difficult to

imagine circumstances in which the recipient of telephone calls of the

kind made in this case, would be thought to have a strong moral claim

to access to information about the caller's personal affairs which it

would be unreasonable to disclose to other members of what s3 of the

Act calls 'the Australian community'. But nothing in the Act except

s91(2) qualifies the recipient's freedom to disseminate throughout the

community information contained in a document to which he has been

granted access" (page 272).

32. It would seem to follow that the particular interests of the individual seeking access have not been a matter which has been weighed in the balance in considering whether disclosure of another person's personal affairs would be unreasonable. Since Colakovski's case was decided, sub-section 11(2) has been inserted in the Act and underlines that the individual's interest is not relevant (see paragraph 23 above).

33. On the evidence presented to us in the absence of Mr Green and his legal representatives, we are satisfied that the persons to whom the information relates, oppose its release. We are also satisfied that it is still "relevant information" in the sense that it is still current information. Disclosure of the information would disclose the persons who made the calls to Mr Green's telephone at the times specified in those documents to which he has already had access. We are also satisfied that the persons about whom that information is concerned object to its disclosure.

34. If these were the only matters to which we had regard, we would find that disclosure under the FOI Act would be unreasonable. In this case, we must consider Mr Jones' submission that justice would be frustrated by Mr Green's failure to be granted access. Whether or not justice is frustrated is a matter of public interest and is one of the considerations, together with questions of privilege and public interest immunity, taken into account when considering whether documents, which are the subject of a subpoena, must be produced in particular civil or criminal proceedings. Considerable weight is given to issues relating to the administration of justice and its possible frustration in the particular court proceedings in relation to which the subpoena has been issued (see, for example, Archbold at paragraph 14 above and Cross On Evidence, 3rd Australian Edition, Chapters 13 and 14).

35. Having examined the FOI Act, we do not consider that the same degree of weight should be accorded to those issues in the context of the FOI Act. The FOI Act balances the Australian community's right of access to documents against a number of other public interests which it prescribes. Without giving an exhaustive list, the public interests include, in very general terms, those relating to matters of security and those which could generally be described as affecting the ability of government to govern. Also included are those affecting persons dealing with government so that documents affecting international relations, relations with States and personal privacy are exempted as are documents relating to business affairs and containing material obtained in confidence. Documents arising out of the companies and securities legislation are exempted. In so far as legal proceedings are concerned the FOI Act exempts documents the disclosure of which would be contempt of court (section 46) and those, subject to some exceptions, which are subject to legal professional privilege (section 42). It also exempts those which would, or could reasonably be expected to, prejudice the fair trial of a person or the impartial adjudication of the particular case (paragraph 37(2)(a)).

36. In considering the exemption provisions to the general right of access given in the FOI Act, Parliament has clearly turned its mind to the question of legal proceedings and made specific provisions for them. It has recognised that certain documents connected with legal proceedings raise particular concerns and require exemption from the Australian community's general right of access.

37. Having adopted that course in relation to the exemption provisions, we might have expected that Parliament might have made some specific reference to persons seeking access to documents for use in legal proceedings had it intended that weight be given to that factor. Instead, Parliament has stated not only that the person's reasons for seeking access are irrelevant but has also effectively stated that it has no interest in the use which is made of the information once it has been released. The only exceptions to that are found in sub-section 91(2) relating to defamation, breach of confidence and copyright. In stark contrast to the approach and philosophy of the FOI Act, questions relating to whether justice will be frustrated by the failure to produce documents in a particular case, require consideration of the interests of the person seeking their production in the proceedings and the relevance of those documents to the proceedings as well as other matters such as any privilege or public interest immunity considerations. Those interests and matters are among those taken into account by the trial court. Those issues cannot be determined by this Tribunal and it would not only be an attempt to second guess the trial court's decision to do so but also inconsistent with the philosophy and requirements of the FOI Act.

38. In reaching this conclusion, we recognise that Lockhart J. said in Colakovski's case that:

"If documents contain information which could provide valuable

evidence or lead to evidence that would be useful or material in

establishing the commission of an offence under the law, that is a

matter which in my view may be taken into account in determining

whether the disclosure of the information would be unreasonable under

s41(1). In this case it is clear from the transcript of proceedings

before it, that the Tribunal was aware of the provisions of s86 and

that the Deputy President had this in mind when considering the

question of unreasonable disclosure. Ryan J., correctly in my view,

so held. I also agree with Ryan J. that this was not a consideration

of the kind that, having been taken into account, would have compelled

the Tribunal to reach a conclusion different from that which it did.

Prosecutions for offences of the kind to which s86 is directed must be

brought within twelve months of the commission of the offence:

s21(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). As the last of the alleged

'nuisance calls' was made in June 1987 the question of prosecution

must have been academic at the time the matter was heard by the Deputy

President".

39. While the question of whether or not an offence has been committed raises issues related to the administration of justice, we consider that they are quite distinguishable from the issues of the administration of justice raised in this case. Consideration of whether or not an offence may have been committed by the person who made the telephone calls does not require a consideration of the reasons why the information in the document is sought or the purpose to which it will be put by the person requesting it. It requires a consideration of the public interest in the administration of justice generally and whether a person's interests should continue to be protected in circumstances in which he or she may have committed an offence. As we have said, a consideration of issues relating to the administration of justice in the circumstances in which we have been asked to consider it would require a consideration not only of the issue generally but also a weighing of Mr Green's particular interests against those of the persons whom the information concerns.

40. The FOI Act does not seek to override or in any way vary the rules relating to the production of documents in the context of court proceedings. It adds to a person's rights to obtain access but does not in any way restrict his or her gaining access by other means. This is specifically recognised in sub-section 14 which provides:

"14. Nothing in this Act is intended to prevent or discourage

Ministers and agencies from publishing or giving access to documents

(including exempt documents), otherwise than as required by this Act,

where they can properly do so or are required by law to do so".

41. Parliament has not chosen to alter the normal application of the law of evidence in relation to matters relating to telecommunications. Indeed, paragraph 88(3)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 1991 provides:

"(3) This section does not prohibit a disclosure by a person of a

fact or document:

(b) if the disclosure is made as a witness summoned to give evidence

or to produce documents;".

42. It follows from our view of the differences between disclosure under the FOI Act and production in accordance with the rules of evidence in court proceedings that considerations of whether or not justice will be frustrated in Mr Green's criminal trial are not matters to which we should give weight so as to tilt the balance in favour of disclosure under the FOI Act. Taking all the matters to which we have referred into account, we consider that to disclose under the FOI Act the documents to which access has been sought would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about persons other than Mr Green. Consequently, we affirm the decision under review.