//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2023] VSC 562
plaintiff. The executor’s application was granted and the unsigned draft will admitted to probate.
3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Lindy Hirschfeld died before signing a solicitor-prepared draft will. The Supreme Court of Victoria accepted evidence that she had reviewed the draft, said it reflected her wishes, made only a small address correction, and arranged to sign it. Applying the statutory power to dispense with formal execution, the Court granted probate of the draft. The decision turns on the evidence of Lindy's intention and circumstances, rather than treating every solicitor-prepared draft as a valid will.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,095 words · generated 29/09/2026
Re Estate of Hirschfeld concerned an application by Eric Robert Hirschfeld, the executor of Lindy Val Hirschfeld's estate, for probate of a will that Lindy had not signed. Daly AsJ heard the application in the Supreme Court of Victoria. Lindy died on 3 December 2019, aged 59, after being diagnosed with pancreatic cancer in or around January 2019 [1], [6].
Lindy and Eric attended a solicitor's office in October 2019 to give instructions for wills and powers of attorney. On 7 November, the solicitor's office sent draft documents to them by email. Eric's evidence was that Lindy printed and read the draft will, then told him it accurately reflected her wishes and she wanted to arrange for it to be signed. Their daughter Kate separately said Lindy showed her the draft, explained the distribution, and said she was happy with it and intended to sign [6]-[7].
The next day, Lindy emailed the solicitor with Ashlee's full residential address. That detail was inserted into the draft. The judgment says Lindy did not request other changes and the amended copy was not sent to her before she died [8]. As Lindy's health worsened, she asked Eric to arrange a meeting with the solicitor at their home. The proposed appointment was for 4 December 2019. Lindy died the day before it could take place [9].
The document was a 15-page typed draft, unsigned and undated. It appointed Eric as executor, provided him a life interest in the family home, and divided the residue into three testamentary discretionary trusts. The adult children and other defined beneficiaries were included in the arrangements [10]. Kate, James and Ashlee were notified of the application and consented to the draft being admitted to probate. No contradictor was appointed, although general beneficiaries of the trusts were not before the Court [11].
The application was necessary because the draft did not meet the formal execution requirements in s 7(1) of the Wills Act 1997 (Vic). If it were not admitted, the estate would be distributed under the intestacy provisions described in the reasons [4]-[5]. The Court granted the relief sought [26].
The Court's analysis began with the distinction between formal validity and the statutory dispensing power. Section 7(1), reproduced at [15], requires writing, a signature made with the intention of executing a will, and attestation by two witnesses. Lindy's draft was unsigned and undated, so it did not meet the ordinary execution requirements [4].
Section 9(1), set out at [16], permits the Supreme Court to admit a document that has not been executed as required if satisfied that the deceased intended it to be their will. The Court described the provision as remedial, while also noting that the statutory formalities should not be unduly relegated in importance [17]-[18]. This qualification matters: the section is not described as making execution formalities irrelevant. It supplies a route to probate where its test is met.
The judgment stated three requirements: there must be a document; the document must express or record the deceased's testamentary intentions; and the deceased must have intended that document, without alterations, to be their last will [19]. The executor, as propounder, bore the burden of proving the requirements on the balance of probabilities, with the judgment referring to Briginshaw and s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) [20].
The evidence supporting intention was cumulative. The draft was a complete testamentary document prepared by a solicitor. Lindy had reviewed it, said it reflected her wishes, and made a limited correction by providing Ashlee's address. She arranged to sign it and told Kate that an appointment had been made for that purpose. The Court emphasised that she made no other changes and that the only reason she did not sign was that she died before the scheduled appointment [7]-[9], [25].
Capacity was also addressed. The executor relied on affidavits from Lindy's long-term medical practitioner, who expressed the opinion that Lindy had testamentary capacity when she gave instructions and during the period when she adopted the draft. The judgment set out the Banks v Goodfellow elements: understanding the nature and effect of making a will, awareness of the general nature and value of the estate, awareness of those with a natural claim, and ability to evaluate those claims [14], [22]. The judge concluded that the evidence demonstrated capacity during the relevant period [24].
The reasons also set out the need to prove knowledge and approval for an informal will, and factors relevant to that inquiry, including the testator's understanding, the complexity of the document and estate, and the opportunity for reflection and independent advice [23]. The conclusion at [24]-[25] rests on the evidence as a whole: Lindy's statements, her review and limited correction of the draft, the solicitor's involvement, and her arrangements to execute it. The decision should not be read as dispensing with proof of capacity or knowledge and approval in other cases.
The judgment describes the legal framework rather than changing it. Before the Court considered the application, s 7(1) supplied the ordinary execution requirements, and s 9 supplied the power to admit a non-compliant document where the deceased intended it to be their will [15]-[16]. The three-part test and the burden on the propounder were drawn from authorities cited in the reasons, including Re Estate of Masters, Equity Trustees Ltd v Levin, Fast v Rockman, Re Besanko, and Re White [19]-[21].
The decision's contribution in this particular application is its application of those established principles to a solicitor-prepared draft that had not reached execution. The Court treated the draft as a testamentary document and found that the deceased's conduct and statements established an intention that it serve as her final will [24]-[25]. The key factual feature was not simply that the document had been professionally prepared. It was the evidence that Lindy had adopted its terms and was arranging to execute it, with no indication that she intended to make further substantive changes.
The judgment also makes clear that the degree of non-compliance is relevant to the difficulty of being satisfied about intention. It quotes the principle, through its discussion of Re White, that greater departure from s 7 makes the Court's task more difficult [21]. Here, the missing execution was explained by the deceased's death before a scheduled signing appointment. The Court nonetheless considered the statutory formality significant, as reflected in its caution at [18].
On testamentary capacity, the judgment records that the usual presumptions applicable to duly executed wills do not apply to informal wills. The propounder must prove capacity and knowledge and approval [22]-[23]. The decision applies that stated burden; it does not state that medical evidence is invariably required or that the evidence in this case establishes a universal evidentiary formula.
At [19], the Court states: “Three criteria must be established to admit an informal will to probate”. In plain English, a claimant cannot rely only on evidence that the deceased talked about making a will. There must be a document, it must record testamentary intentions, and the deceased must have intended that document to be their final will.
At [21], the reasons explain that the document must not merely be a personal note, a record of instructions, or a trial draft. The relevant intention may arise when the document is created or later. In this case, the Court considered both the draft's content and what Lindy said and did after receiving it.
At [22], the Court identifies the Banks v Goodfellow capacity elements. In plain English, the question includes whether the person understood what making a will does, had a general understanding of their estate, knew who might naturally expect to benefit, and could weigh those competing claims. The judgment says the burden rested on the person seeking to prove the informal will.
At [23], the reasons explain that reading a document is relevant but not conclusive when deciding whether the deceased knew and approved its contents. The assessment depends on the case's circumstances, including the document's complexity, the deceased's understanding, the treatment of persons with a natural claim, and the opportunity for reflection and independent advice.
At [24], Daly AsJ states that the informal will “meets the test established by s 9”. That is the Court's direct conclusion, based on the evidence it summarises. At [25], the judge identifies the particular circumstances supporting the result, including Lindy's terminal illness, her lack of substantive requested changes, her statements that she wanted to sign, the completeness of the draft, and her death before the appointment.
This decision is relevant to fact patterns involving an unsigned or otherwise formally defective testamentary document and an application under s 9 of the Victorian Wills Act. Its reasoning is most closely connected to a situation where a deceased person received a complete solicitor-prepared draft, indicated that it reflected their wishes, made only a limited correction, and arranged to sign it but died before execution.
The judgment also identifies circumstances that may make the intention inquiry more difficult. It states that a document that is only a note of instructions, a personal memorandum, or a trial run is not enough merely because it concerns future estate planning [21]. It further indicates that substantial departure from s 7 formalities can make it harder to establish that the deceased intended the document to be their will [21].
The decision does not establish that every unsigned solicitor-prepared will should be admitted. The evidence here included multiple statements to family members, communications with the solicitor, the absence of requested substantive changes, and a scheduled signing appointment. Other cases may involve different evidence about adoption of the document, capacity, understanding, changes contemplated by the deceased, or the document's completeness. Those are matters the judgment identifies as relevant, not a checklist that guarantees a particular result.
The supplied judgment does not cite any later judicial treatment of Re Estate of Hirschfeld. It is dated 20 September 2023, and the accompanying material says it was last updated on 26 March 2024. That material provides no subsequent cases applying, distinguishing, approving, or criticising this decision. Accordingly, later treatment cannot be stated on the basis of the supplied source.
The authorities discussed in Hirschfeld are earlier authorities, not later treatment of Hirschfeld. The Court refers to Re Estate of Brock for the remedial character of s 9 and cautions, with reference to Brock and Re Hancock, that formal requirements retain importance [17]-[18]. It also relies on the test drawn from Re Estate of Masters and other cases, and discusses Re White and Re Martin on intention and knowledge and approval [19]-[23]. Those citations show the framework the Court used; they do not establish how later courts have treated Hirschfeld.
The reasons resolve the application before the Court but do not address every evidentiary or procedural issue that may arise in a different informal-will case. For example, they do not specify how much weight should be given to a particular kind of medical evidence, or what evidence would be sufficient where a testator did not tell family members that a draft reflected their wishes. The judgment's general statement is that capacity and knowledge and approval must be proved, and that sufficiency depends on the circumstances [22]-[23].
The judgment does not decide how the s 9 test would apply where a deceased had asked for substantive changes, where the document remained incomplete, or where there was no planned signing appointment. It notes that the extent of departure from execution requirements may affect the difficulty of proving intention, but does not quantify that relationship [21].
Nor does this decision discuss a contested application in which potential beneficiaries oppose probate. Kate, James and Ashlee consented, and the Court did not appoint a contradictor despite the existence of general beneficiaries not before it [11]. The reasons therefore do not determine how opposition, disputed evidence, or conflicting accounts might affect the assessment.
Finally, the judgment applies Victorian legislation and addresses the document and evidence before it. Its stated statutory framework is s 7 and s 9 of the Wills Act 1997 (Vic), alongside the cited authorities. The reasons do not compare the legislation of other Australian jurisdictions or decide questions about the application of different statutory regimes.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
WILLS AND ESTATES - Informal will - Application for a grant of probate of informal will - Where informal will was prepared by solicitors, but deceased died before it could be signed and dated - Whether testator intended informal document to be will - Application granted - Wills Act 1997 (Vic), ss 7 and 9.
1 Lindy Hirschfeld ('deceased') died of pancreatic cancer on 3 December 2019, aged 59 years. The deceased was survived by her husband Eric Hirschfeld ('executor') and three adult children, Kate Robinson ('Kate'), James Hirschfeld ('James'), and Ashlee Hirschfeld ('Ashlee').
2 At the date of her death, the deceased's assets were valued at $1,293,568.99 and the liabilities amounted to approximately $20,000. The main asset of the deceased's estate was the family home in Croydon Hills, of which the deceased was the sole registered proprietor for asset protection purposes, the executor being a building surveyor.
3 By originating motion filed 28 February 2022, the executor seeks a grant of probate of the deceased's unsigned draft will ('informal will'). The deceased died prior to the execution of the informal will. No prior testamentary documents of the deceased have been located.
4 The informal will was prepared by the deceased's solicitor Clare Sunderland, formerly of Aughtersons Lawyers. Ms Sunderland is also the executor's solicitor in this proceeding. As the will is unsigned and undated, it does not comply with the requirements of s 7(1) of the Wills Act 1997 (Vic) ('Wills Act'). Pursuant to s 9 of the Wills Act, the Court may dispense with formal execution requirements in s 7(1) of the Wills Act and make a determination as to the validity of the informal testamentary document.
5 As there is no prior testamentary document, if the informal will is not admitted to probate, the estate of the deceased will be distributed in accordance with the intestacy provisions in s 70A of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) ('Administration and Probate Act'). The executor is the sole beneficiary on an intestacy pursuant to s 70K of the Administration and Probate Act.
6 In or around January 2019, the deceased was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. After her health deteriorated during the course of 2019, the deceased and the executor attended the offices of Aughtersons Lawyers on or around 14 October 2019 and met with Ms Sunderland to provide their instructions regarding the drafting of their wills and powers of attorney. By letter dated 17 October 2019, Ms Sunderland wrote to the executor and the deceased providing a summary of the instructions obtained for their estate planning documents and confirmed that the documents would be prepared.
7 On 7 November 2019, a representative of Aughtersons Lawyers sent drafts of the wills and powers of attorney to the deceased and the executor by email. In the executor's third affidavit, he deposed that on the same day the draft wills were sent to them, the deceased printed the wills and gave the executor a copy for him to read. The executor and the deceased discussed the wills later that day, with the deceased stating that the draft will accurately reflected her wishes and that she wished to arrange for it to be signed. In Kate's first affidavit, she deposed that the deceased showed her the draft will and explained the distribution of her estate as set out in the draft will, and told her she was happy with the draft will and intended to sign it.
8 The deceased sent an email on 8 November 2019 to Ms Sunderland providing Ashlee's full residential address for the purpose of the final version of the will. The email made no other comments nor included any questions about the contents of the draft will. The street number of Ashlee's residential address was subsequently inserted into cl 1.2 of the deceased's will. A copy of the amended will was not provided to the deceased prior to her death. No other changes to the will were requested by the deceased.
9 The deceased's health continued to deteriorate. On or around 29 November 2019, the deceased asked the executor to contact Aughtersons Lawyers and arrange a meeting on 4 December 2019 at their home address. In Kate's third affidavit, she deposed that the deceased spoke with her on 1 December 2019 to discuss her wishes regarding her funeral and burial arrangements as well as her will. The deceased told Kate that an appointment had been made to sign the will with the Aughtersons Lawyers on 4 December 2019. On or around 2 December 2019, the executor telephoned Aughtersons Lawyers and left a message with Ms Sunderland's assistant notifying her of the deceased's deteriorating health and requested that Ms Sunderland attend their home to assist with the execution of the deceased's will. Ms Sunderland's assistant telephoned the executor the following day to arrange the appointment, but was notified that the deceased had died earlier that morning.
10 The informal will comprises 15 typed pages and is unsigned and undated. The informal will:
(a) appointed the executor as executor, and failing his appointment, Kate and Ashlee as substitute executors;
(b) bequeathed a life interest in the deceased's property in Croydon Hills to the executor;[1]
(c) after the payment of all debts and testamentary expenses, the residuary estate was to be divided into three equal testamentary discretionary trusts being the:
(i) Lindy Hirschfeld Number 1 Trust;
(ii) Lindy Hirschfeld Number 2 Trust; and
(iii) Lindy Hirschfeld Number 3 Trust.
(d) the specified beneficiary of each testamentary trust is the executor and in the event of the executor's death:
(i) Kate is the specified beneficiary of the Lindy Hirschfeld Number 1 Trust together with a broad class of general beneficiaries (defined in cl 7 of sch B of the will);
(ii) Ashlee is the specified beneficiary of the Lindy Hirschfeld Number 2 Trust together with a broad class of general beneficiaries (defined in cl 7 of sch B of the will); and
(iii) James is the specified beneficiary of the Lindy Hirschfeld Number 3 Trust together with his issue.
11 The beneficiaries under the informal will include the executor, Kate, James, and Ashlee, and the general beneficiaries under the testamentary trusts. Notice of the application was given to each of Kate, James and Ashlee, and each provided their consent to the informal will being admitted to probate. In these circumstances, and notwithstanding that there are general beneficiaries of the trusts not before the Court, no orders were made for the appointment of a contradictor.
12 Given that the consent of all potential beneficiaries has not been obtained and that the value of the estate exceeds $1 million, pursuant to r 2.09 of the Supreme Court (Administration and Probate) Rules 2014, the Registrar of Probates was unable to determine the application, and the executor filed a Notice to Produce on 6 June 2023.
13 In his written submissions, the executor submitted that the informal will is a 'document' within the meaning of the Wills Act, and that it expresses the deceased's testamentary intentions. Further, the executor submitted that the deceased intended the document to have effect as her will without subsequent amendments as she:
(a) read the draft will provided to her, which contains the same terms save for the addition of the street number for Ashlee's residential address;
(b) advised the executor and Kate that the draft will reflected her wishes;
(c) provided Ms Sunderland with the street number to be inserted into the will;
(d) did not request any other changes to the document;
(e) requested that the executor schedule an appointment with Aughtersons Lawyers to execute the will;
(f) was relieved when an appointment had been made with Ms Sunderland; and
(g) told Kate that she wanted to sign her will and an appointment had been scheduled with Aughtersons Lawyers on 4 December 2019.
14 The executor also submitted that the burden of proof in relation to testamentary capacity has been met. The deceased had been a patient of medical practitioner Dr Susan Rogers since February 2001. Dr Rogers has provided affidavits deposing as to her opinion that the deceased had full testamentary capacity at the time she gave instructions for the preparation of her will and for the period during which the deceased adopted the informal will, being 7 November 2019 to 30 November 2019. Dr Rogers confirms that the deceased had not been diagnosed with any form of cognitive impairment prior to her death, and referred to the elements of the Banks v Goodfellow[2] test in providing her opinion regarding the deceased's mental capacity.
How should a will be executed?
(1) A will is not valid unless -
(a) it is in writing, and signed by the testator or by some other person, in the presence of, and at the direction of the testator; and
(b) the signature is made with the testator's intention of executing a will, whether or not the signature appears at the foot of the will; and
(c) the signature is made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time; and
(d) at least two of the witnesses attest and sign the will in the presence of the testator but not necessarily in the presence of each other.
(2) Subject to the requirements of the remote execution procedure, a statement in a will that the will has been executed in accordance with this section is not necessary for the will to be valid.
(3) Where a testator purports to make an appointment by his or her will in the exercise of a power of appointment by will, the appointment is not valid unless the will is executed in accordance with this section.
(4) Where a power is conferred on a person to make an appointment by a will that is to be executed in some particular manner or with some particular solemnity, the person may exercise the power by a will that is executed in accordance with this section, but is not executed in that manner or with that solemnity.
(5) For the purposes of this section, a will may be executed by using the remote execution procedure and that will is a valid will.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a signature may be an electronic signature if the remote execution procedure is used.
(7) For the purposes of this section "in the presence of" includes being present by audio visual link in accordance with the remote execution procedure.
When may the Court dispense with requirements for execution or revocation?
(1) The Supreme Court may admit to probate as the will of a deceased person -
(a) a document which has not been executed in the manner in which a will is required to be executed by this Act; or
(b) a document, an alteration to which has not been executed in the manner in which an alteration to a will is required to be executed by this Act -
if the Court is satisfied that that person intended the document to be his or her will.
(2) The Supreme Court may refuse to admit a will to probate which the testator has purported to revoke by some writing, where the writing has not been executed in the manner in which a will is required to be executed by this Act, if the Court is satisfied that the testator intended to revoke the will by that writing.
(3) In making a decision under subsection (1) or (2) the Court may have regard to -
(a) any evidence relating to the manner in which the document was executed; and
(b) any evidence of the testamentary intentions of the testator, including evidence of statements made by the testator.
(4) This section applies to a document whether it came into existence within or outside the State.
(5) The Registrar may exercise the powers of the Court under this section -
(a) where the Court has authorised the Registrar to exercise the Court's powers under this section; and
(b) where -
(i) all persons who would be affected by a decision under this section so consent; or
(ii) if consent is not given, the value of the estate does not exceed the limit set for the purposes of this section by the Court.
(6) In this section "document" has the same meaning as in the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984.
17 Section 9 of the Wills Act is a remedial provision and empowers the Court to dispense with the formal execution requirements of a will outlined in s 7 of the Wills Act. The remedial nature of s 9 of the Wills Act is explained by Hollingworth J in Re Estate of Brock; Chambers v Dowker ('Brock'):[3]
Section 9 is remedial in nature, meaning that it provides a means by which the court can give effect to the testator's true testamentary intentions, despite the fact that a will has not been validly executed. Where legislation is remedial, it should be given a broad as opposed to a narrow construction, one which will serve to achieve the broad objects and purposes which parliament had in mind. Here, parliament's clear intention was to avoid failure of the testamentary purpose caused by non-compliance with the formalities due to ignorance or inadvertence.
19 Three criteria must be established to admit an informal will to probate:
(a) there must be a 'document';
(b) the document must express or record the testamentary intentions of the deceased; and
(c) the document must have been intended by the deceased, without any alterations, to be his or her last will.[5]
20 The executor, as the propounder of a will, must satisfy the above criteria on the balance of probabilities, in accordance with the principles set out in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[6] and s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).
21 In determining whether the document was intended to be the deceased's will, McMillan J in Re White; Montgomery & Anor v Taylor[7] referred to the following relevant principles:
The third requirement is that the deceased intended 'that particular document to be his or her final will and did not want to make changes to it'. As stated by Whelan J (as his Honour then was) in Equity Trustees Ltd v Levin, 'it cannot be a document intended as a personal memorandum or a note of intended instructions, it cannot be a draft or a "trial run"'. The relevant intention must be possessed 'either, at the time of the subject document being brought into being, or, at some later time'.
Satisfying the third requirement depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court may consider evidence regarding the making of the will, as well as direct evidence of testamentary intent. Ultimately, the inquiry remains:
whether the document itself, the circumstances regarding its contents ... and other relevant circumstances ... lead to the conclusion that the relevant deceased intended the subject document to constitute his will;
that, while each case must depend upon its own facts, the greater the departure from compliance with the requirements of s 7 of the Act, the more difficult will it be for the court to be satisfied that the relevant deceased intended the subject document to be his will.
A relevant consideration under the third requirement is the deceased's testamentary capacity. Where a deceased lacked the capacity to make a will, then the Court cannot be satisfied that he or she intended the document to be his or her will. In the context of an informal will, the usual presumptions as to testamentary capacity do not apply. While the Court considers the evidence as a whole, the onus of proving testamentary capacity rests upon the party seeking to propound the informal will.[8]
22 The rebuttable presumptions which apply to duly executed wills do not also apply to informal wills.[9] As such, the propounder of a will must satisfy the Court on the balance of probabilities that the deceased possessed the requisite testamentary capacity and knew and approved of the contents of the informal will. Following the principles in Banks v Goodfellow,[10] to establish a testator's testamentary capacity, the propounder of a will must show that the testator:
(a) understood the nature and effect of making their will;
(b) was aware of the general nature and value of their estate;
(c) was aware of those with a natural claim on their estate; and
(d) was able to evaluate and discriminate between such claims.
23 In determining whether a deceased person knew and approved of the contents of an informal will, McMillan J in Re Martin[11] explained that this requires:
... consideration of whether the deceased actually understood the document and its effect, such that it can be said that the document represents the deceased's testamentary intentions. The sufficiency of evidence will depend upon the circumstances of each case. While evidence that the document was read by the deceased is relevant, and should be given due weight, it will not be conclusive. Other considerations include the mental acuity and sophistication of the testator, the complexity of the contents of the document and the estate being disposed of, the exclusion or non-exclusion of persons naturally having a claim upon an estate, and whether there has been an opportunity in the preparation and execution of the will for reflection and independent advice.[12]
24 In my view, the informal will meets the test established by s 9 of the Wills Act, as explained by the authorities considering that provision, and discussed in the preceding paragraphs of these reasons. The draft will is a document within the meaning of the Wills Act. It is clearly a document of testamentary character. I am satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that the deceased had testamentary capacity during the relevant period, and that the deceased on a number of occasions, demonstrated her intention that the draft will represented her final testamentary intentions.
(a) the deceased knew that she had a terminal illness, and she accelerated arrangements to prepare and execute her will as her health deteriorated;
(b) she made no comments upon, asked any questions about, and made no changes to the draft will save for completing the address of one of the beneficiaries;
(c) she told the executor and Kate that she wanted to sign the draft will and had made arrangements to do so the day after she died;
(d) the draft will is complete, and is effective to dispose all of her assets; and
(e) the only reason she did not sign the draft will was because she died before her scheduled appointment with her solicitor.
26 Accordingly, the relief sought by the executor in the originating motion will be granted.
[1] The informal will also empowered the trustees of the testamentary trusts to sell the family home and use the proceeds to fund appropriate accommodation for the executor in the future.
[2] (1870) LR 5 QB 549, 567 (Cockburn CJ).
[3] [2007] VSC 415 [19]-[20] ('Brock').
[4] See Brock (n 3) [20] and Re Hancock; Rennie v Whippet Association of Victoria Inc [2016] VSC 496 [11].
[5] Re Estate of Masters; Hill v Plummer (1994) 33 NSWLR 446, 449, 455, 466; Equity Trustees Ltd v Levin [2004] VSC 203, [14]-[15]; Fast v Rockman [2013] VSC 18, [46]; Re Besanko [2020] VSC 170, [30].
[8] Ibid [53]-[55], citations omitted.
[9] Ackerley v Felton [2012] NSWSC 1468 [30]; Fielder v Burgess [2014] SASC 98 [25]; Jageurs v Downing [2015] VSC 432, [19]; Re Kelsall [2016] VSC 724, [22]. See Veall v Veall [2015] VSCA 60; (2015) 46 VR 123, [168]-[171], regarding the usual presumptions.
[10] (1870) LR 5 QB 549, 567.
[11] (2019) 59 VR 584, citations omitted.
(1994) 33 NSWLR 446
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(2015) 46 VR 123
(2019) 59 VR 584
The executor’s application was granted and the unsigned draft will admitted to probate.