Ackerley v Felton

(a) Whether Kevin really intended the document to be his will 25This contention really is that the document does not embody Kevin's real testamentary intentions. 26Charlene seeks to make the case that on many occasions in the past, Kevin has said he would commit suicide and would not be leaving her any property in his will. He was baiting her. On this occasion, he was trying the same trick, but accidentally overdosed so that he really did die. She argues that on the balance of probabilities, he only wrote the note as a furphy and never intended it should operate. 27In Whyte v Pollok [1882] 7 AC 400 (at 405) Lord Selborne said: I lay it down that it is, in my judgment, a proposition universally true that nothing can receive probate which was not intended to be a testamentary act by the testator. Of course, it my happen that something he did not originally intend to be a testamentary act was converted into a testamentary act by a subsequent and sufficient manifestation of intention on his part: but either at the time when the act was originally done or at some other time, he must, in a sufficient way, manifest his purpose that it should be a testamentary act. 28The court must thus be satisfied that at least at some point before he died, Kevin intended the paper to constitute his will. 29I need to deal with the onus of proof. The onus of proving a will is on the person who propounds it. In the case of a formal will, the fact that the testator has signed the document in the presence of two witnesses who have not noticed signs of incapacity is sufficient prima facie to discharge that burden (Bailey v Bailey [1924] HCA 21; (1923) 34 CLR 558). 30Where the case comes within s 18A, there is no such easy discharge of the propounder's burden of proof. However, in practice there is little difference as the court always takes account of the surrounding circumstances and watches closely facts raising suspicions. The propounder clearly bears the onus of proof. 31The present argument is one that is rarely raised. There are cases in the books such as Nichols v Nichols (1814) 2 Phill Ecc 180; 161 ER 1113 where the so called will has been made as a joke, but there are very few such reported cases. What there is mainly arises with nuncupative wills, (see, for example, Re Beech [1923] P 46; Re Knibbs [1962] 1 WLR 852; [1962] 2 All ER 829). 32In Nichols, it was put to the Probate Court that the deceased at dinner had written a short will as a demonstration as to how a drafter could be brief and still produce an effective will. The judge was shown a verbose will to the same effect including an obscure reference to a certain religious group and this helped him hold that the "will" in question was only made in jest and was not intended to be the testator's real will. However, he said that it was proper for the court to assess the evidence against admitting a document which, on its face, was a will, "with jealousy". 33The facts as set out above show that there was no doubt some ill feeling against Charlene held by the deceased in the day before his death. It matters not whether that had been building up over a period (the bags had been packed) or whether it arose (or exacerbated previous ill feeling) on 4 June 2007 either because of the deceased's sadness because of the lack of visits from his daughter and grandson or over his possible rhinoscopy operation. 34Significance must be accorded to the fact that Kevin entitled the document, "my will" and that the contents of the document shows that it was part of a package relevant to the aftermath of Kevin's death. Further, if Kevin intended to die, it is significant that the page was torn out of the notebook and was placed on his person. 35Further, I agree with Mr Chapple's submission that there is significance in the fact that the note ended "Good by" and was left in Kevin's pocket in that state: as previously noted, it was not destroyed. 36Against this is the evidence of Charlene that on previous occasions, Kevin had threatened suicide and excluding Charlene from benefit under his will. 37The principal evidence was that on two occasions after 2005, Kevin prepared notes purporting to be his will leaving his property to his daughter and waved them in front of Charlene. He subsequently tore them up. 38There are two inferences that can be drawn, one, that this was a method of taunting Charlene and two that Kevin actually created a testamentary document but then changed his mind. 39As at least impliedly noted earlier, I was not impressed with Charlene as a witness. Her "I can't remember" was unimpressive and her evidence conflicts with what Senior Constable Devine informed the Coroner she was told at the time of death. 40I accept that there may have been previous times when Kevin had threatened suicide and exclusion. However, the circumstances and precisely what occurred are not too clear from Charlene's affidavits. 41Mr Chapple submitted that it could not be said in the instant case that Kevin's intention was to taunt Charlene with the alleged will. It was clear he never even showed it to her despite the opportunity to do so late in the morning of 4 June 2007 when she returned to the house. 42I consider that the points raised by Mr Chapple are valid and significant and that the evidence is sufficient to satisfy me, and does satisfy me that Kevin intended the document to have testamentary effect.

(b) Whether Kevin was of sound mind, memory and understanding at the time he executed the document 43As to the question of sound mind memory and understanding, it is clear from the authorities (see, for example, Estate of Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698 and Ryan v Kazacos (2001) 159 FLR 452 at [50]) that the mere fact that the testator committed suicide shortly after making the alleged will is insufficient to show that the document was made without sound mind memory and understanding. 44Mr Elliott puts that this is a case of delusion. He says that Kevin suffered a delusion that he had some reason to ill treat and exclude from his affections and bounty his child and wife. He puts that there was indeed a loving and supportive relationship between Kevin and Charlene and the venom expressed in the handwritten document is irrational and unreasonable. The case against the document being the will of a testator of sound mind memory and understanding is exacerbated by the deceased's level of intoxication. 45Delusion in Probate Law was defined by Sir J Nicholl, Judge in Probate in Dew v Clark (1826) 3 Add 79 (at 90); 162 ER 410 (at 414). After noting the significant difference between "mere folly" and "phrensy" the learned judge said: Wherever the patient once conceives something extravagant to exist which has still no existence whatever but in his own heated imagination, and where ever at the same time, having once so conceived, he is incapable of being, or at least permanently reasoned out of that conception, such a patient is said to be under a delusion in a peculiar half technical sense of the term. 46More recently, and for us more authoritatively, the High Court said in Bull v Fulton [1942] HCA 13; (1942) 66 CLR 295 (at 339) that a delusion in the present context was a "fixed and incorrigible belief which the victim could not be reasoned out of". 47I do not consider this to be a case of delusion. One must be very careful in using that term. In the usual case, if there is ever a "usual case" in this area of the law, a delusion is with respect to a state of imagined fact. The discussion by Gleeson CJ in Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284 (at 291) (with which Handley JA agreed) shows that delusions may occur in other situations as well, but that with such other situations, "great care needs to be exercised before concluding that a harsh or unreasonable treatment of another amounts to a delusion." 48The authorities show that there is a vital and significant distinction between spite and prejudice on the one hand and a delusion on the other (Easter v Griffith at 290-291). 49In Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P & D 64 (at 66), Sir James Hannan, Judge of the Probate Court directed the special jury in these terms: Now you will naturally expect from me a definition, or, at any rate an explanation of the legal meaning of the words "sound mind".....I must commence, however, by telling you what those words do not mean. They do not mean a perfectly balanced mind. If so, which of us would be competent to make a will? Such a mind would be free from all influence of prejudice, passion and pride. But the law does not say that a man is incapacitated from making a will if he proposes to make a disposition of his property moved by capricious, frivolous, mean or even bad motives.....Accordingly ...every one is left free to choose the person upon whom he will bestow his property after death....He may disinherit, either wholly or partially, his children, and leave his property to strangers to gratify his spite, or to charities to gratify his pride, and we must give effect to his will, however much we may condemn the course he has pursued. 50In contradistinction, a material delusion which has influenced a testator's testamentary dispositions may invalidate a will or part thereof (Timbury v Coffee [1941] HCA 22; (1941) 66 CLR 277 and King v Hudson [2009] NSWSC 1013 at [77]). 51The law was well summed up by Ward J, as her Honour then was in King v Hudson at [92]. In particular, her Honour noted that mistaken belief is not a delusion (Du Maurier v Wechsler [2001] NSWSC 34 at [40] and affirmed on appeal in Wechsler v Du Maurier [2002] NSWCA 13). 52In my assessment, the evidence in the present case does not go further than to show that, on the day in question, Kevin was not well disposed towards Charlene and that that fact may have influenced his testamentary writing, but it is not shown that he was suffering from a delusion in the relevant sense. 53Accordingly, letters of administration cum testamento annexo minore aetate should be granted of the will. 54Darren asks that he be appointed guardian for the purpose of taking out the grant. Such a guardianship is that provided for in Rule 78.31 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 which only operates for the purpose of taking a grant durante minore aetate (during the age of minority). Otherwise, Corey remains in his mother's care. 55A grant is usually made to the person with the largest interest in the estate. That person is Corey. He is only 10 years of age. 56If a person appoints a minor as his or her executor, the court makes a grant durante minore aetate and then makes a final grant when the minor comes of age. 57The reason why Darren seeks the grant is that Corey's mother, Becky, has made a Family Provision claim against the estate. This seems a good enough reason not to appoint Becky as the administrator. In my view, Darren is the next best person to act for Corey until he obtains his majority. 58Thus an order should be made appointing Darren as an assigned guardian to take the grant under Rule 78.29 of the Supreme Court Rules. 59There is already a s 41A Probate and Administration Act 1898 grant of administration to Charlene for the sole purpose of her presenting a Family Provision application. That grant appears now to be otiose. The Registrar should recall it unless it appears to him to be of some continuing value. 60The parties have agreed that I should not deal with orders for costs, but that they should be dealt with by the judge hearing the Family Provision Act proceedings. I agree that this is a sensible course. 61Accordingly, I make the following orders:

1. Declare that the document commencing "My will Kevin J Ackerley" dated 4 June 2007 is entitled to be admitted to probate.
2. Order that the court assigns the plaintiff as guardian of Corey Gates to take the grant of administration during the minority of Corey Gates for the latter's use and benefit.
3. Refer to the Registrar to complete the issue of letters of Administration cum testamento annexo durante minore aetate to the plaintiff limited until Corey Gates attains 18 years of age.
4. Refer to the Registrar as to whether the grant under s 41A of the Probate and Administration Act 1898 ought to be recalled.
5. Reserve questions of costs with the intent that the judge hearing the pending applications under the Family Provision Act 1982 in the estate of Kevin James Ackerley may deal with such costs when making orders in those proceedings.

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