"(1) A person who, after the commencement of this Act, receives, possesses, conceals, disposes of or brings into Australia any money, or other property, that may reasonably be suspected of being proceeds of crime is guilty of an offence against this section punishable, upon conviction, by:

(a) if the offender is a natural person - a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 2 years, or both;

(b) if the offender is a body corporate - a fine not exceeding $15,000.

(2) Where a person is charged with an offence against this section, it is a defence to the charge if the person satisfies the court that he or she had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property referred to in the charge was derived or realised, directly or indirectly, from some form of unlawful activity."

During the course of summing up the trial judge addressed the elements of the alleged offences and the burden of proof:

"Secondly, the second element is, that the prosecution, if this is proved must show that the money is reasonably suspected of being the proceeds of crime. So you the jury have to have a reasonable suspicion that that money which was sent off in relation to each count was the proceeds of crime. That fact does not have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, namely, that it was the proceeds of crime. You as a jury merely have to have a reasonable suspicion about it.

I also direct you in relation to that element of the reasonable suspicion that you have to have, the suspicion has to be that it came from the importation of illicit drugs, not just any unlawful activity. You, using objective standards as a jury have to reasonably suspect that that money which was sent overseas in relation to each count is reasonably suspected of having been the proceeds of crime, namely the importation of illicit drugs. ....

If those two elements are shown to exist, one being proved, beyond reasonable doubt, namely the telegraphic transfers, and one by a reasonable suspicion that you hold about that money, then the onus shifts to the accused. The ball passes to him. The accused then has to satisfy you that he did not suspect that this money came from some form of unlawful activity. He has to prove that to you."

Mr Zotti complained that the trial judge incorrectly directed the jury that the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the monies were proceeds of crime need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted that the reasonable suspicion must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

It was accepted on appeal that it was for the jury to determine whether the money found in the possession of Mr Zotti may have reasonably been suspected to be the proceeds of crime. The reasonable suspicion must be determined by an objective criterion.

In Brown[7] Olsson J summarised the scheme of the legislation as follows:

"In my view the scheme of the Act is clear. Subsection (1) [of section 82 of the Proceeds of Crimes Act] undoubtedly erects a purely objective test. Once it is shown that there has been a relevant receiving, possession, concealment or disposal of property that may reasonably be suspected of being proceeds of crime, then an offence has, prima facie, been committed. The Act clearly follows the same scheme as that found in s 527c of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); and the reasoning enunciated in authorities such as Ex parte Patmoy; Re Jack [1944] NSWStRp 33; (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 351, English (1989) 17 NSWLR 149; 44 A Crim R 273 and Anderson v Judges of District Court (NSW) (1992) 27 NSWLR 701; 62 A Crim R 277 (Anderson) is clearly applicable. The existence of the requisite suspicion is, of course, determined not by reference to the subjective beliefs of the police at the time, but according to an objective criterion of reasonableness applied by the court before whom the accused stands charged, in light of the proven facts and circumstances."

The origins of section 82 of the Proceeds of Crime Act were recounted by Hunt CJ in R v Buckett[8]:

"It is agreed by the parties to this appeal that the origin of s 82 is to be found in the old offence of goods in custody (now described as things in custody); (Act 19 Victoria No 24 1855 s 1; Police Offences Act 1901 (NSW) s 27; Summary Offences Act 1970 (NSW) s 40; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 527C; there are similar legislative provisions in other States), and that it should be interpreted in accordance with the decisions relating to that offence. In my view, that approach is correct. The phrase 'may reasonably be suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained' in the various statutory formulations of the offence of goods in custody is now interpreted as being attached in an objective sense to the goods (or things) in custody themselves, and not as requiring proof by the prosecution that either the arresting officer or the person in whose custody they are had such a suspicion; whether or not the goods are such that they may reasonably be suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained is determined by the court upon the state of the evidence available at the time of the trial rather than that which was available to the arresting officer: Ex parte Patmoy; re Jack [1944] NSWStRp 33; (1944) 44 SR(NSW) 351 at 356; Cleary v Hammond [1976] 1 NSWLR 111 at 116-117; R v Abbrederis [1981] 1 NSWLR 530 at 539-41; R v English (1989) 17 NSWLR 149 at 153; 156; Anderson v Judges of the District Court of New South Wales (1992) 27 NSWLR 701 at 714-15; R v Chan (1992) 28 NSWLR 421 at 425, 433, 435-6."[9]

The words of section 82 of the Proceeds of Crimes Act include the phrase "reasonably be suspected" preceded by the word "may". The concept of suspicion has been the subject of considerable judicial comment. It has been said to mean or to refer to "a state of conjecture", "surmise where proof is lacking", "suspect but cannot prove", "a slight opinion but without sufficient evidence", "a positive feeling of actual apprehension", and "something short of a belief".

In Homes v Thorpe[10] Angas Parsons J said:

"According to the plain meaning of the words there is therefore a clear distinction between things that are 'suspected' of having a certain quality or characteristic, namely, in this case, of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained, and things which are believed to have this peculiarity. The gradation in mental assent is 'suspicion' which falls short of belief, 'belief' which approaches to conviction, and knowledge which excludes doubt."

In George v Rocket[11] Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ considered the state of mind of suspicion: albeit in a different context:

"In considering the sufficiency of a sworn complaint to show reasonable grounds for the suspicion and belief to which s 679 [of the Criminal Code Qld] refers, it is necessary to bear in mind that suspicion and belief are different states of mind (Homes v Thorpe; Seven Seas Publishing Pty Ltd v Sullivan) and the section prescribes distinct subject matters of suspicion on the one hand and belief on the other.

Suspicion, as Lord Devlin said in Hussien v Chong Fook Kam, 'in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: 'I suspect but I cannot prove.' The facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient reasonably to ground a belief, yet some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. In Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees, a question was raised as to whether a payee had reason to suspect that the payer, a debtor, 'was unable to pay [its] debts as they became due' as that phrase was used in s 95(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth). Kitto J said :

'A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere ideal wondering whether it exists or not; it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting to 'a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence', as Chambers's Dictionary expresses it. Consequently, a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence. The notion which 'reason to suspect' expresses in sub-s (4) is, I think, of something which in all the circumstances would create in the mind of a reasonable person in the position of the payee an actual apprehension or fear that the situation of the payer is in actual fact that which the subsection describes - a mistrust of the payer's ability to pay his debts as they become due and of the effect which acceptance of the payment would have as between the payee and the other creditors.'

The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture."

The use of the word "may" as opposed to "is" supports the view that the legislature intended that the ordinary meaning of suspect or suspicion, namely conjecture, surmise, or something less than proof be utilised. The concepts of beyond reasonable doubt and a reasonable suspicion are inconsistent. A reasonable suspicion is something less than a belief, and a belief is something less than satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt. This construction necessarily leads to the conclusion that it would be incongruous to speak of a jury being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of a reasonable suspicion. This incongruity was identified by the Victorian Full Court in R v Tween[12], and in the South Australian Full Court in Tepper v Kelly[13].

In Tween, the Court was concerned with the construction of section 317(4) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). The subsection relevantly provided:

"Any person who makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance, under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is not making it or does not have it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object shall, unless he can show that he made it or had it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object, be guilty of an indictable offence, ..."

Sholl J considered that in addressing reasonable suspicion the proper question for the jury, if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the circumstance relied on by the prosecution was - Do we as reasonable men all think that on those facts, one hypothesis open is that of guilty possession? Sholl J considered that reasonable suspicion did not have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. He took the view that such a proposition was highly complex and confusing. He considered that the requisite standard was simply that of reasonable opinion. His Honour reasoned[14]:

"I do not find it easy to comprehend the notion involved in a direction that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion of guilt. If a given set of facts gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of guilty possession, it is because guilty possession is one hypothesis open to reasonable minds upon those facts. It may, as I have said, be one of a number, the others being consistent with innocence. To say that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the circumstances proved give rise to a suspicion of guilt seems to me to involve the highly complex and confusing proposition that it must prove that there is no hypothesis reasonably open from the facts proved except the hypothesis that one possible hypothesis is that of suspicion. True, this is at one remove, so to speak, from proof of actual guilt, and is not, in strict logic, the same thing as proving that there is no hypothesis really open except one of guilt. But in my opinion, it introduces unwarranted and unnecessary confusion into the subject to speak of proving beyond reasonable doubt that to reasonable persons one hypothesis open is that of guilt. It is true that the jury must form an opinion, according to some standard, but the circumstances proved give rise to such reasonable suspicion, but, in my opinion, the standard is merely that of reasonable opinion, and the proper question which they should ask themselves is, if they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the circumstances relied on by the prosecution, 'Do we as reasonable men all think that on those facts one hypothesis open is that of guilty possession?' I think juries should be so directed. For, if I may respectfully say so, it is inappropriate to introduce at that point the notion of proving beyond reasonable doubt merely that there is room for a particular hypothetical opinion. It involves, I think, too literal an application of the principle that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements of a criminal charge."

Winneke CJ did not expressly address the issue[15]:

"In my opinion, the sub-section upon its proper interpretation requires proof by the Crown, first, that the accused was knowingly in possession of the explosive substance charged and, secondly, that the possession was under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he did not have it in his possession for a lawful object: see R v Hallam, [1957] 1 QB 569; [1957] 3 All ER 566, and Archbold, 35th ed, p 920. The second requirement , in my view, is descriptive of an incident of the possession necessary to give rise to the offence. It must, I think, be a possession in circumstances which are capable of giving rise to the suspicion specified in the section. In other words, any circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be related to or connected with the possession charged in such a way as to leave it open to a jury to find that such circumstance, either by itself or in conjunction with other relevant circumstances, gives rise to the suspicion specified. In my opinion, proof by the Crown of both the above mentioned requirements is necessary before the onus placed on the accused by the sub-section arises."

The reference to "both the above mentioned requirements" appears to be to the accused being knowingly "in possession" and to the "circumstances" that are said to give rise to a reasonable suspicion. The remarks do not suggest that the reasonable suspicion must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Pape J spoke of the Crown having to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of circumstances which are capable of raising a reasonable suspicion[16]:

"It is to be observed that s 317 (4) of the Crimes Act 1958 places the onus of showing possession of explosive substances for a lawful object upon the accused. He is, however, not called upon to discharge this onus (which he must do on a balance of probabilities only: Sodeman v R [1936] HCA 75; (1936), 55 CLR 192, per Dixon J, at p 216; [1936] HCA 75; [1936] ALR 156), unless the Crown first proves beyond reasonable doubt his possession of the explosive substances, and that he knew that they were explosive substances: R v Hallam, [1957] 1 QB 569; [1957] 3 All ER 566. Furthermore, the Crown must also prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of circumstances which are capable of raising a reasonable suspicion that the possession of such explosive substances was not for a lawful object, and the connexion of the accused with such circumstances. But it is not necessary for the Crown to prove that the circumstances are consistent only with suspicion, for once the Crown has laid the appropriate foundation the section casts on the accused the burden of proving that his possession was for a lawful object.

It is for the jury to say, once circumstances capable of arousing a reasonable suspicion are proved, whether such a suspicion arises and (if they are satisfied that it does) whether that suspicion has been dissipated by the explanation given by the accused for his possession. Since the existence of a reasonable suspicion from the circumstances is an ingredient of the offence charged, it follows that this must be proved by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt. If the jury are left in doubt as to whether they have such a reasonable suspicion, the accused is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, and they need not then consider whether he has satisfied them on a balance of probabilities that his possession was for a lawful object. To place the burden on the Crown of proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a reasonable suspicion is not equivalent to saying that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the suspicion is well founded, for at this stage of the jury's inquiry they should be directed to consider the matter without reference to the accused's explanation. Unless reasonable suspicion is established there is no need for explanation."

Pape J was of the view that the circumstances which are capable of arousing a reasonable suspicion must be proved but that the Crown do not have to prove that the circumstances are consistent only with suspicion. His Honour concluded that it is for a jury to say whether a reasonable suspicion arises. The suspicion either arises or it does not.

In Tepper v Kelly[17] at first instance Cox J considered the construction of section 41 of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA). Section 41 provides:

"(1) Any person who has in his possession any personal property which either at the time of such possession, or at any subsequent time before the making of a complaint under this section in respect of such possession, is reasonably suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) It shall be a defence to a charge of an offence under this section to prove that the defendant obtained possession of the property honestly ...".

Cox J stressed that the underlying grounds or reasons founding the suspicion must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

"Because of the special nature of s 41 the courts have properly required strict proof of the ingredients of the charge and have examined with care the basis for the suspicion alleged by the prosecutor. Factual elements - most important, the possession and the suspicion - have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. However, it is not appropriate, in my view, to speak of the reasonableness of the suspicion being established beyond reasonable doubt. It is for the court to form a judgement as to whether any suspicion, duly proved, should properly be characterised as a reasonable suspicion. Unless the complainant satisfies the court that the suspicion was reasonable the charge will not have been made out, so in that sense it is apt to speak of the complainant carrying the burden of satisfying the court of the reasonableness of the suspicion. But the court's judgment or opinion in that respect, as distinct from the proof of the underlying grounds or reasons, cannot be graded by reference to the standards of proof applicable in different jurisdictions to contested facts. A suspicion is either reasonable or not reasonable. To contrast (as the learned magistrate did here) a suspicion that is reasonable on the balance of probabilities and a suspicion that is reasonable beyond reasonable doubt is to misconceive the requirements of the section."[18]

The Full Court upheld Cox J's decision and gave support to his analysis. White J with the agreement of von Doussa J said[19]:

"[Cox J] then proceeded to analyse certain cases which distinguished between the satisfaction by proof beyond reasonable doubt of the court as to the facts upon which the suspicion was said to be based and the formation of a judgment or opinion by the court as to the reasonableness of that suspicion. His Honour concluded:

'It was enough for him to find, as indeed he expressly did, that it was reasonable for Marks to be suspicious. The test that he went on to apply, whatever precisely it meant, obviously led him in some way to a different result. The error, then, was decisive.'

With respect, I agree that the court's judgment or opinion as to the reasonableness of the suspicion 'cannot be graded by reference to the standards of proof applicable ... to contested facts. A suspicion is either reasonable or not reasonable.' To state these propositions is to state the obvious. It is incongruous, even tautologous, in my opinion, to speak of 'proof' beyond reasonable doubt of the reasonableness of a suspicion because reasonableness is a matter of opinion or judgment, not proof. That disposes of the onus of proof point."

In Anderson v Judges of the District Court of New South Wales[20] the Court of Appeal considered the interpretation of section 527c (1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Section 527c(1) provides:

which thing may be reasonably suspected of being stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained, shall be liable on conviction before a stipendiary magistrate to imprisonment for 6 months, or to a fine of $500.

(2) It is a sufficient defence to a prosecution for an offence under subsection (1) if the defendant satisfies the court that he had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the thing referred to in the charge was stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained."

Kirby P (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) reasoned[21]:

"... the section under which the claimant was charged is an exceptional one. It has stood in our law, in varying forms, for a very long time. Attention must be drawn to the qualified mental element which must be established in order to attract the operation of the section. It is enough that it is shown that the thing in custody 'may be reasonably suspected of being ... unlawfully obtained'. The word 'may' falls short of 'is'. The word 'suspected' falls short of 'known' or even 'convinced' or 'shown'. In another context it has been said that 'suspicion' is a state of conjecture or surmise when proof is lacking: see George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 115f. The suspicion must, it is true, be 'reasonably' held. It must be determined not according to the subjective beliefs of the police at the time but according to an objective criterion determined by the Court before whom the accused stands charged: see R v English (at 153); Ex parte Patmoy; Re Jack [1944] NSWStRp 33; (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 351 at 356.

As was observed during argument, there is an ambivalence in the section. The preconditions must, as in any other criminal offence, be established beyond reasonable doubt. How a level of thought which is qualified by what 'may' be (and does not need to reach beyond what is 'suspected') can be established beyond reasonable doubt is not entirely clear. But the section exists and has survived for more than a century in substantially the same form. It can apply to banknotes. It must therefore be given meaning. Presumably the criminal onus and the words of the section must be reconciled by saying that the court before which the person is charged must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the circumstances are such that the thing in question may reasonably be suspected of being stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained."

Kirby P identified the difficulty raised by the section. He recognised the importance of reconciling the criminal onus with the words of the section. Reconciliation was achieved by requiring satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt "that the circumstances are such" that the reasonable suspicion may arise. The circumstances must be proved. The jury then either has the requisite state of mind or it does not.

In Buckett, Hunt CJ (with the agreement of McInerney and Bruce JJ) considered section 82 of the Proceeds of Crimes Act:

"As with the offence created by s 82, the offence of things in custody as it is presently formulated in s 527C of the Crimes Act provides a defence to the person charged if he satisfies the court that he had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the things in his custody were stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained. The effect of this statutory framework is thus that the state of knowledge of the person charged as to the provenance of the things in his custody is irrelevant to the prosecution case; but if the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt upon the state of the evidence before it that those things may reasonably be suspected of being stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained, the person charged must, in order to escape conviction, discharge the lesser civil onus upon him of satisfying the court that he had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that they were stolen or unlawfully obtained: Ex parte Patmoy; Re Jack (at 356); Tegge v Caldwell (1988) 15 NSWLR 226 at 227-8; Anderson v Judges of the District Court of New South Wales at 716-17."[22]

I do not understand Hunt CJ to be departing from the reasoning advanced in Anderson which for all relevant purposes accords with the reasoning of Cox J and the Full Court in Tepper and the Victorian Court in Tween.

More recently in Gazepis v Police[23] the question of burden of proof under s 41 of the Summary Offences Act was considered. Doyle CJ (with whom Lander and Bleby JJ agreed) said:

"It was not necessary for [the detective's] suspicion to be entertained or to be established beyond reasonable doubt. All that was required was that, under the circumstances, the suspicion be a reasonable one: Tepper v Kelly (1988) 47 SASR 271. The suspicion that he entertained need not be the only suspicion that might be entertained under the circumstances: R v Chan (1992) 28 NSWLR 421 at 424E, per Mahoney JA, (at 426F) Hunt CJ at CL and (at 440C) Abadee J."

Chan concerned an offence against s 527C of the Crimes Act (NSW). The Court in Chan applied Anderson. Doyle CJ saw no tension between Chan and the reasoning in Tepper.

It is to be recalled that in Brown Olsson J referred to the reasoning in Anderson and spoke of the objective criterion of reasonableness being applied by the Court, "in light of the proven facts and circumstances."

This analysis of the authorities identifies a consistent approach to the interpretation of section 82 of the Proceeds of Crimes Act and comparable State statutes. Such consistency is unsurprising in view of the history of section 82. Although the holder of the suspicion differs between the legislation this is not a persuasive ground for distinguishing the reasoning in Tepper. The critical issue is the relationship between proof beyond reasonable doubt and the holding of a reasonable suspicion.

If there is tension between the reasoning in Tepper and that in Buckett or Anderson, I consider that the reasoning in Tepper is to be preferred. The reasonableness of a suspicion is a matter of judgment or opinion. As White J said:

"It is incongruous, ... to speak of 'proof' beyond reasonable doubt of the reasonableness of a suspicion because reasonableness is a matter of opinion or judgment, not proof."

It does not appear that the New South Wales courts were referred to the decisions in Tween and Tepper.

The Crown carries the burden of proving the circumstances that may give rise to a reasonable suspicion beyond reasonable doubt. The ultimate conclusion whether "any property may reasonably be suspected of being proceeds of crime" is to be determined by the jury. The jury either has the requisite opinion or it does not. By this process the provisions of the statutes are reconciled with the criminal burden of proof. The trial judge did not misdirect the jury with respect to the onus of proof in Mr Zotti's trial.

Otherwise I agree with the reasons of Lander J for rejecting the submissions advanced by the appellant.

LIST OF CITATIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE JUDGMENT

1 [1994] SASC 4606; (1994) 72 A Crim R 527 at 538

2 (1995) 132 ALR 669 at 675

3 It has been noted that the decisions in Tween and Tepper did not appear to have been referred to the courts in Anderson and Buckett.

4 [1925] SAStRp 37; [1925] SASR 286 at 291

5 [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 115

6 [1965] VicRp 89; [1965] VR 687

7 (1988) 47 SASR 271

8 [1965] VicRp 89; [1965] VR 687 at 693

9 [1965] VicRp 89; [1965] VR 687 at 689

11 (1987) 45 SASR 340

12 (1987) 45 SASR 340 at 343

13 (1988) 47 SASR 271 at 273

14 (1992) 27 NSWLR 701 at 714-15

15 (1992) 27 NSWLR 701 at 714

16 (1995) 132 ALR 669 at 675

17 [1997] SASC 6813; (1997) 70 SASR 121

[1] (1988) 47 SASR 271

[2] Tepper v Kelly (1988) 47 SASR 271 at 272 and 273

[3] (1995) 132 ALR 669; (1995) 79 A Crim R 302

[4] R v Parsons [1983] VicRp 109; (1983) 2 VR 499 at 506

[5] Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd [1993] HCA 15; (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 492

[6] (1992) 27 NSWLR 701

[7] [1994] SASC 4606; (1994) 72 A Crim R 527 at 538

[8] (1995) 132 ALR 669 at 675

[9] It has been noted that the decisions in Tween and Tepper did not appear to have been referred to the courts in Anderson and Buckett.

[10] [1925] SAStRp 37; [1925] SASR 286 at 291

[11] [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 115

[12] [1965] VicRp 89; [1965] VR 687

[13] (1988) 47 SASR 271

[14] [1965] VicRp 89; [1965] VR 687 at 693

[15] [1965] VicRp 89; [1965] VR 687 at 689

[16] [1965] VicRp 89; [1965] VR 687 at 701

[17] (1987) 45 SASR 340

[18] (1987) 45 SASR 340 at 343

[19] (1988) 47 SASR 271 at 273

[20] (1992) 27 NSWLR 701 at 714-15

[21] (1992) 27 NSWLR 701 at 714

[22] (1995) 132 ALR 669 at 675

[23] [1997] SASC 6813; (1997) 70 SASR 121