R v Thompson [2015] ACTSC 69

CRIMINAL LAW - Sentence - diminution in moral culpability - rehabilitation

Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) s 86

Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7(1), 33(1), 34

Alseedi v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 185

Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 305 ALR 323

DPP v Lebehen [2011] VSCA 75

Love v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 8

Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357

Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59

Monfries v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 46

Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610

R v Ray and Vella [2014] VSC 165

R v Ray and Vella [2014] VSCA 140

R v Verdins, R v Buckley, R v Ho [2007] VSCA 102

1. Andrew Francis Thompson, whom I will call the offender in these sentencing remarks, pleaded not guilty to an indictment charging him with two counts.

2. The first count alleged that on 4 November 2013 he entered or remained in a building in Lyneham as a trespasser with intent to commit an offence that involved causing harm, or threatening to cause harm, to anyone in the building, and at the time had an offensive weapon with him.

3. The second count alleged that, on the same date, he unlawfully confined another person, namely, the complainant whom I will anonymise in these published remarks on sentence as JB.

4. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on each count.

5. Aggravated burglary, as the first count is known, carries a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment and is an offence under s 312 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (the Criminal Code). The second count, forcible confinement, which is the act of unlawfully confining or imprisoning a person, carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment and is an offence under s 34 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). In accordance with Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [30]- [31], it is necessary to give careful attention and consideration to the maximum sentence of each offence.

6. On the sentencing hearing, in consequence of the above verdicts, I was asked to deal with the two charges transferred from the Magistrates Court. These charges were common assault, which occurred when the offender tackled JB to the bed and held his gloved hand over her mouth, and carry/use a firearm with disregard for own safety or safety of other persons. In the case of the common assault, the maximum penalty is two years. The firearm charge attracts a maximum penalty of 6 months

7. The offender falls to be sentenced under the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (the Sentencing Act). The purposes of sentences are set out in s 7(1). These are:

(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence in a way that is just and appropriate;

(b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences;

(c) to protect the community from the offender;

(d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender;

(e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions;

(f) to denounce the conduct of the offender;

(g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.

8. As is evident, in many cases, these purposes will give rise to conflicting considerations and the weighing of essentially incommensurate factors.

9. Section 33 of the Sentencing Act sets out the relevant considerations of sentencing. I will return to those considerations later in my remarks.

10. There was a measure of common ground between the Crown and the offender at trial about the events that occurred and the relationship between the offender and the complainant in the period preceding the commission of the offences.

11. The offender and JB commenced a relationship after they had come into contact with each other through an online dating web site known as eHarmony. They first met in late March 2013. The offender was then aged 26 and JB was 21 years of age, turning 22 in May of that year. JB was then studying for her Masters at university. Some five weeks after their first meeting, in April 2013, JB had formed the view that the offender was not the right man for her. She was critical of him, telling him that he dressed poorly, and expressing disappointment that he was still a student and living at home with his parents. She told him that she did not have time for the relationship, but that they could continue to be friends. By the end of May 2013 JB had taken up an overseas internship opportunity for some two months, returning to Australia in August 2013.

12. I interpolate here to record two matters. The first is that before she left Australia to undertake her internship, JB gave a key to the offender to her premises at Archibald Street, Lyneham. This was so as to enable the offender to check the apartment on a regular basis, making sure nothing was remiss in terms of security. The second is that during the currency of the relationship JB had exhibited a distinct dislike of guns. The use of guns upset her and made her uncomfortable because she connected them with violence. The offender was a gun enthusiast, as was his father. They each kept multiple firearms at their home and regularly shot targets.

13. Some intermittent messages were exchanged between the offender and JB whilst she was overseas. On her return, in August 2013, the key to her apartment was returned and the offender sought to rejuvenate the relationship. This attempt failed, although the offender persisted in his contact with JB. She did not reciprocate contact.

14. On 9 October 2013 or thereabouts JB agreed to meet and did meet with the offender in a public place at the Dickson shops. The offender had told JB that he had something he needed to get off his chest, that it would only take 10 minutes, and that this would be the last time she would see him.

15. The meeting was not a success. The offender told the jury that he was humiliated by what JB said to him on that occasion. In her evidence, JB agreed she had been "cruel" to the offender at that meeting. She had "yelled at him" and "humiliated him". Amongst the topics upon which JB expressed her views were that the offender was "boring" and he was "too simple to be her partner". The meeting lasted approximately 45 minutes.

16. What happened on 4 November 2013 was the subject of greatly conflicting evidence at trial. JB gave evidence that after finishing work and then doing some shopping she went home to her apartment. She went into her spare bedroom looking to put on her running singlet with an inbuilt bra. At the time she entered her spare bedroom she was wearing only underpants. The offender was hiding in the spare room, behind the door. He was wearing white latex medical gloves. When she entered the bedroom the offender sprung out from behind the door, covered her mouth with his gloved hand and told her not to scream. In his other hand he was holding a gun. There was a struggle, as a result of which she fell onto the spare bed and the offender fell on top of her, still holding his hand over her mouth. JB gave evidence that she still remembered the smell of the glove. In his other hand he held the gun, resting it on her bare chest. Eventually, JB was able to get dressed and thereafter the offender and JB talked for some time, although the gun was still present.

17. By contrast, the offender gave evidence before the jury that on 4 November 2013 he had waited in his car outside JB's apartment. After seeing her arrive home from work, and without bringing attention to his presence, he waited five further minutes and then approached her door, knocking on it. She answered, and although she expressed surprise, allowed him to enter.

18. He had no gun with him and he wore no gloves. Thereafter they talked for a period of some three hours. The defence case put to the jury was that the complainant's evidence was an entire concoction.

19. By the jury's verdict, they found each of the elements of the two charges proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is necessary to make some further findings consistent with these verdicts.

20. JB was confined in her apartment for some three hours. During the three hour period JB was in fear of her life. JB thought of attempting to escape the apartment but believed she could not accomplish this without the possibility of being shot. Although the offender said that the gun was not loaded and that the gun was "for me" that did not allay her concerns over the constant presence of the gun. The offender broke into the apartment in some way. The manner by which he did so was not identified in the evidence. The Crown proved neither that the gun was loaded nor that the offender had any ammunition with him so that the gun could be loaded. The offender is to be sentenced on the footing that the gun was not actually loaded at any relevant time.

21. I firstly undertake this assessment by reference to the nature of the offending and not by matters personal to the offender. I bear in mind the maximum sentence for these offences.

22. It cannot be said that these two offences are anything other than very serious.

23. A young woman was in her own apartment. By some means the offender had broken into that apartment. He had with him a gun which he displayed. He wore medical gloves. That situation is immediately productive of terror. The terror continued when the young woman was forced onto the bed with the gun resting on her naked chest. Although the level of terror may have diminished over the course of the next three hours it still persisted until she managed to convince the offender to leave the premises. This did not bring the ordeal entirely to an end. JB reasoned that, if the offender was able to break in, then he had the capacity to return the same way. In consequence, JB left her apartment and attended a police station.

24. In terms of the confinement, it has to be noted that the offence was committed over a period of three hours, at least in part in the presence of the gun.

25. The Crown put to me that the objective seriousness of the aggravated burglary offence lay somewhere in the mid- range for that offence. On the forcible confinement offence, the Crown contended that this offence was slightly short of the midpoint in terms of objective seriousness. On the other hand, counsel for the offender, contended that both offences fell into the lowest quartile.

26. A number of cases were referred to the Court as being potentially able to throw light on the proper range of sentences available on the current facts. I did not derive great benefit from them. No closely analogous case emerged. It is evident that in all Australian jurisdictions breaking into a person's house is regarded as very serious and attracts the principle of general deterrence. As does the presence of a firearm. Of course, regard must be taken of the different statutory offences and their specific penalties in the various jurisdictions. In addition to those cases, I have also had regard to the statistics by penalty type kept by the ACT Supreme Court for sentences given from 1 July 2012 to 31 January 2015 for offences under s 312 of the Criminal Code. That sample consisted of 66 charges. I have also had regard to the statistics for the same offence for the same period as to the duration of the terms of imprisonment imposed. That sample consisted of 29 charges. Those statistics I have used only as a general guide. I have also considered DPP v Lebehen [2011] VSCA 75; R v Ray and Vella [2014] VSC 165; R v Ray and Vella [2014] VSCA 140; R v Verdins, R v Buckley, R v Ho [2007] VSCA 102 and Love v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 8.

27. The above material provides an indication of what sentences have been imposed in more or less comparable cases. Nevertheless I approach the matter in accordance with Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 305 ALR 323 at [40] to sentence the actual offender and applying the relevant legal principles to his case.

28. The Crown read in Court two victim impact statements. JB described the impact that the attack had on her and continues to have. Fear and insecurity have been and still are an everyday part of her life. She has been and is still unable to fully participate in life. Fear and distrust are prominent. The contrast to her previous participation in life with its joys is stark. JB moved interstate and left an established life and career path. She is receiving ongoing psychological assistance and is driven by stress, sleeplessness and hyper vigilance. The impact of the legal process has also added to her burden.

29. JB's mother corroborates the above matters and gives further detail of them. JB suffered major disruption in her studies and has on-going economic concerns on a number of fronts. Fortunately, she had and has a supportive family.

30. There is no doubt that the actual harm caused to JB was a likely consequence of the actions of the offender. This actual harm cannot be simply put to one side as an unanticipated reaction by a hypersensitive or fragile individual. However, a matter I must return to is whether this offender was able to appreciate the degree of harm that his actions would cause owing to mental impairment or functioning at the time of the offences.

31. As noted above, s 33(1) of the Sentencing Act compels the Court to consider a number of factors when sentencing an offender. During the course of the sentencing hearing the Crown drew my attention to the following sub-sections of s 33(1) of the Sentencing Act:

(f) the effect of the offence on the victims of the offence, the victims' families and anyone else who may make a victim impact statement;

(i) the degree of responsibility of the offender for the commission of the offence;

(m) the cultural background, character, antecedents, age and physical or mental condition of the offender;

32. I have also had regard to the following in s 33(1) of the Sentencing Act:

(d) if the personal circumstances of the victim were known to the offender when the offence was committed-the circumstances;

(q) the degree to which the offence was the result of provocation, duress or entrapment;

(t) whether the offender is voluntarily seeking treatment for any physical or mental condition that may have contributed to the commission of the offence;

(v) the reason or reasons why the offender committed the offence;

33. At the time of sentence the offender was 28 years old. He had no criminal record or any difficulty with drugs or alcohol. He was brought up in a loving family. Neighbours and acquaintances speak very highly of him and his willingness to help others. This is reflected in his volunteer work as well. Those neighbours and friends acquainted with him describe the offences as completely out of character and at odds with past observable behaviour. In his favour, the offender was simply not a person with no prior record, he was a positive force in his community.

34. The offender graduated from high school in Year 12. His academic performance at high school was described by the offender as poor, resulting in graduation but no UAI. I leave aside, for the moment, possible mental health reasons for this.

35. Thereafter, the offender commenced an Engineering Certificate in 2005 but gradually lost interest. He dropped out of the course in late 2006. He worked as a postal worker until 2011, when he commenced a business degree through Open Universities Australia.

36. A major issue at the hearing on sentence was the mental health condition of the offender and its impact, if any, upon the circumstances of the offences. The Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) dated 11 February 2015 was tendered. A Psychological Treatment Report by Dr Michael Barry dated 5 February 2015 was also tendered by the defence.

37. The reports did not speak with one voice on the major issues. It is convenient, in the first instance, to deal with two issues arising out of these two reports. The first is the history of the offender's mental health.

Mr Thompson reported no mental health issues previous to the offences however to his credit he has maintained fortnightly contact with various specialists in relation to his mental health. It is recommended that this continues.

39. On the other hand Dr Barry, amongst other matters of relevant mental history, recorded:

12. Mr Thompson described a history of depressive episodes from his early adolescence, and reported a self-harm/suicide attempt at the age of 13 in which he took 40 paracetamol tablets. He advised that his condition improved after changing schools, in 2001/2002 but fluctuated during his last two years of secondary schooling, and deteriorated further following the episode of Glandular fever in 2005.

40. At the end of the evidence on this issue it became clear, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender has suffered for some time from a depressive mental condition. There is evidence, for example, that in 2009 he took anti- depressant medication prescribed by his doctor. I think it can be inferred that the questions that the author of the PSR asked of Dr Barry and Dr Pickup, so as to ascertain the offender's medical history may have been badly phrased or misunderstood. It is not necessary to attempt to date the onset of this condition but it may very well date from his school years and have affected the offender's school results. It should be recorded that the PSR stated that the City Mental Health Team diagnosed the offender with a personality disorder.

41. However, by itself, the fact of an ongoing depressive condition does not mean that his mental condition played any role in the offences on 4 November 2013.

42. A second important difference between the reports can be illustrated by comparing the commentary and opinions of the authors, on the account of the offences given to them by the offender.

43. The following extract is taken from the PSR, at page 3:

Attitude to the Offence

Mr Thomson failed to accept responsibility for his behaviours, demonstrated by his disagreement with the facts of the Case Statement, particularly that he was at the premises without consent. Mr Thompson stated he regretted going to the premises when he was "unstable" and he was there to seek support from the victim to manage his mental state. It is of concern to this Service that his actions on the day of the offence appear to conflict with his reported motivation.

When discussing the offence, Mr Thompson appeared to focus on the effects a criminal conviction will have on his future employment options rather than demonstrating concern for the victim.

Opinion

Mr Thompson has no previous criminal history and appears to have led a pro-social lifestyle prior to the commission of the current offences. He has a supportive family and continues to study towards achieving his degree in Accounting.

Mr Thompson reported no mental health issues previous to these offences however, to his credit he has maintained fortnightly contact with various specialists in relation to his mental health. It is recommended that this continues.

Mr Thompson expressed feeling unfairly convicted of these offences demonstrating a lack of victim empathy, which is of concern to this Service. He expressed no insight into his offending behaviour and may benefit from a family violence intervention to gain a better understanding of his offending pathway and the impact of his offences on the victim.

Mr Thompson is assessed as a moderate risk of reoffending due to the seriousness of the offence, mental health and his lack of victim empathy.

44. The following extract is taken from the Report of Dr Barry:

27. In the weeks following the incident at the Dickson shops, Mr Thompson reported feeling increasingly suicidal, and stated that "everything was gone". He reported writing a suicide note while his parents were interstate, which he hid in his bedroom, and advised that he did not feel that he could talk to his friends due to "male stigma" about mental health.

28. Mr Thompson stated that he went to see [JB] in the hope that she would be able to help him, and because they had been able to talk about his feelings in the past.

29. He stated that he told her that he wanted to kill himself, in part because of what she had said at the Dickson shops, but that this was "the tip of the iceberg" as there were a lot of other issues which had contributed to his depression. He said that he and [JB] talked for several hours and that she had "calmed him down" and that they left on good terms.

30. After leaving [JB's] house, Mr Thompson stated that he went home, and that he is aware that JB subsequently attended the police station.

Attitude toward the offence

31. When asked about the offence, Mr Thompson stated that at no time had he any intention of hurting [JB], and that he only wanted to hurt himself.

32. Mr Thompson stated that he had told [JB] that he did not want to hurt her, and that he just wanted to hurt himself, but he acknowledged that he now believes that she was likely to have been frightened of him at the time of the incident.

33. He has consistently expressed regret at the fear that he has caused [JB], and has stated on a number of occasions that he cared about her as a person and did not want to cause her harm or upset her.

45. The opinions of both authors were anchored in what the offender had told each of them about the offence. The offender denied to each author that he had broken into the premises, that he had a gun or that he wore gloves. In substance, the offender adhered, in relation to both authors, to the version of events that he had told the jury. However, the author of the PSR proceeded upon a version of facts consistent with the jury's verdict.

46. Dr Barry, on the other hand, based his opinion upon the sequence of events as recounted to him by the offender. In consequence, Dr Barry's conclusions on issues such as the risk of recidivism, remorsefulness and the offender's insight into his offending behaviour, are for the most part, based upon a factual foundation inconsistent with the verdicts. Dr Barry readily conceded this. By way of example, Dr Barry was asked the following questions by the Crown:

Now, if you would like to go over the page to paragraph 70, you've been asked the question about whether Mr Thompson appeared to demonstrate insight in relation to his offending or insight into the distress caused to the complainant, on his version. You've stated that he recognised he was particularly emotionally unbalanced, suicidal, irrational and desperate for help. So would you agree that that's insight in relation to the distress caused to the complainant?---Yes.

Would you agree with me that you can't have insight into events that you deny you ever did?---That's correct, and I have very carefully worded that paragraph to specify where Mr Thompson has insight.

Yes, I appreciate that. Again, if we go to paragraph 72 where the question arises as to whether he demonstrates remorse in relation to his offending, again you've stated, "He expresses considerable remorse for his actions and the impact of his behaviour on [JB]." Once more, just to clarify for the record, that's remorse for his version of how he went to [JB's] house, isn't it?---That's remorse for the impact that his actions had on [JB].

But the actions obviously being the actions on the version that he gave you?---That is correct.

47. That, however, does not mean Dr Barry's clinical judgment as to the offender's mental health status should be rejected. I do not do so.

Findings on Mental Health and Degree of Responsibility

48. The offender denied at trial, and still denies, that he broke into the apartment, that he had a gun and that he wore latex gloves. Without any satisfactory explanation of these matters I cannot accept the truth of the statement made by the offender to Dr Barry (at [28] of the report) "that he went to see [JB] in the hope that she would be able to help him, and because they had been able to talk about his feelings in the past." It is also inconsistent with the verdicts.

49. I cannot make any precise finding as to why the offender was motivated to break into [JB's] apartment in the circumstances in which he did on that day. The most likely explanation to my mind is that he wished to impress upon her the gravity of the distress that she had inflicted upon him. I find that the presence of the gun in some way, again in the offender's perception, was to emphasise this gravity. It was to assist the words he was to say to [JB] at the apartment and to gain traction with her. It follows, therefore, that I accept, consistently with the jury's verdicts, that he did take the gun to the apartment with the intention of harming [JB], this being a "harm" within the Criminal Code. It is difficult to characterise the offender's action as an implicit "cry for help", as opined by Dr Barry at [63] of his report, when the offender will not give an accurate account of the offence. It may be that, in some fashion, it was a cry for help but I decline to act on that basis because I have no confidence in its factual underpinnings.

50. I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender was suffering from mental health issues on the day of the offence. Exhibit L at the trial, being two notes written by the offender probably three weeks before the commission of the offence give some evidence of the offender's mental health status at the time. I accept that the results of tests administered by Dr Barry are consistent with major depressive disorder, and Dr Barry's evidence that in the weeks leading up to the offence that the offender was experiencing symptoms consistent with a depressive episode. I accept Dr Barry's opinion that a person suffering from a depressive condition is likely to have impaired judgment, be more reactive to emotional triggers, more impulsive and less able to contemplate the consequences of his or her actions.

51. During the course of the hearing on sentence my attention was directed to Monfries v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 46 at [58]- [68] on the issue of the significance of mental health issues in the sentencing process. I gratefully adopt the cases gathered there as the law to be applied in the present case.

52. I find that the moral culpability of the offending conduct was reduced, although certainly not eliminated, by reason of the depressive illness the offender was suffering from at the time of the commission of the offences. A degree of planning and thought was involved in the offences. The Court does not know how much. The Court does know that the planning and thought processes were ill conceived. Breaking into the apartment with a gun and confronting the occupant was inevitably going to engage the police and be productive of the "dilemma" situation as it was referred to at the trial. As [JB] put it, at one stage in her evidence, "... Drew said his dilemma was that if he left or if he let me leave I would go straight to the police, so he needed an assurance, that I wouldn't go to the police."

53. It follows that having regard to the offender's mental health status, the sentencing principles of general deterrence, accountability and denunciation need to be moderated. The adequate punishment required needs to be just and appropriate to the circumstances.

54. It should be noted that there is potential for imprisonment to weigh more heavily upon the offender because of his emotionally vulnerable state and because he will be effectively separated for much of the time from his social and clinical supports. In that regard, however, I also note the evidence of the author of the PSR that there are services available within the Alexander Maconochie Centre to assist prisoners with mental health issues, including depression.

55. For the reasons set out at [43] there must be a moderate risk of reoffending. There is no reason not to accept the opinion of the author of the PSR that the offender is a moderate risk of reoffending due to the seriousness of the offence, his mental health and his lack of victim empathy. There is a chance that if the offender was placed in the same or similar circumstances with the same pressures that he may react the same way. The fact that the offender has no history of violence or aggression, and that he has sought to characterise his actions as a "cry for help" (although rejected at [49]) do not engender sufficient confidence to conclude that there is not a risk of reoffending in a similar way under similar pressures. I have already commented that characterising the offender's actions as an attempt to elicit assistance is difficult given his continuing rejection of the jury's findings as to what occurred.

56. The likelihood of further offending is increased, should the offender's underlying depressive illness cease to be treated or is undertreated. The proper treatment of this illness is very much in both the offender's and the community's interests. This is in concert with the sentencing aim of promoting the rehabilitation of the offender.

57. I conclude that there are very good prospects of rehabilitation. There are a number of reasons for this conclusion. The offender's mental illness has now been the subject of a more comprehensive diagnosis and as a result is being optimally treated. The offender has already demonstrated that he has the capacity to be a positive force in the community. The evidence given by Ms Marshall, the offender's current girlfriend, gave an insight into the offender's current functioning (with treatment to date). It was very positive. Although Ms Marshall may or may not be a constant force in the offender's life in the future, it is clear that the offender is behaving and responding appropriately in their relationship. The offender also has the benefit of a supportive family. I find the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation notwithstanding that he maintains a version of events inconsistent with the jury's' verdicts: Alseedi v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 185 at [65].

58. The Crown identified the assault as the grabbing of [JB] and pushing her onto the bed with the gun in hand. This incident is referred to at [16]. From the evidence given at trial I find this offence proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Carry/ Use Firearm with disregard for own safety or safety of other persons

59. The firearm is the firearm taken to the premises by the offender and referred to at [16]. From the evidence given at trial I find this offence proved beyond reasonable doubt.

60. By consent I will dismiss the other charge of possess offensive weapon with intent.

61. As per s 34 of the Sentencing Act, the offender's plea of not guilty and his subsequent prosecution of his case at trial have not led to any increase in the severity of the sentence otherwise to be imposed.

62. The offender stands for sentence for four offences. In accordance with Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59, 63 I have had regard to the totality of the criminal behaviour. I have also had regard to the principle in Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610 and have avoided punishing the offender twice for what could be thought to be, in substance but not in form, common features of the offences and which could be looked at as being the one transaction. I will order that the sentences are to be served partly concurrently and partly cumulatively.

63. I take into account that the convictions for the two offences on the indictment and the two further offences inevitably bring with them other restrictions in various aspects of day to day life. The references tendered on sentence demonstrate this. I also infer that future employment prospects have been negatively impacted by the conviction, as will entry to other countries that place restrictions on entry based on criminal history.

64. Finally, I return to s 7 of the Sentencing Act and to the purposes of a sentence which are set out at [7]. In this sentencing proceeding I consider that all seven articulated purposes are engaged. In the particular circumstances of this case, I consider it possible and desirable to give weight to the promotion of the rehabilitation of the offender. At the same time I have accommodated the other purposes conformably. As is obvious, there can be no mathematical approach taken. In particular, I have formed the view that a lengthy term of full time imprisonment will be counter- productive to the prospects of rehabilitation and that adequate punishment can be accommodated. As is pointed out in the authorities, my task is to take account of all relevant factors and arrive at a single result. An early return to the community under supervision will enhance the prospects of beneficial reengagement with the community. I also bear in mind the offender's relatively young age and the fact he has not been to prison before.

65. I am satisfied that no penalty is appropriate other than imprisonment.

66. On the count of aggravated burglary the offender is convicted and I sentence him to a period of imprisonment for one year and nine months. That sentence will commence on 9 May 2015.

67. On the count of unlawful confinement the offender is convicted and I sentence him to a period of imprisonment for 12 months. That sentence will be back dated to commence on 9 February 2015 so as to take account of pre-trial custody.

68. On the count of common assault, the offender is convicted and I sentence him to a period of imprisonment for two months. That sentence is back dated to commence on 9 February 2015.

69. On the count of carry/ use firearm with disregard for own safety or safety of other persons, the offender is convicted and I sentence him to a period of imprisonment for one month. That sentence to back dated to commence on 9 February 2015.

70. I dismiss the charge of possess offensive weapon with intent.

71. This provides for a total effective sentence of two years' imprisonment.

72. I order that the balance of the sentence is to be suspended from 9 December 2015 conditional upon the offender signing an undertaking to comply with obligations imposed under a good behaviour order. The order will expire on 8 February 2017.

73. In addition to the core conditions as provided by s 86 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), I impose an additional condition that the offender report to ACT Corrective Services at Eclipse House within 48 hours of his signing the order and a further condition that he accept the supervision and comply with all reasonable directions as deemed necessary by ACT Corrective Services during the period of the order.

I certify that the preceding seventy-three [73] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his honour Acting Justice Robinson