Effective sentence of 8 years imprisonment with a nonparole period of two years and eight months.

CRIMINAL LAW - Sentence - offences of indecent assault and buggery - historical offences - delay in prosecution -prosecution previously statute barred - "current sentencing practice" - applicable sentencing pattern

Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 7, 33(1)

Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 79, 81, 92E, 92K, 441

Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) ss 25, 30

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 61E, 61M

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 19

Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)

AJB v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 51; (2007) 169 A Crim R 32

Dousha v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 263

MJL v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 261

Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610

R v Blanco [1999] NSWCCA 121

R v King [2013] ACTCA 29

R v MJR [2002] NSWCCA 129; (2002) 54 NSWLR 368

R v Moon (2000) 117 A Crim R 497

R v Roberts [2003] NSWCCA 309

R v Schumacher (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, McGregor J, 15 January 1980)

R v Shore (1992) 66 A Crim R 37

R v Wruck [2014] QCA 39

Stalio v The Queen [2012] VSCA 120; (2012) 223 A Crim R 261

1. The offender pleaded guilty at the earliest reasonable opportunity to 12 sexual offences that occurred between 1 December 1979 and 31 December 1980, when the offender was 23 to 24 years of age. The offences involved one victim, who was then aged between 11 and 12 years old. The 12 offences occurred during four separate incidents.

2. The offences are one count of buggery (contrary to s 79 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act) as in force at that time) and 11 counts of indecent assault on a male (contrary to s 81 of the Crimes Act as in force at that time). At the relevant time, all sexual assaults against a male apart from buggery were prosecuted as indecent assault, including fellatio.

3. In relation to the buggery count, the maximum available sentence is life imprisonment, and a sentence of not less than five years' imprisonment must be imposed. In relation to the remaining counts, the maximum available sentence is five years' imprisonment.

4. In recognition of the utilitarian value of the early pleas, the offender will receive the usual discount of 25%.

5. A detailed statement of facts is contained in Exhibit 1.

6. At the outset, I acknowledge the terrible impact that these offences must have had upon the victim. I do not doubt that they have had a permanent and severe impact upon the victim's sense of self and freedom to enjoy his own sexuality. I appreciate that they would also have had a devastating effect on the victim's family.

7. In 1979, the victim joined the Cubs Association and through the Association met the offender, who was then a 23 year old Scout Master in charge of the Scout Group to which the victim's brother belonged. Through this connection, the offender became a friend of the victim's family. The victim's parents trusted the offender and allowed him to look after the victim, whom the offender saw up to 3 or 4 times a week.

8. The offender owned a shoe shop. During the 1979/1980 Christmas holiday period, the victim, then 11 years old, went to the offender's shoe shop to assist the offender.

9. On one occasion when the shop was free of customers, the offender took the victim to the storage/tea room area of the shop, and started to talk about sex. He showed the victim a collection of pornographic magazines, which contained pictures of sexual acts. While the victim was looking at the pictures, the offender stood behind the victim and pushed his erect penis against the victim's back (offence 1). When a customer entered the shop, the offender left to serve the customer, but he encouraged the victim to continue reading the pornographic magazines.

10. Later, the offender returned to the storage area, asked to see the victim's penis, and removed the victim's pants. The offender fondled the victim's erect penis (offence 2) and then performed fellatio on the victim for a period that the victim thinks was 10 minutes (offence 3). He stopped when a customer entered the shop.

11. After the customer left, the offender returned to the storage area and asked the victim to remove the offender's pants and underpants. The victim did so. At the offender's request, the victim performed fellatio on the offender until the offender ejaculated into the victim's mouth (offence 4).

12. Needless to say, these offences comprised the victim's first sexual experience.

13. After that incident, the victim spent more time with the offender, both at the offender's shop and at the home of the victim's parents.

14. The second incident occurred one afternoon when the victim was 11 years old. He was home alone when the offender arrived. The offender removed the victim's school pants and underpants, fondled the victim's penis and then performed fellatio on the victim (offence 5). About 10 minutes later, the offender removed his own pants and underpants. At the offender's request, the victim performed fellatio on the offender (offence 6). The offender then placed Vaseline on a finger and digitally penetrated the victim's anus before attempting to insert his penis into the victim's anus. This was not the first occasion upon which the offender had attempted penile penetration. Despite the victim's protestations that he was in pain, the offender proceeded to penile penetration and continued intercourse until he ejaculated inside the victim (offence 7 - buggery).

15. The third incident occurred during 1980. The offender was at the victim's home. The offender invited the victim to accompany him to his parent's home, saying that he needed to pick something up. When the offender and the victim arrived at the home of the offender's parents, no one was home. The offender began to rub the victim's penis through the victim's pants, then inserted his hand into the victim's underpants and started to masturbate the victim's penis with his hand (offence 8). The offender then performed fellatio on the victim for about five minutes (offence 9). At the offender's request, the victim unzipped the offender's pants and performed fellatio on the offender until the offender ejaculated into the victim's mouth (offence 10). The offender again performed fellatio on the victim (offence 11). The offender returned the victim to the victim's home.

16. The final incident occurred on a Saturday afternoon in 1980, when the victim was still 11 years old. The victim was watching television with his mother, a family friend and the offender. The offender and the victim were sitting on the same couch. The offender covered himself and the victim with a blanket. While they were covered up, the offender put his hand down the victim's pants and fondled the victim's penis for about 45 minutes (offence 12).

17. The offending conduct involved one victim. It occurred in four separate episodes over, at most, a 12 month period.

18. There was a significant age gap between the victim (who was about 11 years of age at relevant times) and the offender (who was 23 or 24 years old).

19. The offender gained entree into the victim's family circle through his leadership role in the Scout movement, although the offences were not directly related to the offender's role as a Scout Master. In this regard, the breaches of trust perpetrated by the offender were not as dire as they would have been had the offender been in a role of special responsibility such as parent or teacher. Nevertheless, in relation to each of the first three incidents, the victim's parents had allowed the offender to have care of the victim because they trusted him. The last incident involved a subterfuge that was a gross violation of the close relationship between the offender and the victim's family.

20. In evidence, the offender conceded that he had made deliberate attempts to be alone with the victim. He acknowledged that he was trusted by the victim and his family.

21. It is true that no threats or violence were used in connection with the offences. However, the offender took advantage of the victim's vulnerability in that he was on the cusp of adolescence and was sexually inexperienced but, because of his age, he was beginning to become aware of his own sexuality.

22. The buggery offence was objectively very serious. It was the culmination of a series of interactions that could be characterised as "grooming" of the victim. The victim made it quite clear that the offender was hurting him, but the offender persisted until he attained ejaculation. The offence was not isolated, in that there had been prior attempts at penile penetration of the victim. That consideration mitigates any leniency that might otherwise have been extended on the basis that there was one isolated attempt at penile penetration.

23. Each of the indecent assaults was objectively serious, but the offences involving fellatio were particularly serious. Fellatio is among the most serious types of indecent assault. The true nature of such conduct is now recognised in that fellatio is now characterised as sexual intercourse rather than indecent assault.

24. In the late 1980s, the victim made a complaint to a friend.

25. Some years after the offences, the offender contacted the victim's family for the purpose of apologising to the victim, but the victim's father told him that he was not welcome and should not attempt further contact.

26. In January 2003, the victim made a police statement. On 31 January 2005, he attended the Winchester Police Centre and participated in a "pretext phone call" with the offender. During the telephone call, the offender apologised for molesting the victim, saying that he now realised that his conduct was wrong.

27. On 31 March 2005, the offender attended the Winchester Police Centre and participated in a record of interview in which he admitted to engaging in acts of indecency with the victim. He denied penetration. He told police that, at the time of the offences, he did not appreciate that his conduct was indecent but that, about 15 years prior to the interview, he developed an appreciation that he had acted wrongly. As a consequence, he had attended the victim's home for the purpose of apologising, but the victim's father had told him that he was not welcome.

28. At the time of the offences and until recently, a limitation period of 12 months applied to prosecution of the offences. After the offender participated in the police record of interview, he was advised that he would not be prosecuted because of the limitation period.

29. Pursuant to s 441 of the Crimes Act, which came into effect on 9 December 2013, the limitation period was retrospectively repealed.

30. In R v Blanco [1999] NSWCCA 121 at [16] and [17] Wood CJ at CL said that delay may be relevant to a sentencing exercise first, because of the "uncertain suspense" in which an offender may have been left, second, because the offender may have demonstrated progress toward rehabilitation during the intervening period, or third, because a sentence for a stale crime calls for a measure of understanding and flexibility of approach, it being in the public interest that those suspected of serious crime be brought to justice quickly, particularly when there is a strong case available against them.

31. The second and third of these considerations are relevant in the present case. In relation to rehabilitation, in the decades since the commission of the offences, the offender has gained insight into his misconduct and has voluntarily sought treatment. There is no suggestion that he has reoffended.

32. The offender is now 58 years old. He has no other criminal record. The fact that the offender is otherwise of good character is a matter to be taken into account, but it must be remembered that, had he not been of good character, he would have been refused access to the victim.

33. The offender has had a variety of employment, including work in the hospitality and landscaping industries. Currently, he works as a gardener.

34. He was raised in a religious family. He was the second youngest of six children. His father, a domineering man, was a foreign diplomat who was frequently absent from the home. The offender's older brother was chronically ill and required a high level of care by the offender's mother. As a result, the offender was deprived of normal security and intimacy within the family home.

35. The offender was traumatised by an incident that occurred when, as a boy, he was bicycling with his father. The offender's father fell from his bike, sustaining brain damage that rendered him an invalid for the rest of his life.

36. During his childhood and adolescence, the offender witnessed inappropriate sexual behaviour within the family home and he was repeatedly subjected to serious sexual assaults by a family member. When he was 13 years old, he complained to his mother but she told him that such conduct was normal. At a Catholic school, he was bullied, and he was beaten by Christian Brothers in a humiliating manner. At another private school, he participated in male to male sexual behaviour. According to Dr Knox, a psychiatrist, these behaviours probably contributed to the offender's attitude to and participation in the offences.

37. Dr Knox said that the offender probably suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in childhood, resulting in a decreased ability to reflect on his behaviour as a young man.

38. The offender married when he was 26 years old, but the relationship did not endure. He has no children. He has never had a long-term same-sex partner, although he has had several homosexual relationships. He has always been attracted to adolescent males.

In summary I believe that the particular psychosocial circumstances of Mr Scheeren's early life, particularly his own sexual abuse, and the liberal attitude towards sex in his home, led him to accept such behaviour as normal during his adolescent years, and to continue it into his early adult life. I believe that Mr Scheeren's personality had been retarded by his difficult early circumstances leaving him relatively immature in his sexuality and other personality attributes, even to the present time. His general personality has been severely disrupted and he has not been able to settle into regular work or ongoing intimate relationships with adult partners.

40. The offender said that, when he was confronted in his late 20s, he began to appreciate that his conduct towards adolescent boys was wrong. Prior to this awakening, he saw sexual interaction with adolescent boys as "naughty, but not bad", as "fondling, not molestation". In evidence, he said that "it was just a lifestyle (to him), part of (his) childhood since (he) was about eight years old." Remarkable as such an attitude now seems, I accept that the offender's evidence was truthful.

41. The offender sought counselling and, through counselling, began to appreciate that his own upbringing had been traumatic and dysfunctional and that sexual behaviour towards adolescent boys would disrupt their personal development. He was particularly assisted by a counsellor whom he saw when he was about 31 years of age. Through her, he gained an appreciation that, as a consequence of his own abnormal upbringing, he suffered from a lack of behavioural and social boundaries. It was after he consulted that counsellor that he attended the home of the victim's family for the purpose of apologising to the victim. In evidence, the offender said that, when he gained an appreciation of the impact of his conduct on the victim, he was horrified.

42. The offender has demonstrated acknowledgement, contrition and remorse and has cooperated with police to an extent that is unusually high extent for a child sex offender. He has voluntarily undertaken counselling and did so a long before learning that the victim had approached police.

43. The author of the pre-sentence report has assessed the offender as being at low to moderate risk of future sexual and general offending, and considered that the risk may be further reduced by psychological counselling for risk management and mental health issues. Given the offender's age, the treatment that he has undertaken, and the fact that he has not come to attention for other offences, I consider that the risk of reoffending is low.

44. The offender submitted that he should be sentenced in accordance with sentencing patterns applicable at the time of the offences.

45. The Crown submitted that the proper approach in the ACT to sentencing for historical offences differs from that in NSW, and that in the ACT an offender should be sentenced in accordance with sentencing patterns that are applicable at the time that the sentence is imposed.

46. If the offender was sentenced in accordance with current sentencing patterns, it is likely that he would receive sentences that were more severe than those that would have been imposed had he been sentenced in 1980/1981, particularly in relation to the offences of indecent assault, where no mandatory minimum sentence applies.

47. The Crown relied upon s 33(1)(za) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), and the absence of a comparable provision in the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (Sentencing Procedure Act). The Crown also relied upon s 19 of the Sentencing Procedure Act (which provides that, in NSW, increased penalties apply only prospectively, but reduced penalties apply retrospectively) and the absence of a comparable provision in the ACT.

48. In NSW, it has been held that where, by reason of delay, an offender is exposed to a harsher punishment and sentencing regime than that which existed at the time of the offence, if an authentic and credible body of statistical material exists that is capable of reconstructing what would have been done previously, then the sentencing court should seek to impose a sentence appropriate not only to the then applicable statutory maximum penalty but also to the then appropriate sentencing pattern: R v MJR [2002] NSWCCA 129; (2002) 54 NSWLR 368 at [31], [69], [71] and [105] (a five-judge bench of the Court of Criminal Appeal, Mason P dissenting) approving R v Shore (1992) 66 A Crim R 37 per Badgery-Parker at J at [42]. In R v MJR, Spigelman CJ explained the background to the approach taken in NSW and the import of s 19 of the Sentencing Procedure Act at [17]- [19], [26]-[27] and [29]:

17 A similar debate has arisen in the context of increases in the maximum penalty for an offence between the commission of the offence and trial. A number of English decisions held that the maximum at the date of the conviction is applicable (DPP v Lamb [1941] 2 KB 89; Buckman v Button [1943] KB 405 and R v Oliver [1944] KB 68). These decisions have been subject to criticism in England and would now be inconsistent with Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights - signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 - (see F A R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed (1997) London, Butterworths at 235-240)... The issue in this line of cases is one of statutory interpretation and the strength of the presumption against retrospectivity.

18 The position was put beyond doubt by statute in New South Wales ... In New South Wales, the provision is now found in s19 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ...

19 As can be seen by contrasting s 19(1) and s 19(2), the legislature has applied the policy that offenders receive the benefit irrespective of the change, that is, if the penalty goes up, they are not subject to it, if it goes down, they receive the benefit of it.

...

26 It is, of course, clear in the context of statutory interpretation that where Parliament manifests an intention that a new sentencing regime operate retrospectively, the courts will give effect to that intention (see Siganto v The Queen [1998] HCA 74; (1998) 194 CLR 656 at 662). It may also be the case that the purpose to be served by a change in sentencing practice would require the court to take into account the new practice even when sentencing for an offence that occurred many years before, eg, an increased emphasis on general deterrence because of prevalence. Nevertheless, that will not necessarily be so..

27 Section 19 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 and its predecessor reflects a principle of perceived fairness applicable to maximum and minimum penalties, which it is appropriate to adopt for other aspects of the exercise of the sentencing discretion.

...

29 It is sufficient for present purposes to employ the statute as reflecting a principle of fairness that it is appropriate to adopt....

(emphasis added)

49. In NSW, it has been held that, when sentencing an offender for offences committed many years earlier and where no sentencing range current at the time of offending can be established, the sentencing court can only sentence by reference to the relevant objective and subjective features and maximum penalty: R v Moon (2000) 117 A Crim R 497 per Howie J at [41], R v MJR per Sully J at [107], R v Roberts [2003] NSWCCA 309 per Howie J at [20]. Where limited decisions are available and those decisions do not reveal any distinct pattern of sentencing, the decisions cannot be relied upon to show a pattern of sentencing: Dousha v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 263.

50. In summary (as the Crown submitted), the NSW approach is that, subject to any express statutory provision to the contrary, not only should offenders receive the benefit of the more favourable maximum penalty (whether it be that applicable at the time that the offence was committed or that applicable at the time of sentence), but (where there is evidence to support such an approach) they should also receive the benefit of the more favourable sentencing pattern.

51. Should a similar approach be taken in this jurisdiction?

52. In the ACT, s 25 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) is similar to s 19 of the Sentencing Procedure Act. It provides:

(2) A penalty may not be imposed on anyone for a criminal offence that is heavier than the penalty that applied to the offence when it was committed. If the penalty for an offence is reduced after anyone commits the offence, he or she benefits from the reduced penalty.

53. Should this policy flow through to the consideration of earlier sentencing patterns (as it does in NSW) or does s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act preclude such an approach?

54. Section 33 of the Sentencing Act (which finds no parallel in the NSW Sentencing Procedure Act) provides:

(1) In deciding how an offender should be sentenced (if at all) for an offence, a court must consider whichever of the following matters are relevant and known to the court:

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not limit the matters a court may consider in deciding how an offender should be sentenced (if at all) for an offence.

55. There is a difference between current sentencing practice or practices and current sentencing patterns, although the distinction has often been confused. In Monfries v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 46, the Court of Appeal considered s 33(1)(za). The Court adopted the approach that has been taken in Victoria to a similar provision, s 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), which provides that, in sentencing an offender, a court "must have regard to ... current sentencing practices". In Stalio v The Queen [2012] VSCA 120; (2012) 223 A Crim R 261, Neave and Osborn JJA and King AJA decided that s 5(2)(b) means that a sentencing judge must have regard to sentencing practices (patterns) at the time when a sentence is imposed, rather than practices (patterns) at the time when the offence was committed. However, referring to R v MJR [2002] NSWCCA 129; (2002) 54 NSWLR 368, AJB v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 51; (2007) 169 A Crim R 32, MJL v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 261, R v Wruck [2014] QCA 39, the Court held that sentencing practices (patterns) at the time when the offence was committed could also be relevant; such practices (patterns) may illuminate a consideration of equal justice, for example where sentencing practices (patterns) had moved in a manner adverse to an offender.

56. Section 25 of the Human Rights Act sits within pt 3 of the Act, which sets out the civil and political rights that apply in the ACT. When interpreting ACT legislation, those rights must be acknowledged. Section 30 of the Human Rights Act provides that "so far as it is possible to do so consistently with its purpose, a Territory law must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights".

57. Section 30 of the Human Rights Act requires that, as far as possible consistently with its purpose, s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act be interpreted in a way that is "compatible" with the human right set out in s 25 of the Human Rights Act. Even if it is appropriate to read s 25 narrowly as referring only to maximum penalties (and I make no finding in that regard), s 33(1)(za) and s 33(3) should be interpreted in a manner that is compatible with the s 25 human right, to permit consideration of sentencing patterns at the time when the relevant offence was committed, where those patterns are more lenient than current sentencing patterns.

58. The Court was assisted by the parties' research into sentencing patterns in about 1980/1981. Defence counsel accessed a manual/log book maintained by the Court's library and provided a table of all fulltime custodial sentences imposed in 1980/1981, together with the relevant nonparole periods. The table is reproduced as an annexure to these reasons.

59. During 1980/1981 there was one sentence for buggery R v Schumacher (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, McGregor J, 15 January 1980 (Schumacher)) which involved a head sentence of five years' imprisonment and a nonparole period of the same length. Schumacher was a different type of case from the present case.

60. In 1980/1981 there were six sentences for rape. Head sentences of between four years' imprisonment and nine years six months' imprisonment (Shumacher) were imposed, with associated nonparole periods of between 15 months and five years' imprisonment (Shumacher), that is, between 31% and 54% of the head sentence. This range is consistent with the range for all custodial sentences imposed in the period (numbering approximately 40, a number that would appear to be statistically significant), where the nonparole period was between 17% and 69% of the head sentence. Looking at all custodial sentences, nonparole periods were typically one third of the head sentence, and the average was 38% of the head sentence.

61. Although it suggests that sentences at that time were relatively lenient, the material does not establish any pattern in relation to head sentences for offences of buggery or rape. However, the material clearly shows a sentencing pattern pursuant to which the Court imposed nonparole periods that were significantly less than the nonparole periods that are currently imposed by the Court (which often lie in the range of 50 - 70% of the effective sentence).

62. The Court was referred to R v King [2013] ACTCA 29, in which the Court of Appeal upheld a Crown appeal against the inadequacy of sentences imposed for 25 sexual offences committed on 5 boys aged between 10 and 16 years. The offences occurred between 1989 and 1997. They involved different offence provisions (relevantly, act of indecency on a person aged 10 to 16 years under s 92K(2) of the Crimes Act, in relation to which the maximum penalty was 10 years imprisonment, and sexual intercourse with a person aged 10 to 16 years under s 92E(2) of the Crimes Act, in relation to the which the maximum penalty was 14 years imprisonment). However, the facts of some offences were similar to the facts of some of the subject offences. In relation to fondling offences, the offender was resentenced to 20 months' imprisonment. In relation to the fellatio matters, he was resentenced to three years nine months' imprisonment or four years' imprisonment.

63. The Court had regard to a number of NSW decisions concerning sentencing for historical sexual offences and to a table of pre 1999 NSW Court of Criminal Appeal cases involving breaches of s 61E and s 61M(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) for which sentences were imposed in NSW during the 1980s and 1990s. The sentencing pattern in NSW at that time is of marginal assistance, both because it relates to a different jurisdiction and because it covers a period of time subsequent to the period when the subject offences were committed. To the extent that it is of relevance, it confirms that, at least in NSW, sentences at that time were significantly more lenient than current sentences for similar offences.

64. It is important to consider the sentencing pattern applicable in the ACT at the relevant time, while remembering that the Court is bound by the provisions of the Sentencing Act and that the essential parameters in relation to any sentencing exercise are the objective circumstances, the subjective circumstances and the maximum available penalty.

Considerations under the Sentencing Act and otherwise.

65. The Court is required to consider the sentencing purposes set out in s 7 of the Sentencing Act. In this case, relevant sentencing purposes include the imposition of just and appropriate punishment, general deterrence, promotion of rehabilitation, accountability, denunciation and the recognition of harm done to the victim.

66. In so far as those factors are known to the Court and relevant, the Court is required to consider the matters set out in s 33(1) of the Sentencing Act, and has done so; the relevant matters have been referred to above.

67. The Court is required to sentence in an appropriate manner having regard to the decisions in Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610 and Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59, considering the correct sentence for each offence and accumulating sentences so as to properly reflect the totality of the criminal behaviour.

68. I record a conviction for each of these matters and I impose the following sentences.

Incident 1

1. 6 months' imprisonment (reduced from 8 months) 24.9.14 - 23.3.15

2. 9 months' imprisonment (reduced from 12 months) 24.9.14 - 23.6.15

3. 22 months' imprisonment (reduced from 30 months) 24.3.15 - 23.1.17

4. 22 months' imprisonment (reduced from 30 months) 24.3.15 - 23.1.17

Incident 2

5. 22 months' imprisonment (reduced from 30 months) 24.6.17 - 23.4.19

6. 22 months' imprisonment (reduced from 30 months) 24.6.17 - 23.4.19

7. 5 years 3 months' imprisonment (reduced from 7 years) 24.6.17 - 23.9.22

Incident 3

8. 9 months' imprisonment (reduced from 12 months) 24.9.15 - 23.6.16

9. 22 months' imprisonment (reduced from 30 months) 24.9.15 - 23.7.17

10. 22 months' imprisonment (reduced from 30 months) 24.9.15 - 23.7.17

11. 22 months' imprisonment (reduced from 30 months) 24.3.16 - 23.1.18

Incident 4

12. 18 months' imprisonment (reduced from 24 months) 24.12.16 - 23.6.18

69. The total effective sentence is eight years' imprisonment from 24 September 2014 to 23 September 2022. I fix a nonparole period of two years and eight months, from 24 September 2014 to 23 May 2017.

I certify that the preceding sixty nine [69] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Chief Justice Murrell

Sentences imposed in the ACT Supreme Court in 1980 and 1981 (where terms of imprisonment that were not fully suspended were imposed)