CRIMINAL LAW - bail - successive applications for bail - Bail Act s 20C - change in circumstances - jurisdiction - fixing of trial date sufficient to grant jurisdiction - effect of delay before trial - lengthy delay inappropriate - delay relevant but not determinative to bail.

CRIMINAL LAW - bail - strength of Crown case - entirely circumstantial case - weak Crown case not a justification for granting bail - risk of reoffending - onus of proof - Crown must at least adduce sufficient evidence to raise the risk of re-offending - finding on a risk of re-offending must not be merely speculative.

Bail Act 1992 (ACT), ss 9A, 20C(2), 22, 25(6), 42A, 43A

Bail Act 1978 (NSW), s 32

Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), Pt 4.4

Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s 18

Collins v The Queen [2003] ACTCA 17

Dunstan v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] FCA 921; (1999) 92 FCR 168

Edwards (1988) 35 A Crim R 465

Eleko v Government of Nigeria [1928] AC 459

Filipetti (1978) 13 A Crim R 335

Gray v Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] VSC 4

Hillier v The Queen [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618

Mercanti v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 254

Musarri v The Queen [2001] WASC 200

Pinkstone (2000) 119 A Crim R 462

R v A (1968) 13 FLR 342

Re an Application for Bail by Breen [2009] ACTSC 172; (2009) 172 ACTR 21

Re an Application for Bail by Holmes [2011] ACTSC 187

Re an Application for Bail by Rodriguez [2008] ACTSC 50

Re an Application for Bail by SA [2010] ACTSC 114

R v Hilton (1987) 7 NSWLR 745

R v Kissner (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hunt CJ, 17 January 1992)

R v Rochford; Ex parte Harvey (1967) 15 FLR 140

Saka v The Queen [2001] WASC 92

Gans, J, Henning, T, Hunter, J, Warner, K, Criminal Process and Human Rights (Federation Press, 2011)

(1) Mr Rubino is bailed to take his trial on 9 December 2013 or on any other occasions as directed by the Registrar of the Supreme Court, on the following conditions:

(a) a cash surety of $10 000 is to be paid by Ms Anna Rubino, who the Court declares to be an acceptable person for that purpose;

(b) that he reside at [an address provided to the Court];

(c) that he not use a mobile telephone;

(d) that he may use a land line telephone but must disclose that telephone number to the police if requested;

(e) that he not contact or approach, directly or indirectly, Mr Michael John Robertson, save that his legal representatives may contact Mr Robertson's legal representatives;

(f) that he not drive a motor vehicle;

(g) that he report twice a day, between 6:00 am and 11:00 am and then 3:00 pm and 8.30 pm each day, to the officer in charge of Belconnen Police Station;

(h) that he not absent himself from his place of residence between the hours of 9:00pm and 6:00am unless he is and remains in the company of his mother; and

(i) that he not attend or be within 100 metres of any shopping centres or clubs after 6:00pm.

• 1․ In November 2010 and February 2011, the Weston Club in Canberra was, on three occasions, broken into and cash changing machines and poker machines damaged so that the cash in them could be and was stolen. In January and February 2011, a number of autopay parking machines in the ground level car park at Belconnen Westfield Shopping Centre were, on three occasions, damaged so that cash could be and was stolen.
• 2․ These burglaries and thefts were recorded on closed-circuit television (CCTV) at each location and showed a number of men armed with various tools involved in these events. Police viewed the CCTV of the incidents. Police also intercepted telephone conversations under warrants and, in August 2011, executed search warrants on the homes of Michael John Robertson and the applicant, Richard Michael Rubino.
• 3․ On 26 September 2011, Mr Rubino was arrested and charged with a number of offences of aggravated burglary, theft and criminal damage. He appeared in the Magistrates Court the next day and applied for bail, which was refused. He has remained in custody since that time.
• 4․ On 23 February 2012, he was committed for trial to this Court. An indictment containing 15 counts was filed. Mr Robertson was also arrested and charged with the same offences. He, too, was committed for trial to this Court and, as he and Mr Rubino were jointly charged with the same offences, the one indictment was filed in respect of both Mr Rubino and Mr Robertson.
• 5․ On 28 August 2012, Mr Robertson pleaded guilty to four of the counts on the indictment. It was indicated to the Court at the time that a number of other counts would be included in a list of additional offences under Pt 4.4 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). I was advised also that charges arising out of the two incidents in February 2011, at the Westfield Belconnen Shopping Centre car park, would not be pursued against Mr Robertson.
• 6․ On 28 August 2012, Mr Rubino was arraigned on the indictment referred to above and pleaded not guilty to all counts. His trial was set to commence on 9 December 2013, by which time he will, were he not released on bail before then, have been in custody for two years and about two and a half months. Mr Rubino has now applied for bail.
• 7․ This is, however, not Mr Rubino's first bail application. As I have noted above, he applied for bail when he first appeared in the Magistrates Court. So far as I can tell, he made two further bail applications to that Court on 11 October 2011 and 24 November 2011. Each was refused.
• 8․ There is, of course, no limit to the number of bail applications that a person arrested and detained in custody can make. The Privy Council held in Eleko v Government of Nigeria [1928] AC 459 that an applicant for bail under a writ of habeas corpus has the right to apply to each judge of the Court and that the judge is bound to entertain the application on its merits. For long in this Territory, applications for bail to this Court do not need to be by way of application of habeas corpus_: R v Rochford; Ex parte Harvey_ (1967) 15 FLR 140 at 146.
• 9․ Although in this Court Gibbs J (as his Honour then was) in R v A (1968) 13 FLR 342 at 342-3 expressed some doubts about whether successive applications could be made, the matter is now put beyond doubt by the Bail Act 1992 (ACT), which expressly contemplates that an applicant may make more than one application, though under s 20C(2) of that Act, successive applications may only be entertained by the Court if it is satisfied:

(a) that since the last application for bail there has been a change in circumstances relevant to the granting of bail; or

(b) that there is fresh evidence or information of relevance to the granting of bail that was unavailable at the last application for bail.

• 10․ I shall return to that issue shortly.
• 11․ On 9 December 2011, apparently following the failure of his third application for bail in the Magistrates Court (presumably a review under s 42A of the Bail Act: Re an Application for Bail by Holmes [2011] ACTSC 187), thereby meeting the criteria set out in ss 42A and 43A of the Bail Act, Mr Rubino made an application to this Court. It was refused. It appears to have been refused because the judge considered that there was an unacceptable risk of reoffending and that the Crown case appeared to be particularly strong.
• 12․ A further application was heard on 23 March 2012. I do not have clear evidence of the reason for the refusal on that occasion, but it appears also to have related to the risk of reoffending.
• 13․ An application was again made. This application was heard on 8 June 2012. On this occasion the police officer who has been assisting the informant in the matter, known as the corroborator, gave extensive evidence about the Crown case and was cross-examined. It was submitted that the Crown case, then disclosed, was not strong but that did not find favour with the Court. Though a circumstantial case, the Court considered that the case based on the combined strength of what individually may be challengeable items of evidence was "not inherently weak".
• 14․ The Court then considered the likelihood of reoffending. What, I have to say, was unclear was the Crown's basis for submitting that there was a risk of reoffending. It appeared that there was an assumption that there was such a risk and that the applicant had to disprove that. I shall refer to this issue further below.
• 15․ Following the listing of the case for trial, a further bail application was made, this time to me. This was clearly prompted by the fact that the date for trial, set about 15 months after the arraignment because of the substantial workload of this Court, which meant that no earlier date could be allocated, would result in Mr Rubino remaining in custody for a substantial period of time.
• 16․ On this occasion, Mr Rubino submitted that there were changes in circumstances necessary to entitle the Court, under s 20C of the Bail Act, to consider his application. Those were, he submitted, that the hearing date for the trial had now been set and that Mr Rubino's uncle was offering him employment if he was granted bail.

• 17․ There has not been a detailed consideration in this jurisdiction of how a court should approach the preconditions for considering successive applications for bail. Part of that may be that because bail applications need to be considered speedily; as the liberty of the subject is at issue and delay is highly inappropriate, those reasons are often prepared under a considerable time pressure. This means that the Court does not always have the luxury of research or the opportunity for reflection on matters of jurisprudence in this area. Of course, reasons can be delivered after the decision is given.
• 18․ In this case, there was no significant issue around the test of what might be summarised as "change of circumstances" or "fresh evidence".
• 19․ In Re an Application for Bail by Rodriguez [2008] ACTSC 50 at [20], I noted:

Mr Pappas further submitted that while on its face the terms of the section [that is, the predecessor to section 20C of the Bail Act] provide a high threshold to be met by applicants for a review, the provision had to be interpreted in the light of s 18 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and that the effect of this would be to moderate the strictness with which the threshold was to be applied. I have said before that, in my view this is a strong submission. I have not had the opportunity to consider it in detail. It is clear that the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) does not prevent pre-trial custodial detention and does not mandate bail in every case. I have not had an opportunity to give the interaction between the two Acts a detailed consideration and, given the time available to me, will not do so now.

• 20․ It is clear, of course, that the change of circumstances has to be a relevant change in relevant circumstances as so described by Roberts-Smith J in Pinkstone (2000) 119 A Crim R 462 at 464; [15]. In Edwards (1988) 35 A Crim R 465, McPherson J had to consider a similar provision and what was required, and said (at 471):

A persuasive and satisfying case is ... required, and not one in which the differences disclosed by the additional material go only to matters of mere detail, or to considerations which, although not previously raised, would not have been likely to alter the balance to one favouring the grant of bail.

• 21․ That approach was followed by White AUJ in Musarri v The Queen [2001] WASC 200 at [12], where his Honour said:

Accordingly, I hold that the matters raised [in the equivalent to section 20C of the Bail Act] in order to enliven the jurisdiction ... be matters that would have been likely, if known to the judge who previously refused bail, to alter the balance in favour of bail.

• 22․ That formulation was adopted by the Court of Appeal of Western Australia in Mercanti v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 254 at [28]. That, of course, was a case decided on different legislative provisions and without the obligation to interpret legislation consistently with the rights in the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). Thus, I would hesitate to follow this approach strictly were it to mean that the change in circumstances or fresh evidence can only enliven the Court's jurisdiction to consider a successive bail application if that factor means that bail must then be granted. That is certainly not how the provision has been approached in this jurisdiction.
• 23․ Nevertheless, that it must not merely show some change in detail and must favour a grant of bail, seem to me to be important elements. That would be required by the judicial restraint that ought to be applied so that too low a threshold of fresh evidence or change in circumstances would not justify the Court simply assuming jurisdiction and being able then to revisit the matter on its own.
• 24․ In Re an Application for Bail by SA [2010] ACTSC 114 at [7], Penfold J held that the fixing of a date for trial was sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction in those circumstances. Employment is clearly relevant favouring a grant of bail.
• 25․ In this case, the prosecution accepted that there was a change of circumstances or fresh evidence or both that permitted me to consider the application, and I do so.

• 26․ As so often happens, the application was conducted in a somewhat protean manner. This is partly a result of the structure of s 22 of the Bail Act, which identifies three issues which a court must consider, namely, the likelihood of the applicant appearing to take his trial, the likelihood of what might be called a misbehaviour while on bail (that is, committing an offence, harassing or endangering the safety or welfare of someone, or interfering with evidence, intimidating a witness or otherwise obstructing the course of justice) and the interests of the applicant.
• 27․ Subsection 22(3) then provides that the Court may have regard to any relevant matter, including matters set out there such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the applicant's character, background and community ties, the likely effect of the refusal of bail on the applicant's family, any previous grants of bail and the strength of the evidence in the Crown case.
• 28․ Unlike some other bail legislation, such as s 32 of the Bail Act 1978 (NSW), these are not identified as relevant to any of the specific issues which the Court must consider.

• 29․ The prosecution, represented primarily by Ms M Jones, accepted that there was no specific concern that Mr Rubino would not attend to take his trial so long as appropriate conditions were in place. The issue that had been canvassed in earlier applications and which was raised again, so far as the Crown was concerned, was the risk of reoffending.
• 30․ Mr K Archer, who appeared for Mr Rubino, submitted that a major issue to be considered was the weakness of the Crown case. The Crown case was, as noted above, entirely circumstantial. I saw a significant amount of evidence. It is, of course, not appropriate for me to attempt to try the case or make any findings, especially about the credibility of evidence other than in a very broad way. This was addressed at some length by Cross Ch QS in R v Wakefield (1969) 89 WN (Pt1) (NSW) 325 at 329-31. I do not need to repeat what is there said, but I follow it in general terms.

• 31․ A good deal of evidence was tendered before me and I was invited to have regard to the evidence tendered in the earlier bail application on 8 June 2012.
• 32․ Still photographs taken from the various incidents show a number of persons engaged in the activities said to constitute the offences. It is not possible to identify any of the persons other than Mr Robertson.
• 33․ My attention was particularly drawn to the following items shown in the photographs: a pair of motorcycle gloves with a distinctive buckle; a silver coloured thin metal pole; a handheld CB radio receiver and transmitter; and a sweatshirt with the word "Russell" on it in red. These were identifiable in the photographs, though the reproductions were by no means perfect. I can accept, however, that a jury, properly instructed, could properly identify them.
• 34․ The evidence was that these items used in a number of the incidents were located in Mr Rubino's house when the search warrant was executed there. That would be powerful evidence linking Mr Rubino with incidents, though not necessarily with their commission, for it may simply be that he was an accessory after the fact. That, of course, is a matter for the jury.
• 35․ Only one of the items, however, was found in the bedroom that was said to be occupied by Mr Rubino. The other items were found elsewhere in the house. The force of this evidence was further diluted by a statement that had apparently been made by Mr Robertson and another suspect in the incidents that they were, at the relevant time, staying at Mr Rubino's house. This would confront the Crown with a problem of the kind identified in Filipetti (1978) 13 A Crim R 335. That is not to say that it could not be overcome, but it does weaken the case.
• 36․ The Crown further relied on the shoe print found at the Weston Club just inside where the window was broken to gain entry and behind the receptionist's desk. That made it very likely, if not certain, to have been left by those involved in the incident. A shoe was also located in the search under the search warrant, though the shoes were found in the laundry of Mr Rubino's house. The shoe was compared with the shoe print found in the club. The forensics expert who made the examination concluded that the prints had been produced by the seized shoe "to the exclusion of all others". That again was strong evidence, perhaps a very strong evidence.
• 37․ Mr Rubino, however, made a formal admission through his counsel that his shoe size was 10. The shoe seized in the search was size 13. I was not told whether these sizes were comparable; that is, there are different size systems in different countries, but without further evidence it is not a strong link with Mr Rubino.
• 38․ There is also some telephone intercept material. My attention was drawn to statements that suggested that Mr Rubino was aware of the incidents and that he would not give any assistance to police by identifying any of the other participants. Again, this circumstantial evidence may assist the jury to come to a view about Mr Rubino's guilt, but it is not strong evidence.
• 39․ The police have clearly worked hard with considerable energy and care in investigating these incidents. The evidence that they have accumulated is an impressive testament to their skill and diligence. It cannot, however, make the case stronger than the actual evidence produced will allow. It is, of course, important that a court does not assess the individual items of evidence alone. It has to assess the combined effect of all the evidence to assess its value. Such was made clear by the High Court in Hillier v The Queen [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618. Even applying that test, I am left with a grave suspicion that I cannot assess the evidence as disclosing a strong Crown case.
• 40․ That a case is weak is, of course, not a justification for bail in itself. It is rather that where the case is strong the case for bail is less compelling. So much is clear from R v Wakefield.

• 41․ The other matter, however, is whether Mr Rubino is likely to commit further offences. As I noted above, there seemed to be an approach in the prior bail applications that it would be assumed that Mr Rubino would commit further offences and he had to disprove that. That is not only inconsistent with the presumption in favour of bail in s 9A of the Bail Act, it also offends against the presumption of liberty in s 18 of the Human Rights Act.
• 42․ In Re an Application for Bail by Breen [2009] ACTSC 172; (2009) 172 ACTR 21, I suggested that an applicant may bear an onus in a bail application. I was trenchantly criticised by J Gans et al in Criminal Process and Human Rights (Federation Press, 2011) at 173-4, especially as I had relied on a decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal where a later, though unreported decision, had come to a different conclusion: see R v Kissner (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hunt CJ, 17 January 1992); cf R v Hilton (1987) 7 NSWLR 745 at 748. Though a decision of a single judge, R v Kissner was a decision by one of the judges in the earlier case.
• 43․ I accept that I may be wrong and that it may be, as Hunt CJ held in R v Kissner, the Crown retains the onus throughout the hearing. I do not have the time to come to a final view about that. It does seem to me, however, that the Crown must, certainly in respect of a claim that the appellant is likely to commit further offences, at the very least adduce sufficient evidence to raise the issue. The finding on that issue must be cogent and not speculative.
• 44․ This matter has been addressed by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia when the appellate court of this Court in Dunstan v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] FCA 921; (1999) 92 FCR 168. In that case, Madgwick J said (at 174; [21]):

It is a wrong approach to deny a person bail in an effort to eliminate the risk that such a person might commit offences if free to do so. There is no legislative warrant for preventative detention based on a fear that the worst possibility will come to pass. The question posed by the Bail Act is whether the Court is satisfied that any risk is sufficient to justify the Court denying the accused person a legal right, the right to bail, established by s 8.

In my view, it is wrong to approach the issue under ss 8(2) and 22(1)(c) on the basis of the elimination of risk. The correct question to ask is whether the prosecution has satisfied the Court that on the evidence before it there is a real likelihood of the applicant committing an offence while released on bail, although in this connection, likelihood does not mean more likely than not: see the explanation by Deane J in Tillmans Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (1979) 42 FLR 331 at 346-348 ... If the answer is yes, then that factor, and the extent of the likelihood, will be taken into account in the general weighing process. If the answer is no, then any possibility short of real likelihood is simply to be ignored in the balancing process. > > It should be borne in mind, when considering this topic, that refusal of bail upon the basis of 22(1)(c) alone is tantamount to preventative detention. In my view, this is a cogent reason for not permitting a finding to be made on this issue on the basis of suspicion and speculation. Discussion of the matter in terms of risk is calculated to encourage that basis.

• 46․ This approach was approved by the ACT Court of Appeal in Collins v The Queen [2003] ACTCA 17 at [28].
• 47․ In this case, the Crown relied on Mr Rubino's record. It was a challenging one, disclosing 32 convictions or findings of guilt in 12 court appearances. The offences of which he was convicted include very serious offences of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and attempted robbery. There were also a number of theft offences, assault and trespass offences.
• 48․ They have resulted in prison terms for Mr Rubino though, more recently, those terms have been suspended. Convictions for the offences of which he now stands charged may breach a Good Behaviour Order imposed on 16 April 2010. The most recent prior offences, however, were committed in 2009, that is, they are not very recent though still recent enough to be worrying.
• 49․ There is also a reference in the telephone intercept material to another incident. On 27 June 2011, Mr Rubino spoke to Mr Robertson about what was called the "CISAC" job, suggesting that it was "going ahead". While that is worrying, it is also some time in the past and Mr Robertson is now in a position where he has pleaded guilty to various of the offences as noted above. He is also in custody, rendering at least his participation in the "job" unlikely.
• 50․ Against this evidence, I had evidence from Mr Rubino's uncle. He is the owner of a company, T Rubino Boring Pty Ltd, which installs infrastructure for a number of very significant clients in Canberra. The company engages in directional drilling and trenching. He employs 11 people currently.
• 51․ He made, on oath, an offer to employ Mr Rubino and keep him employed full-time for at least six months. He had employed Mr Rubino previously. He frankly said that he could not guarantee employment after that time because it depended on contracts and workflow, though he was confident that he would be able to find him part-time work thereafter, though he could not, of course, guarantee the amount of that work.
• 52․ He readily accepted there would be days when the work would not progress because of rain, but he said that on those days his employees were employed on maintenance at his depot. He accepted that he would not be supervising Mr Rubino at all times, but was emphatic that he would notice if he did not attend for work even were he to be working on one of his other crews.
• 53․ He acknowledged that he had spoken to police suggesting that the work would not be full-time. He explained that he had since then spoken to his project manager, who had advised him that there was full-time work that was available, in fact, and that he would also be happy to work with Mr Rubino, despite his long criminal record. Mr Rubino's uncle showed a low tolerance of misbehaviour, especially with his employees being alcohol or drug affected at work.
• 54․ He also expressed the view that Mr Rubino's offending is more a result of associating with what he described as "the wrong crowd", suggesting that it was not really an issue of the use of illicit drugs. This is not insignificant when considering whether bail conditions will address the risks that I need to consider.

• 55․ Delay in the hearing of proceedings is a relevant factor. It may be that, as was decided by Bongiorno J in Gray v Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] VSC 4, delay before trial that would exceed any sentence to be served by an offender would require bail to be granted. I do not need to consider that matter in this case. That eventuality is unlikely to be met here. The offences are very serious ones and lengthy prison terms are likely to be imposed were Mr Rubino to be convicted. Nevertheless, lengthy delays in setting cases down for trial are inappropriate (see, for example, what fell from McKechnie J in Saka v The Queen [2001] WASC 92 at [38]-[40]). While the time between this application and the trial is by no means determinative, it is certainly relevant.
• 56․ Having carefully considered as evidence, I am not satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that Mr Rubino if released on bail, will re-offend.
• 57․ Not without some hesitation, I am prepared to grant Mr Rubino bail on strict conditions. I consider that the proposed conditions are strict. They have, however, been proposed by Mr Rubino. Section 25(6) of the Bail Act provides:

(6) A court or an authorised officer, in granting bail to an accused person who is an adult -

(a) must not impose a condition mentioned in subsection (1) unless the court or authorised officer is of the opinion that the imposition of the condition is necessary to secure 1 or more of the following purposes:

(i) the attendance of the person before a court from time to time as required in relation to the offence in relation to which bail is being granted;

(ii) the protection from harm of the accused person or any other person;

(iii) the prevention of the accused person from committing an offence while at liberty on bail;

(iv) the prevention of the accused person from interfering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing the course of justice whether in relation to himself or herself or anyone else; and

(b) must not, except at the request of the accused person, impose a condition, or a combination of conditions, that impose obligations that are more onerous than necessary to secure the purposes referred to in paragraph (a) for which the condition or combination of conditions is imposed.

Section 25(6)(b) makes the point that if the accused person requests the bail conditions I can impose them even if they are more onerous than necessary to secure the relevant bail obligations.

Suitability of the person providing the surety

• 58․ Finally, it was suggested that Mr Rubino's mother, who offered to provide a cash surety and with whom he would reside, is not a suitable person because she is recorded in a telephone conversation as saying, in effect, that she would interfere with evidence if incriminating of Mr Rubino.
• 59․ As she is now to lodge a very substantial sum of money, which comprised her savings, that position is somewhat different. She has described the money as follows: "It's a lot of money. I've worked hard for it. It's my security and I honestly believe, at this stage, Richard has woken up to himself. He's got a daughter".
• 60․ This was a reference to Mr Rubino's first child, who is just over one year old. He has been in custody for a large part of her life. Mr Rubino indicated in a letter to the Court that he is missing her growing up. He also noted that his fiancée has made it clear that if he engages in more crime she will leave the ACT and take their daughter. This can be a powerful motivating force for him to remain crime-free in the circumstances.
• 61․ Accordingly, I shall grant Mr Rubino bail to attend his trial on 9 December 2013, and on any other occasions when directed by the Registrar, with the following conditions:

(a) a cash surety of $10 000 is to be paid, and I will declare that Anna Rubino is an acceptable person for the purpose of lodging the surety;

(b) he is to reside at [an address provided to the Court];

(c) he is not to use a mobile phone;

(d) he may use a landline but must disclose that number to police if requested;

(e) he is not to approach or contact John Michael Robertson directly or indirectly save that his legal representatives may contact Mr Robertson's legal representatives;

(f) he is not to drive a motor vehicle;

(g) he is to report twice a day, between 6:00 am and 11:00 am and then between 3:00 pm and 8.30 pm each day, to the officer in charge of Belconnen Police Station;

(h) he is not to leave his residence between the hours of 9:00 pm and 6:00 am unless he is and remains in the company of his mother;

(i) he is not to attend or be within 100 metres of any shopping centres or clubs after 6:00 pm. Although where second level quotes exist some attention may need to be paid to the spacing between first level and second level quotes, in circumstances where you are including quoted paragraph numbers. It is too hard to fix this in the template.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Refshauge.