"It is now settled (See, in particular, Cleland v. The Queen (1982) 151 CLR, at 9, 23-24, 34-35; Pollard v. The Queen (1992) 67 ALJR, at 196, 203, 206, 226) that, in a case where a voluntary confessional statement has been procured by unlawful police conduct, a trial judge should, if appropriate objection is taken on behalf of the accused, consider whether evidence of the statement should be excluded in the exercise of either of two independent discretions. The first of those discretions exists as part of a cohesive body of principles and rules on the special subject of evidence of confessional statements. It is the discretion to exclude evidence on the ground that its reception would be unfair to the accused, a discretion which is not confined to unlawfully obtained evidence. (See, Duke v. The Queen [1989] HCA 1; (1989) 63 ALJR 139, per Brennan J., at 141; Van Der Meer v. The Queen [1988] HCA 56; (1988) 62 ALJR 656, per Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, at 665-666. See also Collins v. The Queen (1980) 31 ALR, per Muirhead J, at 277, per Brennan J, at 313) The second of those discretions is a particular instance of a discretion which exists in relation to unlawfully obtained evidence generally, whether confessional or 'real'. It is the discretion to exclude evidence of such a confessional statement on public policy grounds. The considerations relevant to the exercise of each discretion have been identified in a number of past cases in the Court. (See, as regards the unfairness discretion, McDermott v. The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 513-515; R. v. Lee [1950] HCA 25; (1950) 82 CLR 133 at 148-155; Pollard v. The Queen (1992) 67 ALJR, at 226, and, as regards the public policy discretion, R. v. Ireland [1970] HCA 21; (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 334-335; Bunning v. Cross ; at 74-80; Pollard v. The Queen (1992) 67 ALJR, at 196, 203-204, 206-209) To no small extent, they overlap. The focus of the two discretions is, however, different. In particular, when the question of unfairness to the accused is under consideration, the focus will tend to be on the effect of the unlawful conduct on the particular accused whereas, when the question of the requirements of public policy is under consideration, the focus will be on 'large matters of public policy' and the relevance and importance of fairness and unfairness to the particular accused will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. In a case where both discretions are relied upon to support an application for the exclusion of a voluntary incriminating statement obtained by unlawful police conduct, it will commonly be convenient for the court to address first the question whether the evidence should be excluded on the ground that its reception and use in evidence would be unfair to the accused. It is so in the present case.