The views already expressed are sufficient to dispose of the appeal but in view of the fact that the point just discussed was not debated at the trial and that attention was focused solely on the question whether the appellant had adduced "direct proof of malice" it is necessary that something should be said on this point also. The expression "direct proof" used in relation to malice raises questions of some difficulty. It is, of course, not difficult to distinguish between "direct evidence" and "circumstantial evidence" when it is used concerning issues of fact which are provable by either means. There is no difficulty in appreciating how the commission of many crimes may be proved by direct evidence, that is to say, by the evidence of witnesses who have observed the commission of those crimes, or by circumstantial evidence, that is to say, by direct evidence of collateral facts from which inferences may be drawn concerning the existence of a fact or facts primarily in issue. But it is virtually impossible to prove some issues of fact by direct evidence. If A be charged with assaulting B with intent to murder him, or with intent to rob, the question of A's intent in either case is a question of fact. But the mental processes of one person are not capable of being proved by the direct evidence of others in the sense in which that term is generally understood. (See Phipson on Evidence, 9th ed. (1952), p. 2, and Taylor on Evidence, 12th ed. (1931), p. 63.) The issue of fact must, therefore, be proved in the first instance by way of inference from proved facts. The same observation may be made concerning proof of malice, that is to say proof that a defendant was actuated by some improper motive or motives. It is, of course, quite impossible for a plaintiff to prove such an issue except by inference from collateral facts and this alone is sufficient warrant for saying that the statutory provision does not debar a plaintiff unless malice be proved by direct evidence in the sense in which I have used that term. The examination of the provision should, therefore, commence by assuming that "direct proof of malice" does not exclude proof by evidence of facts which give rise to the inference that the defendant was actuated by malice for this is the only way in which that issue may be established. This being so what is meant by the expression "direct proof of malice"? The learned trial judge was fully aware of the difficulties created by the expression and finally expressed the view that the provision would operate as a bar unless a plaintiff could prove what, in fact, the improper motive of the defendant was; it would not be sufficient, he thought, to prove circumstances leading to the inference that there must have been an improper motive unless the motive was also identifiable. But once it is recognized that "direct proof" cannot mean "direct evidence", and that the former expression does not exclude proof by evidence of facts from which the inference of malice may be drawn, I can see no reason for the distinction made by his Honour. As pointed out in the passage quoted by him from the judgment of Cave J. in Brown v. Hawkes [1] , "Malice can be proved, either by showing what the motive was and that it was wrong, or by showing that the circumstances were such that the prosecution can only be accounted for by imputing some wrong or indirect motive to the prosecutor" [2] . In endeavouring to construe the provisions of par. H it should be borne in mind that it was first enacted in Western Australia in 1853 and it was introduced in sufficiently wide terms to cover a multitude of activities. It was designed for incorporation in any Act passed by the Parliament of the State and it was contemplated that it might be adopted for the protection of government officials and others in the exercise of a wide variety of statutory powers. Quite obviously it was the intention of the legislature to afford protection to governmental officers in respect of wrongful acts, that is to say, the exercise or purported exercise of statutory powers on insufficient grounds or "without just cause or excuse". There can, however, be no reason for attributing to the legislature an intention to afford protection in respect of wrongful acts which have been prompted by some motive other than the legitimate interests which the exercise of any particular statutory power is intended to serve. But divergent meanings have, over a long period, been assigned to the word "malice" and the absence of just cause might, itself, be taken as evidence of it. As Bayley J. said in Bromage v. Prosser [3] : "Malice in common acceptation means ill will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse" [4] . See also M'Pherson v. Daniels [5] and Reg. v. Munslow [6] . Since, however, it was the aim of the provision to afford protection in respect of acts done without such cause or excuse it was necessary to distinguish between malice in this sense and what has been described as actual or express malice. Hence the use of the expression "unless there is direct proof of malice" to indicate that the protection afforded by the section extends to cases where malice may be said to be implied from the absence of just cause and excuse; but the use of the expression does not, in my view, exclude a plaintiff who is able by evidence of collateral facts to prove the existence, in fact, of an extraneous motive whether the motive be identifiable or not.