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CC 2025/6223 – Count 2 Use carriage service to Maximum penalty: 15 years access child abuse imprisonment material: contrary to s Mandatory minimum: 4 years 474.22(1)(a)(i) of the imprisonment Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) CC 2025/6225 – Count 3 Failure to report under a Maximum penalty: 5 years reporting condition as imprisonment, $80,000 fine or registered person: contrary both to s 58A of the Crimes (Child Sex Offenders) Act 2005 (ACT) CC 2025/12166 – Count 4 Use carriage service for Maximum penalty: 15 years child abuse material: imprisonment contrary to s Mandatory minimum: 474.22(1)(a)(iii) of the 4 years imprisonment Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) CC 2025/12170 – Count 5 Use carriage service for Maximum penalty: 20 years sexual activity with person imprisonment under 16 years of age: Mandatory minimum: contrary to s 474.25A(1) of 5 years imprisonment the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) CC 2025/12172 – Count 6 Attempt to use carriage Maximum penalty: 20 years service for sexual activity imprisonment with person under 16 years Mandatory minimum: 5 years of age: contrary to s imprisonment 474.25A(1) with s 11.1(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) CC 2025/12175 – Count 7 Transmit indecent Maximum penalty: 10 years communication to person imprisonment under 16 years of age: Mandatory minimum: 3 years contrary to s 474.27A(1) of imprisonment the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth)

Prior offending

6. On 18 May 2006 Mr Morris was convicted of two counts of acts of indecency of a person under the age of 10, and possessing child pornography of a person under 16 years of age. As a result of that conviction, Mr Morris became a registered child sex offender. He has thus been a registered offender for over 20 years. As a registered offender, Mr Morris participated in annual interviews with the ACT Police Child Sex Offenders Registry Team; his last interview was on 13 June 2024. As a part of that process, Mr Morris is and was required to report personal details including details of carriage services, email addresses, internet usernames, instant messaging usernames, chat room usernames and others. He was required to report those details within 7 days of inception. Mr Morris failed to report the details of the accounts under consideration for the subject offending. He did not and does not have a reasonable excuse for failing to do so.

Relevant aspects of the legislative framework

7. Sections 16AAA and 16AAB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) set out the mandatory minimum penalties for the offences. Section 16AAC of the Crimes Act 1914 provides I may set a sentence lower than the mandatory minimum period only in prescribed circumstances: 16AAC Exclusions and reductions—minimum penalties … Reduction of minimum penalty (2) A court may impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than the period specified in column 2 of an item of a table in section 16AAA or subsection 16AAB(2) only if the court considers it appropriate to reduce the sentence because of either or both of the following: (a) the court is taking into account, under paragraph 16A(2)(g), the person pleading guilty; (b) the court is taking into account, under paragraph 16A(2)(h), the person having cooperated with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of: (i) in relation to any of items 1AA to 1H of the table in section 16AAA—the offence or an offence against subsection 80.2H(1) or 80.2HA(1) or Part 5.3 or 5.5 of the Criminal Code; or (ii) in relation to any of items 1 to 15 of the table in section 16AAA or any of the items in the table in subsection 16AAB(2)—the offence or a Commonwealth child sex offence. (3) If a court may reduce a sentence, the court may reduce the sentence as follows: (a) if the court is taking into account, under paragraph 16A(2)(g), the person pleading guilty—by an amount that is up to 25% of the period specified in column 2 of the applicable item in the relevant table; (b) if the court is taking into account, under paragraph 16A(2)(h), the person having cooperated with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of: (i) in relation to any of items 1AA to 1H of the table in section 16AAA—the offence or an offence against subsection 80.2H(1) or 80.2HA(1) or Part 5.3 or 5.5 of the Criminal Code; or (ii) in relation to any of items 1 to 15 of the table in section 16AAA or any of the items in the table in subsection 16AAB(2)—the offence or a Commonwealth child sex offence; by an amount that is up to 25% of the period specified in column 2 of the applicable item in the relevant table; (c) if the court is taking into account both of the matters in paragraphs (a) and (b)— by an amount that is up to 50% of the period specified in column 2 of the applicable item in the relevant table.

8. The parties in advance of sentencing provided me with an agreed statement of facts which outlines the offending of Mr Morris. Where it is relevant the offending has been set out above. Whilst the maximum penalty for each of the offences will provide my assessment of sentencing with a yardstick in regard to seriousness, the sentence imposed must be proportional to the point in which Mr Morris’ offending falls upon the spectrum of objective seriousness. I set out Mr Morris’ personal circumstances below and take those into account as guided by the relevant sentencing principles.

9. Section 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 sets out matters to which I must have regard in the sentencing exercise including the nature and circumstances of the offence. Section 16A (2AAA) provides relevantly: (2AAA) In determining the sentence to be passed, or the order to be made, in respect of any person for a Commonwealth child sex offence, in addition to any other matters, the court must have regard to the objective of rehabilitating the person, including by considering whether it is appropriate, taking into account such of the following matters as are relevant and known to the court: (a) when making an order—to impose any conditions about rehabilitation or treatment options; (b) in determining the length of any sentence or non-parole period—to include sufficient time for the person to undertake a rehabilitation program.

10. In Minehan v R [2010] NSWCCA 140; 201 A Crim R 243 at [94], in assessing the objective seriousness of offences involving the possession or transmission of child pornography, Hulme J (with Johnson J and Macfarlan JA agreeing) identified a non-exhaustive list of prospectively relevant factors: (a) whether actual children were used in the creation of the material; (b) the nature and content of the material, particularly in regard to the age of the victim and gravity of the offending; (c) the extent of cruelty or physical harm discernible; (d) the number of items that make up the material; (e) the degree of sophistication; and (f) the purpose. The nature of the offence

11. The total material recovered from Mr Morris’ devices and accounts amounted to over 1,700 individual files in a mixture of videos and images in category 1 and category 2.

12. A description of the material includes:

Type Category Description

Image 2 Image of a young blonde prepubescent female, aged approximately seven to nine years old, naked at the beach. The image is cropped to focus on the child and to draw focus to the female’s breast and vagina

Video 1 A video with a focus throughout on the genitals of children from infants to pre-teens. The nudity is graphic, with children engaging in sexual acts, including masturbation and sexual intercourse. Video is 1 hour and 27 minutes in duration.

Image 1 A prepubescent female, aged roughly 4-6 years old, wearing a black with white polka dot pants on her left leg. The photo is of her vagina being penetrated by an adult penis.

Image 1 A prepubescent female, aged roughly 6-9 years old, wearing a pink shirt, the image is cropped to focus on her exposed vagina with her legs spread.

Image 2 A prepubescent male, aged roughly 6-9 years old, taking off black shorts to expose his penis. The photo seems to be taken in a public grass area. The photo has been cropped to focus on the male and his genitals.

Image 1 A prepubescent female, aged roughly 4-6 years old, wearing a black with white polka dot pants on her left leg. The photo is of her vagina being penetrated by an adult penis.

Image 1 Pubescent aged roughly 7-9 years old. Wearing black lace stockings and shirt, opened in the middle to expose her vagina and anus. She is laying on her back holding her legs to her chest, holding her legs open to expose her vagina and anus.

Image 2 Image of a blonde Caucasian prepubescent female, aged between 10 to 12 years old, naked, posing seductively to emphasise her bottom.

Image 2 A prepubescent male, aged roughly 6-9 years old, wearing green short[s], with the left leg sleeve rolled up to expose his penis. He is playing a gaming device, not looking at the camera.

Video 1 A video of an early pubescent female and prepubescent female. The pair undress, then cuddle, kiss and manipulate each other’s breasts.

13. It is apparent that the motivation in part for Mr Morris was his own sexual gratification and to ‘trade’ images online with like-minded individuals. The offending otherwise included: (a) posing as a child to gain access to child pornography; (b) disseminating explicit images to other online users; (c) exchanging child pornography images and videos with other online users; (d) holding images depicting depraved and penetrative sexual activity with young children; (e) repeated episodes of accessing child abuse material online; (f) repeated episodes of offending via exposing himself to children and young victims in video and chat forums over a period of one and ½ months; (g) exposing himself to children online and masturbating in front of a total of 30 different children; and (h) failing to report personal details in relation to his various online and digital accounts.

14. My assessment of Mr Morris’ offending is that in the overall sense it falls in the low to mid-range of objective seriousness. Some of the offending such as the possession charge and the failure to report charge is at the lower end of the range. The access charge relating as it does to repeated access over a period of time is more serious, approaching the mid-range, as are the charges relating to using a carriage service for sexual activity with persons under the age of 16 years. Injury, loss or damage resulting from the offences

15. It is a matter of significance that real children were involved in the offending, notwithstanding their identities are not known. The long-term psychological impacts of childhood sexual abuse are very well recognised. The inability to identify the victims in this case and the absence of evidence from them concerning the impact of Mr Morris’ offending does not prevent this court from reaching a conclusion as to the likely negative impact of the offending on the victims. It is reasonable to infer that impact would be significant and sustained. In Small v R [2020] NSWCCA 216 at [55] Johnson J (with Hoeben CJ at CL and Lonergan J agreeing) observed, citing with approval Kannis v R [2020] NSWCCA 79, that cybersex offending against children has just the same persuasive principles of presumption of harm being suffered by the victim as it would to offending that occurs “in person”.

Plea of guilty

16. Mr Morris entered pleas of guilty to the offences in the Magistrates Court. The Crown appropriately concedes there is utilitarian value in the plea. Delay of the trial proceedings is avoided, and a conclusion to the matters is more readily achieved. Importantly, the guilty pleas ensure members of the community who might have made up a jury are spared from witnessing distressing and depraved material that may have been exhibited.

17. The Crown submits the pleas were entered in the face of an overwhelmingly strong case and thus a recognition of the inevitable. Section 16A(2)(g) of the Crimes Act 1914 requires the court to have due regard to the timing of the plea and “the degree to which that fact and the timing of the plea resulted in any benefit to the community, or any victim of, or witness to, the offence”. In the circumstances, the victims are unknown but the members of the community otherwise comprising the jury have clearly been afforded a benefit.

18. A point of contention arose between the parties in submissions as to the quantum of the discount to be afforded for a plea of guilty. The Crown submits Mr Morris should be afforded a discount but is silent as to its quantification. Section 16AAC of the Crimes Act 1914 provides for a discount of up to 25% for a plea of guilty, being 25% of the period specified in column two of the applicable item in the table in s 16AAB. The Crown submits a reduction in those terms will be appropriate only where the prima facie sentence determined falls within, or falls close to, the “least serious circumstances”. Reliance for that proposition is placed on the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Glasheen v R [2022] NSWCCA 191 and on R v Taylor [2022] NSWCCA 256; 304 A Crim R 384. I do not accept that submission, nor was it pressed by the Crown on appeal in Glasheen, although the contention had been raised in submissions before the primary judge and relied upon in the first instance decision. In Glasheen the Court of Appeal observed at [13]-[14]: The applicant’s complaint was that her Honour was not barred from applying the full discount of 30% to the undiscounted starting point of 4 years and 6 months, as s 16AAC(2)- (3) applied. The applicant contended that his head sentence should have been 3 years 1 month and 24 days with a non-parole period of 2 years and 1 month. In this Court, the Crown conceded that her Honour had erred in failing to give full effect to the combined discount of 30%. The Crown accepted that it was not necessary for the sentence to be the mandatory minimum sentence, or even in the lowest category of objective seriousness, before the deductions in s 16AAC could be utilised.

19. I accept the first step in the process is the determination of an appropriate head sentence, with due regard to the objective seriousness of the offending, and the parameters provided by the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences. Once that process has occurred, and regardless of whether there is a finding the offence constitutes the least serious circumstances, the court is called upon to apply s 16AAC of the Crimes Act 1914 and, where applicable, to determine an appropriate discount for the plea of guilty, whether or not the discount results in a sentence falling below the statutory minimum.

Whether a discount should be given for assistance

20. Section 16AAC (3)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914 allows a sentence reduction of up to 25% for cooperation with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of: (i) in relation to any of items 1AA to 1H of the table in section 16AAA—the offence or an offence against subsection 80.2H(1) or 80.2HA(1) or Part 5.3 or 5.5 of the Criminal Code; or (ii) in relation to any of items 1 to 15 of the table in section 16AAA or any of the items in the table in subsection 16AAB(2)—the offence or a Commonwealth child sex offence;

21. The Crown accepts some assistance was provided to the police in the form of the provision of passcodes to enable access to devices. Although a s 3LA order was obtained prior to the first period of cooperation, the Crown concedes its import may not have been fully understood by Mr Morris and as a consequence some allowance for cooperation should be made. Mr Morris highlights the fact that assistance was provided to police on three occasions and no relevant order was in place in respect of the second and third episodes of assistance. He submits the latter assistance was thus uninfluenced by any coercion and as a consequence a modest discount for his cooperation is appropriate. Subjective circumstances of the offender

22. I have the benefit of a psychological assessment report prepared by Ms Ahu Kocak, forensic psychologist. Ms Kocak describes in detail Mr Morris’ personal background. At approximately two and a half to three years of age, Mr Morris developed measles meningitis, thrombocytopenia (abnormally lowered blood platelets) and/or a cerebral haemorrhage resulting in an acquired brain injury. His medical records also describe developmental delay, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, left hemiparesis, ataxia and periods of absence/seizure like episodes during childhood. Mr Morris attended Woden special school until year 9 when he transitioned into mainstream education. He completed year 12 at around 18 years of age. Thereafter his employment history is limited but includes several periods of work, including a 12-month period of barman/general duties work in a local club prior to his 2005 remand. Other work has included cleaning duties, work with his father, some office work and retail employment. His employment appears to have been generally part-time or intermittent. After his earlier time in custody, Mr Morris was employed in bar work and a liquor store for approximately three years prior to his arrest for the subject offending.

23. Mr Morris has limited intimate relationship experience. The records indicate his social and sexual development was immature relative to his chronological age. Ms Kocak describes Mr Morris’ family relationships as comparatively stable and supportive. Mr Morris denied any drug or alcohol use.

24. Mr Morris’ cognitive functioning is consistently assessed as significantly impaired. Psychometric testing undertaken in 2005 placed him in the borderline IQ range. Dr George, psychiatrist, placed Mr Morris in the lower 6% of the population for intelligence. Mr Sutton, psychologist, found his intellectual level to be borderline, “between low average and intellectually deficient”. His memory functioning was worse according to Mr Sutton, performing at no better than approximately 0.3% of his age group. Visual memory st was around the 1 percentile, as was attention/concentration, and verbal memory around rd the 3 percentile. Ms Kocak also records the findings of Dr Juanita Smith, clinical psychologist: Dr Smith summarised the results as indicating borderline intellectual functioning, between low average and intellectually impaired, with impairments in memory and executive functioning, including reasoning, organisation and impulse control.

25. Ms Kocak observes: The reports repeatedly link Mr Morris’ offending-related vulnerabilities to his cognitive and executive limitations rather than to substance dependence or major mental illness. The relevant concerns include poor impulse control, limited insight into behavioural triggers, poor capacity to anticipate consequences, difficulty understanding or verbalising his internal states, limited age-appropriate social and sexual development, and reduced capacity to benefit from insight-oriented group therapy. Mr Sutton considered that Mr Morris was not a predatory paedophile in the ordinary sense, but rather a cognitively impaired and developmentally immature man with poor cortical inhibition, immature sexual drives, and limited capacity to understand or manage those impulses. Later ASOP material similarly identified that his borderline intellectual functioning, memory impairment and executive deficits limited Mr Morris’ capacity to benefit from standard cognitively based or insight-orientated sex offender treatment, indicating the need for structured, concrete, behavioural and disability-informed intervention (Tom Sutton Neuropsychological Report, 30 July 2005; ACT Corrective Services ASOP Suitability Assessments, 2005 and 2006; Dr George Psychiatric Report, 1 May 2006).

26. Ms Kocak administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale as a comprehensive measure of his adult intellectual functioning. Mr Morris’ verbal comprehension index assessment fell in the borderline range, “indicating weakness in verbal reasoning, verbal concept formation, and the ability to understand and express complex verbal information.”

27. Ms Kocak concludes: In my opinion, Mr Morris’ presentation is best understood as reflecting a longstanding cognitive impairment rather than a primary mental illness. The available material does not support a diagnosis of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder or a trauma-related disorder. His difficulties are more appropriately understood in the context of early neurological illness and injury, with subsequent developmental delay, cerebral palsy and historical epilepsy.

28. In response to questions concerning his ability to exercise appropriate judgement she expresses the view that his cognitive impairment would have impaired his ability to exercise appropriate judgement to a moderate degree; finding an impaired capacity to process complex information, consider consequences, integrate prior learning and apply rules consistently in novel or unsupervised contexts. As to his ability to make calm and rational choices she says: In practical terms, this means Mr Morris may be able to understand simple information when it is presented clearly, but still struggles to use that information consistently when emotionally aroused, socially isolated, sexually preoccupied, or acting privately online.

29. Ms Kocak does not consider Mr Morris’ cognitive impairment to have removed his basic appreciation of wrongfulness. However, the sophistication of his moral reasoning and ability to understand the harm, seriousness and broader legal implications of child abuse material are reduced. Whilst she accepts his impairments likely made a meaningful contribution to his offending in reducing his capacity to regulate impulses and to consider the consequences of his behaviour, his impaired social skills also contributed to his offending. She concludes: In Mr Morris’ case, his ongoing limited intimate relationship history, social immaturity, poor understanding of boundaries and stated interest in online communication for “friendship” suggest that impaired social adaptation may have contributed to his use of online platforms and his poor judgement in sexualised communication. However, the alleged offending appears to have involved repeated conduct over time, use of multiple platforms with a focus on prepubescent children, and some concealment and planning. Those features suggest that his cognitive vulnerabilities also interacted with offence-related or sexually deviant interests that appear to have been insufficiently addressed during his prior convictions.

30. Ms Kocak recommends a coordinated treatment plan, observing his cognitive impairment renders him unlikely to benefit from “standard insight oriented or cognitively demanding group programs unless they are substantially adapted”. She observes the imposition of full-time imprisonment is likely to be more onerous for Mr Morris than for an individual of average cognitive functioning. Having said that Mr Morris expressed no particular psychosocial stressors arising from his incarceration at the time of Ms Kocak’s assessment. To be effective she considers any community-based sentence needs to involve robust treatment and supervision conditions noting the history of engagement with psychological treatment has been inconsistent despite previous recommendations for ongoing intervention.

31. I also have the benefit of a pre-sentence report. The most notable features of that report are: (a) Mr Morris has a relatively limited criminal history in the ACT, commencing in 1997 at age 18 with charges including sexual offending; (b) following his last conviction in 2004, Mr Morris remained free from sexual offending convictions for approximately 18 years until the first of the subject offences in 2022; (c) since entering custody in June 2025, Mr Morris has behaved in a compliant way with no particular issues identified; (d) Mr Morris described his upbringing as stable and positive and denied any history of neglect, abuse or substance misuse within the family home; (e) he described trouble forming relationships; (f) prior to entering custody Mr Morris was in rental accommodation in which he had resided for approximately six years. He anticipates residing with his father and his father’s partner on release from custody. No children reside at or regularly attend that address; (g) Mr Morris is a recipient of the disability support pension with payments ceasing during custody. There is no indication of financial difficulty or any involvement with gambling activity. Mr Morris has not accessed NDIS support; (h) he has a small group of friends established through his time at school and they are considered to be a pro-social influence; (i) there is no history of problematic alcohol or drug use; (j) his leisure activities are limited and there is a lack of involvement in structured social activities; (k) Mr Morris suffers some physical disability with ongoing pain in his knees and hands and has restricted capacity to stand for extended periods; and (l) Mr Morris displayed limited insight into the circumstances and motivations underpinning his offending. Whilst describing his behaviour as “pretty bad”, he was unable to articulate the aspect of his behaviour that was wrong or why the behaviour was wrong. As to his failure to comply with his reporting obligations he expressed an inability to understand those obligations. That statement is difficult to reconcile with records suggesting compliance with his reporting requirements between his release in 2006 up until the time of the subject offending.

32. The authors conclude: Mr Morris demonstrated limited insight into his offending behaviour and was unable to adequately identify or articulate the factors that contributed to his offending. This raises concerns regarding his capacity to comply with the requirements of a community-based order. Specifically, his limited understanding of offence-related risk factors may reduce his ability to effectively self-monitor, recognise escalating risk, and implement appropriate risk-management strategies in the community without ongoing external oversight and specialised intervention and significant support.

33. Mr Morris is considered suitable for high level supervision by corrective services reflecting the assessed risk of sexual reoffending. In the community he will require ongoing intensive supervision, specialised offence specific intervention and coordinated disability informed supports to mitigate the risk of further offending.

34. I also have the benefit of an email from Mr Morris’ father. He notes Mr Morris was placed in his care for a period of time following the previous offending which led to him being much more stable. Mr Morris senior was concerned when it was recommended to him previously that his son be released from his care and permitted greater freedom so as to develop some self-reliance. He therefore recommends that as part of any sentencing exercise Mr Morris is released into his long-term care with an obligation for continuing psychological treatment to assist in the development of behavioural changes. He notes the prospect of funding for long-term therapy through NDIS – a matter he is currently exploring.

Criminal antecedents of the offender

35. Mr Morris’ previous offending, although entirely relevant, is short and comprises the following: (a) 14 November 1997 – one count of indecent exposure and three counts of using a telecom service offensively; (b) 20 August 1999 – one count of offensive behaviour in a public place, one count of using a telecom service offensively and a breach of a recognisance order; and (c) 19 August 2005 – one count of possessing child pornography and three counts of acts of indecency on someone under 10 years of age

Expression of contrition

36. As noted above Mr Morris displays little insight into his offending. I have attributed little weight to his acceptance of responsibility, in recognition of his apparently limited capacity to reason why the offending behaviour occurred. As Ms Kocak explains Mr Morris appears to recognise the conduct is wrong but to lack insight into the gravity of the wrongdoing and its consequences. As a result, he is ill-equipped to manage sexually impulsive behaviours when unsupervised and lacks the motivation to exercise control because he doesn’t appreciate the likely impacts of his behaviour. What is not well explained by the evidence is the combination of factors leading to such a long period without evident offending following his previous incarceration. Perhaps it is explained by the supervision he received from his father in that period, although the duration of the period of supervision and the relationship between the ending of that supervision and the commencement of the subject offending is not apparent from the material before me.

The role of general deterrence in this case

37. In written submissions the Crown described general deterrence as the “primary sentencing consideration for offending involving child abuse material”. Section 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 does not elevate the deterrent effect that any sentence under consideration may have on other persons above the level of the other mandatory sentencing considerations set out in the section. Mr Morris submits the sentencing exercise is no different to any other and rehabilitation is just as important as general deterrence in synthesising the various factors to be taken into account. In oral submissions the position of the Crown moderated with the observation that other sentencing considerations are not excluded but general deterrence remains “one of the stronger drivers in the circumstances of this case”.

38. I adopt the helpful observations of McCallum CJ in R v Bajracharya [2022] ACTSC 276; 302 A Crim R 393, in the context of a similar submission, at [12]: I return, however, to the second proposition contended for by the Crown prosecutor, which is that general deterrence is the paramount sentencing factor. An unqualified statement in those terms does not sit comfortably with the requirement for individualised justice to which I have referred. For that reason, I doubt the correctness of the submission. Further, as to one of the offences, even if the proposition contended for by the Crown was ever a correct statement of sentencing principle, it certainly cannot be said to have survived the enactment of the amendments to the Crimes Act which came into effect on 22 June 2020.

39. The matters set out in s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 are of equal importance in the sense they are all matters that must be taken into account. In the circumstances of a particular case some will have no work to do, and others will be attended with significant weight. A general statement as to the primacy of a particular criteria in a category of cases is of little assistance and is not consistent with the principal of individualised justice. That is not to ignore the importance of general deterrence in this case consistent with the community’s abhorrence for crimes of this kind as reflected in the applicable maximum penalties.

40. I do not accept as Mr Morris contends he is not a suitable vehicle for general deterrence. Accepting he is cognitively impaired in a way that is impactful on relevant behaviours, the impairment is not such as to prevent him from functioning in a normal way in the community, occupying rental accommodation, engaging in paid employment from time to time and apparently managing his affairs. I do not accept Mr Morris’s cognitive impairment is at a level where he presents as an entirely inappropriate medium for making an example to others, accepting his impairment results in some moderation of the impact of general deterrence. In those circumstances general deterrence remains a relevant factor: R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 at [32(3)]

41. Relevantly also, Mazza J (with whom McLure P and Buss JA agreed) observed the following in Gok v The Queen [2010] WASCA 185 at [58]-[60]: While the existence of a mental impairment will almost always be relevant to the sentencing of an offender and will often result in a lower sentence, this is not always the case. As Gleeson CJ pointed out in R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67, 71, the existence of a mental impairment is one of the factors which must be balanced with other factors to produce a just sentence. It is wrong to assume that the existence of a mental impairment will automatically result in a lesser sentence: see also Lindsay v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 142 [23]. The impact of general deterrence is something which is often misunderstood. It is not the law that once it is demonstrated that an offender has a mental impairment that general deterrence is irrelevant. General deterrence still operates when a court is sentencing an offender with a mental impairment but its effect is, to use a phrase sometimes used in the cases, 'sensibly moderated'. In many cases, general deterrence will be given less weight because the offender is simply an inappropriate medium for making an example to others. However, it is an extreme case where considerations of general deterrence are eliminated entirely. These propositions are evident from F v The State of Western Australia [39], Champion v The Queen (1992) 64 A Crim R 244, 254 - 255 (Kirby P), and Paparone v The Queen [2000] WASCA 127; (2000) 112 A Crim R 190, 200 (Murray J). The degree to which general deterrence is moderated very much depends on the facts of the case. At one end of the spectrum stands the case where the offender is so afflicted by his or her mental impairment or impairments that general deterrence plays virtually no part. At the other end are cases where the moderation of general deterrence is small because the offender knows what he or she is doing and appreciates the gravity of his or her actions: R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48, 51 (Hunt CJ). Reduction in moral culpability

42. The Crown submits Mr Morris acted with knowledge of his actions and the capacity to appreciate their wrongfulness. As a consequence, they contend his moral culpability is not substantially reduced. Mr Morris submits his moral culpability is reduced because he knows what he is doing is wrong, but he has an impaired ability to abstain from the wrongful behaviour. I accept that submission.

43. The New South Wales Court of Appeal observed in R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 at [23]: To the extent that mental illness explains the offence - as her Honour found to be the position in the present case - then an offender's inability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions, or to make reasonable judgments, or to control his or her faculties and emotions, will impact on the level of culpability of the offender, even where the illness does not amount to an excuse at law. As Wood CJ at CL put it in Henry, supra, at [254]: "... the community will readily understand that the offender who suffers from a mental disorder or abnormality is less in control of his or her cognitive facilities or emotional restraints, and in some instances lacks the ability to make reasoned or ordered judgments. Almost invariably there is a limited appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act, or of its moral culpability, which although falling short of avoiding criminal responsibility does justify special consideration upon sentencing."

44. In Verdins the Court identified at [32] (at least) six ways in which impaired mental functioning may be relevant to sentencing: Impaired mental functioning, whether temporary or permanent (“the condition”), is relevant to sentencing in at least the following six ways: 1.The condition may reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct, as distinct from the offender’s legal responsibility. Where that is so, the condition affects the punishment that is just in all the circumstances; and denunciation is less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective. 2.The condition may have a bearing on the kind of sentence that is imposed and the conditions in which it should be served. 3.Whether general deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of sentence or both. 4.Whether specific deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration likewise depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms of the condition as exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of the sentence or both. 5.The existence of the condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable recurrence) may mean that a given sentence will weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person in normal health. 6.Where there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on the offender’s mental health, this will be a factor tending to mitigate punishment.

45. Mr Morris’ cognitive impairment does not prevent him from seeing the conduct in which he engaged as wrongful behaviour. It does however impair his capacity to manage his response to impulsive thoughts and to understand the consequences of his wrongful behaviour. The relevant question is whether the behaviour was less likely to occur if the cognitive impairment was not present. In Mr Morris’ case that question must be answered positively. Whilst his cognitive state is then relevant in reducing his moral culpability, it is also relevant when consideration is given to the protection of the community.

46. Noting Mr Morris recognises his offending conduct as wrongful, and with due regard to his apparently positive response to the previous period of incarceration in terms of subsequently modified behaviour for an extended period, I accept specific deterrence is a matter of significance in this case.

Prospects of rehabilitation

47. The Crown submits a guarded approach is called for in assessing prospects of rehabilitation because: (a) the offender lacks insight into his offending and his accountability for the offending; and (b) his cognitive deficits lead to a number of relevant risk factors: inability to regulate impulses or consider consequences, inability to comply with complex obligations and reduced capacity to disengage from inappropriate online behaviours.

48. Mr Morris emphasises the long period of positive behaviour following his previous offending before engaging in the subject offending. The significance of that 18-year period must be recognised. It sits in real contrast to the above average risk of sexual reoffending described by the authors of the presentence report. As I have identified earlier, that period of positive behaviour is not well explained by the material before me. I accept, as Mr Morris submits, his status as a repeat offender does not necessarily lead to the conclusion he has poor prospects of rehabilitation: R v Bone [2026] ACTSC 184 at [43].

49. The absence of any evidence of relevant offending for such a long period following his previous incarceration augurs well for the prospects of rehabilitating Mr Morris following a further custodial sentence. What is abundantly clear is that he will require support of a personal and therapeutic nature if rehabilitation is to occur and deliver sustained outcomes. I am also mindful of the evidence concerning the lack of suitable modified therapeutic programs available to Mr Morris in the context of a custodial sentence compared with the opportunities for engagement with relevant therapy in the community. It is also relevant to reflect upon the prospect of financial support for therapeutic input via NDIS – a service not previously utilised by Mr Morris.

50. I assess Mr Morris to have reasonable prospects of rehabilitation if, and only if, suitable supports of the kind described in the expert evidence are made available to him.

Current sentencing practice

51. In R v Pham [2015] HCA 39; 256 CLR 550 French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ stated at [23]: Part IB of the Crimes Act does not specifically provide for sentencing judges to take current sentencing practices into account. Apart from the application of such relevant State or Territory legislation as may be picked up and applied by s 68 of the Judiciary Act, the obligation of a judge to take current sentencing practices into account when sentencing an offender for a federal offence arises as a matter of common law.

52. The Crown identified Glasheen, a case involving possession of child abuse material including penetrative sexual acts with prepubescent children. The offending occurred over an eight-day period but was not isolated. The ultimate sentence on appeal was a term of imprisonment of four years with a non-parole period of two years and eight months. The case of Hurt v R [2022] ACTCA 49; 18 ACTLR 272 was a resentence by the Court of Appeal. It involved child abuse material comprising 486 photos and 55 videos and was assessed as a mid-range offence. After reduction for the plea of guilty a sentence of four years and six months was imposed. There were two other offences leading to an aggregate sentence of four years and eight months and a non-parole period of two years and one month. R v Delzotto [2022] NSWCCA 117; 298 A Crim R 483 was a resentence by the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The offending involved possession of 142 videos and 2511 images. There was a previous conviction for child sexual abuse offences. A discount of 25% was applied for the plea of guilty and 5% for cooperation from a starting sentence of six years. The result was a sentence of four years and two months. A sentence of one year was imposed for a related offence with an aggregate sentence of four years and six months and a non-parole period of three years.

Sentence

53. Mr Morris accepts, as the Crown submits, no penalty other than full-time imprisonment can be considered appropriate with reference to the objective seriousness of the offending, the need for deterrence and to afford due recognition for the inevitable harm suffered by the victims of the offending.

54. The difficulty in structuring a sentence comprising both Territory and federal offences is well recognised: see in particular DPP v Swingler [2017] VSCA 305; 269 A Crim R 526 at [78]; DPP v Bobb [2025] ACTSC 491 at [60]-[62]. Adopting the approach of Baker J in Bobb, and for the reasons therein enunciated, I will deal first with the Territory sentence. The starting sentence for that offending will be a term of 10 months imprisonment and to that sentence I apply a discount of 25% for the plea of guilty and 5% to account for assistance provided to the authorities: DPP v Joliffe-Cole [2024] ACTSC 256 at [50]-[51], resulting in a head sentence of seven months.

55. For each of the offences CC 2025/6221 and CC 2025/6223, I begin with a sentence of 5 years, reduced in each case by 25% to account for the plea of guilty and by 5% to account for assistance provided to the authorities, resulting in a sentence of 3 years and 6 months for each offence. I propose to apply significant concurrency to reflect the close relationship between the two categories of offending.

56. For each of the offences CC 2025/12170 and CC 2025/12172, I begin with a sentence of 5 years, reduced by 30% for the reasons set out above, resulting in a sentence of 3 years and 6 months. For CC 2025/12175, I begin with a sentence of 3 years and 6 months, reduced by approximately 30%, resulting in a sentence of 2 years and 5 months. For those three sentences I propose to apply a significant degree of concurrency.

57. In relation to CC 2025/12166, I begin with a sentence of 4 years 2 months reduced by 30%, resulting in a sentence of 2 years and 11 months. I propose to allow significant concurrency between the sentence for that offence and the Territory offence.

58. I have also allowed for some concurrency between the groups of offences identified above. I have done so because I am satisfied the result is a total sentence of the severity appropriate in all the circumstances. In accordance with s 19(7) of the Crimes Act 1914, I am required to give reasons for concurrency between sentences. I have allowed concurrency in part because of the overlap in the nature of the offending, in particular the close relationship between the access and possession counts and also the close relationship between the use, attempt to use and transmit counts. I have also considered the need for the overall sentence to be appropriate in all the circumstances and not a crushing one. Concurrency has been introduced between the groups of offences so as to arrive at an overall sentence appropriate in all the circumstances whilst maintaining recognition of the distinct criminality of each of the offences.

Count Starting Point Reduction (%) Sentence Cumulation (Months)

3 10 months 30 7 months 7

4 4 years, 2 30 2 years, 11 31 months months

5 5 years 30 3 years, 6 25 months

6 5 years 30 3 years, 6 0 months

7 3 years, 6 30 2 years, 5 0 months months

1 5 years 30 3 years, 6 20 months

2 5 years 30 3 years, 6 0 months

83 Months

59. Counts 5,6 and 7 have been grouped, as have counts 1 and 2. Of those groups the table indicates only counts 1 and 5 have involved a degree of cumulation. That is because the remaining counts have been treated as a group for the purposes of the cumulation exercise.

60. The aggregate sentence is 83 months or six years and eleven months. I consider a generous non-parole period is appropriate allowing for Mr Morris’ cognitive impairment, his need for active therapeutic intervention via a tailored program and the availability of strong family support in the community to facilitate the process of rehabilitation. For those reasons it is desirable to ensure a very substantial period during which Mr Morris will be subject to supervision in the community. A non-parole period is not required for the Territory offence. For the Commonwealth offences the non-parole period will be for two years and 10 months. The sentences will be backdated to allow for the time spent in custody and therefore commence on 11 June 2025. The sentence is visaged as follows: Sentence

61. I make the following orders: (1) Aaryn John Morris, I convict you in relation to the offence of failing to report under a reporting condition as a registered person contrary to s 58A of the Crimes (Child Sex Offenders) Act 2005 (ACT) (CC 2025/6225), and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of 7 months commencing 11 June 2025 and ending 10 January 2026. (2) Aaryn John Morris, I convict you in relation to the offence of using a carriage service for child abuse material contrary to s 474.22(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (CC 2025/12166), and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of 2 years and 11 months commencing 11 September 2025 and ending 10 August 2028. (3) Aaryn John Morris, I convict you in relation to the offence of using a carriage service for sexual activity with a person under 16 years of age contrary to s 474.25A(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (CC 2025/12170), and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of 3 years and 6 months commencing 11 March 2027 and ending 10 September 2030. (4) Aaryn John Morris, I convict you in relation to the offence of attempting to use a carriage service for sexual activity with a person under 16 years of age contrary to s 474.25A(1) with s 11.1(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (CC 2025/12172), and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of 3 years 6 months commencing on 11 March 2027 and ending on 10 September 2030. (5) Aaryn John Morris, I convict you in relation to the offence of transmitting indecent communication to a person under 16 years of age contrary to s 474.27A(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (CC 2025/12175), and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of 2 years, 5 months commencing 11 March 2027 and ending 10 August 2029. (6) Aaryn John Morris, I convict you in relation to the offence of possession of child abuse material obtained using a carriage service contrary to s 474.22A(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (CC 2025/6221), and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of 3 years and 6 months commencing 11 November 2028 and ending 10 May 2032. (7) Aaryn John Morris, I convict you in relation to the offence of using a carriage service to access child abuse material contrary to s 474.22(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (CC 2025/6223), and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of 3 years and 6 months commencing 11 November 2028 and ending 10 May 2032. (8) The total head sentence is a period of imprisonment of 6 years and 11 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 10 months commencing 11 June 2025.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one [61] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Muller. Associate: MG Malouf Date: 4 September 2026