[2026] ACTSC 417
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-10-30
White J
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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Evans Citation: [2026] ACTSC 417 Hearing Date: 16 October 2026 Decision Date: 30 October 2026 Before: White J Decision: See [85] Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – protracted harassment of victims by offender – repeated threats to kill – use of carriage service to menace, harass or offend – contravention of family violence orders – serious examples of offending – complete lack of remorse CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentencing principles – mixture of Territory and Commonwealth offending – Territory sentence to commence first-in-time – non-parole period – no Territory non-parole period fixed Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 7, 10, 33, 62, 63 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 26, 30, 116 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 16A, 19, 36A Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), ss 474.15, 474.17 Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT), s 43 Cases Cited: DPP (ACT) v Myers (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 354 DPP v Bobb [2025] ACTSC 491 DPP v Kustic [2026] ACTSC 309 DPP v Slattery [2025] ACTSC 125 Jewell v DPP [2024] ACTCA 30 Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 Lawrence v The King [1933] AC 699 Marsh v Mukhin (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 182 Murphy v The King [2025] ACTCA 10 R v Ali [2017] ACTSC 366 R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83 R v Hudson [2019] ACTSC 110 R v John [2017] ACTSC 144 R v Jones (1998) 72 SASR 281 R v Mokbel [2010] VSCA 11 R v Morris [2026] ACTSC 334 R v Sheard [2022] NSWSC 992 R v Wilkinson (No 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Kevin Gweslyn Evans (Offender) Representation: Counsel M Howe (DPP) Self-represented (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Self-represented (Offender) File Number: SCC 81 of 2026 WHITE J: Introduction
Count Charge number Offence Provision Maximum penalty 1. CC2026/1837 Use carriage Criminal Code 10 years’ service to make Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment a threat to kill s 474.15(1) 2. CC2026/1836 Use carriage Criminal Code 5 years’ service to Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment menace, harass s 474.17(1) or offend 3. CC2025/13102 Contravene Family Violence 5 years’ family violence Act 2016 (ACT), imprisonment, a order s 43(2) fine of $80,000, or both 4. CC2025/13099 Aggravated Crimes Act 3 years’ common assault 1900 (ACT), imprisonment s 26(1) 5. CC2025/13101 Aggravated Crimes Act 3 years’ damage 1900 (ACT), imprisonment, a property s 116(3) fine of $9,600, or both 6. CC2026/1840 Use carriage Criminal Code 5 years’ service to Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment menace, harass s 474.17(1) or offend 7. CC2026/1860 Use carriage Criminal Code 5 years’ service to Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment menace, harass s 474.17(1) or offend Count Charge number Offence Provision Maximum penalty 8. CC2026/1853 Use carriage Criminal Code 10 years’ service to make Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment a threat to kill s 474.15(1) 9. CC2026/1855 Use carriage Criminal Code 10 years’ service to make Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment a threat to kill s 474.15(1) 10. CC2026/1858 Use carriage Criminal Code 10 years’ service to make Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment a threat to kill s 474.15(1) 11. CC2026/1873 Contravene Family Violence 5 years’ family violence Act 2016 (ACT), imprisonment, a order s 43(2) fine of $80,000, or both 12. CC2026/1894 Use carriage Criminal Code 10 years’ service to make Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment a threat to kill s 474.15(1) 13. CC2025/13104 Aggravated Crimes Act 13 years’ reckless threat 1900 (ACT), imprisonment to kill s 30 14. CC2026/1859 Contravene Family Violence 5 years’ family violence Act 2016 (ACT), imprisonment, a order s 43(2) fine of $80,000, or both 15. CC2026/1918 Use carriage Criminal Code 10 years’ service to make Act 1995 (Cth), imprisonment a threat to kill s 474.15(1) 16. CC2026/1920 Contravene Family Violence 5 years’ family violence Act 2016 (ACT), imprisonment, a order s 43(2) fine of $80,000, or both Count Charge number Offence Provision Maximum penalty 17. CC2026/1926 Contravene Family Violence 5 years’ family violence Act 2016 (ACT), imprisonment, a order s 43(2) fine of $80,000, or both 18. CC2026/1932 Aggravated Crimes Act 13 years’ reckless threat 1900 (ACT), imprisonment to kill s 30 19. CC2026/1933 Intimidate Crimes Act 5 years’ witness in a 1914 (Cth), imprisonment judicial s 36A(1) proceeding
Facts
The factual background to these offences is disturbing. The crux of the behaviour constituting these offences is a campaign of systematic harassment and intimidation by the offender against various persons including his brother, mother, other family members and their associates. The full background to the offending, which is set out in an agreed statement of facts, cannot be replicated in full in these reasons. What follows is therefore a necessarily truncated summary of the offences, in which I have forborne gratuitous repetition of the appalling threats and language used by the offender.
I do not deem it necessary to anonymise the identity of the offender. However, I will refer to the victims in these proceedings by the following pseudonyms in the hope that it somewhat protects their privacy, noting that their relationship to the offender is identified: (a) Janelle is the mother of the offender; (b) Kristopher is the ex-partner of Janelle, with whom she lived throughout the time when the offences were committed; (c) Jeremy is the brother of the offender and the youngest son of Janelle; (d) Diana is the partner of Jeremy and the sister-in-law of the offender; (e) Jeremy and Diana have two children: Cora and Lindsay; and (f) Debbie is the mother of Diana.
The genesis of the offender’s antagonism against the victims is not entirely apparent from the material available to me. However, it does appear that the offender’s motivation for the offending at least in part relates to the offender’s belief that Kristopher had acted inappropriately towards the offender’s mother, and his frustration with his mother and brother about their attitude towards this. Further, the offender appears to have held the belief that his mother and brother, as well as others in the legal profession, were responsible for taking his child away from him.
Count 1
Between 7:12am and 2:44pm on 12 April 2021, Jeremy received six emails from the offender. These emails contained repeated threats to kill, shoot and fight him, and expressed the offender’s hopes that Jeremy’s daughters “would end up on ice.” The offender warned Jeremy that “death is the only option for you”, “you don’t have much time left” and “I’ll probably just shoot you at your house in front of your kids. That’s funny.” For obvious reasons, Jeremy found these emails highly alarming and threatening. The offender wrote his name at the bottom of each email and there can be no doubt that they were sent by him.
The following day, on 13 April 2021, Jeremy received a further nine emails from the offender which again made repeated threats to assault, shoot and kill him. The emails also implied that Jeremy had enabled the sexual abuse of other family members. Again, the offender signed off on each email in his own name.
Around two and a half years later, on 1 November 2023, Jeremy received another email from the offender. Among other things, the offender threatened to kill Jeremy’s children and again used detestable language to threaten and belittle Jeremy and his family in terms which do not bear repetition here.
Together, the sending of a total of 16 emails to Jeremy on 12-13 April 2021 and 1 November 2023 constitutes the offence of using a carriage service to make a threat to kill (count 1).
Count 2
Count 2, the offence of using a carriage service to menace, harass, or offend, is again predicated on the offender’s sending of violent, intimidating and sexually explicit emails to Jeremy in late 2023 and early 2024.
On 20 December 2023, the victim received an email with the subject line “demise.” The email mentioned the offender’s son and ex-partner, both of whom now reside overseas. The offender referred to Jeremy as a “weak gutted cunt”, followed by the pistol, knife, pickaxe and several other emoticons with a threatening subtext.
At 5:56am on 18 January 2024, the victim received another email, this time with the subject “'you and your childrens [sic] demise is a go!” The theme and content of this email was similar to those which I have described above. Further emails, each containing similar content, followed on 21 January and 16 June 2024. Together, the sending of this correspondence (five emails) is the offence of using a carriage service to menace, harass, or offend (count 2).
Counts 3-5
On 6 December 2024 and 25 July 2025, interim Family Violence Orders (iFVOs) were imposed in the ACT Magistrates Court which required the offender not to approach addresses in Calwell and Isabella Plains respectively, with some of the residents of those premises being specifically named as protected persons. I will refer to those addresses as the Calwell Protected Address and the Isabella Plains Protected Address.
The Calwell Protected Address was the home of Jeremy’s family, including his partner and their two children. The Isabella Plains Protected Address was the home of Janelle and Kristopher.
At 3:22pm on Friday 26 September 2025, the offender drove to his mother’s home, the Isabella Plains Protected Address. Security footage from a nearby residence shows that the offender parked his Toyota Landcruiser in the driveway. At that time, Janelle was home alone. At no time had she provided permission for the offender to attend the Isabella Plains Protected Address. His actions in attending the address constitute count 3, the offence of contravene family violence order.
The offender spoke to Janelle at the front door of the residence. He explained that he was there to take the dog for a walk. Although Janelle was apprehensive about allowing the offender into the residence, she allowed him to do so when he requested to use the toilet inside.
The offender disappeared into the house while Janelle waited at the front door. After a few minutes, he crossed back through her line of sight and walked to the kitchen cooktop. There, he took a cordless digital phone handset from its charging cradle and threw it to the floor, breaking it immediately. The offender walked back outside, past Janelle, while verbally abusing her. He also took the dog from the residence and placed it into his vehicle before departing the premises. The smashing of the phone constitutes count 5, the offence of aggravated property damage.
After the offender left, Janelle went to her bedroom to call her then-partner, Kristopher, to inform him of the incident. Upon entering the bedroom, she noticed her mobile phone to be missing. As a result of the household phone being inoperable due to the damage caused by the offender, and her mobile phone missing, Janelle could not contact Kristopher.
Later that evening, the offender returned to the Isabella Plains Protected Address to return the dog. Again, Janelle was alone at the residence. When Janelle opened the door, the offender grabbed her right forearm and forced her arm up and behind her head. The forceful and awkward motion caused the victim immediate moderate pain in her arm and shoulder. The offender also grabbed her hair and shoved her backwards through the door of the residence. She stumbled backwards and collided with a small table behind her. As he released her arm, the offender ripped out the tuft of hair which he had been holding. This is the common assault constituting count 4.
Counts 6-7
Counts 6 and 7, each being the offence of using a carriage service to menace, harass or offend, arise from further emails sent by the offender to his brother Jeremy and mother Janelle respectively.
On the evening of Sunday 5 October 2025, Jeremy received two emails from the offender. The offender threatened that Jeremy would now “pay the ultimate price” and again displayed a fixation on the sexual assault of members of Jeremy’s family. The offender said “Im [sic] going to send you straight to fucking hell”.
A total of nine further emails were received by Jeremy and Janelle on 29 October 2025, again along the same lines already described.
On 30 October, Jeremy and Janelle attended Tuggeranong Police Station to report the ongoing menacing, harassing and offensive emails which they were receiving from the offender. While in the presence of police, Janelle received another email from the offender, in which he called her a “kidnapping lying rapist loving slut!” and threatened sexual violence against her partner. Janelle informed police that she received emails of this nature from the offender non-stop throughout the day and night. She also said to police that she was afraid for her life, and that she was no longer able to sleep normally due to the extreme stress the offender had caused her.
Counts 8-11
In late October and early November 2025, the offender continued to bombard the victims with harassing communications. On 31 October, Jeremy and Janelle received two emails from the offender, in which he said “I'm going to slice jump and cut your fucking heads plus yr [sic] kids.” That same day, Kristopher received five voicemail messages on his mobile phone from an unknown number. Kristopher recognised the offender’s voice in these recordings, and became increasingly concerned for his safety based on multiple threats made by the offender. In one voicemail, the offender threatened that Kristopher would be “disembowelled, slaughtered, slit, broken, set on fire, raped, butchered, and everything else”. Other emails and voicemails of a similar nature were received between 1 and 7 November 2025. Without recounting the content of these communications in gratuitous detail, they included threats by the offender that he would “fucking set [Kristopher] on fire,” and also that he had driven past the residences of Jeremy and Janelle and noted how easy it would be to kill them all.
These communications constitute counts 8-11 for which the offender is to be sentenced. Count 8 relates to the emails sent to Jeremy, count 9 relates to the emails sent to Janelle, count 10 relates to the voicemails left with Kristopher. Count 11 deals with the voicemails left with Kristopher in breach of the iFVO.
Count 12
In the span of 12 hours on 24 November 2025, Jeremy received 14 further emails from the offender. The repeated threats to assault, kill or otherwise seriously injure him continued. This time, the offender also levelled threats against Jeremy’s solicitor and other legal practitioners.
Another ten emails were received the following day on 25 November 2025. These emails contained threats including the killing, assaulting, sexual assault or otherwise serious harming of Jeremy and other people including Debbie and certain legal practitioners.
Counts 13-14
On 26 November 2025, one month after first attending the Isabella Plains Protected Address, the offender returned at a time when Janelle was again the only person at the address. CCTV cameras captured the offender walking towards the front door. This contravention of the iFVO made on 25 July 2025 is count 14.
The offender knocked on the front door and shouted “Police!” before knocking again. Janelle came to the door but, recognising the offender, refused to unlock the fly-screen door in order to prevent his entry into the house. The offender immediately became verbally abusive towards Janelle, calling her names and threatening to kill her.
The offender demanded that Janelle give him mail belonging to him which had apparently been delivered to that address. He remained highly aggressive throughout the interaction. Janelle slid the offender’s mail between the doorframe and the fly-screen without opening the door. As he walked away from the house, the offender made further threats to kill Janelle. This is count 13: aggravated reckless threat to kill.
Police attended the property at 10:30 that morning. They observed Janelle to be visibly trembling, with her voice trembling and tears in her eyes. She told police that she believed that the offender would one day make good on his threats to kill her.
Counts 12 (continuing) and 15
Counts 16-18
At 9:30am on Monday 1 December 2025, Jeremy was at his mother’s house, the Isabella Plains Protected Address. He had taken to visiting her home daily due to concerns about her safety arising from the offender’s harassment.
Meanwhile Debbie, the mother-in-law of Jeremy, was home alone at the Calwell Protected Address. The offender drove into the driveway of the property and rushed towards the front door holding a short baton or bat in his right hand. He banged this against the front door, demanding that Jeremy come outside. He paced back and forth outside the front of the house, knocking on windows and trying to look inside the residence. Thankfully, Debbie had the presence of mind not to make her presence known. The offender used further obscene language and walked back towards his car, striking the property’s letter-box twice with his baton before driving away. His attendance at this address is count 16.
Once informed by his mother-in-law that the offender had attended his house, Jeremy grew concerned that the offender would next come to the Isabella Plains Protected Address. Jeremy urged his mother to secure herself in a bedroom of the home. He soon heard tyres screeching in the street. Looking outside, he saw the offender’s vehicle and glimpsed the offender. The offender then proceeded to cut power to the residence by interfering with a power box. In doing so, he deactivated the property’s security cameras. This contravention of the iFVO is count 17.
The offender pounded his fists against the windows and front door of the house, and made further threats to kill the occupants (count 18). The offender left shortly afterwards.
The offender was arrested on Wednesday 3 December 2025.
Count 19
Victim impact
The effect on the victims of the offender’s crimes has been profound. The victims lived in a state of fear for their own safety, as well as for the safety of their loved ones. After the 26 November 2025 offending, Janelle was visibly trembling as she told police she believed her son would kill her eventually. Kristopher believed the offender was capable of carrying out the threats made against him.
A victim impact statement of Jeremy was read to the court. In it, he stated in part: I stand here as a father, a brother, a son, and more importantly, a human being. Your Honour, for decades our family has made excuses for Kevin’s behaviour. We became conditioned to accepting what should never have been considered normal, placing his anger, abuse and threats into what I call the accepted basket. Over time, we became desensitised, accommodating his behaviour rather than confronting the damage it was causing. Fear became a form of leverage, particularly over Mum and [Kristopher], while responsibility and accountability were continually avoided. This cycle of destructive behaviour had continued for far too long. It needed to stop. Kevin has threatened to kill me, my daughters, Mum and [Kristopher]. He sent threatening emails and arrived at my home carrying a baseball bat. As a father, knowing my own brother has threatened the lives of my children is deeply confronting. My girls have experienced fear through circumstances they should never have been exposed to. Their childhood should be filled with the freedom to explore, discover and enjoy life, not the uncertainty created by an adult threatening their lives. What concerns me further is that I have witnessed no remorse for the suffering Kevin’s behaviour has caused. He has continued to express his intention to kill us once released. The fear therefore remains. Even after these proceedings conclude, we are left with the uncertainty of what may happen in the future. It is difficult to find peace knowing that the people I love have been threatened and those threats have continued.
A victim impact statement of Kristopher was also read to the court. The cumulative psychological toll of this abuse is staggering. The threats left on my phone were beyond words; no human being should ever have to suffer the level of emotional stress, anxiety, and absolute terror that I went through, living each day thinking I was going to die. The horrific detail with which the offender described exactly how he was going to kill me on those voice calls will haunt me forever. Even today, the stress haunts me. To this very day, I still don’t get a full night's sleep, because the offender will never truly understand just how much his actions have completely broken my sense of peace and affected my daily life.
A victim impact statement of Diana was tendered. Quite naturally, she was particularly affected by threats of the offender towards her children: The threats to kill [Jeremy] and to harm our daughters affected me more than any prior threat made against me personally. They occurred against a backdrop of years of conduct that I had witnessed first-hand. As a result, they did not feel isolated, impulsive or empty. They felt real and they were heightened by my knowledge of Kevin’s military training and capabilities. Whether a threat is believed often determines the harm it causes. In this case, the threats felt credible. Combined with periods where his whereabouts were unknown, this created a constant and exhausting sense of uncertainty.
It is to be hoped that the victims receive some degree of solace for having gone through the process of compiling a victim impact statement and having had it read or tendered in court. Clearly enough, the effect of the offender’s crimes is likely to be long-lasting on all of the victims.
Plea of guilty / remorse
The offender was originally indicted on 74 counts, and pleaded not guilty to each count. The matter was listed for trial. However, on 9 October 2026, being the Friday before the trial was due to commence, the offender pleaded guilty to what might be termed a condensed indictment containing 19 counts. A number of the counts in the new indictment are rolled-up counts; for example, count 1 is a rolled-up charge relating to 16 emails.
After the pleas were taken, the presiding judge, McCallum CJ, indicated that she was prepared to order a pre-sentence report, but the offender indicated that he did not want a pre-sentence report, and would not co-operate with Corrective Services officers in its preparation, stating: No, I won't speak to them, your Honour. I don't want to speak to anybody. I just want to get it over and done with because I've got other things I need to deal with and then I'll either come and deal with every single person that's put me in here.
The implicit threat by the offender to continue his vendetta against the victims in the immediate aftermath of having pleaded guilty to his crimes against them can only be interpreted as a complete lack of remorse or contrition: cf s 33(1)(w) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act) and s 16A(2)(f) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
In relation to the lack of contrition, the prosecution also pointed to other declarations by the offender in court. On 7 October 2026, the offender appeared before McCallum CJ and the issue of a possible plea was canvassed. The offender indicated that he would ‘‘probably’’ plead guilty to a condensed indictment. However, he said “and really I’m going after him when I finish here so I don’t care.” Later he said: “[I’m going] to hold my head up and I’ll just deal with it when I get out of here. You can’t keep me in here forever.”
On 9 October 2026, when the offender was arraigned on the new 19-count indictment, he replied as follows when indicted on the first count, which alleged a threat to kill Jeremy: “I am guilty but I wish I had have [sic] carried it out before I got arrested.”
However, although entered late, and entirely lacking contrition, the utilitarian value of the plea was high. The trial had been listed for two weeks and the victims would have had to give evidence. They were spared that indignity. It is also relevant to record that the offender had not previously had the opportunity to plead to a condensed indictment. In all the circumstances, a discount of 10% for the utilitarian value of the plea is justified.
Proceedings on sentence
On 9 October 2026, after entering pleas of guilty before McCallum CJ, the offender indicated that he did not wish to be present for his sentence proceedings, which were fixed by her Honour for 16 October 2026 before me. Her Honour, having consulted with the prosecutor, told the offender that he did not have to come into court but could appear via AVL from custody.
On 16 October 2026, the offender was initially unwilling to go to the AVL room. I raised with the prosecutor whether it would be possible to proceed in the offender’s absence from the AVL room. The prosecutor raised the issue of the statement of facts. If the facts were not agreed, they would have to be proved via what would in effect be a contested facts hearing. The prosecutor then undertook to have provided to the offender a copy of the proposed statement of facts. After an adjournment, I came back onto the bench and the offender was present in the AVL room. I explained the situation to him. He indicated that he agreed with the statement of facts, but would prefer not to participate in the remainder of the sentence proceedings. I indicated to him that I would not require him to remain in the AVL room if he did not desire to do so. He then absented himself from the room, and the proceedings on sentence continued in his absence.
The general principle is that the trial for an indictable offence should be conducted in the presence of the accused, and for this purpose trial includes sentence: see Lawrence v The King [1933] AC 699 per Lord Atkin. However, that principle is qualified as set out in R v Jones (1998) 72 SASR 281 at 295, per Lander J (Prior and Wicks JJ agreeing): [I]f the court is satisfied that the accused has waived his or her right to be present during the trial, and that the trial may proceed without any injustice to that person except the injustice caused by the accused’s own waiver, then the court may proceed with the accused’s trial. Any discretion to proceed in the absence of the accused, however, should be exercised sparingly.
The Jones approach was applied specifically to sentencing proceedings by the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Mokbel [2010] VSCA 11, where the court noted at [42]: Just as the ‘essential principle’ enunciated by Lord Atkin, requiring the accused’s presence, applies with equal force to trial and to sentencing, so does the qualification to the principle stated by Lander J. The applicant waived his right to be present for the concluding part of his trial and, likewise, waived his right to be present at sentence. There was no error on his Honour’s part in proceeding to sentence the applicant in his absence.
In the present case, I was satisfied that the accused had consciously waived his right to be present during his sentencing hearing and that it was appropriate in those circumstances to proceed in his absence: see. R v Ali [2017] ACTSC 366; Marsh v Mukhin (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 182; R v Sheard [2022] NSWSC 992, and DPP (ACT) v Myers (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 354.
I note that in the absence of the offender, the prosecutor, as was his obligation, very fairly raised matters favourable to the offender or which would properly be the subject of submissions on behalf of the offender were the offender represented.
Objective seriousness
The prosecution submits that the offending was a protracted ‘course of conduct’ in which the offender terrorised members of his family by repeatedly menacing, harassing, and threatening to kill them. In doing so, the offender showed a disregard for the rights and wellbeing of each of the victims, as well as a contumacious attitude towards the processes of the courts. I accept that submission.
An assessment of the objective seriousness of individual offences should not be artificially confined. In Murphy v The King [2025] ACTCA 10 at [108], the Court of Appeal referred to R v Wilkinson (No 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 at [61]: Common sense and moral sense extend the circumstances of an offence which may be considered for an assessment of the objective seriousness of a crime, to events which precede and follow the technical limits of the crime. In imposing sentence for a crime, a judge should take into account not only the conduct which actually constitutes the crime, but also such of the surrounding circumstances as are directly related to that crime, and are properly to be regarded as circumstances of aggravation or mitigation: Director of Public Prosecutions v England at 263-264 [18].
As the Court of Appeal noted in Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 at [156], any attempt to place an offence on a spectrum of seriousness “invites a simplistic approach to sentencing that is generally unhelpful”. Instead, it is preferable to identify and articulate the factors that inform the character of the objective seriousness of the offence. To that end, the prosecution concisely identified matters relevant to the objective seriousness of each count. I largely accept their analysis, and have reflected this in the following table under the column titled ‘Nature and circumstances of offending’:
Count Date of Offence Nature and circumstances of offending Offence 1. 11 January Use carriage • Rolled-up charge relating to 16 2021 – 2 service to make emails November threat to kill • Numerous threats to kill his brother 2023 and his brother’s children as well as other offensive content 2. 19 December Use carriage • Rolled-up charge relating to five 2023 – 21 service to emails June 2024 menace, • Content was offensive and harass, or threatening and referred to sexual offend abuse of brother’s mother and children 3. 26 September Contravene • Attendance at protected residence 2025 family violence without prior written consent order • Victim ([Kristopher]) was not home 4. 26 September Aggravated • Assault caused victim pain and to 2025 common assault lose footing and collide with a table • Victim was in state of fear due to earlier offending involving damaging phone • Occurred in victim’s own home • Victim was elderly (74 years old) and vulnerable Count Date of Offence Nature and circumstances of offending Offence 5. 26 September Aggravated • Property was not of great value, but 2025 damage offending is consistent with property exercising control / dominance over vulnerable victim • Occurred in victim’s home 6. 4 October Use carriage • Rolled-up charge relating to five 2025 – 31 service to emails sent to brother October 2025 menace, • Content was offensive and harass, or threatening offend 7. 4 October Use carriage • Rolled-up charge relating to nine 2025 – 31 service to emails sent to mother October 2025 menace, • Content was offensive and harass, or threatening offend 8. 30 October Use carriage • Rolled-up charge relating to 10 2025 – 8 service to make emails sent to brother November threat to kill • Numerous threats to kill, set on fire, 2025 and shoot the victim and his kids including referring to having driven past the victim’s residence 9. 30 October Use carriage • Rolled-up charge relating to 12 2025 – 8 service to make emails sent to mother November threat to kill • Numerous threats to kill, including 2025 referring to having driven past the victim’s residence. Throughout emails would refer to victim in offensive terms such as “slut” or a “cancerous cunt” Count Date of Offence Nature and circumstances of offending Offence 10. 30 October Use carriage • Rolled-up charge relating to 27 2025 – 8 service to make voicemails left on [Kristopher]’s November threat to kill phone 2025 • Numerous threats to kill, including that the victim would be disembowelled, burnt to death, raped, charged with perjury and have petrol poured down his throat 11. 30 October Contravene • Engaging in family violence towards 2025 – 8 family violence [Kristopher]* November order • The offence is clearly contumacious 2025 * The conduct that amounted to a breach is also separately charged. 12. 23 November Use carriage • Rolled-up charge relating to 31 2025 – 30 service to make emails sent to brother November threat to kill • Numerous threats to kill the victim, 2025 victim’s partner, their children, victim’s lawyer, [Kristopher], as well as threats towards other members of the legal profession 13. 26 November Aggravated • Threat was made in person to 2025 reckless threat offender’s mother to kill • Victim was in her own home at time threat was made to her • Victim was elderly (74 years old) and vulnerable • Threat occurred in the context of many other threats having been made via email in last four weeks as well as earlier offence of personal violence Count Date of Offence Nature and circumstances of offending Offence 14. 26 November Contravene • Attendance at protected residence 2025 family violence without prior written consent order • Victim ([Kristopher]) was not home • The offence is clearly contumacious 15. 23 November Use carriage • Single email sent to offender’s 2025 – 30 service to make mother in which he threatened to kill November threat to kill her, her partner, her son, her son’s 2025 partner, and her lawyer
1 December Contravene • Attendance at protected residence 2025 family violence in possession of offensive weapon order • Behaved in highly offensive and threatening manner • Damaged property • Victim ([Diana] and children) were not home • Offending occurred in the context of having repeatedly threatened victim’s family and her children • The offence is clearly contumacious 17. 1 December Contravene • Attendance at protected residence 2025 family violence without prior written consent order • Victim ([Kristopher]) was not home • The offence is clearly contumacious 18. 1 December Aggravated • Victim was in her own home at time 2025 reckless threat threat was made to kill • Victim was elderly (74 years old) • The offender cut the power to the residence prior to making the threat, Count Date of Offence Nature and circumstances of offending Offence thus rendering the victim even more vulnerable • Threat occurred in the context of many other threats having been made via email and in person over last month as well as earlier offence of personal violence 19. 28 January Intimidate • Occurred in open court 2026 witness in a • Engaged in prolonged staring, name judicial calling, as well as making threats proceeding • Offending is contumacious and an obvious affront to the administration of justice
Having regard to the factors identified in the table above, and taking into account the surrounding circumstances of each offence which are directly related to the crime, I find that each of these offences was objectively a very serious matter.
The offending in counts 4, 10, 11, 13, 16, and 18 was particularly serious.
The offending in count 19 was an affront to the administration of justice and by that fact particularly serious.
In relation to the contravene family violence order offences (counts 3, 11, 14, 16 and 17), each requires acknowledgement that the victim had recourse to the courts to protect themselves by obtaining an order which the appellant ignored: cf Jewell v DPP [2024] ACTCA 30 at [105]. However, for some of these offences, the victims were not at home when the contravention happened, which is a factor that may lessen the seriousness of the offence (but will not automatically do so).
Many of the offences, being the assaults, criminal damage and threat to kill offences, involved the direct infliction or threat of infliction of harm or inconvenience.
Although the threat to kill using a carriage service offences were not offences accompanied by actual violence, they left the victims in a perpetual state of anxiety. I emphasise that there is some offending, and the present offending exemplifies this, where the continuing threat and the gnawing, ever-present anxiety that it causes can be as bad as or even worse than the infliction of physical harm. The victim impact statements speak eloquently of this.
The offences involving use of a carriage service caused the victims to experience anxiety for their own safety and that of others. In R v Hudson [2019] ACTSC 110, Murrell CJ at [43] considered matters relevant the objective seriousness of such offences. These included; the period of time of the harassment in question, the nature of the communications, and the fear of the victims. In the current matter, on all of these measures, the offending was serious.
Rolled-up counts
A number of the charges are rolled-up counts; that is, a collection of offences bundled together into a single count. This procedure can only occur by agreement with the defence and only for the purpose of the plea of guilty. Used appropriately, there is utility in the practice as it simplifies the task of the sentencing judge and works to the advantage of an offender.
In R v John [2017] ACTSC 144 at [107], referring to R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83, Refshauge J summarised the approach to be taken by a sentencing judge as follows: • for sentencing purposes, the rolled up count is one charge and the sentence may not exceed the maximum penalty for the offence charged; • nevertheless, the criminality encompassed within the count is greater than were the count to be constituted by only one offence; • the sentence is not necessarily, and perhaps not usually, the sum of the sentences that would be imposed for the offences comprising the count, though in an appropriate case it may be; and • the fact that the count is a rolled up count may have a bearing on the application of the relevant principles as to accumulation or concurrency. Subjective circumstances
The offender is 52 years old. He has limited prior criminal history.
The offender has refused to participate in the preparation of a pre-sentence report. Further, soon after his arrest on these charges, the Magistrates Court ordered a brief mental health report to be prepared; however the offender refused to engage in the process and no information was obtained.
From material in the brief of evidence, it does appear that the offender served in the Australian Defence Force and has been deployed in areas of conflict; a fact he frequently alluded to when making threats against the victims.
The offender has clearly developed a fixation in relation to the victims. He has displayed rage and extreme anger in the course of his offending. Whether there is any underlying pathology is not known to the court.
Time in custody
Comparative cases
Unsurprisingly, given the sustained nature of the offending in this case, the prosecution were unable to furnish me with cases that could be said to be properly comparable with the present matter. In DPP v Slattery [2025] ACTSC 125 at [81], Christensen AJ observed there was a dearth of authority involving sentencing for offences against s 474.15(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), being threat to cause serious harm. The same appears to apply to offences against s 474.15(1), which is threat to kill.
I have had careful regard to the cases referred to me by the prosecution, however none was particularly helpful. It is clear however, that sentences of imprisonment to be served by way of full-time custody are frequently imposed for these offences.
Disposition
In the current matter, despite the offender’s lack of a significant criminal history, I accept that the s 10 threshold in the Sentencing Act is well and truly crossed. No other sentence other than one of imprisonment is appropriate.
In sentencing the offender, I am to have regard to the matters set out in s 7 of the Sentencing Act, which have their counterparts in various matters set out in s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914. Those matters include; ensuring that the offender is adequately punished for the offence, that the offender is specifically deterred, that the conduct of the offender is denounced, and that the harm done to the victims of his crimes is recognised.
I accept the prosecution submission that in light of the protracted nature of the offending, its contumaciousness, the complete lack of remorse, and accordingly the continuing danger the offender presents to his family, protection of the community is to be given significant weight.
In relation to the rolled-up counts, I have been conscious of the fact that the criminality encompassed within the count is greater than were the count to be constituted by only one offence.
The offender has expressed a complete absence of remorse. Indeed, he seems presently intent on resuming his campaign against his victims once he has served his sentence. In those circumstances, his prospects of rehabilitation are clouded to say the least. It is to be hoped that the offender will reflect upon his crimes and resolve to move on from his fixated hatred. It is to be hoped that there will be some courses available to him in custody which promote this. However, it will be appropriate to impose a lengthy non-parole period as part of the overall sentence to allow time for reflection, self-realisation and hopefully some commitment to rehabilitation to develop.
There are a mixture of Commonwealth and Territory offences to be sentenced. Consistent with the approach taken by Baker J in DPP v Bobb [2025] ACTSC 491 at [61]- [62], the sentence imposed on the Territory offences will take effect first to comply with s 62 of the Sentencing Act. Section 63 of the Sentencing Act does permit a sentence to be backdated, and that will be done here to take into account the time the offender has spent in custody. However, s 62 does not permit the court to impose a sentence which commences in the future, unless that sentence is accumulated upon an existing Territory sentence. By contrast, s 19 of the Crimes Act 1914 permits a Commonwealth sentence to commence on a future date. That section is directed to avoiding a lacuna between the end of a Territory sentence and the start of a Commonwealth sentence.
As to non-parole periods where there is a mixture of Territory and Commonwealth sentences, I note that in DPP v Kustic [2026] ACTSC 309, Taylor J fixed separate non-parole periods for Territory and Commonwealth offences. On the other hand, in R v Morris [2026] ACTSC 334, Muller J did not deem it necessary to fix a non-parole period for the Territory offences, and instead set a non-parole period for the Commonwealth offences which achieved an appropriate overall balance. In the circumstances it is appropriate to proceed here as Muller J did in Morris. The non-parole period in relation to the Commonwealth offences will mean that the offender will not be eligible for parole until he has served 4 years of his total sentence of 5 years, 6 months and 8 days.
The issue of totality requires particular attention. Although in one sense all the offending is a course of conduct, care should be taken not to elide the seriousness of the individual acts of criminality; see Jewell v DPP [2024] ACTCA 30 at [102]. As I have found, each offence is objectively serious and each requires separate consideration of the particular gravity. Further, in identifying the objective seriousness of the offending as I have above, I acknowledge that although the offending is of a broadly similar nature, there are different issues of criminality involved in the different offences. And of course, there are four different victims of the offending. In all the circumstances, a degree of accumulation between the different offences is required to reflect the overall criminality of the conduct.
As set out in the agreed statement of facts, it is possible to group the offending behaviour into a series of incidents. For example, counts 3, 4 and 5 relate to offending on a particular day (being 26 September 2025). Where it is possible to group offences in this way, I have determined to apply concurrency between each individual offence within that group. However, it is appropriate to accumulate the sentences relating to each group of offences to reflect the overall criminality as set out in the previous paragraph.
I am conscious of the fact that in accumulating the individual sentences I must avoid a sentence that is crushing.
The individual sentences I have determined, I set out in the following table. In each case, I have applied a 10% reduction for the plea of guilty.
Maximum Charge Commencement Count penalty Sentence End date number date (Imprisonment)
CC2026/ 10 years 1 year, 4 8/12/2027 12/4/2029 1837 months, 5 days
CC2026/ 5 years 2 months, 8/12/2027 27/2/2028 1836 20 days
CC2025/ 5 years 2 months, 3/12/2025 21/2/2026 13102 19 days
CC2025/ 3 years 10 months, 3/12/2025 26/10/2026 13099 24 days
CC2025/ 3 years 2 months, 3/12/2025 21/2/2026 13101 19 days
CC2026/ 5 years 5 months, 1/1/2029 12/6/2029 1840 12 days Maximum Charge Commencement Count penalty Sentence End date number date (Imprisonment)
CC2026/ 5 years 5 months, 1/1/2029 12/6/2029 1860 12 days
CC2026/ 10 years 1 year, 9 1/2/2029 18/11/2030 1853 months, 18 days
CC2026/ 10 years 1 year, 9 1/2/2029 18/11/2030 1855 months, 18 days
CC2026/ 10 years 1 year, 9 26/4/2027 12/2/2029 1858 months, 18 days
CC2026/ 5 years 1 year, 4 26/4/2027 31/8/2028 1873 months, 6 days
CC2026/ 10 years 1 year, 9 1/3/2029 18/12/2030 1894 months, 18 days
CC2025/ 13 years 2 years, 8 2/1/2026 12/9/2028 13104 months, 11 days
CC2026/ 5 years 5 months, 2/1/2026 13/6/2026 1859 12 days
CC2026/ 10 years 10 months, 26/2/2030 18/1/2031 1918 24 days Maximum Charge Commencement Count penalty Sentence End date number date (Imprisonment)
CC2026/ 5 years 1 year, 4 2/4/2026 7/8/2027 1920 months, 6 days
CC2026/ 5 years 10 months, 2/4/2026 23/2/2027 1926 22 days
CC2026/ 13 years 2 years, 8 2/4/2026 13/12/2028 1932 months, 12 days
CC2026/ 5 years 1 year, 1 26/4/2030 9/6/2031 1933 month, 15 days
Orders
I certify that the preceding eighty-five [85] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice White. Associate: Date:
DPP
Evans