R v Loulanting [2015] ACTSC 172

1. For the offence of attempted robbery on 7 April 2006, the conviction for which was confirmed on 28 November 2014, James Conrad Loulanting be sentenced to two years imprisonment, to commence on 8 December 2014, to take into account pre-sentence custody.

2. James Conrad Loulanting be convicted of contravening a Protection Order on 18 January 2015 and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, to commence on 18 June 2016; that is, to be cumulative as to six months on the first sentence.

3. James Conrad Loulanting be convicted of threatening to kill the victim on 19 January 2015 and sentenced to two years and six months imprisonment, to commence on 8 June 2016, to be cumulative as to 18 months on the sentence for the first contravention of the Protection Order.

4. James Conrad Loulanting be convicted of contravening a Protection Order on 19 January 2015 and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, to commence on 8 June 2016; that is, to be wholly concurrent with the sentence for the offence of threatening to kill the victim.

5. A non parole period of two years and two months be set, to commence on 8 December 2014 and to end on 7 February 2017.

CRIMINAL LAW - Practice and procedure - Sentence - Threat to kill - Breach of Protection Order - Family violence - Contravention of a Good Behaviour Order through further offending - Extensive criminal history - Use of methylamphetamines - Previous opportunities for reform - Denunciation - General deterrence

CRIMINAL LAW - Jurisdiction - Transfer of offences from the Magistrates Court - Back up offences - Related offences - Statutory interpretation - Ordinary or grammatical sense of the words modified to avoid absurdity

Bail Act 1992 (ACT), s 49

Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 30

Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 7, 33(1)

Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT), s 90(2)

Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 190

Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), s 90A (7) (8) and (12), 90B (1)(a), 92A, 94

Supreme Court 1933 (ACT), s 68CA, Pt 8

Auld v The Queen [2013] ACTCA 21

Director of Public Prosecutions v Grabovac [1998] 1 VR 664

Footscray City College v Ruzicka [2007] VSCA 136; (2007) 16 VR 498

Grey v Pearson [1857] EngR 335; (1857) 6 HLC 61

Guy v Telford [2013] ACTSC 5

Oliver (1982) 7 A Crim R 174

PR v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 40

R v Barker [2014] ACTSC 374

R v BB [2013] ACTSC 290

R v Hally [1965] Qd R 582

R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302; (2006) 164 A Crim R 179

R v Harris [2007] NSWCCA 130

R v Loulanting (Unreported, ACT Supreme Court, Crispin J, SCC 153 of 2006, 16 April 2007)

R v Loulanting [2014] ACTSC 392

R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517

R v Todd Elphick (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 23

R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269

Sabra v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 38

Saga v Reid [2010] ACTSC 59

Walker [1996] 1 Cr App R (s) 180

1. There is no doubt that the addiction to drugs creates significant problems for the community, as well as for the user and his or her family. When the drug is methylamphetamine, or ice, the violence that it also generates can create further problems, particularly if there are stressed family situations leading to family violence. When mental health issues are added to the situation, it creates great complexity in trying to deal with the multiple issues that arise.

2. Now standing for sentence before me is James Conrad Loulanting, who has pleaded guilty to a charge of making a threat to kill his partner and two charges of contravening a Protection Order to which he was subject and which had been personally served on him. Those offences breached certain Good Behaviour Orders, some of which had their genesis in sentencing for an offence which is now nearly a decade old.

3. While suspended sentences can have value as a sentencing option (see R v Loulanting [2014] ACTSC 392 (Loulanting 2014)) breaches of the Good Behaviour Order made when the sentence of imprisonment is suspended need to be treated seriously (Saga v Reid [2010] ACTSC 59 at [99]- [101]), especially if those breaches are constituted by further offending (R v BB [2013] ACTSC 290 at [50]).

4. In all, this is now a very complex sentencing exercise which has its genesis in a sentence imposed in 2007. By that time, Mr Loulanting had already a significant criminal history. [Redacted for legal reasons]. He has been dealt with for an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, an offence of aggravated burglary with intent to assault and an offence of attempted aggravated robbery.

5. In order to understand the background, it is necessary to set out the chronology since then:

7 April 2006 Committed offence of attempt to rob. Arrested and remained in custody for 55 days;

16 April 2007 Sentenced to three years imprisonment, wholly suspended, for the offence of attempt to rob;

18 January 2009 Assaulted two women; July 2009, offence of affray committed in Melbourne. Arrested and bail refused;

22 March 2011 Sentenced for the offence of affray to imprisonment for the time served, 621 days;

29 May 2012 Sentenced to a total of three months imprisonment, wholly suspended, for assault committed on 18 January 2009;

4 July 2012 Sentenced for the breach of Good Behaviour Order of 16 April 2007 constituted by the assaults. Good Behaviour Order cancelled and further Good Behaviour Order made for 18 months (Loulanting 2012);

1 November 2013 Committed offence of assaulting a male committed. Arrested and bailed;

18 November 2013 Arrested and granted further bail;

10 April 2014 Drove a motor vehicle whilst unlicensed;

14 May 2014 Arrested and sentenced for offence of common assault and two offences of failing to appear in accordance with bail understanding. Sentenced to three months imprisonment to be served by periodic detention and with a Good Behaviour Order for two years;

1 July 2014 Convicted and fined for offence of unlicensed driving;

1 July 2014 Committed offence of assaulting his partner and a trespass on her premises;

8 July 2014 Required to serve three months and 18 days in fulltime custody when periodic detention order cancelled;

31 July 2014 Subject to Domestic Violence Order issued at the request of his partner;

2 September 2014 Sentenced to a term of three months imprisonment for common assault and trespass to premises committed on 1 July 2014;

28 November 2014 Appeared in Supreme Court on breach of Good Behaviour Order, deferred sentence order made until 17 February 2015 (Loulanting 2014);

18 January 2015 Contacted partner in breach of domestic violence order;

19 January 2015 Contacted partner, again in breach of Domestic Violence Order, and also made threat to kill her;

17 February 2015 Failed to appear in court in accordance with deferred sentence order;

27 February 2015 Arrested by police and charged with two offences of contravening Domestic Violence Order, making a threat to kill and failing to appear in court, remained in custody.

6. The offences of assault committed on 1 November 2013 and failing to appear in accordance with his bail undertaking committed on 12 November 2013, for all of which he was sentenced on 14 May 2014, constituted a breach of the Good Behaviour Order I made on 4 July 2012, which relates to the suspended sentence of imprisonment made on 16 April 2007 for the offence of attempted robbery. It was for this breach that I made the Deferred Sentence Order on 28 November 2014 and for the further sentencing on 17 February 2015 for which Mr Loulanting failed to appear.

7. He has now been charged with two counts of breaching the Protection Order made on 31 July 2014 and with making a threat to kill. He entered pleas of guilty to these offences in the Magistrates Court on 14 April 2015, after his arrest on 27 February 2015. He was remanded in custody on 25 February 2015 and has remained in custody since then.

8. After four adjournments he pleaded guilty and was committed to this Court for sentence. Making a threat to kill is an offence contrary to s 30 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) and attracts a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. It is, therefore, an indictable offence, as s 190 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) provides that an offence is an indictable offence if it is punishable by imprisonment for longer than two years.

9. The same applies to the two charges of contravening a Protection Order. Those offences are contrary to s 90(2) of the Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT) and render Mr Loulanting liable to a maximum penalty of 500 penalty units; (that is a fine, at the time, of $75,000) and five years imprisonment. Those offences are therefore indictable offences under s 190 of the Legislation Act.

10. He was also charged with the offence of failing to appear in court on 17 February 2015 in accordance with his bail undertaking. The offence of failing to appear in court in accordance with a bail undertaking is an offence contrary to s 49 of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT). The maximum penalty is 200 penalty units (that is a fine of $30,000) and imprisonment for two years. It is thus a summary offence.

11. This latter offence has been transferred to this Court under s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT). Prior to the making of that section and of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), this Court had no jurisdiction in respect of summary offences. Amendments to the Magistrates Court Act, including s 90B, and amendments to insert Pt 8 of the Supreme Court Act have, however, given this Court jurisdiction to hear and determine certain summary offences. I described those provisions in the R v Barker [2014] ACTSC 374 at [78] as "a welcome reform".

12. The provisions require the Magistrates Court to transfer certain charges to the Supreme Court when making a committal order. In particular, s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act requires the court, when committing an offender for trial to transfer what are called back-up offences or related offences to this Court to be dealt with under Pt 8 of the Supreme Court Act.

13. These offences are defined in s 68CA of the Supreme Court Act. They are summary offences or indictable offences capable of being dealt with summarily. A back-up offence is an offence at least some of the elements of which are similar to the elements that constitute the indictable offence for which the offender is committed for trial and which will be prosecuted on the same facts as that indictable offence. A related offence is one that "arises from substantially the same circumstances as those from which the indictable offence for which the offender is committed has arisen" s 68CA Supreme Court Act.

14. The question arises as to the jurisdiction I have to deal with the charge of failing to appear in accordance with Mr Loulanting's bail undertaking. Unfortunately, neither counsel addressed this matter at the sentencing hearing and it was only when I was preparing my remarks on sentence that the issue arose. I requested further submissions from both counsel. They have provided those further submissions and I am grateful for the assistance that they have provided.

15. Two questions arise as to whether the Magistrates Court had power to transfer the charge. The first revolves around the meaning of s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act, and the second as to whether the offence was one that was capable of transfer. As to the first issue, I note that Mr Loulanting pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court on 14 April 2015 to the charges of contravening the Protection Order and the threat to kill.

16. Accordingly, under s 90A (7) of the Magistrates Court Act, he was committed for sentence to this Court. That section refers to committals following a plea of guilty. Given the entry of the plea of guilty and the acceptance by it of the court required under the section, it would ordinarily be considered that the committal was for sentence (see s 92A of the Magistrates Court Act).

17. This, it seems to me, is reinforced by the contrasting references to committal for trial in s 90A(8) and (12). Ordinarily, therefore, a committal under s 90A would be regarded as a committal for sentence and not a committal for trial. Section 90B of the Magistrates Court Act, however, refers to the section applying where a person is "committed for trial under s 90A (7)". Ordinarily, both the statute itself and current practice would refer to a committal under s 90A (7) as a committal for sentence to be contrasted with a committal for trial, which implies that the accused has pleaded not guilty and seeks a trial on indictment.

18. Thus, to read the reference to "trial" in s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act literally would, however, result in an absurdity since there is no committal for trial under s 90A (7) but only a committal for sentence. There is authority, such as Grey v Pearson [1857] EngR 335; (1857) 6 HLC 61 at 106; [1857] EngR 335; 10 ER 1216 at 1234, that where the ordinary or grammatical sense of words would lead to an absurdity the grammatical or ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity. Such an approach has been approved more recently, for example, in Footscray City College v Ruzicka [2007] VSCA 136; (2007) 16 VR 498 at 505.

19. Applying this approach, I read "committed for trial" in s 90B (1)(a) of the Magistrates Court Act as meaning committed for sentence. Indeed, the Magistrates Court Act provides elsewhere for a transfer of back-up or related charges where a person has pleaded not guilty and has been committed for trial to this Court. Thus, s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act provides for the transfer of back-up or related offences where there is a committal for trial, the words used in the section, following a plea of not guilty and the hearing of the evidence.

20. Accordingly, I am satisfied that s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act refers, though misusing the word "trial", to a committal for sentence and it allows in this case back-up or related offences to be transferred to this Court upon the committal of Mr Loulanting for sentence, as has been done.

21. The second question, then, is whether it is a back-up or related offence. It is clearly not a back-up offence for it has had no common elements with the offences of contravention of a Protection Order, making a threat to kill or attempted robbery. Whether it is a related offence depends on whether it "arises from substantially the same circumstances as those from which the indictable offence has arisen".

22. In this case, it seems to me that the fail to appear to answer his bail is not a related offence. It does not apply to bail granted in relation to the offences which have now been committed for sentence. It relates to bail granted by me consequent upon the making of a deferred sentence order in relation to the attempted robbery.

23. It is clear from the statute that a related or back-up offence can be transferred to this court even after the committal but the Deferred Sentence Order relates to a matter that occurred many years before the failure to appear under the Deferred Sentence Order and has nothing to do with the circumstances from which the indictable offence has arisen, namely, the attempt to rob in April 2006. As a result, and it is regrettable, I must remit the offence for failing to appear in accordance with his bail undertaking to the Magistrates Court to be dealt with there in accordance with law.

24. As noted above, Mr Loulanting's partner, the victim, sought, and was granted, a Domestic Violence Order on 31 July 2014 for two years. It prohibited Mr Loulanting from contacting or threatening his partner or behaving in an offensive or harassing manner towards her. At about 8:00 am on 18 January 2015, Mr Loulanting telephoned the victim, asking if he could see his son. She refused because Mr Loulanting said he had been using ice and he was aggressive and demanding.

25. Later that morning, Mr Loulanting sent the victim some text messages that were indecent, offensive and aggressive. They were clearly threatening, offensive and harassing. The victim ignored the messages, though threatening, because he had sent such messages in the past and had not then acted on the threats.

26. The next day, the victim received six missed calls from a private number. She then answered a call from the private number and recognised Mr Loulanting's voice. Again he asked to see his son but the victim refused because he was still using ice. Mr Loulanting then started abusing her. Shortly after 9:00 am Mr Loulanting left two voicemail messages that included the following statement, "I have lost everything and now you are going to loose [sic] everything, I am going to end your life by the end of the day."

27. The victim felt scared and worried for her safety, as these were different threats to those made to her before. The tone of voice made her believe that the threats were real and that Mr Loulanting had the ability to carry them out; she was afraid that he would do so. Later that morning, Mr Loulanting sent the following text messages to the victim:

At 9:23 am: "I want to c my son b4 the day turnz very bad" and "I wil kil u 2day;"

At 9:30 am: "there is 1 bullet 4 u and there is 1 bullet 4 me" and "do not think I am joking, okay."

28. The facts in relation to the attempted armed robbery are set out in R v Loulanting (Unreported, ACT Supreme Court, Crispin J, SCC 153 of 2006, 16 April 2007). I do not need to repeat them.

29. I have dealt, in detail, with Mr Loulanting's subjective circumstances up to November 2014 in my remarks on sentence in Loulanting 2014. I do not need to repeat them. They may be summarised as follows.

30. Mr Loulanting was born in 1986, the second-eldest of six children. His father was a strict disciplinarian and had a significant issue with alcohol and cannabis. His childhood was otherwise normal until he was sexually abused as a child. This has not, until recently, been addressed by counselling. He believes that the abuse changed him and made him violent. His criminal record is consistent with this assessment.

31. He was an outstanding athlete but has been unable to take advantage of that ability. Mr Loulanting has had employment, mainly in labouring positions. The last position of which I had information was a job as a painter, a casual position, from which he was dismissed in about July 2014. When working, he appears to be a good employee.

32. He has had a number of relationships but most recently with the woman who is the victim of the latest offences and with whom he has a son. The relationship has, however, been volatile and the two are apparently currently separated. It appears that the offences were committed because of disputes over access to their son.

33. Mr Loulanting has used alcohol, cannabis and tobacco, though it does not appear that these have been problematic for him. He has used ecstasy but not recently. He started using amphetamines when he was 19 and from 2011 became a regular user. He was smoking four to five points of crystal methamphetamine daily until he was incarcerated in June 2014. He has taken steps to address his drug addiction, but they have not yet been successful. As I noted in Saga v Reid at [89], it can take a number of failed attempts at rehabilitation for drug addiction before it is successful.

34. His criminal history is worrying. I have set it out above. He has now had a number of chances provided by suspended sentences but has continued to breach them, and more culpably by committing further offences. Clearly, the commission of further offences is the more serious form of a breach of a Good Behaviour Order.

35. Mr Loulanting's mental health is of concern. He suffers from PostTraumatic Stress Disorder, stemming from his experiences of childhood abuse. This has not been addressed, though he has had some counselling more recently, but it appears still to be in the very early stages. He has been diagnosed as suffering from depression. He is currently said to have some suicidal ideation and has accessed Forensic Mental Health Services while in custody. He seems to be at a high need for mental health intervention.

36. Mr Loulanting did seek a further opportunity to address his drug addiction and applied for admission to Canberra Recovery Services, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation agency conducted by the Salvation Army. No bed was available. He may be able to access the Solaris Therapeutic Community within the Alexander Maconochie Centre if he is serious about addressing his drug addiction.

37. Making a threat to kill is a serious offence, as the maximum penalty shows. See Oliver (1982) 7 A Crim R 174 at 176. In this case, the surrounding circumstances are very relevant to the seriousness of the offence, as pointed out by the UK Court of Appeal in Walker [1996] 1 Cr App R (s) 180 at 181. The use of ice, the earlier harassment and the changed tone from the earlier conversation all show the serious intent and the fear that the threat is likely to have engendered in the victim. The passion with which Mr Loulanting sought access to his son no doubt heightened the belief of danger in the victim. That the threat was not made in person or with a weapon perhaps makes it somewhat less serious.

38. The offence was committed while Mr Loulanting was on conditional liberty, which also aggravates the seriousness of this and the other offences. See Auld v The Queen [2013] ACTCA 21 at [9]. In my view, it was a serious offence. It was put to me that I should take into account that it was engendered by the use of ice and this is no doubt so. That is not a mitigating factor, however, though I take into account Mr Loulanting's desire for rehabilitation and the efforts he has made, though unsuccessful to date.

39. This can, however, be accessed in the Alexander Maconochie Centre, and the genuineness of his commitment may be assessed by the efforts he makes in custody. In particular, he says that he wishes to engage in the Solaris Program, and that should be available to him.

40. The denial of access to his son is again an explanation, but it does not mitigate the offence. There are mechanisms that our community provides for addressing such claims and, even where the denial of access to have been capricious, it does not justify such behaviour, though provocation may reasonably affect the seriousness of the offence. In this case, I had no information that that was relevant to the issue.

41. The other offences, contravening a Protection Order, are also serious offences, though the maximum penalty shows them to be less serious than the offence of threat to kill. In R v Todd Elphick (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 23 at [59], I explained:

Breaches of personal Protection Orders are also serious, because they involve a disregard of a court order, but also because such orders are specifically designed to protect those for whom they have been granted. A court has made a decision that an appropriate level of protection is required and this needs to be respected. Further, such orders are normally made in the context of family violence and, as I pointed out in Roberts v Smorhun [2013] ACTSC 218 at [120]- [122], this is this is a serious problem which the integrity of the Domestic Violence Order system can help to address.

42. In this case, the breaches were deliberate and intentional. They were, of course, also committed while Mr Loulanting was on conditional liberty. They were not the most serious version of the offences; for instance, they were not made by personal approach. Insofar as the offence on the second day is concerned, the most serious text was really that making the threat to kill, which is being prosecuted as a separate offence. It was an aggravating factor that there were multiple contacts over the two days, not just one contact, and that the content was, on a number of occasions, abusive and indecent. These were not the most serious versions of the offence but must be regarded seriously.

43. The breach of the Good Behaviour Order is also serious. The breach was constituted by the commission of further offences, which is a more serious version of the breach. It is also to be considered in the context of a number of opportunities that Mr Loulanting has been given to reform and conduct himself in the community without committing further crime. While I accept that there is not a presumption in favour of imposing the sentence suspended (see Guy v Telford [2013] ACTSC 5 at [83]- [87]), there seems to me little option in this case, but to do so, though moderated for reasons that I will refer to below.

44. I have regard to the purposes of sentencing as set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). In this case, the offences require punishment and denunciation. General deterrence will play a significant part. I consider, too, that specific deterrence must play a part, as Mr Loulanting has not been able to avoid committing further offences and has not been able to commit himself to reform and rehabilitation.

45. I accept that he genuinely seeks rehabilitation, but while the spirit may be willing, the flesh is particularly weak. For example, in the bail conditions for the Deferred Sentence Order I made express rehabilitation provisions, none of which seem to have been conscientiously followed. Certainly, I have no evidence to suggest the agencies to which I referred him had been accessed in any significant way.

46. I take into account Mr Loulanting's plea of guilty. It was made at an early stage, though the Crown case was strong, if not overwhelming, insofar as the offences of contravening the Protection Order are concerned. The offence of threat to kill is somewhat more problematic but the case was strong. A plea entitles him to some discount for the advantage it offered to the administration of justice. I take into account the matters set out in s 33(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. So far as I know them they have been set out above.

47. I accept that Mr Loulanting is remorseful. I accept that he wishes to avail himself of rehabilitation. It is never too late, but he must accept the consequences of his failure to pursue rehabilitation when he had the opportunities in the past.

48. I take into account his mental health, though it does not seem to me to attract, in a significant way, any of the principles set out in cases such as R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269 at 276; [32]. I assess the seriousness of the offences as I have referred to earlier. That they were committed in the context of family violence requires them to be treated with particular concern (R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302; (2006) 164 A Crim R 179 at 192-6; [67]- [88]).

49. I note that Mr Loulanting has been assessed as not suitable for a community service work condition to Good Behaviour Order and is not suitable for periodic detention. Neither counsel assisted me with any indication of sentencing practice relating to the offences. In my view, and neither counsel submitted otherwise, a sentence of immediate fulltime custody is inevitable.

50. I accept that the matters to which I have referred justify a somewhat shorter non parole period, and I accept the submission of Mr M KukuliesSmith, counsel for Mr Loulanting, that a lengthy parole period will be necessary to ensure that his commitment to rehabilitation is carried out.

51. However, since the offence of attempted robbery is now old and there have been significant sentences imposed on Mr Loulanting since then, I consider that the delay requires some moderation in the sentence to be imposed. He has also, I note, taken some steps, though ultimately unsuccessful, towards rehabilitation during the interval between the original sentencing for that offence and today. See, for example, R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 at 519-20; PR v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 40 at [27]- [46]; Sabra v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 38 at [38].

52. I note that there are multiple offences to be imposed and, of course, I must consider the questions of totality, concurrence and cumulation. I have also considered whether the sentences should be partly or wholly concurrent because, for example, they are part of the same enterprise or otherwise. For example, all of the offences were committed on two days. While not quite part of the same enterprise so as to attract what has been called the 'one transaction' rule (R v Hally [1965] Qd R 582 at 584), it has been pointed out that repetitious behaviour over a confined span of time may be sufficient to permit the presumption of concurrency to continue (Director of Public Prosecutions v Grabovac [1998] 1 VR 664). This does apply to some extent.

53. On the other hand, I must be careful to note that, as pointed out in R v Harris [2007] NSWCCA 130 at [46], an offender's criminality is greater by reason of committing more offences rather than fewer and that the impression should not be left that an offender is not being effectively punished for offences beyond the first in the series. As to the offence of threat to kill, this is, in my view, one where the overlap with the second offence of contravention of the Protection Order is so substantial that concurrency is appropriate.

54. I have then reviewed the length of the term of imprisonment arrived at and ensured that the principle of totality is respected and that the total sentence is adequate to reflect the criminality of the offences committed, but not more than that and that the total sentence is not excessive. Where necessary to achieve this I have adjusted cumulation or concurrency of the individual sentences.

1. For the offence of attempted robbery on 7 April 2006, the conviction for which I confirmed on 28 November 2014, I sentence you to two years imprisonment, to commence on 8 December 2014, to take into account pre-sentence custody. Had you not pleaded guilty, I would have sentenced to two years and 10 months imprisonment.

2. I convict you of contravening a Protection Order on 18 January 2015. I sentence you to 12 months imprisonment, to commence on 18 June 2016; that is, to be cumulative as to six months on the first sentence. Had you not pleaded guilty, I would have sentenced you to 15 months imprisonment.

3. I convict you of threatening to kill the victim on 19 January 2015. I sentence you to two years and six months imprisonment, to commence on 8 June 2016, to be cumulative as to 18 months on the sentence for the first contravention of the Protection Order. Had you not pleaded guilty, I would have sentenced you to three years and two months imprisonment.

4. I convict you of contravening a Protection Order on 19 January 2015. I sentence you to 12 months imprisonment, to commence on 8 June 2016; that is, to be wholly concurrent with the sentence for the offence of threatening to kill the victim. Had you not pleaded guilty, I would have sentenced you to 15 months imprisonment.

5. That is a total sentence of four years imprisonment. I set a non parole period of two years and two months, to commence on 8 December 2014 and to end on 7 February 2017.

I certify that the preceding fifty-five [55] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Refshauge.