Sentencing for Domestic Violence Offences
65 In approaching the resolution of the present appeal, it is appropriate to refer to statements of this Court with respect to sentencing for domestic violence offences. At the outset, it must be observed that these statements have been made in the context of cases involving a single victim and, usually, a single serious offence. The present case involves three separate victims against whom the Respondent committed serious offences of violence in the course of relationships over an eight-year period between 1996 and 2004. Before and during this period, the Respondent was appearing before Courts and being dealt with for a range of offences of violence, including breaches of apprehended violence orders.
66 This case brings into sharp focus the challenges facing a sentencing court where an offender has committed repeated serious offences of violence against different domestic partners over an extended period of time.
67 In R v Glen (Court of Criminal Appeal, 19 December 1994, BC9403423), Simpson J stressed the importance of general deterrence in cases of domestic violence. Her Honour stated that victims of domestic violence will "receive the full protection of the law, insofar as the courts are able to afford it to them".
68 Since Glen, this Court has emphasised repeatedly the importance of general deterrence in domestic violence cases, given the prevalence of violence by men against women in domestic relationships: R v Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467 at 472-3; R v Berry [2000] NSWCCA 451 at paragraph 32; R v Greene [2001] NSWCCA 258 at paragraph 16.
69 In R v Ross (Court of Criminal Appeal, 20 November 1996, unreported), Adams AJ (Newman J agreeing) observed, in the context of a sentence appeal concerning an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed upon a domestic partner:
"This was an act of frightening violence meted out to a woman [who] was entitled to the protection of the law. Until men such as the applicant understand that the law will treat with real seriousness cases which hitherto have been dismissed as having 'domestic' significance, this appalling series of violent acts meted out continuously to women in this community by men who suppose they have the right to do so will not stop."
70 In R v Fahda [1999] NSWCCA 267, Simpson J (Studdert J agreeing) said at paragraph 26:
"Domestic violence is a problem of considerable proportions in this community and the courts must be strong to ensure that it is adequately punished."
71 In R v Edigarov (2001) 125 A Crim R 551, Wood CJ at CL (Studdert and Bell JJ agreeing) said at 558 [41]:
"As this Court has confirmed in Glen NSWCCA 19 December 1994, Ross NSWCCA 20 November 1996, Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467, Fahda (1999) NSWCCA 267 and Powell (2000) NSWCCA 108, violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated with real seriousness. Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically, or otherwise, to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence."
72 In R v Dunn (2004) 144 A Crim R 180, Adams J (Ipp JA and Sully J agreeing) said at 195 [47]:
"Crimes involving domestic violence have two important characteristics which differentiate them from many other crimes of violence: firstly, the offender usually believes that, in a real sense, what they do is justified, even that they are the true victim; and, secondly, the continued estrangement requires continued threat. These elements also usually mean that the victim never feels truly safe. Unlike the casual robbery, where the victim is often simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, the victim of a domestic violence offence is personally targeted. To my mind these considerations emphasise not only the need for general and personal deterrence but also of denunciation in cases of this kind."
73 Unsurprisingly, similar views have been expressed in other jurisdictions with respect to sentencing of domestic violence offenders.
74 In R v Devine (Tasmanian Supreme Court, 5 July 1993, unreported), Underwood J (as Underwood CJ then was) said, in the course of sentencing an offender who had assaulted his estranged wife, in the presence of small children, causing multiple bruising to her face and body and threatened her with a knife:
"Domestic violence is a profound problem and it is the duty of the courts to denounce offences such as these and attempt to deter its recurrence by you and other men. The relationship of husband and wife, albeit estranged, is an aggravating factor for violence of this kind constitutes a breach of trust. It is also an abuse of power and control on one who, in the circumstances, was in a position of vulnerability."
75 In Parker v The Queen (Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 July 1994, BC9400423), Underwood J at page 11 said:
"In my opinion sentencing for crimes of domestic violence should proceed in accordance with the following principles expressed by the Alberta Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Brown (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 242 at 249:
'When a man assaults his wife or other female partner, his violence toward her can be accurately characterised as a breach of the position of trust which he occupies. It is an aggravating factor. Men who assault their wives are abusing the power and control which they so often have over the women with whom they live. The vulnerability of many such women is increased by the financial and emotional situation in which they find themselves, which makes it difficult for them to escape'."