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[2001] TASSC 48
procedural. The Court held that the jury panel was not legally required to list occupations and that a possible fishing-industry connection was not, without specific supporting material, sufficient cause to...
The Court said that the law then in force did not require the jury panel given to counsel to list jurors’ occupations. The defence could not establish cause to challenge a juror merely by pointing to the possibility that the person worked in fishing or fish processing, or was related to someone who did. Some specific evidence of possible bias would be needed. Because the trial was expected to be lengthy and the absence of occupation information raised practical concerns, the Court arranged for jurors to be asked whether they were willing to disclose their occupations.
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2,462 words · generated 28/09/2026
In R v Georgiadis [No 2], Underwood J considered an issue about the information appearing on the jury panel for a criminal trial involving six accused: John Georgiadis, Julie Theodosis, John Belbin, Andrew Wayne Lamont, Paul Edward Kelly and John Bostock. The Crown case, as briefly described in the reasons, alleged that the accused were parties to one or more conspiracies concerning the taking and processing of abalone beyond the quantities permitted by law [16].
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The panel supplied to counsel listed jurors’ names but not their occupations. Defence counsel asked the judge to have each juror’s occupation ascertained. The stated purpose was to identify whether any juror worked in, or was connected with, the fishing industry, so counsel could better consider whether to exercise a peremptory challenge [1]. The issue was therefore both statutory and practical: what information had to appear on the panel, and whether the possible occupational connection supplied a basis to challenge a juror for cause.
Underwood J traced the jury-selection provisions of the Jury Act 1899 (Tas). The judge distinguished the jury list from the panel summoned for a particular trial. The regulations required the provisional jury list to include a person’s name, address, occupation and date of birth [5]. But the provisions for the panel returned with the precept required the names of the people summoned. The Act did not say that their occupations had to be included in that panel [7]–[8].
The judge also considered the rules governing challenges. The right to challenge was linked to s 52 of the Act and s 364 of the Criminal Code [9]. A challenge for cause could concern presumed or actual partiality, described as propter affectum. Underwood J referred to grounds such as a juror being related to a party, having an interest in the case, or there being some suspicion of partiality [10]. The judge concluded that an occupational connection with fishing, by itself, was not enough to establish such partiality [17]–[19].
After further submissions, the judge noted that occupation information was no longer recorded on the State roll, as counsel had informed the Court [20]. The judgment raises concern about the Sheriff’s ability to identify people who might be disqualified under the Act, but does not resolve that broader statutory issue. Instead, for this trial, the judge chose a pragmatic course: Court staff would ask each juror whether they were willing to disclose their occupation, and disclosed occupations would be added to the panel and provided to counsel [21]–[22].
The decision rests on two separate conclusions.
First, the Court interpreted the legislation by following the statutory process. The Sheriff prepared a jury list, selected names at random, summoned jurors in accordance with the judge’s precept, and returned a panel containing the names of those summoned [5]. The fact that the regulations called for occupation information at the earlier jury-list stage did not mean that the same information had to be reproduced on the trial panel. Underwood J considered that the Act specified names for the panel but did not specify addresses or occupations [7]–[8].
The distinction matters. The panel’s statutory function was to identify the persons summoned for the trial. The jury list served an earlier administrative function, including the removal of people who were not qualified or were exempt. Underwood J suggested that the requirement for information beyond names on the list assisted the Sheriff in carrying out that earlier task [7]. The Court did not read the more detailed requirements for the list as silently imposing an equivalent disclosure obligation for the panel.
Second, the judge applied the law of challenge for cause to the proposed occupational objection. The historical sources discussed in the reasons treated partiality, rather than mere category membership, as the relevant concern. Underwood J referred to challenges based on a juror’s relationship to a party, service to a party, interest in the cause, or circumstances creating suspicion of partiality [10]. The judge also reviewed the requirement for the challenger to state a ground and show cause [12]–[14].
The alleged subject matter of the prosecution did not, in the judge’s view, bridge the gap between occupation and partiality. The possibility that a juror might be a professional fisher, fish processor or close relative of someone in those occupations was not itself evidence that the juror would favour either side [16]–[18]. The judge’s analogies to a farmer trying a farmer accused of stealing cattle, or a burglary victim sitting on a burglary trial, illustrated the point: an occupational or personal connection does not, without more, establish a prejudgment or malice [18].
The judgment did not hold that information about a juror’s occupation could never be relevant. It said the position could be different if specific evidence or other material suggested that an accused would not receive an impartial and fair trial [19]. The distinction is between an unsupported possibility and a fact-based concern capable of bearing on impartiality.
Finally, the procedure ordered at the end did not reverse those conclusions. The Court did not find a legal entitlement to occupation information on the panel. It responded pragmatically to the trial’s circumstances, including its estimated eight-week duration, the number of counsel and the public expense already involved [22]. The disclosed information was to be shared with counsel, but the reasons do not say that jurors were compelled to disclose it.
The judgment describes the statutory position as it stood in 2001. Under the provisions analysed by Underwood J, occupation was required on the provisional jury list, but not on the panel of summoned jurors supplied to the Court and parties [5]–[8]. The decision therefore rejected the proposition that the omission of occupations from this panel, on its own, contravened the requirements described in the Act.
On challenges for cause, the judgment drew on the historical common-law approach reflected in the authorities it discussed. A challenger had to identify a proper ground concerning actual or presumed partiality and bear the burden of establishing it. The reasons describe a procedure in which the challenger stated the cause, and, if it was a legally sufficient ground and an issue remained, the issue could be tried [12]–[14]. Underwood J also referred to Murphy v R as confirming the need for a sufficient factual foundation before potential jurors could be questioned about cause [15]. The judgment does not purport to reproduce every aspect of that case’s reasoning as its own; it uses the authority to support the need for an adequate foundation.
The immediate effect was limited. The Court held that occupational connection alone was not sufficient cause for challenge, while ordering that jurors be asked if they were willing to disclose their occupations in this trial [17]–[19], [22]. That practical direction should not be confused with a general statutory rule requiring jurors to disclose occupations.
The reasons also identify a possible administrative concern that could bear on a different question. Counsel informed the judge that an amendment to the Electoral Act meant occupations were no longer recorded on the State roll and were consequently no longer supplied to the Sheriff [20]. Underwood J noted that this might make it difficult for the Sheriff to perform the jury-list task of excluding people who were not qualified, and observed that the issue might potentially provide cause to challenge the array [21]. The judge expressly noted that the Act did not impose an express duty on the Sheriff to make inquiries. The reasons do not finally determine whether the array was invalid or specify what further information or inquiry would be legally required.
The supplied judgment contains no later judicial treatment of Georgiadis [No 2]. It is therefore not possible, on this source alone, to say whether later courts followed, distinguished or confined the decision.
At [7], Underwood J said there was “no statutory requirement to show the occupations or the addresses” on the panel. In plain English, the Court read the Act as requiring the panel to identify the summoned jurors, not to provide their occupational biographies. The judge treated the occupation requirement for the earlier jury list as a different statutory step.
At [14], the reasons say that a challenger could not simply announce a challenge for partiality and have that issue tried. The challenger had to state a cause, and that cause had to be one capable of justifying the juror being stood aside. Put simply, a challenge required more than suspicion expressed in general terms.
At [17], the Court concluded that the possibility of a fishing-industry juror being on the panel was not sufficient cause. The point was not that occupational information could never matter, but that the occupation itself did not show bias.
At [18], the judge said there was “no reason to suppose” that a fisher or processor would have preconceived views about the accused or fail to comply with the juror’s oath, absent specific statements or other evidence. The accompanying analogies make the reasoning concrete: the Court did not treat shared occupation or experience as an automatic disqualification.
At [19], the judge qualified the conclusion: the case would be different if there were “some specific evidence or other material” supporting a concern that an accused would not receive a fair and impartial trial. This passage is important because it identifies the limit of the ruling. A fact-supported concern remained potentially relevant, even though the general possibility of an industry connection did not suffice.
At [22], the Court directed staff to ask each juror whether they were willing to disclose their occupation. This was a practical response in a trial expected to last about eight weeks, with seven counsel and fourteen jurors to be empanelled. It was not expressed as a ruling that the Act required disclosure or that a juror had to answer.
The decision is most directly relevant where a party seeks to challenge a juror for cause based on a general occupational connection to the subject matter of the prosecution. Its example is a juror who may work in fishing or fish processing, or be closely related to someone who does, in a prosecution concerning alleged abalone offending [16]–[18].
The core comparison is between two kinds of proposed basis for challenge. A general possibility that a juror belongs to an occupational group associated with the case was insufficient [17]. Specific statements or other evidence suggesting preconceived views, hostility, partiality or an inability to try the case impartially could raise a materially different issue [18]–[19]. The reasons do not define a complete test for what evidence would be enough; they identify the need for something more particular than occupational connection alone.
The statutory interpretation may also be relevant when a dispute concerns the difference between information held for jury-list administration and information required on the panel for a particular trial. Underwood J’s analysis was specific to the Jury Act 1899 (Tas), the cited regulations and the provisions then under consideration [5]–[8]. The judgment should not, by itself, be treated as establishing the requirements of a different jurisdiction’s legislation or a later version of the Tasmanian legislation.
The observations about the Sheriff’s access to occupation information concern a related but distinct fact pattern: a challenge to the array based on possible shortcomings in compiling the jury list. Underwood J raised that possibility in light of the information given to the Court about the State roll, but did not decide it [20]–[21]. The case therefore indicates an issue a later court might need to examine, rather than a concluded rule that an array would be invalid in such circumstances.
The supplied judgment does not report later cases discussing R v Georgiadis [No 2], and no later authorities or legal sources have been provided. Its subsequent reception therefore cannot be responsibly characterised here as adoption, limitation, distinction or rejection.
Within the judgment itself, Underwood J considered several earlier authorities. R v Edmonds was discussed for the requirement that a challenger identify a basis for a challenge to the poll [13]–[14]. R v Geach and R v Swain & Ors were referred to as examples of the procedure for addressing a stated challenge [14]. Murphy v R was considered for the need for a sufficient factual foundation before questioning potential jurors [15]. These are authorities used by Underwood J in reaching the decision; they are not later treatment of Georgiadis.
The reasons also refer to R v Power as an example in which a judge tried the issue raised by a challenge to the poll with counsel’s consent [11]. Underwood J noted that historical materials described differing procedures, including the use of triers. The discussion supplies context for the challenge procedure but does not establish a general ruling in Georgiadis about who must try every challenge.
Several questions remain open on the face of the reasons.
First, the Court did not decide whether the lack of occupation information on the State roll, and the resulting difficulty identified for the Sheriff, could invalidate a jury list or support a challenge to the array. Underwood J said this “may be cause to challenge the array” but immediately noted that the Act did not expressly require the Sheriff to make inquiries [21]. The point was left as a possible issue, not resolved as a legal conclusion.
Second, the judgment does not determine the correct interpretation of the interaction between the Act’s provisions about exemption, disqualification and removal from the jury list. The judge described the statutory language as “curious” and noted uncertainty about whether people listed in Schedule I were to be treated in the same way as people excused for a particular panel [21]. No definitive construction of that interaction was necessary to resolve the request before the Court.
Third, the reasons do not specify what kind or quantity of evidence would be sufficient to support a challenge based on partiality. They draw the line between occupational connection alone and “specific evidence or other material” suggesting an unfair trial [19], but do not set out a comprehensive evidentiary threshold.
Fourth, the Court’s voluntary-disclosure procedure was expressly tied to the circumstances of this trial [22]. The reasons do not establish whether a similar inquiry would be appropriate in another case, whether a juror could decline to disclose, or how any disclosed information should affect the exercise of a challenge. The stated direction was to ask whether jurors were willing to disclose, and to provide disclosed occupations to counsel.
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CITATION: R v Georgiadis [No 2] [2001] TASSC 48
Edited edition of reasons for judgment delivered orally
Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Juries - Striking and empanelling - Challenges - Challenge for cause - Non disclosure of jurors' occupations not a sufficient cause for challenge.
Jury - The jury in criminal proceedings - Challenges - Challenge for cause - Non disclosure of jurors' occupations not a sufficient cause for challenge.
Accused (Georgiadis and Theodosis): H Drakos and Company
Accused (Belbin): Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania
Judgment Number: [2001] TASSC 48
1 A question has arisen with respect to the copy of the jury panel supplied to counsel for the accused persons pursuant to the provisions of the Jury Act 1899 ("the Act"), s30. Although the panel shows the names of the jurors, it does not show their occupations. Counsel have requested that I enquire of each juror in order to ascertain their occupation. The object of the request is to ascertain whether any juror has an occupation in, or connected with the Fishing Industry to enable counsel for the accused persons to better consider whether his client should or should not exercise the right of peremptory challenge.
2 The Criminal Code, s361, provides that upon a plea, other than guilty, or one that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court, the issue thereby raised shall be tried by a jury.
3 The Act, s39 provides that all criminal issues joined in the Supreme Court shall be tried "by a jury consisting of 12 persons qualified as jurors according to this Act".
4 The Act, s4, provides in a general way, that every person who is less than 65 years of age and who is enrolled on the "State roll is qualified to serve as a juror and liable to serve".
5 Sections 6 - 7C inclusive, deal with exceptions to that general qualification for jury service. Section 8 defines a "jury district" and ss9 and 27 - 32 inclusive, prescribe the mechanism for providing a jury to try criminal issues. That mechanism is:
1 The Sheriff prepares a jury list for each jury district. This list is current for one year. The list is to contain such number of persons as the Sheriff considers "adequate" (for what is not explained) selected in the manner prescribed from those enrolled on the State roll but excluding those not qualified to act as jurors or exempted from jury service. The list is selected at random.
2 The Act, s69(2)(b) empowers the Governor to make regulations (inter alia) for the selection of names for a jury list. Regulation 4(1) requires the Sheriff to place on a "provisional jury list" the "name, address, occupation and date of birth" of the persons he has randomly selected to go on the list.
3 In accordance with reg4(1)(d) the Sheriff strikes from the provisional jury list those who are exempt or not qualified and, by virtue of reg4(2), "the names of persons remaining on the provisional jury list ... form the jury list for that jury district".
4 Section 27 requires a judge to issue a precept to the Sheriff requiring him to summon "so many jurors as the judge may think sufficient for the occasion".
5 Next, the Act, s28, requires the Sheriff to summons the number of jurors that he is required to summons by virtue of the precept. It may be noted that the section requires him or her to do this "in accordance with the Regulations" but there appears to be no regulation dealing with this matter. By virtue of s28(2), the number summonsed are to be selected at random, from the names on the jury list, excluding therefrom those who have previously been summonsed.
6 Enigmatically, the Act, s29, immediately proceeds to direct that "the Sheriff shall, after the cards have been drawn as aforesaid, ... issue a summons to the several jurors required to be summoned ...". There is no previous reference to "cards", and prima facie, the section is very difficult to understand. Clearly, the intent is that the Sheriff summons those jurors who have been randomly selected from the jury list in order to form a panel of jurors as directed by the precept. It appears that the reference to "cards" is a reference to the now repealed s25 which required the Sheriff to make a card with a number on it for every juror whose name appears on the jury list.
7 Section 32 requires the Sheriff to return the precept "into the Court" on the day that the jurors are summonsed to appear, and to annex to it "a panel" "containing the names of the persons summoned by him in pursuance of the said precept". The Act, s32, also requires the Sheriff to "furnish to the clerk of the Court cards containing the names of the persons so summoned".
6 The Act, s30, provides that a copy of every panel shall be made by the Sheriff two days before the precept is returnable, and a copy shall be delivered to any person on payment of the sum of one dollar.
7 From the foregoing statutory analysis it seems to me that there is no statutory requirement to show the occupations or the addresses of the jurors who, by virtue of a summons issued in accordance with the judge's precept form the panel for the trial of an issue or issues. Although the jury list, from which each panel is randomly selected, is required to show the names, addresses, occupations and dates of birth of the jurors, no such requirement is specified with respect to the panel that the Sheriff returns to the Court and supplies to persons upon payment of $1. No doubt the requirement that the list disclose more than the names of potential jurors is to enable the Sheriff to satisfy his statutory obligation to "cull" the list to remove therefrom persons ineligible for jury service by reason of age occupation and the like.
8 Leaving to one side for the moment the statutory difficulties arising out of the reference to "cards", it appears to me that the panel annexed to the precept is only required to show the names of the persons summoned by the Sheriff in accordance with the precept. No other information is required by the statute to be disclosed. I note in passing, that the panel annexed to the precept is to contain the names of persons summoned (served in accordance with the Act, s29(2)) and not merely a list of persons whom the Sheriff considers have received the summons.
9 An accused has a right to challenge a jury panel or an individual juror. The right is conferred by the Code, s364. It is conferred by reference to the Act, s52, which provides that a challenge to the array and to an individual (or polls) shall be allowed "in such and the like form and manner, and under and subject to such like laws, rules and regulations, in every respect as by law are established, used, and practised in like cases in the High Court of Justice in England at the commencement of this Act".
10 The Act commenced on 1 January 1900. At that time, the High Court of Justice in England permitted the challenge of an individual juror for cause. See Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice (1905) 23 ed 201 et seq. Relevantly, a ground of challenge to a juror was allowed for propter affectum, ie, a ground of some presumed or actual partiality in the juror. Such a challenge might be a principal challenge or a challenge "to the favour". The former arose in the case of prima facie malice or favour, such as the juror is related to a party, or a servant of a party or has an interest in the cause. A challenge to the favour arose where the party had no principal challenge but "objects only some suspicion, as acquaintance, and the like;" per Blackstone, Laws of England Vol III 363.
11 A challenge is to be made before the taking of the oath commences. It appears that in 1900, the procedure adopted in the case of a challenge to the polls was to appoint two triers, often two jurors who had been previously sworn, to try the issue of propter affectum. See Blackstone (supra) at 363. However, it may be noted that in R v Power [1920] VicLawRp 15; [1920] VLR 88, the issue raised by the challenge to the poll was tried by the trial judge with the consent of both counsel. According to a current note in the Argus Law Reports for 1918, 24 ALR (CN), 1, the issue of propter affectum was tried by the trial judge and not triers, but there is no explanation in the note as to why this was done.
12 From the cases noted in Archbold, it appears that the burden of a challenge for cause is on the person who makes it and he is not entitled to question a juror before challenging him. The learned authors proceed at 205:
"When the challenge has been made, the trial proceeds by witness called to support or defeat the challenge; the juror objected to may also be examined on the voir dire at [sic] to his qualification, or the leaning of his affection. But he cannot be interrogated as to matters which tend to his own discredit, as whether he has been convicted of felony etc, nor, as it seems, whether he has expressed a hostile opinion as to the guilt of the defendant."
13 Must any challenge to the favour of the polls be made with prima facie evidence or material to sustain it? R v Edmonds (1821) 4 B & Ald 470: 106 ER 1009 contains a detailed dissertation by Abbott CJ on the subject of challenge to the polls and the array. From that case, it appears that the procedure adopted at that time, and presumably also followed in 1900, in the case of a challenge to the polls, was for the challenger to assert some basis for his or her challenge to the favour. With respect to this Abbott CJ said at 490:1016
"It does not appear, distinctly, in what precise form the question was propounded; but, in order to make the answer available to any purpose, if it could have been received, it must have been calculated to shew an expression of hostility to the defendants, or some of them, a preconceived opinion of their personal guilt, or a determination to find them guilty; anything short of this would have been altogether irrelevant."
14 It is clear from the following passages of the judgment that the challenger must show cause for challenge. It is not possible to simply state that there is a challenge to the poll propter affectum and then have that issue tried. The cause must be stated and if it appears that the cause is a good ground for standing the juror aside and issue is joined upon it, that issue must be tried (absent agreement to the contrary) by two triers. This seems to have been the procedure followed in R v Geach [1841] EngR 88; 9 Car & P 499: 173 ER 929. See also R v Swain & Ors [1838] EngR 511; (1838) 2 M & Rob 112: 174 ER 232.
15 At the time of Murphy v R [1989] HCA 28; (1989) 167 CLR 94 the Jury Act, 1977 (NSW), s46, simply provided that "A challenge for cause shall be tried by the presiding judge at the trial". In their joint judgment, Mason CJ and Toohey J said at 103 - 104:
"It is beyond question that some foundation must be laid before an application to challenge for cause will succeed. Ordinarily this will take the form, at least initially, of an affidavit relating to the disposition of a particular juror or jurors. There may be cases where a reading by the trial judge of offending material, where it has been published in circumstances that justify an inference that members of the jury are likely to have read it and to have been influenced against the accused, will be enough to justify acceding to an application to question potential jurors. But they are exceptional cases. There is still a need to provide a sufficient foundation of fact to justify acceding to the application."
16 Stated briefly, the Crown case against each of the six accused presently before the Court, is that they were a party to one or more conspiracies. The alleged conspiracies all related to the taking and processing of abalone in excess of the quantity permitted by law. Counsel for some, if not all the accused, have complained that some one, or more of the jurors may be professional fishers or engaged in the fish processing industry or might be closely related to such persons and they have a right to be aware of whether this is so or not.
17 It seems to me that firstly, the existence of the possibility that such persons may be on the jury panel is not sufficient cause to challenge the poll. Secondly, even if in fact such a juror was on the panel and that was the stated cause for challenge, that cause, is not sufficient to challenge the poll for the mere fact that the juror is engaged in the fishing industry, or closely related to someone who is so engaged, is no reason to suspect that such juror will show malice or favour to either side.
18 The real complaint of counsel is that if the occupation of the jurors were known to them, they could object to any such juror thereby eliminating the risk of malice, but as the jury panel returned with the precept does not show the occupations (as such returns commonly used to) they cannot do so. There is no reason to suppose that a juror who is or was a professional fisher or processor, or who is closely related to such a person, will have any pre-conceived ideas about the guilt or innocence of any of the accused, nor that he or she will bear malice towards any of the accused, nor that he or she will not obey the requirements of the juror's oath. There is no reason to suppose, absent specific statements or other evidence, that a farmer will not impartially try another farmer charged with stealing cattle. For that matter there is no reason to suppose that a householder who has been the victim of a burglary, will bear malice to an accused charged with that crime.
19 It seems to me that if, as I have held, there is no requirement in law for the panel to show the jurors' occupations, and if the matters of complaint to which I have referred are not a lawful cause for a challenge to the poll, there is nothing that I can or should do about the matter. The case would be different if there were some specific evidence or other material for supposing that any of the accused would not receive an impartial and fair trial in accordance with law.
20 After the above was written I heard further submissions from counsel. I was informed from the Bar Table that, by virtue of an amendment to the Electoral Act 1985 there no longer is any requirement to record the occupation of a person enrolled on the State roll and consequently, that information is no longer supplied to the Sheriff. It seems to me that this change to the State roll makes the compilation of a jury list difficult as no information is received by the Sheriff with respect to the occupation of those on the list.
21 The Act, s7A exempts certain persons who are described in Schedule I or who come within any class or description of persons prescribed as being exempt from serving as jurors. Schedule I contains quite a long list of persons so disqualified. In obedience to the statutory duty imposed upon him by the Act, s9 to prepare an annual jury list the Sheriff is obliged to exclude from the list drawn from the State roll "the names of persons known to the Sheriff not to be qualified for serving as jurors..." It is curious that the Act, s7A refers to the persons identified by Schedule I as "exempt" from jury service, but s9 only requires the Sheriff to exclude persons who are not qualified to serve as jurors. The word "exempt" is also used with reference to persons who have a special reason for not serving upon a particular panel such as a pressing family responsibility. It seems unlikely that the persons identified in Schedule I are to be treated on the same footing as persons exempted pursuant to the provisions of the Act, ss7B and 7 C. Whatever might be the proper interpretation of these various sections, it seems hardly satisfactory if the Sheriff is forced to adopt a stance that he has no information about the occupations of persons and therefore he does not know which, if any, of the persons on the list are disqualified from serving as jurors. It seems possible that this may be cause to challenge the array although I accept that the Act does not expressly impose upon the Sheriff any obligation to make any inquiry. It is however, quite clear that the Act requires some urgent consideration and amendment.
22 In the present matter I have decided to take a pragmatic approach in all the circumstances. The trial is estimated to last about 8 weeks. Seven counsel are engaged in it. Fourteen jurors will be empanelled. Considerable public expense has been and will be incurred. It seems foolish to raise the spectre of some appeal upon the ground that the jury panel was not prepared in accordance with law notwithstanding the provisions of the Act, s56 which provides that want of qualification shall not be a ground of appeal after the juror has been sworn. I propose to have Court staff enquire of each juror if he or she is willing to disclose his or her occupation. Those occupations that are disclosed will be entered onto the jury panel and a copy of that panel will be handed to each counsel.
R
Georgiadis [No 2] [2001] TASSC 48
(1989) 167 CLR 94
The Court held that the jury panel was not legally required to list occupations and that a possible fishing-industry connection was not, without specific supporting material, sufficient cause to challenge a juror. As a pragmatic measure, Court staff were directed to ask each juror whether they were willing to disclose their occupation; occupations disclosed were to be entered on the panel and a copy given to counsel ( [19], [22]).