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[2010] NSWCCA 192
appellant. Crown appeal upheld. The District Court sentence was quashed. The respondent was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment from 24 February 2010, expiring 23 August 2011, with release on or after 24...
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the original six-month sentence did not adequately reflect the seriousness of a priest's repeated online sexual communications with someone he believed was 13. It found that the sentencing judge had wrongly treated the priest's vow of celibacy, the police-created identity, and the lack of an actual child victim as reasons to reduce the sentence. The Court imposed an 18-month sentence, with release on a good-behaviour recognisance after six months, and ordered forfeiture of the computer and cable used in the offending.
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Robert McGregor Fuller, an ordained Roman Catholic priest and parish priest at All Saints Roman Catholic Church in Liverpool, pleaded guilty to an offence under s 474.26(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) ([1], [3]). The charge concerned his use of the internet to transmit communications intending to procure someone he believed was under 16 to engage in sexual activity. The maximum penalty was 15 years' imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $99,000 ([2]).
6 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Between 21 July and 13 August 2009, Fuller engaged in 13 online communications with a police-created identity represented as a 13-year-old girl ([5]). The judgment describes repeated sexual conversations, instructions and encouragement for the assumed identity to masturbate, and live video images of Fuller exposing and masturbating himself ([6]). Fuller proposed meeting, discussed sexual activity that might occur, and arranged to meet the assumed identity in Parramatta. Police observed him circling the agreed location before arresting him ([7]-[8]).
At sentence, the District Court imposed a fixed six-month term of imprisonment, allowing a 25 per cent reduction for the utilitarian value of Fuller's early guilty plea ([2]). The sentencing judge described the offence as serious but considered that the absence of a real child victim placed it at the lower end of objective seriousness ([14], [18]-[20]). The judge also referred to Fuller's status as a priest and his vow of celibacy, and described the police operation as a “sting” that had worked ([15]-[17]).
The Crown appealed, arguing that the sentence was manifestly inadequate and that the sentencing judge had erred in treating celibacy, the police operation and the lack of an actual child victim as mitigating matters. It also sought forfeiture of Fuller's laptop and Bluetooth cable ([21]). Fuller conceded that the failure to order forfeiture was an error ([22]).
The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the Crown appeal. It quashed the District Court sentence, imposed an 18-month term from 24 February 2010 to 23 August 2011, and ordered release on or after 24 August 2010 on a $1,000 recognisance of good behaviour for the balance of the term. It also ordered the Dell laptop and Bluetooth cable forfeited under s 48(2) of the Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 (Cth) ([48]).
The Court began with the statutory elements and reach of the offence. Section 474.26(1) concerns use of a carriage service to communicate with the intention of procuring a recipient, believed to be under 16, to engage in or submit to sexual activity. The Court emphasised s 474.28(8), under which the offence may be committed even if the sexual activity cannot take place, and s 474.28(9), which provides that it does not matter if the recipient is fictitious but represented as real ([24]). Thus, the police-created identity did not prevent the offence from being committed.
The Court explained the protective purpose it understood the legislation to serve. It described the internet as providing opportunities for adults seeking sexual encounters with children to communicate anonymously with young people, and said that harm may be considerable even if sexual activity does not ultimately occur ([25]). It further observed that the legislature had empowered authorities to use fictitious identities because the offence can be difficult to detect ([26]). These general observations formed the context for assessing seriousness and the sentencing judge's approach.
The absence of an actual child victim was not a mitigating factor. The Court accepted the distinction that actual harm to a child may make an offence more serious, but held that the absence of a victim does not reduce the seriousness of the conduct criminalised by the provision ([35]). The offence targets the use of the internet by a person intending to communicate with young people for sexual purposes, and the statutory text expressly contemplates a fictitious recipient ([24], [35]). This was central to the rejection of the sentencing judge's view that the offence fell at the lower end of objective seriousness because the recipient was a police identity ([18]-[19]).
The Court also rejected the suggestion that Fuller had been entrapped. It relied on the respondent's own evidence and counsel's concession that he knew when he initiated contact that the assumed identity was under 16 ([10], [34]). The Court noted that he initiated the sexual topics and continued the communications, eventually arranging a meeting ([12]-[13], [34]). On those facts, the sentencing judge's finding that Fuller had been entrapped was not open.
The vow of celibacy could not mitigate this offending. The sentencing judge had described celibacy as a burden and had suggested that it contributed to sexual frustration and the likelihood of police encountering someone like Fuller ([15], [28]-[30]). The Court considered those views irrelevant to the offence and found that they had affected the sentencing process ([30]-[32]). It noted that Fuller had found avenues for sexual activity with adults, and stated that any personal difficulty reconciling those choices with a vow was not the Court's concern. The Court's stated distinction was that sexual activity confined to adults was different from sexual activity involving young children, for which a priest must be treated like any other offender ([32]).
Finally, the Court considered deterrence and the comparative sentencing decisions cited to it. The 15-year maximum penalty was described as making clear the offence's serious nature. The Court said there was a significant community interest in sentences that deter others, particularly because the offence is difficult to detect ([36]). It considered Fuller unlikely to reoffend, but saw value in a further term of sentence and a period of recognisance as a sanction in the event of future offending ([38], [47]). It concluded that, despite the guilty plea, remorse and prospects of rehabilitation, a more significant sentence was required to punish and deter ([45]).
The judgment did not purport to create a new statutory offence or amend the text of the Criminal Code. Its approach rested on the existing provisions, particularly ss 474.26(1) and 474.28(8)-(9), and on the facts of Fuller's conduct ([24]). Its principal contribution in this case is the clear application of those provisions to sentencing: a police-created identity does not itself reduce seriousness, because the statute expressly says the recipient may be fictitious ([24], [35]).
Before the appeal, the District Court had treated the absence of an actual child victim as lowering objective seriousness and had allowed the circumstances associated with Fuller's priesthood and celibacy to influence its assessment ([18]-[19], [28]-[30]). The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected those approaches. It distinguished between an actual victim potentially increasing seriousness and no actual victim reducing seriousness: the latter does not follow ([35]). It also held that celibacy did not mitigate offending involving young children ([31]-[32]).
The decision also clarified the treatment of a claimed police “sting” in this particular sentencing context. The judgment does not establish a general rule about every police operation. It holds that the sentencing judge's finding was not open on Fuller's facts: he knew the assumed identity's age before initiating contact, and was not misled into communication by mistake ([34]). That factual basis matters when reading the decision.
The Court addressed Crown appeal resentencing under s 68A of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). It followed the majority decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 that s 68A applied to a Commonwealth offence, notwithstanding the respondent's contrary submission ([46]). It then resentenced Fuller, noting that the original sentence had expired and that no further incarceration was required in the exercise of the Court's discretion ([47]). The altered sentence extended the overall term to 18 months and included release on recognisance ([48]).
At [24], the Court explained that the offence could be committed even where the contemplated sexual activity was impossible, and that it did not matter that the recipient was fictitious but represented as real. In plain English, the statutory offence was not confined to cases where a real child was on the other end of the communication.
At [34], the Court said this was not a case where an adult was deceived into communicating with a young person or did so by mistake. The respondent knew the assumed identity was under 16 when he initiated contact. In plain English, the police operation did not supply a mitigating explanation for his decision to begin and continue the communications on the facts found by the Court.
At [35], the Court stated: “Although the presence of an actual victim may aggravate the offence, the absence of a victim will not mitigate it.” The practical distinction is that harm to a real child may add seriousness, but the fact that police prevented contact with a real child does not itself make the offender's conduct less serious under this provision.
At [32], the Court stated that when sexual activity involves young children, a priest must be dealt with in the same manner as any other offender. The Court was not determining the merits of religious celibacy generally. It was deciding that the vow could not reduce the seriousness of this particular offence.
At [36], the Court emphasised a significant need for sentences to deter would-be offenders, alongside punishment of the individual offender. It connected that need to the seriousness of the offence and the difficulty of detecting it. At [37], it concluded that the sentencing judge's remarks did not provide for general deterrence and that the sentence's inadequacy confirmed this aspect had been overlooked.
The decision is most directly relevant to sentencing for an offence under s 474.26(1) where the accused uses an online or other carriage service to communicate with someone believed to be under 16, intending to procure sexual activity, and the recipient is a police-created identity. The statutory treatment of a fictitious recipient was central to the Court's reasoning ([24]-[26], [35]).
The fact pattern in Fuller involved repeated communications over several weeks, explicit sexual conversations, transmission of live sexual images, encouragement of masturbation, and an arranged in-person meeting ([5]-[8], [27]). The Court's assessment of seriousness drew on the accumulation of those circumstances, not solely on the fact that Fuller arranged to meet ([27], [45]).
The case is also pertinent where sentencing submissions suggest that an offender was entrapped or misled by police. The result turned on the respondent's knowledge of the assumed identity's age before his first communication and his deliberate continuation of the contact ([10], [34]). The judgment does not decide how a materially different set of facts, such as genuine uncertainty or a different form of police conduct, would be assessed.
The decision is relevant where an offender's religious or other personal commitment is advanced as mitigation for offending involving young children. The Court held that Fuller's vow of celibacy did not mitigate the seriousness of the offence ([31]-[32]). It is not a general ruling on how every personal or religious circumstance is to be treated in sentencing.
The judgment itself was delivered on 22 October 2010 and does not discuss any later treatment of R v Fuller. The supplied text therefore does not establish how subsequent courts have applied, distinguished or limited its reasoning. No later authorities should be inferred from this judgment alone.
Within Fuller, the Court considered five earlier appellate decisions on sentencing for this offence or a comparable offence: R (Cth) v Poynder, Tector v R, Western Australia v Collier, R v Gajjar and R v Hizhnikov ([39]-[44]). It summarised differences in the number of counts, prior offending, duration, conduct and sentences. The decision does not say that Fuller displaced those cases. It used them as guidance on the sentencing range and assessed the respondent's conduct against them ([36], [39]-[45]).
The Court also followed Director of Public Prosecutions v De La Rosa on the application of s 68A of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) to a Commonwealth offence ([46]). That is the only authority in the judgment expressly identified as followed. Any account of treatment after Fuller would require later sources beyond the judgment supplied here.
The judgment leaves questions that cannot be answered from its text. It does not set a universal sentencing range for all offending under s 474.26(1). It reports several comparable decisions with differing circumstances and sentences, then determines the appropriate sentence for Fuller in light of his conduct and the sentencing errors ([39]-[45]).
It does not decide how much weight the presence of an actual child victim must receive in every case. It says that an actual victim and resulting harm may aggravate an offence, while the absence of a victim does not mitigate it ([25], [35]). The precise assessment of actual harm in a different case remains dependent on its facts and the applicable sentencing framework.
The judgment also does not formulate a comprehensive test for entrapment or determine every possible consequence of police-created identities. Its finding was tied to Fuller's admitted knowledge of the assumed identity's age and his own decision to initiate and pursue sexual communications ([10], [34]). The decision should not be read as resolving factually different cases.
Finally, the judgment does not detail the later development of s 68A or later appellate treatment of Fuller. Its account is limited to following De La Rosa on the provision's application to a Commonwealth offence and resentencing in this Crown appeal ([46]-[48]). Those limits are important when using the decision as a source for propositions beyond the issues it decided.
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JUDGMENT OF: McClellan CJatCL at 1; Hislop J at 49; Barr AJ at 50
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - Crown appeal against sentence - guilty plea - whether sentence manifestly inadequate - whether sentencing judge erred in finding that vow of celibacy imposed on Catholic priests by the Catholic Church was a mitigating factor - whether sentencing judge erred in finding that absence of actual victim created situation of entrapment and whether this was a mitigating factor
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) LEGISLATION CITED: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Crimes (Appeal and Review Act) 2001 (NSW) Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 (Cth)
Director of Public Prosecutions v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 R (Cth) v Poynder [2007] NSWCCA 157 CASES CITED : R v Gajjar [2008] VSCA 268 R v Hizhnikov [2008] VSCA 269; (2008) 192 A Crim R 69 Tector v R [2008] NSWCCA 151; (2008) 186 A Crim R 133 Western Australia v Collier [2007] WASCA 250; (2007) 178 A Crim R 310
PARTIES: The Crown (appellant) Robert McGregor Fuller (respondent)
COUNSEL: P McGuire (Crown/appellant) G Walsh (respondent)
SOLICITORS: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (appellant) Greg Walsh & Co (respondent)
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL 2009/185763
McCLELLAN CJ at CL HISLOP J BARR AJ
FRIDAY 22 OCTOBER 2010 R v FULLER, Robert McGregor Judgment 1 McCLELLAN CJ at CL: The respondent pleaded guilty in the Local Court to an offence contrary to s 474.26(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) being that: "Between about 21 July 2009 and 13 August 2009 at Liverpool, New South Wales, used a carriage service, namely the internet, to transmit a communication to another person believed to be under 16 years of age with the intention of procuring the recipient to engage in sexual activity with himself." 2 The maximum penalty for the offence is imprisonment for 15 years and/or a fine not exceeding $99,000. The respondent was sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 6 months commencing on 24 February 2010 and ending on 23 August 2010. The sentencing judge allowed the respondent a 25% reduction in his sentence to reflect the utilitarian value of his early plea of guilty.
The facts 3 The respondent is an ordained priest in the Roman Catholic Church. At the time of the offence he was the parish priest at All Saints Roman Catholic Church at Liverpool. 4 The respondent committed the offence when he engaged in online communications over the internet utilising a program known as Yahoo 7 Messenger. That program enables computer users to communicate with one another in real time. The process is colloquially referred to as chatting. It allows typed text messages, photographic images and live video recorded by a "web camera" to be communicated between users. 5 During the period 21 July 2009 to 13 August 2009, the respondent engaged in 13 online communications with a female person who was using an assumed online identity created by the police. The respondent believed that this fictitious female person was a 13 year-old girl. Each time the respondent communicated with the online identity, a profile photograph of her was displayed which depicted a young girl with the appearance of being 13 years of age. 6 The evidence includes a transcript of the various conversations between the respondent and the assumed identity. Some of the conversations were short, less than 10 minutes, some were of the order of half an hour and others were in excess of an hour. At various times throughout the conversations the respondent commented on the age of the online identity confirming his understanding that she was 13 years old. He also commented favourably on her profile photograph. During the conversations the respondent was told of the online identity's naivete and sexual inexperience. The respondent initiated topics of conversation of an explicit and sexual nature. He instructed and encouraged the online identity to masturbate herself. On occasions he activated his web camera and transmitted live video images of himself exposing and masturbating his penis. 7 The respondent also introduced into the conversation a proposal that he and the online identity meet. An arrangement was made and the online identity confirmed the clothing she would wear. The respondent suggested to the online identity that when they met he might masturbate her, she would masturbate him and he might perform cunnilingus on her. The respondent indicated to the online identity that he had never dated someone as young as her and described her as his girlfriend. The respondent also indicated that he would give the online identity kissing lessons and during one of the conversations would like to take her to bed for a kiss and cuddle and so that she could rub her pyjamas against his naked legs. 8 Ultimately the respondent arranged to meet the online identity at a location in Parramatta. The police observed him circling the agreed location for approximately 20 minutes before he was arrested. He had in his possession a mobile phone which included details of the proposed meeting on its display screen. 9 The police carried out a search of the respondent's residence and seized a Dell laptop computer and a Bluetooth cable which were determined to have been used by the respondent when committing the offence. The appellant seeks the forfeiture of these items.
The evidence of the respondent 10 The respondent gave evidence at his sentencing hearing. His counsel accepted on the appeal that the evidence confirmed that when the respondent first initiated contact with the assumed identity, he was aware of her approximate age. There can be no suggestion that it was by accident that he made the contact or that he was misled by the authorities into initiating the communication with the assumed identity. 11 The respondent said that he had in the past used the internet to contact adult women for sexual purposes, some of whom he had subsequently met. He said that on a number of occasions he had engaged in acts of sexually intimacy with these women but it would seem that he had not had penetrative penile sexual intercourse with them. He said that on occasions he had attended prostitutes for the purpose of sexual gratification. 12 The respondent confirmed that the assumed identity had described herself as a 13 year-old female and had "kept indicating that age." He accepted that he believed that the person with whom he was communicating was a 13 year-old girl who was either pre-pubescent or going through puberty. He accepted that sexual topics of conversation had all been initiated by him and that when the online identity attempted to change the topic of conversation he would turn the conversation back to sexual matters. He accepted that his communications with the online identity were "driven by sexual desire." 13 The respondent accepted that he had intended to meet the online identity. He had suggested a meeting during their first conversation and agreed that he had pursued that topic on a number of occasions during the period of the offence. He accepted that at the time he knew what he was doing "wasn't a proper thing to do" and "wasn't acceptable by society standards." He accepted that what he was doing "was wrong and probably illegal." He said that it was for that reason that he had encouraged the online identity to keep their communications secret.
Remarks of the sentencing judge 14 The sentencing judge recounted the relevant facts. He observed that there is "great alarm in the community of [sic] people sexually exploiting young children and it is described as disgusting, repulsive, repugnant." His Honour observed that the offence was "a very serious matter evidenced by the maximum penalty being 15 years imprisonment. 15 His Honour then observed that in this case there was no actual child victim the respondent having communicated with an assumed identity. His Honour said: "And indeed in the cases that have been put before me, only one involved an actual child being investigated by the police, the rest were policemen posing as children. This is not necessarily to condemn the behaviour of the Commonwealth and the police. In a sense they are seeking to be I suppose proactive, or I do not like to use that term so much, but they seem to try and forestall anyone with a proclivity to commit the acts of sexual exploitation of children from doing so. And in that regard, as the Crown read out the Act, they are certainly entitled to and it is in the public interest that they do search out for possible people acting in that way. However, blind Freddy would expect that they would turn up with people like the offender here, who is a priest with a vow of celibacy, who is sexually frustrated after fifty-five years after becoming a priest straight after his HSC he has become a priest, that such an invitation or at least a willingness to continue a conversation with him would end up with the kind of charge and in the kind of conversations that I have just, with some reluctance, read out." 16 His Honour later commented that "the police sting operation so to speak, worked." 17 His Honour then discussed the fact that the respondent was a Catholic priest who had taken a vow of celibacy and was expected by the Church to eschew sexual activity. His Honour accepted a submission from the Crown that the respondent had groomed the assumed identity and observed that: "He knew the child was 13 years of age, or he was told that information, or he says in his evidence that there is a degree of fakery in these things and some people still believe that there are people in Nigeria with bank accounts who want to give you four million dollars and they still answer them. But there are degrees of fakery in that and in that sense he was, so to speak, taking some of these matters as tongue in cheek, but nevertheless the chat logs were commenced or very shortly after they started, with sexual discussions. They were over a period of time and very graphic." 18 The sentencing judge recognised that the respondent had pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity. He described the circumstances of the respondent as a tragedy and commented upon the temptations provided by the anonymity of the internet. His Honour said that he had given consideration to the matters in s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and said that he had taken them into account with respect to the seriousness of the offence. He said: "However, as to the objective seriousness, because in a sense there was no real victim, but a policeman, and I have heard of course, and the Crown concedes, that in those cases where there is no real victim then one has to take that into account. So in my opinion this falls at the lower end of objective seriousness." 19 His Honour then considered the remarks of Rothman J in R (Cth) v Poynder [2007] NSWCCA 157 and said in relation to the present offence: "There is no child participating in it at all. In my opinion, this is to the lower end of objective seriousness but some of the actions and speech of the offender are quite serious." 20 His Honour concluded that the offence required a prison sentence but accepted that there was a low chance of recidivism. For this reason his Honour did not set a non-parole period.
The appeal 21 The Crown submitted that the sentence which his Honour imposed was manifestly inadequate. In support of that ground it was submitted that the sentence failed to adequately reflect the criminality of the offending, its nature and the role of the respondent. It was further submitted that his Honour failed to properly take into account the maximum penalty for the offence, resulting in "unjustifiable disparity" between the sentence of the respondent and sentences imposed in comparable matters. The Crown further submitted that the sentence failed to adequately reflect principles of general deterrence. A second ground of appeal alleged that his Honour erred by accepting that the respondent's vow of celibacy was a mitigating factor. The third ground of appeal alleged that his Honour erred by considering the absence of a child victim and entrapment to be mitigating factors. Finally, it was pleaded that his Honour erred in failing to make an order under s 316 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) pursuant to which the Crown sought the confiscation of the respondent's laptop computer which had been used in the offence. 22 The respondent concedes that the sentencing judge erred in not ordering the forfeiture of the laptop computer and Bluetooth cable and this ground of appeal will be upheld. 23 With respect to the sentence his Honour imposed, I am satisfied that a number of errors have occurred. I shall identify them although it is unnecessary to discuss them in detail. 24 It is important to appreciate that the offence is constituted by the use of a carriage service to transmit a communication to another person with the intention of procuring the recipient to engage in or submit to sexual activity, the recipient being a person whom the sender believes to be under 16 years of age. By reason of s 474.28(8) the offence will be committed even if it is impossible for the relevant sexual activity to take place. Furthermore, and of particular significance is subs 9 which provides that it "does not matter that the recipient to whom the sender believes the sender is transmitting the communication is a fictitious person represented to the sender as a real person." 25 The internet has produced many benefits for the community but has also brought some problems. One of those problems is addressed by s 474.26 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. The offence is made possible because the internet provides access to communicate with others anonymously. Tragically, experience has shown that it is not uncommon for immature persons, particularly females, to explore the internet and accept communications from adults who are seeking sexual encounters with children. Because a child can access and navigate the internet without the supervision of a responsible adult, the opportunity for a sexual predator to identify a potential victim is significant. If communication is made, the harm to the young person may be considerable, even if sexual activity does not ultimately occur. Of course, the potential for harm will be greater if sexual activity does take place. 26 It is for these reasons that the legislature has made it an offence to use the internet to procure a young person to engage in or submit to sexual activity. It is also apparent that the detection of the offence may be difficult. For this reason the legislature has determined that the law enforcement authorities should be empowered to identify persons who are seeking to communicate in the manner prohibited by the section by creating fictitious identities. 27 In the present case, unlike some others, the respondent communicated with only one person whose identity had been created by the law enforcement authorities. However, there were a number of exchanges which occurred on a number of occasions, some of which extended over a lengthy period of time. The respondent engaged in sexual activity and transmitted images of himself masturbating to the fictitious person. He both encouraged and instructed the fictitious person to masturbate herself. Ultimately he made arrangements to meet the fictitious person for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity. 28 During the course of the sentencing hearing his Honour commented that the insistence by the Roman Catholic Church of a vow of chastity by its priests was "a cruel requirement" which resulted in there being "no avenue for his normal sexual experience because he's a priest." His Honour further commented that "I think the celibacy which is imposed on people - I can't understand why it is, because it suppresses normal human instincts." His Honour said "it's archaic" and "cruel, its cruel." 29 These observations were unnecessary and inappropriate. His Honour's remarks were as inappropriate as a judge remarking on a couple living together or having a child when not married. A judge should confine his or her remarks to matters relevant to the offence which has been committed without either criticising or expressing sympathy for the social attitudes or practices of others. 30 Although his Honour did not repeat these observations in his remarks on sentence, his Honour did say that the respondent "has the added burden of a vow of celibacy" and remarked that the obligations of celibacy would have the consequence that "blind Freddy would expect that they would turn up with people like the offender here." I am satisfied that the sentiments which his Honour expressed during the sentencing hearing found their way into his reasoning with respect to the appropriate sentence. 31 The evidence established that the respondent had found avenues to release his sexual needs without breaching the law. The fact that he was a priest who had accepted the obligation of celibacy in no way mitigated the seriousness of the offence for which he was convicted. I am satisfied that his Honour erroneously allowed his personal views of the obligations of Roman Catholic priests to erroneously affect the sentencing process. 32 There was evidence that the respondent had used the internet to seek out sexual activity with adult women. This is not an offence. He has also visited prostitutes for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity. Although he may have personal difficulties in reconciling these actions with his vow of celibacy, that is of no concern to this Court. The difficulties which may be experienced by religious persons who accept a vow of celibacy are self evident. However, when those difficulties may result in crimes being committed against young children, the vow of celibacy cannot mitigate the seriousness of the offence. If a priest finds himself unable to refrain from any sexual activity although the Church may have concerns, society will not, provided that the activity is confined to adults. But when the sexual activity involves young children the priest must be dealt with in the same manner as any other offender. 33 I am satisfied from the passage of his Honour's remarks on sentence which I have extracted at [15] that his Honour allowed his sympathy for the respondent to influence the sentence. This was an error. 34 It was submitted, and the sentencing judge accepted, that the respondent had been entrapped by the authorities. This finding was not open. As the respondent's counsel properly admitted during the hearing of the appeal, the respondent was aware that when he first initiated communications with the fictitious person that she was under 16 years of age. This was not a case where an adult was deceived into communicating with a young person or engaged in that communication by mistake. The respondent knew what he was doing and continued to communicate with the fictitious young person, ultimately arranging to meet her to engage in sexual activities, notwithstanding her age. 35 The sentencing judge identified the lack of an actual victim as a mitigating factor. Although an offence may be more serious when communication is made with an actual child and harm is done to that child, the primary object of the legislature in creating the offence was to prohibit the use of the internet by persons intent upon communicating with young persons for sexual purposes. Although the presence of an actual victim may aggravate the offence, the absence of a victim will not mitigate it. 36 Regrettably the offence committed by the respondent is not uncommon. Consequently there are previous decisions from which guidance can be obtained as to the appropriate range of sentence. By providing a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment the legislature has made plain the serious nature of the offence. Apart from the need to appropriately punish and deter individual offenders, there is a significant need in the interests of the community to impose a sentence that will, in so far as may be possible, effectively deter other would-be offenders. The offence is one which is difficult to detect and investigate and for this reason, special provision has been made so that offenders can be identified even where there is no actual victim. 37 His Honour makes no provision in the remarks on sentence for principles of general deterrence. I accept that the matter was referred to in the course of the hearing but the inadequacy of the sentence to my mind confirms that his Honour must have overlooked this aspect of the matter when determining the sentence. 38 I accept that, given the circumstances of the respondent, he is unlikely to reoffend. His public disgrace and discipline by the Church will be significant factors which may influence his future conduct. In these circumstances the need for a period of supervised release is diminished. However, there will be benefits from an additional term of his sentence if he knows that any further breach will involve him returning to custody. 39 This Court was referred to a number of previous decisions where offenders have been sentenced for this offence. There are 5 decisions of appeal courts. 40 In Poynder the offender was convicted of 2 counts of using a carriage service to procure a person under 16 years of age for sexual activity. He offered the young person money in return for sex. The sentencing court also had regard to two offences of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence contrary to s 474.17(1) of the Criminal Code placed on a s 16BA schedule. The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years and released on recognisance after serving 1 year and 3 months. A Crown appeal was dismissed. 41 In Tector v R [2008] NSWCCA 151; (2008) 186 A Crim R 133 the offender was convicted of 3 offences contrary to s 474.26(1) of the Code. The offender had previous convictions relating to sexual misconduct with young children. The court at first instance found that he had been persistent in pursing his victim and had made a monetary offer for her to engage in sexual activity. He was imprisoned for 11 years with a 7 year non-parole period. On appeal to this Court, the sentence was quashed and he was resentenced to a term of 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years. 42 In Western Australia v Collier [2007] WASCA 250; (2007) 178 A Crim R 310 the Court of Appeal in Western Australia considered the circumstance where an offender had used electronic communications to procure a person believed to be under 13 years of age for sexual activity. The offence was contrary to s 204B(3)(b)(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) for which the maximum penalty is 10 years imprisonment. He pleaded guilty. The offender was 24 years of age and had communicated via an online chat forum with an undercover police officer. He had encouraged the fictitious person to masturbate and ultimately arranged a meeting at which he was arrested. After a successful appeal he was sentenced to a term of 18 months imprisonment and was made eligible for release to parole after serving 9 months. 43 In R v Gajjar [2008] VSCA 268 the offender was convicted following a plea of guilty to one count contrary to s 474.26(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). The offender had used an internet chat room entitled "Family Sex" to communicate with an undercover operative who was posing as a 14 year-old female. The offender initially pretended to be a 20 year-old female but later revealed that he was a male. A meeting was arranged at which the offender was arrested. Notwithstanding that the offence was of limited duration (2 days) with a relatively early plea, the offender was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2.5 years to be released to recognisance after serving 8 months. 44 In R v Hizhnikov [2008] VSCA 269; (2008) 192 A Crim R 69 the offender was convicted of one count contrary to s 474.26(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) and one count of possessing child pornography. He engaged in online chats on three occasions over the course of one day with an undercover operative who he believed was a 14 year old girl. He arranged to meet the fictitious person and sent her an email containing 8 adult pornographic images. He arranged a meeting and was arrested. The offender was initially sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 22 months imprisonment but was immediately released on a 4 year good behaviour bond. The Victorian Court of Appeal determined that a wholly suspended sentence was grossly inadequate and that the offender should have been required to serve a term of actual imprisonment. However, because of the principles applicable to Crown appeals the Court said that it was inappropriate to intervene and the appeal was dismissed. 45 As I have previously indicated, in my opinion the offence committed by the respondent was serious. Although it was not aggravated by the existence of an actual victim the legislature has made plain that when the offence is detected through the introduction of a fictitious person, a significant punishment is likely. In my opinion, notwithstanding the respondent's guilty plea, remorse and good prospects of rehabilitation a more significant sentence was required. That sentence should both punish the respondent and be sufficient to deter others who may be contemplating similar conduct. Furthermore, a period of recognisance, which will operate as a sanction should the respondent be tempted to reoffend, should be imposed. 46 The respondent is to be dealt with following the abolition of the principles of "double jeopardy" on a Crown appeal by s 68A of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). A majority of this Court determined in Director of Public Prosecutions v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 that s 68A applies to a Commonwealth offence and although the respondent submitted otherwise, I am satisfied that this Court should follow that decision. The sentence I propose takes that approach. 47 It will be apparent that the sentence originally imposed by the sentencing judge has now expired. In the exercise of this Court's discretion when resentencing in a Crown appeal, I do not believe that a further period of incarceration is required. However, the overall term should be extended by twelve months both to mark the seriousness of the offence and to provide for a period of supervision for the respondent. 48 The orders I propose are as follows:
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R
Fuller
Crown appeal upheld. The District Court sentence was quashed. The respondent was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment from 24 February 2010, expiring 23 August 2011, with release on or after 24 August 2010 on a $1,000 recognisance to be of good behaviour for the balance of the sentence. The respondent's Dell laptop computer and Bluetooth cable were forfeited under s 48(2) of the Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 (Cth) ([48]).