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Category: Sentence

Parties: Rex (Crown)
Gofal Baziad (Offender)

Representation: Counsel:
B Hatfield SC & J Dewhurst (Crown)
M Avenell SC (Offender)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Krayem & Co Lawyers (Offender)

File Number(s): 2024/00223517

Publication restriction: Section 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) prohibits publication of the name or any information identifying any children referred to in the proceedings.

JUDGMENT

1. HIS HONOUR: On 9 April 2026, the offender, Gofal Baziad, was arraigned on an indictment that charged him with the murder of Jason Palmer at Lakemba in the State of New South Wales between 5 and 8 February 2004. Mr Baziad pleaded not guilty and the trial proceeded. On the morning of 27 May 2026, a jury of 11 returned from their deliberations with a verdict of guilty to murder.

2. Mr Baziad must now be sentenced. The maximum sentence for murder is life imprisonment (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 19A). I am required to impose a life sentence if, pursuant to s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (the “CSP Act”), I am satisfied the level of culpability involved in the commission of the offence was so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence.

3. Despite my ultimate finding that the offender’s culpability in the commission of the offence was significant, I have found, as will become apparent, that it was not so extreme that a life sentence is appropriate to meet the community’s interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence.

4. Consistently with Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 (at [27]) (“Muldrock”), I am required to be mindful of the “two legislative guideposts” when sentencing Mr Baziad: these being, the maximum penalty; and the standard non-parole period. In this case, the standard non-parole period is 20 years, as prescribed by the Table to Div 1A of the CSP Act*.* In keeping the two guideposts firmly in mind, I must identify all the factors that are relevant to the sentencing task, consider their significance and then determine the appropriate sentence (see Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 (at [51]) per McHugh J).

5. Accordingly, the sentence I impose will reflect the sentencing discretion informed by proper principle. Underpinning the sentencing exercise are the various purposes of sentencing, which are identified by s 3A of the CSP Act. This provision states:

3A Purposes of sentencing

The purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows—

(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,

(b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences,

(c) to protect the community from the offender,

(d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender,

(e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions,

(f) to denounce the conduct of the offender,

(g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.

6. While I may address the different purposes of sentencing throughout these reasons as the need relevantly arises, I will also take them into account without necessarily referring to them specifically.

7. It is important to recognise that there were, and continue to be, significant factual disputes between the parties. It remains clear that, despite the jury’s verdict, the offender continues to deny responsibility for Mr Palmer’s death. Yet this Court’s role is to determine the facts which are relevant to the sentencing exercise, consistent with the verdict of the jury.

8. It follows that any findings of fact that are adverse to the offender must be established beyond reasonable doubt, whereas any facts that favour the offender are to be established on the balance of probabilities (see R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [27]).

The circumstances of the homicide

9. Given the jury’s verdict, I must proceed to sentence the offender on the basis that he murdered Jason Palmer on or about 6 or 7 February 2004 in Lakemba, New South Wales. In so doing, it is necessary to identify the relevant facts from before, concomitant to and after the homicide as based upon the salient evidence adduced at trial.

A short overview of the Crown’s circumstantial case

10. To provide important context, it is convenient to first set out a relatively brief overview of the evidence, reflecting my findings.

11. The case was set against the enmeshed lives of three individuals: the offender (Gofal Baziad); the deceased (Jason Palmer); and a common love interest (Renny Palmer). Much of the evidence focussed on the relationships that developed between these three key individuals towards the end of 2002 until early 2004. The offender stabbed the deceased to death on the night of 6 February or morning of 7 February 2004 as a result of him not being able to (or not being prepared to) curb his jealous and controlling states of mind.

12. No one claims to have seen Jason Palmer alive after he left Renny Palmer’s home at about 11:00pm on 6 February 2004. His body, discovered some three weeks later on 29 February 2004, was located in the Nepean River at Menangle, New South Wales.

13. Taking a step back, the offender and the deceased knew each other through a mutual connection with Renny Palmer. The deceased was married to Ms Palmer, although their relationship took a turn for the worse in late 2002, being around the same time at which the offender met her.

14. In 2003, all three of their lives became increasingly intertwined. Surprisingly, the offender and the deceased appeared to become close friends, while both men continued to show romantic interest in Ms Palmer. Despite the schism in the deceased and Ms Palmer’s marriage, their relationship nevertheless continued to show signs of mutual affection.

15. However, a quiet swell of intense jealously developed throughout 2003. Ms Palmer and the offender formed a romantic and intimate relationship. At times, though, the deceased also sought to re-establish his relationship with her. Both men were, I find, jealous of each other. The extent of the jealousy reached its fatal peak in early 2004 when, ultimately, the offender brutally murdered the deceased.

16. On 6 or 7 February 2004, the offender inflicted three fatal stab wounds to the deceased. The stab wounds were consistent with having been inflicted by a sharp, solid bladed instrument, such as a knife. Each wound may have been independently fatal, or they may have all contributed to the deceased’s death.

17. The three fatal stab wounds were located in the following areas:

18. one horizonal wound was located on the middle of the left side of the back, measuring 6cm in length and 1.5cm in width;

19. one oblique wound was located near the chest, under the arm, measuring 5.5cm in length and 1.7cm in width; and

20. one oblique wound was located near the right hip bone, measuring 5.5cm in length and 2.5cm in width.

21. The deceased suffered other non-fatal injuries as well. These included:

22. a fourth stab wound located at the back of the left lower chest, measuring 3.7cm in length and 1.3cm in width;

23. an irregular abrasion on the point of the chin, measuring 4cm in diameter; and

24. two lacerations to the deceased’s head, described as being “full thickness”, meaning the lacerations went right through the entire thickness of the skin.

Key factual findings

19. With that overview of the prosecution case in mind, it is now necessary to embark upon a more comprehensive fact-finding exercise.

Events up to mid-2003

20. The deceased met Renny Palmer in 1994. They married in 1996 and had a daughter, CP, in 1998. Shortly after, they purchased a home in Isa Place in Cartwright, but, as I have noted, a schism in their marriage developed in mid-to-late 2002 after the deceased had an affair with another woman.

21. The deceased moved to Wiley Park following his affair. Meanwhile, Ms Palmer moved to Bellevue Avenue in Lakemba, where she lived with both CP and her cousin, Ms Ridanita Septantini. Despite their separation, the deceased continued to act as a committed father. He also kept bonds with Ms Palmer, visiting her almost every day despite the breakdown in their marriage.

22. Ms Palmer met the offender in late 2002. They quickly established what could only be described as a romantic and sexual relationship. They started a kebab shop together and in April 2003 they travelled to Indonesia together.

23. Throughout this time, the deceased continued to spend time with Ms Palmer. He became jealous of the offender. Or alternatively, and perhaps more likely, he and Ms Palmer were making each other jealous. Ms Palmer stated in her oral evidence that she knew the deceased still loved her. I accept this and I also accept that the deceased continued to love Ms Palmer up until he died in February 2004.

24. No doubt the deceased knew about Ms Palmer’s relationship with the offender. It became impossible to miss. The deceased often communicated to Ms Palmer about how he felt. He asked her to come back to him. Signs of jealousy started to develop. Ms Palmer described an occasion where she was driving with the deceased and they noticed the offender following them. The deceased stopped the vehicle and confronted the offender.

25. Yet surprisingly, a friendship simultaneously developed between the offender and the deceased. It seemed to be a close friendship irrespective of the tensions and complications that stemmed from their mutual attraction to Renny Palmer. In July 2003, for example, the deceased named the offender as his “nearest relative” on a personal loan application form.

26. Others noticed the two men spending time together, too. Ms Taraivosa Fonu lived across the road from the offender’s Barremma Road unit and, in her oral evidence, she described both men spending lots of time with each other. She even believed they lived together. Another witness, Ms Leanne Lonesborough, provided important evidence about the pair’s relationship as well. She described how the two men went clubbing together. They would hang out at her place, which they both considered to be a “haven”.

August and September 2003

27. August and September 2003 was an important period. The deceased was pressing for Ms Palmer to come back to him, while the offender was clearly aware of the threat that the deceased posed to his own relationship with Ms Palmer.

28. The following questioning from Ms Palmer’s cross-examination is illustrative of this:

Q. Are you saying that while you had a relationship with Gofal where you told Gofal you loved him, you also told Gofal that you loved Jason?

A. I often said to Gofal that I loved Jason more and to Gofal I described the relationship was not really love. Although, also in our conversations there were phrases like, 'I miss you', or phrases like that.

Q. Whose conversations said 'I miss you'?

A. Gofal often said 'I care for you', 'I love you and I give you attention'.

29. Ms Palmer gave evidence, and I accept, that the offender tried to persuade her against returning to the deceased. The offender suggested it would be futile. For example, he said, “the glass is already broken”, meaning her relationship with the deceased could not be repaired. But curiously, the two men continued to spend a great deal of time together.

30. By September 2003, the three key players all lived in separate properties. As it happened, they lived in these same properties until the incident on 6 or 7 February 2004. The offender lived on Barremma Road in Lakemba; the deceased lived on MacDonald Street in Lakemba; and Ms Palmer lived on Baltimore Street in Belfield. Despite having their own separate properties, both men likely spent some nights with Ms Palmer. There is no doubt that, by this point, the three had very enmeshed relationships with one another.

31. Around this time, Ms Septantini was living with Ms Palmer. She spoke about how the offender did not want the deceased to get back together with Ms Palmer. She also recounted a time when Ms Palmer told her that the offender said, “Don’t you try to leave me or I’ll kill you”. The Crown relied on this evidence to show that the offender had a tendency to have a particular state of mind, namely, to be jealous about Ms Palmer and any male she might be romantically involved with. This was pleaded as tendency (a) at the trial.

32. I ruled this evidence as admissible pursuant to s 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) before the trial commenced. But as it turned out, Ms Avenell SC’s cross-examination undermined its probative force quite significantly. While it is in my mind doubtless that the offender threatened Ms Palmer in some way or another, and Ms Palmer told Ms Septantini about it, I cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he used precisely those words.

The “conversation of three”

33. I find that, in December 2003, the deceased organised for the three of them to sit down to clarify where exactly Renny Palmer’s affections were placed. Did she want to be with the deceased or the offender? This was an opportunity to make their individual relationships more straight-forward. No doubt by that time there were complicated and powerful emotions that each of them experienced, and which made their lives quite difficult.

34. As it turned out, Ms Palmer confirmed her preference rested with the deceased as opposed to the offender. In some senses, this was entirely understandable. The two of them were still married and they both had parental responsibilities in respect of CP, who they both loved very much.

35. Quite plainly, the offender was hurt by Ms Palmer’s decision. I find that he became focussed, from this point onwards, on changing her mind.

January 2004

36. The offender, by this point, found himself in financial distress. He was facing the prospect of being evicted from his Barremma Road unit. He owed money on his car loan. He continued to work with Ms Palmer, but with the kebab shop sold, they were working at a traffic survey company.

37. On 31 January 2004, an explosive incident took place at the Barremma Road unit. There were often parties at the address, as there was on this particular night. Ms Fonu described in her evidence a confrontation that occurred between her cousin and the deceased. She intervened and the deceased armed himself with a knife – though, it should be noted, there was no suggestion the deceased did anything with the knife other than hold it. Nor is there any suggestion that the offender did anything to engage in the incident.

6 and 7 February 2004

38. The deceased was last seen alive on 6 February 2004. No one claims to have seen him after he left Renny Palmer’s address at about 11:00pm that night. It is necessary, in this respect, to summarise the evidence about the final day on which he was seen alive.

39. In the morning, the offender and the deceased went to a real estate agent’s office together. After that, they travelled to the El Toro Hotel in Warwick Farm where the deceased purchased a small amount of cannabis. They then travelled back to Lakemba together.

40. As I foreshadowed, the deceased went to Renny Palmer’s place in Belfield that night. The offender was there as well. They travelled there separately. Nothing extraordinary happened at Ms Palmer’s place that night. Both men stayed until about 11:00pm. The deceased told Ms Palmer that he was leaving to purchase “Indonesian cigarettes”, which, as she noted, were sold in the Cabramatta area.

41. So, the deceased left, and then so did the offender. The offender claimed to police in a statement on 18 February 2004 that he never saw or heard from the deceased ever again. According to him, he said goodbye and drove off by himself. That statement to the police was untruthful.

42. The deceased ended up at the offender’s unit that night. I find that the offender killed the deceased at the offender’s unit sometime after 11.00pm. While it is true the evidence does not establish the reason why the deceased went to the offender’s unit after leaving Ms Palmer’s place, particularly in light of his statement to Ms Palmer that he was going to purchase Indonesian cigarettes, I am nevertheless satisfied that is what occurred.

43. There is, for example, important forensic evidence from the Barremma Road unit. DNA recovered on a skirting board in the hallway of the apartment revealed the deceased as being the major contributor. It contained the deceased’s blood. The only reasonable possibility for its presence is that the deceased was stabbed there. I reach that conclusion in light of all of the evidence in the case.

44. Over the next few days the offender, no doubt with the assistance of others, took steps to clean up the crime scene at his unit. He removed large portions of the carpet. I find that the offender ripped up the carpet after killing the deceased. He attended the property’s real estate agent on 9 February 2004 and indicated he had moved out, that he had lost the keys and that the carpet had been damaged. When the agent inspected the property on 10 February 2004, she noticed carpet missing from the loungeroom and hallway of the unit.

45. In addition, the deceased’s vehicle was seen outside his MacDonald Street address on the morning of 7 February. Ms Palmer’s evidence was that she and the offender drove past and saw it. As it turned out, his vehicle was parked at an odd angle with the seat well forward. I find that the deceased did not park his car outside his address, but instead, the offender (or someone helping the offender) drove the deceased’s car back there after he was killed at Barremma Road.

The offence

46. The offender stabbed Jason Palmer to his death, inside the offender’s Barremma Road unit, either late on 6 February or very early on 7 February 2004.

47. The Crown prosecutor submitted that the offender struck the deceased twice with a glass object to the back of his head and then stabbed the deceased four times with a “solid bladed instrument such as a knife”. While I accept that the offender carried out those acts of violence, the evidence does not enable me to conclude the order in which the injuries were inflicted upon the deceased.

48. I am unable to find how the violent encounter started or how it developed. It would be speculating to find that the offender prepared for the attack, let alone that the offender lured the deceased to the apartment intending to attack him when he got there. It may be that the two men had an argument and that the offender lost his temper and attacked the deceased but that, too, is mere speculation. All I can find is that the two men made their way to the unit and, when there, the offender attacked the deceased.

49. The absence of any defensive injuries suggests that the deceased had little or no time to defend himself. The offender’s stabbing motions probably occurred quite quickly and, given the fact that three of those stab wounds would have been fatal by themselves and, given their location, the offender must have formed an intention to kill the deceased at the latest by the time he was inflicting at least one of the fatal stab wounds.

50. It follows that, despite the Crown prosecutor’s submissions, I am not satisfied that the offender planned the attack. Likewise, I cannot find that the deceased acted provocatively towards the offender or that the offender had to defend himself from the deceased’s aggression. I will sentence the offender simply on the basis that the incident involved the offender attacking the deceased with a glass object and stabbed him with a knife that may have been close to hand. I find the incident must have lasted a short time – seconds, not minutes. And I accept beyond reasonable doubt that the offender formed an intention to kill the deceased, no later than after he inflicted one of the three fatal stab wounds.

51. Then, there were records of two important telephone calls that were made from the deceased’s phone at 2:23am and 2:25am on 7 February 2004. The first call was to Muksin Muhammad, and the second call was to Ibrahim Basalamah. The deceased had very little familiarity with either of these men but they were friends with the offender.

52. Mr Muhammad did not answer the call made to his telephone at 2:23am. The phone records clearly establish as much. Mr Basalamah, contrary to his evidence at the trial, did answer the call made to his telephone at 2:25am. The phone records confirm the call was answered; it lasted for two seconds. Mr Basalamah falsely gave evidence that he was asleep and missed the call.

53. Of significance, Mr Basalamah originally claimed to police, very early in the investigation, that he did answer that call. He told police he had a conversation with the deceased. This was also a plainly false account; undoubtedly, Mr Basalamah changed his evidence after he learnt that such a version could not possibly be sustained in circumstances where the phone records showed the call only lasted only two seconds.

54. Mr Basalamah claimed in his evidence that the offender, who was with Ms Palmer in a car that they used to take him to the police station to be interviewed, advised him to give a false version to police about that call. While I have doubts about where and when the offender spoke to Mr Basalamah about what to say to the police, I do accept that the offender scripted his version for him.

55. There is no doubt in my mind that the offender was responsible for urging Ibrahim Basalamah to tell the police that the deceased called him at about 2:25am on 7 February and the two of them spoke for a time. As I said, this call only lasted for 2 seconds. But Mr Basalamah originally told the police that the deceased sounded like he was in a noisy place, like a bar. Mr Basalamah’s original account to police about this call was demonstrably false. It was designed to give the impression that the deceased was out at a bar at 2.25am whereas, in fact, the offender had already killed the deceased at the time of that call.

56. I find the offender called both Mr Muhammad and Mr Basalamah’s telephones after he killed the deceased in an effort to gather help from his friends so that he could deal with the aftermath of the murder that he had committed.

Subsequent events

57. There was additional evidence relating to the aftermath of the deceased’s disappearance.

58. Ms Palmer said that on 7 February 2004 the offender and three other men arrived at her Baltimore Street address sometime in the afternoon. She said the offender claimed he needed “cleaning equipment”. While she saw the offender and one of the other men, who she identified as Muksin Muhammad, walk to her garden shed where cleaning equipment was stored, she went inside her home and did not see which items they collected.

59. Pausing here, it should be noted that the offender and the three other men arrived at Ms Palmer’s address in her red Ford Falcon. This needs to be considered alongside the forensic evidence. The deceased’s DNA and blood was found in the boot of Ms Palmer’s red Ford Falcon – the same vehicle which the offender borrowed on 7 February 2004, the day after the deceased went missing.

60. Separately, the evidence about the offender collecting items from Ms Palmer’s garden shed also relates to the discovery of the deceased’s body in the Nepean River some three weeks later. His body was discovered in a sleeping bag, weighed down by sandstone rocks, tied with distinctive yellow rope. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender disposed of the deceased’s body in the Nepean River, likely with the assistance of others, using the items from Ms Palmer’s back garden shed, in an effort to avoid detection.

61. This is reinforced by the evidence arising from the police investigation. On 11 March 2004, police attended Ms Palmer’s place and seized a very similar type of yellow rope from the back garden shed. Both sets of rope were of the same or similar colours; they were constructed in the same or a similar way; and they had even been twisted in the same configuration. Also, Ms Palmer had some sleeping bags stored at her place. I find that the offender used one of the sleeping bags to wrap the deceased’s body when the offender dumped the body in the Nepean River.

62. Then there are the telephone call records from 7 February 2004, the same day the offender collected items from Ms Palmer’s back garden shed. At 11:07pm, Ms Palmer called the offender’s telephone, it was answered, and the call lasted 9 minutes and 48 seconds.

63. This particular evidence is of significance because the offender’s telephone connected to the “Blairmount-3” tower, which is near a bridge over the Nepean River at Menangle, close to where the deceased’s body was discovered some three weeks later. This cell tower is about 46 kilometres from Lakemba.

64. I find the offender answered Ms Palmer’s call and, at that time, he was either in the course of, or had just finished, disposing of the deceased’s body in the Nepean River. He undoubtedly had assistance from at least one of his friends.

Telephone intercepts

65. In March 2004, the offender fled Australia. He went to Singapore and then to Indonesia. He knew that both Ms Palmer and he were then the subject of the police investigation into the murder.

66. In April 2004 when the offender was overseas, police intercepted numerous telephone calls between the offender and Ms Palmer. The intercepted calls shed considerable light on the relationship between the offender and Ms Palmer and particularly on his obsessive and controlling state of mind concerning Ms Palmer. Aspects of these calls were admitted for the dual purpose of demonstrating the offender’s motive in killing the deceased and to show tendency (a), that is, the offender had a tendency to have a particular state of mind, namely, to be jealous about Ms Palmer and any male she might be romantically involved with.

67. In some of these calls, the offender told Ms Palmer how much he missed her, that he was her only husband, that she should not mix with other men and that she ought not be lascivious.

68. The conversations were in Bahasa Indonesia. However, the relevant transcripts, which were admitted into evidence, were translated to English.

69. It is helpful to provide some examples from these intercepted calls. For instance, the offender and Ms Palmer had the following discussion on 8 April 2004:

The offender: Ren. Ren. You’re not, no one is flirting with you, right?

Ms Palmer: Many, uh.

The offender: Don’t encourage them, okay?

Ms Palmer: Because I’m a widow, a young widow.

The offender: You’re talking without thinking.

Ms Palmer: Of course. There are many, you know?

The offender: Use it, okay? Use your heart.

Ms Palmer: Hm. There are many, you know?

The offender: Don’t do funny things…

70. They had another call on 8 April 2004, during which the following conversation was intercepted:

The offender: But if you do weird things, there’ll be more problems. Believe me.

Ms Palmer: Umh.

The offender: Believe me. You’ll face more challenges.

71. The offender’s obsession with Ms Palmer “reeked” through many of the intercepted telephone calls that were admitted into evidence, as the Crown prosecutor aptly put it. The intercepted calls demonstrate both the offender’s motive in killing the deceased and also his tendency to have a jealous attitude towards Renny Palmer and any male that he thought was involved with her romantically.

72. The intercepted calls also demonstrated that the offender was anxious to avoid talking to the police about the deceased’s murder. He encouraged Ms Palmer to mislead the police about the true nature of their relationship. Whilst the offender was overseas, he gave the investigating police a number of excuses about why he was absent from Australia. I accept that he left Australia, stayed away in Indonesia and declined to talk to the police about the killing because he knew that he was the person who killed the deceased and that he wished to avoid detection and arrest for the murder. He encouraged Ms Palmer to tell the police that they were just friends and urged her to join him. No doubt, Ms Palmer’s presence in Indonesia, away from the investigating police, was something that the offender desired for a number of reasons.

73. Within a month or so of the offender leaving Sydney to travel to Indonesia, Ms Palmer followed him and then joined him. She took CP with her and they all eventually lived as a family in Indonesia. They all lived there until about 2010 when they moved back to Australia. I understand that, throughout these years, the three of them all lived together as a family unit.

74. Ultimately, the offender and Ms Palmer returned to live in Australia. No doubt, when the offender came back to this country and was untroubled by the authorities, he must have been greatly relieved. By then, he must have been quite confident that his crime would go undetected.

Male business partner in 2014

75. By 2014, Ms Palmer was travelling between Australia and Indonesia for work purposes. She had her own real estate business and worked with a male business partner in Indonesia. I find that the offender became jealous, and he disapproved of her travelling to Indonesia to meet with her male business partner. The Crown relied on this evidence also in support of tendency (a).

The incident in 2018

76. The Crown adduced quite important evidence relating to an incident in 2018. It was admitted as tendency evidence in support of tendency (a), as well as a second tendency: that is, the offender had a tendency to act violently towards Ms Palmer, the male rival and/or property, when he believes that Ms Palmer is romantically involved with a person other than him.

77. In and around early 2018, Ms Palmer had ended her relationship with the offender, and she commenced a new relationship with another man called San Hu Mang. Both Ms Palmer and Mr Mang described an incident occurring when they were sitting inside a parked car outside a Mitre 10 store in Beenleigh, Queensland.

78. Specifically, they described how the offender and one of his friends, Arif, approached them while they were sitting in the parked vehicle. It seems that both the offender and Arif initially approached their vehicle, walked away and then promptly returned with one of them wielding a hammer and the other a baseball bat.

79. An attack then ensued. Either the offender or Arif used their weapon to smash the car window or windscreen. There was some conflicting evidence about who hit which part of the car first. After both men took to the car with their weapons, the glass windows smashed on both sides of the car. At this point, Ms Palmer urged Mr Mang to escape. While he attempted to do so, he was hit around his neck and head. Ms Palmer believed it was Arif who hit Mr Mang, while Mr Mang could not recall who it was that hit him.

80. While I cannot be satisfied about all details concerning this incident, it is doubtless that the offender and his accomplice engaged in a violent attack aimed at both Renny Palmer and, in particular, Mr Mang. To the extent there are divergences between the two accounts, I accept Mr Mang’s evidence.

81. Mr Mang declined to co-operate with the investigating Queensland police and, presumably for that reason, the offender was not charged with any offence arising from that incident. Once again, the offender escaped arrest and court.

82. Eventually, in 2024, the police arrested the offender and charged him with Mr Palmer’s murder. After the offender originally claimed to a police officer that he did not know Mr Palmer, or could not remember who Mr Palmer was, the offender pleaded not guilty and was tried and convicted. He maintains his innocence.

Objective seriousness

83. Murder is one of the gravest offences against an ordered society. [1] It falls upon the courts to protect and preserve human life and to punish those who unlawfully take it. [2]

84. The seriousness of the offence of murder is reflected by the terms of the sentencing regime in New South Wales. The offence carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and, in the current circumstances, a standard non-parole period of 20 years. The standard non-parole period was imported into the CSP Act by the New South Wales Parliament after the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 (NSW) was passed in 2002, shortly before the offender murdered Mr Palmer. The standard non-parole period applies to all offences committed after 1 February 2003, and accordingly, it applies in this case.

85. At the outset, I wish to briefly address the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. As I have said, I am satisfied that s 61(1) of the CSP Act is not engaged here. The offender’s level of culpability, though significant, is not so extreme as to require the imposition of a life sentence.

86. The other statutory guidepost is the standard non-parole period. In this respect, it is worthwhile setting out s 54A(2) of the CSP Act, which states:

54A What is the standard non-parole period?

…

(2) For the purposes of sentencing an offender, the standard non-parole period represents the non-parole period for an offence in the Table to this Division that, taking into account only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence, is in the middle range of seriousness. (Emphasis added.)

87. Although it is not a requirement to assess the objective seriousness of a standard non-parole period offence by reference to some position within a notional range, it is not an error to do so. [3] In my opinion, it remains preferable in cases involving standard non-parole period offences.

88. In R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125; 308 (2023) A Crim R 465 (“Eaton”), Hamill J observed relevantly (at [57], with Lonergan and Ierace JJ agreeing): [4]

… while it has become increasingly common for judges to do so, exposing the reasons for the ultimate sentencing outcome does not generally require a sentencing judge to place the objective seriousness of the offence on some putative scale from ‘low range’, through to ‘mid-range’, to ‘high range’. In cases involving a standard non-parole period, it will usually be desirable to do so because it is only if the case falls in (or above) the so called ‘middle range of objective seriousness’ that the standard non-parole period applies (emphasis added.)

89. In saying all of this, my assessment is that the offending is at about the middle of the range of objective seriousness. The following factors have informed my assessment.

90. First, I find, as has been said already, that the offender committed a deliberate act with an intention to kill the deceased. It should be noted that an accused person’s intention is relevant to an assessment of objective seriousness. In this context, an intention to kill, as opposed to an intention merely to inflict grievous bodily harm, will tend to increase the objective seriousness of the murder (see R v Dawson [2022] NSWSC 1632 at [7]).

91. Secondly, I find that the offending involved the actual use of a weapon — being a knife. While s 21A(2)(c) of the CSP Act prescribes this as an aggravating factor, it only does so, in this case, very marginally, if at all. The offence of murder so commonly includes the actual use of a weapon such that the degree to which it aggravates the offending is often reduced or eliminated — as it is here. [5]

92. Thirdly, I am satisfied the attack involved a significant degree of violence. It was, as the Crown prosecutor submitted, a brutal attack. While the Crown’s case was a wholly circumstantial one, and in that sense it is more difficult to be positively satisfied about the extent of the violence involved, the evidence concerning the deceased’s extensive injuries, and the lack of any defensive injuries, makes it abundantly clear that the attack was a significantly violent one. But I do not think that the offender’s violence was prolonged. Indeed, I find the offending was a relatively short but frenzied attack. I find the incident must have only lasted a short time – seconds, not minutes.

93. Fourthly*,* I find that the offender concealed and disposed of the deceased’s body in an effort to avoid detection from the authorities. His disposal of the deceased’s body in the Nepean River was a plainly callous act, and it aggravates the objective seriousness of the offence. As Johnson J stated in R v Wilkinson (No 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 (at [61]):

Care must be taken in considering whether post-offence events may be taken into account in assessing the objective seriousness of the crime itself. However, the circumstances of an offence are not neatly marked out by two lines, one at the technical beginning and the other at the technical end of the crime. Common sense and moral sense extend the circumstances of an offence which may be considered for an assessment of the objective seriousness of a crime, to events which precede and follow the technical limits of the crime. In imposing sentence for a crime, a judge should take into account not only the conduct which actually constitutes the crime, but also such of the surrounding circumstances as are directly related to that crime, and are properly to be regarded as circumstances of aggravation or mitigation. The dumping of a body by a murderer constitutes an aggravating circumstance of the offence itself, and such concealment of the body is not limited in its significance to the absence of remorse (citations omitted and emphasis added.)

94. Fifthly*,* I find the offender was motivated by a desire to romantically pursue Ms Palmer. He was very jealous of the deceased’s relationship with Ms Palmer. Where sexual jealousy motivates the offence of murder, as it does here, general deterrence has an important role to play on sentence (see R v A1 (No. 6) [2019] NSWSC 1581 at [90]).

95. Separately, and contrary to the Crown prosecutor’s submissions, I am unable to find that the offending involved any real degree of planning or preparation. I do not accept that the absence of defensive injuries on the deceased, and the evidence of the deceased having been hit on the head with a glass vessel, necessarily mean that the offender hit the deceased on the head when the deceased did not expect it and that thereby the offender was able to overcome him and then inflict the stab wounds, three of which were fatal.

96. There are too many unknowns to reach such conclusions without speculation. But equally, nor am I able to determine that the deceased contributed in any way to cause the offender’s violence, such as by provoking the offender or by acting aggressively towards him in a way which led the offender to take steps to defend himself.

Victim impact

97. Victim impact statements were received from the deceased’s daughter, CP, his sister, Emma Branscombe, his niece, Gabrielle O’Donoghue, and his nephew, Ryan O’Donoghue. Both Ms Branscombe and Ms O’Donoghue read their statements to the Court. Ms Branscombe travelled to Sydney from London with her son, Mr O’Donoghue, for the sentencing proceedings. Indeed, they both also travelled here to be present throughout the entirety of the trial.

98. I consider it worthwhile to make some brief observations about these statements. First, CP’s statement was poignant. She attended the trial on many days – especially when her mother was giving evidence. She was a small child when the offender murdered her father. Understandably, she spoke of the loss of living her life without her father and without being connected with the other members of the deceased’s family who lost contact with her when she was still a small child. No doubt the knowledge that her father was murdered by the man who became her stepfather involves complex emotions. The offender’s deceit towards CP was significant. I accept her description of experiencing permanent pain. There is also no doubt that her experience of watching the trial in Court was difficult for her. She described it as causing her “emotional dissonance that is difficult to unpack”.

99. Ms Emma Branscombe’s statement provided a compelling account of the damage that the offender caused to the deceased’s extended family. The offender’s dissembling conduct caused Ms Branscombe a significant degree of trauma over a long period of time.

100. Her trauma stems from when she and her then young son, Mr O’Donoghue, both travelled from London to Sydney, at short notice so that they could attend the deceased’s funeral. The offender, who had no prior connection with them, met them in Sydney and drove them around in the same red Ford Falcon that he had used to move the deceased’s body only weeks beforehand. Ms Branscombe talked about how the offender placed himself at the centre of the deceased’s funeral, including by giving himself “the honour” of washing the deceased’s body and wrapping it in muslin. Ms Branscombe formed suspicions around the offender’s involvement in her brother’s death from a very early stage.

101. Ms Gabrielle O’Donoghue spoke about the impacts that reached into almost every aspect of her life, as well as her family’s lives. She described the offence as shaking the stability of everything she knew. What is perhaps most apparent from her statement is the near impossibility of fully reducing to words the true impact of the offence.

102. Finally, I wish to make a brief observation about Mr Ryan O’Donoghue’s statement. He was 11 years old when the offence took place. As noted, he travelled to Australia with his mother, Ms Branscombe, to attend Mr Palmer’s funeral in 2004. It is clear from his statement that, following the offence, his family became significantly isolated. He himself has also suffered considerably, especially during his adolescence. He has, commendably, remained constantly by his mother’s side throughout the ordeal, perhaps even at some cost to himself.

103. These statements all illustrate the extent of the harm caused by the offender’s actions. The Crown prosecutor applied for the Court to take these statements into account pursuant to s 30E(3) of the CSP Act. That provision allows for victim impact statements to be taken into account “in connection with the determination of the punishment for the offence” as an “aspect of the harm done to the community”. [6] While the death of any person is a harm inflicted upon the community, I consider it appropriate to take the statements into account. [7] I accept that the harmful impact of the offence as outlined by the deceased’s family members is an aspect of the harm done to the community.

104. As will become apparent, the offender’s attitude to his offending is also relevant for another purpose. He has never admitted his responsibility for the murder. He has denied that he killed the deceased and continues to deny it. The offender’s cavalier attitude to his violent offending is clear evidence of his lack of remorse.

The offender’s subjective case

105. The offender is currently 54 years of age. He is an Indonesian man who has, by now, spent many years in Australia. While it appears he has very limited support here in Australia, he does have two sons, as well as a young grandson, who live in Queensland. He continues to remain in regular contact with them based on the gaol call records. His first language is Bahasa Indonesia and, despite his proficiency in English being “functional”, he at times requires assistance.

106. The offender has led what appears to be a largely unremarkable life and he has no criminal history, besides a property-related offence he committed in Queensland in 2012 for which no conviction was recorded. This entitles him to some leniency.

107. There is otherwise little evidence before the Court about the offender’s background. Ms Avenell SC drew the Court’s attention to Justice Health notes which provide that the offender reported having diagnoses of depression and anxiety after his reception into custody. However, that is hardly surprising. There is nothing before the Court to suggest that he continues to suffer from either depression or anxiety but, even if he does, the evidence does not allow me to conclude that he is suffering from a mental health condition which will make his sentence more onerous than other prisoners who have been sentenced for serious offences. The Crown prosecutor submitted that no weight should be given to his self-reported history, and I agree.

108. There are also custodial records before the Court. These suggest that the offender is a relatively orthodox prisoner. He has participated in different programs and has been employed in the laundry. According to staff, he works efficiently and is polite and friendly to staff and other inmates. While he was disciplined for stealing a sandwich press from an officer’s room in July 2026, he has not otherwise committed a gaol offence since his reception into custody in June 2024.

Moral culpability

109. It is necessary to assess and make findings about the offender’s moral culpability. While there is very little evidence before the Court about the offender’s upbringing and background, there is still nevertheless evidence which bears upon his level of moral culpability. Of relevance, and indeed significance, is the fact that, after killing his love interest’s romantic rival, the offender resumed his relationship with Ms Palmer and assumed the role of stepfather to her and the deceased’s young daughter, CP. This was, on any view of it, highly deceitful and is likely to have caused great confusion and trauma to CP.

110. In my opinion, the offender’s deceit operates to increase his moral culpability. It not only reveals his total abandonment of responsibility over the commission of the offence, but it also reflects his personal attitudes towards the offending and specifically the deceased.

111. Otherwise, there is no psychological or psychiatric evidence to suggest that he was suffering from a mental health condition at the time he killed Mr Palmer. So, there can be no diminution of penalty to reflect a need to mitigate the sentence to reflect a lesser form of moral culpability. Nor is this a case where there is evidence that the offender was exposed to dysfunction and violence as a child or as a young person such as to warrant the Court giving effect to the reduced moral culpability flowing to offenders whose formative years are impacted by such problems.

Other factors – delay, remorse and prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of re-offending

Delay

112. There has been a delay of some 21 years between the commission of the offence and sentence. Accordingly, it is important that I briefly observe the different ways in which delay could be of relevance.

113. In R v Blanco [1999] NSWCCA 121; (1999) 106 A Crim R 303 (“Blanco”), the Court held (per Wood CJ at CL, with Bell J and Smart AJ agreeing):

Delay should be taken into account when sentencing an offender for the following reasons: the offender may have been left in uncertain suspense; the offender may have demonstrated rehabilitative progress in the intervening period; and a sentence for a stale crime calls for flexibility of approach, it being in the public interest that those suspected of serious crime be brought to justice quickly[:] Todd (1982) 2 NSWLR 517; Mill (1988) 166 CLR 59; Harrison (1990) 48 A Crim R 197; King (NSWCCA, 24 February 1998, unreported), cited.

114. More recently, in Sabra v R [2015] NSWCCA 38; (2015) 257 A Crim R 33, Bellew J considered the “different levels” on which delay might be relevant on sentence. His Honour stated (at [45], with whom Meagher JA and Schmidt J agreed):

Delay which is not attributable to an offender may be relevant on sentence at a number of different levels. Ordinarily, such delay will be a mitigating factor if (as in the present case) it has resulted in significant stress to the offender, or has left him or her, to a significant degree, in a state of uncertain suspense. Where there is evidence that delay has led to consequences being visited upon an offender which are adverse to his or her circumstances and which are over and above stress and anxiety, be those consequences in the nature of interrupted rehabilitation or otherwise, then the weight to be given to such delay in the sentencing process will obviously be greater. But that is not to say that an offender must be able to establish consequences of that kind before delay can become relevant at all. To so conclude would be contrary to the weight of previous authority in this Court (emphasis added.)

115. In this case, the facts are somewhat unusual as the delay is only partially attributable to the offender. He fled Australia shortly after killing the deceased and then lived in Indonesia until 2010. Not only that, he manufactured lies to the police during the initial investigation, and he also influenced others to lie on his behalf, including Ibrahim Basalamah and Renny Palmer. His conduct undoubtedly made it more difficult for police to assess the true import of the evidence they had gathered by that point.

116. However, the police investigation left much to be desired. While a travel alert was placed on the offender as soon as he left Australia in March 2004, he managed to return in March 2009 and again in May 2010. It seems that little was done to advance the investigation at all, even following the inquest that was held in August 2007.

117. After Ms Branscombe’s active endeavours to bring the offender to justice for several years, there was finally an important turning point in 2022: the matter was transferred to Detective Sergeant Hamill from the Unsolved Homicide Squad. From then, and until the offender’s arrest in June 2024, there was a renewed energy in the investigation.

118. Although it was not entirely his own doing, the delay in this case does not operate to mitigate the sentence. Quite plainly, the offender’s attitude to his offending suggests he has not been left in uncertain suspense for the years following his departure to Indonesia. Indeed, the evidence suggests quite the opposite. In particular, I find that, until he was arrested in 2024, the offender genuinely believed that he had gotten away with murder.

119. For instance, he applied to return to Australia on a visa under his own name in 2009. In 2010, he actually returned to Australia, where he continued his relationship with Ms Palmer. It was in 2018, after his relationship with Ms Palmer had just broken down, that he and an accomplice attacked Ms Palmer and her then new boyfriend, Mr Mang.

120. In my opinion, the incident in 2018 is especially illustrative. It reveals how little concern the offender had about the stale police investigation. He was, quite clearly, not labouring under any particular difficulty in light of the long delay. He believed he was in the clear.

121. More so, the incident in 2018 demonstrates that the offender had taken few steps, if any, towards his rehabilitation. While it involved a different magnitude of violence compared to the murder of Mr Palmer in 2004, it nevertheless highlights the extent to which the offender’s sexual jealousy was capable of being re-ignited. True, he did not commit any offence resulting in a conviction in the intervening period, but in 2018 he harboured the same sexual jealousy that had previously motivated him to kill.

122. Nevertheless, as Wood CJ at CL noted in Blanco, this murder is a stale crime and this calls for some degree of flexibility. The delay in the offender’s arrest was unacceptable and now the offender appears to be sentenced as a very different man than he was at the time he killed Mr Palmer. He is now a man in late middle age. He has had no connection with Renny Palmer for about 8 years. He is certainly going to be an old man when he is released from prison and, as I note below, he is unlikely to pose a risk of re-offending in the future. I will moderate the sentence somewhat because of the stale nature of the crime.

123. Separately, it is also relevant to consider s 21B of the CSP Act, which enables a court, where available, to sentence an offender in accordance with earlier sentencing patterns and practices. The provision reads as follows:

21B Sentencing patterns and practices

(1) A court must sentence an offender in accordance with the sentencing patterns and practices at the time of sentencing.

…

(3) Despite subsection (1), a court may sentence an offender for an offence in accordance with the sentencing patterns and practices at the time the offence was committed if—

(a) the offence is not a child sexual offence, and

(b) the offender establishes that there are exceptional circumstances.

124. No suggestion has been made that the sentencing patterns and practices for the offence of murder were different in 2004. In my opinion, it is instructive that the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 (NSW) had been passed by the time the offence had been committed. Even if the sentencing patterns and practices could be said to be different, the offender has not sought to establish exceptional circumstances such that s 21B of the CSP Act may be engaged.

Remorse

125. As I have already made plain, the offender has not shown any contrition or remorse. This is commonplace between the parties. He has always denied his involvement in the murder, and I expect that he always will. His lies and post-offending conduct underscore the extent to which he has refused to accept responsibility for the murder.

Prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending

126. In both written and oral submissions, Ms Avenell SC submitted that it is most unlikely that the offender will have the disposition to offend in the same kind of way again. Ms Avenell SC specifically argued that the offender’s post-offence conduct can only have a marginal effect on his prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood that he reoffends.

127. In short, I accept Ms Avenell SC’s submission. The offender is very unlikely to reoffend after he inevitably spends such a considerable period of time in custody. He will be much older by the time he is to be eventually released on parole. This bodes well for his prospects of rehabilitation. The fact that he has failed to express remorse does not automatically disentitle him to a favourable finding of this kind. [8]

128. Accordingly, there will not be the need to emphasise specific deterrence as there would have been if the offender came to be sentenced for his crime in the years immediately after the killing. In saying that, specific deterrence is not irrelevant. The offender showed that he can still flare into violence – as he did in 2018. But there will be some moderation in sentence due to the unlikelihood that he will re-offend in the future.

129. General deterrence is the primary sentencing consideration, along with denunciation for his offending. There must be a very significant gaol sentence imposed to reflect the gravity of this man’s murderous conduct.

Conclusion

130. It is necessary to now pass the sentence. Needless to say, no penalty other than a lengthy term of imprisonment is appropriate in this case. The sentence that I impose must consist of a non-parole period and an additional term. Unless I find special circumstances to exist, the non-parole period must not fall below three-quarters of the term of the sentence (CSP Act, s 44(2)).

131. Ms Avenell SC submitted that it is open to the Court to find special circumstances having regard to the offender’s age, the fact it is his first time in custody and because of the lengthy sentence he will inevitably receive. I have taken his age and lack of record into account already. The fact that this is his first term of imprisonment does not in this case warrant a finding of special circumstances. Nor does the length of the sentence justify such a finding. None of these factors, alone or together, constitute special circumstances in this case such as to enable me to vary the statutory ratio.

132. Gofal Baziad, for the murder of Jason Palmer, on, or about, 6 or 7 February 2004, at Lakemba in the State of New South Wales, I sentence you to a non-parole period of 18 years, commencing on 17 June 2024, with an additional term of 6 years’ imprisonment. The total term of imprisonment is 24 years, expiring on 16 June 2048.

133. Pursuant to s 25C of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), I advise you of the existence of that Act and the fact it may apply to you and to this offence. I direct your legal representatives to explain the significance of this to you.

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Endnotes

R v Bolt [2001] NSWCCA 487; (2001) 126 A Crim R 284 at 293.

R v Dawes [2004] NSWCCA 363 at [31].

CSP Act, s 54B(6); Muldrock at [28]-[29]; see also, Dorsett v R [2024] NSWCCA 192 at [148]-[150].

See also, Daher v R [2026] NSWCCA 26 at [13].

Milat v R; Klein v R [2014] NSWCCA 29 at [95].

Eaton at [13].

See Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162 at [154] (citing R v Do (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 512).

See, for example, BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 159; (2010) 201 A Crim R 379 at [84].