R v B O [2006] VSCA 247

R v B O [2006] VSCA 247 - VSCA 2006 case summary — Zoe

[4]

1 On 22 February 2005, the applicant was found guilty by a jury on 13 counts of wilfully committing an indecent act with or in the presence of a child under the age of 16[1] and five counts of taking part in an act of sexual penetration with a child under the age of 16[2] (the first trial - Presentment No. S00563438.1).

2 Six days later, he was found guilty on one count of wilfully committing an indecent act with or in the presence of a child under the age of 16[3] (the second trial - Presentment No. S00563438.2). [4]

3 The applicant had no prior convictions.

4 After hearing a plea in mitigation of penalty, the judge, on 4 March 2005, imposed the following sentences:

On Presentment No. S00563438.1

On each of counts 1, 2, 8,

14, 15, 16 and 17 - six months' imprisonment;

On each of counts 3, 5, 6,

11 and 19 - four years' imprisonment;

On each of counts 4, 7, 10,

12, 13 and20 - eight months' imprisonment.

On Presentment No. S00563438.2

On count 2 - four months' imprisonment.

5 Her Honour directed that, with respect to Presentment No. S00563438.1, two months of the sentences imposed on each of counts 7, 13 and 20 and two years of each of the sentences imposed on counts 11 and 19 be served cumulatively upon that imposed on count 3 and upon each other. This created an effective sentence of eight years and six months' imprisonment.

6 It was further directed that one month of the sentence imposed on count 2 on Presentment No. S00563438.2, be served cumulatively upon the effective term imposed for the offences encompassed by Presentment No. S00563438.1.

7 These orders created a total sentence of eight years and seven months' imprisonment in respect of which a non-parole period of five years and nine months was fixed.[5]

8 The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against convictions and the sentences imposed upon him.

The Applications for Leave to Appeal Against Conviction

The Grounds - First Trial

9 The application with respect to the convictions and sentences contained in Presentment No S00563438.1 is based upon the grounds set out in the applicant's Full Statement of Grounds that:

[8]

The Background

11 The complainants, who will be referred to as, L, P and V, are brothers and the sons of the applicant's cousin, G.

The First Trial

12 Eight of the counts of indecent acts and four of the counts of sexual penetration on which the applicant was convicted relate to his alleged offending against L, who was born on 13 June 1979. The prosecution contended that the relevant conduct took place between 1 January 1992 and 31 December 1994 when L was aged between 12 and a half years and 15 and a half years. At that time, the applicant was aged between 25 and 27 years, having been born on 8 January 1967.

13 The offences were claimed to have been committed in the course of two discrete episodes, separated by a matter of weeks. The first group, it was asserted, were perpetrated at the applicant's home in Dandenong, on an occasion on which it had been arranged with L's parents that the young boy would stay overnight.

14 According to L, the applicant asked him whether he would like to sleep in the same room with him. L thought that this was a "cool" suggestion as the applicant had a waterbed and therefore agreed. However, as he started to go to sleep, the applicant began rubbing his arm and back and then his anus. Moving his hand around towards L's front, he commenced touching the boy's penis on top of his boxer shorts and then to masturbate him (count 1). The applicant assured L that this conduct was "normal" and said that he need not be shy. He turned the boy over so that he was lying flat on the bed and then took L's hand and placed it on his (the applicant's) penis, directing L to masturbate him (count 2). Following this, the applicant pulled down L's boxer shorts and placed the boy's penis in his mouth. The applicant then recommenced masturbating him (count 3). After a while, the applicant removed his own boxer shorts, knelt on the bed and pulled L into a kneeling position. The applicant again masturbated L and then directed the boy to masturbate him. The applicant then rubbed L's penis with his own (count 4), after which he inserted his penis into L's mouth for "a little while" (count 5). The applicant again inserted L's penis in his mouth (count 6). The applicant then masturbated L until he ejaculated (count 7). He then directed L to masturbate him until he also ejaculated (count 8). He told L "this is our secret, don't tell anyone".

15 The second episode of offending occurred, it was claimed, a week or two later in L's bedroom at his home in Noble Park.

16 L stated that, on this occasion, the applicant was present in the house on an evening during the week when L's mother was at work. The boy's father was sleeping in the lounge room and his two brothers were elsewhere in the premises. The applicant told L that he was in a hurry as he had to go out and requested the boy to come to his (L's) bedroom with him. Once in the room, the applicant closed the door and proceeded to masturbate him. He then placed L's hand on to his (the applicant's) penis and directed the boy to do likewise (count 10). Following this, the applicant sat on L's bed, and while the boy was standing facing him, put L's penis in his mouth and engaged in oral sex (count 11). The applicant then masturbated L until he ejaculated (count 12). The applicant continued to masturbate himself until he also ejaculated (count 13). The applicant then said that he had to go, and left the house.

17 The other counts on which the applicant was convicted on the first trial relate to P, the younger brother of L, and who was born on 10 December 1981. The offending was said to have occurred between 10 December 1992 and 31 December 1993, when P was aged 11 to 13 years, at the applicant's Dandenong home.

18 According to P, the applicant had asked whether the boy could go with him back to his house. P's mother agreed and the applicant drove him there. P was standing just outside the kitchen area in the lounge when the applicant came over to him and started to masturbate the child inside P's pants (count 14). The applicant then directed P to do the same to him (count 15). The applicant took P to his bedroom. Once there, he removed P's clothes as well as his own and, when both were on the waterbed, commenced to touch P's penis (count 16). The applicant then directed P to masturbate him (count 17). P was lying on the bed and the applicant gave him oral sex (count 19). Whilst performing this act on P the applicant masturbated to the point of ejaculation (count 20).

The Second Trial

19 The count on the second presentment, on which the applicant was convicted related to the youngest of the three brothers, V, who was born on 4 April 1984.

20 V gave evidence that the conduct took place on an evening on which the applicant was present at V's home. V, who was aged between seven and nine years, had had a bath and was naked in front of the heater in the lounge room while his mother was busy in the kitchen. The applicant offered to dry his hair. He then sat behind the boy in a lounge chair while V was sitting on the floor between his legs. While drying his hair, the applicant leaned over and started playing with the child's testicles. He then moved his hand to V's penis and started masturbating him for some 10 to 15 minutes before V said "stop". V then stood up, walked off and put on his pyjamas.

The Grounds of Application for Leave to Appeal Against the Convictions Entered at the First Trial (Presentment No. S00563438.1)

Ground 1

21 There were two propositions advanced under this ground.

22 Evidence was led by the prosecution of a complaint made by L to a school friend, DP, after the second alleged episode of offending. It was contended that there was no evidence as to the proximity of this complaint to the events in question and none as to what may have happened in the meantime. In those circumstances it was not possible, the argument proceeded, for the inference to be drawn that the complaint was made at the first reasonable opportunity and, accordingly, the evidence should not have been put before the jury.[8]

23 In a police statement made on 27 April 2003, L claimed that the first person he informed about what had happened was his "best friend", DP, in a conversation that took place a "few weeks" after the second episode -

[14]

"In The Queen v. Freeman and Others ..., the court made it clear that the question of first reasonable opportunity had to be weighed against all the surrounding circumstances bearing in mind the subjective situation of the complainant. It is apparent from other depositional material, particularly that of the complainant's mother, that the complainant's family was in some turmoil at about the time of the alleged offending, with Community Service involved because of the behaviour of the complainant's brother, [P], who is also a complainant the subject of other counts of this presentment. It appears from the statement of [the] school counsellor during 1993 and 1994, that she had ongoing contact relating to anger and behavioural problems with [L] and his brother [P]. It is also apparent from the statement of the complainants' father that he was having problems of his own unspecified. He states that the marriage to the complainants' mother ended in 1995 and the breakdown was 'from domestic problems and it also involved alcohol'.

It is clear from the complainant's own statement that, regardless of whether he was 12 or 15 years of age when the first episode of offending is alleged to have occurred, he was shocked and confused after it. He had also been allegedly threatened by the accused that he would be killed if he told anyone. This factor, taken in conjunction with his dysfunctional family situation, is, in my mind, relevant to whether this complaint to [DP] could be said to be the first reasonable opportunity, particularly in the context of the alleged offender being his own mother's cousin.

The situation as to whether the complainant did or did not complain to his mother prior in time to [DP] is unclear from the other depositional material. In any event, the authorities suggest that there can be more than one recent complaint.

Although the complainant's statement that he told [DP] 'a few weeks later after the last time it happened' is not very specific, it would appear to be a complaint made within a period of weeks rather than months or years. As Eames, J.A. stated in The Queen v. GG ... 'There is no set rule as to when delay is too long to enable a complaint to be deemed "recent".'

In the circumstances of this particular case involving the accused before me, I regard the complaint as presently detailed in the statement of [DP] as a 'recent' one in relation to all of the offending alleged. It is clear from [DP's] statement that the complaint was not confined to one episode of 'something to do with his arse and being touched there.' [DP] also refers to 'the touching and all that', and states that the complainant had said that 'it had happened to him more than once, but I can't remember how many times. It was more of an ongoing thing'.

In The Queen v. GG, Eames, J.A., in referring to the trial judge's reasoning in that case, acknowledged ... that, 'The fact that an earlier opportunity might have arisen was not conclusive of the question whether the timing of this complaint when made was the first reasonable opportunity.'

Having regard to the complainant's subjective situation at the time of the alleged commission of the offences, both domestically and his own described emotional turmoil after the alleged offending, compounded by the threat alleged to be made to him by the accused, I find that the complaint to [DP] is one made at the first reasonable opportunity."[12]

[17]

The issue of delay in the making of the initial complaint did not arise in the present case and no further instruction was required on that basis. The directions given by her Honour were expressed in a conventional form, were appropriate and adequate in the circumstances and there was nothing in them that could be seen to have "sterilised" the evidence from critical comment. The jury were properly directed with respect to the onus and standard of proof and the various facts and considerations advanced on behalf of the defence were drawn to their attention. There was nothing that could reasonably give rise to concern that they may have engaged in some form of impermissible reasoning or failed to have regard to some consideration, the significance of which may not have been apparent to them. No complaint was made by counsel at the trial with respect to the adequacy of the instructions and no further directions were sought or required.

29 This ground accordingly fails.

Grounds 2 and 3

30 Those grounds were argued together. In the course of delivering his final address to the jury, counsel for the applicant referred to the claims by the three complainants as being "uncannily similar" and suggested that there was at least the possibility of contamination of the evidence, if not deliberate collusion between them. The situation called for, it was submitted, the provision of a strong direction by the trial judge, pointing out to the jury the presence of these possibilities and cautioning them with respect to the risks of injustice inherent in this situation.

31 This complaint also lacks merit in my view. Neither in the court below nor before us was it argued that any of the counts on the presentment should have been severed. The jury were instructed that they had to give separate consideration to each count and that it would be wrong of them, if they found the applicant guilty or not guilty of one offence against a particular complainant, to reason that he must therefore be guilty or not guilty on any of the other counts relating to that complainant. They were also instructed that a finding of guilty of the commission of an offence against one complainant would not permit them to reason, via propensity, to his guilt of an offence against the other. No exception was taken at the trial to these instructions. They were simply expressed and sufficiently clear to enable the conclusion to be reached that, as a realistic possibility, the contention that the jury may have engaged in impermissible reasoning based upon their perception of the propensity of the applicant to commit sexual offences, or the use of the evidence of one complaint to support that of another, can be discounted.

32 Prior to the final address of the counsel then appearing for the applicant, and at the conclusion of the prosecutor's address which contained no suggestion to that effect, the trial judge raised the issue of the possible cross admissibility of the evidence of the separate complainants. After discussion, the following exchange took place:

[27]

39 The argument was advanced in this Court that the question posed by the prosecutor carried the implication that neither of the complainants possessed any motive to lie, and that therefore not only could the evidence given by both be relied upon with confidence, but, indirectly, that, if the evidence was not to be accepted as reliable, it was incumbent upon the applicant to establish the existence of some such motive. This view of the jury would have been reinforced, it was claimed, by the later submissions of defence counsel that the motivation for making "false" allegations by L, in particular, was a desire to attract the level of attention that he regarded as his due.

40 For this argument to succeed, either the initial premise that the question posed by the prosecutor, reasonably understood, carried implications of the kind asserted has to be accepted, or the fact that the issue was raised by defence counsel necessitated the provision by the judge of a specific instruction.

41 As the passage makes apparent, the prosecutor did nothing more than invite the jury to consider whether the claims of the complainants had what he described as a "ring of truth" about them or whether they sounded as if they were fabricated. Clearly, no question of motivation was raised directly and there is nothing to support the contention that this invitation would have been perceived by the jury as implicitly suggesting that the applicant was required to advance a motive for the fabrication by the respective complainants of the allegations made against him. Although the theoretical possibility that the posing of the question: "Did it sound like it was made up to you", could raise the issue of motive in the minds of some people cannot be excluded, as I have remarked it is apparent that the prosecutor was directing attention to what he asserted was the high degree of probability that the evidence was true as it possessed the "ring of truth that you get because [the event] actually happened." Even assuming that some members of the jury regarded the prosecution's invitation to view the evidence as suggesting more than that they should have regard to the inherent plausibility of the evidence itself, considered in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances and speculate as to whether the respective complainants may have possessed motives to lie, the prospect that they would then have reasoned that it was incumbent upon the applicant to establish the presence of some motive, is, in my view, remote. In any event, as I have earlier pointed out, the jury was properly instructed with regard to the burden and standard of proof and there is no reason to suppose that those instructions were not followed.

42 With regard to the suggestion that as the matter was raised by defence counsel some further instruction was required, the only references made in the trial to the possibility or significance of the presence of some motive to lie were those of the applicant's counsel for his own forensic purposes. The explanation proffered by him, that is, having made an allegation as a young boy in order to gain attention he felt constrained to repeat it on oath years later as an adult, was hardly likely to have found favour with any reasonable juror and it is difficult to see how, if it was the subject of instructions by the trial judge in the fashion urged in this Court, that this could have operated other than to the detriment of the applicant. The situation was not one in which there was reference made or implied to the absence of motive for the making of a false complaint but one in which a specific motive for lying was attributed to the complainant. If instructions were provided, presumably the judge would have said something to the effect that, if the jury rejected the defence contention that the complainant concerned was lying for the reason proffered, they would be in a situation in which there was simply an absence of a motive to lie and to then instruct them that the defence was under no obligation to advance any such motive. This would have highlighted the obvious unlikelihood of the explanation, and almost certainly enhanced the credibility of the complainant's evidence in the mind's of the jury. And it must be borne in mind that the instructions would have been given in a trial in which there were no suggestions express or implied that the applicant may have had to prove anything or advance any motive, as defence counsel himself pointed out in one of the passages upon which reliance has been placed. Unsurprisingly, no exception was taken to the judge's change on this aspect.

43 This complaint fails.

[35]

"I want to say something else to you which is a warning. It is something to which I want you to listen very carefully and to which you must pay heed when you are assessing the evidence in this case. These two offences are alleged to have occurred between 1 January 1992 and 31 December 1993. [V] was aged seven to nine between these dates, he is now 20 years old. It was not until June 2003, when the accused was first contacted by the police and interviewed, that the accused was first made aware of the allegations. The experience of courts in dealing with cases where there has been a substantial delay like this is what causes me to give you this warning that I am about to give you.

You must bear in mind that the delay has deprived the accused of the means of testing the complainant's allegations which would have been open to him, had there been no delay in the prosecution. Had the complainant's allegations been made soon after the alleged offences, it would have been possible to explore in detail the alleged circumstances and perhaps it would have been open to the accused to call evidence throwing doubt upon the complainant's story or confirming his denial.

A complainant earlier in time, particularly if he had identified the precise date, may - I do not say necessarily would - have allowed the accused to call evidence which might have assisted him in his defence and thrown doubt on the evidence of the complainant. After so many years these opportunities have been lost or compromised.

The other thing about delay is that it affects the memories of all concerned. You have to take into account that the complainant, [V], now has an adult's recollection of a childhood memory. His evidence cannot be adequately tested after that time. Contemporaneous questioning of a child may, for example, distinguish fantasy from reality. Experience has shown that human recollection, particularly of childhood events, may be erroneous or distorted and that the likelihood of error can increase with delay.

So the warning is: As the evidence of the complainant, [V], cannot be adequately tested after the passage of so many years, it would be unsafe to convict on the evidence alone unless, having scrutinised all of the evidence with great care, considering the circumstances relevant to its evaluation and paying heed to the warning, you are satisfied of its truth and accuracy.

...

... In this case, as is often the case in complaints of a sexual nature where there are no witnesses, there is no evidence which corroborates that of the complainant from an independent source. In other words, there is no evidence which confirms or supports or strengthens what [V] said actually happened in relation to the two allegations, so you must scrutinise carefully the evidence of [V], taking into account the warning I have given you.

If, after careful scrutiny, you are satisfied that his evidence is truthful and accurate, then you are entitled to act upon that evidence alone and then to convict."[27]

[36]

They were appropriate and adequate in the circumstances. Again, no complaint was made and none would have been justified. This ground must fail.

Ground 3

55 The complainant stated in evidence, with respect to count 1, that his family had stayed overnight at the applicant's home after a party. He was sleeping with his brothers, the applicant and another person in the applicant's waterbed, when he was touched and masturbated by an adult from behind. He said that he was scared and did not look around, however, he was confident that it was the applicant who molested him.

56 Although, as is apparent from this outline, it was not a case of personal identification at all, the trial judge instructed the jury in the manner indicated as required in such cases by the High Court in Domican.[28] In this Court, the contention has been advanced that her instructions were inadequate. Although a question could be seen to arise with respect to the correctness of the judge's approach to a situation in which the questions relating to the drawing of an inference of identity appear to have been confused with those arising from evidence of personal identification, ultimately the matter assumed no significance as the applicant was acquitted on that count.

57 Similarly no issue of identification arose in relation to count 2. According to V he was sitting immediately in front of the applicant who was drying his hair. There is no suggestion of the presence of anyone else in the vicinity and he was clearly able to say who touched him. Once again, no exception was taken to the judge's direction at the trial.

58 This ground fails.

Grounds 5 and 6

59 These grounds can be considered together. The trial judge gave clear directions to the jury to give separate consideration to each count and the evidence led in proof of it. There was no suggestion at any stage that the evidence led in support of count 1 was admissible in proof of count 2 and the jury acquitted on count 1 in any event. There was no exception taken to her Honour's directions on this aspect. There was clearly sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict which could not reasonably be regarded as unsafe and unsatisfactory in the circumstances.[29]

60 These grounds must fail.

61 Accordingly, this application also fails in my opinion.

The Applications for Leave to Appeal Against Sentence

62 The Full Statement of Grounds of the applications for leave to appeal against sentence are in identical terms and read:

[50]

75 The reasons for requiring a propensity warning in such cases in addition to a separate consideration direction are explained in each of the authorities mentioned but with respect perhaps most clearly and convincingly in R. v. TJB.[38] As they demonstrate, there is a greater need for a propensity warning (in addition to a separate consideration direction) in cases where evidence is ruled to be not cross-admissible than in cases where it is.

76 In recent times, it has also been remarked almost as often that, where a judge gives a propensity warning of the kind required in T, it is preferable that he or she does so in terms or to the effect that in the event that the jury find that the accused committed an offence with one of the complainants "the jury is not to reason that the accused is the kind of person who is likely to have committed the other offences charged". The reasons were restated by Callaway, J.A. in DCC_,__[39]_ and have since been repeated several times in other judgments.

77 Despite his Honour's observations, and similar observations by other judges of this court, we continue to see a significant number of cases in which one of the grounds of appeal is that the trial judge did not follow the preferred form of warning. Regrettably, this is one more such case. The judge used a form of words which came close to the form suggested by Hunt, CJ at CL in R. v. Beserick,[40] but which in result was not as clear as it could have been or should have been.

78 It is accepted that, in some circumstances, forms of the warning other than the preferred form of warning may be sufficient.[41] As Callaway, J.A. put it in DCC,[42] the preferred form of warning should be used but in the end the sufficiency of a warning, however it is phrased, depends on the facts of the case, the precise language employed and the context. But, self evidently, doubt is to be avoided if is possible and most times the way to avoid doubt is to stick with the form of warning

that has been sanctioned.

79 In the end, bearing in mind the facts of the case, the precise language employed and the context, I am not persuaded that the direction was inadequate to convey to the jury the need to avoid propensity reasoning. But I admit to having some reservations about it.

[52]

[1] Counts 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 20 on Presentment No. S00563438.1.

[2] Counts 3, 5, 6, 11 and 19 on Presentment No. S00563438.1. The applicant was found not guilty in relation to one count of committing an indecent act with or in the presence of a child under the age of 16 (count 21); one count of taking part in an act of sexual penetration with a child under the age of 16 (count 18); and one count of making a threat to kill (count 9).

[3] Count 2 on Presentment No. S00563438.2. The applicant was found not guilty in relation to one count of committing an indecent act with or in the presence of a child under the age of 16 (count 1).

[4] On 9 February 2005, the applicant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in the County Court to Presentment No. S0056348 which contained 16 counts of wilfully committing an indecent act with or in the presence of a child under the age of 16; six counts of taking part in an act of sexual penetration with a child under the age of 16 and one count of making a threat to kill. On 15 February 2005, the trial judge heard pre-trial argument in respect of an application to sever the presentment in relation to one of the complainants. The application was granted and two counts were severed. On 16 February 2005, Presentment Nos. S00563438.1 and S00563438.2 were filed over the original presentment.

[5] Her Honour also declared that on counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 , 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20 on Presentment No. S00563438.1 and on count 2 on Presentment No. S00563438.2, the applicant was sentenced as a serious offender pursuant to the provisions of the Sentencing Act 1991. She further declared that, pursuant to the provisions of the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 and by reason of the applicant's conviction on counts 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 20 on Presentment No. S00563438.1 and count 2 on Presentment No. S00563438.2, he be registered as a Class 2 offender. It was also declared that by reason of his convictions on counts 3, 5, 6, 11 and 19 on Presentment No. S00563438.1, he be registered as a Class 1 offender.

[6] A further ground 6 was not pursued and need not be addressed.

[7] A further ground 4 was not pursued and need not be addressed.

[8] Objection was taken to the admission of this evidence at the trial and the question was considered on the basis of the depositional material.

[9] T179.

[10] T179-180.

[11] T180-181.

[12] T181-183.

[13] R. v. MWL [2002] VSCA 221.

[14] Crofts v. R. [1996] HCA 22; (1996) 186 C.L.R. 427.

[15] Crofts v. R. [1996] HCA 22; (1996) 186 C.L.R. 427 at 451.

[16] T377.

[17] Palmer v. R. [1998] HCA 2; (1998) 193 C.L.R. 1.

[18] Palmer v. R. [1998] HCA 2; (1998) 193 C.L.R. 1 at 7 per Brennan, C.J., Gaudron and Gummow, JJ.

[19] Palmer v. R. [1998] HCA 2; (1998) 193 C.L.R. 1 at 9.

[20] T273.

[21] T386-387.

[22] T374.

[23] Longman v. R. [1989] HCA 45; (1989) 168 C.L.R. 1.

[24] Longman v. R. [1989] HCA 45; (1989) 168 C.L.R. 1 at 91.

[25] T433.

[26] T32.

[27] T208-210.

[28] Domican v. R. [1992] HCA 13; (1992) 173 C.L.R. 555.

[29] M v. R. [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 C.L.R. 487.

[30] A further ground 2, in respect of both applications for leave to appeal against sentence, was abandoned.

[31] Sentence T289.

[32] Sentence T291.

[33] Sentence T291.

[34] Sentence T282.

[35] Sentence T290.

[36] (1996) 86 A.Crim.R. 293.

[37] ibid. at 299; see also R. v. J (No 2) [1998] 3 V.R. 602 at 642; R. v. TJB [1998] 4 V.R. 621 at 633; R. v. DCC [2004] VSCA 230; (2004) 11 V.R. 129 at 131[4].

[38] [1998] 4 V.R. 621 at 629-633.

[39] [2004] VSCA 230; (2004) 11 V.R. 129 at 134[14].

[40] (1993) 30 N.S.W.L.R. 510 at 515-516.

[41] R. v. Glennon (No.2) [2001] VSCA 17; (2001) 7 V.R. 631 at 679.

[42] [2004] VSCA 230; (2004) 11 V.R. 129 at 134 [15]; see also Eames, J.A. at 143 [57]-[59].

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (52 paragraphs)

Parties