R v Atteya; R v Khaled [2026] NSWSC 675 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWSC

R v Atteya; R v Khaled

[2026] NSWSC 675

Supreme Court of NSW|2026-06-12|Before: Sweeney J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2026-06-12

Before

Sweeney J

Catchwords

SENTENCING — Sentencing after trial — Murder — Disputed facts — Disputed cognitive impairment — Issue of life sentence

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

SENTENCING — Sentencing after trial — Murder — Disputed facts — Disputed cognitive impairment — Issue of life sentence

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Atteya; R v Khaled [2026] NSWSC 675

Hearing dates: 27 March 2026

Date of orders: 12 June 2026

Decision date: 12 June 2026

Jurisdiction: Common Law

Before: Sweeney J

Decision: (1) Abdulrahman Atteya is sentenced to a non-parole period of 25 years, 6 months to date from 14 June 2023, with an additional term of 8 years 6 months. That is a total sentence of 34 years imprisonment. The non parole period will expire on 13 December 2048.
(2) Mohammed Khaled is sentenced to a non-parole period of 18 years, to date from 19 January 2024, with an additional term of 6 years, making a total sentence of 24 years imprisonment. The non-parole period will expire on 18 January 2042.
(3) Both offenders advised about the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW).

Catchwords: SENTENCING — Sentencing after trial — Murder — Disputed facts — Disputed cognitive impairment — Issue of life sentence

Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 19A
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 21(1), 22A, 61(1)

Cases Cited: R v Adams (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 179
R v Arthurell (Supreme Court (NSW), Hunt CJ at CL, 3 October 1997, unrep)
R v Harris [2000] NSWSC 285; (2000) 111 A Crim R 415
R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557; [2004] NSWCCA 19
Rogerson v R; McNamara v R [2021] NSWCCA 160; (2021) 290 A Crim R 239
Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267; [2001] HCA 21

Texts Cited: Nil

Category: Sentence

The jury was directed that in order to find Mr Atteya guilty of the offence of murder, they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he was in the Golf in the basement car park as either the person who shot Mr Nazlioglu or the driver. The jury’s verdict indicates that they were so satisfied.
Mr Dalton SC for Mr Atteya made submissions in the sentence hearing, as he had done in the trial, that because of evidence of Mr Atteya’s height, of the height of the Golf, and some expert opinions about the movements of the shooter in CCTV footage, the Crown could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Atteya was the shooter.
I am satisfied, consistent with the jury’s verdict, that Mr Atteya was present in the basement at the time of the shooting. I am unable to find that he was the shooter, but I am not prepared to find that he was not. He was either the shooter or the driver. In my view the culpability of the shooter and the driver was barely distinguishable.
I make the following findings about Mr Atteya’s conduct in pursuance of the agreement to kill Mr Nazlioglu, which I find he was a part of and acting in pursuit of on and from 18 June 2022.
On 18 June 2022 Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi, driving in Mr Atteya’s Audi, conducted reconnaissance in Rhodes, the suburb where Mr Nazlioglu lived, from about 2:44 PM to 3:36 PM. In the course of the reconnaissance they drove past the entry to the car park of Mr Nazlioglu’s apartment building and to a car park in Leeds Street, Rhodes. That car park was where Mr Atteya and, I am satisfied Rabeih Baltagi, transferred into the Golf on the night of 27 June before they drove the short distance to Mr Nazlioglu’s building and shot him. They also attended the car park for that purpose the previous night, 26 June, in a failed attempt to shoot Mr Nazlioglu.
On 22 June 2022 Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi conducted further reconnaissance in Rhodes in Mr Baltagi’s Mercedes.
In the morning of 24 June 2022 Mr Atteya’s Audi was detected on CCTV footage driving to Mount Pritchard and back to Mr Baltagi’s home at 9 Linne Place, Hinchinbrook. That CCTV footage and their phone records showed that they drove to Mr Khaled’s home, collected his white Hilux and drove it back to 9 Linne Place. This is disputed on behalf of Mr Khaled and I will address the factual findings in relation to him later in these remarks, but I am satisfied that Mr Atteya with Mr Baltagi performed those actions in pursuit of their agreement and plan to kill Mr Nazlioglu.
On the same day Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi drove in Mr Atteya’s car to and around Stante Close at Middleton Grange. This was where the Mercedes used to transport Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to Rhodes to conduct the attempted shooting and the shooting, on 26 and 27 June, was set on fire on the night of 27 June, and I am satisfied that their attendance at that location on 24 June was in pursuit of the agreement and part of the planning of the shooting of Mr Nazlioglu.
At about 5:30 PM on 24 June 2022 a stolen Range Rover arrived in the Hoxton Park Reserve car park. The Crown asserts that the driver of that car was Mr Khaled, which Mr Khaled disputes, and I will deal with that issue later in respect of Mr Khaled. However, I am satisfied that Mr Atteya attended the Hoxton Park Reserve car park in his Audi and guided the Range Rover to a particular parking spot. The Range Rover was one of the cars planned to be used in the enterprise focused on the shooting of Mr Nazlioglu. Mr Atteya then drove to Mr Rabeih Baltagi’s home at 9 Linne Place.
26 June 2022 was the day of the failed attempt to shoot Mr Nazlioglu in the evening. Mr Atteya arrived at 9 Linne Place in his Audi at 10:47 AM.
At 3:47 PM Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi drove in a stolen Mercedes with false number plates to Rhodes. They drove into the car park at Leeds Street, then drove to a nearby area and collected the stolen Volkswagen Golf with false number plates. They returned to the Leeds Street car park with the Mercedes and the Golf. Jade Jeske was using Mr Nazlioglu’s vehicle on that evening. At 5:24 PM Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi left the Leeds Street car park in the Golf and parked on the street outside the entrance to the car park of Mr Nazlioglu’s apartment building. At 6:39 PM Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi in the Golf entered the car park by tailgating another vehicle, and parked the Golf in close proximity to the car space where Mr Nazlioglu usually parked his car. At 6:51 PM Ms Jeske arrived in the car on her own and parked in the car space where the car was usually parked. As she parked, the shooter left the Golf and approached. The shooter then returned to the Golf. Ms Jeske did not notice a person in black crouched and moving in the car park and went to the lifts. The Golf left the car park and returned to the Leeds Street car park, from which some time later Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi left in the Mercedes and drove to the Hoxton Park Reserve car park.
Meanwhile, Mr Atteya’s wife, Grace Sinclair, had gone to 9 Linne Place. She had placed a tracker in Mr Atteya’s Audi and had noticed that his car had not moved for some time, and she had become frustrated that he had not answered her calls and text messages during the day. It was the Crown case, and I am satisfied, that Mr Atteya did not take his phone with him when he attended Rhodes on 26 June, in order to not be detected in or on the way to or from Rhodes. I am satisfied that the persons acting in pursuance of the agreement to kill Mr Nazlioglu had some form of communication which was not detectable by police, which enabled Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to attend the car park of Mr Nazlioglu’s building when his car was approaching on that evening. It may have been the ciphr phones which were found by police at Mr Rabeih Baltagi’s home at 9 Linne Place in a later search, but I am unable to make that finding, as those ciphr devices may have been in Mr Baltagi’s home for another purpose. It matters not, because I am satisfied that the people involved in carrying out the killing had a form of communication available to them, which was not their usual phones. Mr Atteya’s wife, Ms Sinclair, attended Rabeih Baltagi’s home and spoke to Mr Rabeih Baltagi’s wife, Emily McIvor and, I am satisfied, satisfied herself that Mr Atteya was not at 9 Linne Place. Ms Sinclair left 9 Linne Place at 7:41 PM.
Mr Atteya returned to 9 Linne Place at about 8 PM and thereafter his phone was activated. Ms McIvor sent Ms Sinclair a text message saying that the “boys” had returned and were in the garage.
Mr Atteya arrived home at 10:49 PM and Ms Sinclair recorded a video of him while they had a discussion. Earlier Ms Sinclair had sent Mr Atteya a video recording of a shoe print on a counter under a manhole cover in their home. The Crown case was that Mr Atteya had collected some item from in the ceiling to be used in connection with the shooting of Mr Nazlioglu. That may be so, given the closeness in time to Mr Atteya’s attendance at Rhodes on that evening, but I am unable to make any finding about what Mr Atteya removed from the ceiling or that it was connected to the shooting.
On 27 June 2022 Mr Atteya arrived at 9 Linne Place at 1:26 PM, driving his brother’s Corolla. I am satisfied that he used his brother’s car on that day because he had found out the night before that his wife had placed a tracker in his Audi. Just before 5 PM Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi drove in the stolen Mercedes to Rhodes. In the Leeds Street car park they transferred into the Golf. At about 6 PM they drove to and parked in the street from which cars entered the car park of Mr Nazlioglu’s building. Mr Nazlioglu and his wife were driving back towards Rhodes. At 6:09 PM Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi in the Golf entered the car park by tailgating another vehicle and parked near the car space where Mr Nazlioglu ordinarily parked.
When Mr Nazlioglu drove into the car park, parked and began to get out of the car the shooting occurred. After the shooting, as the shooter began running away, the Golf pulled out of its parking spot, the shooter entered the front passenger seat of the Golf and the Golf drove out of the car park. Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi returned to the Leeds Street car park. At 6:29 PM the Golf was set on fire in the car park. Within the burnt car a pistol was found. It was not the pistol used to shoot and kill Mr Nazlioglu.
Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi then drove in the Mercedes back to the Hoxton Park Reserve car park. Almost immediately after the Mercedes parked in the Hoxton Park Reserve car park the Range Rover started up and left the car park. I am satisfied that Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi left in the Range Rover, that they drove it to Kemps Creek, and then were driven back to 9 Linne Place, arriving there just after 8:30 PM, when Mr Atteya went to the Corolla. In the meantime Mr Atteya’s wife Ms Sinclair had been trying to contact him on his phone and messages exchanged between Ms Sinclair and Ms McIvor indicated that Mr Atteya and Mr Rabeih Baltagi were not at Mr Baltagi’s home. Mr Atteya called Ms Sinclair after 8:30 PM.
On 6 July police searched Rabeih Baltagi’s home at 9 Linne Place. On 9 July 2022 Mr Atteya paid for a plane ticket for Rabeih Baltagi to travel to Lebanon. When he missed that flight Mr Atteya paid for another ticket to Lebanon for Mr Baltagi on 12 July 2022. Rabeih Baltagi left Australia on that flight and has not returned to Australia since. Mr Atteya has visited Rabeih Baltagi overseas, but has returned to Australia.
The Crown case was that Mr Atteya was paid for his role in the killing of Mr Nazlioglu. The Crown seeks that that fact be inferred from two bodies of evidence. One is that on 9 July 2022 after Rabeih Baltagi’s home had been searched by police, Mr Atteya and his wife exchanged messages about depositing a sum of money into a bank account in their daughter’s name so that it would not be seized by police. On 11 July Ms Sinclair sent messages to Mr Atteya saying that he had miscounted bundles of $10,000. That day she deposited $78,050 into their daughter’s account.
There was a note on Mr Atteya’s phone:

The Crown contended that this note recorded a $300,000 payment for the murder of Mr Nazlioglu, of which Mr Atteya received $60,000. Mr Atteya disputed that on several bases, including that he had bought the Audi RS6 in March 2022, that the phrase “gear_up” likely referred to drugs, and that the distribution of money was not consistent with the Crown case as to who was involved in the killing of Mr Nazlioglu, including the payment to Ms Grace Sinclair.
I am of the view that the evidence gives rise to an inference that Mr Atteya was involved in the supply of drugs, and that the money which Mr Atteya and Ms Sinclair discussed fairly frankly and deposited into their daughter’s account was likely to be the product of drug supply and cash from the beauty business Ms Sinclair was running in her home. The reference to “$31k 100 from gear_up” I am of the view was more likely the proceeds of drug supply activity. The “60k for me” may be a reference to a payment to Mr Atteya for his involvement in the killing of Mr Nazlioglu. It is difficult to make that finding beyond reasonable doubt on that evidence, even combined with other circumstances. I am satisfied that Mr Atteya did receive some payment for his involvement in killing Mr Nazlioglu, but I am unable to find beyond reasonable doubt that it was $60,000, or part of $300,000, or any specific amount.
Clearly Mr Atteya had no personal relationship with Mr Nazlioglu and there is no apparent personal motive for Mr Atteya to engage in the killing of Mr Nazlioglu. I conclude that a significant motive for Mr Atteya’s involvement was his loyalty to and being influenced by Mr Rabeih Baltagi, and he also received some financial reward. Why Rabeih Baltagi was involved in the killing of Mr Nazlioglu is also not clear, but I am satisfied he was, of the group involving himself, Mr Atteya and Mr Khaled, the person directing the conduct undertaken and specifically Mr Atteya’s. I draw that inference from Rabeih Baltagi’s home being the site of all the meetings of the group, and from where people left to engage in acts of planning and carrying out the shooting, that Rabeih Baltagi left Australia and Mr Atteya organised his flights to do so, and that Mr Atteya’s acts in planning and carrying out the shooting were all done in the company of Rabeih Baltagi.
The only motive the Crown was able to offer was that Mr Nazlioglu had in effect stolen two luxury cars he had hired. To kill a man over two cars is conduct which the community would rightly find shocking.

Many of the facts of Mr Khaled’s participation in the murder of Mr Nazlioglu alleged by the Crown were disputed by Mr Khaled as having been proved to the requisite standard.
The jury was directed that in order to find Mr Khaled guilty of the offence of murder they must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he was one of two people who rode electric scooters on the night of 27 June 2022, when Mr Nazlioglu was killed, and burned the Mercedes which had been used by Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to drive to and from Rhodes in connection with their killing of Mr Nazlioglu. The jury’s verdict indicates that they were so satisfied. I turn then to consider the other asserted acts by Mr Khaled performed in connection with the murder of Mr Nazlioglu.
It is accepted by Mr Khaled that on 18 June 2022 he collected a white Hilux from a street in Prestons where it had been left for him by a man named Osman Kammoun by arrangement between them. I am satisfied that Mr Khaled did not acquire that car specifically for the purpose of using it in connection with the murder of Mr Nazlioglu, but rather that he acquired it to use generally. However, he did thereafter use it to perform tasks in connection with the murder of Mr Nazlioglu.
After collecting the car Mr Khaled drove to Rabeih Baltagi’s home at 9 Linne Place, and was there at about 5 PM. That was after Rabeih Baltagi and Mr Atteya had driven to Rhodes and passed the entrance to the car park in Mr Nazlioglu’s building.
On the night of 18 June 2022 at about 10:30 PM Mr Khaled drove the white Hilux into the car park in Mr Nazlioglu’s building, drove down to the B5 level where Mr Nazlioglu parked the car he was using, drove around that level twice and then drove out. The issue between the Crown and Mr Khaled was whether, when he did so, obtaining information about the place where Mr Nazlioglu parked his car, he knew of the plan to kill Mr Nazlioglu and that he was obtaining information for that purpose.
In disputing that the Crown had proved that knowledge and purpose in Mr Khaled at that time, his counsel submitted that he did not disguise his car’s number plates, but drove it past CCTV cameras, and also had his phone with him which allowed his movements to be tracked.
The Crown submitted that Mr Khaled obtained information about the placement of Mr Nazlioglu’s car on level B5 of the car park, and provided it to Mr Rabeih Baltagi and Mr Atteya for use in connection with their plan to kill Mr Nazlioglu in that location and that Mr Khaled must have been entrusted with the reason for his performing that task when requested or directed to perform it. The Crown submitted that Mr Khaled’s behaviour in the car park was not consistent with an alternative plan, such as to steal the car Mr Nazlioglu was driving.
I am satisfied that Mr Khaled drove into the building car park and down to level B5 where Mr Nazlioglu parked his car for the purpose of ascertaining the location of Mr Nazlioglu’s parking space, in connection with the plan to kill Mr Nazlioglu and with knowledge of that plan. In part that is because Mr Khaled’s information gathering visit to the car park occurred on the same day that Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi had visited the outside of the car park and that after collecting the Hilux Mr Khaled went to Rabeih Baltagi’s home and then later that night made his visit to the car park. I infer that he was directed to do so by Rabeih Baltagi and perhaps also Mr Atteya. It is possible that Mr Khaled could have been tasked to obtain that information without his being told of the reason for it, but I consider that that is unlikely. One reason for that is that the operation to kill Mr Nazlioglu seems to have been planned meticulously, and the plan carried out with a great deal of discipline. For example, there was no “loose chatter” on phones which may have incriminated the participants. Further, I am satisfied that Mr Khaled performed other tasks in connection with the killing of Mr Nazlioglu in the next few days, and while I am prepared to find that his doing so involved some degree of loyalty to Rabeih Baltagi and Mr Atteya, I am not satisfied that Mr Baltagi would have recruited and entrusted Mr Khaled without explaining the reason and purpose for his assigned tasks, nor am I persuaded that Mr Khaled would have accepted and performed them without an explanation by Mr Baltagi. As to his performing the task without disguising his or his car’s identity under CCTV surveillance, that may be explained by his having only acquired the Hilux that day, by his performing the task about a week before when the shooting occurred, or that he did not think about CCTV surveillance in the car park. It would not be the first time a person has performed an act in connection with a criminal offence while under surveillance from CCTV cameras. I am not prepared to find that Mr Khaled performed a research task which was crucial to the killing of Mr Nazlioglu without knowing its purpose. I am satisfied that Mr Khaled had joined the agreement to kill Mr Nazlioglu as of 18 June 2022.
The next events in dispute are Mr Khaled’s actions on 24 June 2022. The Crown asserts that on that day Mr Khaled collected the stolen Range Rover from an unknown location and drove it to the Hoxton Park Reserve car park. The Crown asserts that the following events happened that day. In the morning Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi drove to Mr Khaled’s place at Mount Pritchard in Mr Atteya’s Audi, collected Mr Khaled’s white Hilux and drove it to Linne Place, while Mr Khaled stayed at home. The Crown relies on CCTV footage of the two cars and the phone records of Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi. In the afternoon of 24 June Mr Khaled was collected from his home and taken to collect the stolen Range Rover. Then Mr Khaled took the stolen Range Rover to Hoxton Park Reserve, that Mr Atteya arrived in that car park in his Audi and guided the Range Rover to a parking spot, then Mr Atteya drove Mr Khaled in Mr Atteya’s Audi to 9 Linne place. Then Mr Atteya and Mr Khaled spent from shortly after 5:30 PM until just after 9:30 PM at Linne Place, when the white Hilux left Linne Place and arrived at Mount Pritchard at 9:51 PM, at Mr Khaled’s address, and Mr Khaled’s phone moved from a cell tower at Hinchinbrook to a cell tower at Cabramatta Golf Club, which was adjacent to his home at Mount Pritchard. The Crown case was that Rabeih Baltagi and Mr Atteya moved Mr Khaled’s white Hilux to Linne Place on that morning so that Mr Khaled could use it to drive home after he had collected the stolen Range Rover and deposited it in the Hoxton Park Reserve car park for use in connection with the planned shooting of Mr Nazlioglu.
Mr Khaled disputes those facts. By reference to the CCTV footage of Mr Atteya’s Audi and the white Hilux that morning and Mr Atteya’s and Rabeih Baltagi’s phones being recorded as connecting to phone towers in the relevant locations I am satisfied that Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi collected Mr Khaled’s white Hilux from his home on the morning of 24 June and took it to 9 Linne Place where it was parked. I am satisfied that Rabeih Baltagi and Mr Atteya would not have done that except with the knowledge and assistance of Mr Khaled, such as providing the key to the vehicle.
I am satisfied also by reference to CCTV footage of the white Hilux at 9 Linne Place that evening and thereafter at Mr Khaled’s home address, and the movement of his phone records coinciding with the movement of that car that Mr Khaled drove the white Hilux from 9 Linne Place to his home on the evening of 24 June 2022.
The Crown case was that in the afternoon of 24 June at around 2:30 PM, Mohammed Baltagi drove to Mr Khaled’s home at Mount Pritchard, collected Mr Khaled and took him to pick up the stolen Range Rover which was to be used in the murder plan as a getaway car. The Crown relied on CCTV footage of Mohammed Baltagi’s blue Hilux at Mount Pritchard and Mohammed Baltagi’s phone connecting with the cell tower at Cabramatta Golf Club near Mr Khaled’s home to establish the fact of Mr Mohammed Baltagi collecting Mr Khaled from that place at that time.
Counsel for Mr Khaled disputed that the Crown’s evidence proved that Mr Khaled had any role in the collection and the placement of the Range Rover in the Hoxton Park Reserve car park. Counsel relied on records of Mr Khaled’s phone at the time the Range Rover was seen at the Hoxton Park Reserve car park to rebut the Crown’s allegations.
The CCTV footage showed the Range Rover driving on the streets around the Hoxton Park Reserve car park and in the car park from about 5:05 PM. Counsel for Mr Khaled relied on his phone connecting with the cell tower at the Cabramatta Golf Course near his home in Mount Pritchard at the time the Range Rover was in the vicinity of the Hoxton Park Reserve car park, to submit that Mr Khaled was not driving the Range Rover. The Crown case was that Mr Khaled did not have his phone in the Range Rover but had left it in Mohammed Baltagi’s blue Hilux. The records for Mr Khaled’s phone and Mohammed Baltagi’s phone showed that they were both connecting to the Cabramatta Golf Club phone tower from about 4:44 PM (in the case of Mr Khaled’s phone) until 5:05 PM for Mr Baltagi’s phone and 5:06 PM for Mr Khaled’s phone. There was then a gap in Mr Khaled’s phone connecting to phone towers while Mr Baltagi’s phone seemed to travel. From 5:11 PM Mr Khaled’s phone and Mr Baltagi’s phone, by reference to the location-based service (LBS) data, roughly corresponded and appeared to be connecting to phone towers in similar locations. It was the Crown case that Mohammed Baltagi’s blue Hilux was driving on the roads around the Hoxton Park Reserve car park shortly after the Range Rover arrived in that vicinity, and that the blue Hilux then travelled to Linne Place, away from Linne Place and then back to Linne Place, arriving there at 5:36 PM, at about the same time that the Audi returned to Linne Place after having directed the Range Rover to a parking spot in the Hoxton Park Reserve car park. The phone records for Mohammed Baltagi’s phone show his phone connecting with the Cabramatta Golf Club phone tower at 5:05 PM, at Liverpool and Warwick Farm phone towers at 5:08 PM and 5:09 PM and Bonnyrigg at 5:10 PM, when the blue Hilux is said to have been driving near the Bilal Mosque and the Hoxton Park Reserve car park. The location of Mohammed Baltagi’s phone at Cabramatta Golf Club, then Liverpool, Warwick farm and Bonnyrigg does not appear to correspond with the blue Hilux being seen on Wilson Road, Hinchinbrook at corresponding times. However from 5:11 PM Mr Khaled’s phone and Mr Mohammed Baltagi’s phone correspond with each other travelling to Linne Place, Hinchinbrook. It may be that there was a misidentification of the blue Hilux said to have been seen on CCTV footage on Wilson Road, Hinchinbrook as Mohammed Baltagi’s. However, I am satisfied that Mr Khaled’s and Mr Mohammed Baltagi’s phones seemed to be travelling together from 5:11 PM until the blue Hilux was seen to arrive at Linne Place at 5:36 PM. So I am satisfied that Mr Khaled’s phone was at that time in Mr Mohammed Baltagi’s possession.
What is clear is that Mr Khaled was at home on the morning of 24 June, and remained there, with his phone connecting to the adjacent Cabramatta Golf Course phone tower, while his white Hilux went to Linne Place. What is also clear is that Mr Khaled’s white Hilux and his phone, and I infer he, travelled from Linne Place to Mr Khaled’s home after 9:30 PM on 24 June 2022. For Mr Khaled to have driven from 9 Linne Place at 9:30 PM he must have arrived there at some point before then. One possible way for that to happen on the evidence is that Mr Mohammed Baltagi transported him there from about 5:06 PM, and they arrived there at 5:36 PM, consistent with their phones travelling together at that time. However, if that was the case then it would not have been necessary for Rabeih Baltagi and Mr Atteya to have transported Mr Khaled’s white Hilux to 9 Linne Place that morning. I am satisfied that Mr Atteya in his Audi drove to the Hoxton Park Reserve car park and guided the Range Rover to a selected parking spot. Somebody was trusted to bring the Range Rover to the Hoxton Park Reserve car park. I infer that it was a trusted member of the group who was aware of the other participants in the agreed plan and because of the close proximity timewise to the attempted shooting and successful shooting of Mr Nazlioglu, was aware of the planned shooting. In connection with the movements of the white Hilux to 9 Linne Place in the morning from Mount Pritchard and away from 9 Linne Place later that night to Mount Pritchard I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Khaled collected the Range Rover and drove it to the Hoxton Park Reserve car park, and parked it there as directed by Mr Atteya, then was taken to 9 Linne Place by Mr Atteya and thereafter spent some time with Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi, I infer for at least some of that time planning the murder.
Consistent with the jury’s verdict I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that on the night of 27 June 2022 Mr Khaled was one of two people who rode electric scooters and collected the Mercedes from the Hoxton Park Reserve car park after Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi had returned there in that car after having shot Mr Nazlioglu. One of the scooter riders drove the Mercedes to Stante Close and the other scooter rider rode a scooter there. The Mercedes was set alight in Stante Close by those two people, who then rode the scooters to where the white Hilux was parked and where it had been parked earlier that day, and then the white Hilux travelled to Mr Khaled’s home address at Mount Pritchard, with the lid of the tray of the vehicle slightly ajar, from which I infer the scooters were in the tray of the vehicle. I infer that Mr Khaled drove his white Hilux to his home at that time with the scooters in the car, in connection with hiding the scooters. What is in dispute is what the Crown asserts Mr Khaled did earlier that day, which was to take Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to the Mercedes in the Hoxton Park car park in the white Hilux, and drive the white Hilux to Cape Baron Avenue, Green Valley for use later that evening to take the scooters away after the Mercedes was set alight.
I note that sometime after June 2022 Mr Khaled gave his electric scooter to another person, who told Mr Khaled when the scooter was seized by police in December 2022. After being told that, Mr Khaled rang Mr Atteya and arranged to meet him, which they did later that day. That is another fact which confirms Mr Khaled’s involvement with the group who were engaged in the plan to kill Mr Nazlioglu, and his connection with Mr Atteya.
The facts in dispute on 27 June are whether Mr Khaled transported Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi in the white Hilux to the Hoxton Park Reserve car park to the black Mercedes, and did Mr Khaled park the white Hilux at Cape Baron Avenue, in preparation for its use later that night transporting the scooters after the Mercedes had been set alight in Stante Close.
The white Hilux arrived at Linne Place on 27 June 2022 at 3:57 PM and Mr Khaled’s phone was interacting with nearby phone towers. At 4:15 PM the white Hilux left Linne Place. The white Hilux arrived back at Linne Place at about 4:42 PM and Mr Khaled’s phone was at that time connecting to phone towers in the vicinity.
The white Hilux drove into 9 Linne Place before it left at 4:49 PM. The white Hilux arrived at Hoxton Park Reserve car park at 4:51 PM. The Mercedes and Range Rover were parked with one car space between them. The white Hilux appeared to wait for some other cars to leave then reversed into the parking spot between the Mercedes and Range Rover. On the Crown case that was to permit Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to enter the Mercedes without being noticed. Given that I am satisfied to the requisite standard that Mr Khaled had already joined the agreement to kill Mr Nazlioglu, that he normally drove the white Hilux, and that later that night he performed his assigned role of setting fire to the Mercedes, escaping on the scooters and then transporting the scooters to his home in the white Hilux, I am satisfied that Mr Khaled drove Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi in the white Hilux to the Mercedes.
For the same reasons I am satisfied that Mr Khaled drove the white Hilux to Cape Baron Avenue and left it there for use later that night in transporting the scooters after using a scooter to flee from the place where the Mercedes was burned.
The Crown case was that on 26 June 2022, when the aborted attempt to kill Mr Nazlioglu occurred, Mr Khaled performed the same acts as on 27 June, being that he dropped Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi at the stolen Mercedes, which was at a different location than the Hoxton Park Reserve car park, and that he left the white Hilux at Cape Baron Avenue. Mr Khaled disputed that and posited that another person may have engaged in those tasks on that day.
I am satisfied on the evidence of the presence of the white Hilux at 9 Linne Place at various times during the day of 26 June, and Mr Khaled’s phone records placing him there, that he went to and from 9 Linne Place during that day from about 11 AM.
The white Hilux left Linne Place just after 3 PM that day. It had pulled into the driveway of 9 Linne Place before leaving so people entering the car were not visible on CCTV footage. The white Hilux arrived at Daydream Crescent at 3:26 PM. The Crown theory is that during that time Mr Khaled dropped Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi at the stolen Mercedes at an unknown location. It is clear that Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi were in the Mercedes on the M4 at 3:47 PM, but there is a gap in the evidence between the white Hilux leaving Linne Place and arriving at Daydream Crescent. There is an absence of CCTV footage or phone records. It is quite possible given the highly planned nature of the enterprise to kill Mr Nazlioglu that Mr Khaled transported Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to the Mercedes, as I am satisfied he did on the following day, 27 June. But the gap in the evidence is such that I cannot make that finding beyond reasonable doubt.
However, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Khaled left the white Hilux at Cape Baron Avenue just after 5 PM on 26 June, in preparation for the anticipated use and removal of the scooters later that night, in accordance with the plan, as occurred on 27 June, and I am satisfied that he was transported to collect the white Hilux from Cape Baron Avenue, after the failed plan, at about 9:30 PM, and then returned to 9 Linne Place at about 9:55 PM before returning to his home early next morning.
The last disputed task asserted by the Crown to have been performed by Mr Khaled was setting fire to the Range Rover which had been used by Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to drive away to Kemps Creek on the night of 27 June. The Range Rover was set alight at Luddenham, the Crown asserted by Mr Khaled, assisted by Ahmed Malas who drove another car to the site to transport Mr Khaled away. Mr Khaled’s position was that his phone data placed him in the general area at the time, and connecting to cell towers at Luddenham between 11:47 PM and 11:52 PM, but at the time a flash of light was seen at 11:59 PM, submitted to have been the car being set alight, his phone was connecting to cell towers some distance away. The Crown submitted that the flash of light seen on CCTV at 11:59 PM was not the time at which the fire commenced, because the call to the Fire Brigade occurred at 11:53 PM, so that the fire must have been started before then. That seems logical and acceptable, and since Mr Khaled’s phone was connecting to Luddenham cell towers between 11:47 PM and 11:52 PM I am satisfied that he set the Range Rover alight, consistent with his other tasks in the plan and with the Range Rover having been used as a getaway vehicle by Mr Atteya and Mr Rabeih Baltagi the previous night.

Mr Nazlioglu was shot in the car park at his home. The planning for the murder was meticulous and sophisticated. I am satisfied that Mr Atteya was involved in the planning, given his attendance with Mr Rabeih Baltagi performing surveillance of locations and his frequent attendance at 9 Linne Place in the days before the murder, when I am satisfied the planning was occurring. I am also satisfied that Mr Khaled was a party to the planning, by his presence at 9 Linne Place during the planning phase, and his attendance at the car park of Mr Nazlioglu’s apartment building on the night of 18 June to ascertain and, I infer, report back, the location of Mr Nazlioglu’s parked car.
Mr Atteya was present at the shooting, either as the shooter or the driver. Clearly the plan, which was achieved, was to await Mr Nazlioglu’s arrival in the car park, shoot him as he got out of his car and leave quickly, which was done. Therefore, the importance of the driver of the car was significant, and there is a very fine distinction between the seriousness of the role of the driver and the shooter. I infer from Mr Nazlioglu having been shot eight times, including twice to the head, in a confined space, and given the detailed planning, that the intention of the shooter and accompanying driver was to kill Mr Nazlioglu. I am satisfied that Mr Atteya’s motive for participating in the killing was financial gain, although I am not able to find what he was to be paid, or if he was so paid, and loyalty to Rabeih Baltagi. I assess Mr Atteya’s offence as of high seriousness.
Mr Khaled was not present at the shooting. His role in ascertaining the location in the car park where Mr Nazlioglu parked his car was critical to the success of the plan to conduct the shooting where it occurred, in a place where Mr Nazlioglu was confined and unguarded. Mr Khaled’s role otherwise was in relation to vehicles used to transport Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to Rhodes in preparation for the murder, and the getaway Range Rover. So he collected the stolen Range Rover and placed it in the Hoxton Park Reserve car park to enable Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to perform a quick getaway after the successful shooting on the night of 27 June. He transported Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi to the Mercedes in the Hoxton Park Reserve car park on 27 June so they could travel to Rhodes to carry out the shooting of Mr Nazlioglu. He participated in setting alight the Mercedes on the night of 27 June after the successful shooting, and planned to do so on the previous night. He set alight the Range Rover on the night of 28 June, it having been used by Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi on 27 June to distance themselves from the Mercedes which was used to distance themselves from the site of the shooting. I am satisfied Mr Khaled performed all of those tasks with the knowledge that they were connected with the plan to kill Mr Nazlioglu, and he intended that Mr Nazlioglu would be killed. There is no evidence he received a financial reward for his role in the killing of Mr Nazlioglu, and I cannot speculate that he did. His friendship with the other participants was likely a factor in his participation, particularly in light of an assessed psychological condition which I will refer to shortly. Loyalty was clearly important to the success of the plan. Mr Khaled’s role, supportive though important, is clearly distinguishable from that of Mr Atteya and Rabeih Baltagi, and of less seriousness. I assess his offence as in the mid-range of seriousness.

Mr Khaled relies on diagnosed psychological conditions as reducing his moral culpability for his offence. The Crown disagreed.
Mr Khaled relied on the report of psychologist Ann-Marie De Santa Brigida, who interviewed and tested Mr Khaled. Mr Khaled reported to Ms De Santa Brigida that his parents separated when he was aged 10, following frequent domestic assaults of his mother by his father. He said that after his parents separated his mother struggled financially. Mr Khaled told Ms De Santa Brigida that at 17 he was sexually assaulted by a male employee in a juvenile detention centre. I accept this report because of the now notorious frequency with which such assaults have occurred in that environment.
Mr Khaled reported that he commenced drug use with cannabis at the age of 12 or 13, used MDMA and GBL in his late teens, and from the age of 21 used opioids and benzodiazepines. He said that at the time of the offence for sentence he was only taking Valium occasionally and was using medicinal cannabis.
Ms De Santa Brigida tested Mr Khaled for symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) because of his reports of witnessing domestic violence and his sexual assault. He did not display significant PTSD symptoms, so Ms De Santa Brigida tested him for dissociation, because of his behaviour in the assessment and his reported response to conflict in the family home during his childhood. Ms De Santa Brigida found that Mr Khaled’s score indicated a noticeable level of dissociative experiences; he had a high level of absorption which can be a coping mechanism to avoid stress.
Ms De Santa Brigida said that Mr Khaled’s dissociative response may have developed in his early life to distance himself from memories of domestic violence and subsequently from memories of sexual assault, and then he discovered he could easily dissociate from memories of the past by using illicit substances. Ms De Santa Brigida did not say that Mr Khaled is suffering from a dissociative disorder.
Ms De Santa Brigida expressed the opinion that due to Mr Khaled’s tendency to dissociate, he “may be more susceptible to the influence of others; as he tends to become engrossed in activities that revolve around fantasy”. Ms De Santa Brigida also said that Mr Khaled’s psychological conditions make his incarceration more onerous for him than for other inmates. I accept the latter opinion and will take that into account. I also accept Ms De Santa Brigida’s opinion about Mr Khaled’s dissociative response to his childhood and adolescent traumas and that he may therefore be more susceptible to the influence of others. I accept this explains to some extent Mr Khaled’s involvement in the offence; that he was recruited to, and agreed to, perform a more “junior” role in the plan to kill Mr Nazlioglu. That reduces his moral culpability for the offence to a slight extent. Given the nature and extent of his diagnosed dissociative condition, I do not consider that it reduces the need for specific or general deterrence to play a part in his sentencing.
Senior counsel for Mr Khaled also relied on his youth and immaturity, he being 24 years old at the time of the offence. I have not heard from Mr Khaled nor did Ms De Santa Brigida refer to his immaturity. I accept that scientific evidence now supports the view that generally young men do not mature, emotionally and psychologically, until about the age of 25, but in the absence of any more specific evidence about Mr Khaled I am not able to make any finding about his maturity or immaturity at the time of the offence.
Mr Khaled is now 28 years old. He has the support of his mother and his wife Ms Britney Tutton.
His prior record consisted of a possession of a prohibited drug in November 2017, for which he was placed on a good behaviour bond for 18 months in 2018, and an offence of possessing unregistered firearms, including a prohibited pistol, in 2019, for which he was sentenced to two years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 months. His prior possession of firearms is a matter of concern. The sentencing judge sentenced Mr Khaled on the basis that he was a driver and go-between for another person who negotiated to buy firearms.
After the murder offence, in November 2022 Police searched Mr Khaled’s home and found under the house a self-loading pistol on which there was a DNA profile from which Mr Khaled could not be excluded as a contributor. For that offence Mr Khaled was sentenced to 2 years and 7 months imprisonment, which commenced on 19 April 2023, the date he was arrested for the murder offence, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 9 months which concluded on 18 January 2025. That affects the commencement date for this sentence for Mr Khaled.
Mr Khaled accepted through his counsel that a substantial period of imprisonment is appropriate. He asked that a finding of special circumstances be made to reduce his non-parole period, to encourage his rehabilitation, having regard to his relative youth, and because his mental health issues will make his time in custody more onerous and the sentence will be partly accumulated on the sentence for the most recent firearms offence.
Mr Khaled’s prior record was short but his offences with firearms serious. Having regard to a lack of evidence otherwise it is not possible for any finding to be made about Mr Khaled’s prospects of rehabilitation. I have taken into account that his psychological conditions will make his time in custody more onerous in fixing the term of his sentence. I accept there will be some overlap of this sentence and the sentence for the most recent firearms offence. However, given that Mr Khaled’s sentence will be substantial, there will be a sufficient period on parole in the usual term of that sentence for him to focus on his rehabilitation under supervision, without reducing his non-parole period from the statutory ratio. Therefore I have not made a finding of special circumstances.
Mr Khaled through his counsel sought to rely on s 22A of the C**rimes (S**entencing P**rocedure) A**ct 1999 (NSW) (‘the Act’) as warranting a reduction of his sentence for his having facilitated the administration of justice in the conduct of his trial. The Crown disputed that Mr Khaled had done so or that the trial was quick or efficient. Mr Khaled did not dispute and did not put the Crown to proof of his use of a particular phone number or that he was a speaker in listening device recordings. He permitted the Crown to rely on extensive summary documents, particularly in respect of phone records. Most significantly, in my view, Mr Khaled did not object to the Crown adducing hours of CCTV footage of cars with the officer in charge, Detective Phillips, explaining to the jury what the Crown asserted was visible in the footage. Such commentary by Detective Phillips was objectionable. That Mr Khaled did not object to the Crown adducing evidence in that way obviously assisted the Crown in presenting its case to the jury and assisted the jury in understanding the case the Crown was seeking to present. Mr Khaled’s permitting the Crown to do so entailed a significant degree of cooperation. For all those reasons I will take that into account to reduce his sentence. I will not nominate a specific discount but take it into account as part of the instinctive synthesis.
Although no specific submission to that effect was made on behalf of Mr Atteya, he also cooperated with the Crown’s presentation of its evidence to the jury in a similar way and I will reduce his sentence accordingly in a similar way.

Mr Atteya sought to rely on a traumatic brain injury as reducing his moral culpability for the offence and warranting less weight to be placed on specific and general deterrence in sentencing him. Mr Atteya’s traumatic brain injury and its consequences were contested by the Crown, who required Mr Atteya’s doctors for cross-examination and adduced evidence from Dr Sally McSwiggan, neuropsychologist. Because of the extent of dispute between the parties, it is necessary to recount the evidence in some detail.
Mr Atteya relied on a report of Dr Travis Wearne, neuropsychologist, dated 29 October 2025 and a report of psychologist Julie Dombrowski dated 11 August 2025. There were also hospital records of Mr Atteya’s admission for his brain injury and update reports.
The hospital records showed that Mr Atteya was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of Westmead Hospital on 20 February 2011 and was discharged from the ICU on 27 February 2011. He was admitted with a history of having been thrown off his motorbike, for 10 metres, at the age of 17. He was reported to have had an initial fluctuating level of consciousness, but presented to the emergency department with a Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) score of 12 – 14 [out of 15]. He was noted to have no evidence of head or neck injuries and his brain CT was “unremarkable”. He was found to have a dislocated shoulder and a small left pneumothorax (collapsing of the left lung). He was noted as “neurologically he was mobilising all his 4 limbs during first 3 days of his intensive care stay”.
There was a report of a neuropsychological assessment by the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) Clinic, dated 16 June 2011, by Alicia de Vries and Amanda Olley. The report noted that its purpose was to review Mr Atteya’s cognitive recovery in regard to his return to work after he sustained a head injury in a motorbike accident on 20 February 2011, in a collision with a motor vehicle. Ambulance officers found him unconscious on the side of the road with a GCS score 5/15 at the scene and 12–14/15 on admission to the Emergency Department about 50 minutes later. He had a left occipital head laceration but a CT scan performed on admission revealed no intracranial abnormalities. The neurology registrar cleared him of post-traumatic amnesia on 1 March 2011 and he was discharged from hospital on 2 March 2011.
During the assessment on 7 April 2011 Mr Atteya “spontaneously reported several cognitive changes since the accident including poor memory, feeling vague and slower, and a low mood.” The report stated that Mr Atteya’s performance on an initial formal test of motivation and effort was “sub-optimal”. His performance on a subsequent task monitoring effort later in the day was within acceptable limits. He was described as demonstrating inconsistency throughout tests with a lack of persistence resulting in his ceasing tasks prematurely. His premorbid level of intellectual functioning was estimated to be in the low average to average range. Several test results were found to be unusual which might be explained by fluctuations in effort.
The report writers thought that Mr Atteya’s post-traumatic amnesia may have been inflated due to the effect of narcotic analgesics and sedation. That, together with his GCS scores and normal CT scan suggested that he sustained a “moderate to severe TBI [traumatic brain injury]”. His variable performance on memory tests was considered likely the result of poor attention and concentration during the learning phase. His memory appeared intact. It was considered that his inconsistencies in performance were somewhat unusual and had been exacerbated by attentional and motivational factors. He was assessed as having sufficient cognitive skills to return to full-time work.
There was a report by a rehabilitation consultant who assessed Mr Atteya on 5 July 2011. It repeated some of the de Vries/Olley report. The doctor concluded that Mr Atteya appeared to have suffered from a “mild to moderate traumatic brain injury” although that was difficult to tell from his post-traumatic amnesia testing because of his having been sedated.
There were also hospital records of Mr Atteya having been admitted to the Gold Coast Hospital at age 18 in January 2012, after a jet ski collision in which he sustained a lacerated scalp and a bruise behind his left ear.
In Ms Dombrowski’s report she recorded that Mr Atteya told her that in 2011, at age 17, he was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident and sustained injury to his shoulder, back, knees, and head. He told her he was placed in a medically induced coma for three weeks, was diagnosed with a brain injury and underwent several months of post-operative rehabilitation while in hospital (e.g. learning to walk again). He told her he has experienced difficulty with concentration, problem solving, stuttering and emotional regulation since that accident.
Of the psychometric assessment which she conducted, Ms Dombrowski said that Mr Atteya’s responses on a particular test “resulted in an invalid protocol. He reported a large number of infrequent responses … which is uncommon even amongst individuals with genuine and severe psychological difficulties who report credible symptoms. The magnitude of his over reporting rendered the protocol uninterpretable.”
Ms Dombrowski recommended neuropsychological assessment to determine if Mr Atteya had sustained a brain injury. She expressed an opinion that his reported ongoing difficulties with concentration, problem solving and emotional regulation may also be explained by his admitted substance use.
In her evidence Ms Dombrowski said she maintained her report after having heard Dr McSwiggan give evidence. She agreed in cross-examination that Mr Atteya’s responses in testing may have been designed to present himself as psychiatrically affected as he could.
Ms Dombrowski also said in her report that Mr Atteya reported at the time of the subject offending (which offending Mr Atteya denies) he was regularly associating with antisocial peers and using cannabis, cocaine, heroin and nonprescribed benzodiazepines and opioid based medications.
Mr Atteya told Ms Dombrowski that during his childhood his family experienced significant financial hardship and his father routinely physically abused him, his siblings and his mother. This account was supported by a letter from Mr Atteya’s sister Assma Atteya in a letter to the court and I accept that those events occurred. Mr Atteya also reported to Ms Dombrowski that he was sexually abused by a teacher between the ages of 8 and 10, which I also accept as he has consulted solicitors about civil proceedings.
Mr Atteya told Ms Dombrowski he has predominantly socialised with antisocial peers since adolescence and does not have any prosocial peers, although he said his wife is prosocial. He reported using substances – cannabis, cocaine, heroin, benzodiazepines and opioids – to manage negative thoughts and feelings associated with past traumatic events. He had engaged in detoxification at the age of 21, achieved abstinence from drugs for several months at the age of 22, and completed an EQUIPS Addiction program while in prison during his early 20s, although admitted to drug use since then. Ms Dombrowski assessed Mr Atteya as at a ‘high-moderate’ risk of committing further offences, violent or non-violent, within five years. She said his test scores suggested he currently exhibits criminal attitudes and beliefs that support offending, an early history of antisocial behaviour and a pattern of criminal recidivism. She thought there was a nexus suggested between his substance use and offending and between his anger and offending. She assessed him as at a moderate risk of committing further violent offences. She expressed the opinion that his substance use at the time of the subject offending “very likely impaired his judgement and decision making (and disinhibited his behaviour) at that time”.
Ms Dombrowski said that Mr Atteya’s sexual abuse and involvement in a serious motor vehicle accident gave rise to symptoms associated with PTSD, for which he used substances to manage his negative thoughts and feelings and also to conform with antisocial peers. She expressed the opinion that the stressful and chronic nature of his experiences during his formative years likely interfered with the normal development of the frontal areas of his brain and shaped the development of an unstable personality structure which makes him vulnerable to depression and anxiety and an increased risk of engaging in emotionally reactive behaviours and falling foul of the law. Ms Dombrowski said “It was not possible to explore what led to Mr Atteya’s offending because he maintained his innocence. Based on the available evidence, unstable personality structure, antisocial peers and substance use may have all contributed to the subject offending.”
Dr Travis Wearne, neuropsychologist, prepared a report dated 29 October 2025, for which he assessed Mr Atteya over three and a half hours, which included two and a half hours of psychometric testing. Dr Wearne had had access to the report of Alicia de Vries and Amanda Olley from 2011 and the report of Ms Dombrowski.
Dr Wearne took the history of Mr Atteya’s admission to Westmead Hospital after his motorbike accident in 2011 from the report of Ms de Vries and Ms Olley.
Dr Wearne noted from the report of Ms Dombrowski that Mr Atteya’s personality profile was invalid due to over reporting of symptoms.
Dr Wearne obtained a history from Mr Atteya of his traumatic brain injury, incurred as he was riding a bicycle and collided with an overtaking car. He said he was unable to recall any details for days to weeks prior to the accident and he believed he lost consciousness. He was unsure of the length of time between the accident and his waking up in the ICU; he thought it was at least several days to a week and may have been up to two weeks. Mr Atteya told Dr Wearne he was hospitalised for approximately one month and had injuries to his shoulder, back and knees and required significant physiotherapy input.
Mr Atteya said that after the accident he identified difficulties with attention, concentration, memory and anger. He told Dr Wearne he struggled to follow television programs and conversations, although he believed his attention and concentration had improved over the years “but only to a certain point”.
Dr Wearne said that Mr Atteya’s performances on tests of effort administered through the assessment were considered satisfactory, that he appeared to try his best when completing tasks, and he passed three tests and one was borderline. Dr McSwiggan was critical of Dr Wearne applying this “borderline” description to the test; in her view it was inappropriate. Dr Wearne addressed this in his evidence which I will address below.
Dr Wearne said Mr Atteya’s immediate auditory-verbal attention span and his ability to hold and manipulate information in his mind, his working memory, was in the average range on formal testing, which was consistent with premorbid estimates. He said Mr Atteya performed in the extremely low ranges across simple and complex tasks of mental processing speed, all of which were below premorbid estimates. Dr Wearne said Mr Atteya’s overall level of intellectual functioning was in the borderline range.
Dr Wearne said that Mr Atteya was distressed, experiencing ongoing psychological trauma as a consequence of his childhood sexual assault, that he had a mood and/or anxiety disorder consistent with PTSD and a depressive disorder with anxious distress. He said those disturbances in his mood appeared to cause significant impacts on his thinking, judgment and behaviour. It was uncertain whether they were explained by a history of trauma and/or an enduring personality disorder.
Dr Wearne said Mr Atteya demonstrates executive dysfunction on psychometric testing, which point specifically to a disorder of the frontal lobes of the brain.
Dr Wearne expressed the opinion that 14 years post injury, the impacts of Mr Atteya’s traumatic brain injury are now an enduring feature of his psychological profile. He said his PTSD and mood disorder will continue to hinder his cognitive and functional output without treatment and support.
In his evidence in the sentence proceedings Dr Wearne agreed with Dr McSwiggan’s opinion that the “Dot Counting Test”, on which he ranked Mr Atteya’s performance as “borderline” has either a pass or fail result. He said he assessed Mr Atteya’s performance as borderline by qualitative observations.
In cross-examination he agreed that he did not have the Westmead Hospital medical records and relied on information in the de Vries and Olley report. He had not read a report by Dr Walker from 2012. I will come to Dr Walker’s report shortly. Dr Wearne agreed that Dr Walker found very poor performances by Mr Atteya in tests and that his results were extremely uncommon even in people with extremely severe traumatic brain injury. Dr Wearne did not agree that Dr Walker’s opinion was that Mr Atteya was malingering. He agreed that one would not expect someone with a brain injury to perform poorly on the tests on which Mr Atteya performed poorly in 2012. He agreed that poor performance on those tests conducted by Dr Walker would not be reflective of a brain injury and that was not the reason for Mr Atteya’s poor performance on those tests. Dr Wearne agreed that some of Mr Atteya’s results had improved since he was assessed by Ms de Vries in his testing by Dr Wearne but there were a range of results, with some being worse.
Dr Wearne said Mr Atteya’s report to Ms de Vries of a retrograde amnesia of approximately one month was inconsistent with what he would expect for his injury. He agreed that Mr Atteya seemed to have over-reported his hospitalisation and injuries in 2011. He did not agree that that meant that Mr Atteya was unreliable. He described him as someone who is “prone to amplification and catastrophising”. He did not agree that the assessment from Mr Atteya’s neuropsychological assessments were invalid or that he was an unreliable or invalid responder, but he believed there were “concerns and caution regarding the interpretation of self-report”. He agreed, when asked to what extent Mr Atteya is impaired, “we will know that those symptoms are present but we won’t know the severity of them”.
In his evidence-in-chief and re-examination Dr Wearne maintained his opinions in his report.
Is clear from the hospital records that Mr Atteya was not in a three-week coma as he told Ms Dombrowski, or in hospital for a month, as he told Dr Wearne. He was in hospital for about 10 days and the ICU for about seven days.
Dr Wearne did not have regard to reports of Dr McCarthy and Dr Walker from 2012 before he prepared his report. Dr McCarthy prepared two letters to Dr Obeid, apparently Mr Atteya’s general practitioner. She signed her reports as a Rehabilitation Physician at the Brain Injury Rehabilitation Service at Westmead Hospital. Her first report was dated 14 February 2012. She said she had reviewed Mr Atteya in the Westmead Brain Injury Rehabilitation Service Clinic on 7 February 2012. She briefly recounted the circumstances of his motorbike accident, including that his CT scan of his brain was normal. She said:

There was a report from Dr Alexandra Walker, senior clinical neuropsychologist at Westmead Hospital, dated 21 March 2012. Dr Walker recounted the history of Mr Atteya’s motorbike accident, including that he was cleared by the brain injury registrar on 1 March 2011, suggesting up to eight days post-traumatic amnesia, but that his sedation may have increased the post-traumatic amnesia duration. She noted that initial neuropsychological assessment was performed on 7 April 2011 and while his scores on testing were reduced, inspection of scores revealed compelling indicators of poor motivation and effort, such that the results cannot be validly interpreted.
Dr Walker saw Mr Atteya on 20 March 2012. Dr Walker noted that Mr Atteya gave up easily on tasks and after about one hour of testing Mr Atteya stated he did not feel well and did not wish to continue and the assessment was terminated.
Dr Walker said Mr Atteya’s scores on specific testing as well as embedded measures of motivation were strongly indicative of an intentional motivation to perform poorly, rather than accurately, on tests. She said there was a pattern across several tests and measures of motivation to return low scores and an apparent attempt to exaggerate memory and other cognitive difficulties. She said when compared to clinical groups, the scores returned by Mr Atteya on the tests were extremely uncommon in groups of individuals who have incurred a severe or even an extremely severe traumatic brain injury with associated cognitive and day-to-day impairment. She said the indicators of invalidity and lack of genuine effort returned on that occasion were consistent with those returned on the initial testing occasion, confirming that the results are invalid and cannot be explained by the brain injury.
Dr Walker reviewed the circumstances of Mr Atteya’s admission to the hospital after his motorbike accident, including that he had no fracture or brain bleeding. She noted that he was considered by a Dr Chapman (who reviewed Mr Atteya in March 2011) to have had a “mild to moderate traumatic brain injury” [although Dr Chapman actually said in her report that Mr Atteya has “possibly had a mild to moderate traumatic brain injury although it is difficult to tell from PTA (post-traumatic amnesia) testing because of his requirement of sedation.”]
Dr Walker said of the assessment over one year post-injury:

Dr Walker said in conclusion “Mr Atteya is expected to be cognitively capable of working and resuming all former activities. Currently he is unlikely to benefit from brain injury services …”.
Dr Sally McSwiggan prepared two reports for the Crown, the first of 17 December 2025 and a short supplementary report of 22 December 2025. She did not interview Mr Atteya but considered his prior medical records from Westmead Hospital from February 2011. She noted from the hospital material that when brought into hospital after his motorbike accident Mr Atteya had no fractures and his CT brain scan showed no bleed or injury. She noted the assessment that he possibly had a mild to moderate traumatic brain injury. She commented that his one month retrograde amnesia was an implausible duration for a mild to moderate traumatic brain injury. She noted that his premorbid level of intellectual functioning was estimated to be in the low average to average range. She said when interviewed by Ms Olley on 7 April 2011 Mr Atteya’s verbal comprehension skills were below premorbid estimates. She commented that verbal comprehension skills are impervious to the impact of a mild to moderate traumatic brain injury. Dr McSwiggan said that while some other measures which were tested were likely to be affected or disrupted by a mild to moderate traumatic brain injury his unusual pattern of results were hypothesised as “fluctuations in effort throughout the assessment”. Dr McSwiggan considered the first report by Dr McCarthy and the report by Dr Walker, to which I have already referred.
Dr McSwiggan noted that on 30 May 2021 Mr Atteya was the driver in a motor vehicle accident with a GCS score of 15/15 and memory of the event. He was not admitted and had a head strike 3 cm laceration, which she considered indicated some kind of knock to the head.
Of Dr Wearne’s report Dr McSwiggan said that Mr Atteya showed some unusual, inconsistent results.
Dr McSwiggan said that in 2011 Mr Atteya sustained either a mild or moderate traumatic brain injury. She said a mild traumatic brain injury would not be expected to persist indefinitely. Moderate traumatic brain injury is noted for a wide variability of outcomes. Outcome is generally assessed at six months after injury when about 85% of cognitive recovery occurs within that time period, but further recovery can occur later. She said attempts to gauge Mr Atteya’s cognitive outcome in 2011 and 2012 with neuropsychological tests showed variations of such a degree that fluctuations in effort were concluded; his pattern was inconsistent with known brain injury outcomes. She said by performing poorly only on some measures within a cognitive domain Mr Atteya’s inconsistency showed he did not sustain lasting cognitive deficits. She said measures he performed poorly on in 2025 were performed normally in 2011. She said there is no documented history of cognitive decline in areas expected to decline after a traumatic brain injury in 2011. His CT brain scan was uncomplicated. His history showed he went on to have a business in a skilled trade area. She said at 32 years old he continues to show variability in his performance not consistent with a lasting brain injury. He would not likely meet criteria for a current diagnosis of a mild or major neurocognitive disorder.
Dr McSwiggan said that while Mr Atteya is reporting a history more consistent with a severe traumatic brain injury, his medical records from the time show either a mild or moderate traumatic brain injury. She said 14 years later he reports even more extremely severe symptoms of mental disorder and behavioural dysfunction than in 2011 and 2012.
Dr McSwiggan said that records showed Mr Atteya did not sustain a brain bleed or skull fracture. He dislocated his shoulder and was sedated. He was discharged home at day 10 with no rehabilitation needs. From there his report of his injuries became increasingly severe. She said by reference to reports and historical records Mr Atteya’s results showed he has a history of tending to overreport his symptoms and misrepresent his history. She said his history and evaluation showed no lasting cognitive impairment from the event 14 years ago, but his overreporting has been a pattern.
In her short supplementary report Dr McSwiggan said that in the test where Dr Wearne interpreted his performance as “borderline” Mr Atteya’s performance showed “suspect effort”.
In her evidence in the sentence proceedings Dr McSwiggan said, relevantly, the following. She had looked at Mr Atteya’s medical records from Westmead Hospital in February 2011 because the injuries to the skull and brain, the duration of amnesia and other symptoms are important to a neuropsychologist in assessing the severity of damage to the person’s brain. She said that the lack of fractures and that the CT brain scan showed no bleed or injury to the brain, showed that the injury was not in the severe stage and that it may have oscillated between moderate to low to mild. Dr McSwiggan said that the period of retrograde amnesia does not tend to be greater than the period of post-traumatic amnesia except in extremely life changing events, so Mr Atteya’s reported retrograde amnesia for a month was highly implausible with his post-traumatic amnesia for a short duration.
Dr McSwiggan said of the deterioration in Mr Atteya’s performance from the testing by Ms Olley until the testing by Dr Wearne that the expectation would be that a person would be completely recovered 14 years after the injury, that it would not be expected a person would get “worse and worse” 14 years later.
Dr McSwiggan said that by the results of some tests by Dr Wearne, Mr Atteya had improved, which would be the expectation for someone who had not sustained a life changing severe brain injury. She said when he was assessed by the Mild TBI Clinic in 2011 he was still in the process of recovery.
She said that for a decline in results demonstrated by Mr Atteya 14 years after the injury one would expect a moderate to severe brain injury with a brain bleed or skull fracture seen on a brain scan, which are the markers of the severity of an injury. She said brain injury, particularly a mild brain injury, can occur without seeing it on a CT scan.
Dr McSwiggan said the results from the testing done by Ms Olley did not follow a consistent pattern but tended to highlight that there may be some difficulties with effort, that the testing subject may not be showing their true skills. She said Ms Olley believed there were difficulties with level of effort and highlighted that in her report.
Dr McSwiggan said that based on the initial severity of Mr Atteya’s injury, where there was nothing on the CT scan, no broken bones and his GCS score rose fast in the ambulance, then 14 years later, after having had a career as a fairly skilled professional, there should not be any lasting cognitive impact. Dr McSwiggan said there was no doubt that Mr Atteya did sustain a knock to his head in 2011, because he had a haematoma.
Dr McSwiggan said the records of Mr Atteya’s head injury as a result of the jet ski accident in January 2012 did not indicate whether he sustained a brain injury. Of his further motor vehicle accident in May 2021 she said he was not amnesiac. He had a 3 cm cut to his head so he did have a head knock, but his GCS score, which is an indication of severity, was not impaired, but was 15 out of 15.
She was taken to specific parts of Dr Wearne’s and Ms Dombrowski’s report and said she would not disagree with what they had expressed because it was their views. Dr McSwiggan said she did not disagree with Ms Dombrowski’s opinions. She thought there were some aspects of Dr Wearne’s report that she would not necessarily agree with. She said that Mr Atteya had reported the period of his hospitalisation incorrectly, whereas the history is important in terms of staging severity. She also disagreed with Dr Wearne’s assessment of “borderline” on one of the measures of testing.
Dr McSwiggan said she did not re-test Mr Atteya because the invalid test result with Ms Dombrowski showed her there would have been difficulties in terms of assessing the validity of Mr Atteya’s reporting, and that Dr Wearne had done a full battery of measures, for which there were practice effects associated with repeating them straight away, and also from Dr Wearne’s tests she was able to provide an opinion about whether or not Mr Atteya had lasting neurocognitive disorders.
Taking all that evidence into consideration, I am satisfied that Mr Atteya suffered a brain injury in his 2011 accident but he does not have lasting effects of the brain injury such as to reduce his moral culpability for the offence. I am convinced that he has routinely overstated his hospitalisation in 2011, his symptoms since and deliberately performed poorly in testing in an attempt to appear to have ongoing cognitive impairments, which I am persuaded he does not have. Nor did his subsequent jet ski accident in 2012 and car accident in 2021 cause such effects. Mr Atteya sought to rely on Ms Dombrowski and Dr Wearne maintaining their opinions but their doing so was unconvincing when Mr Atteya’s performance on their testing was not genuine, and Dr Wearne did not make concessions about the effects of Mr Atteya’s overreporting and deliberately poor performance in testing by him and historically.
Although Mr Atteya denies the offence, Ms Dombrowski thought that antisocial peers and drug abuse may have affected his judgment and thinking at that time. I accept that opinion and also Ms Dombrowski’s opinion that Mr Atteya misused substances to deal with his PTSD which resulted from his childhood experiences. It reduces his moral culpability slightly for this offence in the circumstances in which it was committed, with planning and precision.
I accept her opinion that Mr Atteya suffers from PTSD, depression and anxiety and I will take them into account as making his experience of custody more difficult.
Mr Atteya’s wife, Grace Sinclair, provided a letter in which she stated the difficulties involved in giving birth to her and Mr Atteya’s second daughter while he was in custody, and raising their two children without him. I take into account the difficulties for Ms Sinclair and her and Mr Atteya’s children from his being in custody, not as exceptional hardship, but as part of his subjective circumstances. A letter from Mr Atteya’s sister, Assma Atteya, confirmed that his family maintain their support of him and maintain contact with him. He is now 33 years old and was 29 at the time of the offence.
Mr Atteya’s prior record contains offences of assaulting and resisting police officers in 2013, 2014 and 2016, a domestic violence assault, some traffic offences and possession of a prohibited drug in 2021, the latter consistent with his admitted history of drug abuse. His record is not lengthy and clearly there is nothing of the seriousness of this offence in his prior criminal history. I have noted Ms Dombrowski’s assessments of Mr Atteya’s risk of reoffending. I am unable, on the material before me, to make a positive assessment of his prospects of rehabilitation.

The Crown submitted that the offence by Mr Atteya requires the imposition of a life sentence.
Senior counsel for Mr Atteya opposed such a course. He referred in his written submissions to decisions of this Court, in one of which, R v Adams (No 7*)* [2017] NSWSC 179, Button J identified features of cases which have attracted life sentences, including multiple murders, cases featuring “some exceptionally heinous act of cruelty, torture or mutilation” and “a cold-blooded contract killing”, although there were then other instances of “contract killings” where life sentences were not imposed. Senior counsel submitted that even if the court found that Mr Atteya committed the shooting for financial gain this did not exclude that he was acting under the authority of and at the direction of Rabeih Baltagi, out of loyalty to him. He submitted that the effects of Mr Atteya being sexually abused as a child and his subsequent substance abuse should be taken into account to reduce his moral culpability, and relied on Dr Wearne’s opinion that Mr Atteya’s involvement with antisocial and criminal peers was symptomatic of his poor thinking and judgment that is commonly associated with his mental health disorders and traumatic brain injury. He submitted that Mr Atteya’s mental health is likely to have contributed to his reasoning at the time of the offence. Ultimately, he submitted that Mr Atteya’s offence would not attract a life sentence.
The Crown submitted that whether Mr Atteya was the driver or the shooter that made little difference to his culpability and the seriousness of his offence. The Crown also relied on Mr Atteya’s motivation for the murder being financial gain and decisions of this Court that “contract killings” are frequently though not always assessed in the worst category of offending.
Section 19A of the C**rimes A**ct 1900 (NSW) provides that a person who commits murder is liable to imprisonment for life.
Section 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) states “A court is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on a person who is convicted of murder if the court is satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence.”.
Section 21(1) of the Act provides that if by any provision of an Act an offender is made liable to imprisonment for life, a court may nevertheless impose a sentence of imprisonment for a specified term.
Section 61(1) was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rogerson v R; McNamara v R [2021] NSWCCA 160; (2021) 290 A Crim R 239 (‘Rogerson*’**). The Court at [623] endorsed the consideration of s 61(1) by Bell J in R v Harris [2000] NSWSC 285; (2000) 111 A Crim R 415 (‘Harris’*). Her Honour said:

In R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557; [2004] NSWCCA 19 Wood CJ at CL, with whom Tobias JA and Hidden J agreed, said at [52] that the primary focus of the section is directed towards how extreme the offender’s culpability is. His Honour referred to the decision of Hunt CJ at CL in R v Arthurell (Supreme Court (NSW), 3 October 1997, unrep) about the meaning of heinousness, which his Honour said was a substantial test.
I have said above that I am not satisfied that Mr Atteya has lasting cognitive impacts of his brain injury. His diagnosed mental health conditions and his drug use at the relevant time, which resulted from his childhood traumatic experiences, slightly reduce his moral culpability for the meticulously planned and carried out offence and his role in it.
Mr Atteya’s conduct in the offence clearly requires significant punishment and a need for personal and general deterrence to be reflected in sentencing him. Retribution, used in s 61, is not a purpose of sentencing referred to in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). In Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267; [2001] HCA 21 McHugh J at [46] said that retribution is “a notion that reflects the community’s expectation that the offender will suffer punishment and that particular offences will merit severe punishment”. Although Mr Atteya coolly planned and carried out the murder of Mr Nazlioglu, nothing in his prior record or the psychological material before me indicates a heightened need for future protection of the community from Mr Atteya. There is nothing in Mr Atteya’s personal circumstances which mitigates this offence, but I do take into account that Rabeih Baltagi was the ringleader and Mr Atteya’s participation in the offence was motivated by his friendship with and loyalty to Mr Baltagi. That was misguided, and it does not mitigate the offence so much as explain his involvement in conduct more serious than he had ever previously been involved in.
As serious as Mr Atteya’s offence was, to engage himself in a meticulously planned and carried out killing of a stranger in part for financial reward, I am not satisfied that his culpability is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met by the imposition of a life sentence.
Mr Atteya’s sentence must commence on 14 June 2023, the date on which he first went into custody in relation to the offence.
As for the commencement of Mr Khaled’s sentence, I have noted above at [70] Mr Khaled’s sentence which commenced on 19 April 2023, the date he went into custody. I will accumulate this sentence by 9 months on that sentence, so it will commence on 19 January 2024.
Mr Atteya, I sentence you to a non-parole period of 25 years, 6 months to date from 14 June 2023, with an additional term of 8 years 6 months. That is a total sentence of 34 years imprisonment. The non parole period will expire on 13 December 2048.
Mr Khaled I sentence you to a non-parole period of 18 years, to date from 19 January 2024, with an additional term of 6 years, making a total sentence of 24 years imprisonment. The non-parole period will expire on 18 January 2042.
I am required to tell you both that because of your offences the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) may apply to you, and I ask your lawyer to explain the effects of it to you.

R v Atteya; R v Khaled

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment

JUDGMENT

Facts

Factual findings about Mr Atteya

Mohammed Khaled factual findings

Objective Seriousness

Mr Khaled’s subjective factors

Mr Atteya’s subjective circumstances

Life sentence for Mr Atteya?

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (7)