appellant. The sentence imposed on 15 May 2020 was quashed. In lieu, AD was sentenced to imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years, commencing 22 November 2017 and expiring 21 November 2027, and a...
Key principles
On the facts of this case, the 14-year aggregate sentence, including its eight-year non-parole period, was manifestly inadequate because it did not adequately reflect the...
The strength of an offender's subjective case, including a deprived upbringing and serious health conditions, must be weighed against the objective seriousness of the offences;...
In assessing an aggregate sentence, the degree of concurrence and the resulting aggregate term may be examined. In this case the concurrence was excessive, and the non-parole...
The delay before detection supported findings about reduced risk of reoffending, but on these facts it should not otherwise have operated in the respondent's favour because it...
Issues before the court
Whether the aggregate sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Whether the sentencing judge gave appropriate weight to the respondent's subjective circumstances.
Plain English Summary
The Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that the original sentence was too low for the combined seriousness of the offending. The case involved many serious sexual offences against eight children, as well as force, threats and abuse of a family relationship of trust. The Court accepted that AD's deprived childhood, health and other personal circumstances called for consideration, but found that the original sentence gave those matters too much weight. The Crown appeal succeeded. The original sentence was quashed and replaced with a 15-year term, including a 10-year non-parole period.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
Deep Dive
2,152 words · generated 30/09/2026
What happened
R v AD [2020] NSWCCA 275 concerned a Crown appeal against sentence, not an appeal against the jury’s verdicts. AD had been found guilty after a six-week trial of 22 sexual offences against eight children. The offences occurred between 1978 and 1987, and the victims were aged between six and fourteen. AD was the uncle of five victims and the cousin of three. The judgment describes him as an elder in their family and community, and records that several children trusted or respected him in that role.
Whether lack of grooming, delay and the victims' trauma were appropriately considered.
Whether the Court should decline to interfere despite manifest inadequacy.
Cited legislation
4 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The offending covered a range of conduct, including indecent assaults and penetrative offences. The evidence described physical violence, threats, confinement in rooms and repeated abuse of some victims. The victims also gave evidence about the lasting effects of the abuse. Their accounts included shame, fear, difficulties with relationships, nightmares, alcohol use and other continuing effects.
On 15 May 2020, the District Court imposed an aggregate sentence of 14 years, commencing on 22 November 2017, with a non-parole period of eight years. The Crown appealed on the sole ground that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The appeal was filed on 11 June 2020, after AD had been told on the day of sentence that a Crown appeal was being considered.
The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal. It quashed the original sentence and imposed a 15-year term, with a non-parole period of 10 years and a five-year balance of term. The new sentence retained the same commencement date, 22 November 2017.
Why the court decided this way
The Court’s central concern was the mismatch between the seriousness of the offending and the aggregate sentence. The sentencing judge had described each offence as “at the very least a serious example of its type”. The Court considered that the resulting aggregate sentence did not adequately reflect the criminality of 22 offences involving eight child victims.
The objective features identified in the judgment included the victims’ young ages, penetration, force, threats and the respondent’s position in the family. Some children were left in his care or treated him as an adult authority figure. The Court did not accept that the relationship was merely incidental because he happened to be the only adult present. N Adams J reasoned that the respondent was an adult male and the children were nearly all under 10, and that they regarded him as an elder or authority figure. The Court concluded that the position of trust and authority was not adequately reflected in the sentence.
The Court also considered the treatment of grooming. The sentencing judge had noted that the offending was opportunistic, involved little planning and did not involve grooming. N Adams J explained that grooming in this context commonly involves preparing a child to be more likely to acquiesce in sexual conduct. But the lack of grooming was not a mitigating feature in this case. The judgment describes threats and violence that had silenced children and enabled the offending. In those circumstances, the absence of grooming did not reduce the seriousness of the conduct.
The totality assessment was another important part of the reasoning. There were 22 counts, eight victims and 10 identified occasions, with some offending continuing beyond a single event. The indicative sentences proposed by the sentencing judge added to just under 63 years, but the aggregate sentence was 14 years. The Court accepted that some concurrency was appropriate, including for offences committed in the same episode. It nevertheless found that the overall degree of concurrence was excessive and did not adequately reflect the distinct criminality involving multiple victims and occasions.
The Court also considered the non-parole period. The sentencing judge had found special circumstances because AD’s health made custody more onerous. The Court accepted that health and the effect of imprisonment were relevant, and that the sentencing judge had a broad discretion in relation to special circumstances. But the Court’s reasons treated the reduction in the non-parole period, alongside the aggregate term and concurrency, as part of the overall inadequacy.
AD’s subjective circumstances remained significant. The Court accepted the findings about his deprived upbringing, his own childhood sexual abuse, his health problems and the likely hardship of imprisonment. Hoeben CJ at CL expressly took account of the strength of that subjective case when resentencing. The conclusion was not that those circumstances were irrelevant; it was that they had been given too much weight in the original sentencing balance.
Delay also required careful treatment. The long period between the offending and its detection supported a finding of reduced risk of further sexual offending. But the Court was not satisfied that the delay should otherwise have benefited AD. N Adams J considered the victims’ evidence about threats, shame, respect for elders and the difficulty of disclosing abuse. The delay, in the Court’s view, was connected to the conduct used to keep the children silent and to the barriers to disclosure.
Finally, the Court addressed the statutory approach to historical child sexual offences. Section 25AA of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) required sentencing according to current sentencing patterns and practices and required regard to current understanding of trauma to children. The Court accepted that the sentencing exercise had to account for both the historical maximum penalties and contemporary understanding of the effects of abuse.
Before and after state of the law
This judgment did not purport to create a new general tariff for historical child sexual offences. It applied established Crown appeal principles to a particularly serious set of facts. The judgment restated that manifest inadequacy is a conclusion and does not require proof of a particular error. The Crown still had to show that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust, while first-instance sentencing judges retained flexibility consistent with proper principle and consistency of approach.
The decision also reiterated that a successful Crown appeal is not automatic once inadequacy is shown. The Court must separately consider its residual discretion to leave the sentence undisturbed. Here, the Court relied on the prompt appeal, the absence of Crown contribution to the inadequate sentence, the fact that release was not imminent and the need for guidance in cases involving serious sexual offending against multiple child victims.
Section 25AA was central to the treatment of historical offending. The judgment explained that the sentence was to be based on current sentencing practices, not those prevailing when the offending occurred, and that current understanding of childhood trauma had to be considered. N Adams J discussed WB v R [2020] NSWCCA 159, which had observed that a low historical maximum penalty may not reflect the fuller understanding now available of the harm sexual abuse can cause. But in R v AD, the Crown had not argued that substantial injury was an aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(g), so that question was not squarely decided.
The decision therefore confirms the importance of examining how the aggregate sentence reflects the offending as a whole. That examination includes the number of victims, distinct episodes, seriousness of individual conduct, totality, and the relationship between the head sentence and non-parole period. It also shows that objective seriousness cannot be lost from view when an offender presents a strong subjective case.
Key passages with plain-English translation
The judgment states that “manifest inadequacy is a conclusion and does not depend on the establishment of specific error”. In plain English, the Crown did not have to prove that the sentencing judge made a particular legal mistake. It had to establish that the sentence, viewed as a whole, was plainly inadequate.
N Adams J concluded that “the sentence imposed does not reflect the objective criminality of the offending”. This identifies the essential imbalance. The sentence was assessed against the actual features of the offending, including the number of victims, the violence and threats, and the respondent’s relationship with the children.
On grooming, N Adams J reasoned that the absence of grooming “could hardly be considered a mitigating factor” in circumstances involving threats and violence. Put simply, where an offender uses force or intimidation rather than preparatory manipulation, the absence of grooming does not itself make the offending less serious.
On delay, N Adams J stated that “the delay in this matter was the result of the threats of violence made by the respondent to the children and a culture of silence in relation to the offending”. The judgment distinguishes between delay as evidence relevant to future risk and delay as a reason to reduce punishment. The former was relevant on these facts; the latter did not follow automatically.
Rothman J’s brief concurring reasons emphasised that the respondent’s own deprivation affected his moral culpability, but that the criminal law also had to protect and vindicate victims. His comments highlight the tension the Court faced: recognising an offender’s background while ensuring that victims from disadvantaged communities receive equal protection.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
The case is particularly relevant to Crown sentence appeals involving multiple serious sexual offences against children, especially where there are multiple victims and more than one offending occasion. It demonstrates that an aggregate sentence can be challenged by reference to the combined effect of the indicative sentences, the amount of concurrency and the way the total sentence reflects the overall offending.
It may also be relevant where the offender occupied a family or community role that gave access to children or caused them to trust or obey the offender. The Court’s reasoning indicates that the assessment of trust and authority is factual. Formal guardianship was not necessary to the reasoning where the children regarded the offender as an elder and he was an adult in a position of influence.
The treatment of threats and delay may matter in cases where victims disclosed abuse only after a long period. The Court considered evidence about why the victims did not report earlier, including fear of violence, shame and community expectations. The case does not say that delay can never mitigate sentence; it shows why the cause of delay matters.
The judgment also matters where the offender’s subjective circumstances are substantial. AD’s deprivation, personal history and serious ill-health were accepted, and the Court took them into account when resentencing. The decision illustrates that these factors may remain weighty without determining the outcome of the sentencing exercise.
How later courts have treated it
The supplied judgment records decisions that were already available when R v AD was decided. It discusses WB v R [2020] NSWCCA 159 in relation to historical sexual offences, low historical maximum penalties and current knowledge of harm. It also refers to Cabezuela v R [2020] NSWCCA 107, Franklin (a pseudonym) v R [2019] NSWCCA 325 and R v Cattell [2019] NSWCCA 297, concluding that none was comparable to the facts before it.
R v Hill [2020] NSWCCA 197 was considered in connection with comparable cases. N Adams J explained that Hill’s observations about the Crown’s failure to provide comparables arose in that case’s circumstances and did not establish a general obligation on the Crown to provide comparable cases in every sentence appeal.
The supplied material does not provide post-2020 decisions applying or distinguishing R v AD. It therefore does not establish how later courts have treated the decision. For a current research task, that later treatment would need to be checked against subsequent judgments and any later statutory amendments.
Still-open questions
The judgment did not decide whether substantial injury under s 21A(2)(g) should be found on the facts. The Crown had not advanced that aggravating factor at sentence, even though the judgment discussed the possibility that current understanding of trauma may be significant in historical cases involving low maximum penalties.
Nor did the Court set a general formula for the appropriate amount of accumulation or concurrency in cases involving multiple child victims. It held that the concurrence in this case was excessive, while acknowledging that offences occurring in the same event may appropriately attract some concurrency. The appropriate approach remains dependent on the charges, episodes and sentencing facts in each case.
The judgment also leaves the significance of delay dependent on its particular cause and consequences. It accepted that the passage of time supported a finding about reduced reoffending risk, but rejected broader mitigation because of the threats and barriers that had prevented earlier disclosure. The decision should not be read as making delay irrelevant in all historical offending cases.
Finally, the case illustrates but does not resolve the broader sentencing difficulty where both offender and victims come from disadvantaged backgrounds. N Adams J invoked Munda v The Queen, including the criminal law’s role in recognising victims’ dignity and protecting vulnerable people. The judgment’s application of that principle is fact-specific and does not remove the need to assess an offender’s individual circumstances.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before you act on this, rely on it, or use any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Catchwords
[1990] HCA 18
Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571[2013] HCA 37
Cabezuela v R [2020] NSWCCA 107
CMB v Attorney-General for New South Wales (2015) 256 CLR 346[2015] HCA 9
Cowling v R [2015] NSWCCA 213
Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321[2000] HCA 54
Franklin (a pseudonym) v R [2019] NSWCCA 325
Green v The QueenQuinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462[2011] HCA 49
Hili v The QueenJones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520[2010] HCA 45
Holyoak v The Queen (1995) 82 A Crim R 502
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357[2005] HCA 25
Munda v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 600[2013] HCA 38
Peiris v R [2014] NSWCCA 58
Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623
Judgment (27 paragraphs)
[1]
rmation is prohibited by operation of s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: District Court of NSW
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Date of Decision: 15 May 2020
Before: Flannery SC DCJ
File Number(s): 2017/354022
[2]
JUDGMENT
HOEBEN CJ at CL: This is an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) pursuant to s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) against the sentence imposed on the respondent by her Honour Judge Flannery SC (the trial judge) at the Sydney District Court on 15 May 2020.
The respondent was found guilty by a jury after a six week trial. The jury found the respondent guilty of 22 sexual offences, committed between 1978 and 1987, against eight victims. He was the uncle of five of the victims and the cousin of three of the victims. The evidence established that he was their elder, a position which carried certain responsibilities. The victims were aged between six and fourteen years of age.
On 15 May 2020, the trial judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 14 years to date from 22 November 2017 and to expire on 21 November 2031 with a non-parole period of 8 years to date from 22 November 2017 and to expire on 21 November 2025 (57 per cent of the head sentence).
On 15 May 2020 the respondent was notified that a Crown appeal was being considered. The Notice of Appeal, relying on the sole ground of manifest inadequacy, was signed by the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions on 11 June 2020. It was lodged that day and served on the respondent in custody on the following day.
[3]
The offences and sentences
Count Offence Year Particulars Maximum Penalty Indicative Sentence
Aged 8 or 9
1. KJK Respondent was uncle
Breach of trust/authority
1 Indecent assault on male 1978 Respondent's penis in victim's mouth (not isolated - happened many other times) 5 years 2 years
s 81 Crimes Act 1900
2 Buggery 1978 Penile anal intercourse on same occasion as Count 1 14 years 5 years
s 79 Crimes Act 1900 (not isolated - happened many other times)
3 Buggery 1978 Penile anal intercourse (not isolated - happened many other times) 14 years 5 years
s 79 Crimes Act 1900
Aged 11
2. RS Respondent was first cousin
Breach of trust/authority
4 Indecent assault on female 1978 Laid on top of victim and said he was going to rape her 6 years 12 months
s 76 Crimes Act 1900
Aged 8
3. MJ Respondent was first cousin
Breach of trust/authority
5 Incident assault on female 1978 Laid on top of victim, rubbed vagina outside clothes, put hands in pants and digitally penetrated 6 years 21 months
s 76 Crimes Act 1900
6 Carnal knowledge of girl under 10 1978 Penile vaginal intercourse on same occasion as Count 5 (not an isolated incident) Life 5 years
s 67 Crimes Act 1900
Aged 6 or 7
4. PS Respondent was first cousin
Breach of trust/authority
9 Indecent assault on female 1978 Had the victim touch his penis while she was blindfolded 6 years 12 months
s 76 Crimes Act 1900
10 Indecent assault on female 1978 Immediately after Count 9 grabbed the victims head and tried to put his penis in her mouth 6 years 2 years
s 76 Crimes Act 1900
11 Indecent assault on female 1978 Immediately after Count 10 moved the victim's hand on his penis and tried to open her vagina with his fingers 6 years 12 months
s 76 Crimes Act 1900
12 Indecent assault on female 1978 Immediately after Count 11. After hitting and restraining her when she tried to leave accused digitally penetrated victim 6 years 12 months
s 76 Crimes Act 1900
13 Carnal knowledge of girl under 10 1978 Immediately after count 12, had penile vaginal intercourse with the complainant Life 5 years
s 67 Crimes Act 1900
Age 9
5. RK Respondent was uncle
Breach of trust
14 Buggery 1979 Penile anal intercourse 14 years 5 years
s 79 Crimes Act 1900 Respondent on parole
Aged 6, 7 or 8
6. TD Respondent was uncle
Breach of trust
15 Indecent assault on female 1978-1981 After grabbing victim and locking them in a room rubbed her vagina with his finger 6 years 12 months
s 76 Crimes Act 1900
16 Carnal knowledge of girl under 10 1978-1981 Immediately after count 15, penetrated vaginal lips with penis Life 5 years
s 67 Crimes Act 1900
Aged 6 or 7
7. CD Respondent was uncle
Breach of trust/authority
18 Carnal knowledge of girl under 10 1980-1982 Penile vaginal intercourse Life 5 years
s 67 Crimes Act (not isolated offending)
19 Sexual assault of person under 16 1982-1983 Digital penetration of complainant's vagina 10 years 3 years
s 61D(1) Crimes Act (not isolated offending)
20 Sexual assault of person under 16 1982-1983 Immediately after count 19 put his penis in complainant's mouth 10 years 3 years
s 61D(1) Crimes Act (not isolated offending)
Aged 14
8. MT Respondent was uncle
Breach of trust
21 Sexual assault of person under 16 1982-1983 After locking them in a room digital penetration of complainant's vagina 10 years 30 months
s 61D(1) Crimes Act (not isolated offending)
22 Sexual assault of person under 16 1982-1983 Immediately after count 21, penile vaginal intercourse 10 years 3 years
s 61D(1) Crimes Act (not isolated offending)
23 Sexual assault of person under 16 1982-1983 Immediately after count 22, penile vaginal intercourse 10 years 3 years
s 61D(1) Crimes Act (not isolated offending)
24 Sexual assault of person under 16 1982-1983 Immediately after count 23, penile vaginal intercourse 10 years 3 years
s 61D(1) Crimes Act (not isolated offending)
25 Sexual assault of person under 16 1982-1983 Immediately after count 24, respondent put his penis in victim's mouth 10 years 2 years, 6 months
s 61D(1) Crimes Act (not isolated offending)
[4]
KJK - Counts 1 - 3
KJK gave evidence in the trial when he was aged 50. Counts 1 - 3 occurred when he was aged eight or nine years in 1978. They occurred in the respondent's home in Barbers Lane when the respondent was looking after KJK and his siblings because their parents were working.
Counts 1 and 2 occurred when KJK was eating some biscuits that were on a bench. The respondent's brother's partner, June, was angry that the biscuits had gone and told the respondent about the biscuits. The respondent yelled and called KJK "a stupid little c---." RD (the respondent's brother) and June left the house.
KJK was taken by the respondent into a room and the door was locked. He was not sure whether something was pushed up against the door or a knife was put in between the beams.
The respondent told him to take off his clothes. The respondent put him on a box or a bench table and then he pushed him against the wall and tried to put his penis in KJK's mouth. KJK was crying. The respondent slapped and swore at him. He told him to shut up. The respondent's penis was erect and that was something KJK had not seen before. The respondent then forced his penis into KJK's mouth (Count 1 - indecent assault). KJK tried to move his head to get away from him but the respondent was holding his head, so he could not move. That happened for a few minutes, during which KJK was crying.
KJK was sitting on the box or bench table up against the wall when the respondent lifted his legs up and put his penis into his anus (Count 2 - buggery). KJK felt pain in his anus when that occurred. The respondent ejaculated on his stomach which was something that he had not seen before. KJK was "horrified, terrified. I didn't know what was going on".
The respondent told him that if he did not shut up "he would tell my mum and dad that I was stealing from him". KJK believed this threat and he did not say anything because he would get into trouble from his father.
KJK said it happened at other times, many times. He said that "I can't say how many times. I know it was a lot" and it would happen virtually every time he went to Barbers Lane.
On another occasion, the respondent put his penis into KJK's anus (Count 3 -buggery). That was a time KJK could distinguish because RD and June came back into the house and the respondent was flogging him. The respondent was swearing and telling him to shut up and then RD and June came to the door and the respondent told them that KJK was "mucking up again".
[5]
RS - Count 4
Count 4 involved the respondent lying on top of RS and telling her that he was going to rape her. RS was one of ten children. She lived on the Bowraville Mission with her mother. Her mother "was a good mum but then she started drinking a lot and started smoking the weed". For a period of time RS went to Stuarts Point School and lived in the Barbers Lane farmhouse with the respondent, RD, and June.
The respondent was a nephew of RS's mother. RS looked up to the respondent and RD as brothers, first cousins and she respected them as elders. That meant that she had to listen to them and do what they told her to do.
When RS was aged 11, she had been watching TV in the lounge room when she got roused on by the respondent. She went into her bedroom and she climbed up onto the top bunk. She lay on her stomach and then the respondent came into the room and climbed onto the top of the bunk and lay on top of her.
Her arms were folded under her chest and she was lying with her stomach touching the mattress. The respondent's head was in line with her head and then the respondent whispered really softly in [her] left ear "I'm going to rape you". RS froze and thought that he was going to "have, like, something like sex" (Count 4). She froze and could not move and the next thing she remembered happening was the door opened and RD and June came into the room and that was when the respondent got off her (Count 4 - indecent assault).
RS said that she did not tell anybody about what had happened to her on the bunk bed. She said it was because she felt shame and just kept it to herself and did not want to tell anyone. She had not told anyone until she told her twin sister in 2000.
[6]
MJ - Counts 5 and 6
MJ is the younger sister of RS. Towards the end of 1976 or 1977, her mother and siblings returned from Townsville to Bowraville. She did not know her biological father. She was one of ten children. The family lived on the mission. Her mother left the kids with other people and her mother drank a lot. Her mother lived a nomadic lifestyle.
Her mother left the four sisters with their cousins at the Barbers Lane farmhouse for a period in 1978. She was eight years old. The respondent was like a brother to her. He was supposed to look after her. He was the authority figure and was like her parent at the time. He was her guardian and a person that her mother trusted.
When she was walking from the farmhouse, the respondent grabbed her and pulled her into his room. He put her on the bed and he started lying on top of her. Her legs were hanging over the bed, he started rubbing up and down like he was having sex and he was touching her down near her vagina area. The respondent's hand was, firstly, on top of her clothing, then he ended up putting his hand inside her underpants. Then he started putting his fingers inside her vagina (Count 5 - indecent assault).
A girl came to the door and was told to go away. Then the respondent locked the door. The respondent unbuttoned his overalls and pulled out his penis. He lay on top of her, lifted her legs up and put his penis inside her vagina (Count 6 - carnal knowledge). After the respondent removed his penis from her vagina, she felt stuff coming down her leg. She sat up and he gave her a towel and told her to wipe herself and go to the toilet. When she went to the toilet she saw blood. There was blood on her legs. Her vagina hurt, as did her legs and her hip, as well. At the time, she did not know what the wet stuff was between her legs.
There was evidence that this was not an isolated incident. There were times when they were swimming in the river that the respondent would "[r]ub you up" and "[h]e'd be touching you under the water".
The respondent told MJ not to tell anyone and "he always threatened us". She understood that she was not allowed to tell anybody about what he was doing to her and her words were "[h]e would bash me. If he didn't bash me he'd bash my sister, [PS], or else he'd kill me or kill her if I told anyone". She believed him when he said that.
[7]
PS - Counts 9 - 13
PS is the younger sister of MJ and RS and she was aged six or seven at the time that they were at Barbers Lane.
PS said that when the family lived in Bowraville, her mother was drinking alcohol, gambling and partied all the time. The children were left with different relatives. PS looked up to the respondent and RD because they were the strong males in the family and they were trusted.
PS said that at Barbers Lane they were treated as "slaves" and that they were "belted every day". PS was down at the vegetable garden when the respondent called her away from the group and they went away so no one else could hear them. He said to her "[d]o you want a hiding or a punch up the c---?". She did not want to get a hiding so she said "[y]eah, I'll do the other thing" because she did not know what that was.
The respondent asked her to play a touch and feel game. He got her to close her eyes and he wrapped his scarf around her eyes so she was wearing a blindfold. He then told her to get on her knees. She did not know why she had to do this so she started getting really frightened. The respondent asked her to put her hands out. When she put her hands out, she was still blindfolded and he put something in her hands which was soft. She subsequently realised that this was his penis. The respondent's penis got hard and he guided her hands down to his testicles. During all this time he was moaning and groaning. PS was kneeling and blindfolded. The respondent placed PS's hands on his penis (Count 9 - indecent assault).
The respondent then grabbed the back of PS's head by her hair and tilted her head back. He was trying to open her mouth to put his penis in her mouth. She had her teeth clenched while the respondent was holding her jaw and trying to open her mouth to put his penis inside it (Count 10 - indecent assault).
As the respondent was trying to get her mouth open, she bit down. She did not know whether she bit his finger or his penis. He yelled out and swore and pushed her back down to the ground. He held her hands and slapped her.
The respondent guided PS's hand while she was still kneeling wearing a blindfold. He was moving her hands with his hands and she could hear his hands moving. He was trying to open her vagina with his fingers and was moaning and groaning and guiding her hands down to his penis. He was masturbating his penis (Count 11 - indecent assault).
[8]
RK - Count 14
RK was in year 3 in 1979. RK is the brother of KJK, TD and MT. He was aged nine. The respondent was in custody from 19 July 1978 until 7 September 1979. The count involving RK happened in the period 8 September 1979 to 31 December 1979 when the respondent was on parole.
On an occasion during that period RK opened the front door to his family home in Kempsey and went into the house to change out of his school clothes. He went towards the toilet area when he heard footsteps behind him. He turned and saw the respondent coming towards him.
The respondent put one hand over RK's mouth and used the other hand to push RK into the bathroom. The respondent locked the door. The respondent pushed RK to the tiled bathroom floor. The respondent pulled down RK's pants and pushed his penis into RK's anus (Count 14 - buggery). RK felt a very sore feeling and was crying at the time. He gave evidence: "[i]t was horrible, it was terrible and he did not care about what was happening to me". The respondent only stopped when there was a knock at the front door.
RK gave evidence that he had tears rolling down his cheeks and face and he was frightened for his father because the applicant had threatened to hurt him if RK said anything about what had happened. After it was over, RK pulled up his pants and then noticed that there was blood on his underwear.
[9]
TD - Counts 15 and 16
TD is the sister of KJK, RK and MT. Counts 15 and 16 were in respect of one incident which occurred between 1978 and 1981, when she was aged six, seven or eight. She was with her parents and her siblings at Macksville during the holidays. She was playing with her cousins in the backyard. When she came into the kitchen to go to the bathroom, the respondent grabbed her from behind and took her into another room. The respondent had his hand over her mouth. He was holding her really tightly, so she could not move. He put a knife into the door so as to lock the door. He pushed her down so that she was lying with her back on a bed. The respondent pulled her shorts and underpants off and started to use his finger to open her vagina. The respondent rubbed his finger up and down her vagina (Count 15 - indecent assault).
TD saw the respondent pull out his penis. He was rubbing it up and down her. The respondent placed his penis onto her vagina and went inside her so that the lips of her vagina were penetrated (Count 16 - carnal knowledge). She saw "white stuff coming out". At that time, she did not know what the white stuff was. The respondent told her not to say anything.
TD gave evidence that when she walked to the door, she was walking in a funny way. She was wobbling because her vagina was stinging. She noticed that her vagina hurt when she had a bath that night.
The respondent was TD's mother's brother. TD gave evidence that she had a lot of respect and trust for the respondent and that he was supposed to protect her. TD gave evidence that she respected the respondent as an elder.
[10]
CD - Counts 18 - 20
CD is the daughter of LD, who is the sister of the respondent. CD is deaf and illiterate. She first obtained a hearing aid when she was 12 or 13. She viewed the respondent as a father figure because she did not have a father. She respected the respondent as an elder. She had to obey what elders said and if she did not do so she would get into trouble. The respondent lived with her in her house. Her mother lived between two houses. When her mother was not living with CD, CD was with her uncle or on her own.
When CD was aged six or seven, she went camping with her relatives and the respondent. Because it was starting to get cold, she and others were sent out to collect firewood. While she was doing this, the respondent approached her and told her to lie down. The respondent then stretched her swimming costume with his hands and put his penis into her vagina (Count 18 - sexual assault). The respondent told CD not to say anything. She obeyed because he was her elder. After that incident, CD felt wet between her legs. Before she jumped into the water she noticed that she had white stuff in between her legs.
Counts 19 and 20 were part of the same incident which occurred in CD's home in Macksville when she was aged eight.
Her sister, VD, and her brother and cousins were at home and it was a time when her "pop", KD Senior, and her mother had gone shopping. She had finished school for the day and the respondent was the only adult in the house.
During a game of hide and seek, she went with her sister into a back room. They hid in a cupboard, her sister on one side and she on the other.
The respondent came in and opened her door first. The respondent said "[d]on't make a noise". The respondent told her sister to leave. The respondent then locked the door behind him and told CD to lie down on the bed. The respondent put his finger in her vagina, stopped for a while, then he pulled it out (Count 19 - sexual assault). CD sat up and pulled her pants up.
The respondent told her that he wanted to try something else. He described it as "our game". He pulled his pants down and placed his penis into her mouth (Count 20 - sexual assault). The head part of the respondent's penis went into her mouth and the respondent had his hand behind her head. After this happened, she washed her mouth out with soap and was crying.
[11]
MT - Counts 21 - 25
MT was the eldest girl in the K family. She lived with her grandmother on the Bellbrook reserve at Kempsey. She is the sister of KJK, RK and TD.
The respondent is her mother's brother. That meant that he was supposed to be a father figure to her as well. She viewed him as a father figure and respected him. When she was a child, she was taught to obey him.
Counts 21 to 25 occurred on the same day. MT was aged 14 and this event occurred in the school holidays in 1982. She was at home, playing hide and seek with the respondent when there were no other children around. When she went to hide, the respondent came over to her and said "[b]oo, I found you". The next thing was that the respondent walked into the room and put a knife into the door. He said to MT "[i]f you don't be quiet, I am going to use that knife".
The respondent pushed her onto the bed. She was scared, intimidated and feared for her life. Her shorts were taken off by the respondent and then he put his finger into her vagina. He put one finger in and then he put two fingers in (Count 21 - sexual assault). She was crying, telling him to stop but he would not. The respondent had sharp nails that hurt her vagina. She kept telling him it was hurting but he continued to get rougher and rougher.
The respondent then put his penis into MT's vagina (Count 22 - sexual assault). The respondent turned her over and told her to get on her knees. The respondent put his penis into her vagina (Count 23 - sexual assault) and she continued to tell him to stop but he would not. The respondent told her to turn over. While she was lying on her back, the respondent put his penis in and kept on thrusting his body up and down (Count 24 - sexual assault).
The respondent put his penis in MT's mouth (Count 25 - sexual assault). The respondent ejaculated in her mouth. Her evidence was that this made her sick and she wanted to vomit. The respondent threatened MT by saying "[i]f you ever open your mouth or saying anything to anyone, I will hurt your grandmother. I'll kill your grandmother". MT took notice of that threat because she had grown up with her grandmother. This was not an isolated incident. There were other times where things happened but she could not specifically differentiate them. She could particularise Counts 21 - 25 because of the threat to use the knife.
[12]
Sentence proceedings
The following matters were placed before her Honour:
1. the Crown bundle (Exhibit A), which included a schedule of references to the evidence about the impact of the offending on the victims;
2. Victim Impact Statements from RS, MJ and PS;
3. written submissions (MFI 1); and
4. proposed Crown facts (MFI 2).
The respondent did not give evidence on sentence. His subjective case was presented in a psychological report of Mr Patrick Sheehan, dated 17 March 2020 (Exhibit 1), medical records (Exhibit 2) and a transcript of a conversation with KJK (Exhibit 3).
Oral submissions were made by both parties by AVL on 1 May 2020.
[13]
Victim Impact Statements and trauma to victims
On 22 November 2019, PS and MJ read out their Victim Impact Statements. The officer in charge of the investigation read RS's Victim Impact Statement. The statement of PS described the devastating impact of the respondent's offending on her, which included a fear of the dark, waking in terror, broken sleep and hypervigilance with her own children. She said that on occasions she could physically smell the respondent. PS said:
"The offender hid behind his cultural status and used this to stop me from coming forth as a young child to inform authorities or other family members. In the Aboriginal community there is a major repercussion that can lead to be shunned and asked to leave our community as we have disrespected our cultural elders. In Aboriginal culture we look after our family and have as strong bond to ensure family are safe and healthy in body mind and spirt, not suffer at the hands of a sexual offenders."
MJ's Victim Impact Statement described the devastating impact that the respondent's conduct had on her life. The abuse impacted her relationship with her mother because she was angry that her mother left her with the respondent. She had intense feelings of self-blame. She felt that she should have protected her sisters. The abuse impacted her sexuality. She has nightmares and cold sweats. It caused her to be a heavy drinker and took away her childhood. She described the abuse as a "dark secret eating me up inside".
RS's Victim Impact Statement described the profound impact of the respondent's criminal conduct on her. She still could hear his voice. She could not trust anyone. She started smoking marijuana. She was filed with rage. She said:
" ..the alcohol got hold of me. The drinking has cost me so much and I blame [him]".
The effect of the offending on KJK, TD, RK, CD and MT was set out in a schedule tendered before the trial judge (Exhibit A, document 9).
KJK gave evidence that:
"Yeah, he took it all away from me. I just shut out, I shut out, shut myself out, ... You try and block things out, push it away, so you can deal with it. And, yeah, that's what I had to do. ...
The person I am today, it's, I know it wouldn't happen today, but it happened, and it's just nothing I can change in my life about that, it's, he stuffed my life up. From the start. ...
Just being a man. Just being an Aboriginal man. I'm looked upon as a leader and for me to talk about stuff like that, it's, it's hard. I don't want people looking at me differently. And I have children, I have grandchildren and I'm just trying to set the right way for them in their lifetime in the future by doing this."
[14]
Findings on sentence
Her Honour found (Sentence judgment 9.5) that "each of the offences was at the very least a serious example of its type". Her Honour noted the ages of the victims, the use of threats for Counts 1 - 3, 9 and 13 - 16 and that they took place in or around the home.
Her Honour found that the offending occurred opportunistically, involving very little planning and no grooming. Her Honour found that the offending against KJK, MT and CD was more serious because the offending was not isolated. Her Honour found that Counts 5 and 6 against MJ were isolated occasions. Her Honour found that on occasions, the respondent used his position as a relative to assist in the offending. Her Honour qualified that finding by noting that he was a young man at the time and this reduced the significance of that as an aggravating factor.
Her Honour took into account the uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 and adopted the observation of Wilson J in RC v R; R v RC [2020] NSWCCA 76 at [254]:
"254 ... It is reasonable to conclude that the respondent, a man of advanced age who suffers from a long-term bronchial condition, will experience a level of stress, anxiety, and even fear at the potentially fatal consequences to him were he to be infected with the COVID-19 virus in prison, that would not be the case for a younger, fitter, prisoner."
Her Honour qualified that observation by noting that the COVID-19 situation was likely to be relevant for only a part of the respondent's sentence.
Her Honour took into account that prison would be hard for an older offender because each year in prison represented a substantial portion of the remaining years of his life and there would be little opportunity for him to live down the shame and disgrace relating to the offences in circumstances where his life expectancy was 71½.
Her Honour accepted that some accumulation of sentences should occur for each offence, although where the convictions arose from the same event or similar conduct, the level of accumulation ought to be small. Her Honour accepted that submission on the basis that the severity of a term of imprisonment was exponential and not linear and that this allowed for a substantial degree of concurrence.
Her Honour noted that the sentence which she would impose would reflect the fact that the preponderance of the offences occurred in 1978 or 1979 and that there were eight victims and that some of the offences were committed on the same occasion and that the onerous nature of a prison sentence was not just a product of its length.
[15]
Subjective features
The respondent was born in January 1958. He was aged 62 at the time of sentence. His criminal record contained mainly driving matters and so did not disentitle him to leniency. Her Honour noted that he was on parole for larceny when he committed Count 14.
He was born and raised on the mid-North Coast area of New South Wales to Aboriginal parents and was the ninth of eleven children. He had been mainly looked after by his parental grandmother, because his mother had passed away when he was young and his father was an itinerant worker. Her Honour found that his primary care givers did not abuse substances but that the broader family did and that alcohol abuse was widespread among that broader family (Sentence judgment 10.8).
He had been raped by three persons when he was aged six or seven, who threatened to kill his father if he said anything. This had a profound effect on him and created hostile views towards Aboriginal people and caused him to harbour homicidal fantasies about murdering his assailants (Sentence judgment, 11.3).
From the age of nine or ten, he stole alcohol and tobacco and drank as frequently as possible. He moved to a remote region when he was aged 15. He did not complete year 10. He had consumed cannabis during most of his adult life. When in his 20s and 30s, he had drunk alcohol daily. He had initially worked as a seasonal farm labourer but had been on a disability support pension since 2008 secondary to physical illness. This was a quadruple heart bypass in 2008 which was repeated in 2009. He had a number of other medical issues including a Hepatitis C diagnosis in 2009, blindness in one eye from a fight in the 1990s and chest pain requiring admission to hospital in 2017.
The respondent had experienced persistently poor health since entering custody in 2017. In January 2018, his diagnoses were recorded as coronary artery disease with a history of acute myocardial infarction and coronary artery bypass grafts. In 2019, he was diagnosed with asthma, diabetes and cirrhosis of the liver. He experiences painful swelling in his legs which interferes with his capacity to walk. He had been using a walking frame for three months before sentence (Sentence judgment 13.5).
Mr Sheehan noted that although the sexual abuse the respondent had suffered had been a source of stress for him over the years, and was possibly related to the present offences in a material way, the respondent was unable to describe the sequelae to those events in a way that would establish a link between them and the symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. Despite those reservations, the trial judge was satisfied that there was a connection. Mr Sheehan thought that the present offences would be consistent with a diagnosis of paedophilic disorder and noted that although the offences occurred 37 years ago, there was not a remission rule for this disorder. He considered that the respondent's history of alcohol use was sufficiently pathological to meet the criteria for "an alcohol use disorder severe in sustained remission in a controlled environment".
[16]
Principles relating to Crown appeals
The primary purpose of a Crown appeal against sentence is to lay down principles of law for the governance and guidance of courts having the duty of sentencing convicted persons. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act the Court retains a residual discretion to decline to interfere with a sentence even though the sentence is erroneously lenient: Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49 at [1], [26]; Bugmy v The Queen at [24]. The Crown must negate any reason why the residual discretion of the Court not to interfere should be exercised: Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen at [36].
A Crown sentence appeal based on a claim of manifest inadequacy of sentence requires the Crown to establish that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust in a sentencing environment where there is no single "correct" sentence, and judges at first instance are to be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with the application of proper principle and consistency of approach: Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; [2000] HCA 54 at [325]; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25; Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at 538 [58].
Manifest inadequacy is a conclusion and does not depend on the establishment of specific error: Dinsdale v The Queen at [6].
Uniformity of sentencing is a matter of great importance in maintaining confidence in the administration of justice. Inadequate sentences give rise to a sense of injustice, not only in those who are the complainants of the crimes in question but also in the general public; they are likely to undermine public confidence in the ability of the courts to play their part in deterring the commission of crimes.
The Court might also conclude that the inadequacy of the sentence appealed was so marked that it amounted to "an affront to the administration of justice" which risked undermining public confidence in the criminal justice system: Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen at [42]. In such a case, the Court was justified in interfering with the sentence.
[17]
The sentence pronounced was manifestly inadequate
The Crown submitted that the sentence imposed was required to reflect the objective seriousness of the offending, to reflect the impact on the victims and the trauma which they suffered. The Crown submitted that the proper application of the totality principle required an appropriate recognition of the objective seriousness of the offending and the harm suffered by each victim. The Crown noted that in this case, there were twenty two offences, eight separate victims and ten specific occasions when offending took place. This did not take into account the offending against three of the victims which was described as continuing over a period of time. The Crown submitted that the aggregate sentence of 14 years with a non-parole period of 8 years did not satisfy those requirements.
The Crown submitted that the appeal should be allowed so as to provide further governance and guidance to sentencing courts. This would ensure that due consideration continue to be given by such courts to the adequacy of sentences imposed for child sexual abuse. This was particularly so when the child sexual abuse involves multiple victims and multiple offences. Such sentences must reflect the high level of criminality of offences of that kind. The Crown submitted that such sentences will usually include an element of general deterrence and should reflect the significance of s 25AA of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).
The Crown submitted that there was a disconnect between the finding by her Honour as to the seriousness of the offending, i.e. that each offence was "at the very least a serious example of its type" and the aggregate sentence. In order to make out that proposition, the Crown relied upon a number of what were said to be errors on the part of her Honour, the total effect of which was to make clear that the aggregate sentence was manifestly inadequate.
The Crown submitted that her Honour failed to have any regard to the complete absence of remorse on the part of the respondent. The Crown submitted that this was particularly striking when one had regard to the sexual assaults which the respondent had experienced as a child at the hands of three assailants and their effect upon him. The Crown submitted that the respondent, more than many others, would have been aware of the consequences for a victim of offending of that kind. The Crown submitted that when one had regard to what the respondent said to Mr Sheehan, it was clear that he had no regard to those matters when he committed the offences, and no insight into the effect of his offending on the three victims who suffered his abuse over a substantial period of time.
[18]
Decision
For the reasons set out by the Crown, I am persuaded that the sentence imposed by her Honour is manifestly inadequate.
The above analysis does not end the matter. Even though error has been demonstrated, the Crown must also satisfy this Court that the residual discretion to decline to intervene and re-sentence the respondent should not be exercised (CMB v Attorney-General for New South Wales (2015) 256 CLR 346; [2015] HCA 9).
The following matters militate against the exercise of the residual discretion in the present case:
1. the respondent was sentenced on 15 May 2020;
2. the notice of appeal was filed on 11 June 2020 and served upon the respondent on 12 June 2020. The respondent was notified on 15 May 2020 that the Crown was considering an appeal. There has been no delay in notifying the respondent or filing the appeal;
3. the Crown has not contributed to the manifest inadequacy of the sentence;
4. the date of the respondent's eligibility for release is a matter relevant to the exercise of the residual discretion not to intervene and here it is not "imminent" (Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen at [43]; and
5. guidance should be provided to sentencing judges in order to achieve a higher level of consistency in the sentencing range for separate incidents involving serious levels of sexual offences against multiple victims, who are children. This Court is also required to set the appropriate level of notional accumulation of the indicative sentences that might otherwise be thought to apply in such a matter.
It follows that I have concluded that the residual discretion to decline to intervene in this sentence should be not be exercised.
[19]
Re-sentence
Apart from the matters to which the Crown has made specific reference, there was no challenge to the other findings by her Honour. Accordingly, when re-exercising the sentence discretion, I accept the findings of fact by her Honour and in particular the strength of the respondent's subjective case. This has regard to his present health difficulties, how they will impact on him while in prison and the substantial reduction in moral culpability which must flow from his deprived upbringing.
In carrying out the re-sentencing exercise, I have had regard to the up to date material in relation to the respondent's health set out in his affidavit of 14 September 2020 and that of the solicitor from Legal Aid, David Mulligan, of 11 September 2020. Mr Mulligan's affidavit has annexed to it copies of records produced by Justice Health relating to the respondent.
It is clear from that material that as anticipated in the sentence proceedings, the respondent's health has deteriorated while he has been in custody. However, none of the specific conditions is directly life threatening other than his heart condition which was always the most serious of his ailments. It is largely as a result of that material that the proposed increase in sentence has been, in all the circumstances, comparatively modest.
Moreover, there is no need to adjust the indicative sentences proposed by her Honour. The complaint made by the Crown was not so much about their adequacy but the failure of the aggregate sentence to reflect those indicative sentences.
Having regard to those matters, the sentence which I would impose is imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years and a balance of term of 5 years. Accordingly, the orders which I propose are as follows:
1. The sentence imposed by Judge Flannery SC on 15 May 2020 is quashed.
2. In lieu thereof, the respondent is sentenced to imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years, commencing 22 November 2017 and expiring 21 November 2027, with a balance of term of 5 years expiring 21 November 2032.
ROTHMAN J: I have had the considerable advantage of having read the draft reasons for judgment of Hoeben CJ at CL, and the concurring reasons of N Adams J. I agree with each of them and with the orders proposed by Hoeben CJ at CL.
The respondent to this Crown appeal had a devastatingly deprived background and childhood. He was the victim of sexual abuse as a child. This affects his moral culpability, but, as a consequence, he is aware of the profound life-long trauma that it usually causes.
[20]
Failure of sentence to adequately reflect the criminality
The finding of objective seriousness made by the sentencing judge was as follows:
"Each offence is at the very least a serious example of its type, having regard to the nature of the assaults, the degree of force or coercion they involved, the age of each of the victims, the use of the threats in respect of counts 1 to 3, 9 and 13, and 14 to 16, and the fact that the offences took place in or around the home.
Despite the Crown's submission to the contrary in respect of some of the counts, I do accept that the offences were committed opportunistically, involved very little planning and did not involve any grooming."
(Emphasis added.)
Her Honour had earlier noted Mr Evers' submission that:
"…it was something of a futile exercise to place each offence at a particular point in a range. However, he did submit that it was relevant that each count appeared to have involved opportunistic and spontaneous conduct with very little planning, and that there was no evidence of grooming."
(Emphasis added.)
Although all of the offences were serious, some were undoubtedly more serious than others. The sole offence against MJ was a threat to "rape" her, whereas the offences against some of the other children were penile-anal penetration of young boys causing bleeding and penile-vaginal intercourse with young girls causing, on occasion, bleeding. In addition, her Honour observed that the offences committed against JK, TD and CD were more serious because they were not isolated. Given the different aggravating features for the different offences, it is to be inferred that when her Honour described them globally as being serious "at the very least" her Honour meant that they ranged from "serious" upwards. This would be consistent with the submissions put to her by Mr Evers (extracted below at [146]) that the offences were "extremely serious". The Crown submitted that the aggregate sentence imposed did not reflect the seriousness of the offending behaviour.
It is well established that matters relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of an offence of sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years of age include how the offences took place, over what period of time, with what degree of force or coercion, the use of threats or pressure before or after the offence to ensure the victim's compliance with the demands made and subsequent silence, and any immediately apparent effect on the victim: R v AJP (2004) 150 A Crim R 575 at [25], per Simpson J. It was no doubt based on these factors that her Honour found that the offences were "at the very least serious".
[21]
Totality principle
The respondent stood to be sentenced on 22 offences on eight victims over ten occasions. The maximum penalties were as follows:
1. Counts 6, 13, 16 and 18: life imprisonment;
2. Counts 2,3 and 14: 14 years imprisonment;
3. Counts 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25: 10 years imprisonment;
4. Count 4, 5, 9, 10, 11,12 and 15: 6 years imprisonment;
5. Count 1: 5 years imprisonment.
Her Honour imposed an aggregate sentence. The indicative sentences were as follows:
1. Counts 2, 3, 6, 13, 14, 16 and 18: 5 years imprisonment:
2. Counts 19, 20, 22, 23 and 24: 3 years imprisonment:
3. Counts 21 and 25: 30 months imprisonment;
4. Count 10: 2 years imprisonment;
5. Count 5, 21 months imprisonment;
6. Counts 9,11, 12,15 12 months imprisonment;
7. Count 4: 2 months imprisonment.
This Court has held that it is permissible to have regard to notional accumulation and concurrence on appeal to this Court alleging either manifest excess or inadequacy in relation to an aggregate sentenced imposed under s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("Sentencing Act") (see eg Berryman v R [2017] NSWCCA 297). Given that the indicative sentences totalled just under 63 years, the Crown submitted that there was an excessive amount of concurrence in this matter.
The respondent submitted that the level of accumulation and totality was appropriate in the circumstances. This was because the 22 counts related to only 10 separate events. It was submitted that it would have been appropriate to make all counts referable to the same event completely concurrent and in this way the aggravating factors requiring denunciation could be reflected in one sentence imposed for each event without need for further accumulation. It was conceded on behalf of the respondent that the fact that there were eight different victims called for sentences that reflected a substantial degree of accumulation, but it was contended that the aggregate sentence imposed reflected the total criminality of the respondent's offending.
Not only was there significant concurrence as between the separate offences, a very generous finding of special circumstances was made by her Honour under s 44(2) of the Sentencing Act. After imposing an aggregate sentence of 14 years imprisonment, her Honour varied the statutory ratio to 57% on the basis of the respondent's poor health (a factor which had already formed part of her Honour's reasons for ameliorating the head sentence). It is accepted that her Honour had a broad discretion in relation to this finding of special circumstances. But the non-parole period reflects the minimum period the offender must spend in custody having regard to the purposes of punishment and objective and subjective features of the case: Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525 at 537; [1990] HCA 18; Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623; [1974] HCA 26 at 628. From the victim's perspective in the present matter, the respondent was sentenced to only one year in prison in relation to each of them.
[22]
Delay
The question of delay was a significant feature in the sentencing process and was treated as one favouring the respondent. Her Honour's reasons reflect that the following submission was put to her on the relevance of delay by Mr Evers at sentence:
"In his submission although [AD's] offending behaviour was extremely serious, there were reasons why the sentence should be shorter than it otherwise would be. They were; the delay between the offending and sentence so that general deterrence and denunciation can be reflected in the fact that a sentence of imprisonment will now be imposed rather than in its length; the gap between offending is such that the sentence need give very little weight to specific deterrence and community protection."
(Emphasis added.)
Her Honour went on to make the following finding on this issue:
"I agree with Mr Evers that having regard to [AD's] age, the time since his offending without further similar offences and the time into the future that he will have to spend in custody, the likelihood of his reoffending in a similar fashion is reduced and so there is less need for the sentence to reflect a substantial measure for specific deterrence or the protection of the community."
The respondent submitted in this Court that the delay in this matter caused detriment to him and was, thus, a mitigating factor. It was acknowledged by Mr Evers that the factor of delay is less likely to be a mitigating factor in child sexual assault cases, but it was submitted that those cases were distinguishable in this case.
I am not satisfied that this was a clear case in which the factor of delay ought to have operated solely in favour of the respondent. Cases where delay has been found to be a mitigating factor have included those where conduct on the part of the prosecuting authorities has caused the applicant to remain in a state of "uncertain suspense" such as The Queen v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 at 519 or where there has been extra-curial punishment via the media, as occurred in Holyoak v The Queen (1995) 82 A Crim R 502. ("Holyoak") However, as Allen J noted in Holyoak:
"...[a]t the other extreme the offender may have gone through the years untroubled by his offences, lacking any remorse in respect of them and feeling confident that they will never come to light because the victim never would be prepared to talk about them, his confidence increasing as the years went by with his victim remaining silent - the offender enjoying over the many years unwarranted acceptance by his associates in his respectable and stable lifestyle."
The respondent submitted that this case could be distinguished from the observation by Allen J in Holyoak because the respondent went on to live his life on the "margins of society", rather than enjoying acceptance by his peers and a stable lifestyle. The difficulty with this submission is that there was no evidence before the Court that the respondent did not live his life with the acceptance of his peers.
A second difficulty in relying upon delay as a mitigating factor is that it ignores the reason for the delay in this matter. The victims all gave evidence as to why they did not come forward sooner. KJK did not complain because he had been threatened by the respondent and had been taught to respect his elders who, he said, are treated like "God" in the Aboriginal community. RS did not complain because she felt shame. MJ did not complain because she knew the respondent would "bash" or kill her or her sister if she did so. To compound this, when MJ did finally tell her mother at the age of 12, her mother did not believe her and punched her in the mouth for lying. PS did not complain because she believed that the respondent would "bash" her brother and the respondent. TD did not complain because she respected the respondent as an elder and trusted him. MT did not complain because the respondent threatened her by telling her that if she ever told anyone he would hurt her grandmother. A number of the victims gave evidence that they felt pressured not to disclose the child sexual abuse in their Aboriginal community. The delay in this matter was the result of the threats of violence made by the respondent to the children and a culture of silence in relation to the offending.
[23]
Impact on the victims
The Crown submitted that the aggregate sentence imposed does not reflect the impact on the victims' health and wellbeing as described by them in their evidence and at sentence.
Following the Royal Commission into Institutional Sexual Abuse, on 31 August 2018, s 25AA of the Sentencing Act commenced. It is, relevantly, in these terms:
(1) A court must sentence an offender for a child sexual offence in accordance with the sentencing patterns and practices at the time of sentencing, not at the time of the offence.
…..
(3) When sentencing an offender for a child sexual offence, a court must have regard to the trauma of sexual abuse on children as understood at the time of sentencing (which may include recent psychological research or the common experience of courts).
Her Honour was required to sentence the respondent under s 25AA. In order to meet the requirements of s 25AA(3), the Crown tendered material from the Final Report published by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. It was not submitted before her Honour that it was an aggravating feature of the offending that the "injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was substantial": s 21A(2)(g). Rather, the aggravating factors relied upon were confined to the fact that the offences had been committed in the home (s 21A(2)(eb)), and that the respondent abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim (s 21A(2)(k)).
Her Honour's finding on the issue of victim trauma was as follows:
"In the sentence proceedings PS and RS and MJ read statements they had prepared in which they detailed the significant effect upon them of the offender's abuse. I have also had regard to the transcript extracts provided by the Crown which refer to the impact of the abuse on KK, TD, RK, CD and MT.
The Crown also referred me to Volume 3 of the Final Report of the Royal Commission into Institutional Child Sexual Abuse which outlines the effects of trauma on a child's development which 'can shape their health and wellbeing throughout their life' and includes affecting the ability to form secure childcare giving attachments and interpersonal relationships, causing lasting changes in the endocrine, automatic and central nervous systems, and disrupting the capacity to emotionally regulate.
Each of the victims has described how the abuse has affected their health and wellbeing throughout their lives in ways consistent with what the Royal Commission found. I take those matters into account pursuant to s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act."
[24]
Lack of remorse
At the hearing of this appeal, the Crown pointed to the lack of remorse shown by the respondent as another feature militating against leniency. This is a striking feature of this case. The respondent maintained his innocence at sentence and, in the face of an overwhelming Crown case, all eight victims were required to give evidence of the details of his offending at trial. That was clearly his legal right and lack of remorse is not an aggravating factor. But this approach by the respondent was surprising for two reasons.
The first reason why the lack of remorse in this matter is striking is because admissions were made by the respondent in a recorded conversation, pursuant to a warrant, between the victim KJK and the respondent on 17 October 2017 prior to his arrest. This recording was before the jury at the trial. After some small talk KJK introduced the topic by suggesting that his mother had asked KJK to talk to the respondent. He then said this to the respondent:
"You see, this is what she asked me to ask you, why, why did you do that to me years ago? I dunno why Mum said it, but she said that to me."
After some further exchanges the respondent said:
"R: Well unc, at that time I was probably young and stupid, you know, and didn't even realise what I was doin'."
KJK: Like a lot of people?
R: Yes. You know? I was sorry about that."
Later the respondent said to him:
"R: ...The things I done years ago, right, I was young and stupid, I didn't realise what I was doin'. Right?
KJK: You did.
R: I didn't mean to do it.
KJK: But you made me, you forced sex with me, unc.
R: I know I did, uncle, and I did not mean to do that." (Emphasis added.)
KJK then told the respondent that he had idolised him as a "kid" to which the respondent disclosed the following:
"R: ..because when I was a kid (XXXX) raped me.
KJK: Who?
R: (XXXX) Right?.......not only me there's other fellas in the family he raped too.
KJK: But if we don't make a stop on his, unc---...it's gunna keep goin'."
KJK then told the respondent that he wanted to tell people before but he could not because he was too frightened, to which the respondent replied:
"Yep. Righto, this is where it all come from, that (XXXX) stuff. It's not only happened to me, it happened other people in, people in the family. Right? Even old (XXXX)..."
Later in the conversation the respondent stated:
"Back then I had, I did not mean to do anything wrong. I dunno…like I said, because in my head, maybe (XXXX) put it in my head 'cause every time I, I stayed on that farm for 13 years, working on that farm and I copped it. I couldn't tell Aunty (XXXX) because I didn't know how to talk to her."
[25]
Comparable cases
The Crown attached a schedule of cases to its written submissions said to be comparable to this case. It would appear that this was in response to the observations of Price J (with whom Garling and Wright JJ agreed) in R v Hill [2020] NSWCCA 197 at [100]-[101] that:
"The Director did not rely on previously decided cases so as to provide a yardstick against which the sentences indicated by the judge could be measured or as illustrative of approaches taken by other sentencing judges.
The Director's failure to provide this Court with any comparable cases for offences against s 86(2) of the Crimes Act and for offences against s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act was surprising and did not assist the Director's case."
Price J made those observations in the particular circumstances of that case. I do not consider his Honour to have laid down any rule that the Crown is routinely obliged to provide comparable cases in every Crown appeal. In some cases no comparable cases will be available. This is one of those cases. The cases provided by the Crown pertained to both single and multiple victims but none could be said to be similar to the objective and subjective features of this case. The Crown also drew the Court's attention to three appeals to this Court since the commencement of s 25AA: Cabezuela v R [2020] NSWCCA 107, Franklin (a pseudonym) v R [2019] NSWCCA 325 and R v Cattell [2019] NSWCCA 297. None of them could be said to be comparable to the present case.
[26]
Conclusion
For these reasons, I am satisfied that the sentencing discretion miscarried and a manifestly inadequate sentence was imposed. Although this was a difficult sentencing exercise, the respondent's strong subjective case caused inadequate weight to be given to the objective seriousness of the offending: Regina v Rushby [1977] 1 NSWLR 594; Regina v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349.
I am also satisfied that the Crown has established that the residual discretion should not be exercised in this matter: CMB v Attorney General for NSW (2015) 256 CLR 346; [2015] HCA 9. The respondent submitted that one reason why the discretion should be exercised is because no further guidance is needed with respect to principles involving serious sexual offences against multiple victims. I disagree. The fact that there are no comparable cases to the respondent's matter suggests the contrary.
This case concerns the issues considered by the High Court in Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 ("Munda"), as to how the court approaches the sentencing exercise when both the offender and the victims come from a disadvantaged background, as the respondent and victims did in this matter. As the court observed in Munda at [54], the role of the criminal law is, inter alia:
"...to recognise the long-standing obligation of the state to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community's disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence."
It is necessary for this Court to recognise the importance of this principle in the present case and other matters in which Aboriginal children have been sexually assaulted and to confirm that, if such victims can overcome the barriers to reporting such matters, the sentence imposed will vindicate their dignity.
Further factors relied upon by the respondent as militating in favour of the residual discretion being exercised included the fact that the sentence is a lengthy one on a man in his early 60s with health issues and that the sentence imposed on him will be more onerous than had it been imposed shortly after the commission of the offences.
I have had regard to these factors and weighed them against the matters summarised by Hoeben CJ at CL at [112] above. I am satisfied that this is not an appropriate case in which to exercise the residual discretion for the reasons enumerated by his Honour.
[27]
Endnote
Munda v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 at [53], CLR 619.
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Decision last updated: 30 May 2024
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
R
Respondent/Defendant:
AD
Legislation Cited (4)
Crimes Amendment (Sexual Procurement or Grooming of Children) Act 2007(NSW)
The sentence imposed on 15 May 2020 was quashed. In lieu, AD was sentenced to imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years, commencing 22 November 2017 and expiring 21 November 2027, and a balance of term of five years expiring 21 November 2032.
Counts 1 - 3 were not isolated. Similar events would occur virtually every time the respondent had the opportunity. After the occurrence of Counts 1 and 2, KJK started to wet himself. He also needed to go to the doctor about his anus.
The respondent was KJK's uncle, his mother's youngest brother. KJK said "Spiritually, in my culture, we, from day dot, we're taught to respect our elders. It's a, you know, they're treated like God to us, and we just, yeah, we just, we've got a, it's just about respect when it comes to elders in our tradition". (This was a reference to the Aboriginality of the respondent and all of his victims.)
The respondent was in a position of trust as an uncle and a position of authority as an elder. At the time of Counts 1 - 3, KJK was in the care of the respondent.
KJK did not complain because he was frightened and "[b]ecause, as I said before, in our culture you grow up respecting your elders". He explained that he tried to block things out, he tried to push it away so he could deal with it.
MJ gave evidence about trying to tell her mother when she was aged about 12. Her mother told her to "[s]hut up and that I was lying and she punched me in the mouth". MJ said that after that happened, she was very scared and she did not say anything.
MJ gave evidence that she was supposed to protect her sister (PS). She blamed herself for failing to do so. She said "I didn't know then but I know now. I feel very ashamed". She said "[i]t's hard to talk about everything, like, what happened. I don't want to be here. I don't want to talk about it".
PS was really frightened. The respondent could not get her pants off because she was moving and kicking too much. The respondent was bigger than her and she was kicking and yelling and she started screaming. When she did that he slapped her more. He slapped her and then settled in between her legs and let go of her hands to take off her pants fully. He spread her legs wider and he was trying to open her vagina. He then put his fingers inside her vagina (Count 12 - indecent assault).
The respondent was spreading PS's legs more and more. She was stunned from the hits she had received. She was seeing stars. She was crying and could feel his penis on her thigh and groin. She then felt immense pressure and pain when he put his penis inside her vagina (Count 13 - carnal knowledge). She yelled out and he hit her. She felt burning, stinging and pain. The respondent started moving in and out. PS had the blindfold on the whole time and was lying there in fear.
The respondent told her not to say anything to anyone because no one would believe her. He said that he would bash her brother and would hurt her other sisters. PS went into the house and had a shower. She was bruised, shaking and crying. She cleaned herself up because she did not know what else to do. PS was bleeding and had pain in her vagina area. She believed that the respondent would bash her brother because the respondent was one of the strong males in the family. Everyone listened to them or they would be bashed.
PS gave evidence that the first time that she told anyone about what happened was when she made her statement in 2010 to a detective.
Counts 18 - 20 were not isolated. CD gave evidence of other times that the respondent would come into her room and get into her bed in her home. The reason she did not tell anyone was that she felt ashamed, embarrassed and did not want her partner to look at her differently.
TD gave evidence that the respondent was her mother's brother and the significance of that for her was that "He broke my heart". She did not call out for help when the offending occurred:
"Because I was frightened and scared. ...
Because he was my uncle and he did this to me. He's my elder. He should have he should have respected me as well. He's my uncle. He was my uncle."
RK gave evidence:
"I blocked it all out because I ended up being an alcoholic. So I've been drinking since the age of ten or -- because I tried to block it out, so like I'm 50 next year, so all those years I've been an alcoholic".
CD gave evidence that she did not tell anyone about what happened because she was "ashamed, embarrassed, and I didn't want my partner, that I live with now, to look at me different. CD said that she has nightmares and her husband cannot sleep with her.
Her Honour found that condign punishment was required for grave and repeated sexual offences committed against children, particularly by a person in a position of trust and authority. Her Honour noted that the sentences must be in accordance with sentencing patterns at the time of sentencing and regard must now be had to the understanding of the trauma of sexual abuse on children which emerged from the Final Report of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (MFI 3, Sentence judgment 19.8).
Her Honour noted that although general deterrence had a lesser role to play because of the respondent's deprived background, it was still of some significance so as to ensure that others, particularly those who were in a position of trust or authority do not offend in a similar way.
Mr Sheehan considered that the respondent's history supported a diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder, although to what extent he was conduct disordered in childhood was obscured by his limitations as a historian. Mr Sheehan noted that the respondent's offending appeared to have been attenuated in his late 40s, which was consistent with the course of an anti social personality disorder (Sentence judgment 14.2).
In relation to remorse, Mr Sheehan noted that the respondent denied many of the offences and although he admitted some behaviour against one of the male victims, he denied penetrating him. In respect of that victim, the respondent told Mr Sheehan that he did not know why he did it and that he asked himself that question every day "Maybe I just wanted to know what it felt like. It probably affected him the same as it affected me when it happened to me" (Sentence judgment 14.7). Her Honour noted Mr Sheehan's assessment that the respondent was at average risk of re-offending. On that issue, Mr Sheehan took into account that the respondent had spent the last 34 years unsupervised in the community without further sexual offending (Sentence judgment 14.9).
In addition her Honour made these additional findings:
1. there was a reduced likelihood of re-offending in a similar fashion and less need for specific deterrence or protection of the community because of the respondent's age, the time that had passed since the offending without further instances and the length of his sentence;
2. the respondent had a background of profound deprivation as described in Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 such that his moral culpability was reduced and there was less need for general deterrence and denunciation;
3. there was a link between the respondent's own sexual abuse, which had a profound effect on him, and his offending at least against KJK (Counts 1 - 3); and
4. the respondent's custody would be more onerous due to his medical conditions and was the basis for a finding of special circumstances.
I agree with the Crown submission that her Honour erred in failing to have regard to the respondent's lack of remorse in respect to any of the offences. The exchange between the respondent and Mr Sheehan at [24] of his report is particularly chilling:
"24 During interview, [AD] denied much of his offences consistent with his plea. He did make some limited admission regarding sexual behavior against one of the male victims saying "I laid on him. I never penetrated him". When asked what had motivated his behaviour he said "I don't know why I did it. I ask myself the same questions every day. Maybe I just wanted to know what it felt like. It probably affected him the same as it affected me when it happened to me."
If there were any doubt about the absence of remorse and contrition on the respondent's part, the callousness of those comments would determine that matter beyond doubt.
The Crown submitted that although the appeal was against the aggregate sentence, regard had to be had to the indicative sentences and the part they played in producing the aggregate sentence. The Crown submitted that when that exercise was carried out with the indicative sentences, it was obvious that a very substantial amount of notional concurrency had been involved to produce the aggregate sentence. The Crown submitted that, given the effect on the victims in relation to which there was no challenge in the sentence proceedings, it was again obvious that there was a significant disconnect between the objective seriousness of the offending and the aggregate sentence. This was so when regard was had to the observation of her Honour:
"[The court] … must have regard to the Court's present understanding of the trauma of sexual abuse on children …" (Sentence judgment 19.9)
The Crown submitted that the aggregate sentence was well below the legislative guideposts which the maximum sentences available for these offences represented. The Crown submitted that by fixing maximum penalties, such as life imprisonment, the parliament had made it clear how serious these offences were. In this case, four of the offences had maximum penalties of life imprisonment with others having maximum terms of 14 and 10 years. The Crown submitted that against that background the aggregate sentence inadequately took into account the life long psychological effects brought about by offences of this kind on young and vulnerable children. This was evident when regard is had to the high level of violence which accompanied these offences, i.e. punches and the use of brute strength by a male in his twenties against children who except in two cases only, were all under the age of 10.
The Crown submitted that while full weight had to be given to the background of violence and deprivation in which the respondent was raised and to the consequent reduction in his moral culpability, regard still had to be had to the objective seriousness of the offending. This had to take into account both the violence associated with the actual offending itself and the long term psychological consequences for the victims. The Crown submitted that although this was a difficult sentencing exercise with a strong subjective case for the respondent, this should not have been allowed to become the overriding consideration given the seriousness of the offending and the comparative helplessness of the victims.
The Crown submitted that in the circumstances of this case, her Honour erred in taking into account the spontaneity of the offending and the lack of grooming as matters favourable to the respondent. The Crown submitted that in doing so, her Honour failed to take into account that the respondent did not need to engage in any grooming because his threats and violence towards the victims had achieved a situation where they would not complain and he could abuse them with impunity. The Crown submitted that in such circumstances, questions of grooming and spontaneity were irrelevant.
The Crown submitted that her Honour erred in taking into account the extent of the delay between the offending and the proceedings as a matter favourable to the respondent in that by not offending for more than 30 years, the respondent had demonstrated that he was substantially rehabilitated and no longer a danger to the community. The Crown submitted that such considerations needed to be substantially discounted when regard was had to the means used by the respondent to remain at liberty for such a long period. The unchallenged evidence was that the respondent used threats of injury and death to terrorise his young victims into silence for many years. The Crown submitted that, as an older member of the victims' family, the respondent was in an ideal position to know their vulnerabilities and make threats which would have the most effect on the particular victim. For example, in the case of MT who had been raised by her grandmother, his threat was to kill the grandmother.
The Crown noted that in relation to special circumstances, the trial judge found:
"Further I agree with Mr Evers that [AD's] custody will be more onerous because of his medical conditions. For that reason, I propose to find special circumstances." (Sentence judgment 18.4)
The Crown submitted that while the finding of special circumstances on that basis was open, her Honour double counted the respondent's health factors when she also took them into account when assessing his subjective case. The Crown submitted that in those circumstances, the health factors were taken into account in reducing the head sentence and were therefore reflected in the non-parole period (Regina v Fidow [2004] NSWCCA 172 at [18]).
The Crown submitted that in addition her Honour had made a finding of special circumstances without any consideration of whether there was a need for rehabilitation and if so, over what period of time. The Crown submitted that the adjustment for special circumstances was very substantial and resulted in a non-parole period which was 57 per cent of the head sentence. The Crown submitted that this failed to set a non-parole period which represented the minimum time that the respondent should spend in custody.
The Crown submitted that when all of those matters were taken into account, they demonstrated errors in her Honour's reasoning, which produced an aggregate sentence which was so low as to be unreasonable or plainly unjust.
His deprived background, while sad and relevant, must give way to the general deterrence necessary to end such intergenerational conduct. It is inconsistent with principle to treat aboriginal victims of crime, and potential victims of future undeterred crime, as less deserving of protection and vindication than others. [1]
N ADAMS J: I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment of the Chief Judge in draft. I adopt the summary of the background to this appeal and relevant principles at [1]-[95]. I also adopt his Honour's summary of the Crown submissions at [96]-[109].
I agree with the orders proposed by his Honour for the following reasons.
The sentencing judge was presented with a difficult sentencing exercise. As was acknowledged by Mr McGrath SC for the Crown and Mr Evers of counsel for the respondent, the objective and subjective factors relevant to the sentencing discretion pulled in different directions. The respondent's counsel, put it this way:
"…her Honour was required to sentence a very damaged man, who had had a very damaged upbringing, who lived among damaged people in a damaged community, and by his offending, wrought substantial damage on those around him."
There were many subjective factors which militated in favour of leniency on sentence. These factors included: that the offences occurred when he was in his 20s; that he had significant health problems; that he had had a childhood of profound deprivation; that he had been sexually assaulted himself when he was about five years old; that during the period between offending and detection he had not come to the attention of police for any sexual offending; and that his time in custody will be more onerous with the real risk that he will either die in prison or shortly after released.
Despite this strong subjective case, the respondent stood to be sentenced for horrific child sexual assaults against eight vulnerable young children.
The sole ground of appeal was that the aggregate sentence was manifestly inadequate. I propose to consider the competing submissions regarding the particulars relied upon under this ground in turn.
Despite this finding, her Honour also found that the offending was "opportunistic", "involved very little planning" and did not involve "grooming". The finding by her Honour that the offending did not involve grooming is hardly surprising given the violent and threatening circumstances of some of the offending. But the question arises as to how the lack of grooming could be a mitigating factor in this case in the same vein as the factors of the offending being opportunistic and involving very little planning.
"Grooming" has a special meaning in the context of offences against children. It describes conduct engaged in by paedophiles which makes it more likely the child will acquiesce in the sexual conduct. Common grooming techniques (putting to one side online grooming) would be to buy gifts for a child, or to compliment and spoil the child. Regrettably, this sort of conduct can make it more likely that a child will willingly engage in sexual activity with the adult. Concern over such behaviour led to the introduction of an offence of grooming in s 66EB of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) by the Crimes Amendment (Sexual Procurement or Grooming of Children) Act 2007 (NSW). When introducing the bill in the Legislative Council on 7 November 2007, the Honourable John Hatzistergos, Attorney General and Minister for Justice, stated this (New South Wales Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 7 November 2007 at 3587):
"This bill makes it an offence for an adult to procure or groom a child for any unlawful sexual activity. It aims to capture the kinds of grooming activities commonly engaged in by paedophiles, whether online, through electronic communications or through any other means or activities. The offences of procuring and grooming have been drafted as separate offences in this bill, which is appropriate given that grooming is a preparatory offence and procuring involves more substantial acts. The offences are directed against people who are actively engaging with children in ways that make the children more likely to participate in sexual activity. Grooming can include a wide range of behaviour including conduct that encourages a child to believe they have romantic feelings for the adult or desensitising the child to the thought of engaging in sexual activity with the adult. Procuring a person to engage in sexual activity includes encouraging, enticing, recruiting or inducing - whether by threat, promises or otherwise - in relation to that activity. For example, procuring offences would apply when a person offered money to a child to engage in sexual acts or promised them gifts or some other form of benefit."
(Emphasis added.)
The respondent clearly did not groom any of his victims. Although not all of the offences were accompanied with threats or violence, many of them were. Some of the children were locked in a room when the offending occurred, unable to escape. Some of them were slapped or otherwise physically assaulted. PS, who was 6 or 7 years old at the time, described "seeing stars" because she was so stunned by all of the blows she received during her sexual assault. Many of the children were crying throughout the ordeal and some were sworn at. In these circumstances, the fact that there was no "grooming" could hardly be considered a mitigating factor.
Another factor relevant to the objective criminality of the offending was the fact that the respondent was in a position of trust and authority to the victims. Her Honour accepted that to be the case when she stated:
"I take into account that the sexual abuse of young children is a matter of grave concern to the community and that condign punishment is called for where grave and repeated sexual assaults are perpetrated upon young children, particularly by a person in a position of trust and authority.
Although I have found that general deterrence has a lesser role to play here because of [the applicant's] deprived background, it is still of some significance so as to ensure others, particularly those who are in a position of trust or authority, do not offend in a similar fashion."
(Emphasis added.)
Her Honour went on to place less weight on the fact that the respondent was in a position of trust as follows:
"The fact that the victim was either living with the offender or visiting the house, or he used his position to get the victim to go with him, is an aggravating factor, as is conceded by Mr Evers. The fact that he was either their uncle or cousin is also a matter of significance, however I agree with Mr Evers that as the offender was a young man at the time of the offending and did not set out to establish a particular relationship with the victims arising from his position as an uncle or cousin, the significance of the position of trust is moderated to some extent."
(Emphasis added.)
The respondent submitted in this Court that the children were not under his authority; he was just the only adult in the home at the time of the offences. It was submitted that many of the children were left with various family members such as the three sisters, PS, RS and MJ, whose mother had effectively abandoned them into the care of the respondent's brother and his wife. It was submitted that this familial connection provided the respondent with the opportunity to commit the offences but that he was not in a position of authority or trust. Reliance was placed on the decision in Cowling v R [2015] NSWCCA 213 where Leeming JA observed the following at [10]:
"It is well-settled law that more must be established than a mere breach of trust in order for the statutory factor to be made out. In Karl Suleman v R [2009] NSWCCA 70 at [22], Howie J, with the agreement of McClellan CJ at CL and Hislop J, said of the factor that:
'This aggravating factor is not made out simply because the victim trusted the offender for some reason or other [.] ... The relevant factor is that there was at the time of the offending a particular relationship between the offender and the victim that amounted to 'a position of trust'. It is a special relationship existing between them and transcends the usual duty of care arising between persons in the community in their everyday contact or their business and social dealings.'
See further Peiris v R [2014] NSWCCA 58 at [52]-[54]."
The Crown conceded error in Cowling v R because the sentencing judge had aggravated a sentence based on a breach of trust when a 22 year old man sexually assaulted a 20 year old woman who was his friend. That is very different to the present case. Although it is to be accepted that the victims were not formally placed under the respondent's care, I do not accept the respondent's submission that the fact that he was the only adult in the home when many of these offences occurred means that he was not in a position of authority or trust with them. He was an adult male and the children were nearly all under 10 years of age. They all considered him an adult or "elder". I am satisfied that, although her Honour found that the respondent was in a position of authority and trust, this aggravating factor is not reflected in the sentence imposed.
Overall, the sentence imposed does not reflect the objective criminality of the offending. I am satisfied that her Honour placed too much weight on the respondent's subjective factors and insufficient weight on the objective seriousness of the offences resulting in a manifestly inadequate sentence.
I am satisfied that there was an excessive degree of concurrency in the aggregate sentence imposed.
The delay between offending and detection did permit her Honour to make favourable findings about the respondent's prospects of sexual re-offending. After this period of sexual offending between 1978 and 1981, he did not come to the attention of police for any sexual offending thereafter and his criminal history was relatively minor. In 1978, when he was 19 years old, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment for stealing a motor vehicle. The non-parole period was 12 months to date from 19 July 1978. He was on parole for this offence when he committed count 14 against RK. His criminal history thereafter was confined to the following matters. He was placed on a 2 year good behaviour bond for an assault in 1989. He was imprisoned for 3 months in 1990 for further assaults. He was fined for another assault in 1996. He was imprisoned in 1999 for 9 months, with a non-parole period of 4 months for driving offences. He was imprisoned in 2002 for 3 months for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. In 2004, he was imprisoned for 12 months for driving offences. He was imprisoned for 2 months and 15 days in 2004 for possessing an offensive implement in public place.
It is to be accepted that, based on the respondent's relatively minor criminal record, the respondent's risk of re-offending was low and it was open to her Honour to make the positive findings she did in this regard. But the respondent should not otherwise have benefited from the delay. I am satisfied that the weight placed on delay in favour of the applicant is another factor that led to the imposition of a manifestly inadequate sentence.
(Emphasis added.)
The respondent relied upon these comments by her Honour in support of his submission that the sentence adequately reflected the impact on the victims and the level of trauma suffered. The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the aggregate sentence imposed did not reflect or explain how it reflects the significant trauma to each of the eight victims in this matter.
It is now widely accepted that, at the time when these offences occurred, there was a lack of awareness in the community of the considerable life-long damage that can be inflicted on children by sexual abuse such as that which occurred in this matter. Hoeben CJ at CL has already summarised the evidence of trauma provided by the individual victims above at [5]-[62]. Her Honour had also seen the victims give evidence at the trial.
The need to sentence under s 25AA was another factor which made this a difficult sentencing exercise. Her Honour was required to sentence the respondent with regard to the statutory maximum penalties applicable in the 1970s but in accordance with current sentencing patterns and practices and, in particular, what is now well known about the ongoing trauma of such childhood sexual abuse. Although it is clear that her Honour stated that she had taken the victim's trauma into account, I accept the Crown submission that it was not explained how it was reflected in the aggregate sentence imposed.
Although four of the offences for which the respondent stood to be sentenced carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, some of the others had very low maximum penalties (much lower than the same conduct would attract now).
Recently, in WB v R [2020] NSWCCA 159 Davies J (with whom Bell P and I agreed) considered a ground of appeal that the sentencing judge had erred in finding that the sexual offending against the child in that case had resulted in substantial injury. The ground was rejected but in doing his Honour observed the following at [63]:
"It is not without significance that offences which have, in more recent times, superseded s 81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), carry far greater penalties which, at least partly, take into account greater damage by reason of the age of the child when the offence is committed: Tuala at [64]. The maximum penalty for an offence under s 81 is 5 years' imprisonment which might be thought not to take much account of damage or emotional harm which would be suffered by the victim of such an offence. Part of the reason for the heavier penalties is, obviously, that there is now much greater knowledge of the long-term effects of sexual abuse of a child or young person than was known when s 81 was enacted and remained in the Crimes Act. That may mean that it will be easier to find that damage or emotional harm is substantial where historical offences are dealt with under earlier legislation with much lower maximum penalties. Such an approach would not be inconsistent with the rationale behind s 25AA of the Sentencing Act."
The respondent submitted that a sentence for historical child sexual offences imposed after the enactment of s 25AA need not necessarily be substantially different from those imposed prior to its enactment. This is because there has been a growing awareness of the impact of this offending over time since the 1980s reflected in statements of principle made by this and other appellate courts.
I am satisfied that, consistent with the observations of Davies J in WB v R, with which I concurred at the time, that it may well be easier to make a finding of substantial injury to a child for a sentence imposed on a historical child sexual assault offence after the enactment of s 25AA if the maximum penalty is so low as to enable a conclusion that the significant lifelong trauma such offending can inflict on a child is not already reflected in the maximum penalty. Despite this, as stated above, the Crown did not make a submission to her Honour that "substantial" injury was an aggravating factor in this case so the question does not squarely arise.
Despite these admissions, the respondent did not plead guilty to any of the charges involving KJK at trial. Instead, it was put to KJK in cross-examination that all the applicant ever did to him was lie on top of him and rub himself against him without penetration. This was denied by KJK.
The second surprising feature of the lack of remorse in this matter is that the respondent was well aware of the trauma such offending has on young children because he described the impact it had had on him to Mr Sheehan, the psychologist who prepared a report for the proceedings on sentence. Hoeben CJ at CL has referred to this issue at [89] above. Her Honour had regard to Mr Sheehan's report as follows:
"On balance I also consider there is a link between that abuse, which I accept had a profound effect on him, and his offending, at least in respect of KJK, as Mr Sheehan thought it possible and as he was not far into adulthood when he committed the offences against KJK."
This finding was one open to her Honour. But given the profound impact such offending had on the respondent, this made his lack of remorse even more stark.
Her Honour made no mention of the respondent's lack of remorse in her Reasons. Although, as stated above, a lack of remorse is a not an aggravating factor, a finding of remorse is a mitigating factor. The respondent's aggregate sentence of 14 years with a non-parole period of 8 years was for a sentence where there was no discount for a plea of guilty and no finding of remorse.