1. Both the Board and the respondent have referred the Tribunal to a number of comparative cases.[27] Whilst we appreciate that these are not binding regarding our decision (as each matter must be individually determined on its own unique set of facts, and specifically here, according to our findings), we consider that the following cases in particular do provide some guidance regarding our task:

20.1 Psychology Boad of Australia v Wakelin [2014] QCAT 516

The respondent provided treatment for a period of 11 days. Personal information was exchanged with the client and a sexual relationship commenced immediately after the professional relationship ended. The respondent gave false statements to AHPRA and was accordingly Reprimanded by the responsible Tribunal and disqualified for a period of 18 months with a costs order. The Tribunal stated at [25] that deceptive conduct made the boundary violation more serious and emphasised the importance of deterring other practitioners who need to know that serious consequences will follow if they flout their professional responsibilities.

20.2 Psychology Board of Australia v Maroulis [2019] SACAT 69

The respondent provided two treatments and two weeks after the final session, engaged in sexual conduct with the client. Whilst there was no false or misleading conduct, the practitioner's registration was cancelled and a disqualification period of three years imposed. An appeal to the Supreme Court proceeded but was dismissed with the Court pronouncing (per Bleby J) that: "cancellation of registration and a considerable period of disqualification are commonly deployed in response to breaches of the professional boundary by sexual contact. The question of the appropriate sanction in any given case directs attention to what, in the Tribunal's assessment, is necessary to protect the public in the particular circumstances, having regard to the historical course of sanctions for broadly comparable transgressions."[28]

20.3 Psychology Board of Australia v Meulblok [2020] VCAT 579

A female psychologist provided treatment to a male client for a period of about 12 months. During that period, she sent personal inappropriate emails, text and digital messages and then commenced a sexual relationship just prior to the end of the treatment period. Although there was no dishonest conduct concerning the disclosure of the relationship, she did state to the client that she would lose her professional registration and income if he reported the matter. The respondent was reprimanded, her registration was cancelled and she was disqualified from seeking re-registration for two years and prohibited from providing health services for the same period.

20.4 Psychology Board of Australia v Holmes [2020] SACAT 122

The respondent engaged in a sexual relationship with a client for three months at the end of the treatment period. There was a conspiracy to conceal the relationship which included the destruction of evidence together with the misleading of the AHPRA investigation. The respondent was reprimanded, disqualified for five years and prohibited from providing health services for seven years. The Tribunal specifically stated that a health practitioner cannot expect favourable consideration if they are not immediately cooperative with the regulatory authorities.

20.5 Psychology Board of Australia v Garcia [2015] VCAT 128

The respondent of some 10 years standing, engaged in a sexual relationship with a vulnerable client whom she later married. Another practitioner reported the conduct two years later. The respondent was reprimanded, suspended for six months and ordered to undergo education and mentoring.

20.6 Health Ombudsman v WFB [2025] QCAT 3

A psychologist commenced a romantic relationship with a client immediately at the end of the treatment period. There was a self-notification, admissions were made and steps were taken to educate. The responsible Tribunal reprimanded, suspended the practitioner's registration for six months and imposed supervisory conditions.

20.7 Health Ombudsman v LNA [2022] QCAT 194

The respondent treated a vulnerable client with significant mental health conditions over two years. A romantic and sexual relationship developed during the last month of treatment and was maintained for 15 months. The respondent was reprimanded and suspended from practising for a period of six months.

20.8 Psychology Board of Australia v Cook [2014] QCAT 162

A psychologist formed a sexual relationship with a married client. There was no notification for three years. Harm was caused to the client. The responsible Tribunal reprimanded the respondent and imposed a six month suspension with conditions for supervision.

20.9 Health Ombudsman v De La Rey [2020] QCAT 223

A psychologist formed a romantic relationship with an extremely vulnerable client over a four year period. There were a large number of emails and telephone calls exchanged. The practitioner ended the relationship and made a subsequent notification to AHPRA. The responsible Tribunal found that the practitioner did show considerable insight and remorse and accordingly, imposed a reprimand and a fine of $2000.

20.10 Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Williams [2013] SAHPT 1

The respondent falsified documents regarding her professional qualifications. She lied to AHPRA and the Board during the course of their investigations and was also found guilty of committing criminal fraud offences. The respondent was reprimanded by the former Health Practitioners Tribunal and her registration was cancelled and a disqualification of two years imposed.

1. As previously stated, comparative cases are not binding and are of limited assistance. We refer to the judgement of his Honour Chief Justice Kourakis in Marin v Chiropractic Board of Australia[29] at [79]-[80]:

1. It is well accepted that in sentencing for criminal offences the assistance provided by comparative sentences is limited. That is all the more the case in periods of disqualification imposed to maintain professional standards. In lee v Health care Complaints Commission, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales observed:

(a) comparison with the outcomes in earlier cases may be useful if those earlier cases show some discernible range or pattern; > > (b) such a range or pattern, even when discernible, cannot be regarded as a precedent indicating what is 'correct'; > > (c) the range or pattern is, at best, a reflection of the accumulated experience and wisdom of decision-makers; > > (d) the range or pattern will potentially be of value only if it is possible to gather from it an appreciation of some unifying principle; > > (e) since the predominant consideration is the protection of the public, a decision can only be made by reference to the facts of the particular case and by considering what measures are needed to ensure that the future behaviour of the particular practitioner is shaped in a way that is consistent with that protection... > > 80. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield, it was held: > > The gravity of professional misconduct is not to be measured by reference to the worst cases, but by the extent to which it departs from proper standards.

1. The treatment period here spanned a period of four months from April to July 2019. As a trauma specialist, the respondent provided treatment to CA in relation to work related post-traumatic stress disorder, complicated by him being involved in an unhappy marriage at the time of treatment. Although we accept that there is no evidence that CA was vulnerable to the influences of the respondent, the fact remains that he was her client and she had an ethical and professional responsibility to maintain proper boundaries not just during the treatment period but for two years thereafter. Instead, she took advantage of the situation having allowed an attraction between her and CA to develop with the knowledge that both of them at the time were involved in unhappy relationships.
2. The respondent as we have found, sent a large volumes of emails to CA during the treatment period which were of a personal, intimate and flirtatious nature and she also attended gym and had coffee with CA outside of those treatment sessions.
3. The sexual relationship between the respondent and CA commenced the day after treatment ended which is at the commencement of the two year restriction period imposed by the Code of Ethics regulating Dr Angelakis' conduct as a psychologist.
4. We are mindful that Dr McHugh has opined that there is little risk that the respondent would engage in boundary violations of any sort in the future. He also considers that the risk of dishonest or reckless conduct by the respondent in dealing with her professional regulators is very low as previously referenced. It is a question of what weight we place on his evidence on the basis of our assessment of the respondent's veracity in claiming that she is now a reformed practitioner who is endeavouring to gain the trust of the Board, her profession, AHPRA and the Tribunal against the background of her professional misconduct. It must not be overlooked in approaching this task that she also misled Dr McHugh for some 21 sessions of mandatory supervision and has only recently been candid in her disclosures following the Tribunal and Supreme Court findings and for that matter, in anticipation of the disciplinary outcome of these proceedings. However, he has still not been provided by her with copies of the copious emails passing between the respondent and CA during the treatment period.
5. The aggravating feature of the respondent's conduct when viewed as a whole, is the false and misleading statements she made in her self-notification to the Board compounded by the fact that the notification was made some seven months after the relationship commenced. Whilst the respondent admitted to a sexual relationship, she did not disclose the earlier boundary violations during the treatment period and she gave a misleading impression about how and when the relationship began not just to the Board, but to AHPRA during its investigation, to Dr McHugh during the mandated supervisory sessions and ultimately to the Tribunal in evidence during the Stage 1 hearing. Even now, it is apparent from the respondent's evidence during the sanctions hearing, that she still does not really accept that her dishonest conduct was deliberate as opposed to reckless or careless even though she states that she does accept the Tribunal's findings in that regard. We consider that this is contrary to the respondent's assertions that she is a reformed practitioner with increased self-awareness.
6. Whilst we do accept that the respondent has taken steps to rehabilitate through the voluntary resumption of counselling with Dr McHugh and the completion of professional education courses, we consider that her insight into her conduct as a whole is still very limited and accordingly, we are somewhat sceptical as to the timing of those efforts pending the imposition of sanctions. We are also concerned about the speed and intensity with which the inappropriate relationship between the respondent and CA progressed and, given the respondent's limited insight and her lack of candour, we cannot be confident that such conduct may not occur again should her current personal circumstances change.
7. In coming to our decision we have had regard to the following:

28.2 The rehabilitation efforts Dr Angelakis has taken to date and her intention to continue with high level counselling supervision with Dr McHugh in the future as recommended by him;

28.3 Dr McHugh's expressed opinions that any future risk of boundary violations and/or dishonest or misleading conduct is very low;

28.4 The character testimonial of Natalie Bottroff and the fact that Dr Angelakis provides a specialist service in the area of trauma management, has previously held a managerial position with a reputable psychology service and has until recently held a tertiary academic position which she has now relinquished on account of our findings. There is no doubt that she is highly regarded in her field;

27.5 The evidence before us, the submissions of the parties' counsel (both written and oral) and the legal authorities to which we have been referred; and

27.6 The concluding remarks of his Honour Justice B Doyle upon dismissing the respondent's Supreme Court appeal, namely that:[30]

1. Ethical obligations are uncompromising, but life is complicated. Nothing could be clearer than that the connection formed between the appellant and CA was powerful and mutually felt. That connection has, it seems been enduring.
2. It is not alleged, and it would not appear to be the case, that CA was in fact particularly vulnerable to any conduct by the appellant in displaying interest in him. Plainly, the appellant did not consciously exploit her position or any power imbalance that existed. To the extent that reference was made on appeal to issues of 'causality' in relation to the timing of the end of CS's relationship, I would indicate that I see no basis for such findings. Those observations are not intended to condone the ethical transgression; but rather to contextualise them and the findings of misconduct in connection with the inaccuracies in her self-reporting and the first interview.
3. Notwithstanding the conclusions I have reached on the grounds of appeal, the fact remains that the appellant did, ultimately, self-notify and has embarked in a conscientious way on a process of mentoring and self-refection. (reference footnoted) Although some issues were contested before the Tribunal, the appellant made significant concessions. The ethical transgressions the subject of the notification would appear to have been an aberration in an otherwise promising and worthwhile career. These will be matters for the Tribunal to consider in the context of the principles informing the imposition of appropriate sanctions under the National Law.

1. We are firmly of the view that the respondent's conduct is too serious for us to consider suspension of her registration as urged by her counsel, Ms Walker SC. Under the circumstances, nothing but cancellation of Dr Angelakis' registration and the imposition of a significant disqualification and prohibition period is appropriate. We consider that such sanctioning will not only provide public protection against the risk of any repeat conduct but will specifically deter the respondent and importantly, other practitioners from engaging in such conduct and in particular, the misleading and deception of the professional regulators. As the Queensland Tribunal stated in Wakelin,[31] practitioners who engage in boundary violations who then misrepresent the truth to the regulators can expect serious consequences will follow. We also have particular regard to the comments of the Supreme Court (per Bleby J) in Psychology Board of Australia v Maroulis as previously referred to in [20.2] of these reasons concerning the imposition of substantial sanctions regarding professional boundary violations. By imposing what we consider are appropriate sanctions here, we wish to highlight the seriousness of the respondent's conduct and to ensure that professional standards are maintained at all times and that the public are assured and the psychology profession at large is in no doubt that such conduct will not be tolerated.
2. Having regard to the circumstances of this matter, we consider that a period of three years as recommended by the Board, is appropriate. But for the developing (but partial) insight now displayed by the respondent, her rehabilitation efforts to date, her professional standing to date and the fact that she comes before the Tribunal with no prior disciplinary history, we would have considered imposing an even greater period.
3. Consideration will need to be given by the appropriate authority at the end of the period of disqualification/prohibition as to whether the respondent is a fit and proper person to be re-registered should she make an application and if so, as to any appropriate conditions to be placed on her registration in light of Dr McHugh's evidence regarding the ongoing need for high level supervision into the future.
4. The Orders of the Tribunal pursuant to s 196 of the National Law are as follows:

32.2 The respondent's registration as a registered health practitioner is cancelled (s 196(2)(e));

32.3 The respondent is disqualified from applying for registration as a registered health practitioner for a period of three (3) years (s196(4)(a));

32.4 The respondent is prohibited from providing any health service until she is granted further registration as a health practitioner under the National Law, whether directly or indirectly, and whether as an employee, contractor, manager or volunteer including, but not limited to, any health service that involves the provision of counselling or other treatment relating to the mental health of any person (s 196(4)(b));

32.5 The Orders set out in [32.2-32.4] hereof, are to take effect 28 days after the date of this decision.

32.6 The respondent is to pay the costs of and incidental to these proceedings, to be agreed or assessed in default of agreement pursuant to s 195 of the National Law.

[1] Psychology Board of Australia v Angelakis [2024] SACAT 24.

[2] Angelakis v Psychology Board of Australia [2024] SASC 133.

[4] New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt [1968] HCA 20; (1968) 117 CLR 177.

[5] [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545.

[6] [2022] SACAT 111.

[7] Craig v Medical Board of South Australia, ibid at [43].

[8] Health Care Complaints Commission & Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297; (1997) 41 NSWLR 630, at 637F.

[12] Transcript (T) P 9 and SBOD P 2949 [15].

[23] NG: Dr McHugh stated in evidence that he only became aware of the email contents after having read the Tribunal and Supreme Court decisions (as referred to therein).

[28] [2021] SASC 16 at [57].

[29] [2020] SASCFC 74.