Prosecution v Accused

1 Dean Hadjina, you have pleaded guilty to one charge of theft, contrary to s 74(1) of the Crimes Act 1958, and 13 charges of obtaining financial advantage by deception, contrary to s 82(1) of the Crimes Act 1958. Each of these charges carry a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment.

2 Your offending took place in the context of your practice as a solicitor. In 2019, you were engaged to act for Ms Par Tin Mawi Sawmhal ('the victim') regarding a dependency claim arising from the death of her husband in a workplace accident in 2018. At the time, you were a sole practitioner and the sole director of your own legal practice, 'Dean's of Law'. That practice had two bank accounts - the office account and the trust account - and you had exclusive control of both accounts.

3 In early 2019, the victim contacted you, having been informed by her family members that you were to be her lawyer in respect of the dependency claim. The victim has limited proficiency in English, and therefore asked a friend and qualified interpreter, Ms Cherry Myint, to assist in her communications with you.

4 A letter of engagement signed on 24 March 2019 provided that you would act for the victim in connection with a 'Dependants [sic] Claim'. Further documents signed in April and May 2019 gave authority for all correspondence regarding the claim to be directed to you, and any proceeds from the dependency claim to be transferred to the Dean's of Law trust account.

5 You performed some legal work for the victim and progressed the dependency claim. In May 2019, the claim settled. The victim's husband's employer agreed to pay her a sum of $644,095.44, as well as continuing to pay the victim's pension and her reasonable legal costs. You signed the terms of settlement on the victim's behalf. At no stage did you tell her the amount she would be receiving, or that she could accept or reject the settlement sum. In fact, she was not made aware of the total settlement sum until two years later. The settlement sum was sent to your office by way of bank cheque, which you then deposited into the trust account.

6 Around 27 June 2019, the victim received only part of the settlement sum - $500,000 -from you, provided by way of bank cheque. At no stage did you pay her any part of the remaining sum. Instead, over four occasions between June 2019 and February 2020, you transferred the remaining sum from the trust account to the office account. At least two of the transfer references suggest that they were for the victim's legal fees. In fact, the total value of the legal work you performed for the victim was only $548.30. You never rendered a bill for that work, and were therefore never entitled to charge the victim for it.

7 These four transfers form the basis of charge 1, a rolled-up charge of theft in the sum of $144,060.40.

8 Your deception of the victim continued. You had the victim sign a number of further documents, and suggested to her that they related to a further legal proceeding for compensation which was to commence in this court. That proceeding was entirely fictitious.

9 Through Ms Myint, you regularly contacted the victim to ask for money which you said was needed to progress her claim. You told her to send the money to the office account. Some of these requests were made verbally, with a written receipt provided afterwards, and others were made in writing, occasionally with provision of an invoice. You explained to the victim that if she deposited money for this claim, Workcover would pay her more back. The victim understood that these payments were to be given to 'the higher up people' to advance the prospects of her claim.

10 Between 15 November 2019 and 17 February 2021, the victim made 13 individual payments to you, totalling $338,093.80.[1] Each of these payments were made on the basis of false representations made by you, and are each referrable to a separate charge of obtaining financial advantage by deception (charges 2-14).

11 During that period, you went to substantial lengths to continue your ruse. On three separate occasions, you collected the victim and took her to the city for purported hearings or meetings regarding this claim. You produced and sent to the victim a number of sham documents, including false documents and emails bearing the Supreme Court coat of arms.

12 You indicated to the victim that she would be paid in excess of $17 million in the first two months of 2021 as a result of the settlement of the fictitious proceeding. In a lengthy fabricated email, purportedly from the 'Principal Registry, Lump Sum Claims Manager', you thanked yourself for your 'extensive help and countless hours of assistance'. The email suggested that because the fictitious settlement amount 'far exceeds damages that have been paid within the jurisdiction of Victoria', the matter must be treated with 'extreme privacy' and 'under an Anonymity (Pseudonym) ... for [the victim's] privacy and protection'.

13 The victim and Ms Myint began to grow suspicious by May and June 2021, when the anticipated payment was not made. On 22 June, you were sent an email indicating that the victim's pension entitlement would cease in September. You doctored that email so that it suggested the victim would be paid her lump sum after 1 July, and provided it to Ms Myint.

14 Eventually the victim, with the assistance of Ms Myint, enquired of the Workcover insurer directly. She was told that she would not be receiving any further lump sum payment, her pension payments would be ceasing, and the initial settlement sum was in excess of $600,000. The victim and Ms Myint confronted you in July, and asked you to 'be honest about [the] insurers lump sum payment'. You said that you did not want to be 'second guessed' and insinuated that you were due an apology. You told the victim 'as a good christian and lawyer i DO NOT lie. Ever.'

15 Following a separate complaint to the Legal Services Commissioner, the Legal Services Board appointed a lawyer, Mr Damian Neylon, to conduct a compliance audit of your legal practice in August 2021. You lied to Mr Neylon about the nature of your relationship with the victim and the contents of her file, saying that you only saw her on one occasion. As a result of Mr Neylon's findings, the Board appointed a manager, Mr Howard Rapke, to the practice. Upon gaining control of the office and trust account, Mr Rapke found both accounts bare. He also noted that a number of documents, including documents relating to the victim's fictional legal proceeding, had been deleted from your computer in the minutes before he and his staff attended the office.

16 You spoke with Mr Rapke about the victim's matter. You told him that the four transfers from the trust account to the office account were for legal fees to date, and also indicated that although the victim believed there was a claim in the Supreme Court on foot, there was no such proceeding.

17 In November 2023, the Board referred this matter to Victoria Police. The informant communicated with you in early 2024 to arrange a police interview, which you ultimately declined. You were subsequently charged on 1 March 2024.

18 At the time that you met her, the victim was incredibly vulnerable. She is from Myanmar, and had only migrated to Australia with her husband in April 2018. Tragically, just five months later, her husband was killed in a motor vehicle accident whilst at work.

19 She spoke limited English, and was only educated to a year 7 equivalent. She had no prior involvement with lawyers - she did not know what a lawyer was before she met you.

20 For the losses you caused her, the victim was reimbursed by the Legal Services Board fidelity fund in February 2023. However, that is not to say that yours was a victimless crime.

21 Although the Court did not receive any victim impact statements for consideration, it is not a stretch to conclude that this entire affair would have been highly stressful for the victim. Although the impact on her may have been somewhat diffused through that compensation, the financial burden of your offending was not entirely extinguished and was ultimately borne by a public fund.

22 You will be required to reimburse the Fidelity Fund for the amount it paid to compensate the victim. I have therefore had regard to the ongoing financial burden you are likely to face due to your continuing obligation to repay the Fund.

23 At the time of offending, you were between the ages of 41 and 43. You are now 47 years old.

24 You are the son of immigrants and have two sisters. You were apparently a shy, self-conscious child, and experienced bullying. You attended secondary school in the western suburbs of Melbourne, and went on to complete a bachelor's degree and a post-graduate Juris Doctor.

25 In the late 1990s, you were involved in a motor vehicle accident alongside your future wife and her sister. You suffered acute injuries, and your sister-in-law was tragically killed. This has understandably had a lifelong impact on you and your family. You were diagnosed with lumbosacral disc prolapse with nerve root irritation and bursitis of the left shoulder. As a result of the medications you were prescribed, you developed a long term tramadol addiction.

26 You were admitted to practice as a lawyer in 2002, and worked as a solicitor at a number of firms, largely in the area of plaintiff law. You apparently found no particular enjoyment in this work.

27 In 2019, and in the context of workplace conflict and feeling bullied, you left employed work and started Dean's of Law with little success. Following the discovery of this offending in 2021, that practice was terminated and you have been unemployed since.

28 You married your wife in 2009, and your three daughters were born in 2012 and 2013. You and your family have lived with your parents for a number of years. Until your remand, you were actively involved in caring for the children and volunteered as a coach at their local soccer club.

29 Your mental health declined in 2015. You reported experiencing daily panic attacks, pervasive anxiety, and poor concentration, which led to a decline in the standard of your work. You commenced gambling in 2011, and by 2015, you were using gambling and tramadol as maladaptive means of coping. You reported feeling worthless and experiencing passive suicidal ideation.

30 The Court received a report from Dr Naveen Thomas dated 26 June 2025. Dr Thomas has been your treating psychiatrist since March 2021.

31 You were referred to Dr Thomas by your GP for psychiatric assessment and treatment of persistent depressive symptoms and anxiety. These conditions were noted in the context of 'significant workplace-related stress and concerns about [your] safety and functional capacity'.[2]

32 Dr Thomas stated that while you initially presented with symptoms of depression and trauma, by mid-2021, you had paranoid ideation, affective flattening, auditory hallucinations and social withdrawal. Your diagnosis was subsequently revised to one of schizophrenia with prominent negative symptoms, and you were treated with antidepressants and antipsychotics, which you have since ceased taking.[3]

33 The Court received two further reports from consultant forensic psychiatrist, Dr Jaqueline Rakov - the first in July 2025 and the second in November.[4] Dr Rakov also gave evidence at the plea hearing. I considered her to be an impressive and highly persuasive witness.

34 Dr Rakov diagnosed you with major depressive disorder (MDD), generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), opioid use disorder, and gambling disorder. Contrary to your earlier assessments, she found no evidence of psychosis or PTSD, and considered your symptoms better explained by MDD and GAD. In her view, the treatment provided to you by Dr Thomas did not alleviate or address your symptoms.[5]

35 Dr Rakov considered that, at the time of the offending, your symptoms were significant and severe.[6] Your functional impairment was compounded by a 'pathological reliance' on tramadol and gambling.[7] She regarded your gambling disorder to be a symptom of your depressive and anxiety disorders, rather than a primary condition.[8] I will address this in more detail when considering the Verdins[9] factors advanced on your behalf.

36 Although Dr Rakov initially considered your gambling disorder to be in remission, she revised her opinion upon receipt of further records indicating that you continued to gamble up until your remand.[10] Notwithstanding this, Dr Rakov said that the concealment and denial of this activity was entirely consistent with the recognised features of a gambling disorder. She expanded:

Accordingly, his minimisation of gambling activity is clinically relevant as it exemplifies the same shame-based and avoidant mechanisms central to his psychiatric presentation. It reinforces, rather than contradicts, my earlier view that his offending occurred in the context of chronic anxiety, depression, and maladaptive coping strategies, including denial and concealment.[11]

37 As to the relationship between your condition and the alleged offending, Dr Rakov said the following:

In my opinion, Mr. Hadjina's psychiatric illnesses during the offending period impaired his capacity to manage professional stressors, exercise sound judgment, and seek appropriate support when difficulties arose. His depressive and anxiety symptoms likely contributed to avoidant and procrastinatory behaviour, impaired decision-making, and reduced capacity to think flexibly and realistically about solutions to his difficulties. His ongoing tramadol use and gambling disorder may also have affected his capacity to regulate his behaviour, although they did not deprive him of the ability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions. There is no evidence to suggest that his intellectual or cognitive functioning was otherwise significantly impaired.[12]

38 Dr Rakov formed the view that there was a 'realistic connection' between your mental impairment and the offending, although she did not consider it to have directly caused your offending conduct.[13] Rather, she notes that your mental illnesses 'help to explain how [you] came to occupy a vulnerable and deteriorating position (both professionally and personally) at the time of the offending, and how [you] came to rely on maladaptive and unethical strategies in an attempt to manage those pressures'.[14]

39 Dr Rakov concluded that your psychiatric conditions are likely to make imprisonment more onerous than for someone without such vulnerabilities.[15] She noted the risk of your condition deteriorating in a custodial setting without appropriate treatment and support, and told the Court that, given the constraints of the prison system, you are unlikely to have access to regular psychiatric care while in custody.[16]

40 Dr Rakov considered that you demonstrated a moderate level of insight and genuine remorse.[17] You acknowledged the wrongfulness of your conduct, expressed regret and guilt for the harm caused, and accepted personal responsibility. You also recognised your past reluctance to engage with treatment and its role in your difficulties, and conveyed a desire to change, particularly for the sake of your family.

41 Dr Rakov assessed your risk of reoffending as low, citing protective factors such as your lack of criminal history, strong family support, and the removal of situational opportunities for similar offending, by reason of your inability to practice law.[18]

42 Finally, Dr Rakov notes that you suffered a stroke in late 2024 and report ongoing blurred vision, occasional face numbness, and a perceived decline in memory and concentration.

43 Your counsel sought to enliven the principles in Verdins[19] in order to mitigate your sentence. Drawing on Dr Rakov's findings, it was submitted that it was open to the Court to find that your mental impairment should:

(a) reduce your moral culpability for the offending (limb 1 of Verdins);[20]

(b) moderate the weight afforded to general and specific deterrence (limbs 3 and 4 of Verdins); and

(c) inform an assessment of the burden of incarceration (limb 5 of Verdins).

44 Under the first limb of Verdins, an offender's moral culpability may be reduced where the evidence establishes that the impairment contributed in a way that made the offender 'less blameworthy as a result'.[21] Although a strict causal connection is not required, it is widely accepted there must be at least a 'realistic connection' between the impairment and the offending conduct.[22]

45 Your counsel submitted that Dr Rakov's opinion establishes a 'meaningful nexus' between your depressive and anxiety disorders and the offending conduct.[23]

46 Conversely, the prosecution argued that if there is any connection, it is not a realistic one - but rather, an indirect connection by way of your gambling disorder. It was submitted that although your psychiatric conditions may have contributed to the development of your gambling disorder, the offending conduct is entirely explicable by the latter rather than the former. The prosecution pointed to the matter of R v Grossi,[24] in which the Court of Appeal held that the presence of a gambling disorder will generally provide a motive and explanation for the offending conduct, rather than a basis to reduce sentence.[25]

47 While Dr Rakov did not regard your mental impairment to have directly caused your offending, she was unequivocal in concluding that there was a 'realistic connection' between them. Her evidence, to put it briefly, was that your longstanding depressive and anxiety disorders lead to your gambling dependence, and that package contributed to the type of offending you engaged in.

48 Dr Rakov expressed the view that your mental impairment progressively eroded your ability to cope effectively and manage personal and professional stressors.[26] This led to patterns of avoidance, indecision and impaired judgment that meant you were unable to seek help or implement appropriate solutions as your problems escalated.[27]

49 Accepting Dr Rakov's evidence as I do, I am satisfied that there is a realistic connection between your mental impairment and your offending. I accept that the impairment reduced your capacity to exercise appropriate judgment and to think calmly and rationally in the circumstances. Your primary psychiatric illnesses - MDD and GAD - preceded and gave rise to your gambling disorder. As Dr Rakov explained, gambling became a maladaptive coping strategy, offering a sense of hope and reward that temporarily lifted your mood and relieved your depressive symptoms. Ultimately, however, your impaired judgment led to a cognitive dissonance, and you became trapped in a gambling cycle from which you could not break free. Your offending was a means of sustaining that habit, one which you rationalised in the hope of resolving the problems it had created.

50 While I am satisfied that limb 1 of Verdins is enlivened, the degree of mitigation must be assessed in light of both the nature and severity of the impairment and the seriousness of your offending.[28] Dr Rakov's evidence makes clear that your mental illnesses did not deprive you of the ability to understand what you were doing, the seriousness of your conduct, and its consequences. I accept the prosecution's submission in this regard that your offending was organised and repeated, rather than the avoidant and procrastinatory behaviour which appears to have been characteristic of your depressive and anxiety disorders.

51 Accordingly, while I accept that your mental impairment justifies some reduction in moral culpability, it does so only to a limited extent.

52 In accordance with limbs 3 and 4 of Verdins, your counsel submitted that it is open for me to find that you are not an appropriate vehicle for general and specific deterrence given your mental impairment.

53 In my view, there is no reason general deterrence should not have role to play in determining your sentence. There is nothing to indicate that you did not have a full appreciation of the wrongfulness of your conduct. I accept the prosecution's submission in relation to the importance of general deterrence for 'white collar offending', where offenders more often than not are people of good character. Despite your mental impairment, denunciation of your conduct is still required, and you remain, to a considerable degree, an appropriate vehicle for general deterrence for offending of this kind.

54 As for specific deterrence, notwithstanding that you are unlikely to find yourself in control of trust funds again, thereby removing opportunities for similar offending, the prosecution submitted that specific deterrence has a role to play in the sentencing exercise given you are yet to address the motivators of the offending. While I accept this to some degree, I do not consider that specific deterrence has a substantial role to play in your sentence. I accept that you are unlikely to reoffend. You will never again hold a practising certificate and be in the position that allowed you to engage in this offending.

55 It was submitted that your psychiatric conditions are likely to make imprisonment more burdensome than for someone without such vulnerabilities. The prosecution conceded that limb 5 is engaged to some degree based on Dr Rakov's evidence.

56 I accept that you will find custody more burdensome on account of your mental illness. These conditions are likely to make it harder for you to adapt and function in a custodial environment. Accordingly, I have taken this into account when determining the sentence to be imposed.

57 Offending of this kind is inherently serious. Any offending by a solicitor against a client involves a profound breach of trust, and brings the entire legal profession into disrepute.

58 While many cases of this nature involve larger sums of money, the amounts misappropriated in the present case are far from negligible. More importantly, although quantum is a significant factor to the extent that it provides an indication of the loss and damage caused to the victim,[29] it is not determinative of seriousness.[30] Rather, it is the repeated and calculated nature of the offending that is critical in assessing gravity.[31]

59 Your offending was deliberate and sustained, spanning a period of two years and resulting in the misappropriation of close to half a million dollars. It was not the result of a momentary lapse of judgement - it was calculated and prolonged. Your conduct is particularly serious given the extreme vulnerabilities of the victim, of which you had specific knowledge.

60 Unlike other examples of this kind of offending which could be described as 'passive' misappropriation of client funds, you deliberately made requests of the victim for further payments. You attempted to legitimise those requests by fabricating materials purporting to be from this court. When confronted by the victim and Ms Myint, you continued to shirk blame and tried to cover your tracks.

61 Notably, your orchestration of fictitious legal proceedings, which served as the foundation for what might be described as the 'second wave' of your offending (charges 2-14), involved a level of deception and brazenness that significantly elevates the seriousness of your conduct. In my view, this instance of offending was even more egregious than that relating to the first charge, and constitutes a profound breach of the trust and responsibility vested in you as a solicitor.

62 I accept that your offending was not in furtherance of a lavish lifestyle. However, this is tempered by evidence that at least some, if not all, of the funds were expended on gambling. It follows, in my view, that your offending must be regarded as serious examples of the offences of theft and obtaining financial advantage by deception.

63 For the reasons set out earlier, I am prepared to accept that your mental impairment reduces your moral culpability for the offending. I repeat, however, that the extent to which it does so must be limited. Despite your mental health issues, the evidence leads me to conclude that you alone are responsible for your actions.

64 I consider that your moral culpability can only be characterised as high.

65 Your counsel submitted that the delay in finalising this matter should be taken into account as a mitigating factor in sentencing.

66 I accept that you have had this matter hanging over your head for some time. You were at least aware that there was 'interest' in the activities of your practice from September 2021. The Legal Services Board subsequently conducted an investigation, preliminary findings were delivered in October 2022, the matter was referred to Victoria Police in November 2023, and charges were not laid until March 2024 - some two and a half years later.

67 Although there was delay beyond your control from the discovery of your offending to the date you were charged, much of the delay from that point onward must fall at your feet. You demonstrated a passive and avoidant approach to these proceedings, and failed to meaningfully engage with the legal process until your legal representatives were appointed in December 2024. Even then, you continued to avoid addressing your legal issues with any urgency until your remand in September 2025, to the extent that your plea hearing had to be adjourned twice.

68 The prosecution submitted that the issue of delay is twofold: it was conceded that the first period, being outside of your control, should attract some, albeit modest, consideration; whereas the second period, largely due to your own inaction, should carry little, if any, weight.

69 While you accept responsibility for a significant portion of the delay in these proceedings, it was submitted that this did not diminish its relevance as a mitigating factor. Counsel referred me to the decision of R v Merrett, Piggott and Ferrari,[32] in which Maxwell P observed that the significance of delay lies 'in the effect which the lapse of time - however caused - has on the accused'.[33] However, those remarks were clarified by the Court of Appeal in the matter of Arthars v R,[34] which emphasised that the Court must consider the extent to which the accused had control over the delay, and that systemic delay will generally carry greater weight than delay attributable to the offender.[35]

70 In assessing the extent to which you had control over the delay in these proceedings, it was submitted that consideration should be given to the impact of your mental impairment. You rely on Dr Rakov's evidence that your psychiatric conditions were directly relevant to your avoidant behaviours and made the legal process significantly more burdensome for you than for someone without those vulnerabilities.[36] In Dr Rakov's view, your mental impairment underlies both your difficulty in managing your legal affairs and your reluctance to disclose your offending to your family.[37]

71 Your counsel pointed to the matter of R v Blackberry,[38] where delay was taken into account despite the offender having absconded to Tasmania and prolonging the resolution of his legal proceedings.[39] While I have had regard to this decision, it is notable that Lasry J gave little explanation as to the weight he placed on delay, simply stating that it had been considered 'in the sense that these matters have no doubt been a constant source of concern' for the offender.[40] On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case - including the respondent's attempts to avoid apprehension by police between 2011 and 2018 - the sentence imposed by his Honour of two years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 months was within range, albeit at its lower end.[41]

72 Noting that the presence of delay calls for 'a considerable measure of understanding and flexibility in approach',[42] I am prepared to accept that it warrants a degree of mitigation in these proceedings.

73 I have had regard to the character references provided by your wife, Branka Hadjina; your sister, Karen Koleski; your close family friend, Belinda Koleski; and your colleague, Antonio Giuliani, with whom you have been involved in a local junior soccer club.

74 Your wife describes you as a loving husband and devoted father to three daughters. She believes you never fully recovered from the car accident that claimed your sister-in-law's life, and explains some of the challenges you have faced, including anxiety, depression, and workplace stress. She speaks of your kindness, respect for others, and generosity with your time, particularly through your commitment to coaching young people in soccer. Your family has been deeply affected by your offending and your time in custody, yet they remain committed to supporting you in addressing your mental health issues.

75 The remaining character references echo these sentiments. They also emphasise your remorse and shame and the challenges that contributed to your offending. I have taken all of these matters into account and accept that you are a person of previous good character.

76 You have no criminal history and no record of adverse disciplinary findings. While this is broadly relevant and of some importance, it must be considered in its proper context. Your reputation and status as a solicitor allowed you to engage in the deceptions that you did - the victim implicitly placed her faith in the fact that you were a fit and proper person and an officer of this court. Your previous good character is therefore of limited weight in these circumstances.

77 You pleaded guilty to these charges, which is of utilitarian value. Your plea has facilitated the course of justice and has avoided the need for contested court hearings.

78 You first offered to plead guilty in around March of this year - three months prior to the trial listing. The prosecution submit that this constitutes a late plea. While this was disputed by your counsel, it was accepted that your plea was not an early one. I am of the view that it was neither early nor late, but falls somewhere in between. You are entitled to a discount on the sentence that reflects that.

79 The fact that your plea did not arrive at the earliest opportunity is not, in my opinion, indicative of a lack of remorse. As I have already noted, you did not seek legal representation until December 2024, and it was not until then that you engaged with the legal process in a meaningful way. Prior to that, you continued to behave in the procrastinatory and avoidant way that was symptomatic of your mental illnesses. It follows, then, that I am prepared to infer some level of remorse from your plea.

80 Turning to your prospects of rehabilitation, I again note that Dr Rakov considered your risk of reoffending to be low. While it is regrettable that you did not take more meaningful steps to address your gambling problem until you were remanded in custody, I consider that the loss of your career, the salutary effect of your incarceration, and the significant impact on your family, means there is no realistic prospect of you reoffending.

81 I do not accept the prosecution's submission that there is no evidence of rehabilitation beyond the absence of further offending. I also note Dr Rakov's evidence that incarceration has afforded you 'a degree of psychological relief and allowed for increased emotional stability and insight'.[43] In my view, if you continue to reflect on your offending and engage with treatment and support services while in custody, your prospects for rehabilitation are good.

82 You accept that as a consequence of your offending, your name will be removed from the Roll, and you will never again practice as a solicitor. The loss of your career is a matter I must take into account as a kind of ancillary punishment. However, it is your misconduct in that very profession which has led to the loss of your career, and so again, the weight which that factor carries must be significantly reduced.

83 There are a number of other factors I am required by law to take into account in determining the appropriate sentence.[44]

84 To begin with, I have considered the principle of parsimony.[45]

85 The primary factor guiding your sentence is the need for general deterrence. Your conduct strikes at the heart of public trust in the legal profession and the justice system. It is essential that your sentence reflects not only the gravity of your offending, but that it sends a clear and unequivocal message to other legal practitioners, and the broader community, that such breaches of trust will attract serious consequences.

86 As noted earlier, the issue of specific deterrence is of limited significance.

87 Counsel also referred me to several comparable cases, which I have considered.[46] Many of these involved continuing criminal enterprise offences, where the maximum penalty is doubled.[47] Although these cases are of assistance, as always, each case turns on its own unique facts.

89 Balancing, as best I am able, the competing considerations required by law and having regard to the matters I have just discussed, I sentence you to the following terms of imprisonment:

(a) On charge 1 - 3 years.

(b) On charges 2 and 3 - 9 months.

(c) On charges 4, 8 and 11 - 12 months.

(d) On charges 5 and 9 - 15 months.

(e) On charge 6 - 18 months.

(f) On charges 7 and 12 - 6 months.

(g) On charges 10 and 13 - 3 months.

(h) On charge 14 - 1 month.

90 I order that the base sentence is 3 years' imprisonment on charge 1. All other sentences are to be served concurrently, save where I specifically direct cumulation.

(a) On charges 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13 - 1 month each.

(b) On charges 5, 6 and 9 - 2 months each.

92 This means that you have a total effective sentence of 4 years and 3 months' imprisonment.

93 I order that you serve 2 years and 6 months before becoming eligible for parole.

94 I further declare that you have served 86 days of pre-sentence detention, not including today.

95 Pursuant to s 6AAA of Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ('the Act'), I declare that but for your pleas of guilty, I would have sentenced you to 7 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.

96 Finally, I make a compensation order under s 86 of the Act for $481,605.94 in favour of the Fidelity Fund.

97 I also declare that, pursuant to s 23(1) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law, your name and other particulars be removed from the Roll of persons admitted to the legal profession kept by this court.

Charge 2: On 15 November 2019, Mr Hadjina provided a letter to the victim in relation to 'Wrong Full [sic] Death/Wrongs Act/Dependency Claim' and providing the office account details 'with regards to depositing $25,000 as discussed'. On the same day, the victim transferred $25,000 to the office account.

Charge 3: On 2 December 2019, Mr Hadjina delivered a further letter to the victim referring to 'previous advice' and confirming the office account details 'with regards to depositing $25,000'. On the same day, the victim transferred $25,000 to the office account. Mr Hadjina provided a handwritten receipt for $50,000 for 'security of costs fees associated with wrongful death/dependency claim'.

Charge 4: On 25 February 2020, the victim transferred $30,000 to the office account, recording the payment reason as 'lawyer fees'. Mr Hadjina provided a receipt for 'security for costs, fees associated with wrongful death/dependency claim... total $80,000'.

Charge 5: On 24 March 2020, Mr Hadjina produced a letter headed 'Attention Supreme Court', which the victim signed. The letter made reference to provision of a 'further $20,000' in 'Security of Costs'. On the same day, the victim transferred $40,500 to the office account, recording the payment reason as 'court security fee.' Mr Hadjina provided two separate receipts for this payment: one for 'security of costs' and one for 'costs/disbursements'.

Charge 6 and 7: On 27 April 2020, the victim transferred $50,000 to the office account (charge 6) and on the following day, the victim transferred a further $19,500 (charge 7). The victim's bank records suggest this was meant to be a total transfer of $69,500, but was processed as two payments. On 27 April, Mr Hadjina provided a receipt for $69,500 for 'costs/disbursts [sic] fees associated with wrongful death/dependency claim'.

Charge 8: On 9 June 2020, Mr Hadjina provided the victim with a tax invoice for the sum of $30,800 for 'professional costs' in relation to 'Your Dependency/Wrongful Death Claims'. On the same day, the victim transferred $30,800 to the office account. Mr Hadjina provided an associated receipt for 'legal costs/solicitor client fees'.

Charge 9: On 20 July 2020, Mr Hadjina issued an identical invoice to that issued on 9 June 2020, but in the sum of $44,000. On the same day, the victim transferred $44,000 to the office account. Mr Hadjina provided an associated receipt for 'legal costs'.

Charge 10: On 23 July 2020, the victim transferred $8,420 into the office account at Mr Hadjina's request. Mr Hadjina provided a handwritten receipt for 'costs associated with claim and court'.

Charge 11: On 3 August 2020, the victim transferred $29,000 into the office account at Mr Hadjina's request. Mr Hadjina provided an associated receipt for 'costs of [indecipherable] fees associated with wrongful death + dependency claim'.

Charge 12: On 31 August 2020, the victim transferred $22,800 into the office account. Mr Hadjina provided an associated receipt for 'costs, costs associated with legal work/court application costs'.

Charge 13: On 29 January 2021, the victim transferred $11,023.80 into the office account at Mr Hadjina's request. Mr Hadjina provided an associated receipt for 'costs/in as agreed and to be reimbursed in total with interest already agreed'.

Charge 14: On 17 February 2021, the victim transferred $2,050 into the office account. Mr Hadjina provided an associated receipt for 'as agreed in, interest and reimbursement in total (with what has already been paid) for costs/disbursements'.

[1] The details of which are included in the Schedule to these reasons.

[2] Report of Dr Naveen Thomas dated 26 June 2025, 2 ('Thomas Report').

[3] At the plea hearing, you advised that since being remanded you have been prescribed Mirtazapine (an antidepressant) and continue to take tramadol, though with reduced reliance.

[4] Report of Dr Jacqueline Rakov dated 16 July 2025 ('Rakov Report') and Supplementary Report of Dr Jacqueline Rakov dated 3 November 2025 ('Supplementary Rakov Report').

[5] Transcript of Proceedings, DPP v Hadjina S ECR 2024 0220 (Supreme Court of Victoria, Incerti J, 13 November 2025) 24 ('Transcript').

[9] R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269 (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) ('Verdins').

[10] Supplementary Rakov Report, [1.5].

[19] [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA).

[20] Note: Oral submissions referred to limbs 1-4 and limb 5 of Verdins. However, there were no substantive submissions on limb 2, nor do I consider limb 2 to have any application in the present circumstances.

[21] DPP (Vic) v Patterson [2009] VSCA 222, [46]-[49]. See also Arthars v The Queen [2013] VSCA 258; (2013) 39 VR 613, 618 [13] ('Arthars'), Wright v The Queen (2015) 257 A Crim R 261, 271 [41].

[22] DPP v O'Neill [2015] VSCA 325; (2015) 47 VR 395, 414-15 [74]. See also Bowen v The Queen [2011] VSCA 67 [33]; Arthars 618 [13]-[15]; Qui v The Queen [2019] VSCA 147, [73].

[24] [2008] VSCA 51; (2008) 23 VR 500.

[28] R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 275 [25]-[26].

[29] DPP v Sidaoui [2019] VSC 225, [11].

[30] Kotsifas v The Queen [2021] VSCA 368, [79]-[80].

[32] (2007) 14 VR 392; [2007] VSCA 1; BC200700230 ('R v Merrett')

[34] [2013] VSCA 258; 39 VR 613.

[36] Supplementary Rakov Report, [2].

[38] [2019] VSC 279.

[41] DPP v Blackberry VSCA 296 at [33].

[42] Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59.

[43] Supplementary Rakov Report, [4.1]

[44] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s 5.

[45] Ibid, s 5(3).

[46] R v Maloney [2014] VSC 641; Kotsifas v The Queen [2021] VSCA 368; R v Munt [2015] VSC 132; R v Coleman [2013] VSC 548; DPP v Roache [2023] VCC 1034; R v Merrett [2007] VSCA 1; (2007) 14 VR 392; DPP v Bouhalis [2019] VSC 684.

[47] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s 6I.