After consultation, the Tribunal is in complete agreement that the proposed sanctions upon Mr Triffitt for his professional misconduct are not adequate in this set of circumstances. > > Accordingly, the Tribunal invites the parties to consider again their agreed position, especially with regard to length of time of that the Board is prohibited from licensing the Respondent and to the nature of any possible restrictions upon that licence and scrutiny upon its renewal. With regard to possible restrictions the Tribunal notes the contents of the Affidavits of Mr Tom Harrison and Dr P Reid, which were presented with the Respondent's response to the Complainant and with which, presumably, the Respondent agrees.

14. By letter dated 6 June 2024 (sic), Mr Triffitt's legal representative wrote to the Tribunal, with the stated consent of the Board's legal representative, advising that it was Mr Triffitt's position that:

The consent position filed by the parties was prepared following:

15. An adversarial negotiation facilitated by two legal practitioners with significant litigation experience, including in the field of professional regulation;
16. Facilitated by employed staff of [the Board] with significant experience in the field of ethics and professional regulation; and
17. Approved by [the Board] comprising a membership drawn from the profession and community, also with significant knowledge and experience.

In the circumstances, the Respondent submits there is not any "clear or exceptional reasons" to justify departing from the consent position of the parties. > > In any event, your letter suggests that in reaching its view that the "proposed sanctions...are not adequate," the Tribunal has had regard to affidavits of Mr Harrison and Dr Reid. > > At present, the only evidence before the Tribunal is a consent memorandum outlining a series of agreed facts and sanctions. > > Other documents have been filed with the Tribunal's Registry, but those documents are not in evidence before the Tribunal. We submit that it would constitute an error of law for the Tribunal to have regard to those documents without the consent of the parties or otherwise than having been properly taken into evidence at hearing in accordance with natural justice and procedural fairness.

18. On 30 June 2025, the day prior to the abolition of the former Tribunal, the Registrar, again, presumably on the instructions of the panel of the Tribunal, wrote to the parties effectively defending the contents of the letter of 15 May 2025 and concluding with:

As the Tribunal remains of the view that the proposed sanctions are inadequate, kindly advise whether you wish to make oral submissions on these matters, or whether the parties wish to continue negotiations to reach a conclusion that all participants can agree upon.

19. Following the transfer of the relevant jurisdiction to this Tribunal and the delivery of the former Tribunal's existing files, as these were "undetermined proceedings" in accordance with transitional provisions provided in the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Amendment Regulations 2025, the Tribunal's Principal Registrar wrote to the parties on 15 July 2025 requesting, amongst other things, confirmation (or otherwise) that the parties continued to seek orders by consent as originally sought from the former Tribunal, and submissions as to whether the Tribunal was in any way bound by the commentary provided by the former Tribunal in relation to the proposed consent orders.
20. On 17 July 2025, the legal representative for the Board, with the concurrence of the legal representative for Mr Triffitt, responded to the Principal Registrar's letter advising that the facts remained as agreed previously between the parties and that neither party departed from the proposed consent orders filed with the former Tribunal on 9 May 2025. The parties advised that they did not wish to make any further submissions and were content if the Tribunal decided to determine the matter without being further heard, that is, without conducting a hearing. In relation to the commentary provided by the former Tribunal, the parties submitted that:

The correspondence of the Property Agents Tribunal of 15 May 2025 and 30 June 2025 is not a determination, finding or ruling by that Tribunal; at most those letters are expressions of (presumably tentative) opinion and/or concern, and constitute an invitation for the parties to consider their position and to put submissions to the tribunal at an appropriately convened hearing.

21. In this regard, we agree with the submissions put by the parties. Whilst the correspondence issued by the former Tribunal put forward a clear opinion, there is nothing to suggest that it amounted to a final determination or ruling of the former Tribunal, as constituted. It is unclear as to the intended purpose of the correspondence issued by the former Tribunal on 30 June 2025. Given it was issued on the day prior to the former Tribunal's abolition, the former Tribunal could not have intended to have proceeded to further determine the matter, and the transitional provisions in no way suggest that this Tribunal would be bound by what can be best described as procedural commentary.
22. Having reviewed the documents that are before us by way of consent, together with the contents of the administrative file of the former Tribunal, we were satisfied that it was appropriate to proceed to determine these proceedings on the papers and have proceeded to do so.

1. The Act is legislation intended to regulate certain auction and real estate practices, and to regulate property agents generally.
2. Whilst the Act does not codify the functions of the Tribunal in determining matters under the Act, the functions which the Act prescribes to the Board are instructive. In the circumstances of this matter, the following functions of the Board prescribed in s 6(1) are pertinent:

(c) to ensure that property agents comply with the requirements of this Act relating to their conduct in carrying on their businesses or in performing their functions and, where they fail to do so, to take appropriate action, including disciplinary action, to protect the public and to discourage such conduct;

(e) to develop and ensure compliance with a Code of Conduct for property agents;

1. The term "property agent" is defined in s 3(1) of the Act as:

a real estate agent, a property manager, a general auctioneer, or a property representative.

2. Part 7 of the Act provides for the complaints against, and the disciplining of, property agents. The Board is required to establish a Code of Conduct for property agents to regulate their professional practice, conduct and discipline (s 84 of the Act). Section 85 of the Act specifies the applicability of the Code of Conduct:

85. Application of Code of Conduct > > (1) The Code of Conduct is to contain guidance on what does or does not constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct. > > (2) The Code is to specify, in particular, the obligation that a real estate agent named in Part 1(1) of the Register, a property manager named in Part 2(1) of the Register or a general auctioneer named in Part 3(1) of the Register has to supervise people employed by the agent, manager or auctioneer, and the agent's, manager's or auctioneer's liability in the event of their failure to carry out that obligation. > > (3) A failure on the part of a property agent to observe a provision of the Code does not of itself render the property agent liable to disciplinary action, but the failure may be relied upon as tending to establish that the property agent was guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.

3. There is no contention that the applicable Code of Conduct in these proceedings is version 3 effective 1 July 2018 and that the provisions of the Code relied upon by the Board in framing the complaints against Mr Triffitt are valid. The relevant provisions have been outlined above as applicable to each complaint and do not need to be restated.
4. Part 7 of the Act provides the following definitions of unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct in s 83(1):

unsatisfactory professional conduct includes conduct of a property agent when acting as a property agent that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a reasonable member of the public is entitled to expect from a reasonably competent property agent. > > professional misconduct includes -

(a) unsatisfactory professional conduct of a property agent, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and

(b) conduct of a property agent whether occurring when acting as a property agent or occurring otherwise than when acting as a property agent, that would, if established, justify a finding that the property agent is not a fit and proper person to continue to act as a property agent;

1. In the event that the Tribunal finds that a property agent has been guilty of the conduct that was the subject of the complaint, we may take one or more of the following actions under s 110(1) of the Act:

(a) suspend the licence of the property agent;

(b) cancel the licence of the property agent and prohibit the Board from licensing him or her without the approval of the Tribunal;

(c) prohibit the property agent from conducting all or any part of real estate agency business, property management business or general auctioneering business, as the case may be, permanently or for a period specified by the Tribunal;

(d) impose on the property agent a fine not exceeding an amount equivalent to 750 penalty units;

(e) prohibit the property agent from conducting all or any part of real estate agency business, property management business or general auctioneering business, as the case may be, except in accordance with conditions, restrictions or limitations specified by the Tribunal;

(f) require the property agent to take or refrain from taking actions specified by the Tribunal;

(g) caution or reprimand the property agent.

1. As previously noted, the parties have provided to the Tribunal a statement of agreed facts. The following is a summary of the agreed facts that forms the basis of the complaint against Mr Triffitt.
2. At all material times Mr Triffitt was a property representative, and therefore a property agent for the purposes of s 3 of the Act. As such, he was subject to the Code of Conduct version 3 issued by the Board. Mr Triffitt was an employee of K F Tas (Property Services) Tas Pty Ltd, a real estate agent for the purposes of the Act, which treaded under the business name Knight Fank Tasmania (Knight Frank).
3. On a date unknown, but around March 2019, Mr Triffitt opened an email account with the address "sujatapradhan1311@yahoo.com" (the Email Address) which was maintained and accessible by him.

1. In March 2019, Mr Triffitt was responsible for the listing of a property for sale at Collins Street, Hobart (Property 1).
2. On or about 28 March 2019, Mr Triffitt prepared and presented to the owner of Property 1 as genuine, a false contract for sale for the property and had the owner of Property 1 sign the false contract (Contract 1). Contract 1 named an unrelated person, Sujata Pradhan, who had made no offer and expressed no interest in Property 1, as purchaser, and contained, or was accompanied by, the Email Address for the purpose of directing correspondence regarding Contract 1 intended for the named purchaser, to the Mr Triffitt. Mr Triffitt signed Contract 1 purporting to be Sujata Pradhan.
3. On 28 March 2019, Mr Triffitt provided Contract 1, as signed by himself and the owner of Property 1 to Knight Frank's administrative assistant Ms Bodi Jacobs in the knowledge that Knight Frank's office procedure would cause Ms Jacobs to, amongst other things, email a copy of the contract to the vendor, the vendor's solicitor and the purchaser's solicitor. As a consequence of the provision of Contract 1 to Ms Jacobs Contract 1 was emailed by Ms Jacobs to the owner of Property 1, and solicitors in the firms Page Seager and Butler McIntyre & Butler, thereby representing Contract 1 as genuine.
4. On 18 April 2019, Ms Jacobs sent an email to Mr Triffitt querying whether a deposit had been paid for Contract 1. Mr Triffitt sent an email reply to Ms Jacobs representing that a deposit had 'been transferred' for Contract 1, in the knowledge that Ms Jacobs would and/or intended to convey that information to the others involved with the purported sale of Property 1. Ms Jacobs, in reliance on the Mr Triffitt's representation, sent an email to Page Seager as solicitors acting for the owner of Property 1, falsely advising that a deposit of $168,000.00 in respect of Contract 1 had been paid into the trust account of Knight Frank.
5. Between about April 2019 and 25 June 2019 (inclusive), Mr Triffitt sent emails from the Email Address in respect of Contract 1 to Page Seager as solicitors acting for the owner of Property 1, purporting to be Sujata Pradhan, and culminating in a representation that a condition precedent to completion of Contract 1 was not fulfilled.
6. By an email sent on 17 July 2019, Mr Triffitt represented to Page Seager, as solicitors acting for the owner of Property 1, that Knight Frank held a deposit for Contract 1.

1. In July 2019, Mr Triffitt was responsible for the listing of a property for sale at Nelson Road, Mount Nelson (Property 2). On or about 22 July 2019, Mr Triffitt prepared a false contract for the sale of Property 2 (Contract 2). The false contract named a fictitious purchaser, Community Ventures Discretionary Trust, created by Mr Triffitt, and contained, or was accompanied by, the Email Address for the purpose of directing correspondence regarding Contract 2 to Mr Triffitt. Mr Triffitt presented the false contract to the owners of Property 2 by email, as genuine, and had the owners of Property 2 sign the false contract. Mr Triffitt signed the false contract as the purported representative of Community Ventures Discretionary Trust.
2. On 26 August 2019, Contract 2 was sent by email by Mr Triffitt to Lowrie Kent Conveyancers as conveyancers acting for the owners of Property 2, thereby representing Contract 2 as genuine.
3. On 27 August 2019 and 28 August 2019, Mr Triffitt sent emails from the Email Address in respect of Contract 2 to solicitors and/or conveyancers acting in the purported sale of Property 2, purporting to be a representative of Community Ventures Discretionary Trust, and culminating in a representation that a condition precedent to completion of Contract 2 was not fulfilled.

1. In April and May 2020, Mr Triffitt was responsible for the listing of a property for sale at Brinsmead Road, Mount Nelson (Property 3).
2. On or about 6 May 2020, Mr Triffitt prepared a false contract for sale for Property 3 (Contract 3). The false contract named a fictitious purchaser, Hamdy Azab, created by Mr Triffitt, and contained, or was accompanied by, the Email Address for the purpose of directing correspondence regarding Contract 3 to Mr Triffitt. Mr Triffitt presented the false contract to the owner of Property 3 as genuine and had the owner of Property 3 sign the false contract. Mr Triffitt signed the false contract purporting to be Hamdy Azab.
3. On 18 May 2020, Contract 3 was sent by email by Mr Triffitt to Simmons Wolfhagen as solicitors acting for the owner of Property 3, thereby representing Contract 3 as genuine. Mr Triffitt sent an email to the owner of Property 3, and Simmons Wolfhagen as solicitors acting for the owner of Property 3, advising that a deposit for the purchase of Property 3 had been paid into the trust account of Knight Frank.
4. Between 18 May 2020 and 1 June 2020, Mr Triffitt sent emails from the Email Address, purporting to be Hamdy Azab, to the owner of Property 3 and his solicitors Simmons Wolfhagen, and culminating in a representation that a condition precedent to completion of Contract 3 was not fulfilled.
5. By way of the memorandum filed on, and dated, 9 May 2025, the parties have agreed that Mr Triffitt's conduct as set out by the agreed facts, amounts to him being guilty of conduct which amounts to professional misconduct as defined in s 83 of the Act. That conduct relates to 20 separate breaches as summarised below:

(a) Complaints 1, 2 and 3: Representing to someone else anything that is false or misleading in relation to the sale of a property (Act, s. 56(1)).

1. On 28 March 2019, Mr Triffitt gave to his client, the owner of Property 1, what purported to be a contract for the sale of the property at Collins Street, Hobart, but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.
2. On or about 25 July 2019, Mr Triffitt gave to his clients, the owners of Property 2, what purported to be a contract for the sale of the property at Nelson Road, Mount Nelson, but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.
3. On 6 May 2020, Mr Triffitt gave to his client, the owner of Property 3, what purported to be a contract for the sale of the property at Brinsmead Road, Mount Nelson, but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.

(b) Complaint 4, 5 and 6: Failing to accept that the Respondent's first responsibility is to serve the interests of the client, to act fairly, honestly, and in a reasonable manner (Code, s. 8(a)).

1. On 28 March 2019 Mr Triffitt gave to his client, the owner of Property 1 what purported to be a contract for the sale of the property at Collins Street, Hobart but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.
2. On or about 25 July 2019 Mr Triffitt gave to his clients, the owners of Property 2, what purported to be a contract for the sale of the property at Nelson Road, Mount Nelson but which was, to the knowledge of the Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.
3. On 6 May 2020 Mr Triffitt gave to his client, the owner of Property 3, what purported to be a contract for the sale of the property at Brinsmead Road, Mount Nelson but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt , a false contract prepared by him.

(c) Complaint 7, 8 and 9: Knowingly conveying to a client a false or misleading impression about any matter related to a transaction (Code, s. 9(1)(g)(i)).

1. On 28 March 2019, Mr Triffitt conveyed to his client, the owner of Property 1, the false and/or misleading impression that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Collins Street, Hobart but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.
2. On or about 25 July 2019, Mr Triffitt conveyed to his clients, the owners of Property 2, the false and/or misleading impression that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Nelson Road, Mount Nelson but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.
3. On 6 May 2020, Mr Triffitt conveyed to his client, the owner of Property 3 the false and/or misleading impression that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Brinsmead Road, Mount Nelson but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.

(d) Complaint 10, 11 and 12: Knowingly making to a client a representation which is false or misleading (Code, s. 9(1)(g)(ii)).

1. On 28 March 2019, Mr Triffitt falsely and/or misleadingly represented to his client, the owner of Property 1, that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Collins Street, Hobart when there was only, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.
2. On or about 25 July 2019, Mr Triffitt falsely and/or misleadingly represented to his clients, the owners of Property 2 that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Nelson Road, Mount Nelson when there was only, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared by him.
3. On, 6 May 2020, Mr Triffitt knowingly, falsely and/or misleadingly represented to his client, the owner of Property 3 that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Brinsmead Road, Mount Nelson when there was only, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt a false contract prepared by him.

(e) Complaint 13, 14, 15 and 16: Knowingly allowing to be conveyed to a customer a false or misleading impression about any matter related to a transaction (Code, s. 9(2)(d)(i)).

1. On 28 March 2019 and 18 April 2019, Mr Triffitt allowed his employer, Knight Frank, to convey to:

   a) his customers, Page Seager and Butler McIntyre & Butler the false and/or misleading impression that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Collins Street, Hobart but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared and signed by him; and

   b) to his customer Page Seager that a contract deposit had been transferred to Knight Frank when, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt no transfer had been made.

   1. Between April 2019 and 9 August 2019, Mr Triffitt:

      a) conveyed to his customers, Page Seager and Butler McIntyre & Butler the false and/or misleading impression that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Collins Street, Hobart but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared and signed by him; and

      b) represented to Page Seager that Knight Frank held a deposit for Contract 1 when, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, it did not.

   2. On or about 30 July 2019, 26 August 2019, 27 August 2019 and 30 August 2019, Mr Triffitt conveyed to his customer and Kent Lowrie Conveyancing the false and/or misleading impression that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Nelson Road, Mount Nelson but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared and signed by him.

   3. Between 18 May 2020 and 1 June 2020, Mr Triffitt conveyed to his customer and Simmons Wolfhagen the false and/or misleading impression that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Brinsmead Road, Mount Nelson but which was, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared and signed by him.

(f) Complaint 17, 18, 19 and 20: Knowingly allowing to be made to a customer a representation which is false or misleading (Code, s. 9(2)(d)(ii)).

1. On 28 March 2019 and 18 April 2019, Mr Triffitt allowed his employer, Knight Frank, to falsely and/or misleadingly represented to his customers, Page Seager and Butler McIntyre & Butler that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Collins Street, Hobart when there was only, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared and signed by him.
2. Between April 2019 and 25 June 2019, Mr Triffitt falsely and/or misleadingly represented to his customers, Page Seager and Butler McIntyre & Butler that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Collins Street, Hobart when there was only, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared and signed by him.
3. On or about 30 July 2019, 26 August 2019, 27 August 2019 and 30 August 2019, Mr Triffitt falsely and/or misleadingly represented to his customer and Kent Lowrie Conveyancing that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Nelson Road, Mount Nelson when there was only, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared and signed by him.
4. Between 18 May 2020 and 1 June 2020, Mr Triffitt falsely and/or misleadingly represented to his customer and Simmons Wolfhagen that there was a genuine contract for the sale of the property at Brinsmead Road, Mount Nelson when there was only, to the knowledge of Mr Triffitt, a false contract prepared and signed by him.

1. The consent memorandum of 9 May 2025 provides the following agreed position as to proposed sanctions and other matters of relevance and mitigation:

Matters of Relevance and Mitigation > > 5. The respondent asserts, and the applicant accepts, that he has limited financial capacity to meet a sizeable fine and costs order if made against him. The quantum of both the fine and costs order proposed by the parties, has taken into account the respondent's financial circumstances as made known to the applicant and summarised in Annexure "A" hereto. > > 6. The parties accept and agree that at the time of the respondents' conduct the subject of the Complaint, the respondent was suffering high level of work stress and symptoms of anxiety, depression and problematic alcohol use (Alcohol Use Disorder). It is not agreed that these matters were a causative contributor to the respondent's conduct, but it is agreed that these constitute mitigatory matters. > > 7. The applicant acknowledges and submits that while ordinarily the conduct the subject of its complaint in this matter would potentially call for more onerous orders, the mitigatory circumstances of this matter appropriately permit an approach which seeks to differently balance the respondent's personal circumstances with the public protective functions of the applicant and the Tribunal, and to which the below consent orders are directed. > > Consent Orders > > 8. For these reasons, and without either party requiring the Tribunal to convene an evidentiary hearing or hear further submissions unless the Tribunal so wishes, the parties seeks orders by consent as follows: > > (i) The respondent is found guilty of each charge of the Complaint. > > (ii) The: > > (a) property agent licence of the respondent be cancelled; and > > (b) applicant be prohibited from licensing the respondent under the Act without the approval of the Property Agents Tribunal for a period of five years, > > with effect from 23 June 2021. > > (iii) The respondent is prohibited from conducting all or any part of a real estate agency business, for a period of five years. > > (iv) The respondent pay the applicant a fine of $10,000.00 within six months of the date of the Tribunal's orders. > > (v) The respondent pay the applicant's costs of the Complaint as agreed or as taxed by the Tribunal as between solicitor and client at 85% of the Scale in Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000, and to be 'capped' at $10,000, within six months of the date of the Tribunal's orders.

1. As previously noted, the parties have requested the Tribunal to determine the complaint based upon agreed facts and an agreed position as to the sanctions to be imposed.
2. The Tribunal has previously considered (for example, see Medical Board of Australia v Dr Ian Payne [2024] TASCAT 104 at [8]) the principles to be applied in disciplinary proceedings where the parties have reached an agreed position as those principles enunciated by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in the matter of Medical Board of Australia v Zhao [2021] VCAT 1053 at [9] to [10]:

The law relating to a negotiated settlement, of the kind reflected in the [agreed statement of facts], is well settled and summarised in the following principles: > > (a) There is an important public policy benefit in receiving, and if appropriate, accepting agreed penalty submissions; > > (b) A court or tribunal must have regard to any such agreement reached between the parties and should not readily depart from an agreed finding and sanction where a negotiated settlement and proposed penalty are broadly speaking within the permissible range, having regard to all the circumstances; and > > (c) It is highly desirable for a tribunal to accept the parties' proposal, provided it is persuaded the agreed outcome is accurate and appropriate and does not represent an arbitrary outcome, but reflects a carefully and extensively negotiated outcome that has proper regard to all relevant facts and circumstances. > > However, an agreement between the parties does not automatically determine the outcome and can never supplant the Tribunal's duty to determine the appropriate level of conduct alleged and the determinations to be imposed. The Tribunal must reach appropriate findings and determinations after examining all the circumstances, including the ASOF, applying the statutory definitions and having regard to applicable standards of professional conduct.

3. The facts relevant to the complaint have been agreed between the parties as set out in [31] to [46] above. Mr Triffitt has been legally represented throughout these proceedings and at the time that the memorandum of consent was entered into between the parties. On this basis we find, as facts, the matters set out in [31] to [46] above.
4. Given the facts as found, and the admissions made by Mr Triffitt, we find that Mr Triffitt breached s 56(1) of the Act and clauses s 8(a), s 9(1)(g)(i), s (9)(1)(g)(ii), s 9(2)(d)(i) and s 9(2)(d)(ii) of the Code of Conduct.
5. The Board has submitted that Mr Triffitt's admitted conduct amounts to professional misconduct as defined in s 83(1) of the Act. Mr Triffitt agrees with this characterisation. Given the nature and seriousness of the conducted admitted to by Mr Triffitt, over a period of some 15 months, and the significance of the breach of the trust relationship between Mr Triffitt and the vendors, we are satisfied that Mr Triffitt is guilty of professional misconduct.
6. Having determined to the level of satisfaction required that Mr Triffitt has engaged in conduct which amounts to professional misconduct, we must now decide whether the agreed proposed sanctions are appropriate in all the circumstances. This requires an examination as to whether the proposed sanctions are, broadly speaking, within the permissible range, and that they reflect a carefully and extensively negotiated outcome that has proper regard to all relevant facts and circumstances.
7. There is no doubt in our view that the conduct engaged in by Mr Triffitt was exceedingly foolish and involved a serious breach of the trust placed in him by the impacted vendor clients who he misled in a most egregious manner. His conduct also involved the intentional misleading of his colleagues to engender belief that the contracts for sale that he had falsified were real. This would have been serious enough in itself if he had engaged in the conduct just once. Rather, he engaged in the same pattern of conduct three times over a period spanning some 15 months. When viewed solely through this lens it is questionable as to whether the agreed sanctions sit within the permissible range.
8. However, we are ultimately satisfied that the agreed sanctions are within the permissible range taking account of all relevant facts and circumstances, such that we should not depart from the agreed position, having taken account of the following five matters.
9. First, we place weight on the position taken by the Board, as the relevant regulatory body, that whilst ordinarily Mr Triffitt's conduct should result in more onerous sanctions than as agreed, the mitigatory factors of Mr Triffitt's personal circumstances balanced against the need to exercise the public protective function permit acceptance of the agreed position. As Murphy J said in Inglese v Estate Agents Board & Anor (Unreported Supreme Court of Victoria, 15 August 1988):

If an estate agent is to be disqualified, the purpose which the Tribunal should have in mind is not the punishment of the individual (though it may appear to be a punishment to him) but the importance of protecting the public and the necessity to maintain standards in the conduct of an estate agent's business.

10. We have taken account of Mr Triffitt's personal circumstances at the time the conduct occurred, that is, that he was suffering from a high level of work stress and symptoms of anxiety, depression, and problematic alcohol use. Such matters in no way excuse the conduct in question, but they do assist in providing an explanation for the conduct. Further, we are mindful that Mr Triffitt did not financially benefit from his conduct. Rather, presumably his conduct, coloured by his vulnerabilities at that time, was intended to promote the appearance of him "performing" to his clients, employer, and / or his peers.
11. Second, we are cognisant of Mr Triffitt's personal financial circumstances as they have been explained to us. Whilst a significantly higher fine could be imposed in the circumstances, we are satisfied that the agreed sanction, in combination with the award of costs against him, will represent a significant financial impost upon Mr Triffitt which is commensurate with the conduct he has been found guilty of.
12. Third, on examining applicable caselaw as to the sanctions imposed upon property agents who have been found guilty of similar conduct, we are satisfied that the agreed sanctions fall within the permissible range. For example, in the proceedings before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal of Director of Consumer Affairs v Rakocevic [2012] VCAT 1361, an agent who was found to have made multiple false deposit receipts and made false statements in multiple contracts of sale, resulting in significant personal financial gain, was not fined, due to his precarious financial circumstances, but was prohibited from holding an agent's licence for five years:

[30] In my view, permanent disqualification of Mr Rakocevic 's licence as sought by Ms Bannon is too harsh a penalty in the circumstances of this case. It may be that he will be able at some time in the future to show that "he has established himself as a different man" (Ex parte Tziniolis: Re Medical Practitioners Act (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448 at 461). However, I formed the view that his licence should be cancelled and he should be disqualified from holding a licence for a period of five years from the date of this order.

13. Fourth, we have taken account of the period of time that has passed since the complaint was first made against Mr Triffitt in February 2021. He has been suspended since that time, nearly five years. On the information available to us, whilst there may have been issues raised by Mr Triffitt at certain junctures as to the appropriate characterisation of his conduct, it is apparent that he made admissions as to his conduct at the time the complaint was first made. There is nothing before us to suggest he has been anything but co-operative with the Board during the course of their investigations.
14. As noted by the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia in the matter of Medical Board of Australia and Myers [2014] WASAT 137 (S) at [9]:

The appropriate sanction is to be considered at the time of the making of the sanction and not by reference to the date of the unprofessional acts (Legal Profession Complaints Committee and A Legal Practitioner [2013] WASAT 37 (S) (A Legal Practitioner (S)) at [23]; Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Segler [2014] WASC 159 (Segler) at [7]; A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of NSW [2004] HCA l; [2004] HCA 1; (2004) 216 CLR 253 (A Solicitor [2004] NSW) at [15]; Love at [16]).

15. Whilst we have not been provided with any current information as to Mr Triffitt's personal circumstances, other than his financial position, we have no reason to doubt that Mr Triffitt, akin to any person the subject of professional disciplinary complaint proceedings, has experienced significant stress, if not potentially distress, as a result of these proceedings against him remaining unresolved for nearly five years. In this regard, we find that the following commentary provided by the Supreme Court of Canada in Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz [2022] 2 SCR 220 at [55] to [56] is instructive:

[55] In disciplinary proceedings, inordinate delay can be harmful to members of professional bodies, complainants and the public in general. Allegations of misconduct against a member can weigh heavily on that person. They can overshadow his or her professional reputation, career and personal life. Anxiety and stress caused by the uncertainty of the outcome and the stigma attached to outstanding complaints are good reasons to investigate and prosecute in a timely way. Disciplinary bodies have a duty to deal fairly with members whose livelihood and reputation are affected by such proceedings. > > [56] Complainants, whether patients or clients, benefit from having their case proceed promptly, so that they can be heard and move on to put the matter behind them. Finally, the public at large expects professionals guilty of misconduct to be effectively regulated and properly sanctioned. Given their role to protect the public from harmful professional conduct, disciplinary bodies must ensure that the public's concerns are addressed on a timely basis: Wachtler v. College of Physicians and Surgeons 2009 ABCA 130, 448 A.R. 317, at paras. 46-47.

16. Finally, given Mr Triffitt's property agent licence has been cancelled as a result of our orders, a relevant factor in our consideration is that if, after the period of disqualification expires, Mr Triffitt seeks registration under the Act, s 18(1)(b) of the Act mandates that the Board must not grant the application unless satisfied that Mr Triffitt is, at that time, a fit and proper person to hold a property agent licence. If the Board was minded to grant such an application, it could determine to do so subject to any conditions it considered appropriate pursuant to s 20(1) of the Act. In any event, if such circumstances were to arise, the Board would need to take account of these findings of professional misconduct against Mr Triffitt and evaluate whether granting such application would be in compliance with the Board's functions as specified in 6(1) of the Act.

1. For the reasons provided, we make the following orders:

(i) Thomas Ian Triffitt is found guilty of the conduct that was the subject of each charge of the complaint.

(ii) The:

(a) property agent licence of Mr Triffitt is cancelled; and

(b) the Property Agents Board is prohibited from licensing Mr Triffitt under the Act without the approval of the Tribunal for a period of five years,

(iii) Mr Triffitt is prohibited from conducting all or any part of a real estate agency business, for a period of five (5) years with effect from 23 June 2021.

(iv) Mr Triffitt is to pay to the Property Agent Board a fine of $10,000.00 within six (6) months of the date of this order

(v) Mr Triffitt is to pay the Property Agent Boards' costs of the complaint as agreed, or as taxed by the Tribunal as between solicitor and client at 85% of the Scale in Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000, up to a maximum amount payable of $10,000, within six (6) months of the date of this order.