Praljak v Office of the Australian Information Commissioner

1. The application to extend time, accepted for filing on 10 September 2024, is dismissed. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

MCELWAINE J: 1 The applicant, Mr Adrian Praljak, who describes his occupation as "Australian and Global Lawyer and Attorney-At-Law", is a self-represented litigant with a significant history of failed applications in this Court and others. 2 In the present proceeding, on 10 September 2024, he filed an application for an extension of time which named the office of the Australian Information Commissioner "and another" as the respondents. The schedule to the application does not identify the "other" respondent. Nor does it identify the decision for which an extension of time is required. The applicant also lodged a draft originating application for judicial review on 10 September 2024. The draft originating application specifies the decision of 19 July 2019 made by the Commissioner as the subject of the review. The schedule to that document identifies the law firm Minter Ellison as the second respondent. Although the Commissioner and Minter Ellison have each filed a notice of address for service, neither seeks to be heard on the application to extend time. 3 I made procedural orders on 13 September 2024, for the filing of outlines of submissions and for the determination of the application on the papers. The applicant relies on his submissions dated 16 September 2024 and his affidavits made respectively on 4 and 16 September 2024. 4 There is no copy of any decision made by the Commissioner dated 19 July 2019 attached to either affidavit. I am prepared to accept, however, that the applicant may have made a mistake in his draft originating application by intending to refer to decisions evidenced in the form of letters from the Commissioner and addressed to the applicant dated respectively 5 and 10 July 2019. 5 The decision of 5 July 2019 was made by an investigations officer within the dispute resolution branch of the Commissioner. It concerns a privacy complaint that the applicant made about Bond University pursuant to s 36 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The gravamen of that complaint was to the effect that the University had interfered with the applicant's privacy by inappropriately disclosing some personal information. Having set out some facts, the investigations officer conveyed the preliminary view that an investigation of the complaint would not be warranted within the meaning of s 41(1)(da) of the Privacy Act and advised the Commissioner may determine not to further investigate a complaint if satisfied that there has not been an interference with privacy and an investigation is not warranted in the circumstances. The applicant was invited to provide a response to the preliminary view by 12 July 2019, failing which he was advised the Commissioner would make a decision based on the available information which would likely result in closure of the complaint. 6 The decision of 10 July 2019 is concerned with a complaint made by the applicant about certain conduct of Minter Ellison, to the effect that the firm interfered with the applicant's privacy "by sabotaging [his] previous business ideas". The investigations officer expressed the preliminary view that the complaint lacked substance under s 41(1)(d) of the Privacy Act and Minter Ellison had not interfered with the applicant's privacy as defined by the Privacy Act. The applicant was advised to provide a response to the preliminary view by 17 July 2019, failing which the Commissioner would decide based on the available information and close the complaint. 7 The applicant contends that the decisions of the Commissioner are "fundamentally flawed" but omits to say whether he responded within the specified time frames. The applicant in his first affidavit makes generalised assertions to the effect that the Commissioner failed to conduct a thorough investigation, ignored significant new evidence, misunderstood the Australian Privacy Principles, denied procedural fairness, and reached a decision that was illogical and which failed to address key aspects of the complaint. The list of the key aspects includes allegations of serious criminal misbehaviour against Bond University, Minter Ellison, some other law firms, and the Duke of York. None of this makes any sense. 8 In the same affidavit, the applicant attempts to explain the delay in the filing of his intended application for judicial review. The matters that he adverts to are as follows. First, "the complexity of the legal issues involved required extensive research and consultation with legal experts". No particulars are given of what was done, why the issue was complex or with whom he consulted. For a self-described "Global Lawyer", it should not have been difficult for the applicant to understand whether he had a case for judicial review of either decision of the Commissioner. There is no merit in this assertion. 9 The second matter relied on is expressed as follows: I needed time to gather additional evidence to support my application, including Australian and International Law Enforcement Statements, Reports, Witness Statements, Reports, Medical and Other Statements, Applications and Reports (sic). 10 Apart from attaching some sessional notes from a clinical psychologist dated 1 March 2024 and some letters from a clinical psychologist dated 8 March 2023 and 21 August 2023, the applicant has not disclosed any of the other evidence to which he refers. None of those reports explain why the applicant was unable to proceed promptly with a review application of the impugned decisions. 11 The third explanation asserts that the applicant was "initially unaware of the full implications of the [Commissioners] decision on the grounds for judicial review available to me". That is a bare conclusion, which is unhelpful and unpersuasive. 12 The fourth explanation is the contention that the applicant suffers from "Serious Medical Disabilities and Medical Injuries, Including Latent Personal Injuries, Mental Personal Injuries and Physical Personal Injuries" (sic). Some of those contentions find support in the psychologist's reports, but none of that explains why the applicant was delayed in commencing his review application between July 2019 and September 2024. 13 The last matter relied on is an assertion that the applicant suffers from "Extreme Financial Hardship", is in receipt of Centrelink jobseeker payments and possesses a Centrelink pension card. That does not explain the delay, and in any event, I note that financial hardship has not prevented the applicant from engaging in litigation in this Court, the Supreme Court of Queensland, and the Fair Work Commission in 15 decided cases between December 2021 and August 2024 (according to the database maintained by Austlii). On the last occasion that the applicant sought an extension of time, for leave to appeal orders made by a primary judge in this Court, he failed before Mortimer CJ because, inter alia, he failed to disclose any adequate explanation for his delay: Praljak v State of Queensland [2024] FCA 467. 14 The application for an extension of time fails at the first hurdle: there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay. It also fails for other reasons. The proposed grounds of review comprise a list of common errors of law, some jurisdictional. They include a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, legal unreasonableness and breach of procedural fairness. Each ground is stated propositionally with no identification of relevance to the impugned decision. As such, the grounds fail to perform the basal function of identifying error. Further, the relief sought includes this complete nonsense: An order that, All Available, Maximum Financial compensations, including: Punitive Damages, pecuniary Damages, Exemplary Damages, Equitable Financial Compensation and Damages, Equity Relief, Loss of Past and Future Economic Financial Losses, Delayed Financial Damages, Financial Compound Interests on all Financial Compensation Amounts awarded by this Court and their Honourable Justices and Remedies be awarded...(sic). 15 Time should never be extended when it is manifestly clear that a proposed proceeding, if commenced, would be struck out as an abuse of process. That is this case. 16 I conclude these reasons by recording that the applicant has frequently bombarded my chambers with irrelevant, impertinent, and manifestly improper emails, which appear to have been copied to various ministers and government agencies. More than 100 emails have been received since this matter was docketed to me in September 2024. Many of the emails attach voluminous documents. Some of this material on objective analysis is an attempt to influence my decision-making. Despite the warning of Mortimer CJ in the case just mentioned, the lesson has not been learned by the applicant. I repeat what her Honour said at [16] in the sanguine expectation that the conduct will cease, and if not, it may be the subject of a referral to the Registrar for consideration as to whether contempt proceedings should be initiated: Mr Praljak also sent (or copied) to my chambers a voluminous amount of correspondence, involving a wide range of complaints to regulatory and law enforcement bodies, Judges and Ministers, about purported and alleged criminal activity and other conspiracies against him and others, often accompanied by large numbers of attachments. Mr Praljak was informed by my chambers that he should cease copying the Court into this correspondence, and that the Court would only assess his applications by reference to the documents filed in each proceeding and not by reference to any material provided in this way. Mr Praljak has not ceased sending or copying such correspondence to my chambers. 17 For these reasons, the application is dismissed. I certify that the preceding seventeen (17) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McElwaine.