Praljak v State of Queensland

Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Norton Rose Fulbright

Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant represented himself

Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms P Bindon

Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison

Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant represented himself

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S J Webster

Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison

order made by: MORTIMER CJ DATE OF ORDER: 6 May 2024

1. The application in proceeding VID 40 of 2024 for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal from the orders of McEvoy J on 30 November 2022 be refused.
2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the proceeding. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

AND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE) First Respondent

COMMODORE JAN WILTSHIRE (FORMERLY CAPTAIN JE NOONAN) Second Respondent

order made by: MORTIMER CJ DATE OF ORDER: 6 May 2024

1. The application in proceeding VID 41 of 2024 for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal from the orders of Logan J on 14 December 2021 be refused.
2. The applicant pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the proceeding. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

AND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA) First Respondent

JUSTICE JOHN ALEXANDER LOGAN Second Respondent

order made by: MORTIMER CJ DATE OF ORDER: 6 May 2024

1. The application in proceeding VID 42 of 2024 for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal from the orders of McEvoy J on 30 November 2022 and 8 December 2022 be refused.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent's costs of and incidental to the proceeding. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

AND: BOND UNIVERSITY LIMITED ACN 010 694 121 Respondent

order made by: MORTIMER CJ DATE OF ORDER: 6 May 2024

1. The application in proceeding VID 43 of 2024 for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal from the orders of McEvoy J on 30 November 2022 be refused.
2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the proceeding. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

MORTIMER CJ: 1 The applicant, Mr Praljak, wishes to seek leave to appeal from four sets of orders in four different proceedings commenced by him in this Court against various respondents. Each of his leave applications is well out of time, between 13 months to 23 months to be more precise. Therefore, Mr Praljak must secure an order extending the time in which he may seek leave to appeal. If he does not secure an extension of time, his leave application cannot be determined. 2 The proceedings in which he seeks an extension of time and leave to appeal are as follows.

The State of Queensland application 3 In proceeding VID40/2024 (the State of Queensland application), Mr Praljak seeks leave to appeal against orders made by McEvoy J on 30 November 2022. Those orders related to an application by Mr Praljak for leave to make an application to the Court pursuant to s 46PO(3A) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) regarding his allegations of unlawful disability discrimination by the Southport Magistrates Court in requiring him to appear in a courtroom that was not on the ground floor. Section 46PO(3A) imposes a restriction (by way of the grant of leave) on litigants bringing unlawful discrimination applications in this Court that have been dealt with by the Australian Human Rights Commission under the AHRC Act. McEvoy J refused to grant leave to Mr Praljak. 4 In this proceeding, Mr Praljak has filed an application for extension of time and leave to appeal, two affidavits sworn on 6 January 2024 and a draft notice of appeal. This leave application is approximately 13 months out of time.

The Department of Defence application 5 In proceeding VID41/2024 (the Department of Defence application), Mr Praljak seeks leave to appeal against orders made by Logan J on 14 December 2021. Those orders related to an application by Mr Praljak for leave to make an application to the Court pursuant to s 46PO(3A) of the AHRC Act regarding his allegations of unlawful disability discrimination in relation to the Department of Defence's refusal of his applications to become a member of the Australian Defence Force. Logan J refused to grant leave to Mr Praljak. Relevantly, Logan J also made an order extending the time within which any application for leave to appeal was to be filed to Friday 4 February 2022. 6 In this proceeding, Mr Praljak has filed an application for extension of time and leave to appeal, two affidavits sworn on 6 January 2024 and a draft notice of appeal. This leave application is approximately 23 months out of time.

The Federal Court application 7 In proceeding VID42/2024 (the Federal Court application), Mr Praljak seeks leave to appeal against orders made by McEvoy J on 30 November 2022 and 8 December 2022. Those orders related to an application by Mr Praljak for leave to make an application to the Court pursuant to s 46PO(3A) of the AHRC Act regarding a complaint of unlawful disability discrimination by the Commonwealth of the Australia (the Federal Court of Australia) and Justice Logan in relation to allegations of a failure to organise pro bono representation, a conflict of interest and a failure to take into account his serious health conditions in decision-making. McEvoy J refused to grant leave to Mr Praljak. 8 In this proceeding, Mr Praljak has filed an application for extension of time and leave to appeal, two affidavits sworn on 6 January 2024 and a draft notice of appeal. This leave application is approximately 13 months out of time.

The Bond University application 9 In proceeding VID43/2024 (the Bond University application), Mr Praljak seeks leave to appeal against orders made by McEvoy J on 30 November 2022. Those orders dismissed Mr Praljak's originating application against Bond University, in which he complained of discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), as vexatious and an abuse of process, and McEvoy J's reasons make clear that, favourably to Mr Praljak, his Honour treated Mr Praljak's irregular application as an application for leave pursuant to s 46PO(3A) of the AHRC Act, and that such leave was refused. 10 In this proceeding, Mr Praljak has filed an application for extension of time and leave to appeal, two affidavits sworn on 6 January 2024 and a draft notice of appeal. This leave application is approximately 13 months out of time. 11 Each of the applications is opposed by each of the respondents. In accordance with the Court's orders, Mr Praljak filed written submissions in support of his applications. The respondents filed submissions opposing the applications in each proceeding. 12 Mr Praljak filed identical submissions in chief in each proceeding. It is appropriate to set them out in whole: 1) I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, currently as of Today's Date: 20/03/2024, I rely on all of my, "Submissions", which are contained in each one of my successfully, Filed and SEALED, with The Federal Court of Australia; both: 1) Applications for extensions of time and 2) Leve to appeal in, proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively. 2) In addition to the earlier above paragraph One and those "Submissions" in those stated: Filed and SEALED Documents: I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, respectfully request to Her Honour Chief Justice Mortimer, if she thinks fit, in proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively, to Issue as of Today's Date: 20/03/2024, Legal Referral Certificates coming directly from The Federal Court of Australia, requesting extremely urgent and swift, Legal Pro-Bono sound Legal Help for: 1) Writing all of My, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, Federal Court of Australia Court Documents Legal Pleadings, Ongoing subsequent, "Other Relevant Legal Pleadings", in correct Legal Form, and 2) To appoint on my behalf a Kings Counsel/Silk - For Example - Professor Ian Freckelton AO KC who I look up to as my ongoing Mentor and friend - to run all current brand new Appeal Legal Cases in The Federal Court of Australia, Victoria: proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively, and any Other intended, subsequent, Civil and Criminal Legal Cases which may flow from Today's Daye: 20/03/2024 and onwards. 3) In the 'Interests of Justice'. 4) To Correct all the: Historic/Past/Current/Ongoing: "Unlawful Miscarriages of Justices" and Unlawful Indictable and Summary Offences/Crimes, Civil and Human Right - Offences/Crimes, which are committed to Me, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK and Other vulnerable, "Victims". I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, intend to use these Legal Cases, proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively, to be the leading Legal and Political, "Authority", the "Voice", a "Knight in Shining Armour", to stand up for all, "The Weak", "The Oppressed", "The Vulnerable", "The Victims". 5) Significant, New Credible Legal Evidence, and Facts, has come to light which was not available at the time of the hearing of these previous Legal Cases in The Federal Court of Australia: proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively. This will significantly impact the outcome, their Honour Judgments, of all of these Legal Cases, proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively. 6) These Legal cases of Mine, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, are extremely "Fluid", and surprising revelations are coming to light om average every 24/7. 7) Proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively are in Australia and Foreign Countries, Public Best Interests and in Australia's National Security, United States of America (USA) National Security Interests, England - United Kingdom (UK) National Security Interests, Other Foreign Countries National Security Interests, In the best, Current and Ongoing, Security Interests of: His Majesty, King Charles 111 and Other members of the Royal Family in England, The United Kingdom. 8) Proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively, are extremely necessary to hold serious allegedly, Criminal and Civil Accused Parties, Sex Predators, Accountable under Australian, International, United Nations (UN), Declarations, Charters, Polices, Other International Legal Instruments, Laws, Acts, Legislation, for their; Historic, Past, Current, Ongoing most serious Indictable and Summary, Offences, Crimes, Breach of Human Rights, and all of the significant losses caused to Me, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, To my Family, My Father: […] My Mother: […], My Sister: […], My Sister's Husband: […] Our loving Family and Friends, both: 1) In Australia and 2) Internationally. 9) Maximum Lawful, Accountability, Justice is respectfully requested from Her Honour Chief Justice Mortimer, for all Four, (4) x Legal Cases: Proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively. 10) Additionally, Proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively, are required to respectfully request to both: 1) The Hon Anthony Albanese The Prime Minister of Australia and 2) The Hon Mark Dreyfus The Commonwealth of Australia, Two, (2) x New Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Commissions, these being as follows: 1) Into The Australian Legal Profession, Legal Industry, Judicial System and Other Connected Related Matters/Issues and 2) Into Australia's Law Enforcement Agencies and Intelligence Agencies, Departments, and past and current Australian Government Employees, at both: Australia's Commonwealth/Federal and State and Territory Levels. 11) I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, in the following Proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively, humbly seek, Maximum Financial Compensations which are ATO Tax Free, Compounded Interests, All Available Remedies, Pecuniary Damages, Exemplary Damages, Punitive Damages, All Other applicable Damages and Financial Compensations, All Positive orders such as relevant Stays of Proceedings where applicable, Injunctions, Official Apologies for certain Issues where applicable, and any Other which her Honour thinks fit. 12) Proceedings, VID 40, 41, 42 and 43 of 2024, collectively, have extremely strong, credible, "Prospects of Success". 13) In the Interests of "Natural Procedural Fairness", "Natural Justice" and to safeguard to the Lawful Interests of the Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, which Australian, International Laws, Acts, legislations and United nations, Declarations, Charters, Policies, Other International Legal Instruments currently protects Me, the Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, in the: Past, currently as of Today's Date: 20/03/2024 and into the future. As no party is: neither: "Above the Law" or "Below/Beneath the Law". 14) God Save The King, His Majesty, Charles 111, Charles Philip Arthur George. (Original formatting.) 13 I have redacted the names of Mr Praljak's family in this excerpt. 14 As counsel for the first respondent in the Federal Court application pointed out in her written submissions, much of the content of the originating application is identical to the content of the affidavit material - not only in each proceeding, but as between proceedings. 15 Mr Praljak then also sent four emails to my chambers on 5 April 2024 in response to each party's submissions which I have treated as reply submissions. I have considered the contents of those emails. It is not necessary to set the contents out, but the contents are of the same nature as Mr Praljak's principal submissions. 16 Mr Praljak also sent (or copied) to my chambers a voluminous amount of correspondence, involving a wide range of complaints to regulatory and law enforcement bodies, Judges and Ministers, about purported and alleged criminal activity and other conspiracies against him and others, often accompanied by large numbers of attachments. Mr Praljak was informed by my chambers that he should cease copying the Court into this correspondence, and that the Court would only assess his applications by reference to the documents filed in each proceeding and not by reference to any material provided in this way. Mr Praljak has not ceased sending or copying such correspondence to my chambers. 17 On 5 April 2024, Mr Praljak indicated by email that he was prepared to consent to these applications being decided on the papers. My chambers informed him that I would consider whether it would be appropriate to determine the matters on the papers once all the respondents' submissions had been filed and served. Thereafter, Mr Praljak was informed on 8 April 2024 that I had reviewed the material filed and considered it appropriate to deal with the applications on the papers, and his response was "Excellent. Thank you very much". Accordingly, the hearing listed for 10 April 2024 was vacated and an order was made in each proceeding that the application be determined on the papers. This was a considerable saving of resources, and Mr Praljak's sensible approach should be noted.

Resolution 18 Mr Praljak has not satisfied the Court that an extension of time should be granted in any of the four proceedings in which to seek leave to appeal. I explain my reasons for this conclusion at [20] to [36] below. My decision on the extension of time applications in each proceeding is sufficient to dispose of each of Mr Praljak's applications. 19 However, even if I had been persuaded that any or all of the extensions of time should be granted, I would have refused leave to appeal in each proceeding. That is because, as I explain at [37] to [58] below, none of the orders and reasons for those orders are attended by sufficient doubt to warrant them being reconsidered by the Full Court, and there is no substantial injustice that would result from leave being refused, supposing the orders and the reasoning supporting them to be wrong. Since Mr Praljak is self-represented, I considered it appropriate to include my reasons for why leave to appeal would not have been granted.

Extension of time 20 Rule 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) requires that an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment be made within 14 days of the date of the judgment. 21 Each of the four judgments is properly characterised as an interlocutory judgment, even though it prevents a litigant from pursuing their claim under the AHRC Act any further: see Weir v Telstra Limited [2023] FCAFC 196 at [3]. 22 I consider this is the correct way to characterise the orders in the Bond University application, since Mr Praljak's application was otherwise plainly contrary to the AHRC Act. However, even if those orders should be seen as final orders giving Mr Praljak a right of appeal, he did not exercise that right within the period specified in the Rules, and he still requires an extension of time. I would refuse that extension of time for the reasons I give below. 23 I note also in the respondents' submissions in the Department of Defence application, at [2], there is a submission concerning whether a refusal to grant leave under s 46PO(3A) of the AHRC Act can be subject to an appeal at all: Further, the decision of Logan J below (Decision) determined an application for leave to institute proceedings in the Court. It appears to be of the kind described in section 20(3)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (FCAA). On a plain reading of FCAA s.24(1AA)(a) there ought be no right of appeal. However, this Court is bound by Cement Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC (infra) not to follow that approach. Respectfully, Cement Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC was wrongly decided and stands to be re-examined. 24 If correct, this submission would apply to the other three proceedings as well. With respect, the submission has force. However, cf Weir, where it appears no point was taken and the application for leave (and appeal) was allowed. But these applications are not the appropriate occasion in which to determine if Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 101; 187 FCR 261 was wrongly decided. Again, I proceed favourably to Mr Praljak that he is not precluded by s 24(1AA)(a) from seeking leave to appeal, and seeking an extension of time in which to do so. 25 Rules fixing time should not become instruments of injustice: Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; 64 ALJR 458, 459 (McHugh J). Of course, injustice can operate differentially on different parties. The concept is not relevant only to a moving party on an extension of time application. A respondent may suffer injustice (the concept of prejudice is often used) through the grant of an extension of time. Injustice may include the proposition that an extension of time fails to accord sufficient weight to the principle of finality and certainty in orders made by courts, which is an important aspect of the rule of law. 26 Whether there is injustice is to be assessed objectively by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. An indicator of injustice may arise through explanations of the reason for the delay in filing. Another indicator of injustice will be the prospects of success the proposed application or appeal might have; the stronger the prospects of success, the more this might objectively suggest an injustice if time is not extended. The weaker the prospects of success, the more confident a court can be that adherence to time limits works no injustice. As I said in Mladenov v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2014] FCA 12 at [26]: Unless there are strong countervailing circumstances, it is unlikely to facilitate the just resolution of a dispute to allow a matter, not commenced within the time the law requires, to proceed to a full hearing on a claim that has no realistic prospects of success. 27 The material filed in each in each proceeding does not disclose any explanation for the delay in filing the applications for leave to appeal, and does not attempt to address the well-established criteria for an extension of time. Mr Praljak describes himself in his affidavit material as a "Australian and Global Lawyer and Attorney at Law", and therefore it is a reasonable inference that he was capable of discovering, if he did not already know, that he needed to provide an explanation for not filing his application with time. Apart from anything else, the form he has used, and filled out in extensive detail by reference to a wide range of arguments and factual and legal assertions, states that an application must provide an affidavit stating: why the application for leave to appeal was not filed within time 28 Much of the affidavit material is argumentative, and where there is any factual material, much of it is strictly inadmissible. Nevertheless, and favourably to Mr Praljak, I have taken the argumentative parts as forming part of Mr Praljak's submissions, and I have considered the purportedly factual material. 29 Doing the best I can, in his affidavit material in each proceeding, the closest Mr Praljak comes to deposing to any facts which might explain the delay in filing these proceedings is where he deposes he has: severe Health Issues including Mental Trauma and Acrophobia, Anxiety, Other serious Health Issues in relation to the serious, challenges of being a Self-Representative Litigant in multiple serious Legal Cases trying to get Lawful Justice and Accountability of numerous high profile powerful criminal and civil Accused Parties; Including both; 1) Entities E.G. Bond University Limited, Minter Ellison and 2) Individuals - The List of Accused Individual Parties is complex and long. 30 In Mr Praljak's affidavit material filed in support of his applications, no medical evidence is relied upon to support these assertions. Nor does the affidavit material explain how the conditions to which Mr Praljak deposes prevented him preparing and pursuing these applications over the last year or more, but have not prevented him now filing all the voluminous material he has. 31 Even if Mr Praljak's evidence was accepted about his "Health Issues", given the nature and extent of what he has now filed and in the absence of any further evidence, his evidence does not provide any adequate explanation for delay. Nor does the fact he has multiple pieces of litigation on foot. As these four applications demonstrate, Mr Praljak appears quite capable of managing multiple pieces of litigation. Moreover, each piece of litigation follows a conscious choice by Mr Praljak to commence it, so in that sense he is the author of whatever pressures he experiences because of these circumstances. Indeed it is Mr Praljak himself who describes some of his allegations as "extremely time sensitive criminal allegations", and yet he has waited over a year, and in one case almost two years, to bring these leave applications. 32 Again, generously to Mr Praljak, there is also an assertion in his material that, taking the draft notice of appeal in the proceeding against the State of Queensland as an example, he was: unable to get; "Legal Advice" from Legal Aid and Other Community Legal Centers due to this Civil Federal Court Legal Case being outside their scope and skill set, despite extremely exhaustive best efforts and attempts. So "Natural Justice", "The Right To A Fair Trial", of The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, has been Unfairly, Unlawfully compromised. 33 Yet there is no explanation as to why this inability to secure legal advice meant he could not file an application within 14 days, or even (again generously to Mr Praljak) within a short time after 14 days, and yet he is able to file voluminous material, without external legal assistance, apparently at a time of his own choosing more than 12 months later. 34 In my opinion, there is no injustice from the circumstances relied on by Mr Praljak for not filing these applications within the specified time limits, or at least close to them. 35 There are also no prospects of success in relation to any of the proposed leave to appeal/appeal contentions, let alone reasonable prospects. I see no arguments at all likely to find favour with a court in the material presented by Mr Praljak. Prospects of success is a principal consideration on any application for leave to appeal, the purpose of the appellate process being to correct error. 36 I explain my reasons for this conclusion below. This next section represents my reasoning in respect of the extension of time decision for each proceeding and my reasoning about why, even if time were extended, leave to appeal would not be granted.

The submissions and arguments on error in each of the four sets of orders and reasons 37 In each of his submissions, Mr Praljak makes a series of assertions of error, but his material does not progress beyond assertions. There is very little, or no, engagement with the actual reasoning of the primary judge in each case, other than obvious expressions of disagreement based on the conclusions reached. In order to demonstrate sufficient doubt attaching to the order, or arguable error, an applicant must move beyond expressing simple disagreement and assertion, to a persuasive and probative articulation of where in the primary reasoning error is shown, or if error is said to attach to a conclusion, how the primary reasoning supporting those conclusions discloses material errors of law or fact along the way to those conclusions. Mere assertion is insufficient.

The State of Queensland application 38 In refusing Mr Praljak's application for leave, McEvoy J concluded (at [34], [37] and [41]): Plainly, and as the respondent submits, it is well established that judges and judicial officers have complete immunity for any act arising out of acts done in the exercise of their judicial function or capacity: Re East; Ex Parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 354 at 365-366 [30] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) citing Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522; Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 at 241 (Gummow J); as well as for any act performed within their jurisdiction: Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166 at [36] (Gleeson CJ). What is "within jurisdiction" for these purposes must be understood in its "broad and general" sense as the "authority conferred upon [the] court and upon [the judge] to hear and to determine issues between individuals or between individuals and the Crown": Nakhla v McCarthy [1978] 1 NZLR 291 at 300-301 (Woodhouse J), adopted in various Australian decisions including in Gallo v Dawson (1988) 63 ALJR 121 at 122 (Wilson J); Fingleton at 185 [35]; Rajski v Powell at 532 (Kirby P); Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48 at 58 (Kirby P); Wentworth v Wentworth (2001) 52 NSWLR 602 at 612 [28] (Fitzgerald JA). … The immunity extends to the Court itself. In Re East the applicant had sued the Magistrates Court, the County Court of Victoria and the Governor of Fulham Prison for contravention of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RD Act). The High Court referred (at 365-366 [29]-[30]) to the "fundamental problem" with the notion that "either a judicial officer, or a court, may be subject to legal redress, on the ground of an alleged contravention of s 9 of the Act", namely the "well established immunity from suit which protects judicial officers from actions arising out of acts done in the exercise of their judicial function or capacity" (citing Rajski v Powell and Mann v O'Neill). Furthermore the High Court noted that "there is nothing in the [RD Act] which suggests that it was the intention of the Parliament to override that immunity" (at 366 [30]). It was concluded that the immunity applied to bar the applicant's claims in Re East, making no distinction between the applicability of the immunity to the court itself and to its judicial officers. The respondents submit that the same applies to the DD Act, as it similarly contains no provision to suggest Parliament intended to override that immunity. … I accept that in all the circumstances the decision of the coordinating magistrate not to allow the applicant to appear in a court room located on the ground floor of the courthouse (for reasons explained to the applicant prior to the hearing) falls wholly within the protection afforded to the magistrate pursuant to s 51 of the Magistrates Act and pursuant to the principle of judicial immunity at common law. For that reason alone, leave must be refused. No cogent arguments are advanced by the applicant to the contrary. (Original formatting.) 39 McEvoy J also considered the respondent's submission that Mr Praljak's application for leave amounted to an abuse of process, and found at [49]: In all the circumstances I accept the respondent's submission in relation to these matters. No cogent arguments are advanced by the applicant to the contrary. The applicant's claims represent an abuse of process. The application seeks to advance grounds for an illegitimate purpose, it seeks to re-litigate matters relating to applicant's convictions which were the result of proceedings in 2017 and 2018 before the Magistrates Court, and it seeks remedies that are beyond the power of the Court to grant. 40 For this application, I set out Mr Praljak's draft notice of appeal in full, as it is substantially similar in form and content to the draft notice of appeal filed in the other three proceedings: 1. I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, Submit and I state on "Oath"; 100% both; ''Truthfully" and "Honestly" that the; 'Rule of Law' has been Unlawfully compromised and as a result; various; Unlawful Indictable and Summary Criminal Offences, Crimes, Human Rights Offences, Crimes, other Types of Offences, crimes, have been committed against The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, during this Legal Case and also before this legal case, during and still ongoing as of Today's Date; 06/01/2024. Additionally, serious numerous; "Miscarriages of Justice", "Natural Justice", has been caused to The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK and need to be addressed Lawfully to immediately correct these Unlawful; Injustices, caused in this legal case and during my, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, dealings (Historic, Past, Current, Future), with; The State of Queensland and Other Parties Involved EG The Queensland Police Service (QPS). - To the best of I, The Appellants' current knowledge; His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, was required to disqualify himself from this Legal case and Other Legal Cases of mine, because of I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, raised during these legal cases allegations of serious apprehension of bias, conflicting interests, links and ties with my criminal accused parties in these several legal cases; (EG Scott Morrison Prime Minister of Australia at the time, Christian Porter and Other Parties), which I brought before The Federal Court of Australia. Despite the serious allegations of Indictable and Summary Offences, Crimes, Other Types of Offences, Crimes, Ethical Misconduct, Ongoing Indictable Offences, Crimes still Ongoing as of Today's current date; 06/01/2024 it is transparently clear; that His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, was required to disqualify himself from this Legal case and Other Legal Cases, pursuant to these following leading legal case precedents and Other Legal Cases which their Honours think fit; • Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 (Ebner) • Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 95 ALJR 824 (Charisteas), at [11], • Kumaragamage v Rallis No 2 [2001] NSWSC 710 • Vasik v Vasik [2007] FamCA 671: (2007) 38 FamLR 262. • Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020 • Dietrich v the Queen - 1992 Olaf Dietrich was an unlikely champion of human rights. Charged with smuggling heroin in condoms, he was at trial refused legal aid unless he pied guilty. In his High Court appeal, Dietrich's QC turned to the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and common law tradition to justify his right to a fair trial - which he felt ought to be provided at the expense of the state, given the seriousness of his crimes. Despite the fact that Dietrich went on to commit three armed robberies, his case remains good law for the right to a fair trial in Australia, with some suggesting this right is implicit in our constitution. • Chamberlain v the Queen - 1984 Perhaps one of the most widely broadcast murder trials in Australian history, Chamberlain v the Queen is often cited as a textbook example of the miscarriage of justice. The case related to the death of nine-week-old baby Azaria Chamberlain on a family camping trip near Uluru, the prosecution's claims that she had been murdered by her mother and her mother's claims she had been taken by a dingo. It's difficult to pinpoint the prosecution's biggest blunder in this case - their questionable blood testing, their dismissal of eyewitness testimony which supported the defendant's claims, their recruitment of a forensic scientist whose testimony had been overturned in a previous case - but then again, the idea that Lindy Chamberlain had murdered her baby may have seemed more plausible than the truth. When evidence emerged in 1986 to suggest that Azaria may have indeed been killed by a dingo (a claim that was finally verified by a coroner in 2012), Lindy Chamberlain was released from prison and eventually acquitted. If nothing else, this case proved that in law too, the truth can often be stranger than fiction. 2. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, erred in law in determining that this legal case was in The Federal Court of Australia National Practice Area just limited to the Areas; of Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights. Whilst these Practice Area are correct and part of this legal case at hand; The Federal Court of Australia and His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, failed to include the Practice Areas of both; 1) Criminal Law and 2) Civil Law) and as a Result, I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, I never received a fair Legal Case covering all of my both; 1) Civil Legal Causes of Actions and 2) Criminal Legal Causes of Actions and 3) Other Urgent desired Court Orders such as Injunctions and Other Positive Court Orders to address other wrongs in this legal case. 3. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, erred in both; "Law" and in "Material Facts"; By not dealing with my serious, extremely time sensitive criminal allegations of Indictable and Summary criminal offences committed against me by The State of Queensland and Other relevant Parties; EG; The Queensland Police Service (QPS) , Bond University Limited, Minter Ellison Law Firm, Other involved both Entities and Individuals connected to this criminal accused Parties, who are allegedly responsible Criminal Accused Parties; which Unlawfully compromised my Queensland Police Service Reports (QPS), Police Statements, Obstructing Justice, Perverting The Course of Justice, Attempted Offences, Crimes, Causing numerous Miscarriages of Justice, Aiding and Abetting Offences, Crimes, Facilitating Crimes, Offences, Causing Unlawful numerous serious Types of "Losses" to The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, and also, they Unlawfully interfered and compromised my numerous Judicial Legal Case proceedings and Other they committed additional, Unlawful Offences, Crimes. EG Unlawful Stalking, Harassment, Unauthorized Access to QPS Databases potentially, Criminal Levels of Unlawful Bullying, Serious Conflict of Interests, Nepotism, Cronyism, Ethical Misconduct, Theft of my Computers, Burglary, Stealing, Other Offences, Crimes under various Australian and International legislations, Acts and United Nations - Declarations, Charters, Policies, Other International Instruments. 4. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, erred in "Law" and in "Material Facts"; His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, For example; wrote certain facts throughout his Judgement, the Facts are put, completely out of context and or are not the complete Material Facts; EG How I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, was able to attend one of the Court Rooms in Southport Court room on one occasion. There are further circumstances and material facts to put this into correct context. As without these corrections, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, written Material Facts are simply wrong and may be misleading, Unlawful and give rise to apprehension of bias, nepotism, cronyism. 5. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, erred in "Law" and in "Material Facts"; by stating the following in his Judgement; "I am satisfied that leave should not be granted to the appellant to make an application to pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the AHRC Act. Leave to make the application will be refused and the originating application will be dismissed with costs.". I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, believe that Leave should be granted due to this Legal Case being; an Extraordinary and Unexpected Emergency and on Other valid Lawful Grounds EG It is in Australia's Public Best Interests, there is an immediate security threat to King Charles 111 and Other Royal Family Members of England, The United Kingdom (UK) and there I; Past, Current ongoing serious threats to; Australia, The United States of America (USA), England The United Kingdom (UK), Other certain Foreign Countries- To their National Security Interests. We have recorded all of the credible evidence of these serious offences, crimes committed by various involved criminal accused parties, which are mentioned in this Application by Me, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK. I state the above on "Oath" both; ''Truthfully" and "Honestly" 100%. 6. I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, respectfully request Judicial Review; Judicial review of a decision: • the decision was ultra vires (it was beyond the legal power or authority of the decisionmaker to make the decision). • the decision was made in breach of the rules of procedural fairness (for example, if the decision-maker did not give the person concerned a fair hearing). • in the case of a court or tribunal, there was a jurisdictional error (the court or tribunal mistakenly decided that it had (or did not have) jurisdiction over a particular matter). • in the case of a court or tribunal, there was an error of law on the face of the record (there was a mistake of some kind in the record of the court's decision, not in its reasons for decision). Other remedies include an injunction (a court order requiring a person to refrain from a breach of the law) and a declaration (a court judgment that conclusively declares the pre-existing rights of the parties, without separately ordering a person to do or refrain from doing anything). I the Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, am seeking urgent "Injunctions", "Damages", "Significant Financial Compensation", "Remedies" and other Positive Orders against the State of Queensland, which His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, failed to cover and address. 7. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, failed to apply the legal case precedent of; Dietrich v the Queen - 1992 - Olaf Dietrich was an unlikely champion of human rights. Charged with smuggling heroin in condoms, he was at trial refused legal aid unless he pied guilty. In his High Court appeal, Dietrich's QC turned to the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and common law tradition to justify his right to a fair trial - which he felt ought to be provided at the expense of the state, given the seriousness of his crimes. Despite the fact that Dietrich went on to commit three armed robberies, his case remains good law for the right to a fair trial in Australia, with some suggesting this right is implicit in our constitution. - I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, State on "Oath" both; 100% "Truthfully" and "Honestly" that this legal case precedent of; Dietrich v the Queen - 1992 - applies to my current Criminal Appeal which is up and running currently and into early 2024 in The Court of Appeal in The Supreme Court of Queensland and that The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, and All Parties, including I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, we did not have this Legal Evidence and Material Facts at the time of the legal case. 8. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, failed to apply the legal case precedent of; Chamberlain v the Queen - 1984 - Perhaps one of the most widely broadcast murder trials in Australian history, Chamberlain v the Queen is often cited as a textbook example of the miscarriage of justice. The case related to the death of nine-week-old baby Azaria Chamberlain on a family camping trip near Uluru, the prosecution's claims that she had been murdered by her mother and her mother's claims she had been taken by a dingo. It's difficult to pinpoint the prosecution's biggest blunder in this case - their questionable blood testing, their dismissal of eyewitness testimony which supported the defendant's claims, their recruitment of a forensic scientist whose testimony had been overturned in a previous case - but then again, the idea that Lindy Chamberlain had murdered her baby may have seemed more plausible than the truth. When evidence emerged in 1986 to suggest that Azaria may have indeed been killed by a dingo (a claim that was finally verified by a coroner in 2012), Lindy Chamberlain was released from prison and eventually acquitted. If nothing else, this case proved that in law too, the truth can often be stranger than fiction. 9. I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, State on "Oath" both; 100% "Truthfully" and "Honestly" that this legal case precedent of; Chamberlain v the Queen - 1984- applies to my current Criminal Appeal which is up and running currently and into early 2024 in The Court of Appeal in The Supreme Court of Queensland and that The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, and All Parties, including I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, we did not have this Legal Evidence and Material Facts at the time of the legal case. 10. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, failed to apply the legal case precedent of; GERARD V. HOPE AND OTHERS (221/1964] 1964, SUPREME COURT, CRISPJ. - [After an adjournment the order o.f the court was: judgment for the plaintiff against all defendants in the sum of £3,370 and costs.] Judgment for plaintiff. Solicitors for the plaintiff: Nettlefold and Jennings. Solicitor for the defendants: J. R. M. Driscoll, Crown Solicitor. 11. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, failed to apply the legal case precedent of; DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] AC 562 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 was a landmark court decision in Scots delict law and English tort law by the House of Lords. It laid the foundation of the modern law of negligence in common law jurisdictions worldwide, as well as in Scotland, establishing general principles of the duty of care. Also known as the "Paisley Snail" or "Snail in the Bottle" case, the case involved Mrs May Donoghue drinking a bottle of ginger beer in a cafe in Paisley, Renfrewshire. Unknown to her or anybody else, a decomposed snail was in the bottle. She fell ill, and subsequently sued the ginger beer manufacturer, Mr Stevenson. The House of Lords held that the manufacturer owed a duty of care to her, which was breached because it was reasonably foreseeable that failure to ensure the product's safety would lead to harm to consumers. There was also a sufficiently proximate relationship between consumers and product manufacturers. 12. I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, State on "Oath", both; 'Truthfully" and Honestly"; that these following Parties who engaged in and committed both; Extremely serious Indictable and Summary Offences, Crimes and Other Types of Offences, Crimes against I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK and Other Parties; These Criminal Accused Parties are as follows **** BUT NOT LIMITED TOO 1) The State of Queensland, Yvette D'Ath Attorney-General of Queensland - Recently Reported in an Official Lodged Complaint; To The Crime Corruption Commission Queensland (CCC) By I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, ( Last Communication received from (CCC) was on; 1/5/24, 7:47 AM , Hon Shannon Fentiman, The Queensland Police Service (QPS) and Other Criminal Accused Parties EG; 1) Bond University Limited and 2) Minter Ellison Law Firm and 3) Salerno Law Firm and ( Emma Salerno, Matteo Salerno, Julius Salerno, James Gino Salerno), and 4) Other Criminal Accused parties connected with these Entities Group/Circle/Network, as a result have Breached their Duty of Care, Acted Negligently and these criminally accused Parties have given now as of Today's Date; 06/01/2024 to I, The Appellant: MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, New, Lawful Grounds to pursue both; 1) Several Civil Legal Causes of Actions and 2) Several Criminal Legal Causes of Actions, in The Federal Court of Australia and later, in The High Court of Australia. 13. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, failed to apply the; "The Law of Equity". Where a Law is out of date, to harsh, this Law must be changed, updated and other lawful considerations should be applied to The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK and the legal case at hand. 14. New both: credible; 1) Legal Material Facts and 2) Legal Evidence; has surfaced, which now supports the allegations of I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, which was not previously available during the legal case. 15. I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, respectfully request an Appeal by; "DE NOVO" - An appeal where the appellate court retries all the issues tried by the trial court, without being limited to the evidence that was before the trial court, is called an appeal 'de novo'. Each side presents their case again, and fresh evidence may also be presented. The court rehears the whole matter and does not simply review the decision before the lower court. EG The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, both; 1) Civil Legal Causes of Actions and 2) Criminal Legal Causes of Actions and 3) New Legal Evidence and New Material Facts has come to light, which was not available at the time this legal case was heard in The Federal Court of Australia; EG In-adequate Australian Commonwealth and State Law Enforcement, Police not taking us victims police reports, nor failing to run sound police investigations and criminal prosecutions against the criminal alleged Parties; causing serious; Corruption, Mis-use of The Australian Public Purse, Unfair Justice, Miscarriages of Justice, perverting The Course of Justice, Obstructing Justice, Breach of Human Rights, Many More Offences under various Australian and International Legislations, Acts, United Nations - Declarations, Charters, Policies, Other International Legal Instruments. - This Legal Case is extremely "Fluid' with new both credible and supporting; 1) Legal Evidence and 2) Material Facts coming out to light in the Australian and International Media on average; Daily with "Surprising Revelations' which strongly supports this Legal Case and Other past, current, ongoing Legal Cases of The Appellant: MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK E.G. Here are some new relevant Updates: - Jeffrey Edward Epstein was an American financier and sex offender, and Virginia Louise Giuffre is an American-Australian campaigner who offers support to victims of sex trafficking. As of Today's Date, 06/01/2024 new previously Batches of USA Sealed Court Documents are being Released on a "Rolling" Basis, and I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK; as of Today's Date; 06/01/2024 have already copies of the currently newly released: 1-4 Batches of Legal Documents, with many more batches being released to publicly over the next few days, weeks, months - which is all relevant to this Legal Case of The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK. - Prime Minister Anthony Albanese ordered an inquiry into why 20-year-old Cabinet documents relating to Australia joining the United States-led Iraq invasion remain secret, saying Wednesday that Australians have a right to know why their country went to war in 2003. Albanese blamed the former conservative government of Prime Minister Scott Morrison for failing to follow the usual practice of handing over all documents to the Australian National Archive three years before their due release date. Retired public servant Dennis Richardson had been appointed to investigate over two weeks whether the documents had been withheld as part of a political cover up, Albanese said. 16. The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, respectfully requests an Appeal for this legal case in The Federal Court of Australia, "In The Interest of Justice". 17. The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, applies for various "Injunctions", "Significant Financial Compensations", " Financial Interest Payments", " Damages", "Other Court Orders", against The State of Queensland EG I would like to give additional Oral Submissions during Court Trial and Introduce All Necessary; 1) New Legal Evidence and 2) Legal Material Facts, as necessary, as the is a very "Fluid" Legal Case, with new Legal Evidence and Legal Material Facts coming out on average, a daily basis, with very serious surprising revelations, which supports this and other Legal cases of I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK. 18. There are numerous "Reasonable Doubts" in, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, Judgement and in the legal case as a whole which needs to be re-trialed and new witnesses to be called for cross-examination by The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK. 19. I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, State on "Oath" that it is now necessary for The Appeals Court and their Honour Justices, to "Interfere" in this Legal Case, due to the seriousness of the stated above allegations, concerns, security threats to various parties, including myself. 20. The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, respectfully rejects His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, Judgment, that; 1) Judicial Immunity Applies, 2) I am using the courts for "Illegitimate Purposes" - I take serious offence to his Unlawful attempted offence to assassinate my good character, 3) That leave should not be granted. All of My, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK; Both; 1) Material Facts and 2) Legal Evidence supports the opposite conclusions to His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY conclusions, Judgement. His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, made a wrong Judgment, both in; 1) Material Facts and 2) In Law. 21. The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, was unable to get; "Legal Advice" from Legal Aid and Other Community Legal Centers due to this Civil Federal Court Legal Case being outside their scope and skill set, despite extremely exhaustive best efforts and attempts. So "Natural Justice", "The Right To A Fair Trial", of The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, has been Unfairly, Unlawfully compromised. 22. The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, has severe Health Issues including Mental Trauma and Acrophobia, Anxiety, Other serious Health Issues in relation to the serious, challenges of being a Self-Representative Litigant in multiple serious Legal Cases trying to get Lawful Justice and Accountability of numerous high profile powerful criminal and civil Accused Parties; Including both; 1) Entities E.G. Bond University Limited, Minter Ellison and 2) Individuals - The List of Accused Individual Parties is complex and long. 23. All Other Lawful, valid Grounds which their Honour Justices, think fit to apply to this legal case of The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK. (Original formatting.) 41 The respondent submits: It is the Respondent's submission that the Appellant has not sufficiently identified how the grounds of appeal warrant the grant for leave. For example, in respect of the allegations of apprehended bias, the Appellant has not identified: a. how the Applicant contends that Justice McEvoy demonstrated an apprehended bias towards the Appellant in reaching his decision; b. what ties or connections Justice McEvoy is alleged to have with Scott Morrison, Christian Porter and other parties; and c. if Justice McEvoy does have ties or connections with Scott Morrison, Christian Porter and other parties, how the Applicant contends that such connections could be relevant to, or could have influenced, Justice McEvoy's decision for leave to file an application under s46PO(3A)(a) of the Act. As set out in his reasons, Justice McEvoy refused to give the Appellant leave to file an application under s46PO(3A)(a) of the Act because his Honour ultimately determined that the Appellant did not have reasonable prospects of succeeding in such an application in respect to the Refusal to Relocate as the principles of judicial immunity applied to that decision by reason of s 51 of the Magistrates Act 1991 and/or as a result of the common law principles of judicial immunity. The Respondent submits that the Appellant does not identify any factor/s or elements of doubt in his Notice of Appeal upon which his Honour can be said to have erred in determining that judicial immunity applied to the Refusal to Relocate, either pursuant to s 51 of the Magistrates Act 1991 or at common law. 42 I accept the respondent's submissions. Mr Praljak's assertions in his draft notice of appeal range across a wide range of domestic and international issues, many of them more political than legal, without making any rational connection to any specific errors identified in the primary judge's reasons. Some clear examples are the references to Jeffrey Epstein in the extract above, and to an inquiry Mr Praljak alleges was instituted by the current Prime Minister relating to the Iraq war. 43 These matters would provide an ample basis to reject any proper basis for the grant of leave to appeal. However as the respondents submit, the judicial immunity arising from s 51 of the Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) and, if need be, common law principles of judicial immunity, were, as the primary judge found, a complete answer to Mr Praljak's claims and justified (if not required) the refusal of leave under s 46PO(3A).

The Department of Defence application 44 In refusing Mr Praljak's application for leave, Logan J concluded (at [28]-[29], [31], [34] and [36]-[37]): The difficulty, as I see it, in relation to a grant of leave is that there has been - and I see it as an insurmountable difficulty - an engagement of permissible discrimination. There is no doubt there has been discrimination, but on analysis, and that is offered by Captain Noonan, each of the roles within the Australian Defence Force for which Mr Praljak either specifically sought enlistment or beyond that entail particular physical demands. That is so even in respect of postings within Australia because those carry with them the contingency of deployment by air or sea. The combination of the particular disabilities which Mr Praljak has encountered make it inherently unlikely, in my view, that he could in any way succeed in proving that the discrimination was unlawful, having regard to s 53 of the Act. It is also patent that there are inherent requirements of defence force service. Even, for example, those of serving as a legal officer, for which, in terms of formal, professional admission, Mr Praljak has qualified that is so, because such officers are also subject to the particular physical demands as outlined by Captain Noonan, which append to those in the Australian Army. It became apparent in oral evidence that even military chaplains must be able, if need be, to deploy, and in so doing, to engage in such tasks as latrine digging, or hard forms of field work. … Section 21A also, in my view, presents in this case an insurmountable obstacle in relation to the prosecution of the complaint through to a hearing and determination at trial. There are just inherent requirements entailed in defence service which make, in combination, Mr Praljak's particular difficulties incapable of reasonable adjustment. … The test in relation to s 21A is an objective one. Approaching the case in that way, it is just not possible to see how any reasonable adjustment could be made. In these circumstances, to allow the case to proceed would be to divert unnecessarily the judicial resources of the Commonwealth. … When all is said and done, there are comprehensive particular inherent feature requirements for both combat and combat-related roles. These extend even to those that might think they are in benign postings and appointments. But when push comes to shove, those in such postings or appointments, have to pick up a rifle, dig a fire trench, and engage in physical activity. It only comes to this. I do not consider that the case is one which enjoys sufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of leave. 45 As explained above, the draft notice of appeal in this proceeding is substantially similar to that in the State of Queensland proceeding, although with references to the Defence Force and to Logan J throughout. I extract below the paragraphs of Mr Praljak's notice of appeal that contain any salient differences from the extracts set out above: 2. His Honour JUSTICE LOGAN, Erred both in; 1) Law and 2) In-Facts in making his Judgement; "It only comes to this. I do not consider that the case is one which enjoys sufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of leave". I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, State on "Oath", both; ''Truthfully" and "Honestly", that to the best of my current knowledge; this legal case is one which does enjoys sufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of leave, on the grounds of; To Correct the Administration of Justice wrongs caused to I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, and to correct Miscarriages of Justices, Right to a Fair Trial, other Unlawful Offences committed against; I, The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN Praljak, also this legal case is in The Australian Public Best Interest, and In The Commonwealth of Australia best Interests, as I submit that serious Indictable Offences, Crimes are being committed against The Commonwealth of Australia via the ADF and External Parties, Involving both; 1) Companies and 2) Individuals, also That this Legal Case is one of extreme urgency, Extraordinary, Unexpected Emergency and is in the best interests, and urgent security interests of King Charles 111 and in the best interests of Other Royal Family Members of England, United Kingdom (UK), and in The National Security Interests of both; The United States of America (USA), England United Kingdom (UK) and Other certain Foreign Countries, which their National Security Interests have been seriously Unlawfully Compromised since the time period of around 01/01/2012 to current date; 06/01/2024 pursuant to the legal case precedent of the following *** (But Not Limited To); • Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020 • Dietrich v the Queen - 1992 … • Catholic Education Office v Clarke [2004] FCAFC 197; (2004) 138 FCR 121 • Eastman v Shamrock Consultancy Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 3436 • James v WorkPower Inc [2018] FCA 2083 • Salido v Nominal Defendant (1993) 32 NSWLR 524 • The Application of relevant; "Common Law", and the "Administration of Justice" • "The Rule of Law" • Other Legal Cases which their Honour Justice think fit to Apply … 4. The learned, His Honour JUSTICE LOGAN, trial judge erred in both; "Law" and in "Material Facts"; By not dealing with my serious, extremely time sensitive criminal allegations of Indictable and Summary criminal offences committed against me by The ADF and External Parties; EG; Bond University Limited, Minter Ellison Law Firm and these Entities responsible Criminal Accused Parties; which Unlawfully compromised my ADF Lawyer Role during the Recruitment process. EG Unlawful Stalking, Harassment, Unauthorised Access to ADF Databases potentially, Criminal Levels of Unlawful Bullying, Serious Conflict of Interests, Nepotism, Cronyism, Ethical Misconduct, Other Offences. 5. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE LOGAN, erred in "Law" and in "Material Facts"; He stated the following; - "However, I consider that the exemptions in sections 53 and/or 21A of the DDA apply to the subject matter of your complaint. Section 53 says that it is not unlawful to discriminate against a person on the ground of his or her disability in connection with employment in the ADF in a position involving the performance of combat duties, combat-related duties or peacekeeping service." … 14. The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, applies for various "Injunctions", "Damages", "Remedies", "Other Court Orders", against the ADF.EG To remove the block, unbar Me, so that I can currently and in the future apply for roles with the ADF. 15. As of Today's Date; 06/01/2024 The ADF Web-site at this Web-Link; (https://www.defence.gov.au/jobs-careers/defence-aps-jobs/what-defence-offers/diversityinclusion ) states the following; "Defence supports a range of programs and initiatives aligned to the APS Disability Employment Strategy 2020-25 to remove real or perceived barriers within the workplace, working across the enterprise and other Government agencies to reflect best practice in supporting its personnel. Defence recruitment focuses on an appellant's ability, skills and experience. To support appellant's, Defence is committed to making reasonable adjustments at time of recruitment and throughout an employee's Defence career so that they can optimise their full potential. Therefore, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, states on "Oath" that the learned judge, His Honour JUSTICE LOGAN, erred in both; "Law" and in "Facts"; As the above paragraph is contradictory of His, , His Honour JUSTICE LOGAN, Judgement. This is indicative that, His Honour JUSTICE LOGAN, did not apply the Law and Material Facts correctly, as it seems the ADF is misleading the Australian Public and I. 16. There are numerous "Reasonable Doubts" in, His Honour JUSTICE LOGAN Judgement and in the legal case as a whole which needs to be re-trialled and new witnesses to be called for cross-examination by The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK. (Original formatting.) 46 The respondents submit at [13]-[16] and [20]-[21]: As to any errors in the Decision or prospects of success were an appeal permitted, the Applicant has not identified in the Decision any: (a) misapplication of the law; or (b) miscarriage of discretion. Review of the Decision shows His Honour below went diligently about the task of determining the application before him. Concerning procedural fairness, the Applicant was granted considerable latitude at the hearing, including an extensive cross-examination of the Second Respondent, so that the First Respondent "exposed comprehensively its factual hand." The Applicant's submissions refer variously to serious criminal offences, civil wrongs and strong prospects of success without specifically identifying any. The material discloses no realistic prospects of success upon any appeal. … The Applicant has not demonstrated either of the integers in Niemann. Nor are matters of principal or general public import articulated. As set out above under the First Issue, the Applicant makes general reference to errors and injustices without specificity. The application should be dismissed. (Footnotes omitted.) 47 I accept those submissions. Most of Mr Praljak's grounds either concern objectively irrelevant events and objectively irrelevant authorities (such as Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; 177 CLR 292 and Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020) or seek to agitate the merits of his application to join the Defence Force. The grounds also rely on assertions which do not assist in identifying error, such as "Correct the Administration of Justice wrongs caused to" Mr Praljak.

The Federal Court application 48 In refusing Mr Praljak's application for leave, McEvoy J concluded at [17], [20] and [22]-[23]: Plainly, and as the first respondent submits, at common law judges have complete immunity for any act performed within their jurisdiction: Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166 at 185 [36] (Gleeson CJ). What is "within jurisdiction" for these purposes must be understood in its "broad and general sense" as the "authority conferred upon [the] court and upon [the judge] to hear and to determine issues between individuals or between individuals and the Crown": Nakhla v McCarthy [1978] 1 NZLR 291 at 300-301 (Woodhouse J), adopted in various Australian decisions including in Gallo v Dawson (1988) 63 ALJR 121 at 122 (Wilson J); Fingleton at 185 [35]; Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522 at 532 (Kirby P); Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48 at 58 (Kirby P); Wentworth v Wentworth (2001) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350 at 612 [28] (Fitzgerald JA). … The immunity extends to the Court itself. In Re East; Ex parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 354, the applicant had sued the Magistrates Court, the County Court of Victoria and the Governor of Fulham Prison for contravention of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The High Court referred (at 365-366 [29]-[30]) to the "fundamental problem" with the notion that "either a judicial officer, or a court, may be subject to legal redress, on the ground of an alleged contravention of s 9 of the Act", namely the "well established immunity from suit which protects judicial officers from actions arising out of acts done in the exercise of their judicial function or capacity" (citing Rajski v Powell and Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204). The High Court concluded that the immunity applied to bar the applicant's claims in Re East, making no distinction between the applicability of the immunity to the court itself and to its judicial officers. … Insofar as the applicant purports to rely on the case of Gerard v Hope, the first respondent submits that the case does not assist him. It is the first respondent's position that Gerard v Hope is plainly distinguishable from the present case because the relevant judge was there found not to have any power to do what he did, whereas it is not in doubt that the second respondent had the statutory power to make the orders he made in Praljak v Department of Defence and the authority to preside over those proceedings. Moreover, Gerard v Hope concerned an inferior court judge for whom, as the first respondent submits, historically the immunity was said not to apply in respect of matters outside jurisdiction. As is apparent, the present proceedings concern a superior court and a superior court judge for whom the protection of judicial immunity is not in doubt, even for matters outside jurisdiction. The first respondent's submissions in relation to judicial immunity should all be accepted. That doctrine applies to bar the applicant's claim in its entirety. (Original bold.) 49 While it was not necessary to decide the issue, McEvoy J also accepted the Commonwealth's submissions that each of Mr Praljak's claims had no reasonable prospect of success such as to warrant the grant of leave (at [24]-[27]) and that a series of further factors warranted leave being refused (at [28]-[29]). 50 Again, the draft notice of appeal in this proceeding is substantially similar to that in the other proceedings, although with references to McEvoy J, Logan J and judicial immunity throughout. I extract below the paragraphs of Mr Praljak's notice of appeal that are relevant to this specific proceeding: 5. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, erred in "Law'' and in "Material Facts"; His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, For example; wrote certain facts throughout his Judgement, stating; that; The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity applies, where I, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, states the complete opposite, that due to these following parties; ; 1) The First; Respondents; The Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Comi of Australia) and 2) The Second Respondent; JUSTICE JOHN ALEXANDER LOGAN and 3) His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, engaging in Unlawful Indictable and Summary Offences, Crimes, Other serious Offences, Crimes, Judicial Misconduct, Ethical Misconduct etc., they have by their own actions waived all of the protections of The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity. Furthermore, both His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY and the Respondents and their Legal Counsel Law Firm have both Personal Relationships and Commercial Relationships, which create; Corruption, Prejudice, Bias, Unfair Justice to this Legal Case and all Other Legal Cases of mine, The Appellant, Mr. Adrian Praljak, and that I did raise this with all parties throughout this Legal Case, and The Federal Court of Australia Registry and His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY and Minter Ellison Law Firm and their Legal Counsels failed to respond or take any reasonable lawful actions to fix this. Therefore, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY erred in both Law and in Facts in applying the following legal case precedents; • Chircop v Technical and Further Education Commission [2022] FCA 1015 • Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 34 • Gallo v Dawson (1988) 63 ALJR 121 • Gerard v Hope [1965] TASStRp 1; [1965] Tas SR 15 • James v WorkPower Inc [2018] FCA 2083 • Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204; [1997] HCA 28 • Matthews v Markos [2019] FCA 1827 • Praljak v Department of Defence [2021] FCA 1668 • Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522 • Re East; Ex parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 354; [1998] HCA 73 • Weir v Telstra Corporation Limited [2022] FCA 969 • Wentworth v Wentworth (2001) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350 • Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48 • Nakhla v McCarthy [1978] 1 NZLR 291 • Justice Stephen Gageler, 'Just versus Quick: Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in a Common Law System' [2022] MelbULawRw 11; (2022) 45(2) Melbourne University Law Review 830 As without these corrections, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, written Material Facts are simply wrong and may be misleading, Unlawful and give rise to apprehension of bias, nepotism, cronyism. … 22. The Appellant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, respectfully rejects His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, Judgment, that; 1) The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity Applies to this legal case, 2) I am using the courts for "Illegitimate Purposes" - I take serious offence to his Unlawful attempted offence to assassinate my good character, 3) That leave should not be granted. All of My, The Appellant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK; Both; 1) Material Facts and 2) Legal Evidence supports the opposite conclusions to His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY conclusions, Judgement. His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, made a wrong Judgment, both in; 1) Material Facts and 2) In Law. (Original formatting.) 51 The first respondent characterises Mr Praljak's purported grounds of appeal as capturing allegations about the rule of law and miscarriage of justice, disqualification, Mr Praljak's claim not being limited to the Court's Administrative, Constitutional Law and Human Rights National Practice Area, judicial immunity not being applicable, threats to the monarch requiring leave to be granted, various remedies being sought, various authorities and new facts and evidence not being considered, the interests of justice broadly (using terms such as fluidity, reasonable doubts and seriousness), natural justice, and Mr Praljak's health issues. 52 I accept the first respondent's taxonomy of Mr Praljak's purported grounds of appeal. The first respondent then submits at [26]-[27]: It is tolerably clear from the summary above that none of the purported 'grounds' relied on by Mr Praljak comes close to demonstrating that the primary judge acted upon a wrong principle, allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect the decision, made a mistake on the facts, or did not take into account some material consideration. In particular, the purported 'grounds' fail to point to any arguable error in either the principles the primary judge applied to govern the question of whether leave should be granted, or in the conclusion the primary judge reached for why the grant of leave should be refused, namely that the proceeding was lacking in merit because: a) the doctrine of judicial immunity was a complete bar to the claims against the Second Respondent and, by extension, the First Respondent (the former being a superior court judge and the latter being the superior court in which the Second Respondent presided); and b) even if judicial immunity had not been a complete bar to the claims (which it was), no plausible causes of action conceivably arose from his allegations against the Respondents and the proceeding therefore had no reasonable prospect of success. The obvious lack of any arguable error being disclosed is sufficient to rebut any prima facie case for the grant of leave to appeal by reason of the primary judge's decision having the practical operation of finally determining the parties' rights. Further, as the first limb of the test for the grant of leave cannot be met, it is not necessary to consider the second limb. 53 I accept those submissions. Again, Mr Praljak does not identify error in the primary judge's reasoning, but rather relies on assertions, and often objectively irrelevant assertions, about a range of matters which have no rational connection at all with the primary judge's reasoning.

The Bond University application 54 In refusing Mr Praljak's application for leave, McEvoy J accepted the following submissions of the respondent (set out at [13] of McEvoy J's reasons): (a) first, the originating application asserts that it is in respect of a complaint of discrimination under the DD Act, the RD Act and the SD Act but that neither the originating application or supporting affidavit contains any identifiable allegations of discrimination against the respondent under the DD Act or the RD Act; (b) secondly, that beyond a single allegation which might be understood as a complaint of sexual harassment under the SD Act, the originating application and supporting affidavit take the form of a narrative of general grievances and allegations unconnected to discrimination under the DD Act, the RD Act and the SD Act, including allegations of "spying", blackmail, "fraud", and "Tax Evasion"; (c) thirdly, materially identical allegations have been made by the applicant in the proceeding commenced by the applicant in the Supreme Court, which the applicant has not discontinued; (d) fourthly, as to the single allegation concerning the touching of the applicant which might be understood to involve (asserted) sexual harassment: (i) the allegation is of a single instance of touching or pressing the applicant's lower back, in a public place, in front of the applicants' friends; (ii) the alleged conduct occurred five years ago, in 2017, and no timely complaint was made; (iii) the complaint does not raise any matter of public importance or general application; (iv) this particular complaint has no connection to the relief which is sought in the originating application, for over $29 billion in damages; and (v) the refusal of leave would not preclude the applicant from pursuing a claim in respect of this conduct if he is able properly to articulate such a claim, in the existing Supreme Court proceedings. 55 McEvoy J also found that the entirety of the proceeding was an abuse of process, due to Mr Praljak seeking to advance "substantially the same complaint in this court that is before the Supreme Court" (at [22]) and making scandalous and embarrassing allegations (at [23]), and dismissed the proceeding on that basis. 56 Again, the draft notice of appeal is substantially similar, but contains the following material specific to this application: 4. The learned trial judge, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, erred in "Law" and in "Material Facts"; His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, For example; wrote certain facts throughout his Judgement, stating; that; The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity applies, where I, The Applicant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, states the complete opposite, that due to these following parties; 1) The Respondents; Bond University Limited & their Associates and 2) Minter Ellison & their 3) His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY and 4 ) Any Other Unlawfully involved Parties; Including both; Entities and Individuals, engaging in Unlawful Indictable and Summary Offences, Crimes, Other serious Offences, Crimes, Judicial Misconduct, Ethical Misconduct etc, that they have by their own actions,waived all of the protections of The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity. Furthermore, both His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY and the Respondents and their Legal Counsel Law Firm have both Personal Relationships and Commercial Relationships, which create; Corruption, Prejudice, Bias, Unfair Justice to this Legal Case and all Other Legal Cases of mine, The Applicant, Mr. Adrian Praljak, and that I did raise this with all parties throughout this Legal Case, and The Federal Court of Australia Registry and His Honour .JUSTICE MCEVOY and Minter Ellison Law Firm and their Legal Counsels failed to respond or take any reasonable lawful actions to fix this. Therefore, His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY erred in both Law and in Facts in applying the following legal case precedents **** (But Not Limited To); • Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27 • Energy Australia Yallourn Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2017] FCA 1245 • General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69 • James v WorkPower Inc [2018] FCA 2083 • Ninan v Hannigan [2019] FCA 606 • Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin [2019] FCA 530 • Perera v GetSwift Ltd (2018) 263 FCR 92; [2018] FCAFC 202 • Picos v Australian Federal Police [2015] FCA 118 • R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; [2002] HCA 55 • Tay v Migration Review Tribunal (2009) 178 FCR 1; [2009] FCA 515 • Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28 • UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77; [2018] HCA 45 • Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA 77 • Stradford (a pseudonym) v Judge Vasta [2023] FCA 1020 • Dietrich v the Queen - 1992 … 21. The Applicant; MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK, respectfully rejects His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, Judgment, that; 1) The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity Applies to this legal case, 2) I am using the courts for "Illegitimate Purposes" - I take serious offence to his Unlawful attempted offence to assassinate my good character, 3) That leave should not be granted. All of My, The Applicant, MR. ADRIAN PRALJAK; Both; 1) Material Facts and 2) Legal Evidence supports the opposite conclusions to His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY conclusions, Judgement. His Honour JUSTICE MCEVOY, made a wrong Judgment, both in; 1) Material Facts and 2) In Law. (Original formatting.) 57 The respondent submits at [17]: The substantive bases on which the Applicant seeks to obtain leave to appeal are apparently set out in paragraphs [1] to [21] of the Bond Leave Application. Many of these paragraphs are prolix and difficult to understand, and none disclose a proper basis to conclude that the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant a grant of leave. 58 The respondent then identifies at least ten purported grounds of appeal, and submits that each are either misconceived, irrelevant, scandalous or without substance, and that none of them identify any arguable error. I agree with the respondent's submissions. The draft notice of appeal in the Bond University application, and the way Mr Praljak simply asserts the primary judge was wrong in his conclusions by seeking to draw in a number of irrelevant events, authorities and propositions, suffers from the same kind of difficulties I have outlined in relation to the three previous applications.

Conclusion 59 Given my reasoning, there is no need separately to consider whether substantial injustice would result if the orders in each proceeding are not set aside. 60 Each application for an extension of time will be refused. There is thus no need for orders dismissing each interlocutory application for leave to appeal; Mr Praljak has failed to secure an extension of time in which to proceed with any application for leave to appeal. 61 On ordinary principles, there should be an order for costs in each proceeding. Each proceeding challenged a different set or orders and reasons, including different respondents. Each respondent or set of respondents was entitled to defend the application by retaining separate legal representatives and advancing their own response to Mr Praljak's allegations. 62 Once again, it was a conscious choice of Mr Praljak to bring four sets of proceedings. In that sense he chose, I find, to expose himself to the potential of four different costs orders, just as he faced three different costs orders in the primary proceedings. 63 He is, I infer, well aware of the usual costs principles applied in this Court; namely that the discretion in s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is generally exercised in a way which compensates the successful party for a reasonable and appropriate amount of the legal costs incurred in responding to claims which have ultimately been found to be unsuccessful, in accordance with the Court's Rules and applicable authorities. Aside from the costs orders made against him in three of the proceedings the subject of these applications for leave, Mr Praljak has had at least one other costs order made against him (see Praljak v Bond University Limited [2022] QCA 213). These four instances support the inference I draw that he well understood the costs risks when he commenced these proceedings. Finally, most of the respondents expressly sought costs orders in their written submissions, and Mr Praljak has advanced no contentions about why the usual costs principles should not be applied. 64 Both Mr Praljak and each of the respondents and their legal representatives have conducted this proceeding as efficiently as could be expected in the circumstances. In that sense legal costs have been kept to a minimum. On the material before the Court, I do not see any real prospect of Mr Praljak agreeing to any specific figures in terms of an appropriate quantum for costs. Not because I apprehend he will consciously act unreasonably, but rather because his material demonstrates the firmness of his personal beliefs which I apprehend will not allow him to agree to specific sums in costs. I do not consider it is appropriate for the Court's resources, or the respondents' resources (many but not all of which also involve public funds), to be consumed any more than is necessary with processes unlikely to produce an outcome. For that reason, I do not propose to order the parties to attempt to agree on a quantum of costs in each proceeding. Rather there will be an order that Mr Praljak pay the respondents' costs of each proceeding. If Mr Praljak is prepared to negotiate directly with any or all of the respondents to reach agreement on specific sums in costs, this can occur between the parties prior to the costs process. I certify that the preceding sixty-four (64) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Chief Justice Mortimer.