1. On 8 February 2017, the Applicant lodged his citizenship application and appointed Mr Minter as his representative. Subsequent communication with the Respondent passed through Mr Minter's work email address.
2. On 13 June 2025, a delegate of the Respondent refused the citizenship application based on both the good character and identity criteria at ss 21(2)(h) and 24(3) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) ('the Act'). A notifying email was sent to Mr Minter on the same day. In his Tribunal application the Applicant confirms Mr Minter continues to represent him and that the reviewable decision was received on 13 June 2025.
3. A Decision Record and accompanying letter sent to Mr Minter included information about the Applicant's review rights as follows:

No further assessment of this citizenship application can be taken at this office. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) for a review of this decision if one of the following applies: > > ● ..., or > > ● you were 18 years of age or over when you made the application to become an Australian citizen, and you are a permanent resident. > > An application for review of this decision must be made to the Tribunal within 28 calendar days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter. > > If the time limit has expired, you can ask the Tribunal to extend the time to lodge your application for review. Please refer to the Tribunal website for more information regarding the time limit. > > As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted. > > (Emphasis added.)

Exception -Tribunal may extend period > > Application to extend period > > (1) A person (the applicant) may apply to the Tribunal to extend the period during which the applicant may apply to the Tribunal for review of a decision. > > (2) The Tribunal may, by order, extend the period if the Tribunal considers that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so. > > (3) The Tribunal may extend the period even if it has expired. > > ...

1. The issue to be decided is whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances to extend the period for the Applicant to lodge his review application.

1. The Tribunal's discretion to grant an EOT is unfettered by mandatory considerations. Judicial authority provides guidance about how best to consider such applications,[2] which often cites well-established but non-exhaustive principles.[3] Relevant factors include if an applicant is aware of their review rights, length of the delay and explanation for it, prejudice to the Respondent, and merits of the substantive application. The latter is considered in a 'fairly rough and ready way' or at a 'reasonably impressionistic level'.[4]

1. The Tribunal has considered an 'Outline of Arguments' from Mr Mohammed dated 24 November 2025 and the Respondent's written submissions dated 19 January 2026. Documents available at the interlocutory hearing were:

(a) Applicant's EOT application dated 24 November 2025; > > (b) Applicant's Statutory Declaration dated 25 November 2025; > > (c) Respondent's Decision Record dated 13 June 2025; and > > (d) Accompanying letter from the Respondent dated 13 June 2025.

1. Separate to the EOT application, Mr Mohammed stated at the commencement of the hearing that the Applicant was notified in November 2025 about the Respondent intention to consider cancellation of his visa. The Tribunal advised parties that its current jurisdiction is limited solely to the EOT application.
2. Mr Mohammed's submissions in support of an EOT are summarised as follows:

(a) The 135-day delay in lodging a review application is 'substantial' but 'not inordinate'. Mr Mohammed contends the delay must be seen in the context of how long it took the Respondent to decide the application. When asked by the Tribunal, Mr Mohammed was unaware of any legal authority for this claimed nexus. > > (b) The delay in lodging a review application was explained in the context of the Applicant having 'limited financial means', English not being his first language, Mr Minter being unable to provide legal advice as a migration agent, and the Applicant not obtaining Mr Mohammed's opinion until November 2025. > > (c) In terms of the merits of the substantive application, Mr Mohammed focussed on perceived shortcomings in the delegate's decision. He submitted it 'just contradicts itself', that the delegate did not have 'an open mind', and was in 'a state of bias'. Mr Mohammed said if the EOT is not granted it will cause 'years of uncertainty' for the Applicant and his family. > > (d) In terms of the Respondent's reliance on Tu'uta Katoa, Mr Mohammed said this is distinguished because it relates to judicial rather than merits review.

1. The statutory period for review applications is not to be ignored[5] and reflects Parliament's intent about 'finality in the decision-making process'.[6] As the High Court explained:[7]

When the time for appealing has expired, the litigation is at an end; the successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment in his or her favour...It would make a mockery...if, months after the time for appealing has expired, the unsuccessful party could obtain an extension of time on the ground that he or she had delayed appealing because that person wanted to research the issues involved. Lack of legal knowledge is a misfortune, not a privilege.

2. An adequate explanation for delaying submission of a review application is expected but not determinative.[8] The Applicant stated at paragraph 17 of his Statutory Declaration he only asked Mr Mohammed to review his case on 14 November 2025, which is when able to afford legal advice. He claims, however, it was always his 'intention to apply for merits review'.[9] The 135-day delay in doing so is about five times the available 28-day period.
3. There is no claim that the Applicant did not receive the Respondent's decision or that the delay results from Mr Minter's case management.[10] The timeframe to lodge a review application is clearly set out in the Respondent's letter. A reasonable inference can be drawn that the Applicant did not diligently pursue his review rights during the 28-day period that expired on 11 July 2025. His reliance on when he could obtain advice / representation from counsel rather than a migration agent is unpersuasive. There is no common law right to legal representation.[11] The Tribunal also considers it well within the competence of a migration agent to lodge a review application with the Tribunal.

1. Prejudice resulting from an EOT is a material factor militating against it being granted. The absence of prejudice, however, without more, is insufficient to justify an EOT.[12] There is some prejudice to the Respondent and the public interest in having to resume defence of a matter thought to have been concluded more than six months ago on 11 July 2025. This includes administrative inconvenience and additional public expense, although this is not determinative of the EOT application.

1. The substantive application does not enjoy reasonable prospects of success when considered at a reasonably impressionistic level. This is particularly so on the character aspect. That said, the application was refused on both identity and character grounds. Failure on either is determinative.
2. Concessions made by the Applicant include that he held different identities concurrently and transited multiple countries using an identity he now concedes is not his.[13] Mr Mohammed referred to this in submissions as 'candid and perhaps self-incriminating'.[14] It also points to the likelihood that the Applicant provided false or misleading information to the Department in an official context for a protracted period, including in his citizenship application. Beyond general disagreement with the delegate's decision, the submissions advanced do not illuminate factual assertions that would demonstrate an arguable case. Because the substantive application does not enjoy reasonable prospects of success it would be futile to grant an EOT.

Processing time by Respondent and type of review

1. The Tribunal rejects the contention that the time taken by an applicant to submit a review application should be considered in the context of how long the Respondent takes to decide a citizenship application. There is no apparent legal authority for this. The Respondent's processing time is also not subject to a statutory limit in the same way an Applicant's appeal rights are.
2. The Tribunal respectfully disagrees that Tu'uta Katoa is distinguishable because it relates to judicial review. When dealing with EOT applications the Tribunal is 'bound to have regard to the same principles which guide the Court in the exercise of its discretion'.[15]

1. Because of the significant length of the delay, inadequate explanation, prejudice to the Respondent, and the substantive application not having realistic prospects of success, it is unreasonable in all the circumstances to grant an EOT.

1. The Tribunal declines to exercise its discretion under s 19(2) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) to grant an EOT and dismisses the application.

I certify that the preceding twenty-three (23) paragraphs are a true copy of the written reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member A. Nikolic AM CSC

................[sgd]........................................................

[1] Negri v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] FCA 879, [27] (Bromberg J).

[2] Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579; HCA 28, [12]-[18] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ) ('Tu'uta Katoa').

[3] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344, 348‑349 (Wilcox J). In Quach v RU [2024] FCAFC 32, the Full Court reinforced the applicability of considerations in Hunter Valley Developments.

[4] Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516, [9]; BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218, [33] (Yates, Wheelahan and O'Bryan JJ); MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585, [62] (Mortimer J as her Honour then was); Swanton and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2017] FCA 1142, [32] (Tracey J) ('Swanton'), citing Jamal v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 916, [11]-[12] (Perry J) ('Jamal'); Guo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34, [27] (Siopsis, White and Perry JJ, applying MZABP).

[5] Ralkon Agricultural Co Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission [1982] FCA 153; (1982) 43 ALR 535 and 550.

[6] Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 4516, [42]-[43], [49] (Hill J).

[7] Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 360; 64 ALJR 448, 3 (McHugh J). See also: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541.

[8] Comcare v A'Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441, 444 (Black CJ, Gray and Burchett JJ) ('A'Hearn').

[9] Applicant's Statutory Declaration dated 25 November 2025 [21].

[11] See, for example, SZVLE v Minister [2017] FCA 90 (Katzmann J); ADF15 v Minister [2018] FCA 1099, [25] (Flick J).

[13] Applicant's Statutory Declaration dated 25 November 2025 [6].

[14] Applicant's submissions, 4 [13.c.], 9 [26].