Plaintiff v First Defendant

2 The first part is an urgent ex parte application against the first defendant by which the plaintiff seeks a freezing order[2] against the assets of the first defendant in connection with a claim seeking payment of $61,466.62 that is said to have been paid to the first defendant by mistake in July 2018. This application is made pursuant to the court's inherent jurisdiction, alternatively, Order 37A of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Rules). It is this first part of the applications with which this ruling is concerned.

3 The second part of the applications is proposed to be made on notice to the defendants. In this part of the applications the plaintiff seeks orders that:

(a) the defendant make discovery of a contract of sale relating to a property located in Lalor, Victoria (Lalor Property) that is alleged to be owned by the plaintiff but which it contends the defendants, or one or more of them, has occupied, interfered with, and unlawfully purported to sell; and

(b) an interlocutory injunction enjoining the defendants from dealing with the sale proceeds of the Lalor Property.

4 Notice has not yet been given to the defendants regarding the second part of the applications and this ruling is not concerned with it.

5 The freezing order application is supported by two affidavits of Simon Mikhail, sworn 23 and 29 January 2020, respectively. The plaintiff also filed a short outline of submissions. An undertaking as to damages was proffered by the plaintiff's solicitor, Mr Vlahos, on behalf of the plaintiff.

6 For the reasons that follow, the plaintiff's application for a freezing order and related ancillary order should be refused.

7 The background as the plaintiff presents it is apparent from Mr Mikhail's affidavits, their exhibits, and the statement of claim. The proceeding relates to communications, dealings and disputes between two incorporated associations[3] that are each said to be separate autonomous Christian churches serving individuals and families who live in Melbourne and are Arabic speakers or of Arabic heritage. The evidence shows that they have each been previously affiliated or otherwise connected with an unincorporated overseeing national body or 'Movement' known as the Australian Christian Churches (ACC). As part of its structure the ACC also has a Victorian State Executive, and the second and third defendants are alleged to be the President and Secretary/Treasurer (respectively) of the State Executive.

8 The central dispute between the parties relates to alleged steps taken by the defendants and the ACC through its State Executive to combine or merge the two churches under the umbrella of the first defendant, to seek to wind up and cease the operations of the plaintiff, and to alleged related impermissible dealings with the plaintiff's assets. The primary assets the subject of the dispute are said to be:

(a) a sum of $61,466.62 that is alleged to have been mistakenly transferred to the first defendant by the plaintiff in July 2018 in connection with the proposed merger of the churches; and

(b) the Lalor Property, which, as mentioned, the plaintiff says has been wrongfully occupied and dealt with by one or more of the defendants to the exclusion of the plaintiff, and is alleged to have been recently sold to a third party against the plaintiff's wishes pursuant to a contract of sale that the first defendant has refused to provide to the plaintiff.

9 The evidence filed to date suggests that the dispute between the parties has been heated and acrimonious at times. Given the nature of the application and the urgent circumstances in which this application is being heard and determined, I will not set out the detail of all matters deposed to in the affidavits. However, it is convenient to note that the matters that Mr Mikhail has deposed to include the following:

(a) He is the Senior Pastor, president, elder and secretary of the plaintiff's committee and authorised by the committee to make the affidavits in support of the application.

(b) The plaintiff is a Christian church and currently has 31 members. From the date of its incorporation until 29 December 2019 it was affiliated with the national movement of Pentecostal churches known as the Australian Christian Churches.[4] The affiliation is referred to in the plaintiff's previous rules. Rule 10 of those rules provided that the plaintiff would at all times be an autonomous church of the ACC in Australia unless (relevantly) its membership had fallen below the minimum required for registered status, being 30 adults in regular attendance. In that case the rule provided that '... it shall come under the oversight of the State Executive and provisions of the United Constitution and State By-laws of Australian Christian Churches until its registered status is achieved or restored.'

(c) Resolutions were passed by the members of the plaintiff on 29 December 2019 terminating its affiliation with the ACC in accordance with rule 9 of its rules and adopting the Model Rules under the Incorporated Associations Reform Act 2012 (Vic) (Act) as the plaintiff's new constitution. Documents relating to the meeting were exhibited to Mr Mikhail's first affidavit.

(d) The first defendant was incorporated as an association in 2011 and its Senior Pastor and president of the committee is Mr Awad. Mr Mikhail has been informed by past and present members and believes that Mr Awad used to be the Senior Pastor of the plaintiff until 2011; that Mr Awad's membership was terminated in 2011; and that Mr Awad was forced to leave and that is why he established the first defendant church in 2011. Mr Awad has not been a member of the plaintiff since his membership was terminated in 2011.

(e) The background to Mr Mikhail's and his family's involvement with the plaintiff and the positions he has held.

(f) The ACC's attempts through the third defendant, Mr Bates, to have Mr Awad return to the plaintiff as its Senior Pastor in 2016 and the overwhelming vote against Mr Awad's return as a member or Senior Pastor of the plaintiff.

(g) Claims regarding Mr Awad using his relatives to remain within the plaintiff organisation and cause unrest and unsettle the members so as to make it difficult for any experienced pastor to remain with the plaintiff for any extended period of time.

(h) Mr Bates ignoring the vote rejecting Mr Awad's return to the plaintiff and the ACC using the oversight power in the plaintiff's then rules to impose on the plaintiff the return of Mr Awad as the ACC appointed Senior Pastor notwithstanding the known resistance of its members.

(i) In connection with the unrest among the plaintiff's members, the ACC, through the State Executive, deciding to exercise a claimed oversight power to make decisions to:

(i) combine the plaintiff and the first defendant;

(ii) de-register the plaintiff as being affiliated with the ACC on the basis that its membership had fallen below 30;

(iii) appoint Mr Awad the new Senior Pastor of both the plaintiff and the first defendant; and

(iv) combine the churches under the umbrella of the first defendant and to then take action to wind up the plaintiff.

(j) The terms of the minutes of the meetings and announcements of the decisions to the plaintiff's members in mid-2018. In this context it was said that Mr Mikhail had been informed that he had no choice in the matter because it was an ACC State Executive decision, and that Mr Awad would be Senior Pastor until the end of 2019 but in the meantime Mr Mikhail could apply for ACC credentials and the members would then later be given a vote on who to appoint as the Senior Pastor of the combined church.

(k) The plaintiff deciding in connection with the proposed merger to transfer to the first defendant all of its money, which at the time was $61,466.62, and which amount was transferred to the first defendant on 13 July 2018 by Mr Mikhail on behalf of the plaintiff.

(l) Mr Mikhail's 'mistaken belief that the ACC had the right to wind up the plaintiff under its oversight power' which was said to be the reason why the money was transferred to the first defendant. He said that had he known that the plaintiff's members had the right to vote on whether or not they wanted the plaintiff to be wound up and whether or not they wanted the plaintiff's funds to be given to the first defendant he would not have signed documents nor transferred the plaintiff's funds.

(m) The plaintiff's continued independent existence and membership.

(n) Communications, tensions, and concerns that existed between members of the plaintiff in connection with the proposed merger and related matters.

(o) Details of the meeting of the plaintiff held on 29 December 2019 and at which the members voted to withdraw its affiliation with the ACC and thereby end any oversight power, and voted to adopt the Model Rules under the Act.

(p) Claimed attempts by the second and third defendants, with the consent of the first defendant, to obtain the Lalor Property from the plaintiff.

(q) Mr Mikhail signing a real estate agency agreement in respect of the sale of the Lalor Property on 26 May 2019 in favour of Ray White Real Estate so as to permit it to start the marketing campaign for the Lalor Property in connection with the proposed merger.

(r) The asking price of $1.6 million for the Lalor Property, with the desired price being said to be $1.9 million.

(s) The revocation of the agent's authority to sell on 1 August 2019.

(t) The plaintiff becoming aware in January 2020 that the Lalor Property may have been sold and being informed in late January 2020 that it had been sold.

(u) The plaintiff's absence of knowledge regarding the contract of sale, the settlement date and related details, and the first defendant's refusal to provide the contract of sale to the plaintiff.

(v) Correspondence passing between solicitors and the filing of this proceeding on 16 January 2020.

(w) Bank statements of the first defendant in respect of two Commonwealth Bank accounts, being:

(i) a term deposit account showing a total amount of $76,189.33 as at 31 December 2019 and described to be on a seven-day rolling holding facility; and

(ii) a business transaction account showing a balance of $10,154.57 as at 31 December 2019 and recording numerous day-to-day transactions throughout the period 1 October to 31 December 2019.

(x) The removal of Mr Mikhail's online visibility and access to the first defendant's bank accounts occurring after service of the writ and statement of claim on the first defendant.

(y) The first defendant not owning any real estate, and the plaintiff incurring legal costs and seeking a freezing order in respect of an amount equal to $150,000.

(z) Mr Mikhail's belief, and him being told, that there was no choice but to sell the Lalor Property because the ACC had decided that was what was going to happen.

(aa) A dispute between the parties in relation to Mr Mikhail seeking to exclude the first defendant from the Lalor Property and physical altercations between members of the two churches in January 2020, which also involved a police presence and claimed injuries.

(bb) The plaintiff's difficulties in obtaining information regarding the status of the sale and the related communications with the first defendant and the real estate agent, Ray White.

(cc) The Lalor Property being unencumbered.

(dd) Mr Mikhail being informed on 29 January 2020 by Ray White Real Estate that the contract of sale had been signed and communications relating to the same, including an email from Ray White dated 28 January 2020 regarding the contract becoming 'unconditional'.

(ee) The plaintiff's further unsuccessful attempts to obtain copies of the contract of sale.

(ff) Communications between the solicitors for the parties regarding what the plaintiff contended was an unlawful sale, and the plaintiff's concerns regarding what may become of the proceeds of sale.

10 There are a number of claims made in the statement of claim but not all are relevant for present purposes. As was confirmed during oral submissions, two claims are relied upon for the purpose of the current application.

11 The first is a claim that insofar as the 'oversight' power of the ACC in rule 10 of the rules of the plaintiff in force prior to 29 December 2019 purported to permit the ACC to make decisions and take steps to wind up the plaintiff, or to amalgamate or combine the plaintiff and the first defendant, the rule was and is invalid and of no force or effect because of the operation of s 48(4) of the Act. This, so it was contended, is because if the rule operated in this way, it would be inconsistent with the express provisions of the Act that address the manner in which incorporated associations can be amalgamated or wound up, being ss 17 and 125 of the Act respectively. In each case those provisions require special resolutions to be passed by the members of the relevant incorporated association. Consequently, so it was submitted, any decision by the ACC relying on the 'oversight' power in rule 10 of the plaintiff's rules at the relevant time was and is of no effect.

12 The other claim relied on is a claim that the plaintiff paid $61,466.42 to the first defendant as a result of a mistaken belief held by the plaintiff in connection with the decisions of the ACC regarding the proposed merger and winding up of the plaintiff. In substance the mistaken belief was said to be a belief that rule 10 of the plaintiff's rules as they then stood lawfully empowered the ACC to make decisions and take steps regarding the merging and winding up of the plaintiff; and a mistaken belief that the decisions of the ACC made in July 2018 to that effect[5] were lawful and valid. The result, so it was submitted, is that because the payment was made by mistake the first defendant has been unjustly enriched and the plaintiff is entitled to restitutionary and other relief in respect of the money sum.

Some Principles and Observations Regarding Freezing Orders

13 It is well accepted that the court has the power to make freezing orders pursuant to its inherent power and the express power provided under Order 37A of the Rules.

14 The principles to be applied in determining whether a freezing order ought to be made were conveniently summarised by Justice Forrest in Zhen v Mo & Ors[6] as follows:[7]

1. First... a freezing order, by its very nature, is a drastic remedy and a court must exercise a high degree of caution before taking a step which will interfere with a party's capacity to deal with his or her assets.[8]
2. Second, the order is not designed to provide security for the applicant's claim.[9] It is solely directed to preserving assets from being dissipated, thereby frustrating the court process.[10]
3. Third, the applicant bears the onus both in satisfying the Court that the order should be continued and in satisfying the Court as to the amount which is to be the subject of the order.
4. Fourth...an order can only be made on the basis of admissible evidence which supports the contentions made by the party seeking the order. Speculation and guesswork is no substitute for either the facts or inferences properly drawn from proved facts.[11]
5. Fifth, that before such an order can be made it is necessary that the applicant establish -

(a) an arguable case against the defendant;[12] and

(b) that there is a danger that the prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied as a result of the defendant's actions in either removing the assets or disposing or dealing with them so as to diminish their value.[13]

1. Sixth, the balance of convenience must favour the granting of the freezing order.[14]
2. Seventh...there is no set process determining the exact nature of an order. The order will be framed according to the circumstances of the case.[15]
3. Eighth, the applicant must establish with some precision the value of prospective judgment. The order should not unnecessarily tie up a party's assets and property.[16]
4. Finally, there may be discretionary considerations which militate against the granting of a freezing order, such as delay in bringing the application on before the court or a lack of candour in the materials placed before the court.[17]

15 In Distinctive FX Pty Ltd v Wright,[18] Justice Elliott added that the evidence relied on by a plaintiff in seeking to establish an arguable case against a defendant may also be relied upon to demonstrate that there is a danger a prospective judgment will be wholly or partially unsatisfied as a result of the removal, disposal or diminishing of assets. His Honour also observed that where the allegations made against a defendant contain allegations of serious dishonesty, 'that evidence of itself may satisfy the Court that the requisite danger exists.'[19]

16 Whilst noting the difference in language between 'real risk' under the general law and 'danger' in Order 37A, in the present case the substance of these considerations applies equally, and the result does not change, whether the order is sought pursuant to the inherent powers of the court or pursuant to Order 37A. The plaintiff did not contend otherwise. In this context I note also the recent observations of the Court of Appeal in Rozenblit v Vainer (Rozenblit)[20] regarding the origins of Order 37A, including the observation that[21] '[t]he governing principles set out in O 37A, which was introduced in 2006 as part of a harmonisation exercise involving all Australian States and Territories, closely reflect the principles enunciated by the High Court of Australia in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd.[22]' In so observing the Court of Appeal again emphasised that the rationale is the prevention of the frustration of the court's processes, not the provision of security, and that caution is required so as not to lightly grant such a drastic remedy.[23]

17 Although the Court of Appeal in Rozenblit was addressing circumstances involving a freezing order pending appeal, its considered observations in that context apply more broadly. It is of assistance to extract the summary of principles there set out:[24]

1. In summary then, the principles governing an application for a freezing order pending appeal are as follows:

(1) The purpose of granting a freezing order is to prevent the frustration or inhibition of the Court's process by seeking to meet a danger that a prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied. Its purpose is not to provide security in respect of a prospective judgment or order.

(2) A freezing order is to be viewed as an extraordinary interim remedy. The order is a drastic remedy which calls for a high degree of caution on the part of the Court before an order is made.

(3) An applicant for a freezing order pending appeal will be required to establish that there is a good arguable case that the appeal will succeed. This means that it can be seen from the available material that the appeal has a real prospect of success.

(4) It must be shown that there is a reasonable possibility, not necessarily more than a 50 per cent chance, that assets may be disposed of or dealt with or diminished in value if an order is not made.

(5) In the case of an order against a third party, it must be shown that there is a danger that the prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied as a result of the third party's ability to exercise power in respect of the relevant assets, or that a court process may be available to the applicant as a result of a prospective judgment, under which the third party may be obliged to disgorge assets or contribute to satisfying the prospective judgment.

(6) The value of the assets covered by a freezing order should not exceed the likely maximum amount of the applicant's claim, including interest and costs.

(7) As a condition of making a freezing order it will normally be appropriate to require the applicant to give undertakings to the Court, including the usual undertaking as to damages, supported if necessary by the provision of security.

(8) The order being discretionary,[25] other considerations including the balance of convenience may bear upon the Court's ultimate decision, but it is not a distinct requirement that the balance of convenience favours the making of the order.

(9) The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is preserved and r 37A.05 simply addresses the minimum requirements that ordinarily need to be satisfied in an application.

18 With respect to the power to make ancillary orders, I refer to, without setting them out, the terms of rule 37A.03 and the observations regarding ancillary orders made in Koulouris v Haidaris.[26]

19 The plaintiff filed a written outline of submissions shortly before the hearing and the submissions were further refined during oral submissions. No issue of principle was raised by the plaintiff. Briefly and in substance, it was submitted that:

(a) The freezing order was sought only in relation to the $61,466.42 money claim.[27]

(b) For each of the two claims earlier referred to the plaintiff had established a good arguable case on the evidence.

(c) There was a real risk or danger that a prospective judgment in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the money claim would remain wholly or partly unsatisfied by the first defendant because the assets of the first defendant, and in particular the funds in the two bank accounts, will be disposed of, dealt with, or diminished in value.

(d) The balance of convenience and the interests of justice support the making of the freezing order sought.

20 With respect to the claimed risk of the assets being disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value, heavy reliance was placed upon the evidence that the day after the writ in this proceeding was served, Mr Mikhail's visibility of the bank accounts of the first defendant was removed so that he could no longer access them online. It was submitted that the Court could and should conclude that this evinced an intention on the part of the first defendant to avoid being bound by the court processes, and that it demonstrated or supported the existence of a likelihood or risk that a judgment may go unsatisfied because monies may be dissipated or disposed of.

21 In addition, it was submitted that the evidence demonstrated that the first defendant had occupied the Lalor Property to the wrongful exclusion of the plaintiff as owner, and had done so in a manner that demonstrated a wilful disregard of the legal position. It was contended that the first defendant would have been aware of the legal position because it knew the Lalor Property was the plaintiff's property and because the first defendant was legally represented at the time.

22 It was submitted that this property-related conduct further reinforced the first defendant's willingness to act unlawfully, and that this could be inferred from such conduct when considered together with the removal of the visibility of the bank accounts such that it could be inferred that there is a real risk or danger that the first defendant will seek to dissipate or dispose of the funds in the accounts so as to defeat any judgment on the claim. Some reliance was also placed upon some hearsay evidence regarding what was said to be unsatisfactory conduct of the first defendant's Senior Pastor, Mr Awad, many years ago.

23 With respect to the balance of convenience, it was submitted that this favoured the making of the freezing order because the first defendant is a body corporate and the evidence established that it has no material additional assets other than the limited funds in the two bank accounts. It was also submitted that the existence of a good arguable case in respect of the two claims earlier referred to supported the balance of convenience being in favour of the plaintiff.

24 Even if it were to be assumed for present purposes that the plaintiff has established that the two claims relied upon[28] are good arguable claims, the plaintiff's ex parte application for a freezing order should be refused.

25 On the evidence as it currently stands I do not accept that the plaintiff has established the existence of the required risk or danger that any judgment in respect of the money claim might be wholly or partly unsatisfied because the first defendant may dissipate or dispose of the funds or other assets as contended. I make the following additional brief observations.

26 I refer to the principles referred to above, including the well-accepted position that the purpose of a freezing order is to prevent frustration of the court's process, and that it is not to provide security in respect of a prospective judgment or order. As the High Court and the Court of Appeal have observed, a freezing order is to be viewed as an extraordinary and drastic interim remedy, which calls for a high degree of caution and is not to be made lightly. It is also to be remembered that, as J Forrest J observed in Zhen v Mo,[29] the applicant bears the onus and an order can only be made on the basis of admissible evidence which supports the contentions made by the party seeking the order. Speculation and guesswork are no substitute for either the facts or inferences properly drawn from proved facts.

27 I do not accept that the removal of online access or visibility to the bank accounts, even if assumed to be linked to the commencement of proceedings - and whether or not considered together with the evidence regarding the alleged conduct in connection with the Lalor Property - establishes or allows the Court to infer the existence of the required real risk or danger[30] of any judgment for the money sum being wholly or partially unsatisfied because the defendant might dissipate or dispose of the funds or other assets as contended.

28 The evidence shows that as at 31 December 2019, $76,189.33 was still held in a term deposit account in the name of the first defendant that was earning interest, and that the first defendant was operating a separate business transaction account, which on its face does not demonstrate anything unusual, and nor was it submitted to.

29 There may be a number of explanations as to why Mr Mikhail's visibility of or access to the online bank accounts of the first defendant was removed at the time, although on an ex parte application such as this it is desirable to resist the temptation to speculate too widely. However, it may be noted that it is the plaintiff's case that the plaintiff and the first defendant remain separate incorporated bodies, and the plaintiff expressly confirmed that it was not contended in this application that Mr Mikhail is an officer, member, or committee member of the first defendant so as to entitle him to access the records and information of the first defendant on this basis.

30 Further, the plaintiff is now seeking to recover by court action the $61,466.62 paid by Mr Mikhail on behalf of the plaintiff to the first defendant in July 2018 and it may be that the officeholders or committee of the first defendant removed access and visibility because they considered it prudent or appropriate to do so in those circumstances (noting again that Mr Mikhail does not contend that he has a legal right to access such business records of the first defendant by reason of his position as an officer, member or committee member of that organisation).

31 Whilst it is of course acknowledged that this and other possibilities are necessarily speculative, in my opinion, the removal of online visibility of and access to the two bank accounts of the first defendant in the circumstances relied upon does not allow the Court to conclude, as was submitted, that this evinces an intention on the part of the first defendant to avoid being bound by the court processes, or establish or allow it to be inferred that there is the required risk or danger of a prospective judgment being wholly or partially unsatisfied as a result of the dissipation or disposal of assets by the first defendant.

32 I add that the conduct relied upon in relation to the allegedly unlawful occupation and dealings with the Lalor Property, whether considered alone or together with the other circumstances, does not alter the position regarding the failure to establish the required danger or risk with respect to the money claim being unsatisfied by reason of the prospect that the funds in the bank accounts might be dissipated or disposed of. In this regard it is also to be recalled that the evidence shows that Mr Mikhail, on behalf of the plaintiff, had assisted in facilitating some of the steps in the proposed merger, including transferring funds; authorising a real estate agent to list the Lalor Property for sale; and allowing the first defendant and its members access to and use of the Lalor Property for the purpose of what was described as the 'combined church'.

33 Similarly, even if it is the case that the first defendant has no other assets other than the funds standing to the credit of the two bank accounts, that also does not alter the position. This is because in the circumstances under consideration it does not provide any material additional support for concluding that the required danger or risk is present. In this context it remains important to recognise that it is not the function of a freezing order to provide security for a prospective judgment, and that the Court is not currently dealing with an interlocutory injunction application directed at the preservation of the subject matter of the proceeding.[31]

34 Further, to proceed on the basis of a finding that the limited funds in the two bank accounts are the only assets of the first defendant in the absence of the first defendant having an opportunity to address this factual matter is not an approach that should be taken on this ex parte application. On the evidence before the Court it appears that the most that could be said in this context is that, so far as the plaintiff is aware, the funds in the two bank account are the first defendant's only material assets. That may or may not turn out to be the case, but it is not to the point and it remains important to proceed with principled caution.

35 To the extent that the plaintiff relied upon the somewhat vague hearsay evidence regarding Mr Awad's alleged inappropriate conduct many years ago in connection with the termination of his membership of the plaintiff, this also provides the plaintiff with little or no material assistance. Given the lack of specificity and the nature of the allegations, on this ex parte application and in its current form such evidence should be given little weight. Further and in any event, the evidence relates to events of many years past that, even if assumed to be true, is in my view too remote in time and unspecific to provide material assistance to the plaintiff in the present context.

36 Having concluded that the application for a freezing order ought to be refused even if it were to be assumed that it has been established by the plaintiff that the claims relied on are good arguable claims, it is neither necessary nor desirable to seek to further address this issue at this point and I do not propose to do so.

37 The plaintiff also sought an ancillary order to the proposed freezing order requiring the first defendant to set out in writing certain information regarding its assets and financial position. Having concluded that no freezing order should be made in the circumstances, and having regard to the matters raised above relevant to that conclusion, it is in my view also not appropriate to make an ancillary order of the kind sought. Accordingly, to the extent that this aspect of the application was pressed, it will be refused. In any event, even if I had determined to make a freezing order I would not have made an ancillary order of the kind sought at this stage and would have adjourned that part of the application so that it could be made, heard and determined on notice to the first defendant.

38 The plaintiff's ex parte application for a freezing order and related ancillary order will be dismissed. I will hear from the plaintiff regarding consequential orders and directions.

[1] Which appeared to be erroneously RedCrest date stamped 24 January 2020.

[2] And ancillary disclosure orders regarding the first defendant's financial position. This is collectively referred to as the 'freezing order application' in these reasons.

[3] Being the plaintiff and the first defendant.

[5] As reflected in the minutes of a meeting dated 12 July 2018.

[6] [2008] VSC 300.

[8] Cardile v LED Builders Pty Limited (1998) 198 CLR 380, [51] (Cardile); Practice Note 3 of 2006.

[9] Jackson v Sterling Industries [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612, 621, 625.

[10] Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) [1998] HCA 30; (1998) 195 CLR 1, [73].

[11] Hartwell Trent (Aust) Pty Ltd v Tefal Societe Anonyme [1968] VicRp 1; [1968] VR 3, 13.

[12] Glenwood Management Group Pty Ltd v Mayo [1991] VicRp 45; [1991] 2 VR 49, 49. It is apparent from the balance of the reasons of J Forrest J and the decision his Honour cited that this is intended to be a reference to a 'good arguable case'.

[13] R. 37A.02(1) Under the general law the plaintiff must establish that there is a real risk of assets being disposed of: Cardile [122].

[14] Consolidated Constructions Pty Ltd v Bellenville Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1513.

[15] Jackson v Sterling Industries [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612, 621.

[18] [2015] VSC 299, [39].

[19] Referring to Victoria University of Technology v Wilson [2003] VSC 299, [33] (Redlich J); Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319, 325F-326A (Gleeson CJ, with whom Meagher JA and Rogers AJA agreed).

[20] [2019] VSCA 164.

[21] Ibid, [14] (McLeish and Niall JJA).

[22] (1999) 198 CLR 380 (citation in original).

[23] [2019] VSCA 164, [14] (McLeish and Niall JJA).

[25] Cardile (1999) 198 CLR 380, 404 [53] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ) (citations in original).

[26] [2019] VSC 392. And the cases there referred to at paragraphs 16 and following (Connock J).

[28] Or even the other claims made in the statement of claim.

[29] [2008] VSC 300 [24]-[25].

[30] In the sense referred to by the Court of Appeal in Rozenblit at [15] and summarised at (4) of the summary extracted in paragraph 17 above.

[31] As to the doctrinal differences between a freezing order and an interlocutory injunction see the observations in Rozenblit at [16]-[18] (McLeish and Niall JJA).