Plaintiff v First Defendant [2013] VSC 591 | Case summary

Supreme Court of Victoria|2013-11-01|Before: McMillan J

SUCCESSION LAW - ADMINISTRATION AND PROBATE - FAMILY PROVISION AND MAINTENANCE - Application by adult daughter of the deceased - Where the estate is small - Where the deceased has a large number of children - Where two children received the large proportion of the estate - Where weight should be given to the testator's wishes - Whether the deceased made adequate provision for the proper maintenance of the plaintiff - Whether further provision should be made - Extent of provision that should be made - Application granted - Administration and Probate Act 1958 s 91

2 The deceased died on 18 April 2011, leaving a will dated 27 July 2005 ('the will'). Probate of the will was granted to the defendants, a son and daughter of the deceased, on 25 June 2012.

3 The deceased was survived by nine of his ten children. His wife, Hoyret, pre-deceased him, having died on 17 August 2002. The ten children were born between the years 1955 and 1973. His son, Hannah Assouni (' John') died on 13 January 2007. His now surviving children's ages range from 41 to 58 years.

4 In making his will, the deceased faced a heavy burden, and the decision that faces this Court is no less difficult. One is minded to repeat the opening words of Stein J, in very different circumstances, in Kosic v Queanbeyan City Council:

This is a most unfortunate case because it would require the wisdom of Solomon to solve it in a fashion acceptable to all the participants. ... I am not sure that Solomon's way of dealing with issues actually kept everybody terribly happy. However, it seems to me that whatever the Court concludes, it will be impossible to remedy the situation to the satisfaction of all parties.[1]

(a) his double barrel Browning rifle and his gold ring with diamond to the first defendant, Beshara ('Jack');

(b) his gold ring engraved with a cedar tree to his son, Banda ('Banda');

(d) his necklace to the second defendant, Bernadette ('Bernadette'); and

(e) the rest and residue of his estate to his son, Banda, and his daughter, Bernadette, in equal shares.

6 In his will, the deceased set out his reasons for leaving the residue of his estate to the Bernadette and Banda only:

I express my love and affection for all my children. The terms of this Will are in no way intended to reflect any greater love or affection for one child over another. I have made this Will as herein because it is my wish that all my children at some time in their life own a house or a share of a house. It is my judgment that Banda and Bernadette may need my assistance to do so.
I confirm to my Executors and to any other relevant party that no person is dependent on my financial or other support for any reason and that there is no person not named in this Will who has contributed to my life to the extent that he or she should be entitled to any share or greater share of my estate.
If any one of my residuary beneficiaries does own a house or share of a house at my death whether in her own name or as deemed under family law or other legislation such as under an implied trust, without binding that beneficiary to do so, I express my wish to that beneficiary that she adopts the attitude that she holds her share as a residuary beneficiary herein on behalf of all my other children (excluding the other beneficiary) and therefore shares that share with those other children equally.

7 The inventory of assets and liabilities of the deceased shows that the estate of the deceased comprised the deceased's rifle and jewellery, a small amount of money, furniture and effects the total value of which was $7880, and real estate, being the deceased's residential property at 81 Rennie Street, Coburg ('the Rennie Street property') valued at $750 000.

8 At the trial, it was common ground that the value of the Rennie Street property was $695 000 and that it was in a poor state of repair. The plaintiff's valuer, who did not conduct an inspection of the interior of the house, described the property as a 1920s Californian bungalow maintained in fair to poor condition.

9 The defendant's valuer described the Rennie Street property as follows:

As of the date of inspection the property presents in average condition overall. We note that the dwelling is [in] a relatively poor condition indicating a relative lack of maintenance over many years. We note sagging floors in the kitchen and the lounge room, mould in the bathroom, rotten external weatherboards. The dwelling has not been painted in twenty years and we regard the kitchen and bathroom to provide only very basic accommodation by today's standard.

10 Bernadette referred to photographs showing the state of repair both inside and outside of the house. She said the house needs re-stumping, there is mould in the bathroom, there are cracks in the internal plaster walls, and the fence needs replacing. Banda said the house needs re-stumping and rewiring, the cracked plaster needs fixing and the fencing needs replacing. Both Bernadette and Banda said they recently paid for the replacement of the roof and internal roof beams at a cost of approximately $16 000.

11 Section 91 of the Act provides:

91 Power of the Court to make maintenance order

(1) Despite anything in this Act to the contrary, the Court may order that provision be made out of the estate of a deceased person for the proper maintenance and support of a person for whom the deceased had responsibility to make provision.

...

(3) The Court must not make an order under subsection (1) in favour of a person unless the Court is of the opinion that the distribution of the estate of the deceased person effected by -

(a) his or her will (if any); or

(b) the operation of the provisions of Part I, Division 6; or

(c) both the will and the operation of the provisions -

does not make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of the person.

(4) The Court in determining -

(a) whether or not the deceased had responsibility to make provision for a person; and

(b) whether or not the distribution of the estate of the deceased person as effected by -

(i) the deceased's will; or

(ii) the operation of the provisions of Part I, Division 6; or

(iii) both the will and the operation of the provisions -

makes adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of the person; and

(c) the amount of provision (if any) which the Court may order for the person; and

(d) any other matter related to an application for an order under subsection (1) -

must have regard to -

The section goes on to list a number of matters to which the Court must have regard. These matters are set out below at paragraphs [116] to [135].

12 In hearing evidence under such an application, s 94 of the Act relevantly provides:

94 Powers of Court

At the hearing of such application the Court shall inquire fully into the estate of the deceased, and for that purpose may -

...

(c) accept any evidence of the deceased person's reasons for making the dispositions in his or her will (if any) and for not making proper provision for the applicant, whether or not the evidence is in writing.

13 In making orders under s 91, s 96 of the Act provides:

96 Powers of Court in making orders

...

(3) The Court may in making any order under this Part order that the provision may consist of a lump sum or a periodical or other payment.

14 In an application for further provision made under s 91 of the Act, the Court must decide:

(a) at the date of his death, did the deceased have a responsibility to make provision for the maintenance and support of the plaintiff?

(b) if so, does the deceased's will make adequate provision for her proper maintenance and support?

In considering these questions, the Court must have regard to the matters set out in ss 91(4)(e)-(o) of the Act and, under s 91(4)(p), have regard to 'any other matter the Court considers relevant'.

15 The basis of the jurisdiction is responsibility, traditionally expressed as a 'moral duty' or 'moral obligation'. In determining these questions, the Court must consider what provision a wise and just testator would have thought it his or her moral duty to make for an applicant.

16 The approach taken in Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd is frequently referred to with approval:[2]

Their Lordships agree that in every case the Court must place itself in the position of the testator and consider what he ought to have done in all the circumstances of the case, treating the testator for that purpose as a wise and just, rather than a fond and foolish, husband or father. This no doubt is what the learned judge meant by a just, but not a loving, husband or father. As was truly said by Salmond J in Re Allen, Allen v Manchester:

The Act is ... designed to enforce the moral obligation of a testator to use his testamentary powers for the purpose of making proper and adequate provision after his death for the support of his wife and children, having regard to his means, to the means and deserts of the several claimants, and to the relative urgency of the various moral claims upon his bounty. The provision which the Court may properly make in default of testamentary provision is that which a just and wise father would have thought it his moral duty to make in the interests of his widow and children had he been fully aware of all the relevant circumstances.[3]

17 In applying this test, the Court must also give considerable weight to freedom of testation and only interfere with the terms of a will if the testator has failed in his or her moral duty.[4] As expressed by Bell J in Whitehead v State Trustees Ltd:

It is therefore clear that, when deciding whether to make an order for provision under s 91(1), preserving the deceased's freedom of testamentary disposition is a significant discretionary consideration.[5]

[T]his jurisdiction is pre-eminently one in which the trial judge's exercise of discretion should not be unduly confined by judge-made rules of purportedly general application. A trial judge has to place himself in the position of the testator and to consider what that testator 'ought to have done in all the circumstances of the case'. No doubt this requires him to recognise and to apply prevailing community standards of what is right and appropriate since it is by those standards that the content both of the moral duty owed by a just husband and father to his wife and children and of departures from it will be measured. However, while appellate courts should correct miscarriages of discretion in particular cases, I question whether they should go further and propound general rules by reference to which discretion is to be exercised.[6]

19 In Collicoat v McMillan, Ormiston J elucidated the concept of moral claim and obligation as follows:

In my opinion the expression 'moral claim' has always been treated as a convenient shorthand expression referring to the right correlative to the duty imposed on testators to make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of persons within the class specified. That 'moral obligation', as described in Re Allen and many later cases, reflects a duty resting on a testator to make not merely adequate or sufficient financial provision for members of his or her family in the specified class but also the obligation to measure that adequacy or sufficiency by reference to what is right and proper according to accepted community standards.[7]

20 In the recent New South Wales decision of Slack v Rogan, White J discussed what is meant by 'community standards' or 'community values' in interpreting s 59 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW), which establishes a similar legislative regime in New South Wales.[8] His Honour considered the decision of Allsop P in Andrew v Andrew, who described the section as requiring a 'broad evaluative judgment based necessarily upon community values',[9] and the reasons of Barrett JA in that same case who considered 'the clear need for the court ... to recognise community expectations is undiminished'.[10]

[125] I know of no way of determining what the community would expect, or what its standards are, or values would be. I do not know, but suspect, that the expectations of individual members of the community would vary widely. It may be that the Act itself, at least in so far as it goes beyond allowing provision to be made in favour of spouses and minor or disabled children, runs counter to community expectations about freedom of testamentary disposition. As Basten JA said in Andrew v Andrew, the only guiding light, consistent with the rule of law, for the identification of community standards are those reflected in current legislation. No legislation other than the Succession Act itself is relevant to the present case. Attempts to identify particular community standards, for example, that a testator need not make provision for an able bodied son, or that a widow's claim is paramount, have been rejected. To say that the court itself is the spokesman for the fair and reasonable man or woman in the community is to acknowledge that in truth there is no ascertainable external community standard to guide the decision.

[126] The question of whether the provision, if any, made for an eligible applicant is adequate for his or her proper maintenance, education or advancement in life is to be assessed having regard to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The assessment involves a broad evaluative judgment which is not to be constrained by preconceptions and predispositions. This really means that there are no definite criteria for the exercise of the 'evaluative judgment'.

[127] In my view, respect should be given to a capable testator's judgment as to who should benefit from the estate if it can be seen that the testator has duly considered the claims on the estate. That is not to deny that s 59 of the Succession Act interferes with the freedom of testamentary disposition. Plainly it does, and courts have a duty to interfere with the will if the provision made for an eligible applicant is less than adequate for his or her proper maintenance and advancement in life. But it must be acknowledged that the evidence that can be presented after the testator's death is necessarily inadequate. Typically, as in this case, there can be no or only limited contradiction of the applicant's evidence as to his or her relationship and dealings with the deceased. The deceased will have been in a better position to determine what provision for a claimant's maintenance and advancement in life is proper than will be a court called on to determine that question months or years after the deceased's death when the person best able to give evidence on that question is no longer alive. Accordingly, if the deceased was capable of giving due consideration to that question and did so, considerable weight should be given to the testator's testamentary wishes in recognition of the better position in which the deceased was placed.[11]

22 The plaintiff bears the onus of proving that the deceased had a responsibility to make provision for his or her maintenance and support and failed to do so. Because of the seriousness of the allegation that a testator has abused his or her freedom of testation, the principles concerning the qualities of the proofs required set out in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[12] are applicable.[13] In State Trustees Ltd v Bedford, Neave JA stated:

It is trite law that claims against the estate of a deceased person must be approached with caution_._[14]

23 In Webb v Ryan, Whelan J referred to the difficulties in assessing the evidence in Part IV claims when he stated:

An important matter which may arise in these kinds of cases is the difficulty of assessing evidence concerning things allegedly said by a person who is dead. The court can never be certain it knows all the circumstances, and more often than not one may be sure that the court knows few of them. It is impossible to hear what the other party to the conversation, the deceased, says about it. There is a significant risk of reconstruction. There are dangers in relying on evidence of what may have been a casual observation made to a person who at the time had no reason to remember the exact words used. In the light of these concerns, a substantial burden is placed upon an applicant whose case relies upon such evidence. Such evidence must be very carefully examined.[15]

24 Whether the deceased testator failed to make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of an applicant is determined by a consideration of the facts and matters known to the deceased at the time of his or her death. A wise and just testator is deemed to be aware of relevant circumstances prevailing at the time of death, but the testator will only be deemed to be aware of subsequent events to the extent that they were reasonably foreseeable at the time of death.[16]

25 The time for determining how much provision should be awarded is at the trial, when the Court can consider the applicant's position in the light of any events that have occurred since the death of the testator.[17]

26 Although the value of the estate is relatively small, consisting in effect of one asset only, the Court is still required to consider all the relevant circumstances before a decision is made - there is no 'bottom limit' on the application of the Act.[18] The smallness of the estate is significant in that, in some circumstances, not all of the claims against the estate can be met. In such a case, the Court necessarily should give weight to the paramount claim.[19]

27 The plaintiff, the fourth child of the family, was born in Lebanon on 2 April 1962. In 1969, the family migrated to Australia with their then eight children. The youngest two children of the family were born in Australia. The plaintiff's older sister, Sadie, who was born in Lebanon in 1958, said that she was aged 12 when she came to Australia and Bernadette, who was born in Lebanon in 1969, said the family came to Australia in about 1970 or 1971.

28 The plaintiff also gave evidence that she was 6 years old when she came to Australia. In cross-examination, the plaintiff said she came to Australia with her family in 1971 when she was 9 years old.

29 The plaintiff said that, when the family first came to Australia, they lived in rented accommodation until her parents purchased the Rennie Street property in 1977. In cross-examination the plaintiff said that, when they arrived in Australia, the family bought a house in Amess Street, Carlton, that they then sold that house and rented for about a year in Shaftesbury Parade, Thornbury and that they then bought a house in David Street, Brunswick. The plaintiff said she was aged 9 or 10 when the family lived in David Street, Brunswick. The deceased and his wife sold the David Street property in 1977, when the plaintiff was aged 15, and purchased the Rennie Street property. They owned it as joint proprietors and it was mortgaged. In 1977, the children's ages ranged from 4 years to 22 years. Most of the children lived at the Rennie Street property over the years and, save for Banda and Bernadette, all eventually moved out.

30 While the family lived in Brunswick, the plaintiff and her younger siblings of school age attended Princes Hill Primary School. When the family moved to Coburg, they went to Moreland Primary School. The siblings younger than the plaintiff attended Coburg High School up to either Year 11 or 12.

31 Sadie said that, when she arrived in Australia, she did not go to school and she worked in a factory making shirts. Previously, in Lebanon, she had worked with her parents picking fruit and then in a silk factory.

32 The plaintiff said she left school in the middle of grade 6 when she was 12 years old because her father made her do so. The deceased took her out of school at that age because he thought girls did not need to be educated and she had to go to work. She said that the principal of the school and the Education Department spoke to her father and that he made her tell them she did not want to go to school, but that the principal of the school and the Education Department did nothing about her leaving school. The plaintiff did not know that the minimum school leaving age was then 14 years, and in cross-examination denied that she stayed at school until she was 14 years old, insisting that she did not attend high school. Sadie confirmed that the plaintiff did not go to high school. Bernadette said she did not know when the plaintiff left school as she was too young to remember. Although she said in her affidavit that the plaintiff left school when she was much older, she did so on the basis that her older brothers and sisters had told her that was the case.

33 As a result of leaving school at such a young age, the plaintiff cannot read and write. The plaintiff said that the older children in the family, Jack, John and Sadie, also cannot read or write. The plaintiff's son, Mr Amin Salloum ('Amin'), said that his mother has limited literacy skills and that he and his sister help her in those areas. He said he could not be sure whether the plaintiff has ever taken any classes as an adult to improve her literacy skills.

34 After she left school, the plaintiff worked in two clothing factories until she married her first husband when she was aged 18. Her first job was ironing shirts, which she did for about two years. Her next job was making buttonholes.

35 From the time she started working until she married, the plaintiff said that she handed her unopened wage packet either to her father or her mother. The plaintiff lived at home until she married. The plaintiff said that, by the time the family moved to the Rennie Street property, the deceased was no longer working but the four older children were all working and all of them handed over their pay packets to their parents.

36 It was common ground that, once the children were working, they gave their pay to their parents, although, when the mortgage on the Rennie Street property was paid off in about 2002, the younger children did not hand all of their pay packet to their parents but continued to pay for the household outgoings and expenses.

37 Sadie said that she gave her unopened pay packet to her parents until the day before she married, when she was aged 15 and a half.

38 The plaintiff married when she was 18. She met her future husband, a man referred to in this proceeding only as 'Tony', when he and his family came to the Rennie Street property to visit her father. The plaintiff said it was an arranged marriage.

39 She said the marriage was difficult and that her first husband was a violent man. The plaintiff's sister, Sadie, gave evidence that, when the plaintiff married her first husband, the plaintiff worked at a petrol station operated by Tony's parents in Kyneton.

40 After they married, the plaintiff became pregnant straightaway. When she was three months pregnant, she said that her husband started saying that she was not a virgin, and that he started hitting her. The plaintiff told him to stop, that she had had enough, and that she had been raped by her father, an allegation that I shall return to.

41 The plaintiff's sister, Sadie, said that one day (she could not remember in what year) when she was at her parent's home, she was in the room when her father answered the telephone and she heard him say 'my daughter's not for sale'. She said that her father was upset and was yelling. He slammed the telephone down and said to her mother:

That was Tony. He wants to give [the plaintiff] back because of this and that and if you give me $26 000, I will keep her because when I married her, she wasn't a virgin.

42 The plaintiff said that, after she told Tony she had been raped by her father, he put her in a taxi at Kyneton Roadhouse and sent her to his sister's house. They called the police who, in turn, called the plaintiff's uncle, and he took her to his house. She said that her brother Jack collected her from her uncle's place two weeks later and that she went to live with him. The reason for this, according to Sadie, was that the deceased did not want the plaintiff to live at his home.

43 The plaintiff said that, after her son was born, she was told to go to the Rennie Street property where her father told her that she was a disgrace to the family and that she was not allowed to bring her son, Amin, anywhere near him. The plaintiff said that her father eventually did see her son when he was about 1 year old, when she took him to the Rennie Street property to see her mother.

After the End of the Plaintiff's First Marriage

44 The plaintiff lived with Jack, his wife and his four children from the time that she left her first husband until six months before she married her second husband in 1990, a period of about eight years. During this time she was on a single mother's pension and did not work outside the home.

The Plaintiff's Purchase of a Share in a Property

45 In 1990, the plaintiff said that her sister Georgia suggested that they should purchase a house in Franklin Street, Coburg together, with both of them living there and each paying half the mortgage. They purchased the house for $128 000, using the first home owner's grant for the deposit. The balance of the purchase price was paid by taking a mortgage with Westpac, where Georgia then worked. The plaintiff said that Georgia did all the paperwork for the purchase as she worked at Westpac. The plaintiff said that she did not understand that the Rennie Street property was used as security for the loan for the purchase of the Franklin Street property. She said that her parents may have acted as guarantors for the mortgage, but that she was certain that they did not advance any money for the purchase of the property.

46 It would appear from the titles to the two properties that the Rennie Street property was used as security for the mortgage over the Franklin Street property. The certificate of title for the Rennie Street property shows a second mortgage to Westpac registered on 24 January 1990. The certificate of title for the Franklin Street property shows that the plaintiff and Georgia were registered as proprietors as tenants in common in equal shares on 24 January 1990 and Westpac Bank was the registered mortgagee.

47 The plaintiff lived in the Franklin Street property for six months with her young son until she married her second husband Victor on 1 July 1990.

48 The plaintiff first met Victor through her sister, Sadie. Victor and the plaintiff knew each other for a year before they were married. When they married, the plaintiff was aged 29 and Victor was aged 46. Victor owned a house at 35 Huntington Grove, Coburg and ran a coffee shop business in Brunswick. They lived in Victor's house for about a year and ran the coffee shop for about six months. The plaintiff and Victor had a daughter in 1991.

49 In the same year, Sadie's husband took over the coffee shop because the plaintiff and Victor bought a milk bar business in Wantirna. They moved to Wantirna, lived at the back of the milk bar and rented out Victor's house at Huntington Grove.

The Businesses of the Plaintiff and Her Husband

50 In 1995, after four years of operating the milk bar, it burned down and the plaintiff and Victor no longer had an income. Victor was charged with arson. After the fire, they moved back to live at Huntington Grove. They then borrowed $50 000 and bought an existing restaurant business called 'Lebanon on Lygon'. They struggled to manage the business as Victor was in and out of court dealing with the arson charges against him, and after about a year they walked away from the business.

51 Victor was eventually acquitted of arson and they received an insurance payout of either $100 000 or $150 000. The insurance money went to pay the costs of the court case and their outstanding debts. They were unable to repay their debts and the house, which had secured some of their debts, was sold. They both went bankrupt. They ended up renting in Gulf Road, North Coburg for four years, then moved to another rented house in Dwyer Avenue, Reservoir and lived there until the plaintiff's son bought his house at 1 Gerbert Street, Broadmeadows. The plaintiff said that it was her son's idea to buy the house in Broadmeadows so that they could all live in it as a family. They moved in with him in 2005 or 2006 and have lived there ever since, paying rent to him of $500 per fortnight.

The Plaintiff's Rape Allegation against the Deceased

52 As I have previously stated, the plaintiff told her first husband, Tony, that she had been raped by her father. The allegation that the deceased had raped her was not contained in the plaintiff's first two affidavits filed in the proceeding. The plaintiff agreed in cross-examination that she had not mentioned the rape allegation in her first two affidavits and that the first time she had raised it was in her third affidavit after the mediation of the proceeding.

53 In cross-examination, the plaintiff was taken to paragraph [14] of her third affidavit sworn 21 February 2013, in which she deposed that:

When I was about 10 years old late one night, I remember waking up with my father's hand over my mouth. He was on top of me, and on this occasion I was raped. This only happened to me once. However within the family, the incident has been ignored. As a result of the incident, I felt terrible. This lasted with me for many years, particularly until I got married. My mother found out about the incident about a month after it happened, when she saw my father walking into the bedroom one night.

54 In her oral evidence, the plaintiff said that, when she was 10 years old, she woke up one night to find her father's hand over her mouth and his body on top of her. She said that her father had raped her and had told her that if she said anything about what had occurred he would beat her mother, before walking out of the room.

55 The plaintiff said that she had lived with and suffered from this event for over 30 years and had not told anybody because she was scared that her father would hit her and beat her mother.

56 In cross-examination, the plaintiff agreed that her mother found out about the rape about a month after it happened and that her mother did nothing about it. The plaintiff also agreed that no one at her school or in any position of authority, such as the police or her teachers, were ever told about the rape. The plaintiff said that she thought that her mother was too scared to talk to her father about it because he used to beat her.

57 The plaintiff also said in cross-examination that the family, including her mother, did not know about the rape until she left her first husband, Tony, when she was aged 18. She said that when her mother, brothers and sisters found out about the rape they did nothing about it.

58 The plaintiff initially said that the rape occurred when the family was living in David Street. Her recollection was that she shared a bedroom with her sisters, Josephine, Antoinette and Georgette in David Street but she was not certain of this. She said that, at the time of the rape, her older sister, Sadie, was already married. The plaintiff later said that it was not in David Street where her father had raped her, but that it was in the Rennie Street property. She then said that she could not remember whether it happened in the Rennie Street property or the David Street property, but that it did happen when she was 10 years old. She then repeated her initial claim that it occurred in the David Street property late at night in the bedroom she shared with her sisters. She did not know whether her sisters had heard anything or were too scared to say anything. The plaintiff repeated that her father covered her mouth when it happened. She said that, after the incident, she covered her head and cried but did not scream because she was terrified.

59 The plaintiff said that the sleeping arrangements in the Rennie Street property were that there were four girls in one bedroom, which had a single bed and a double bed. Three of the girls slept in the double bed and the plaintiff slept in the single bed.

60 Bernadette said that she had never heard the rape allegation until the plaintiff raised it in her third affidavit. Bernadette remembers the girls sleeping in two double beds, with the plaintiff sleeping in a double bed with Antoinette. As far as she could remember, Bernadette thought that the sleeping arrangements were that the children always shared rooms. In the Rennie Street property, they had two double beds and at some stage they had bunk beds. Bernadette said that she always shared a room with the younger girls, Amel and Georgia, and not the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's Allegations of Violence by the Deceased

61 The plaintiff said that the deceased used to beat her and that he would also hit her mother and the other children. She said that her father was a very violent man. The plaintiff said that, when she lived at the Rennie Street property, she suffered physical abuse at the hands of her father when he became drunk. She said that he would 'hit us', he would also throw the television outside and, for no apparent reason, start hitting her mother. The plaintiff said that her brother, John, used to stop her father from hitting their mother, and that her father finally stopped hitting her mother a few years before she died when she became sick with diabetes. She said that up until then her father bashed her mother on a daily basis.

62 Bernadette said that she has never seen her father be violent towards the plaintiff but she has seen him be violent towards her mother on one occasion, when her father was drunk and yelled at her mother. Bernadette said she had never seen her father hit her mother and there was no daily beating as the plaintiff has suggested in her evidence.

63 Banda said that his parents argued occasionally but that these were isolated incidents. He said that his father liked to drink but that he did not drink much. He thought that his father did not get abusive towards his mother or hit her but that he would raise his voice towards her on occasions.

64 The plaintiff did not know what work her father did when they lived in Lebanon but said that when he came to Australia he worked in the car industry at General Motors Holden at Fishermans Bend.

65 She said that, when she was aged 11 years and in grade 5 at school, the deceased stopped working because he started drinking, and that he did not work after that. He was on sickness benefits from Centrelink and the plaintiff's mother was in receipt of a family payment for the younger children.

66 The plaintiff's sister, Sadie, said that the deceased stopped working two or three years after she married in 1974, when the family lived in David Street. She said that he did not work at all when they lived in the Rennie Street property. She did not know how old the deceased was when he stopped working. She said that the deceased stopped working because he became sick and had an operation. She said that he suffered all his life, and had operation after operation. In cross-examination, Sadie said that she believed her father stopped work before the 1980s.

67 Bernadette thought that her father stopped work in the early 1980s because he got sick and had lots of hernia operations. Banda does not remember when his father stopped working.

68 The plaintiff said that her mother did not work outside the home. She said that, after Banda was born, in 1971, her mother was hit by a tram while she was crossing the road. As a result, she could no longer move her arm. In 1997, the plaintiff's mother broke her hip. Bernadette took six months off work to look after her, after which her mother recovered and Bernadette was able to return to work.

69 Bernadette said that her mother's state of health was good up until three or four years before she died, when she got diabetes. Bernadette said that she would give her mother daily insulin shots, prepare her breakfast for her and then go to work. When she came home from work she would give her mother another insulin shot. As her health deteriorated, her mother was not able to wash or bathe herself or get in and out of her bed. Bernadette looked after her and also took her mother to all her medical appointments.

70 The plaintiff said that in 2000 or 2001 her mother's health started to decline. The plaintiff said she was aware that her mother suffered from Type 1 diabetes, had cataracts and was legally blind. She said she would go to the Rennie Street property in the morning, get her out of bed and dress her. The plaintiff said that she helped her parents during the last few years of their lives. In cross-examination, the plaintiff said that her father would be in the house when she cared for her mother but that she did not do anything to care for him.

71 The plaintiff also said that from 2000 onwards, she, Jack and Bernadette were always there for their parents. The plaintiff said that Sadie was with her parents every day because she was not working. The plaintiff said that the only time she was not there was when her parents needed to go to the doctors. She could not take them, as she could not read or write. She said that either Bernadette or Banda would take them to their medical appointments.

72 In cross-examination, the plaintiff accepted that Bernadette and Banda were providing the day-to-day care to the deceased and his wife.

73 Amin said that, when his grandmother was alive, the plaintiff would go there a few times a week to check on her. He said that all siblings did their part as far as taking care of his grandparents was concerned.

74 Banda said that, after his mother died, his father's health deteriorated. He had diabetes and an enlarged prostate and he needed medication constantly. Banda said that it was Bernadette who mostly looked after the deceased and that she was helped by Georgia, Jack and Amel. He said that the plaintiff did not really help with the care of their father.

75 Before her father died, when he was in hospital for the last two weeks of his life, Bernadette asked all the siblings to help and they all took it in turns to sit by his bedside. Although the plaintiff said that she was reluctant, she did so. During this time, she said that the deceased called her name in Arabic. Bernadette told the plaintiff that the deceased was calling his own sister, and not the plaintiff. The plaintiff said that she went to him and he gave her a big hug, which he has never done before, kissed her hand and said 'forgive me'. No one else was present at the time of this exchange. Half an hour later, he lapsed into a coma and she did not have a chance to ask what he had meant. About a week later, the deceased died.

Plaintiff's Relationship with the Deceased and the Family

76 The plaintiff said that she did not like her father and that her hatred of him continued up until he died.

77 The plaintiff said that, up until her mother died on 17 August 2002, the whole family would get together for Christmas, Easter, Mother's and Father's days, other celebrations and family social occasions. The plaintiff said that her siblings and her mother and father would be at these functions. She said that she got on well with her siblings and her mother. She would say hello to her father but said that she still disliked him. She said that she would also invite her siblings and parents to her place for barbecues and her father would attend.

78 The plaintiff's son, Amin, described his relationship with the deceased as 'not close', and said that the deceased was not affectionate towards him.

79 Bernadette describes the family as extremely close, spending Christmas, Easter, Mother's and Father's days, and New Year's day together as a whole family. She said that she did not detect any coolness between the plaintiff and the deceased. She said that, after her mother died, the plaintiff would have her father and her over for Sunday lunch.

80 Banda said that they were a close family who would do anything for one another. They would all get together, including the plaintiff, for occasions like Christmas and Easter as well as barbecues at the Rennie Street property. They went to the plaintiff's place at least once every two weeks, and on occasions his mother and father would also go there.

The Current Financial Circumstances and Health of the Plaintiff and Her Husband

81 The plaintiff is now aged 51 years. Victor is aged 68 years. They both receive pensions of $556 per fortnight, a total of $1112, and that has been the position for the past 15 years. They have no savings or superannuation. Their daughter, who is aged 22 years, receives Austudy but does not work. She is at university studying to be a teacher.

82 They have lived at 1 Gerbert Street, Broadmeadows, for the past eight years, paying rent to the plaintiff's son. Their furniture is old and worth little. They own a 2002 Ford Falcon, also worth little.

83 The plaintiff gave oral evidence only of their fortnightly outgoings as follows:

Rent $500

Gas, electricity and water $170

Food $150[20]

Petrol $50

Cigarettes $50 or $126[21]

Telephone $50

Total $970 or 1 046

84 The plaintiff said that their internet connection is paid by an allowance through Centrelink.

85 Both the plaintiff and Victor are in poor health. The plaintiff gave evidence that she suffers from severe migraines and sees a migraine specialist every six months at the Royal Melbourne Hospital. She takes mediation for her migraines and high blood pressure and has done so for the past six years.

86 Victor had a nervous breakdown when he was aged 55. As a result, he can no longer work and has not worked since his breakdown. He suffers from asthma, anxiety attacks and severe depression. A medical certificate from Dr Leonardo Congiu, of Psychiatric Consulting Services Pty Ltd, records that Victor leads a fairly restricted lifestyle, that he has been unable to work and that his long term prognosis remains guarded. The plaintiff says that most days Victor gets out of bed at lunchtime, stays in his pyjamas, watches television and goes outside for a smoke. He is a regular smoker of cannabis and has used it since before the plaintiff married him in 1990. He smokes a joint every day and grows cannabis in the backyard.

87 The plaintiff said that, because of the Victor's health, she cannot get a job. She can only leave Victor alone when she goes shopping and his condition is deteriorating. He is no longer thinking properly and does not play poker on the computer anymore, an activity he used to do regularly. The plaintiff's son, Amin, said that the plaintiff has to do a lot for Victor, and that this is difficult for her. He thinks that the plaintiff is highly strung because she is always concerned about what Victor might be doing and she feels that she cannot leave him alone for too long.

88 Amin said that Victor has his flaws, but that he is not a bad man and that they get along. He said that Victor struggles a lot, is very depressed, suffers from anxiety and has no real coping skills. According to Amin, most days Victor just watches the television or mopes around the house, sometimes going to his brother's house.

89 Bernadette said that she has not seen Victor since the death of the deceased two years ago although she has seen him driving to his brother's place. She knows that Victor had a nervous breakdown when the milk bar burned down.

90 The plaintiff's son, Amin, is employed as a prison officer. He has also recently qualified as a registered builder.

91 About six or seven years ago, he purchased 1 Gerbert Street for $205 000. About three years ago, he purchased 6 Gerbert Street for $210 000. They are both two bedroom homes with small bungalows out the back. When he was single, Amin lived in the bungalow at the back of 1 Gerbert Street and the plaintiff, Victor and his sister lived in the house.

92 In December 2012, Amin married and he and his wife moved to the bungalow at the rear of 6 Gerbert Street. He now rents out the house at 6 Gerbert Street. He has a mortgage of $260 000. His current rate notice values 1 Gerbert Street at $311 000 and 6 Gerbert Street at $290 000.

93 Amin said that he has received approval for plans to build four townhouses on 1 Gerbert Street. At present, he has no building permit for the development. He estimates that it would cost between $650 000 and $700 000 to build the four townhouses. If he were able to go ahead with the project, he would sell three units and live in the remaining one.

94 He does not have the necessary funds to develop the block and he would also need somewhere to live during that process. He thinks that if he sold one of the properties that would give him the funds to go ahead with the project, provided he was also able to obtain a loan.

95 He would be happy to sell 6 Gerbert Street to the plaintiff and Victor for $200 000, which he said would mean that they had a secure home, leaving him free to start the development of the townhouses.

96 At the date of his death, the deceased was living in the Rennie Street property with the Bernadette and Banda. Bernadette is unmarried and now aged 43 years. Bernadette has lived in the Rennie Street property since she was aged about seven or eight. She said of her family:

[We are] Europeans, we don't move out of home, we move back. We've lived there our whole lives until we've gotten married and then they move out.

Bernadette also said that her cousin, Simon, and his wife and their family lived with them for many years and that when Jack married he lived at home and did not leave until he had two or three children.

97 Bernadette attended Moreland Primary School and then Coburg High School, where she completed Year 12. Bernadette said that any further education was not an option because they had to work to help their parents financially.

98 When Bernadette left school she worked in customer service and has done so all her working life, apart from when she took time off to care for her mother. She said she gave her pay packets to her parents and would get some money back. When the mortgage over the Rennie Street property was paid off around 2002, she stopped giving her parents her pay packet.

99 Bernadette and Banda pay the household expenses, sharing them equally.

100 Bernadette gave oral evidence of her assets and liabilities. She said that, apart from her half share of the residue of the deceased's estate, she owns a Mazda 3 car purchased in 2012 for $20 000 and has superannuation of $38 000. She earns a monthly net income of $2 800.

101 In terms of liabilities, Bernadette has a personal loan of $22 000 which she repays at $416 each month, credit card debts of $4 000 and she and Banda have paid legal fees thus far of $20 000.

102 She has car parking expenses of $250 per month, petrol expenses of $150 per month, telephone expenses of $100 per month and pays 50 per cent share of the rates, gas and electricity for the Rennie Street property, which are approximately $400 per month. Bernadette also contributes towards the food costs.

103 About three years ago, she went to Thailand for a holiday and also went there at the start of this year when she received a one-off bonus of about $2 000 from work.

104 Banda attended Moreland Primary School and then Coburg High School, completing Year 11. Banda is now aged 40 years and is married to Lilyana. They married in 2001 and have three young children, aged between 18 months and 8 years. Before she stopped working, Lilyana worked as a part-time medical receptionist. She has not worked since they had children.

105 Banda works as a storeman and has done so for the past 13 years. When he started work he also helped with the household expenses, such as electricity and food, and he continues to pay the household bills, sharing them equally with Bernadette. He also pays childcare expenses of $80 per day for two days a week.

106 Banda gave oral evidence that his take home pay is $700-$750 per week and that he and his wife receive a Centrelink family benefit payment of $220 per fortnight. They have a 2004 Holden Commodore and he has superannuation of approximately $39 000. He has debts of $25 000 from fixing the roof and buying the car, paying $120-$140 per week for the loan. He has a debt of $4000 to Centrelink, which is paid off at $40 per week and he has credit card debts of $4000.

(a) the deceased's will left the residue of his estate to the two children with whom he was then living and who were caring for him at the time; and

(b) the deceased stated in his will that he 'loved his children equally'; and

(c) the deceased said that he made his will as he did because 'it is my wish that all my children at some time in their life own a house or a share in a house'; and

(d) the plaintiff once owned a share in a house, and she no longer does -

the deceased relied on misguided principles when making his will because he did not consider whether he had a responsibility to the plaintiff, as his daughter, to make adequate provision for her proper maintenance and support. Instead he was concerned about whether or not she had at some stage of her life 'had a house'.

108 The plaintiff submits that the matters that should be taken into consideration are:

(a) the plaintiff's circumstances of a difficult upbringing, leaving school at an early age, working to support her father, and her relationship with her father being soured by the 'rape' incident;

(b) having a failed first marriage and a difficult situation in her second marriage, including caring for a sick husband;

(e) the fact that she currently does not have a proper roof over her head; and

(f) the fact that both Bernadette and Banda have jobs, which though not paying a large wage, do offer ongoing employment.

109 In submissions concerning appropriate provision for the plaintiff, counsel referred to a number of cases by way of example: see Scott v O'Brien,[22] Bourke v Keep,[23] Tavra v Petelin,[24] Markovska v Kocevska,[25] and Taylor v Farrugia.[26]

110 The plaintiff submits that, in the circumstances of this case, appropriate provision for the plaintiff would be a legacy of $200 000, as this would allow the plaintiff to purchase Amin's property at 6 Gerbert Street, Broadmeadows. This would provide the plaintiff with a secure roof over her head and Amin with the capital to commence development of the four town houses at 1 Gerbert Street, Broadmeadows.

111 The defendants submit that the deceased was in the best position to weigh up his testamentary responsibilities. Inevitably, he could not please all his children. This is a case where it cannot be said that the deceased abused his right of testamentary freedom. Counsel for the defendant asked rhetorically, what more could the deceased have done in the circumstances? He made his choice, as was his right, and it is not for this Court to interfere with his choice and find that it was wrong.

112 The defendants submit that the deceased had an almost impossible task in providing for all of his children and that he was entitled to favour some over the others. If he had provided for others in the family, the deceased would have inevitably forced Bernadette, Banda and his family out of their home, where they had lived for most of their lives. If Bernadette and Banda were forced out of the Rennie Street property, they would, in all probability, have been left in the position where they could never own or share in the ownership of a house. The size of the estate was not so large that, if the deceased made provision for the plaintiff, the three siblings would all be in position to own or share in the ownership of a house.

113 The defendant further submitted that there is no requirement that the deceased treat his children equally,[27] and, without admitting that the deceased had committed any wrong against the plaintiff, that the legislation is not intended to be a substitute or compensation for loss suffered by a child due to the wrongful act of a parent.[28] In closing, counsel for the defendants quoted from the decision of Palmer J in Carey v Robson, where His Honour said:

One can understand the sense of grievance which one child may have at being treated by a parent differently from another child. Some may be tempted to think that great disproportionality of testamentary treatment in itself indicates some essential error in the testamentary process which requires amelioration under the Family Provision Act so as to achieve approximate equality between a testator's children.

That is not, of course, a position from which one can begin in this, or in any other case under the family provision legislation. It is useful to remind oneself of the parable of the labourers in the vineyard. Those who worked the whole day complained, not because their agreed wage was inadequate, but because those who worked only part of the day received the same wage and were therefore treated more generously. The moral of the parable is: what is fair and adequate to start with does not become unfair and inadequate just because someone else has been treated differently.[29]

114 Finally, the defendants submit that if the Court did decide that the deceased had a responsibility to make provision for the plaintiff's maintenance and support, any provision ordered should be in the form of a legacy of no more that $30 000.

115 In Re Allen,[30] Salmond J noted that applications under the testator's family maintenance legislation fall into two broad categories.[31] The second of those categories was one in which the estate is so large that the complaint of the applicant is of 'a failure of the testator to make out of the abundance of his resources a provision sufficient for the proper maintenance of the claimant'.[32] His Honour identified the first class as follows:

The first and by far the most numerous class consists of those cases in which, owing to the smallness of the estate and to the nature of the testamentary dispositions, the applicant is competing with other persons who have also a moral claim upon the testator. Any provision made by the Court in favour of the applicant must in this class of case be made at the expense of some other person or persons to whom the testator owed a moral duty to support. The estate is insufficient to meet in full the entirety of the moral claims upon it, in the sense that if the testator had possessed more he would have been bound to do more for the welfare of his dependants. In such a case all that the Court can do is to see that the available means of the testator are justly divided between the persons who moral claims upon him in due proportion to the relative urgency of those claims. No question arises in such a case as to the general scope and limits of the duty of the testator to make provision for the maintenance of his widow and children, for his duty in the circumstances is merely to do the best that he can and to distribute his available resources with justice between his dependants in proportion to their deserts and necessities.[33]

116 Plainly, this case falls within that first class. In assessing the just division of what is available 'in due proportion to the relative urgency of those claims', the Court must consider all of the relevant circumstances.[34] Turning to the specific matters to which I am required to have regard, I have reached the following conclusions.

(e) any family or other relationship between the deceased person and the applicant, including the nature of the relationship and, where relevant, the length of the relationship;

117 I have referred to the nature of the relevant relationships.

(f) any obligations or responsibilities of the deceased person to the applicant, any other applicant and the beneficiaries of the estate;

118 Apart from any obligations and responsibilities that arise as part of being a parent, the deceased did not have any obligations and responsibilities to the plaintiff or the beneficiaries.

(g) the size and nature of the estate of the deceased person and any charges and liabilities to which the estate is subject;

119 I have referred to the size and nature of the estate. Apart from the costs of this proceeding, there are no relevant mortgages or liabilities to which the estate is subject. The size of the estate is such that it would be difficult for the deceased to provide for all of his children and still fulfil his wish, as expressed in his will, that 'at some time in their life [all of his children] own a house or a share in a house'.

(h) the financial resources (including earning capacity) and the financial needs of the applicant, of any other applicant and of any beneficiary of the estate at the time of the hearing and for the foreseeable future;

120 I have referred to the financial resources and needs of the plaintiff and the beneficiaries of the estate. The evidence led at the trial in this respect was in many respects inadequate, in that the parties gave only oral evidence of rough estimates of their needs and resources.

121 None of the deceased's children could be described as well off. They all earn modest incomes, either from social security or working. The beneficiaries have modest superannuation entitlements. The plaintiff gave no evidence of any superannuation. The plaintiff does not own her own house, and although under the will Bernadette and Banda have the entitlement of a half share of the estate (represented by the Rennie Street property), they do not otherwise own any property. The plaintiff has a 22 year old daughter studying at university who is in receipt of Austudy and who lives with the plaintiff and Victor. Bernadette has no children. Banda has a dependent wife and three young children.

(i) any physical, mental or intellectual disability of any applicant or any beneficiary of the estate;

122 I have referred to the health of the plaintiff and husband, Victor. Their health is poor. Victor's age and health preclude him from working. The plaintiff is unable to work because she needs to look after Victor and, in any event, apart from the years when she and Victor ran their businesses, she has always worked in the home.

(k) any contribution (not for adequate consideration) of the applicant to building up the estate or to the welfare of the deceased or the family of the deceased;

124 I have referred to the contributions made by the children of the deceased and to the welfare of the deceased and their mother. All of the deceased's children have contributed to his welfare over many years, some more than others. Bernadette, together with assistance from her siblings, including Banda, undertook the work in caring for their parents. The plaintiff's contribution to the care of the deceased was negligible because she did not wish to have anything to do with him and she hated or at least disliked him.

(l) any benefits previously given by the deceased person to any applicant or to any beneficiary;

125 Apart from Bernadette and Banda living in the Rennie Street property, there were no significant benefits that have previously been given by the deceased to the plaintiff or to any beneficiary.

126 However, the Rennie Street property was provided as security to obtain a mortgage for the plaintiff's purchase of the Franklin Street property. The plaintiff did not ultimately benefit in any considerable manner from this, as she moved in with her second husband shortly after the purchase.

(m) whether the applicant was being maintained by the deceased person before that person's death either wholly or partly and, where the Court considers it relevant, the extent to which and the basis upon which the deceased had assumed that responsibility;

127 The plaintiff was not being maintained by the deceased, apart from when she was a child and for part of her teenage years. Once she started working at an early age, the plaintiff assisted with the older children to maintain the family.

(n) the liability of any other person to maintain the applicant;

128 It is not suggested that there is any other person liable to maintain the plaintiff, apart from possibly Victor, who is incapable of doing anything because of his health issues.

(o) the character and conduct of the applicant or any other person;

129 I have referred to the character and conduct of the applicant. The plaintiff is of good character, has been a good mother and wife and has done the best she can within her capabilities and circumstances.

(p) any other matter the Court considers relevant.

130 The deceased attended on a solicitor to have his will drawn and, from the provisions set out in cl 5, cl 6 and cl 7 of the will, I conclude that he attempted to leave his assets as he thought best in circumstances where he owned limited assets. He determined that Bernadette and Banda were the two children who needed assistance to own a share in a property.

131 The plaintiff comes from a cultural background where others within the family are expected to provide assistance to one another, and in particular, where many members of the extended family have remained living in the Rennie Street property for extended periods in order to provide that assistance. This culture has been continued by the plaintiff's son, Amin. That cultural expectation of assistance to the family is reiterated in cl 7 of the deceased's will.

132 The plaintiff's son, Amin, has provided an affordable house for a long period of time for the plaintiff, Victor and his sister near where he lives and he is a responsible and good son to the plaintiff and to Victor, who he said was the only father that he had ever known.

133 The plaintiff's allegation of rape was offered by the plaintiff by way of explanation of her hatred of the deceased, and as a reason why she should receive further provision under his will. The plaintiff believes that the rape occurred. The evidence of others knowing about the allegation of rape is contradictory. If it were known shortly after the time it occurred or when the plaintiff was thrown out of her first marriage, it was not dealt with at all and was not raised again until after the mediation in this proceeding. It is an allegation made where the evidence is not strong and, as stated, there is always a difficulty in assessing such evidence after the death of the deceased. Having said that, an allegation that the deceased raped the plaintiff, alleged to have occurred when the plaintiff was at a very young age is a difficult matter to deal with. It is a serious allegation to make. On the evidence before me, I conclude that the plaintiff has not satisfied the requisite onus of proof on the balance of probabilities.

134 I am also not satisfied that allegations that the deceased was violent towards his wife and children have been made out. The allegations were contradicted by the younger children of the family. Sadie, who is older than the plaintiff, did not give evidence about the deceased being violent.

135 Notwithstanding these last two allegations, the perceptions and belief of family members were that the family was close, with family members always helping one another out as best they could. The evidence sets out many examples of this, on a long-term basis. The evidence also establishes that the plaintiff maintained an ongoing relationship with her parents and her family all her life, up to when these proceedings were issued. No family member said that they noticed a distant or negative relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased over the years.

136 The defendants accept that there is no doubt the deceased had a responsibility to provide for the plaintiff as his daughter but contend that the size of the estate means that he could not provide for her or his other children as well as satisfy his wish to assist Bernadette and Banda in owning a house or a share of a house. The heart of their submission is that the deceased's responsibility towards the plaintiff must be balanced against his freedom of testamentary disposition and that, in the circumstances of this case, this should be paramount.

137 In my view, the deceased's will demonstrates that he did give due consideration to the provisions of his will and weight should be given to his wishes.

138 In determining what should be the balance in the circumstances of the plaintiff's case, I have taken into account the ongoing assistance of the plaintiff's son towards his own family and his generosity towards the plaintiff in providing her with long term and affordable accommodation.

139 In terms of the plaintiff's present financial situation, in my view, renting is the more affordable option for her. I am not satisfied that the plaintiff could manage the financial burdens of owning a house, even though the proposed purchase arrangement is at a reduced price. The plaintiff does not have the financial means to pay for stamp duty or any capital works on the house that may be required in the future. She also has no ability to acquire any significant future savings, as demonstrated by her income and outgoings.

140 Whilst the proposal put by the plaintiff is that she should be provided with a legacy of $200 000 from the estate of the deceased, I consider that such an amount does not give proper balance between the due weight that should be given to the deceased's testamentary wishes and the deceased's responsibility towards the plaintiff.

141 In my view, bearing in mind these factors and the size of the estate, I consider that the deceased's responsibility to the plaintiff is met by allowing her a legacy of $45 000. This amount provides a nest egg for the plaintiff for the future. As Bernadette and Banda would still have an unencumbered asset in the form of the Rennie Street property, and both are in stable employment, in my view they should be in a position to raise the funds to pay this amount and still retain the Rennie Street property.

142 Accordingly, I am satisfied that the will of the deceased did not make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of the plaintiff. I order that further provision be made for the plaintiff from the estate of the deceased by the payment of a pecuniary legacy of $45 000 by a date to be agreed between the parties.

143 I shall hear the parties on the appropriate form of orders and costs.

[1] (Unreported, Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, 26 November 1993) [1]. See also 1 Kings 3:16-28.

Plaintiff v First Defendant

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (231 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (1)

Cases Cited (8)