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[2025] VSC 307
Supreme Court of Victoria
2025-05-30
Cosgrave J
Original judgment source is linked above.
EQUITY - Fiduciary duties - Duties of company directors - Duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company - Whether subjective or objective test to be applied - Duty to act for a proper purpose - Duty to avoid conflicts of interest - Duty to avoid unauthorised benefit - Where director caused assignment of intellectual property to another company for nominal value - Where director caused company to incur research and development expenditure following the assignment of the intellectual property - Fiduciary duties not breached.
CONSUMER LAW - Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 - Australian Consumer Law s 18 - Misleading or deceptive conduct - Where representations made by way of contractual warranties - Whether warranty representations were false - Whether silence amounted to misleading or deceptive conduct - Accessorial liability - Australian Consumer Law s 236(1).
EVIDENCE - Valuation of intellectual property - Expert valuation reports unsatisfactory.
1 This case concerns the consequences of a company's failure to repay a loan. The plaintiff, Mitchell Asset Management Pty Ltd ("MAM"), is a boutique financial services firm providing customised wealth management, investment, custody lending and trust services to clients. The defendant ("Di Pasquale") is the sole director of Cashtivity Pty Ltd ("Cashtivity"). Initially, Di Pasquale established Cashtivity in order to develop a financial literacy tool for school students. Some years later, Di Pasquale changed the nature of the software from its focus on entrepreneurship and financial literacy to a focus on applied maths. Di Pasquale was aware that the Commonwealth government offered subsidies for research and development work performed by companies provided they satisfied certain criteria. In general terms, if a business satisfied the criteria, then it would recover a rebate of 45% of the research and development expenditure incurred in the preceding financial year. So, for example, if a business spent $1 million on eligible research and development and made no profits, then it would receive a rebate of $450,000.[1]
2 MAM lent money to Cashtivity in 2018. It lent an amount equal to approximately 80% of the anticipated rebate which Cashtivity expected to receive. MAM had a general security deed over the assets of Cashtivity but no personal guarantee from Di Pasquale or any other security.
3 Cashtivity did not receive the anticipated rebate and did not repay the loan to MAM.
4 MAM appointed receivers over Cashtivity and those receivers assigned to MAM Cashtivity's choses in action against Di Pasquale.
5 MAM is now suing Di Pasquale for recovery of the loan on two bases. It alleges that Di Pasquale:
(a) engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct by not informing MAM that it assigned Cashtivity's intellectual property to another company in 2015 (and again in 2018 after the second loan was made) so that there were no intellectual property assets available to MAM against which to enforce its security; and
(b) breached her fiduciary duties to Cashtivity in certain ways: by transferring the intellectual property of Cashtivity to another party for $1 on each occasion and failing to have Cashtivity's intellectual property independently valued; and by causing Cashtivity to continue incurring research and development costs after the assignments.
6 Di Pasquale denies that any conduct by Cashtivity or her was misleading or deceptive, or that she breached any fiduciary duties to the company.
7 The parties have agreed that the issues which the Court must determine in this case are as follows:
1. Did the defendant breach her fiduciary duties as the sole director of Cashtivity in December 2015 by causing the present and future intellectual property of the company to be assigned to Cashtivity Inc for $1?
2. Did the defendant breach her fiduciary duties as the sole director of Cashtivity by directing the company to incur the research and development expenditure in circumstances where the 2015 Transfer Deed assigned its intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc, a US company that became Cashtivity's parent company?
3. Did the defendant breach her fiduciary duties as the sole director of Cashtivity in October 2018 by causing the company's present intellectual property to be assigned to Mindsets Learning Pty Ltd ("Mindsets Learning"), another subsidiary of Cashtivity Inc?
(a) Were the Warranties representations (as defined in the second further amended statement of claim dated 17 September 2024 ("FASOC")) pursuant to the 2018 Facility Agreement false because Cashtivity had failed to disclose:[3]
(i) the existence, terms or effect of the 2015 Transfer Deed;
(ii) that Cashtivity Inc was the owner of the Company's intellectual property; and
(iii) that by reason of those matters, the Cashtivity's application for the research and development rebate was likely to be rejected?
(b) Was it misleading or deceptive to fail to disclose to MAM the 2015 Transfer Deed and the effect the same would have on the research and development rebate?
5. Did MAM rely upon the truth of the Warranties representations in respect of those matters in entering into the 2018 Facility Agreement?
6. If the Company had disclosed the 2015 Transfer Deed and its effect to the plaintiff, would the plaintiff have entered the 2018 Facility Agreement and make the advances pursuant to that facility?
7. What was the value of the intellectual property transferred by the 2015 Transfer Deed, and the 2018 Transfer Deed?
8. If the defendant has breached her fiduciary duties as sole director of Cashtivity either in respect of 1, 2 or 3 above, what loss and damage did the plaintiff suffer as a result?
9. If the defendant is found to have engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct what loss and damage flows as a result?
8 In 2008, John Mitchell, the driving force behind the plaintiff, made a takeover offer for a financial services business called Almane Pty Ltd which held an Australian Financial Services Licence. Mitchell renamed the company Mitchell Asset Management Pty Ltd. The company acts as trustee of the Mitchell Asset Management Innovation Finance Fund ("IFF").
9 Mitchell had an extensive background in finance. He began working casually for Macquarie Bank in the late-1980s and remained there for about 10 years before joining Merrill Lynch Australia in 2000. In 2007, he became interim Chief Executive Officer of Carnbrea & Co, a private wealth fund established by the Nicholas family. During this time, he applied for his own Australian Financial Services Licence. He has been the responsible manager and Chief Executive Officer of MAM since 2007.
10 In 2008, MAM was a wealth management firm conducting stockbroking activities through Berndale Securities, the Merrill Lynch third party clearing house. The business was transactional in nature and had unpredictable revenue. Mitchell changed the business to include retail financial planning, wealth management and the operation of an ANZ mobile lending franchise from 2013. He did this with the aim of providing predictable annualised revenue which would enable him to expand the business using retained earnings.
11 From 2012, MAM engaged in funds management via a hedge fund called Blue Charm Capital. This was done in conjunction with a domestic fixed income fund as a way to build a successful record in managing external funds on behalf of institutional and sophisticated clients.
12 In 2014, MAM established an investor visa product which was set up to comply with the investment requirements of the Business Innovation and Investment (Provisional) Visa for foreign investors seeking an Australian class 188C visa.
13 MAM created the IFF in 2016. This fund has grown from an initial investment of $500,000 to now having completed loans in excess of $248 million. The IFF is a unit trust which sells units to investors. Mitchell said that MAM was a custodian or trustee of clients' monies. The clients vary from mum and dad investors to high-net-worth individuals, family offices, universities and wholesale investors. Mitchell was aware of the company's responsibilities as a trustee of the investors' funds. The value of the units fluctuates from time to time. It is an open-ended fund. When investors wish to leave the fund, they apply to redeem their units. The trustee does not guarantee any return on the investment in the fund or indeed the return of the capital invested. Such matters are governed by the performance of the fund. The fund warns investors that the risks of providing loans to borrowers may be higher than those accepted by traditional banks. This is because, inter alia, the borrowers seeking these loans often have no reliable income and have limited access to cash. Indeed, Mitchell acknowledged at one point that he established the IFF to make loans of the very kind in this case - to borrowers with no cash flow and secured by the rebate under the statutory research and development tax incentive ("RDTI") scheme.
14 In the information memorandum produced by MAM in October 2020, MAM said that it intended to produce income for the IFF by providing loans to borrowers who were eligible to receive a refundable tax offset under the Commonwealth government's RDTI program. The document says that once the manager identifies an investment opportunity, it will, through its due diligence process, analyse the opportunity to ensure it presents a suitable risk profile for the IFF. Every borrower must satisfy the key lending criteria:
15 In addition to the above, the manager will analyse and assess the risk of each opportunity by taking into account factors such as:
16 When lending to a borrower, MAM will typically enter into a specific security agreement with the borrower over the borrower's entitlement to receive a rebate from the Australian Taxation Office ("ATO"). If there is a default by the borrower, the trustee has a charge over that receivable. MAM also said that, where appropriate, as advised by the manager which the trustee appointed to manage the investments of the fund,[4] it will also enter into a general security deed over all the assets of the borrower. Again, this means that if the borrower defaults, the trustee has a charge over all the borrower's assets.
17 Di Pasquale completed a Bachelor of Science at the University of Melbourne in 1985 and was recruited by Monash University in 1987 to set up its technology transfer company. She later worked as a project manager in the defence and major projects area between 1989 and 1992 and was a consultant and executive in the government accounts team from 1992 to 1995. From 1995, she worked for a subsidiary of Telstra setting up internet ventures and partnerships, Bigpond products and services. In 1997 she returned to Telstra to set up internet-based products and partnerships.
18 Between 1998 and 2000, she went to the United Kingdom and worked in projects and technology for the investment bank Dresdner Klin Benson.
19 From 2000 to 2006, she formed a consulting company with several Telstra colleagues. The aim of the business was to assist Telstra and other Australian companies in developing customers and products on the internet. During this time she also sat on two boards connected to the Victorian government.
20 In 2006, she returned to Melbourne University and completed a post-graduate law degree. Thereafter, she worked in the legal profession for three years from 2008.
21 From around 1997, Di Pasquale wanted to create a globally scalable company which solved a large problem or was capable of transforming an entire market. In 2009, Di Pasquale conceived the idea of developing a software-based tool which could teach children financial literacy. She was aware that the Commonwealth government subsidised research and development for novel and start-up businesses provided certain criteria were satisfied. The subsidies were provided for eligible research and development in accordance with the RDTI scheme. The RDTI encouraged investment in research and development to help companies grow and innovate to generate benefits for the Australian economy. The scheme was administered by the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, sometimes referred to as AusIndustry. A description of the types of eligible activities was set out in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). It was a self-assessment program and it was an applicant's responsibility to ensure that the research and development activities satisfied the legislative requirements.
22 Di Pasquale incorporated Cashtivity in August 2011. She was the sole director and secretary of the company. There were three shareholders, each with 80 shares: Di Pasquale, Soho Finance Pty Ltd ("Soho Finance"), which was the trustee of Di Pasquale's family trust and Soho Frontiers Pty Ltd ("Soho Frontiers"), which was the trustee of her superannuation fund. Cashtivity was, at its foundation, a company designed to develop software to educate children about financial literacy.
23 In 2012, Di Pasquale made her first application for a RDTI rebate. The application was in the sum of $135,000 and was successful.
24 In 2013, Di Pasquale made her second application for a RDTI rebate. The application was for $175,000 and was again successful. Di Pasquale would go on to be successful in obtaining a RDTI rebate in subsequent years until 2018.
25 Also in 2013, Di Pasquale met Andrew Strachan who, along with others, would advise Di Pasquale about Cashtivity and its business operations.
26 Di Pasquale registered the company Team Cashtivity Pty Ltd ("TCPL") in December 2013. She is the sole director and shareholder of that company. TCPL was related to Cashtivity. It did not trade but attended to administrative functions like paying wages.
27 Between 2011 and 2019, Cashtivity was funded from Di Pasquale's personal funds or money provided by Soho Finance or Soho Frontiers, government grants and RDTI subsidies. From 2014, Di Pasquale received some further funding from external investors.
28 By early 2015, Di Pasquale had realised that, due to the regulation of the Australian education market, Australia was not a viable market for the product which Cashtivity was developing.
29 In 2015, LearnLaunch, an educational technology incubator for startup businesses based in America, invited Di Pasquale to attend their September 2015 program. Di Pasquale attended the program which finished in about early 2016. The program included LearnLaunch investing some money in the business and providing mentoring to Di Pasquale.
30 On 23 November 2015, Di Pasquale incorporated Cashtivity Inc in America as a consequence of LearnLaunch's requirements.[5] She became a director and shareholder in Cashtivity Inc.
31 On 31 December 2015, Di Pasquale prepared and executed an intellectual property transfer deed which transferred the current and future intellectual property of Cashtivity to Cashtivity Inc ("the 2015 Transfer Deed").
32 Between November and December 2016, Di Pasquale, on behalf of Cashtivity, worked towards, and obtained, a loan from MAM ("the 2016 loan"). Cashtivity repaid MAM $240,804.81 together with interest of $22,844.67 in November 2017 after the RDTI rebate was received.
33 Cashtivity sought another loan from MAM for 2018. Initially, Strachan was opposed to the idea. He told Di Pasquale that MAM was unlikely to grant another RDTI loan because the loans to Cashtivity were too small. Strachan suggested some other lenders who might accommodate Cashtivity. One of these lenders later required Cashtivity to engage a preferred R&D advisor to assist with Cashtivity's RDTI application for 2018. Di Pasquale chose PwC.
34 When Di Pasquale made Strachan aware of this, he advised her that he knew Marcus Tierney of PwC and Strachan facilitated an introduction to Tierney. Tierney was a Partner in the Incentives & Innovation section at PwC.[6]
35 After some interaction with PwC around December 2017, Di Pasquale again approached Strachan to ask if the plaintiff would reconsider its position and advance Cashtivity another RDTI loan. Ultimately, MAM agreed but it classified Cashtivity as a higher risk borrower. This was reflected in the interest rate and terms which MAM offered on the new loan.
36 As part of the due diligence process, MAM obtained a copy of the opinion which PwC gave Cashtivity regarding its RDTI application for 2018. PwC interviewed Di Pasquale and reviewed various financial and other documents which it sought from Cashtivity. PwC concluded that:
37 In February 2018, MAM lent Cashtivity $280,000 ("the 2018 loan"). As part of this loan, Cashtivity executed a facility agreement ("the 2018 Facility Agreement") and a general security deed in favour of MAM over all its present and after acquired property.
38 In August 2018, Cashtivity lodged its application for a RDTI rebate for the financial year ending June 2018.
39 In about September 2018, Di Pasquale changed the name of Cashtivity Inc to Mindsets Learning Inc.
40 On 30 September 2018, Cashtivity was due to repay the 2018 loan to MAM.
42 In February 2019, Cashtivity's 2018 RDTI application was rejected.
43 On 7 March 2019, MAM issued a default notice to Cashtivity pursuant to the 2018 loan.
44 After Cashtivity failed to repay the loan or remedy the default, MAM appointed receivers in May 2019.
45 In November 2022, Cashtivity's receivers assigned to MAM any and all rights which the company might have against Di Pasquale for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.
46 The issue of credit arises in this case because there was a lack of relevant documentation in respect of some important issues.
47 The Court is left to record its impression of witnesses as they appeared in the witness box. Notwithstanding that most judges worked as barristers before joining the bench and spent considerable time in court dealing with witnesses, I am not convinced that that they all have a special talent for determining the credit of witnesses solely on the basis of their demeanour in court. A court can be more confident in its credit findings where it has regard to the overall context created by contemporaneous documents and compares that evidence and the framework which it creates with the oral testimony given by witnesses. Courts should also take into account the internal coherence of a witness's evidence and how it sits with agreed or objectively established facts, the inferences which can be reasonably drawn from such matters and the apparent logic of events.
48 Mitchell is plainly an intelligent man with more than 30 years' experience in finance. He established the IFF in 2016.[7] In the present context the relevant qualification to Mitchell's experience is that MAM first became involved in RDTI funding around 2015.[8] Hence, MAM's expansion into this field was relatively recent when it lent funds to Cashtivity in December 2016.[9] He is well aware of the responsibility which the plaintiff bears in this matter. It is part of MAM's business as trustee to obtain funds from investors and to invest that money advantageously so as to provide an attractive rate of return to the investors. To that extent, MAM must take reasonable measures to protect investors' funds and not expose them to unnecessary risk. It can do this by conducting thorough due diligence and performing the usual kinds of checks which a prudent lender would undertake.
49 Mitchell was confident in giving evidence. This stemmed partly from presenting as a confident personality and partly from being asked about matters associated with his work which he felt well able to understand and address.
50 I accept much of the evidence which Mitchell gave. It was often uncontroversial or supported by contemporaneous documents.
51 The main area of dispute between the parties is fairly narrow. But it is Mitchell's evidence regarding this disputed part of the case which troubles me. Mitchell made two witness statements, his initial witness statement on 20 October 2023 and a second witness statement on 9 September 2024. He made the second witness statement a few days after Di Pasquale's solicitor sent a letter to the plaintiff's solicitor in which he said the following:
"It is not controversial that there is no evidence as to reliance in either the statements of evidence of Strahan [sic] or Mitchell. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the investment committee documents some of which your client finally discovered after we pointed out in our letter dated 18 October 2023 that the destruction of documents by your client would be contrary to s 1101E of the Corporations Act 2001."
52 In the second witness statement, Mitchell referred to paragraph 25 of his first witness statement where he said that "for practical lending purposes, MAM operated on the basis that the applicant would need to own the IP subject of the application". He added that, if the loan applicant did not own the intellectual property the subject of the RDTI rebate, MAM does not proceed and would not have proceeded with the loan.
53 A major area of dispute in the case concerns whether Cashtivity should have disclosed to MAM before it took out the 2018 loan that it had transferred its intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc pursuant to the 2015 Transfer Deed. MAM says that the failure to disclose this information constituted a breach of warranty under the 2018 Facility Agreement and misleading or deceptive conduct. MAM also alleges that the failure to disclose constituted misleading or deceptive conduct.
54 Mitchell's second witness statement says several things:[10]
55 There are several aspects of this witness statement which I find troubling.
56 First, the essential nature of the plaintiff's case and the alleged significance of Cashtivity's silence about the assignment were well known in October 2023. Mitchell did not include any evidence in his first statement about reliance. This seems to be a serious oversight and there was no explanation offered for its omission. It looks self-serving and questionable to include the evidence noted in paragraph 54 above only after the defendant has identified the missing evidence.
57 Secondly, Mitchell says that MAM operated on the basis that the borrower had to own the intellectual property the subject of the RDTI rebate. If this were true, then I would expect that MAM, as trustee of the IFF and responsible for the investors' funds, would take effective measures to check this when performing the due diligence. This is especially so if the failure to own the intellectual property is a crucial and determinative factor in deciding the outcome of the loan application. But, on the evidence, MAM made no enquiries about the ownership, content or value of the intellectual property in relation to which Cashtivity sought the loan, even though Cashtivity produced all the documents and information which MAM sought in connection with the loan application. It is difficult to treat ownership of the intellectual property as akin to a pre-condition of the loan if MAM ignores the issue.
58 Thirdly, Mitchell implied in his witness statement and said in his oral evidence that MAM always required the borrower to enter into a general security deed when obtaining an RDTI loan. He said this gave MAM further security and comfort that there were other assets available to realise if the ATO refused to grant the RDTI rebate. The reasoning in this answer is defective. Whether or not having a general security deed provides the lender with greater security and the comfort of additional assets depends on the facts of each particular case. A general security deed is of no practical utility unless there are assets to which it might attach. MAM did not adduce or refer the Court to evidence which showed that it conducted any search, examination or enquiry about what assets of Cashtivity fell within the scope of the general security deed. Unless MAM performed such a task, it could not know that there were any assets apart from the RDTI rebate covered by the general security deed. If there were no valuable assets to which the general security deed could attach, then MAM had no greater security for its loan and could not ensure that the borrower repaid the loan.
59 Fourthly, Mitchell says that if MAM had known that Cashtivity did not own its intellectual property, it would not have lent it any money. That is an unqualified statement of MAM's lending policy. Then, in the same paragraph, he says alternatively, that MAM would have lent Cashtivity money but required additional security. I am concerned by Mitchell's approach to this part of his evidence. He makes statements which are on their face inconsistent without offering any explanation about what factors would cause MAM to act in one way rather than another. This approach to the truth does not sit comfortably with the fact that Mitchell is plainly intelligent and a sophisticated operator in the finance world.
60 Fifthly, I do not accept Mitchell's evidence that MAM would not lend money to a borrower where the borrower did not own the intellectual property.[11] It is apparent from this case MAM was prepared to do that very thing. As appears later in the judgment, on the balance of probabilities, I am comfortably satisfied that Di Pasquale informed Strachan about the transfer of the intellectual property under the 2015 Transfer Deed well before 2018. It follows from this that either Strachan did not pass this information to the investment committee or he did advise the investment committee and it decided to make the 2018 loan anyway. In either case, the likely explanation is that Strachan or the investment committee was not troubled by this fact because the IFF's prime focus was the RDTI rebate. Given Cashtivity's history of successful claims, the change of direction in Cashtivity's research and the positive views expressed by PwC regarding the RDTI rebate application for 30 June 2018, MAM expected Cashtivity to repay the 2018 loan from the RDTI rebate. This was evident from Mitchell's evidence at trial.
61 At one point, the defendant's counsel queried Mitchell about the steps taken to ascertain that Cashtivity owned the intellectual property the subject of its RDTI application. Mitchell said that MAM enquired about the ownership of Cashtivity and he understood that an Australian company undertaking the eligible activity got a full rebate and a non-Australian company did not. Mitchell said that this understanding arose from his experience as a lender. He also said that MAM lent against the RDTI rebate and not the intellectual property of the borrower.
62 Mitchell later repeated that, when lending in relation to the RDTI rebate, MAM's predominant interest was the eligibility of the expenses claimed by the borrower and the likelihood that the ATO would pay the rebate. Mitchell's point was that, though MAM examined the Personal Property Securities Register ("PPSR") registration and insisted upon being the senior secured entity, that was not the main focus.
63 Again, Mitchell referred in the latter part of his cross-examination to MAM's usual procedure - this was to consider the eligible activity and the historical spend by the borrower and to become the senior secured entity on the PPSR. Mitchell's evidence showed that the plaintiff's focus was on the RDTI rebate rather than any consideration about the actual value of the borrower's assets. Other evidence such as the screening documentation reinforced the same point. The risk checklist in that document concentrated on issues regarding the entitlement to the RDTI rebate, not other assets which could provide extra security for the loan.
64 Mitchell's evidence was also unsatisfactory in other ways. He was evasive about what he himself did to assess the value of the borrower's intellectual property. He said that he was not the point man on the loan, as if that absolved him from responsibility. Mitchell failed to mention in that context that the investment committee vote to approve the loan had to be unanimous and therefore, that his approval was required for MAM to grant the loan to Cashtivity. Mitchell did not give any direct evidence about the steps he took to examine or assess the content or value of Cashtivity's intellectual property. I find it more likely than not that Mitchell took no steps to investigate these matters. He said that the value of the intellectual property was partly a function of the money which Cashtivity had spent over time. Based on his experience, he thought the intellectual property value might be 10-15% of the money expended by Cashtivity on research and development. He gave no more detailed rationale to justify this calculation.
65 Mitchell also said that he believed Di Pasquale had applied for patents and that fact indicated there was value in the intellectual property. In saying this, Mitchell implied that the existence of patents was a relevant factor in forming his view about the loan to Cashtivity. However, there was no clear and detailed evidence about patent applications to support Mitchell's evidence. Further, the plaintiff did not raise the question of patent applications in cross-examination with Di Pasquale.
66 More disturbingly, Mitchell said later in his evidence that whether or not Cashtivity had patent applications pending or registered did not factor into his assessment of the merits of the loan sought.
67 Another concern was Mitchell's response to the question whether MAM had enquired about the assets of a borrower when making an RDTI loan. Mitchell said that the plaintiff did make enquiries about assets other than the RDTI rebate. When asked about the extent of the enquiries which MAM undertook, Mitchell said that MAM "generally" looked at the PPSR registration and the application to AusIndustry[12] to get an understanding of the ownership of the company and looked at the experimentation which the borrower was engaged in. He said that MAM seeks more detail about this aspect by getting the advice of a reputable tax agent involved in the borrower's application for the RDTI rebate. That is why MAM signed the "hold harmless" letter to PwC. Upon providing this to PwC, MAM gained access to the opinion which PwC gave Cashtivity in connection with its RDTI application and the likely amount of the rebate.
68 In my view it is notable that none of the evidence from Mitchell actually addressed the concrete steps taken to make enquiries about assets other than the subject of the RDTI application. I infer from the evidence of Mitchell that there were no such enquiries made. To that extent, Mitchell's evidence was misleading and unpersuasive.
69 Mitchell's evidence was evasive in parts. He did not always address the obvious point of a question but gave answers which were non-responsive. At other times, he was determined, regardless of relevance, to make some point which he was anxious to convey. In that way, he was combative. As the founder of the business and the chief executive officer, I assume he felt some responsibility for MAM's current situation. While that is understandable, it did not make him the most compelling witness. His conduct in the witness box drew attention to his significant interest in the outcome of this case. This included not only explaining the delinquent loan to investors, but also the scope for reputational damage. In my view, this affected his conduct and attitude in the witness box. A witness more intent on simply answering questions without calculating their potential impact on the case would not have been as argumentative, evasive or economical with the truth.
70 In short, while I accept much of what Mitchell said, his evidence on some important contested points was unsatisfactory. To that extent, I regard him as an unreliable witness whose evidence I would not accept where it clashes with the defendant's evidence.
71 In 2013, Strachan worked at Allen Partners, a capital advisory and fund placement fund. Strachan holds Bachelor of Commerce, Bachelor of Engineering and Master of Finance and Investment degrees. His main functions at Allen Partners were capital raising, strategy, investor relationships and investment advice. A major focus was assisting overseas fund managers to raise capital from Australian institutions. During the period from late November 2016 to late May 2017, Strachan worked as a contractor or consultant for MAM. In this role, he helped introduce potential investments to wholesale investors. On about 23 May 2017, he became a salaried employee at MAM with a title of "Director, Private Capital". His role then focused primarily on MAM's IFF. This involved finding potential borrowers and working with MAM's investment committee to assess those borrowers. Strachan worked in this role until August 2022, after which he was employed elsewhere.
72 Strachan was, until August 2013, a member of the Australian Institute of Company Directors ("AICD"). In or around 2013, on the AICD's online job board, he saw an advertisement for Cashtivity seeking assistance with a capital raising. He answered the advertisement and spoke to Di Pasquale. She explained that Cashtivity was an online education collaboration platform aimed at teaching schoolchildren about business and finance. Strachan thought it was important for children to learn these things and he was keen to help. He became a director and minority shareholder of TCPL in December 2013, and remained a director until his resignation in July 2016.
73 Strachan provided his services to TCPL free of charge. His primary responsibility was to find people or institutions who would invest in Cashtivity. He arranged introductions for Di Pasquale and attended meetings at which Di Pasquale pitched her ideas to prospective investors. He also reviewed and helped with the presentation of marketing material and other information which Di Pasquale prepared. Part of Strachan's role was to present information about Cashtivity and its work in a way which was attractive to potential investors and easy to review.
He said that he became aware of the 2015 Transfer Deed only after the appointment of receivers to Cashtivity on 29 May 2019.
I consider it more likely than not that Di Pasquale told Strachan about the 2015 Transfer Deed around the time it was executed.
Di Pasquale said that she told Strachan about these matters and he agreed that the parent/subsidiary model should be adopted.
Given the matters referred to above, it is significantly more likely than not that Strachan was made aware of the transfer of the intellectual property before 2018.
102 Glenn Hislop is a certified public accountant who works at Chambers & Partners. He has worked there since before 2005 when he was a student at RMIT. He has experience in small to medium-sized businesses. He began doing accounting work for Cashtivity around November 2014. From about 2015 until the appointment of the receivers to Cashtivity in May 2019, Hislop undertook various tasks for Cashtivity: annual tax returns; general book keeping; filing documents with ASIC; drafting correspondence to the ATO; drafting letters of comfort and providing general tax advice.
103 Hislop presented as a careful witness who sought to tell the truth as he saw it. His evidence was factual and based largely on contemporaneous documents.
104 Although the plaintiff cross-examined Hislop, it did not challenge him about the contents of his witness statement.
105 I consider Hislop a reliable and credible witness whose evidence I can readily accept. Further, Hislop had less of a vested interest in the outcome of the case than other witnesses. There was no suggestion that any work done or advice given by him or the firm was influential in the decision to establish Cashtivity Inc. The decision appeared to be more driven by the advice of people such as Hammond, Glovsky and Twomey and Di Pasquale's assessment of what course of action was most likely to produce a successful future for the business.
106 Di Pasquale provided a detailed witness statement which covered her intellectual and business history in trying to develop a useful educational software program for students. She was obviously heavily invested in the project from 2011. This is reflected by the funding which she, directly or indirectly, provided and the fact that she moved to America for about two years to try to develop the project.
107 In giving her evidence, Di Pasquale's responses were mixed. While she had a good command of the historical sequence of events, she was not always as strong in recalling details. Overall, this did not concern me greatly for a couple of reasons.
108 First, the cross-examination was not as precise and focused as it might have been. More often than is desirable, the questions were lengthy, addressed more than one topic or provoked objection from the defendant's counsel. As a result, the cross-examination was a little messy because questions were withdrawn and repeated and answers were given which were ambiguous because it was not always clear what part of the question the witness was responding to.
109 Secondly, Di Pasquale was the founder of Cashtivity and the driving force behind the project. She was intimately involved in the whole process of developing the concept of the business and bringing the idea to fruition. She was engaged on a daily basis with meetings, emails and phone calls designed to achieve her objective. Given the volume of interactions she had with many people in Australia and overseas,[15] it would be understandable if she had difficulty recalling particular meetings or phone calls or differentiating one call or meeting from another.
110 Di Pasquale answered questions directly and was generally not evasive or argumentative. The plaintiff sought to attack her credibility by reference to changes to her pleadings, the timing of her introduction of Strachan to Hislop and the verification document generated by PwC. The gist of the attack was that her evidence was untrue.
111 MAM argues that the dispute had been on foot for some time before Di Pasquale belatedly said that Strachan knew about the 2015 Transfer Deed before Cashtivity entered the 2018 Facility Agreement. It also says that Di Pasquale "introduced" Strachan and Hislop about one year after the three of them allegedly spoke about the reorganisation of the Cashtivity business and the corporate move to America. Next, MAM submits that she gave false information to PwC about Cashtivity, and not Cashtivity Inc, owning the intellectual property generated through Cashtivity's research and development work.
112 While it was proper for MAM to cross-examine the defendant about these matters, the outcome in my view was not to regard Di Pasquale as a less credible witness than Mitchell or Strachan.
113 I am normally reticent about criticising witnesses on the basis of their pleadings and disparities which might arise between the pleadings and their oral evidence. Once lawyers become involved in a case, their drafting, even though informed by and reliant upon their clients, tends to dominate. It is usually unfair and unhelpful to attack a witness for a document which they did not produce and reflects the judgment of their legal representatives.
114 The "introduction" point depends upon how one should interpret Di Pasquale's witness statement. She said that in 2015, there were many discussions about the structure of the proposed corporate reorganisation in America "between me, Mr Strachan and Mr Hislop". Later in her witness statement, she said that she received an email from Strachan in December 2016 asking her to introduce him to her contact at Cashtivity's accounting firm, Chambers & Partners. The contact was Hislop. Di Pasquale responded by sending an email to Strachan (copied to Hislop) the same day or a day or two after, telling Strachan that the contact was Glenn Hislop and he would be able to answer any of his questions. In cross-examination, Di Pasquale insisted that her witness statement was correct and maintained that Strachan and Hislop had met each other prior to the December 2016 emails. She said that discussions between her, Strachan and Hislop in 2015 related to matters other than the RDTI rebate and that Strachan had contact with several people at Chambers & Partners who worked with Di Pasquale. Thus, the purpose of the December 2016 emails was to introduce Strachan to the right person to talk to at the firm about the RDTI rebate and for MAM's due diligence for the 2016 loan. I accept her explanation.
115 PwC was involved in producing Cashtivity's RDTI application in relation to the financial year ending 30 June 2018. During the course of preparation, PwC created an engagement verification document. The version in the court book records, at Question Number 1.6 of the document, that Cashtivity will own all the intellectual property which it generates through its research and development in that financial year and that no other entity, including Cashtivity Inc, will own that intellectual property. It was put to Di Pasquale that she saw and approved the document which contained the above information. Pasquale accepted that the statement regarding ownership was incorrect. But she denied giving the instructions recorded at Question Number 1.6 of the document.
116 Di Pasquale agreed that, as set out in the engagement verification document, she had a meeting with Tierney and Fon of PwC and a subsequent meeting with Ben Landsberg and Fon. She said that she saw at least three versions of the engagement verification document and made some comments which led to amendments of the proposed document. The only copy of the engagement verification document which the plaintiff had was the one in the court book. Di Pasquale could not say whether this was the final version of the document. Indeed, the evidence (as opposed to counsel's statement from the bar table) did not disclose which version of the document was in the court book.
117 There were some emails in May and June 2018 about which Di Pasquale was questioned. In those emails between Fon and Di Pasquale, Fon said more than once that if the defendant were happy with the engagement verification document, she should sign and return it. In the absence of direct evidence, I infer that PwC produced the emails and the engagement verification document on subpoena. The plaintiff did not ask Di Pasquale and there was no evidence from her or anyone else about why this version of the engagement verification document (if it were the final version) was not signed by Di Pasquale. The evidence surrounding the document was vague and inconclusive. Given the uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the document and the absence of a signature, I accept that Di Pasquale knew the information in Question Number 1.6 of the engagement verification document was incorrect, and she did not approve it. She had made corrections to prior documentation proffered by PwC and denied giving the instructions embodied in the version of the document shown to her. Her failure to sign and date the document is consistent with her evidence.
118 An aspect of the defendant's cross-examination which concerned me was the plaintiff's failure to challenge parts of the defendant's evidence in chief. For example, the plaintiff did not challenge the following:
119 In addition, MAM also failed to put to Di Pasquale certain matters it sought to advance at trial. These included the following:
120 Overall, I consider that Di Pasquale did her best to tell the truth as she recalled it and I accept most of her evidence. Her recollection of the sequence of events was good and she gave reasonable explanations in connection with some of the evidence about which the plaintiff attacked her credit. Much of her evidence was reliant on contemporaneous documents and, to that extent, is supported by objective evidence. I found her credible and, apart from the vague evidence that she gave Strachan a copy of the 2015 Transfer Deed, I prefer her evidence on the other contested issues to that of Mitchell or Strachan. In particular, I find that she informed Strachan of the 2015 Transfer Deed before MAM entered the 2018 Facility Agreement.
Issue 1: Did Di Pasquale breach her fiduciary duties as the sole director of Cashtivity in December 2015 by causing the present and future intellectual property of the company to be assigned to Cashtivity Inc for $1?
121 MAM contends that Di Pasquale breached her fiduciary duties to Cashtivity in 2015 by causing Cashtivity's intellectual property to be assigned to Cashtivity Inc for $1. In the FASOC,[17] MAM says that Di Pasquale:
122 In support of its position, MAM contends that the authorities make plain that a director who transfers a valuable corporate asset for only nominal value contravenes their fiduciary duty to the company. Such conduct deprives the company of a valuable asset without any corresponding benefit. MAM says that by transferring the intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc in 2015 and by failing to take steps to ascertain the proper value of the intellectual property being transferred, Di Pasquale breached her fiduciary duty to the company.
123 MAM submits that the expert evidence in the proceeding, particularly that of Campbell Jaski, is clear that the intellectual property, as it existed in 2015, was valued at up to $2 million and was not worthless as Di Pasquale contends. MAM argues that this position is supported by the documentary evidence. Because it had value, transferring the company's intellectual property for the nominal consideration of $1 was not in the best interests of Cashtivity. In so acting, Di Pasquale deprived Cashtivity of its primary asset without any corresponding benefit.
124 MAM submits that, as both Mindsets Learning and Cashtivity are subsidiaries of Cashtivity Inc, Di Pasquale may have faced a conflict of interest in her role as director. It submits that her fiduciary obligation to Cashtivity should have prevented her from facilitating a transaction that, at Cashtivity's expense, favoured another entity.
125 First, Di Pasquale submits that the entry into the 2015 Transfer Deed must be considered in its context. She says that in 2015, Cashtivity was a failure because:
126 Di Pasquale submits that, in 2015, she decided that as a result of Cashtivity's failure, she was not going to continue funding Cashtivity as an Australian enterprise. Instead, Di Pasquale would pivot to America where there was a more fertile market both for education software and potential investors. She argues that her options were either to liquidate Cashtivity or to establish a parent/subsidiary model with an American company. Moreover, Di Pasquale accepted advice that Cashtivity would be more attractive to investors if Cashtivity Inc, the American parent company, was the ultimate owner of the relevant intellectual property. As a result, she decided that Cashtivity should assign its intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc.
127 Secondly, Di Pasquale emphasises that by transferring its intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc, Cashtivity established the circumstances by which Cashtivity Inc, Di Pasquale and her companies would continue to fund the company. She submits that by executing the 2015 Transfer Deed she had acted consistent with the best interests of Cashtivity - she had ensured a future for Cashtivity.
128 Thirdly, Di Pasquale says that she was not in a position of conflict between her role as director of Cashtivity and her interest as director of Cashtivity Inc.[18] She says that the existence of a transaction between the two companies did not allow a real possibility of conflict to arise as this was not a situation where the parent company, Cashtivity Inc, stripped Cashtivity of its assets. Instead, a restructure of the business had taken place whereby Di Pasquale moved the business to America where customers and investment might be found.
129 Moreover, Di Pasquale was already a shareholder of Cashtivity and, when the restructure concluded, the shareholders of Cashtivity Inc mirrored those of Cashtivity. Consequently, there was no real possibility of conflict arising from the transfer of membership of Cashtivity to Cashtivity Inc because it could not be said that Di Pasquale obtained for herself any profit or benefit.
130 The legal principles regarding a director's fiduciary duty to a company are reasonably clear. Directors must:
(a) act in good faith and in the best interests of the company;[19]
(b) avoid any unauthorised conflict between their duty to the company as a director and either their personal self-interest or their duty to a third party;[20] and
(c) not obtain any unauthorised profit from acting as a director.[21]
131 The case law in the area reflects conflicting views about whether the test for a bona fide duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company is subjective, objective, or a combination of the two. Under the subjective test, where a director acts bona fide in the sense of having an honest belief that the course of action adopted is in the best interests of the company, no breach arises. By contrast, under the objective test, a court must consider whether in light of all the relevant circumstances, a reasonable director would have acted in the way which the director in question did.[22] Other decisions in this Court have considered this question.[23] The Court of Appeal, in relation to the analogous statutory duty, which has been described as being of similar character to the equitable or fiduciary duty,[24] has addressed the appropriate test in the decisions of Mernda Developments Pty Ltd v Alamanda Property Interests (No 2) Pty Ltd ("Mernda")[25] and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Geary ("Geary").[26]
132 In Mernda, the Court said that it is now generally accepted that a court should apply an objective test.[27] In Geary, the Court endorsed the objective test but also stated that
"[a]lthough the test is objective, based on what a reasonable person in a similar position would be expected to have done in the circumstances, the subjective beliefs and intentions of the director or officer may still be relevant."[28]
133 The cases emphasise that, irrespective of the test which is applied, it is crucial that the Court focuses on analysing the facts. Depending upon the evidence in a particular case, it may or may not support an inference that the interests of an individual company were served by a decision which conferred a benefit on a corporate group or other entities within the group.[29]
135 Allied to the duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company is the obligation upon a director to act for a proper purpose. As a fiduciary, a director can exercise powers only for the purposes for which they were conferred and not a collateral or improper purpose.[32] To establish such a complaint about a director's actions, a party must show that the substantial purpose pursued by the director was improper or collateral to his or her duties as a director.[33] A director can act honestly but still act improperly where the director acted for a collateral purpose.[34] The Court must determine whether, but for the improper or collateral purpose, the director would have engaged in the impugned act.[35]
136 As a fiduciary, a director is obliged to avoid conflicts of interest. Directors cannot place themselves in a position where there is a real or substantial possibility of conflict between the director's duty to the company and either the director's own interests or the director's duty to another entity, whether that be a company, a person or a trust of which the director is trustee.[36] In the present case, the emphasis is on any conflict with Di Pasquale's personal interests. MAM does not allege any conflict which could arise from any duty which Di Pasquale might have to Cashtivity Inc as a director of that company.
137 It is well established that a director is liable to account for any profit, benefit or gain obtained in circumstances where there is a conflict or possible conflict of interest and duty or which has been obtained by reason of their fiduciary position or by taking advantage of an opportunity or knowledge derived from holding that position. Hence, a director is obliged to account for any benefit or gain obtained or received due to the fiduciary position or opportunity or knowledge derived through it.[37] The objective is to preclude a fiduciary from being affected by considerations of personal interest and from misusing their fiduciary position for personal advantage.[38]
138 When dealing with this question, the Court needs to examine whether Di Pasquale:
(a) acted bona fide and in the best interests of the company;
(b) acted for a proper purpose;
(c) was in a position of conflict; and/or
(d) derived or received some unauthorised profit or benefit from her directorship.
Did Di Pasquale act bona fide and in the best interests of Cashtivity?
139 I am satisfied that Di Pasquale acted bona fide or honestly and in the best interests of the company in assigning Cashtivity's existing and future intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc for $1. I accept her evidence that it was best for the future of the company to assign the intellectual property to the American company, Cashtivity Inc. There was no future for the software product in Australia because of the absence of investors and the inhibiting effect of government regulation upon sales in the Australian market. Moreover, it was not put to Di Pasquale that she was dishonest in her evidence about this issue or that she did not believe that it was the best option for the company.
140 In determining whether Di Pasquale failed to act in the best interests of Cashtivity in 2015 by assigning the intellectual property, the Court needs to consider what the best interests of Cashtivity were at the time of signing the 2015 Transfer Deed, having regard to such matters as the circumstances facing the company and the valuation of the intellectual property.
141 I turn first to the circumstances of the company at the time that Di Pasquale signed the 2015 Transfer Deed. By the end of 2015, Di Pasquale had been working on the financial literacy software for about four years. During that time, notwithstanding her own best efforts and those of the various people who assisted her, she had not developed a successful product. There was no product which she could market or sell, and there was no specific tangible outcome from the research and development which could be monetised. In other words, compared to Di Pasquale's initial hopes of creating a globally scalable company which solved a large problem or transformed an entire market,[39] her work with Cashtivity was a failure. She would not rival the likes of Messrs Gates, Bezos or Zuckerberg in creating a novel, global business with her financial literacy product.
142 From inception, Cashtivity relied primarily upon Di Pasquale to fund its activities either directly or indirectly through family companies or trusts. Di Pasquale established Cashtivity in August 2011. She was interested in the idea of financial literacy in part because she knew the Commonwealth government, together with ASIC, was developing a national curriculum for financial literacy. The Commonwealth, however, abandoned this plan the following year.
143 By late 2015, Cashtivity had reached a point where it had failed to develop a software product for marketing or sale. The company had developed no assets of substantial worth and could not obtain finance in the usual way from banks or other lending institutions. It was forced to borrow from specialised funders like the IFF which involved providing considerable information about the business and paying higher interest rates to reflect the level of risk associated with the loan. On any objective criteria, Cashtivity's business was a failure and there was no evidence to suppose that there would be a major improvement in the fortunes of the company in Australia. Indeed, the future there looked grim.
144 Before 2015, Di Pasquale spent some time in America attending conferences and meeting teachers, educators and curriculum decision-makers. By March 2015, Cashtivity had won two awards in America: the "LearnLaunch" award in Boston, and the NASDAQ Edtech award in New York. In May that year, Di Pasquale met Jean Hammond of LearnLaunch. Hammond was the managing partner of LearnLaunch and became an advisor to Cashtivity Inc from 2015 until 2019. LearnLaunch was a Boston-based incubator for start-up businesses in the educational technology space. It invited applications from prospective start-ups. When LearnLaunch accepted a business into its program, it invested in the business and provided mentoring for three months. Di Pasquale was invited to attend the program which ran from September 2015 until the end of January 2016.
145 As a result of the program, Di Pasquale decided to base herself primarily in America from 2015 until about September 2017. She researched customer needs and investors while continuing to work on her educational product. Hammond recommended that Di Pasquale seek assistance from an American lawyer, Alex Glovsky, in connection with the transfer of the business from Australia to America.
146 Di Pasquale had two options for structuring the transfer of the business to America: the parallel structure and the parent/subsidiary structure.
147 Under the parallel structure, the Australian and American companies would have identical shareholdings but they would be run as separate businesses. The Australian company would retain the intellectual property and conduct the research and development as it had done previously. The American company would do business in America and seek to attract American investors. The rights of the American company to use the intellectual property owned and developed by the Australian company would be regulated by a royalty agreement between them. If the business were to be sold, it would require the sale of both companies.
148 Under the parent/subsidiary structure, the American company would own all the shares in the Australian company and the assets, including intellectual property, of that company, and investors would invest only in the American company. The existing shareholders in the Australian company would obtain an equivalent interest in the American company as they held in the Australian company. The Australian company, as the subsidiary of the American company, would continue to perform the research and development work as it had done previously. There was no requirement for a royalty agreement between the companies regulating the use of the intellectual property, and as a result, there was no need to be concerned about the payment of royalties or questions concerning transfer pricing requirements.
149 Di Pasquale said that, initially, she wanted to adopt the parallel structure. However, in October 2015, Glovsky told Di Pasquale that American investors would prefer to invest in an American company which owned the assets of the business, including the intellectual property. This required the adoption of the parent/subsidiary structure. Having considered advice from various people (including Gary Twomey, Hislop, Darren Sommers, Glovsky, Hammond and Strachan),[40] Di Pasquale decided to adopt the parent/subsidiary structure, with Cashtivity becoming the subsidiary of an American parent, Cashtivity Inc. In reaching this view, Di Pasquale said that she was influenced by a number of factors, including:
150 Also relevant to the company's best interests are the value of its financial literacy software and whether the assignment to Cashtivity Inc reflected the fair value of that software. Accordingly, I will now examine the valuation evidence.
151 Both MAM and Di Pasquale filed expert valuation reports addressing the value of Cashtivity's intellectual property at 31 December 2015 and 4 March 2018. Di Pasquale was the first party who acted to produce expert evidence about the value of the intellectual property. MAM's conduct was purely reactive when it engaged Jaski to respond to the defendant's evidence.
152 Di Pasquale tendered a report by Brian Jones dated 15 May 2024. Mr Jones holds a B.Sc. (Econ) (Honours) from University College London, a Graduate Certificate in Forensic Studies (Accounting) from Monash University, an MBA from Edinburgh Business School and a Graduate Diploma in Taxation. He is a Business Valuation Specialist and Forensic Accounting Specialist accredited by Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand ("CA ANZ"), a Fellow of CA ANZ, a Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, a registered company auditor and a registered tax agent. Mr Jones has been a director of an accounting firm, Ahead For Business Pty Ltd (previously known as Hancox Jones & Co), since 1989 and a related company, Forensic Accountants Australia Pty Ltd, since 2010. Before his involvement with those companies, Mr Jones worked for BP Finance Australia and BP Australia, Howard Smith and Touche Ross International.
153 In response, MAM filed a report by Campbell Jaski dated 23 July 2024. Mr Jaski has undertaken postgraduate studies in valuation, accounting, economics and finance at Melbourne Business School, Australian Graduate School of Management and New York University. He holds a Bachelor of Science (Honours), an MBA (Rupert Murdoch Fellow) and a Diploma of International Commercial Arbitration. He is a Business Valuation Specialist accredited by CA ANZ, a Fellow of the Financial Services Institute of Australasia and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. Mr Jaski is a partner in the Corporate Value Advisory practice of PwC, the firm's technical valuation division. His experience covers public and private company valuations in Australia and overseas and valuation analysis across a wide range of local and international disputes, including intellectual property valuation.
154 There was no substantial challenge to the expertise of either expert. Neither party submits that the opposing expert ought not be accepted on that basis. I am satisfied that each of Jones and Jaski is appropriately qualified and experienced to provide an expert report.
155 Jones' view was that the value of the intellectual property assigned under the 2015 Transfer Deed and 2018 Transfer Deed was zero at both points in time.
(a) the value of the intellectual property assigned under the 2015 Transfer Deed was up to approximately $2 million, but likely to be less; and
(b) the value of the intellectual property assigned under the 2018 Transfer Deed was up to approximately $4.5 million.
157 I note from the outset that the valuers adopted different approaches regarding the definition of "intellectual property".
158 Jones did not define the term in his report. However, the scope of his engagement required him to value the intellectual property the subject of the 2015 Transfer Deed and the 2018 Transfer Deed. From this, I infer that he valued the intellectual property as defined in those documents.
159 Further, in oral evidence, Jones elaborated on the concept. He said that "intellectual property" was a widely used, generic term which referred to any creation which came out of someone's mind. He said that when he referred to intellectual property, he referred to "business or commercial intellectual property". This was something that was developed ultimately for a commercial purpose. So, for example, where in paragraph 3.4 of his report, Jones said that "no intellectual property existed at 2015", he meant that there was no business intellectual property which had any commercial application. More specifically, he meant that there was no intellectual property of any value.
160 Jaski adopted the definition of intellectual property in the two transfer deeds, which he noted in his report as being:
"intellectual property rights in educational software, including but not limited to:
(a) a library of real-world math, science, STEM and entrepreneurship lessons and the content of such lessons;
(b) the format and design of the platform software, including all software code, which hosts three [sic] lessons;
(c) the Build a Business software application; and
(d) all Materials in relation the [sic] the abovementioned educational software.
... and also includes all current and future intellectual property rights assigned under this deed, including without limitation, any and all:
(a) current and future registered and unregistered rights in respect of copyright, designs, semiconductor or circuit layouts, trade marks, trade names, business names, trade secrets, know-how, confidential information, patents, inventions and discoveries;
(b) applications for grant of any of the above;
(c) other rights of a similar nature arising (or capable of arising) under statue or at common law in the Commonwealth of Australia or anywhere else in the world;
(e) other intellectual property as defined in Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation 1967."[41]
161 I consider it appropriate to adopt the description of intellectual property set out in the transfer deeds because that is what Cashtivity assigned and that was the asset which both experts were instructed to value.
162 In his report, Jones concluded that there could be no value attributed to the intellectual property in 2015 because:
(a) the intellectual property did not exist at this time as there was nothing that could be bought or sold;
(b) it would be difficult to predict a future income stream for the "products" on the basis that their development was a substantial failure at that time; and
(c) no research and development had been capitalised by Cashtivity.[42]
163 Jones concluded that there was no value attributable to the intellectual property in 2018 because:
(a) there was no discernible intellectual property in the sense of "business or commercial intellectual property" and therefore no value could be attributed to the intellectual property;
(b) there were still significant technical problems with the product development (even though progress had been made, especially with "Applied Math Software" and there was still an expectation that the technical difficulties could be overcome);
(c) the product was not yet suitable for going to market and, therefore, it would be highly speculative to predict a future income stream; and
(d) total equity according to the balance sheet of Cashtivity was negative $789,074 due to an amount due from Mitchell Asset Management of $180,200 in current liabilities and $1,010,985 from Mindsets Learning Inc.[43]
164 Jaski took issue with Jones on a number of matters: the existence of the intellectual property; valuation principles; and the assessment of value. The last-mentioned matter involves questions concerning patent applications, investment in research and development, capitalisation of research and development costs in the books of account, the estimation of future income and the company's net asset position.
165 It was appropriate for Jaski to adopt the reference to intellectual property in the two transfer deeds. At the same time, Jones' evidence was helpful in explaining the narrower focus underlying his reference to intellectual property in his written report. Jones appreciated that intellectual property was a broad term which covered any creation emanating from a person's mind. He acknowledged that it could exist and had value whether or not it was formally protected by copyright, patent, design or trademark law. But in this context of addressing intellectual property in a corporate reorganisation, Jones was of the view that the valuation should concentrate upon the ultimate commercial benefit of the intellectual property.
166 Both experts agreed on the possible valuation methodologies which could be used to value Cashtivity's intellectual property. The three fundamental approaches are as follows:
"(a) Income approach - this provides an indication of value by converting a series of future cash flows to a single present value. Under this approach, the value of an asset is determined by reference to the value of income, cash flow or cost savings generated by the asset.
(b) Market approach - this provides an indication of value by comparing the subject asset with an identical or comparable asset for which price information is known.
(c) Cost approach - this provides an indication of value by calculating the current replacement or reproduction cost of an asset and making deductions for relevant forms of obsolescence. It uses the economic principle that a buyer will pay no more for an asset than the cost to obtain an asset of equal utility, whether by purchase or by reconstruction, unless undue time, inconvenience, risk or other factors are involved."[44]
167 Jones adopted the income approach. He said the intellectual property shared the same core concept as any income-earning asset whereby value is linked to an asset's ability to show likely future earnings. In adopting the income approach, the expert would usually consider the projected economic income, an estimate of the time over which the income would be derived and the selection of appropriate risk-adjusted discount and capitalisation rates. The fair value of the asset is the sum of the discounted future income, that is, the figure which represents the value of the income flows in today's money.
168 Jones said that the two traditional methods of valuing intellectual property involved either a quantitative valuation or a qualitative valuation. The quantitative valuation depends upon the ability of the numerical information to produce an estimate of the value of the asset. The calculations could include a comparative analysis of similar market transactions or assessment of the cost of replicating the intellectual property. The qualitative method provides a non-monetary value of the intellectual property by rating it on the basis of its strategic impact, the brand loyalty of customers and its impact on future growth. However, both methods depend upon the intellectual property in question being ready to go to market. Hence, they were not appropriate in the current case.
169 In Jones's view, intellectual property exists where it is protected by patent, trademark, copyright or design rights. But he acknowledged that it could exist and have value without these formal protections.[45]
170 According to Jones, the intellectual property in 2018 was not materially different from what existed in 2015. A significant factor was that there was still no product available for sale. There could be no quantitative prediction of possible future income other than one which was speculative. A qualitative approach was not a viable alternative because Di Pasquale had decided that there could be no sales in Australia and that the future of the company lay overseas.
171 Jaski considered each valuation approach referred to in paragraph 166 above in endeavouring to value the intellectual property. Jaski observed that in both 2015 and 2018, the intellectual property remained at an early stage of development and had not generated any sales. As a result, he considered that the income approach was not a suitable methodology to adopt. It was too difficult to estimate a reliable future cash flow projection.
172 Jaski noted, with regard to the market approach, that external investors had provided some funding to the business in 2017 and 2018. He said that the prices paid for shares could be used as a basis to estimate the value of Mindsets Learning Inc in 2018.[46] As a result, these recent transactions could be used to determine the value of the intellectual property in 2018 by grossing up the equity investment by the corresponding equity interest acquired in the company. The enterprise value of the business could then be estimated by adding net debt to the equity value. Given that Mindsets Learning Inc had virtually no fixed assets, most of the enterprise value would likely be attributable to the intellectual property.
173 Jaski considered the cost approach to be the most appropriate one given the early-stage nature of the intellectual property in both 2015 and 2018. He said that the cost approach usually gave the lowest value. This was because of the significant risk associated with whether the intellectual property would generate future earnings and the timing of those earnings. He said that a willing buyer would only be prepared to pay the costs spent to date on building the asset on the basis that the buyer would have had to spend that money itself to obtain an asset of equivalent utility as at the valuation date. A willing purchaser would expect to spend more money in developing the asset until either it was commercialised or it decided the asset was not viable.
174 The rationale for Jaski's valuation is clear. He said that the cost approach was the most appropriate methodology in 2015. The intellectual property was still in an early stage of development and not generating any profits. As a result, it was not possible to consider the income approach. This approach required a capacity to reliably forecast sales revenue and costs. In addition, there did not appear to have been any third party capital raisings or other transactions in 2015 that would have enabled a valuer to derive the value of the intellectual property using the market approach. Jaski arrived at an intellectual property valuation of up to approximately $2 million in 2015 based upon the cumulative research and development expense in Cashtivity's income statements. He said the value was likely to be less than $2 million.
175 Jaski said that both the income and market approaches could be used for the 2018 valuation. Theoretically, he favoured the market approach because there were some equity investments in Mindsets Learning Inc in 2017 and 2018 and the value of the company would provide a sound basis from which to derive the intellectual property valuation. However, there was a major problem. Jaski said that he did not have enough information to determine a valuation for the company using the market approach. There was insufficient detail - for example, what percentage of the business did particular investors obtain for the amount which they paid?
176 Ultimately, Jaski used the cost approach again for 2018. He opined that, based on the cumulative research and development expense incurred by Cashtivity, the intellectual property valuation could be up to approximately $4.5 million. However, he acknowledged that the value could be less.
177 An important point of difference between the valuers lay in their treatment of the fact that, in 2015 and 2018, there was no evidence of any third party being interested in purchasing the results of the research and development undertaken by Cashtivity. Jones interpreted this as showing that the intellectual property had no value. Jaski said that the intellectual property could still be valuable without a prospective buyer. Jaski was prepared to use the market approach in relation to the 2018 valuation. This approach would have used the funds contributed in 2017 and late 2018 or early 2019 to determine a market value of the intellectual property on the basis that intellectual property constituted the major asset of the business. However, Jaski acknowledged that he did not have enough information to perform that valuation. There was no evidence about how much of the business the investors acquired. Hence, Jaski could not attempt a valuation based on the amount paid for the shares. Nonetheless, Jaski considered that the fact that investors paid money into the business showed that the intellectual property had value.
178 Jones had a different view. He said that venture capitalists routinely invested relatively limited amounts in small businesses like Cashtivity. This was the way they did business. Most small ventures like Cashtivity never amounted to much but venture capitalists hoped to balance out the failures by having conspicuous and profitable success in some investments. Jones said that people like venture capitalists often set aside a small proportion of their funds to effectively make speculative bets on small businesses. So investing money into a business like Cashtivity did not necessarily reflect that it had intellectual property of value. Rather, it reflected the venture capitalists' hope that the speculative investment would bear fruit when the business became the next "big thing".
179 In my view, the current situation is unusual and quite different from valuing more common assets like houses, cars, paintings or businesses. In those cases, it is easier to identify the market and other similar transactions which will often give a reliable guide to the value of a comparable asset, even in the absence of a specific known buyer.
180 Cashtivity's intellectual property was uncommon, especially when it was incomplete at the two dates and was not ready for use and sale in the market. With this product, any market would likely be narrow and specialised. Apart from investors who are prepared to speculate with a portion of their portfolio, I consider the primary candidate for an investor would be a party which has an interest in the same kind of educational software as Cashtivity. This investor would contemplate buying the intellectual property either to rule out avenues of research based on Cashtivity's record of work and failure, or to pursue lines of inquiry which it thinks more promising than Cashtivity did. On any view, at a commercial level, I regard it as unrealistic to imagine that such a third party would pay Cashtivity the accumulated cost of its failed research and development work.
181 By 2015, Di Pasquale had been working on her financial literacy project for about four years. Her work in Australia had not produced the semblance of a useful product which could go to market and attract customers. Having decided that Cashtivity had no future in Australia, she decided to move the business to America.
182 If anything, the situation in 2018 was worse. By this point, Di Pasquale had been trying to develop a product and attract investors and customers for about seven years. But she had finally decided, after years of failure, that her goal of developing a financial literacy product for school students was not achievable. Accordingly, she decided to reorient the business towards software which focused upon applied mathematics. To that extent, it was arguable that any intellectual property developed through Cashtivity's research and development work in financial literacy up to that point had minimal value in the commercial world. This was so notwithstanding the money expended over a period of years on the research and development work.
183 In relation to the question of the valuation, I regard it as significant that Jaski does not provide a valuation in the usual sense. He gives a range from $0 to $2 million in 2015 and $0 to $4.5 million in 2018. This is quite different from the usual market valuation where a valuer decides upon a specific value or gives a limited range. Other than making the general observation that the intellectual property might have value up to some millions of dollars, it is not helpful.
184 Jones said that it was worth nothing and Jaski said it was worth up to either $2 million or $4.5 million depending on the time of valuation. In my opinion, neither valuation should be accepted. Jones' valuation undervalues the intellectual property by saying it has zero value. While the practicalities of portfolio management may require that venture capitalists and fund managers use a small part of their funds on speculative investments or bets which have little or no intrinsic value, it is too absolute a position to say that Cashtivity's accumulated research and development expenditure and its product have no value whatever. For the right buyer, the research and development work would have some value. But that will depend very much upon the nature of the research and development work, the prospective purchaser's assessment of its relevance to its objectives and its assessment of its commercial value in dollar terms.
185 Similarly, Jaski's valuation is unrealistically inflated. The fact that Cashtivity might have spent approximately $2 million up to 2015 and approximately $4.5 million up to 2018 does not mean that a buyer will pay those amounts as representing the value of Cashtivity's intellectual property at the relevant date.
186 Other than referring to the accumulated research and development expenditure which Cashtivity incurred, Jaski did not stipulate any particular figure as a valuation or even a narrow band which included the valuation figure. Nor did he give any rationale to justify either a particular figure or limited range. Jaski produced no evidence of any potential buyers and gave no examples of any other cases in his experience where his cost approach to valuing was accepted as appropriate or where a buyer actually bought a business for the accumulated cost of the research and development expenditure. Overall, I consider that Jaski's valuation is not sufficiently rooted in reality. It assumes without any underlying empirical basis that someone might pay an amount representing the accumulated cost (or a figure approaching it) of failed research and development work.
187 Jaski's valuation states that the seller of the asset has continued to invest in and develop the intellectual property and protect it. He infers from this that Di Pasquale considers that Cashtivity's intellectual property had value and that the intellectual property would be valuable to a hypothetical buyer. Jaski seems not to draw any distinction between, on the one hand, the subjective perspective of a person who wanted to create a globally scalable company which solved a very large problem or was capable of transforming an entire market and, on the other hand, a commercial businessperson seeking a return on investment.
188 I note that Jaski agreed in evidence that, while there was a description of intellectual property in the 2015 Transfer Deed, no one ever told him or gave him any information to understand exactly what the description covered. The same applied to the 2018 Transfer Deed. To this extent, Jaski's valuation was of a high level rather than a detailed nature.
189 However, Jaski failed to give a persuasive explanation for the figure he reached. He did not explain how in the real commercial world, a third party would pay the full cost (or some figure approaching it) of Cashtivity undertaking research and development work for years only to produce nothing but commercial failure. This is important because the Court's view of the matter is largely informed by the evidence of the experts. While the Court must have regard to the evidence, it cannot bring a third set of opinions into the arena or piece together a valuation of its own.[47] The Court is to subject the valuers' evidence to critical evaluation. But the Court is not required to accept the whole of one opinion to the exclusion of the other. A judge is entitled to accept the evidence of one valuer on one issue and the evidence of another valuer on a different issue.[48]
190 In summary on this point, I do not consider that MAM has established that assigning Cashtivity's intellectual property for $1 to Cashtivity Inc was against the best interests of Cashtivity. On my assessment of the evidence, the value of the intellectual property was low, significantly nearer zero than millions of dollars.
191 Having regard to the broader context of the reorganisation of the corporate structure, I find that Di Pasquale acted in the best interests of Cashtivity. Di Pasquale hoped and expected to obtain greater financial support in America and planned to continue funding the work of Cashtivity so that any shortfall not met through the RDTI rebate was covered. She approved the restructure which enabled Cashtivity to continue its research and development work rather than be liquidated. The assignment of the intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc was one aspect of a broader organisational context. I am satisfied that a reasonable person in Di Pasquale's position and facing the same circumstances would have acted as she did. It was reasonable conduct for a company director.
192 Apart from the point that the value of the intellectual property at the time of assignment was minimal, I observe that, given the nature of the transfer between parent and subsidiary, I am not sure that the assignment value necessarily had to reflect the true value of the intellectual property at the time.
193 I also find that Di Pasquale did not use her powers as a director for an improper purpose. MAM alleges that Di Pasquale improperly used her position as a director to gain an advantage for Cashtivity Inc to the detriment of Cashtivity. MAM argues that the benefit in question here was Cashtivity Inc obtaining the intellectual property for $1. However, Cashtivity Inc did not gain any improper advantage through misconduct by Di Pasquale, whether due to the low value of the intellectual property or because of the broader context. MAM has not otherwise established that Di Pasquale breached her fiduciary duty to act for a proper purpose and did not elaborate upon this point in its final submissions.
194 Di Pasquale was a director of both Cashtivity and Cashtivity Inc. Indeed, at least initially, the shareholding in Cashtivity Inc was to be the same as it had been in Cashtivity. Di Pasquale intended that those supporting Cashtivity be treated, after the assignment and incorporation of Cashtivity Inc, as having the same interest in the American company. Also, on the evidence, there was no dispute among the shareholders about the course of action which Di Pasquale adopted.
195 MAM did not plead that Di Pasquale had a duty as a director of Cashtivity Inc which conflicted with her duty as a director of Cashtivity.[49] That being so, the Court cannot find that Di Pasquale is in breach of her fiduciary duties due to her being a director of Cashtivity Inc. Nor am I satisfied that Di Pasquale having an interest in Cashtivity Inc as a director and shareholder necessarily created a conflict between her duty to Cashtivity and her own personal interests. That is because the reorganisation of the business, of which the intellectual property assignment formed part, created a new structure for the business and conferred no new or direct benefit on Di Pasquale. I do not consider that she received any benefit or profit from her position as a director of Cashtivity. Even if she had, because it appears that Cashtivity's shareholders were content for the assignment of the intellectual property to occur and the corporate restructure to proceed as arranged by Di Pasquale, it is most probable that any profit or benefit was implicitly authorised.
196 In summary, notwithstanding several years of research and development work, in attempting to create a product which could be used to teach financial literacy to school students, Cashtivity had not created a product which could be marketed and sold to schools in Australia or indeed anywhere. Cashtivity had reached a point where, due to its developmental problems, Di Pasquale's conclusion that there was no viable market for any such product in Australia and the problems in funding the research and development work, the business would either move to America and restructure or shut down. If Di Pasquale adopted the latter course, that would have been the end of the company's activities. By acting as she did, Di Pasquale enabled the company to survive rather than close down. As a result, Cashtivity was able to continue its research and development work with the support of Di Pasquale and new investors in America. It also meant that Cashtivity could continue to seek the RDTI rebate and that, if it could develop a popular product, there were customers in America who would buy the same. In America, the school curricula varied considerably more from area to area than in Australia and was not regulated to the same extent by federal or state governments. Thus, school districts had considerably more independence and authority in determining the details of the school curricula in their area.
197 On balance, I am not satisfied that Di Pasquale breached her fiduciary duties to Cashtivity by assigning the intellectual property of the company to Cashtivity Inc for $1.
Issue 2: Did Di Pasquale breach her fiduciary duties as the sole director of Cashtivity by directing the company to incur research and development expenditure in circumstances where the 2015 Transfer Deed assigned its intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc?
198 The Court has inferred from the way in which the parties framed Issue 2 that the gist of the allegation is that Di Pasquale, in acting as alleged, has breached her fiduciary duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of Cashtivity. I note that the plaintiff did not address this issue in its final submissions[50] and therefore did not contend that Di Pasquale had breached any other of her fiduciary duties.
200 After the corporate reorganisation, Cashtivity Inc became the primary commercial arm of the business. Di Pasquale planned to use it as the vehicle through which to conduct business in America. It was the company which sought investors and future customers.
201 The applicable facts and legal principles have been set out in the discussion of Issue 1. In my opinion, Di Pasquale did not breach her fiduciary duty to Cashtivity in having the company conduct research and development work and incurring the consequential expenditure after the 2015 intellectual property assignment. I have reached this view on the following basis.
202 The assignment of the intellectual property, effected as part of the restructure, enabled Cashtivity to remain in existence. Cashtivity had experience in performing research and development work with computer software. Relocating the business to America and assigning the intellectual property ensured that Cashtivity remained active and not liquidated. It facilitated access for the business to a bigger market, substantial start-up experience, more potential customers and investors. These were positive developments which were in the best interests of Cashtivity. The change provided research and development continuity in the short term and hope for a better future.
203 Cashtivity became a wholly owned subsidiary of Cashtivity Inc. In that way, the two companies formed a small corporate group in which there was a level of co-dependence. Cashtivity had the experience and expertise to continue the research and development work. This was of benefit to Cashtivity Inc, which became the focal point of the business in America. At the same time, the contacts which Di Pasquale made in America and the investors she attracted enabled Di Pasquale to maintain the funding for Cashtivity's work. There was little or no explicit evidence about precisely how Di Pasquale proposed to fund Cashtivity's research and development work in 2015. However, it appears that she was committed to continuing this work and intended to inject whatever funds were needed to keep Cashtivity alive and able to meet its debt to third party creditors. Over time, it became apparent that she intended to retain Cashtivity at least until it received the 2018 RDTI rebate from which it could discharge its obligations to MAM and PwC. The debt to Cashtivity Inc was to be written off.
204 I reject MAM's argument that Di Pasquale breached her duty as a director of Cashtivity by getting the company to continue its work but not ultimately deriving a benefit from that work. Cashtivity did enjoy a benefit partly because it kept the company functioning and partly because it enabled the creation of Cashtivity Inc and the greater financial security which that company facilitated by attracting interest from investors and venture capitalists. In any case, trust companies often do not benefit directly from activities that they conduct on behalf of the trust (other than being reimbursed through the right to indemnity). But the profits made or dividends earned are for the trust and its beneficiaries, not the directors or shareholders of the trust company. Here, the success of the reorganisation and Cashtivity Inc assists Cashtivity by providing the financial security to ensure that its work is fully funded.
205 Thus, I find that Di Pasquale did not breach her duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of Cashtivity in causing the company to incur research and development expenditure in circumstances where the 2015 Transfer Deed assigned its intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc. I find that she acted as a reasonable director in her circumstances would have acted.
206 If the plaintiff in fact intended to address the question of fiduciary breach more broadly, based on the matters set out above, I do not consider that Di Pasquale acted for an improper purpose or was in a position of conflict. Further, the arrangement between Cashtivity and Cashtivity Inc which resulted from the reorganisation did not, in my view, confer any unauthorised benefit on Di Pasquale.
Issue 3: did Di Pasquale breach her fiduciary duties as the sole director of Cashtivity in October 2018 by causing the present and future intellectual property of Cashtivity to be assigned to Mindsets Learning for $1?
207 MAM submits that Di Pasquale also breached her fiduciary duties when, in October 2018, she again caused Cashtivity to transfer its intellectual property to Mindsets Learning, another subsidiary of Cashtivity Inc for $1.
208 MAM says that this transfer deprived Cashtivity of valuable assets without adequate compensation and was not in the best interests of the company because, on Jaski's evidence, the value of the intellectual property had increased to approximately $4.5 million. Based on this, I again infer that Issue 3 is concerned with whether Di Pasquale breached her fiduciary duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of Cashtivity. I have confined my discussion to this issue accordingly.
209 Di Pasquale says that she regarded it as in the best interests of Cashtivity to enter the 2018 Transfer Deed because:
211 In October 2018, Cashtivity entered into the 2018 Transfer Deed by which it transferred to Mindsets Learning all right, title and interest in its intellectual property from 1 July 2018. The assignment covered Cashtivity's copyright and intellectual property rights in relation to its educational software including its library of real world maths, science, STEM and entrepreneurship lessons and the software code. The rights assigned included all current and future intellectual property rights assigned under the transfer deed. The assignor warranted that neither the execution of the deed nor the performance of its obligations under the deed would cause it to be in breach of any agreement to which it was a party or subject.
213 By around late 2017, Di Pasquale had determined that there was no sufficient market in America for the financial literacy software program. She decided instead that there was a market for a program focusing on applied mathematics and began working on the new product. This change seemed to reflect a gradual change in Di Pasquale's thinking which evolved over a year or two.
214 Di Pasquale decided that Cashtivity would be wound up after it received the rebate from its 2018 RDTI application. The rebate would provide the funds necessary to repay the money owed to MAM and PwC. The only other creditor of the company was Cashtivity Inc and it would write off the debt. Di Pasquale considered it was necessary to close down Cashtivity and continue the research and development work in a new vehicle which focused on mathematics. She considered that this change had two benefits. First, it was a clear signal to potential investors that there was a change in the research and development work with a new focus on applied mathematics. Secondly, it emphasised that Cashtivity's failure to develop a successful product over about six years was in the past. The new research in a different area looked to the future. There was "clean air" between the two ventures. This was intended to send a message to investors, customers and the ATO that research undertaken after 2018 was different from what preceded it and was directed to the pursuit of fresh objectives. That was why Di Pasquale incorporated Mindsets Learning on 4 October 2018.
215 Di Pasquale created and executed the 2018 Transfer Deed at the behest of some investors in Australia.
216 Di Pasquale made two pitches to a group of potential investors called the Melbourne Angels. The first pitch was made in February 2017, with due diligence taking place in April 2017 and $292,441.23 being raised from eight investors between April and September 2017. The second pitch was made in the first half of September 2018. After that, the interested investors conducted another due diligence exercise until late September 2018. As part of that process, Di Pasquale gave them access to the accounts of Cashtivity and Cashtivity Inc, all the RDTI applications and the 2015 Transfer Deed. As a result, some of the interested investors raised with Di Pasquale a matter which concerned them - they said that the 2015 Transfer Deed did not cover the intellectual property generated by Cashtivity after 1 January 2016 insofar as Mindsets Learning wanted to, or was required to, use it. Because of the pivot away from financial literacy to applied mathematics software and the fact that Di Pasquale procured the writing of that software only during 2018, the Melbourne Angels insisted on the execution of another assignment deed. Accordingly, in October 2018, Di Pasquale incorporated Mindsets Learning in Australia and drafted and executed the 2018 Transfer Deed.
217 The major point to make about the 2018 Transfer Deed is that it had no effect. The terms of the 2015 Transfer Deed were such that Cashtivity assigned its current and future intellectual property. Therefore, there was no relevant intellectual property over which the 2018 Transfer Deed could take effect. On this basis, I am satisfied that Di Pasquale committed no breach of duty.
218 But even if I am wrong about the effect of the 2018 Transfer Deed, I consider that Di Pasquale acted reasonably and bona fide, honestly, believing that it was in the best interests of Cashtivity to proceed in the way that she did. Di Pasquale sought to comply with the requirements of investors by entering into the 2018 Transfer Deed. These investors from Melbourne Angels were important to Cashtivity and Di Pasquale because, after the second pitch to them, fourteen investors contributed about $260,000 between October 2018 and January 2019. Again, she acted as a reasonable director would in the circumstances.
219 Di Pasquale's conduct, as she saw it, was in the best interests of Cashtivity because:
220 When considering the possible breach of fiduciary duty, the Court needs to keep in mind the value of the intellectual property assigned. As discussed earlier, the intellectual property was not valuable. I consider Jaski's figure of $4.5 million to be a major exaggeration. In my opinion, it is wholly unrealistic to suggest that anyone might pay that much, or any sum close to it, for the intellectual property associated with the unsuccessful research and development work Cashtivity performed on financial literacy. The fact that there was no evidence of anyone seeking to buy the intellectual property for this sum or any similar sum (or at all) underlines this point.
221 On the evidence before me, the value of Cashtivity's intellectual property in late 2018 was far closer to $0 than $4.5 million. Given the uncertainty of the valuation and the absence of any persuasive evidence, it is difficult to say that Di Pasquale breached any fiduciary duty to Cashtivity in procuring the company to enter into the 2018 Transfer Deed.
222 In short, MAM cannot sensibly claim that the 2018 Transfer Deed transferred a valuable asset for nominal consideration and Di Pasquale thereby breached her fiduciary duty to Cashtivity. I find that the deed transferred no intellectual property and that the consideration was not merely nominal but was consistent with the valuation evidence.
223 Further, even if Di Pasquale did breach her duty by entering into the 2018 Transfer Deed, it is highly unlikely that she caused Cashtivity to suffer any loss or damage as a result. This is because, pursuant to the terms of the 2015 Transfer Deed, Cashtivity purported to assign all existing and future intellectual property in relation to the educational software which it created. Until about early 2018, this software focused on educating students about financial literacy.
224 The 2018 Transfer Deed between Cashtivity and Mindsets Learning purported to assign all Cashtivity's right, title and interest in and to the intellectual property in respect of certain software. The software was defined as:
"educational software, including but not limited to:
(a) a library of real-world math, science, STEM and entrepreneurship lessons and the content of such lessons;
(b) the format and design of the platform software, including all software code, which hosts these lessons;
(c) the Build a Business software application; and
(d) all Materials in relation [to] the abovementioned educational software ..."
225 This definition was almost identical to the definition of "software" in the 2015 Transfer Deed. The wording of clause 1 of the two deeds was in material respects identical. This was the operative provision effecting the assignment.
226 Assuming the 2015 Transfer Deed achieved its objective, then the 2018 Transfer Deed had no effect - there was no software to be assigned because the software as it existed in 2015, together with any software developed after that time, had already been assigned in December 2015.
227 MAM is therefore wrong to claim that the 2018 Transfer Deed transferred a valuable asset for nominal consideration. First, there was no transfer effected in 2018. Even if the deed had assigned software, it was not as valuable as MAM contended. Thus, a sale for $1 did not necessarily represent an undervalue.
228 For the reasons given, I find that Di Pasquale did not breach any of her fiduciary duties to Cashtivity.
Issue 4: Did Di Pasquale (either directly or as an accessory) breach s 18 of the ACL?
229 The plaintiff contends that Di Pasquale breached s 18 of the ACL by reason of the following matters:
(a) the "Warranties representations" (as defined in the FASOC) made by Di Pasquale under the 2018 Facility Agreement were false because Cashtivity had failed to disclose:
(i) the existence, terms or effect of the 2015 Transfer Deed;
(ii) that Cashtivity Inc was the owner of Cashtivity's intellectual property; and
(iii) that by reason of those matters, Cashtivity's application for the RDTI rebate was likely to be rejected; and/or
(b) it was misleading or deceptive to fail to disclose to MAM the 2015 Transfer Deed and the effect the same would have on the RDTI rebate.
230 From the outset, there are two things to be noted about Issue 4.
231 Firstly, the framing of this issue in the terms used creates a problem. The issue as framed in paragraph 229(a)(iii) above assumes that the existence of the 2015 Transfer Deed and Cashtivity Inc's ownership of Cashtivity's intellectual property made it more likely that Cashtivity would not recover the RDTI rebate for the financial year ending 2018. The evidence did not establish this assumption.
232 The documents in the court book included correspondence dated 1 March 2019 from the relevant case manager at AusIndustry, Hieu Lam, to Di Pasquale, rejecting Cashtivity's RDTI application for the 2018 financial year, a document titled "R&D Tax Incentive: Compliance Report - Module 3 - Finding" dated 28 February 2019 setting out details and reasons for AusIndustry's findings and a document titled "R&D Tax Incentive: Compliance Report - Examination of Evidence - Module 2" dated 28 February 2019 further showing AusIndustry's analysis as to why Cashtivity had not demonstrated the relevant requirements for the 2018 RDTI rebate. Nowhere in these documents does it expressly state that Cashtivity's application failed due to the 2015 Transfer Deed or Cashtivity Inc's ownership of the intellectual property. To that extent, the evidence does not support the underlying premise of that aspect of the issue.
233 In reaching the view expressed in paragraphs 231 and 232 above, I accept that the tax legislation specifies the conditions under which an entity might claim the RDTI rebate. The legislation includes conditions about the entity by whom and for whom the research and development work can be done. However, the detail and operation of the applicable law were not pleaded or covered in evidence during the trial, nor were the legislative provisions included as one of the issues for the Court to determine or the subject of detailed analysis in the final submissions.
234 Secondly, I have already stated my finding that Di Pasquale informed Strachan about the 2015 Transfer Deed well before MAM entered into the 2018 Facility Agreement and loan. Because MAM was informed of the 2015 Transfer Deed:
(a) Cashtivity did not render false the warranty representations in the 2018 Facility Agreement; and
(b) Cashtivity did not engage in misleading or deceptive conduct as alleged.
235 On 15 February 2018, MAM and Cashtivity entered into the 2018 Facility Agreement. The 2018 facility had a limit of $280,000. The Facility Agreement included the warranties which MAM required borrowers to provide as part of its usual lending practice. For present purposes, the relevant warranties were that:
(a) the borrower had fully disclosed to the lender in writing all facts material for disclosure in the context of the document (cl 10.1(b)) ("the Disclosure Warranty");
(b) all information provided to the lender by or on behalf of it in respect of the transaction documents, the transactions contemplated by them, the parties and the assets, business and affairs of the parties, was true and correct at the time it was given in all material respects and was not, whether by omission of information or otherwise, misleading in a material respect (cl 10.1(c)) ("the Accuracy Warranty");
(c) no event has occurred which constituted or which, with the giving of notice and/or the lapse of time and/or a relevant determination by the lender, would constitute an event of default as defined in the facility agreement (cl 10.1(a)) ("the Default Disclosure Warranty"); and
(d) there had been no material adverse change in the financial condition of an obligor or any subsidiary or related body corporate of an obligor and there had been no substantial change in the scope or nature of their respective businesses from that disclosed in writing to the lender before the date of the facility agreement (cl 10.1(j)) ("the No Adverse Change Warranty").
236 MAM contends that the representations which Cashtivity made in providing those warranties under the 2018 Facility Agreement were false because Cashtivity failed to:
(a) disclose the existence, terms or effect of the 2015 Transfer Deed;
(b) disclose that Cashtivity Inc was the owner of all the assigned intellectual property of the company within the meaning of the 2015 Transfer Deed; and
(c) disclose that the company's application for the RDTI rebate was misleading because it failed to mention (a) and (b) above, and was likely to be rejected for the same reason.
(a) in giving the warranties, Cashtivity and Di Pasquale represented that the warranties were true when they were false. This amounted to misleading or deceptive conduct;
(b) the failure by Cashtivity and Di Pasquale to disclose the 2015 Transfer Deed was, in the context, itself misleading or deceptive due to the silence; and
(c) apart from Cashtivity's liability as contracted party, Di Pasquale was liable as an accessory under the ACL. She was the sole director and shareholder of Cashtivity and its governing mind.
238 MAM submits that the alleged omissions and misstatements conveyed a misleading impression to MAM about Cashtivity's asset position, financial security and eligibility for the RDTI rebate. This final element regarding the RDTI rebate stemmed from MAM conducting its RDTI lending operations on the basis that an applicant needed to own the intellectual property the subject of the RDTI application. However, MAM did not explain to, or inform, Cashtivity before entering the 2018 Facility Agreement that it held this view or assumption about a borrower owning its intellectual property.
239 MAM asserts that Cashtivity misled it because a contractual warranty is misleading if it conveys a meaning which is false and would have the effect of leading a reasonable person in the position of the other party into error by relying on the representation. MAM says that the warranties conveyed to it that:
240 MAM says that these warranties and underlying representations were materially false.
241 For her part, Di Pasquale denies that she engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18 of the ACL. She says this because: (a) the warranties were not false; and (b) if she did not inform MAM (through Strachan or otherwise) about the 2015 Transfer Deed (which she denies), the failure to mention the deed was not, of itself, misleading or deceptive.
242 As to the warranty allegation, Di Pasquale submits that the representations she made by giving the warranties were not false for the following reasons.
243 Firstly, the Disclosure Warranty was not false because the 2015 Transfer Deed was not something which was material for disclosure purposes. MAM, by its conduct, did not consider that the existence, ownership or value of a borrower's intellectual property was a material matter. Strachan confirmed that he sought from Cashtivity all the information and documentation he needed in making the decision whether to lend money to Cashtivity in 2018. He said that the investment committee would not have approved any loan unless it had received and assessed all the information which it considered material to its decision. MAM's conduct of the due diligence process in connection with the 2018 loan showed that MAM did not consider Cashtivity's intellectual property to be a material matter.
244 Secondly, the Accuracy Warranty was not false notwithstanding that warranty's inclusion of information made false by omission. None of the documents provided by Cashtivity referred to the company's intellectual property. Intellectual property was not required to be valued or included in Cashtivity's balance sheet. No aspect of the due diligence process performed by MAM required the disclosure of the 2015 Transfer Deed. Thus, none of the documents or information provided were false or incomplete by the failure to refer to it. I note that it was not put to Di Pasquale that the information she provided to Strachan was misleading or incomplete by virtue of the failure to refer to the 2015 Transfer Deed.
245 Thirdly, the Default Disclosure Warranty could not by itself be false. As pleaded by MAM, the warranty could only be relevant if another warranty were found to be false. The only "event of default" alleged by MAM is the falsity of certain warranties.
246 Fourthly, the No Adverse Change Warranty was not made false by the failure to refer to the 2015 Transfer Deed. The relevant period conceived by the warranty was the time between the disclosure of matters in writing and the execution of the 2018 Facility Agreement. The 2015 Transfer Deed was executed in December 2015. There was no material change in Cashtivity's position between the undertaking of the due diligence in late 2017 and early 2018 and the execution of the 2018 Facility Agreement.
247 As to the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct arising from any non-disclosure of the 2015 Transfer Deed, she says that the topic of Cashtivity's intellectual property never arose, either in the due diligence discussions with Cashtivity or in MAM's internal deliberations. That being so, she says that there was no basis to create a reasonable expectation that Cashtivity would disclose the same. In the circumstances, the non-disclosure did not become a half-truth.
248 There is no dispute about the principles to apply when determining matters of misleading or deceptive conduct and the loss flowing therefrom.
249 MAM referred to the recent High Court case of Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd[51] in arguing that the Court should adopt a four-step approach to deciding whether there has been misleading or deceptive conduct:
250 The Victorian Court of Appeal in Protec Pacific Pty Ltd v Steuler Services GmbH & Co KG comprehensively summarised the principles governing the issues of causation and loss.[53]
251 An important part of MAM's case is that Di Pasquale's silence about the 2015 Transfer Deed was misleading or deceptive both innately and due to the context of the warranties contained in cl 10 of the 2018 Facility Agreement.
252 The law has developed some specific principles regarding the question of silence and how a failure to reveal something can constitute misleading or deceptive conduct.
253 The authorities support the following principles:
254 The essence of MAM's complaint is that Di Pasquale breached s 18 of the ACL because it: (a) falsified important warranties in the 2018 Facility Agreement; and/or (b) failed to disclose the existence of the 2015 Transfer Deed, which was misleading or deceptive per se.
255 As to the first limb of Issue 4, I consider that Di Pasquale did not engage in misleading or deceptive conduct in making allegedly false representations in the 2018 Facility Agreement. That is because the warranty representations were not in fact false. I accept the defendant's submissions on this point.
256 As to the second limb of Issue 4, I find that even if Di Pasquale did fail to disclose the 2015 Transfer Deed (which I do not accept), such silence was not misleading or deceptive. This is because of MAM's lack of interest in Cashtivity's intellectual property, which was reflected in the loan applications and due diligence process undertaken by MAM in regard to the 2017 and 2018 loans.
257 On 21 November 2016, Di Pasquale approached Strachan regarding a possible loan. About a week later, Strachan sought the following from Di Pasquale: details of Cashtivity's previous RDTI applications and evidence of payment; an introduction to Cashtivity's current RDTI agent; details of Cashtivity's cash burn for the year and estimates of what Cashtivity would claim for the current year's RDTI rebate.
258 By 29 November 2016, Strachan had prepared an initial screening document for the proposed loan. The screening document contained proposed key terms for the loan as well as an assessment of Cashtivity's credit and details of its anticipated RDTI rebate. The document contained no reference to the scope or substance of Cashtivity's intellectual property nor any comment as to its value. However, the document did say that while MAM would conduct its standard due diligence, it needed to understand the impact of moving Cashtivity's operations and holding company to America. This suggests to me that the parties discussed the issue of Cashtivity's move to America, the incorporation of Cashtivity Inc and the reasons for, and ramifications of, such a move.
282 Given the facts as I have found them, there was no proper basis for MAM to hold a reasonable expectation that Cashtivity would have revealed that, in 2015, it had assigned its intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc. Because MAM made no enquiry about Cashtivity's assets in general, or intellectual property in particular, there was no reason for Cashtivity to think that this was a matter of interest to MAM. MAM's conduct exemplified its focus on the RDTI rebate, seeking information and reassurance about the rebate and securing the bank account into which any rebate would be paid so as to ensure that MAM was repaid its loan before Cashtivity could access any excess funds which remained in the account.
283 Therefore, any failure to mention the 2015 Transfer Deed and the assignment of the intellectual property would not have been misleading or deceptive in contravention of s 18 of the ACL.
284 MAM also argues that Di Pasquale should be held liable as an accessory or "person involved" in Cashtivity's contravention of the ACL. Section 236(1) of the ACL provides:
"If:
(a) a person (the claimant) suffers loss or damage because of the conduct of another person; and
(b) the conduct contravened a provision of Chapter 2 or 3;
the claimant may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against that other person, or against any person involved in the contravention."
285 A person was "involved" in a contravention of the ACL if the person:
"(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; or
(b) ...
(c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention ..."[64]
286 A person can aid or abet a contravention only if they know the facts giving rise to the contravention. They must know the essential factual elements of the contravention, even if they do not know that such facts constitute a contravention of the law.[65] To be relevantly involved or a party to a contravention, a party must have actual, and not constructive, knowledge of the essential factual matters constituting the contravention.[66]
287 In the present case, MAM relies upon an allegation that it was Cashtivity's misrepresentation by silence which caused MAM to lend the money to Cashtivity and ultimately suffer loss. This means that for Di Pasquale to be accessorily liable, MAM must establish that she deliberately or intentionally withheld this information. MAM argued that Di Pasquale's conduct showed "a pattern of deliberate concealment to meet her own objectives".
288 Di Pasquale denies that she could be liable as an accessory for an alleged breach of the ACL. In order to be liable, Di Pasquale says that she had to be "involved" in Cashtivity's contravention of the ACL. To be involved in, or party to, a contravention, MAM has to establish that Di Pasquale had actual, and not constructive, knowledge of the essential matters which constituted the contravention. Given that MAM alleges that Cashtivity engaged in misleading conduct by silence in not revealing the 2015 Transfer Deed, Di Pasquale could be involved or a participant in such conduct only if Cashtivity was deliberately silent on the matter, intentionally concealing what it knew it ought to have revealed. If the omission were something which should have been disclosed (which Di Pasquale denies), then she says she was not "involved" within the meaning of the ACL because the omission was not deliberate.
289 There are three reasons why I find that MAM has not established accessorial liability against Di Pasquale.
290 First, MAM has not proved that Cashtivity engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct. Hence, there is no contravention in respect of which Di Pasquale can be liable as an accessory.
291 Secondly, I find that Di Pasquale did not act deliberately or intentionally to conceal the 2015 assignment from MAM. Indeed, I have found that Di Pasquale revealed the 2015 Transfer Deed to Strachan before MAM entered the 2018 Facility Agreement. Even if I were not satisfied of this revelation, I would not have found that Di Pasquale's failure to reveal the intellectual property transfer was deliberate rather than innocent. Given the history of dealings between the parties in relation to the loans made in December 2016 and February 2018, it would have been reasonable for Cashtivity to conclude that its intellectual property was of no concern to MAM. As observed previously, throughout two detailed due diligence exercises, MAM had not asked Cashtivity for any information or data about its intellectual property and had not raised the issue internally within the investment committee.
292 Thirdly, MAM failed to squarely address the topic of deliberately withholding information from MAM. In its submissions, MAM argued that Cashtivity deliberately chose not to inform it of the 2015 Transfer Deed. Hence, it was not a thoughtless or unintended failure to disclose the deed. Rather, it was part of a calculated plan to keep MAM in the dark. This is a serious allegation. For practical purposes, it is tantamount to accusing Di Pasquale, as the sole director and controlling mind of Cashtivity, of deceit. Notwithstanding the significance of the allegation, MAM did not put it to Di Pasquale in cross-examination. I regard it as inappropriate for a party to advance in final submissions a major allegation which it did not raise with the witness primarily implicated in the allegation. Long-established practice and the rules of fairness require that the accused witness be given the chance to respond to such an allegation. Di Pasquale was not given that opportunity.
293 For the reasons set out above, I consider that MAM has failed to prove that Di Pasquale breached s 18 of the ACL in the manner asserted under Issue 4.
Issue 5: Did MAM rely upon the truth of the warranties representation in respect of the matters stated in Issue 3 in entering the 2018 Facility Agreement?
294 MAM contends that the ownership of the intellectual property and the availability of the RDTI rebate were material factors in MAM's decision to provide finance under the 2018 Facility Agreement. It says that it relied on the truth of the warranties representations when entering into that facility agreement. MAM says that it relied on the representations believing that Cashtivity's financial position and the additional security it was offering over the intellectual property pursuant to the general security deed was sound. MAM argues that the warranties created a false impression that Cashtivity owned its intellectual property and was eligible for the RDTI rebate. As a result, MAM says that a reasonable person in its position would have been misled.
295 In oral submissions, counsel for MAM stated that their written submissions referred to the trial decision[67] and the Court of Appeal decision of Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd.[68] Apart from observing that the Court of Appeal judgment showed that warranty representations could be relied upon to enter into an agreement and the reliance could be contemporaneous with the signing of the agreement, counsel did not explain the facts of the case or take the Court to any part of either judgment.
296 I find that MAM did not rely upon the truth of the warranty representations in entering the 2018 Facility Agreement. I say this because, as a result of Di Pasquale telling Strachan about the transfer of Cashtivity's intellectual property to Cashtivity Inc well before MAM entered into the 2018 Facility Agreement, MAM knew about the transfer. To that extent, it could not have relied upon the representations as alleged as it knew the true position with respect to Cashtivity's intellectual property.
Issue 6: If the Company had disclosed the 2015 Transfer Deed and its effect to the plaintiff, would the plaintiff have entered the 2018 Facility Agreement and made the advances pursuant to that facility?
297 For the reasons already given, I have found that MAM was aware of the 2015 Transfer Deed and its effect well before it entered the 2018 Facility Agreement. Strachan knew about the deed and became the person at MAM primarily responsible for dealing with Cashtivity in relation to the 2018 loan and the 2018 Facility Agreement. He reported to, and was part of, the investment committee which decided whether or not to grant the loan. I find MAM would have entered the 2018 Facility Agreement and did so.
Issue 7: What was the value of the intellectual property transferred by the 2015 Transfer Deed and the 2018 Transfer Deed?
298 The Court cannot value with precision the intellectual property transferred pursuant to the 2015 Transfer Deed or the 2018 Transfer Deed. Primarily, this is because the evidence about value is unsatisfactory.
299 The Jones evidence makes some irrefutable points about Cashtivity's lack of success in creating a product which can be sold in the market. The absence of product, customers and income after a lengthy period of development beginning in 2012 compels him to say that the intellectual property has no commercial value.
300 The Jaski evidence is too broad and uncertain. His valuation range is $0 to $2 million for 2015 and $0 to $4.5 million for 2018. The higher figure in each case reflects the amount spent on research and development up to that point.
301 In my opinion, it is fanciful to suggest that someone would pay the total sunk cost of Cashtivity's accumulated failures to obtain its intellectual property. The fact that the range is so broad, Jaski gives no guidance as to the critical factors or criteria which could affect the valuation and there is no specific figure nominated suggests to me that his estimate reflects guesswork and speculation rather than expert professional opinion.
302 Mitchell did not produce any valuation evidence in his witness statements. But in his cross-examination, he suggested that the intellectual property could be worth 10-15% of the expenditure incurred on the research and development work. Mitchell said he arrived at this percentage through 38 years' experience in the finance industry and understanding the nature of an intangible asset. He suggested, at least implicitly that he was entitled to an opinion on the worth of an item of property in the same way that he understood the value of a car through working at Pickles Auctions. But prior to Mitchell's involvement in the IFF, he had no experience in lending against intellectual property. Further, I infer from his failure to mention it that Mitchell did not gain any useful experience regarding the valuation of intellectual property after establishing the IFF. Also, I note that Mitchell did not say that he used or relied upon his 10-15% valuation at the time of approving and making the 2018 loan to Cashtivity.
303 In the circumstances, I attach minimal weight to Mitchell's views. If, before establishing the IFF, he had no experience in lending against intellectual property and he referred to no other relevant knowledge or experience between establishing the IFF and making the loan to Cashtivity, then Mitchell has no specialised knowledge or experience which would justify relying upon his views.
304 It appears from the plaintiff's closing submissions that it is aware of the problem with its valuation evidence. MAM said that, in relation to the calculation of equitable damages designed to put Cashtivity in the position it would have been in but for the defendant's breach of fiduciary duty, it accepts that the assessment of damages may need to be the subject of further expert determination.
305 MAM further contended that, if the Court wished to undertake the valuation exercise, it should assess the value of the intellectual property in the range of $1 to $1.5 million. It said that this valuation took proper account of:
MAM also argued that it was an appropriate range on the evidence and aligned with the principles of economic compensation.
306 The plaintiff's submissions do not explain or set out with any precision a reasoning process to justify the valuation of $1 to $1.5 million which it advanced. That being so, and given Mitchell's lack of valuation expertise, the Court cannot determine the validity or reasonableness of the calculation or quantification process.
307 I do not favour the parties adducing further evidence or having an expert determination on the value of the intellectual property. MAM claimed equitable compensation in the initial statement of claim and each subsequent iteration of the statement of claim. It raised this as an issue in the proceeding and should have been in a position to prove its case (assuming it suffered loss or harm). Subject to the usual rules of practice, I do not propose to authorise or entertain any further evidence or submissions on this issue. The plaintiff is bound by the evidence produced at trial.
308 If MAM suffered loss or harm arising from a breach of fiduciary duty, it did not discharge its onus of proving how that loss or harm should be calculated or quantified.
309 There was some evidence about investors from the Melbourne Angels group and investors in America contributing money to Cashtivity. The problem with this evidence was that there was no indication of the share or percentage of the business which the investors obtained through their contribution. Because this information was missing, it was not possible to use this evidence to perform an approximate valuation of the business.
Issue 8: If the defendant has breached her fiduciary duties as sole director of Cashtivity either in respect of Issues 1, 2 or 3 above, what loss and damage did the plaintiff suffer as a result?
310 For the reasons given in relation to Issues 1, 2 and 3, I find that MAM did not prove that it suffered loss and damage from any alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
311 Further, if I am wrong about that and MAM did suffer loss and damage, I find that it did not satisfactorily prove any particular amount of equitable compensation. In this respect, it failed to discharge its onus of proof.
Issue 9: If the defendant is found to have engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, what loss and damage flows as a result?
312 If the defendant did engage in misleading or deceptive conduct (which I reject), MAM would have suffered loss as a result of entering a loan transaction with Cashtivity. MAM conducted the trial on the basis that it was a no-transaction case - that is, but for relying on Cashtivity's misleading or deceptive conduct, it would not have been induced to lend Cashtivity $280,000 in the 2018 loan. Hence, MAM would be entitled to the loan amount as damages.
(a) compensation for the cost of funds. This is an amount which reflects what MAM says it could have earned if, instead of lending to Cashtivity, it had lent the funds to another borrower or otherwise deployed the funds in an alternative investment; and
(b) the costs incurred by MAM as a result of the receivership. These costs amounted to $450,749.68 and are said to be recoverable pursuant to cl 16.2 of the 2018 Facility Agreement. MAM's argument is that there was ample scope to recover losses which flowed from the impugned transaction.
314 In my view, while MAM would have been entitled to the loan principal as damages, it is not entitled to the other amounts claimed.
315 The cost of funds claim depends on a document which the plaintiff's counsel tendered when Mitchell gave evidence. The document is an investor quarterly report dated December 2023 for the IFF. The report includes a table which set out the annual return generated by the IFF (after fees and costs) in the financial years ending 30 June 2018 to 30 June 2023 inclusive. The lowest return was 8.83% in the 2023 financial year and the highest was 11% in the 2020 financial year. The return in the 2019 financial year was 8.85%. The report was simply tendered and the plaintiff's counsel asked Mitchell no questions about it.[69] MAM contends that in the period since February 2018 when he lent the money to Cashtivity, the IFF had averaged an annual return of 10%. Hence, it claimed that the damages under the ACL should include, in effect, an interest component or loss of use component comprising a 10% interest rate on the principal from the date of the loan until judgment.
316 The cost of funds claim assumed that the funds were placed in some other investment within the IFF and that such investment was profitable.
317 In my opinion, the evidence to support these submissions was inadequate. As observed, there was no specific evidence about what use MAM would have made of the investors' capital had there been no loan to Cashtivity. Even if there were evidence about another potential borrower, there were no guarantees that the alternative investment would perform better than the loan to Cashtivity. MAM warned investors that entities that borrowed within the IFF framework normally had little or no income and there was no guaranteed return either of interest or the capital lent. MAM said that investors had to be prepared to lose the whole of their investment.
318 Had MAM established loss relating to the loan transaction with Cashtivity, it could have reasonably expected to receive an order for statutory interest on the principal sum from the date it issued the proceeding.
319 I do not accept that any alleged misleading or deceptive conduct caused MAM to incur the receivership expenses. It is true that, on this hypothesis, if:
320 However, I consider the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct did not cause MAM to incur the receivership fees in the relevant sense required by the ACL. As a result of Cashtivity's failure to repay the loan, MAM had the option to appoint the receiver and chose to do so. It also had power to determine the extent of the costs and expenses generated in the receivership. Accordingly, the fees in establishing and carrying out the receivership, including the examination process, were due to the actions of MAM rather than Cashtivity.
321 For the reasons set out, I consider that the plaintiff's claim should fail and the proceeding be dismissed.
322 I direct that the parties confer about these reasons for judgment with a view to agreeing upon the final orders to be made giving effect to the judgment including orders for costs. If the parties cannot agree, then they should file:
(a) any affidavit material on which they rely together with an outline of submissions by 4:00pm on 6 June 2025;
(b) any reply material and submissions by noon on 11 June 2025.
The submissions are limited to five A4 pages, and the reply submissions are limited to two A4 pages. Each set of submissions should have a minimum 12-point typeface, 1.5 spacing and 40mm margins on either side of the page. Unless I consider it otherwise necessary, I will decide the issue of costs and the form of final order on the papers.
[1] Initially, the rebate was 45% but it later dropped to about 43.5%.
[2] Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 ("ACL").
[4] The manager is Mitchell Investment Management Pty Ltd.
[5] LearnLaunch's requirements will be discussed later in this judgment.
[6] Tierney left PwC in about July 2022 and became a member of the investment committee at MAM in about August 2022.
[7] First witness statement of John Mitchell dated 20 October 2023 at [17].
[10] Second witness statement of John Mitchell dated 9 September 2024 at [6]-[8].
[12] AusIndustry is the body which runs the RDTI rebate program.
[14] Witness statement of Glenn Hislop dated 24 April 2024 at [19].
[15] See schedule 1 to the witness statement of Marissa Di Pasquale dated 24 April 2024 ("Di Pasquale witness statement").
[16] The plaintiff's counsel opened the case on the basis that Di Pasquale deliberately transferred Cashtivity's intellectual property to another company so that, if called upon to repay MAM's loan other than through the RDTI rebate, it was unable to do so and the general security deed had no practical effect (T92-3, T596-7). This position was maintained in final address (T596-7). The plaintiff said that Di Pasquale transferred Cashtivity's assets to another company, leaving the debt in Cashtivity. Di Pasquale then left the debt in Cashtivity to "rot on the vine" after transferring the business to Cashtivity Inc in 2015 and any residual intellectual property in 2018 (T578). The plaintiff's closing submissions ([29]) described "phoenixing" as "the intentional stripping of assets into another entity controlled by [Di Pasquale]".
[18] In the further amended statement of claim ("FASOC"), MAM does not plead that Di Pasquale owed fiduciary duties to Cashtivity Inc or that a conflict arose from her duty to Cashtivity Inc as its director. MAM describes Di Pasquale as deriving a "personal benefit" from Cashtivity Inc and pleads that Di Pasquale placed herself in a position of conflict "between her duties to [Cashtivity] and the personal benefit she enjoyed as a director and shareholder of Cashtivity Inc": FASOC at [38].
[19] Australasian Annuities Pty Ltd (in liq) (rec and mgr apptd) v Rowley Super Fund Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302 at [58], citing Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306 and Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 44 WAR 1 at 182.
[20] See, eg, Naaman v Jaken Properties Australia Pty Ltd (2025) 421 ALR 227 at [81] ("Naaman"); Australian Careers Institute Pty Ltd v Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 347; (2016) 340 ALR 580 at [3] and the cases cited therein.
[22] See VicBeef Holdings Pty Ltd v Chen [2021] VSC 546 at [149] ("VicBeef").
[23] See, eg, ibid at [149]-[204]; GJB Building Pty Ltd v AI&PB Property Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 782 at [2046]-[2058] ("GJB").
[24] VicBeef (n 22) at [113]; Landsville Huynh Pty Ltd v Huynh [2023] VSC 55 at [145] ("Landsville"). In VicBeef, M Osborne J considered both the statutory and the equitable duty of good faith as both were pleaded: at [20(b)], [113]-[116], [149]-[204]. His Honour noted at [201] that he was bound by the decision of Mernda to apply an objective test (but having regard to subjective beliefs and intentions of the director). His Honour considered that the same objective test set by Mernda applied to both the statutory and equitable duties.
[25] [2011] VSCA 392; (2011) 86 ACSR 277 ("Mernda").
[26] [2018] VSCA 103; (2018) 332 FLR 201 ("Geary").
[30] [1970] Ch 62 at 74.
[31] In VicBeef (n 22), M Osborne J stated that "[e]ven the application of a wholly objective [test] such as in Charterbridge, requiring an assessment as to how a reasonable director would have acted, is carried out in light of such facts as evidence the actual conduct of the director in question": at [204].
[32] Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187 at 218.
[37] Chan v Zacharia [1984] HCA 36; (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 198.
[38] Warman International Limited v Dwyer [1995] HCA 18; (1995) 182 CLR 544 at 557, citing Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd [1975] HCA 8; (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 394.
[40] Twomey was an Australian research and development advisor who had assisted Di Pasquale in preparing some of Cashtivity's RDTI applications. Hislop was Cashtivity's accountant from 2014 to 2019. Sommers was an Australian lawyer. The roles of Glovsky, Hammond and Strachan are described respectively at paragraphs 83 and 145, 144 and 71-73 of this judgment.
[41] Expert Witness Report of Campbell Jaski at [65], [67]-[68] ("Jaski Report").
[42] Expert Report of Brian Jones at [3.1], [3.3]-[3.4] ("Jones Report").
[43] Ibid at [3.2], [3.5], [3.7]-[3.8].
[46] Jaski did not say that the same approach using share purchase prices could be used to value the intellectual property in 2015.
[47] Challenger Property Asset Management Pty Ltd v Stonnington City Council [2011] VSC 184; (2011) 34 VR 445 at [17].
[50] The heading for Issue 2 was in fact Issue 3 in the agreed list of issues, and the submissions made under that heading were referable to Issue 3.
[53] [2014] VSCA 338 at [540].
[54] Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky [1992] FCA 557; (1992) 39 FCR 31 at 32 ("Demagogue"); Addenbrooke Pty Ltd v Duncan (No 2) (2017) 348 ALR 1 at [482] ("Addenbrooke").
[57] Rafferty v Madgwicks [2012] FCAFC 37; (2012) 203 FCR 1 at [278].
[58] Demagogue (n 54) at 41, quoting Kimberley NZI Finance Ltd v Torero Pty Ltd [1989] FCA 400; (1989) ATPR (Digest) 46-054 at 53,195.
[59] Addenbrooke (n 54) at [78], quoting Miller and Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357 ("Miller") at 384-5.
[60] Wormald v Maradaca Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 289 at [111], citing Miller (n 59) at 384-5.
[63] See, eg, Warner v Elders Rural Finance Ltd [1993] FCA 117; (1992) 41 FCR 399 at 404-5.
[65] Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 at 670, 676.
[66] Quinlivan v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2004) 160 FCR 1 at [9], citing Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry [1998] FCA 968; (1998) 157 ALR 1 at 5; Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes [2023] NSWCA 88; (2023) 111 NSWLR 304 at [327].
[67] Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd (No 28) [2022] VSC 13.
[69] Nor did the plaintiff's counsel ask Mitchell any questions about the IFF Information Memorandum document dated October 2020 which he tendered at the same time.
Mitchell Asset Management Pty Ltd
Di Pasquale [2025] VSC 307
(2015) 318 ALR 302
(2012) 44 WAR 1
(2025) 421 ALR 227
(2016) 340 ALR 580
(2018) 332 FLR 201
(1994) 11 WAR 187
(1984) 154 CLR 178
(1995) 182 CLR 544
(1975) 132 CLR 373
(2011) 34 VR 445
(2023) 277 CLR 186
(1992) 39 FCR 31
(2017) 348 ALR 1
(2012) 203 FCR 1
(2010) 241 CLR 357
(1992) 41 FCR 399
(1985) 158 CLR 661
(2004) 160 FCR 1
(1998) 157 ALR 1
(2023) 111 NSWLR 304