Pineiro v Sultana

(1) Ms Kennett has a 'severe illness' and will be having surgery on 28 June 2025 which may have to be postponed 'due to complications';

(2) Ms Kennett 'is suffering a lot', including pain and discomfort which impacts her mood, ability to think and understand;

(3) Ms Kennett requires constant care;

(4) Mr Pineiro has a 'serious life threatening illness'; suffers 'debilitating pain and discomforts'; may need surgery; is 'having various treatments'; takes numerous strong medications to dissipate blood clots and 'there may be more blood clots than what's being identified';

(5) The pain and medication affects Mr Pineiro's ability to 'think, focus, concentrate and do things throughout the day';

(6) As a result of these health issues, the tenants require an extension of time to provide a transcript of the proceedings, documents 'that may or not be relevant to the appeal application', and obtain legal advice;

(7) The tenants would be disadvantaged unless they are represented by a 'Tenancy Advise or other agency', since the landlords are represented 'by a very competent and experienced professional real estate agent';

(8) The tenants 'wish to maintain privacy in respect to the details of our insurmountable personal suffering and circumstances'.

1. Following questions by the Appeal Panel to Mr Pineiro, Mr Pineiro then said that he would email the Miscellaneous Application to Mr Sultana for consideration, and he did so.
2. In support of this second Miscellaneous Application, Mr Pineiro relied on the medical documents attached to the earlier Miscellaneous Application lodged on 28 March 2025, as well as additional medical documentation provided to the Appeal Panel in hard copy, and emailed to the Appeal Panel during the hearing.
3. Mr Pineiro offered to email the medical documents to the landlord, but the Appeal Panel considered that unnecessary.
4. After an adjournment to consider the application and supporting documents, the Appeal Panel refused all orders sought by the tenants and dismissed the Miscellaneous Application, stating that reasons would be provided in writing.

Reasons for dismissing the Miscellaneous Application

1. The medical reports and certificates provided by the tenants set out their medical conditions generally, but did not identify how those medical conditions prevented them from preparing the transcript and their documents and seeking legal advice (see Harmony Stone Gallery Pty Ltd v Ajuria [2017] NSWCATAP 80 and the authorities discussed therein regarding the sufficiency of medical evidence to support an adjournment application).
2. Nor do the documents provide persuasive evidence to support the severity and extent of the symptoms outlined in the application.
3. Even if we were persuaded of the severity of the tenants' medical conditions, we consider they have had a reasonable opportunity to prepare their documents and seek legal advice, considering the length of time between the filing of the Notice of Appeal and the hearing. There was no indication that over the last 5 months the tenants had even contacted a tenants' advocacy service, which is readily accessible by email or telephone.
4. In refusing the extension of time the Appeal Panel took into account the relevant principles identified in Jackson v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22 ("Jackson") at [22]). In particular, the significant length of the delay, the less than satisfactory explanation for the delays in preparing documents and seeking legal advice, and the prejudice to the landlords if the extension was granted, weighed heavily against the exercise of our discretion in the tenants' favour.
5. Further, an application for an adjournment and extension of time made by the tenants, in the course of the stay application, was refused on 28 March 2025 for reasons which were explained in writing and in detail by the Appeal Panel. The tenants were therefore well aware of the relevant principles and the necessity to comply with the Appeal Panel's timetable.
6. The tenants' further application on 28 May 2025 for an adjournment, were it to be granted by us, would not, in our view, be consistent with the Tribunal's obligation to be mindful that the time of the Tribunal is a publicly funded resource and to take into account inefficiencies in the use of that resource: Aon Risk Services Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 at [5] and [30] per French CJ.
7. Further, the application to amend was made during the appeal hearing and without notice to the landlords. The landlords were not afforded a proper opportunity to consider the application and consider whether they ought to bring any evidence to oppose the adjournment application. The proposed amendments were not raised by the tenants, or foreshadowed by them, at the two callovers or the stay hearing. In fact, the tenants had confirmed at the stay hearing that the appeal is against orders 4 and 7 only of the orders made on 25 November 2024. The tenants have had ample opportunity to raise amendments. In these circumstances, granting leave to amend would have caused significant prejudice to the landlords.
8. In refusing the adjournment the Appeal Panel also took into account the principles set out in Touma v Colantuono [2021] NSWCATAP 152 at [57]- [59], including that an adjournment should only be considered an exceptional course and that matters should almost always proceed on the date fixed for hearing.
9. The refusal of the adjournment application was therefore consistent with the guiding principle set out in s 36(1) of the NCAT Act; that is, the resolution of the real issues in dispute in the proceedings in a manner that is just, quick and cheap.
10. Next, the power contained in s 64 of the NCAT Act should be exercised sparingly: Carroll v Tokdogan & Anor [2015] NSWCATAD 200 at [8].
11. The miscellaneous application contained details of the tenants' medical conditions and other personal information which the tenant emailed to Mr Sultana. As the hearing on 28 May 2025 proceeded, Mr Pineiro indicated that he was also willing to email the medical documentation to Mr Sultana. Prohibiting or restricting the disclose of such information would therefore be of minimal utility. Claims of its confidentiality were undermined by the tenant's own willingness to disclose personal and medical information.
12. Weighing the tenants' concerns against the public interest in open justice, and considerations of procedural fairness for the landlords, the Appeal Panel was not satisfied that it was "desirable" to make an order pursuant to s 64 of the NCAT Act, nor to make the other orders sought regarding privacy and confidentiality.

1. In deciding the appeal, we have had regard to the following:

(1) The Notice of Appeal lodged on 14 January 2025; and

(2) The Reply to Appeal lodged on 23 January 2025 including the documents attached: submissions responding to the tenants' claims; rental ledger; report by Balance Design and Construction dated 1 February 2024; report by Nambucca Plumbing dated 5 December 2024.

1. Both parties confirmed at the hearing that they had received copies of those documents.
2. The tenants also sought to rely at the hearing on the first Miscellaneous Application lodged on 28 March 2025, together with the medical documents attached. None of that material had been provided to the landlords prior to the appeal hearing on 28 March 2025.
3. In further explanation for their failure to provide a copy of that application and documents to the landlord, Mr Pineiro added that he believed the Tribunal system had been 'hacked' and people's private documents made available on the dark web. Because he did not know 'the state of NCAT's procedures and whether NCAT has fixed the problem', he had not sent those documents.
4. The tenants did not present evidence that NCAT's electronic systems are not secure, and did not explain their failure to alternatively lodge a hard copy of the documents.
5. The Appeal Panel refused an extension of time for the tenants to provide a copy of the first Miscellaneous Application to the landlords and rely on it at the appeal hearing, taking into account the relevant principles which generally inform the exercise of the discretion to extend time (see Jackson, supra).
6. In particular, the tenants did not provide a satisfactory explanation for their failure to serve a copy of the first Miscellaneous Application and medical documents on the landlords, and the landlords would have been significantly prejudiced if leave was granted, with no reasonable opportunity to consider or respond to the Miscellaneous Application and attached documents.

1. The Notice of Appeal was lodged by the tenants on 14 January 2024.
2. Under cl 25(4)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) ('the Rules') the application should have been lodged within 14 days of the tenants receiving the Tribunal's decision.
3. In the Notice of Appeal the tenants state that the decision was received 'about' 19 December 2024. Therefore, the Notice of Appeal was lodged around 12 days late.
4. The Reply to Appeal states that the landlord objects to the Appeal Panel extending the time for the lodging of the appeal.

1. Section 41 of the NCAT Act allows the Appeal Panel to make an order extending time for the filing of the appeal, if satisfied that leave should be granted.
2. The relevant factors to consider, as identified in Jackson, supra, include the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether the appellant has a fairly arguable case and the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent.
3. The tenants' explanation for their delay is as follows:

Due to serious life threatening illnesses, and the holidays, the tenants have not been able to get legal advice nor put our documents together and file these at NCAT Appeal Panel in Sydney.

The details of the serious life threatening illnesses being suffered by both tenants will be provided in a separate miscellaneous application request to have these illnesses removed from the record as per section 65 or other in the Civil Administrative Act NSW which protects person private information including health.

Medical certificates will be provided with that miscellaneous application to support this extension of time application.

1. We do not consider this is a satisfactory explanation for the delay, for the same reasons outlined above. The medical certificates provided with the miscellaneous applications do not identify how their medical conditions prevented the tenants from lodging the Notice of Appeal within 14 days.
2. The length of the delay is not insignificant, although the landlords did not identify any specific prejudice they incurred as a result.
3. For the reasons which we explain below, taking into account the grounds of appeal and the parties' submissions, we consider that the appeal does not have more substantial merit than merely being fairly arguable (see Tomko v Palasty (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 369; (2007) 71 NSWLR 61 at [14] (per Hodgson JA, Ipp JA agreeing at [17]) and Molyneux v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWADTAP 53 at [58]-[59]).
4. Therefore, on balance, we are not persuaded that an extension of time should be granted for the filing of the appeal.

1. The Notice of Appeal identified the following grounds of appeal:

(1) The tenants did not have the opportunity to consider and/or read the proposed settlement agreement;

(2) The orders are 'inconsistent with the settlement agreement that had been proposed by the tenants';

(3) The Tribunal failed to make all the orders contingent on Order 6 that the landlords conduct repairs by 29 November 2024.

1. The tenants contend that these grounds raise 'a question of law', alternatively they seek leave to appeal on the basis that the decision was not fair and equitable, against the weight of evidence and significant new evidence is now available that was not reasonably available at the time of he hearing.
2. The Notice of Appeal states that:

(1) The Tribunal should have given more weight to the landlords' failure to make repairs to the kitchen, toilet, plumbing and letterbox 'as the rent abates'; the lack of a functioning kitchen; absence of a functional letterbox when the termination notice was purportedly delivered; and a letter from the council acknowledging errors in the water meter; and

(2) The new evidence relied on is a summons 'for the evidence required to be provided by the Landlord's agents, the summons needs to be approved by NCAT, due to the settlement, the summons didn't proceed.

1. Mr Pineiro's oral submissions raised other potential grounds of appeal. Notwithstanding that the tenants did not seek leave to amend the Notice of Appeal, for the sake of completeness we have considered those submissions:

(1) The Tribunal was 'out of jurisdiction' in making the orders;

(2) The conciliation process did not follow NCAT's procedures, in particular conciliation by the Member should not have been conducted after the same Member had heard evidence. Mr Pineiro referred to the NCAT Fact Sheet regarding conciliation dated October 2015;

(3) The Tribunal Member was 'biased', including by making the termination order when the tenants had argued the notice had not been served due to the non-functioning letterbox;

(4) The tenants agreed to the settlement under duress. The Member told the tenants she could terminate the tenancy regardless of their agreement, and the tenants had serious health problems, three children and 'were facing two weeks to vacate';

(5) The orders were unfair; and

(6) There was a verbal agreement to rebate the rent by 50% which was not recorded in the consent orders. The Member did not apply the 50% rent reduction to the occupation fee.

1. In their Reply to Appeal and attached documents the landlords' submissions include:

(1) They complied with Tribunal order 6 by engaging contractors to investigate the claimed repairs;

(2) All of the repairs needed, that were identified during the investigation, could not be completed due to the tenants' own conduct;

(3) An unidentified person had deliberately damaged the dishwasher hose;

(4) The letterbox has always functioned correctly;

(5) Council has never sent a letter acknowledging errors in the water meter;

(6) The tenants have not complied with Tribunal orders 4 and 7.

1. At the appeal hearing Mr Sultana opted to make only brief oral submissions. While he was not present at the Tribunal hearing (the landlords were, as mentioned above, represented by their real estate agent), he received a report of the hearing from the landlords' agent and the report was inconsistent with the claims made by Mr. Pineiro. He denied there was any agreement for rent abatement at 50% which was not recorded in the consent orders. He denied that the tenants were under duress in agreeing to the settlement and said that the total loss to the landlords was in excess of the $6,500.00 the tenants were to pay under the settlement. As we understood Mr Sultana's submission in that respect, the consent orders were beneficial for the tenants in the form of the landlords compromising some of their claims against the tenants.

1. The basis upon which appeals from decisions of the Tribunal may be brought are identified in s 80 of the NCAT Act. Section 80(2)(b) states that an appeal may be made 'as of right on any question of law, or with leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other grounds'.

1. The meaning of a "question of law" was discussed in detail by the Appeal Panel in Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 (Cusumano) at [25]-[40]. A pure question of law does not depend on the facts found, and the question of law must be, self-evidently, a question of law and not depend on the answer.
2. A question of law is distinct from a mixed question of fact and law, for which leave to appeal is required. Examples of questions of law include the matters set out in Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 at [13] and _Cusumano a_t [32]. However, the categories of question of law are not closed. As was stated at Cusumano at [37]-[39]:

"What constitutes a question of law is vexed and context dependent in the sense that the distinction between matters of fact and of law may turn on the circumstances in which the question arises: Targeted Property Investments Pty Ltd v Look Up Technologies Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 416 at [33(4)], citing Thomas and Naaz [2023] NSWCA 40 at [52] and Da Costa v The Queen [1968] HCA 51; (1968) 118 CLR 186 at 194; [1968] HCA 51.

For instance, a ground of appeal that raises the question whether there were adequate reasons may constitute an attack on the merits which would not raise a pure question of law. On the other hand, it may be a contention that the decision is unreasonable in the requisite sense or that the Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction, which would likely raise a question of law: see the exposition of this issue in Wollondilly at [28]-[32]. Care must in any event be taken. As has been clarified by amendment to the NCAT Act since Prendergast was decided, the Tribunal is not required to give reasons for all decisions it makes: NCAT Act, s 62(2A; see too: New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation v Orr [2019] NSWCA 231 at [53]-[54], [109]-[114].

Therefore, discernment and care must be taken to ensure the grounds relied upon by the appellant, properly understood, raise questions of law and arise in the proceedings; or whether leave is required."

1. We have engaged in the process of considering whether there is a question of law that has in fact been raised by the tenants (see Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 at [13]) and consider that there are potentially four:

(1) Whether there was a failure to afford procedural fairness, including because the tenants did not consent to the orders, whether because of duress or unconscionable conduct. This in effect goes to the existence of an agreement founding the consent orders (see McDonald v McDonald [2016] NSWCATAP 252 at [19]; Roney v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2015] NSWCATAP 269 at [41]; Yuen v Thom [2016] NSWCATAP 243 at [8]- [9]);

(2) Whether there was a failure to afford procedural fairness because of the manner in which conciliation was conducted;

(3) Whether the Tribunal's decision was vitiated by bias, or a reasonable apprehension of bias, including because of the manner in which conciliation was conducted: Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 at [32];

(4) Whether the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make an order.

1. Clause 12 of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act provides that, the Appeal Panel may grant leave to appeal a decision from the Consumer and Commercial division (CCD) pursuant to section 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act, only if it is satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because:

(1) The decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or

(2) The decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or

(3) Significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

1. The Appeal Panel considered the meaning of a substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of cl 12 of sch 4 of the NCAT Act in Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 at [76] stating that a substantial miscarriage of justice may have been suffered:

... where there was a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved for the appellant had the relevant circumstance in para (a) or (b) not occurred or if the fresh evidence under para (c) had been before the Tribunal at first instance.

1. The principles to be applied by an Appeal Panel in determining whether leave to appeal should be granted are well settled. In Collins v Urban the Appeal Panel concluded at [84] that:

(1) In order to be granted leave to appeal, the applicant must demonstrate something more than that the primary decision maker was arguably wrong in the conclusion arrived at or that there was a bona fide challenge to an issue of fact: BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [19] and the authorities cited there, Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10 at [45];

(2) Ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal, only in matters that involve:

(b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or

(c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand; or

(d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or

(e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact-finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed.

1. It is important to note that an appeal is not an opportunity for the losing party to rerun their case (Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10]).

1. Where proceedings settle, the Tribunal may make orders by consent. In Daley v Budget Auto Group Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCATAP 149, the Appeal Panel referred to a summary of the relevant principles in Aboriginal Housing Office v Harrison [2021] NSWCATAP 97 (Harrison) at [80] and following:

(1) consent orders can be made to give effect to a written agreement as permitted by s 59 of the NCAT Act. If consent orders are made under this section, any agreement must be in writing and signed by or on behalf of the parties and lodged with the Tribunal. The Tribunal must be satisfied it would have the power to make a decision in the terms of the agreed settlement or in terms consistent with the terms of the agreed settlement: see s 59(1); or

(2) consent orders can be made by the Tribunal at a hearing in the absence of a written document complying with s 59(1)(a). Of course, the parties must appropriately indicate their consent to the Tribunal for this purpose.

1. The Tribunal must also consider r 37 of the Rules which requires the Tribunal to take into account the interests of any vulnerable person who may be directly affected by the orders, including if the particular person is a party to the proceedings, and it is appropriate to do so.
2. The definition of a vulnerable person is found in r 37(3):

(b) a person who is totally or partially incapable of representing himself or herself in proceedings before the Tribunal because the person is intellectually, physically, psychologically or sensorily disabled, of advanced age, a mentally incapacitated person or otherwise disabled.

1. While the tenants may have adverse health conditions, we are not persuaded that the medical documents submitted establish that either tenant is a vulnerable person in accordance with that definition, nor that there was evidence to that effect before the Tribunal at first instance.
2. The principles applicable to setting aside a consent order were outlined by the Appeal Panel in McDonald v McDonald [2016] NSWCATAP 252 (McDonald) at [59]:

A review of the authorities dealing with when a consent order can be set aside can be found in the recent Appeal Panel cases of Prenc v Stojcevski [2016] NSWCATAP 244 at [43]- [45], [53]-[57] and Yuen v Thom [2016] NSWCATAP 243 at [36]- [54]. From those cases, the following principles can be discerned (omitting authorities):

(1) At common law, a consent order may be set aside on the same basis as the underlying agreement may be set aside;

(2) Whether the agreement constituting the compromise can be set aside depends upon the existence of a ground which would suffice to render a simple contract void or voidable or entitle the party to equitable relief against it, grounds for example such as illegality, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of a material fact where disclosure is required, duress, mistake, undue influence, abuse of confidence and the like;

(3) In order to set aside a consent order on one of the above bases, it must be possible to point to some contumelious conduct on behalf of the respondent for instance:

(a) with respect to duress, it must be shown that illegitimate pressure was placed on the appellant such that there was no reasonable alternative but for her to submit;

(5) With respect to other doctrines which may be applicable, such as unconscionable dealing, it must be shown that one party to the transaction was at a special disadvantage in dealing with the other party because of illness, ignorance, inexperience, impaired faculties, financial need or other circumstances that affect their ability to conserve their own interests, and the other party takes unconscientious advantage of the opportunity. It must be emphasised that the disadvantage must be "special" to disavow any suggestion that the principle applies whenever there is some inequality of bargaining power between the parties. What must be present is some disabling condition or circumstance which seriously affects the ability of the innocent party to make a judgment in their own interests, when the other party knows or ought to know of the existence of that condition or circumstance and of its effect on the innocent party.

1. Duress is limited to circumstances where there is threatened or unlawful conduct involving the person, or the person's commercial and financial interests: Turk v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2019] NSWCATAP 207 at [56] - [59].
2. There is no persuasive evidence, nor indeed any evidence, of conduct by the landlords, the agent who appeared at the hearing for them, or the Member, of that nature. The tenants' case, at its highest, involved assertions made by Mr. Pineiro, at the bar table about what had transpired on 25 November 2024. Those assertions were not supported by any affidavit or witness statement by Mr. Pineiro or indeed, from Ms. Kennett, about any reports she was receiving, or later received, about the conduct of the hearing on 25 November 2024.
3. Further, we are not persuaded that the tenants' medical or other issues amounted to 'a disabling condition or circumstance which seriously affected' their ability to make a judgment in their own interests.
4. Nor is there any evidence that the landlords or the Tribunal Member took unconscientious advantage of the tenants' circumstances.
5. A significant difficulty for the tenants is that they did not bring before us a transcript of the proceedings at first instance.
6. That is an important aspect of an appeal particularly where what transpired during the proceedings is at issue.
7. The tenants were directed by order 1(d) made by the Appeal Panel on 7 February 2025 to lodge with the Tribunal and serve on the respondent 'a typed transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing, together with the sound recording of the entire hearing' by 14 March 2025. They did not comply with that direction.
8. During the appeal hearing, the tenants then sought to tender a transcript of part of the Tribunal hearing on 25 November 2024. The part of the transcript sought to be tendered had not been provided by the tenants to the landlords prior to the appeal hearing. This tender was refused by the Appeal Panel because the extension of time had been refused, for the reasons outlined above.
9. In the absence of the transcript and no persuasive evidence about what transpired at the hearing on 25 November 2024, we are not able to determine whether there was a denial of procedural fairness in the conciliation process; whether duress or unconscionable conduct was present; whether the proceedings were impacted by bias, or a reasonable apprehension of bias; whether the orders do not accurately reflect the agreement between the parties; whether the proceedings or orders were not fair and equitable; or whether the orders were inconsistent with the evidence or the weight of the evidence.
10. The Appeal Panel has adopted a similar approach in circumstances where the sound recording or transcript of the hearing at first instance has not been supplied on an appeal: Whear v Kids on Hayes Street Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCATAP 123 at [22]- [26]; Geracitano v Cloughessy [2021] NSWCATAP 329 at [23]- [27]; Lazaris v Kale [2022] NSWCATAP 36 at [23]- [28].
11. The tenants' submission that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make an order was largely unexplained. There was no contention in the Notice of Appeal that there was not a residential tenancy agreement between the parties which would confer jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case.
12. Finally, we are not persuaded that all the other orders made on 25 November 2024 were contingent on order 6, i.e. that the landlords investigate and conduct repairs by 29 November 2024.
13. The meaning of Court or Tribunal orders is assessed objectively, not on the basis of the subjective interpretation of the parties (see, e.g. Mosman Building and Constructions Pty Ltd v Banz Pty Ltd [2021] NSWDC 61; Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited v Tallevine Pty Ltd (as Trustee for the Thornleigh Trading Trust) [2019] NSWSC 1914).
14. There are no words or phrases used in the consent orders suggesting that the other orders were contingent on order 6. Nor does the structure or form of the orders support the tenants' ground of appeal as to the contingent nature of the orders made on 25 November 2025. We have had regard to the context of the orders and the surrounding circumstances and can see no basis to interpret the orders in the manner contended for by the tenants.
15. The plain meaning of the Tribunal orders, taken as a whole and assessed objectively, does not suggest that the orders apart from order 6 were contingent upon the landlords complying with order 6.

(1) Leave to extend time to file the appeal is refused.

(2) Leave to appeal is refused.

(3) The appeal is dismissed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.