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[2026] NSWCA 108
procedural. The stay application was dismissed with costs upon the respondents giving the specified undertaking to the Court. The leave application and appeal were listed for concurrent hearing on 4 August...
The Court did not decide whether the applicant's proposed appeal would succeed. It found that her grounds raised serious issues, but the respondents' undertaking removed the identified risk that Singapore anti-suit proceedings would block her NSW appeal. The evidence did not establish the likely Singapore costs or show that those costs would necessarily be wasted. The stay was therefore dismissed, and the appellate hearing was expedited.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,417 words · generated 07/10/2026
In Perez de la Sala v Perez de la Sala [2026] NSWCA 108, Stern JA dealt with an interlocutory application about the effect of a discharge order on overlapping litigation in New South Wales and Singapore. The decision was not a determination of the applicant’s proposed appeal on its merits. It concerned whether protective orders should remain in place while she pursued an application for leave to appeal and, if leave were granted, an appeal.
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The applicant, Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala, had brought a family provision claim in the NSW Supreme Court concerning her late father’s estate. She also pleaded equitable claims, including a common intention constructive trust claim and two estoppel claims. The estate was said to be worth more than $500 million, and the family’s assets had previously been litigated in Singapore ([21]–[24]). The family provision claim, in which the applicant sought $20 million, remained on foot ([5]).
There was also contested Singapore litigation. The respondents had claims against the applicant there, including claims for declarations and anti-suit relief. Earlier Singapore anti-suit injunctions against the applicant were discharged in June 2025, but the Singapore proceedings continued ([25]–[26]). In November 2025, Parker J made NSW orders restraining the respondents from seeking relief in Singapore or elsewhere that would interfere with the applicant’s NSW equitable claims, and also restraining further prosecution of specified Singapore relief ([1]).
In March 2026, Parker J discharged those orders, subject to later stays and continuing injunctions concerning the CP estoppel claim ([2]). In J4, Parker J summarily dismissed the constructive trust claim and struck out the IG and CP estoppel claims, giving leave to replead the CP estoppel claim. In J5, he refused leave to file a proposed further amended pleading. The family provision claim remained on foot ([5]).
The applicant filed a motion on 31 May 2026 seeking a stay of the discharge order. She also filed a summons seeking leave to appeal from parts of J4 and all of J5 ([6]). Her concern was that, without a stay, the respondents could seek a Singapore anti-suit injunction that might obstruct her NSW leave application or appeal, and that participating in the Singapore proceedings might impose costs that would later prove unnecessary ([15]–[17]).
At the hearing, the respondents gave an undertaking to the Court. They undertook not to apply or press a claim for interim or final anti-suit relief in Singapore or elsewhere that would prevent or otherwise impede the applicant’s prosecution of the NSW proceedings or appeal. The undertaking would last until four days after judgment on the later of the leave application and the proposed appeal ([10]). The applicant accepted that the stay application could be dismissed and the appellate proceedings listed for an expedited concurrent hearing ([11]–[12]).
Stern JA dismissed the stay application with costs, made the undertaking part of the basis for the orders, and set the leave application and appeal down for concurrent hearing on 4 August 2026. The orders also set dates for written submissions and directed further preparation of the appeal books ([46]).
The Court applied the familiar stay framework set out at [36]. The principles were described as analogous to those for interlocutory relief before trial. An applicant must show serious issues for determination and a real risk of prejudice or damage if the stay is refused. If those elements are established, the Court considers the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties. The applicant also bears the onus of demonstrating a proper basis for a stay that is fair to all parties ([37]).
On appeal prospects, Stern JA did not determine whether the applicant’s proposed grounds were correct. The respondents accepted that the leave application was arguable, although they said it had weak prospects. Referring to the principles described in Bolton v WAM Active Ltd [2025] NSWCA 81 at [11], the judgment noted that a court generally does not speculate about appeal prospects on a stay application, while retaining the ability to make a preliminary assessment to exclude an appeal with no real prospect of success brought merely to gain time ([38]). Stern JA considered the merits could not be determined on the stay motion, but found that the draft grounds raised serious issues ([39]).
The Court accepted that some prejudice might arise if the applicant incurred Singapore costs that ultimately proved unnecessary ([40]). That did not, however, establish that the stay should continue. The undertaking addressed the central concern that anti-suit relief in Singapore might prevent or impede the NSW proceedings or appeal. On the undertaking’s terms, Stern JA found no risk to the applicant’s ability to prosecute those appellate proceedings if the stay were refused ([41]).
The remaining concern was the cost and burden of participating in Singapore. The Court identified evidential and practical limits to that concern. The applicant had not put evidence before the Court showing what costs she was likely to incur during the relevant period ([42]). The NSW leave application and appeal would be heard concurrently on 4 August, limiting the period before the appellate hearing. The Court also observed that the applicant could make submissions in Singapore about what steps she should be directed to take while the NSW appellate proceedings were pending ([42]).
Further, the relationship between the two proceedings was not sufficiently clear on the evidence to conclude that Singapore costs or steps would necessarily be wasted. Even if the applicant succeeded in the NSW appeal, that would not necessarily dispose of the Singapore issues. Nor was it clear which steps, if any, in Singapore would prove unnecessary ([43]). The Court noted that the Singapore proceedings had been ongoing since 2024 and considered that litigation about the equitable claims should proceed with due expedition. It treated management of the Singapore proceedings as a matter for the Singapore court ([44]).
These considerations led to the conclusion that the possibility of Singapore legal costs did not tip the balance in favour of a stay ([45]). The result was therefore tied to the combination of the undertaking, the limited evidence about costs, the expedited appellate timetable, and the uncertainty about whether Singapore work would be wasted. The Court did not hold that potential foreign litigation costs could never support a stay.
The judgment describes the governing stay principles as well settled, relying on authorities including Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 128 at [5] and Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694–5 ([36]). The framework is sequential: serious issues and real risk of prejudice or damage are considered, followed, where appropriate, by the balance of convenience and competing rights. The applicant has the onus of establishing a proper and fair basis for the stay ([36]–[37]).
The judgment also restates a restraint on assessing appeal merits at this stage. The Court generally does not speculate on the strength of the appeal, although it may conduct a preliminary assessment to exclude a proceeding with no real prospect of success brought to gain time ([38]). Stern JA applied that approach by accepting the respondents’ concession that the application was arguable and finding serious issues, while expressly declining to decide the appeal’s merits ([39]).
The decision does not announce a change to these principles. Its contribution is their application in a cross-border procedural setting where an undertaking could address a specific risk of foreign anti-suit relief, while leaving the applicant exposed to possible costs in the foreign proceedings. The outcome illustrates that addressing the identified risk may affect the balance of convenience, but does not itself resolve every asserted source of prejudice.
The decision also does not set a general rule about when an undertaking will replace a stay. Its conclusion is expressed on the assumption that the respondents give the undertaking, and the undertaking’s scope and duration are specified in the orders ([10], [41], [46]). The result therefore depends on the particular terms of the undertaking and the evidence concerning the remaining risks.
At [36], the Court states that an applicant must show “serious issues for determination” and “a real risk” of prejudice or damage if no stay is granted. In plain English, it is not enough to identify a possible inconvenience. The applicant must establish a sufficiently real risk, after which the court weighs the practical effects on both sides.
At [37], the judgment says the applicant must establish a “proper basis for a stay that is fair to all parties”. This makes clear that a stay is not assessed solely by reference to the applicant’s interests. The court considers fairness to the parties on both sides.
At [39], Stern JA says she was “not in any position to determine the merits” of the leave application, but was satisfied that the draft grounds raised serious issues. The practical meaning is that the stay ruling did not decide whether Parker J’s decisions were right or wrong. It addressed whether the threshold for considering a stay was met.
At [41], Stern JA explains that, on the respondents’ undertaking, there was “no risk” that the applicant’s ability to pursue the NSW leave application or appeal would be adversely affected if the stay were refused. This was a conclusion about the risk addressed by the undertaking. It was not a conclusion that the applicant faced no burden or expense in the Singapore proceedings.
At [42]–[43], the Court separates the possibility of costs from proof that those costs would be substantial or wasted. The applicant had not established the likely costs, and the Court could not tell whether the Singapore work would become unnecessary even if she succeeded on appeal. In plain English, a possible future expense did not, without more, demonstrate that a stay was needed in this case.
At [44], the Court says the appropriate means of progressing the Singapore proceedings should be determined through case management in Singapore. That identifies which court the NSW Court of Appeal considered responsible for managing the ongoing procedural steps in the Singapore action.
At [45], the Court gives its ultimate assessment: the risk of Singapore costs did not tilt the balance in favour of the requested stay. The orders then dismissed the application with costs, conditional on the respondents’ undertaking, and expedited the appellate hearing ([46]).
The judgment is most relevant to stay applications where an applicant seeks to preserve the position pending an appeal, and identifies a risk that related foreign proceedings may interfere with the appeal. Here, the asserted risk was that the respondents might pursue a Singapore anti-suit injunction that would impede the applicant’s NSW proceedings or appeal ([15], [17]).
It is also relevant where the parties offer an undertaking that directly addresses the alleged procedural risk. The undertaking in this case did not promise to suspend the Singapore action or prevent all steps in it. It prohibited applications for, or the pressing of, anti-suit relief directed at preventing or impeding the NSW proceedings or appeal, for a defined period ([10]). The Court considered that undertaking sufficient to remove the particular risk to the applicant’s ability to prosecute the NSW appellate proceedings ([41]).
The reasoning may also be relevant where the claimed prejudice from parallel litigation is financial. The Court accepted that some costs might be incurred, but considered the evidential basis, likely duration, and connection between the foreign proceedings and the domestic appeal. The applicant had not established the likely costs, the appeal was expedited, and the Court could not conclude that the Singapore steps would necessarily be wasted ([42]–[45]).
The judgment does not determine what result would follow if an undertaking were absent, materially narrower, or not given to the Court. Nor does it decide a case where detailed evidence establishes substantial costs or shows that foreign proceedings would directly frustrate appellate rights. Its factual setting should therefore be kept in view when using it.
The supplied judgment contains no information about how later courts have treated Perez de la Sala v Perez de la Sala [2026] NSWCA 108. It would not be possible, from this text alone, to say that a later court has followed, distinguished, or otherwise applied it.
The authorities discussed in the judgment are earlier authorities, not later treatment of this decision. Stern JA relied on Michael Hill Jeweller and Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation for the stay framework ([36]–[37]), and referred to Bolton v WAM Active Ltd for the limited role of preliminary consideration of appeal prospects ([38]). The Singapore decisions and earlier NSW proceedings are part of the litigation background ([23]–[29]). Those references explain the reasoning or context of this judgment; they do not establish how subsequent courts have treated it.
The decision leaves open how a court should assess a stay application where an undertaking does not fully address the identified risk. Here, the respondents undertook not to apply or press anti-suit relief that would prevent or impede the NSW proceedings or appeal. The Court’s finding about risk was expressly made on the assumption that the undertaking was given ([41]). The judgment does not consider a different undertaking or a refusal to provide one.
The decision also leaves open what evidence of foreign litigation costs would be sufficient to establish real prejudice. The applicant had not shown the likely costs, and the judgment does not set a minimum evidential threshold or quantify what level of cost would alter the balance ([42], [45]).
A further question is how courts should assess whether work in parallel proceedings is likely to be wasted when the issues overlap but are not shown to be identical. Stern JA said it was unclear whether success on appeal would dispose of the Singapore issues or make steps there unnecessary ([43]). The judgment does not resolve the substantive relationship between those proceedings.
Finally, the decision does not determine the merits of the proposed appeal against J4 and J5, the substantive merits of the underlying family provision and equitable claims, or the appropriate case management orders in Singapore. It records only that the proposed grounds raised serious issues for determination and that the leave application and appeal were to be heard concurrently ([39], [46]).
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Perez de la Sala v Perez de la Sala [2026] NSWCA 108
Hearing dates: 09 June 2026
Date of orders: 09 June 2026
Decision date: 10 June 2026
Before: Stern JA
Decision: (1) Upon the respondents undertaking to the Court that they, either individually or collectively, will not apply or press their claim for an anti-suit injunction on an interim or final basis in proceedings HC/OC 871/2024 in the High Court of the Republic of Singapore or elsewhere to prevent or otherwise impede the Applicant’s prosecution of these proceedings or of NSW Supreme Court Proceeding Number 2023/21439 until the later of:
(a) 4 days after judgment of the determination of the Applicant’s summons seeking leave to appeal filed on 31 May 2026; or
(b) 4 days after judgment of the determination of the Applicant’s proposed notice of appeal filed in draft on 31 May 2026,
the application for a stay should be dismissed with costs.
(2) Set down the application for leave to appeal and the appeal for a concurrent hearing on 4 August 2026.
(3) The applicant to file and serve written submissions by 19 June 2026.
(4) The respondents to file and serve written submissions by 3 July 2026.
(5) The applicant to file and serve submissions in reply by 10 July 2026.
(6) Direct the Registrar to make other directions as to the preparation of appeal books and otherwise readying the matter for hearing.
(7) Liberty to apply on one business day’s notice to Justice Stern by her Associate, or the Registrar.
Catchwords: PROCEDURE — stay pending application for leave to appeal — where undertaking offered to applicant by respondents — where respondents confirmed undertaking still offered to Court — where applicant indicated content for Court to make orders dismissing application for a stay and listing application for leave to appeal and appeal for expedited concurrent hearing
Legislation Cited: Succession Act 2006 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685
Bolton v WAM Active Ltd [2025] NSWCA 81
Compania de Navegacion Palomar SA v Perez de la Sala [2017] SGHC 14
Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala v Felicite Terrill Perez de la Sala [2025] NSWSC 835
Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 128
Perez de la Sala v Compania de Navegacion Palomar SA [2018] SGCA 16
Perez de la Sala v Perez de la Sala (No 4) [2026] NSWSC 163
Perez de la Sala v Perez de la Sala (No 5) [2026] NSWSC 556
Perez de La Sala v Perez de La Sala [2025] NSWSC 1018
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala (Applicant / Applicant on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
Felicite Terrill Perez de la Sala (First Respondent / First Respondent on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
James Morgan Copinger-Symes (Second Respondent / Second Respondent on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
Maria-Teresa Perez de la Sala (Third Respondent / Third Respondent on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
Edward Robert Perez de la Sala (Fourth Respondent / Fourth Respondent on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
Maria-Isabel Harry (Fifth Respondent / Fifth Respondent on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
Representation: Counsel:
SK Hill (Applicant / Applicant on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
M Taylor (Respondents / Respondents on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
Solicitors:
L Rundle & Co Solicitors (Applicant / Applicant on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (First Respondent / First Respondent on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
Mills Oakley Lawyers (Second to Fifth Respondents / Second to Fifth Respondents on Motion filed 31 May 2026)
File Number(s): 2026/134707
Publication restriction: Nil
On 17 November 2025 (as amended on 4 December 2025), Parker J made orders restraining the first and third to sixth defendants in those proceedings (the respondents in this Court):
until further order, by way of an anti**-anti-**suit injunction, from taking any steps to obtain an order in the courts of the Republic of Singapore or elsewhere restraining Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala from prosecuting, or to pre-empt, or otherwise interfere with, the common intention constructive trust (c****onstructive t****rust claim) and equitable estoppel claims (which included two claims, which I will describe as the intergenerational estoppel (IG estoppel) claim and the conventionally pleaded estoppel (CP estoppel) claim) brought by Christina in proceedings 2023/214349 in the New South Wales Supreme Court (NSW proceedings); and
until further order, by way of anti**-**suit injunction, from taking further steps to prosecute or maintain the relief sought in proceedings designated as HC/OC 871/2024 in the High Court of Singapore (Singapore proceedings), or substantially similar relief in other proceedings commenced in Singapore or any other jurisdiction other than New South Wales.
Both of those orders were discharged by order 9 of orders made by Parker J on 6 March 2026 (discharge order), save that:
his Honour stayed order 9 until 23 March 2026 (effected by an amendment made to the 6 March 2026 orders under the slip rule on 21 April 2026) and ultimately extended the stay by further orders until 2 June 2026; and
by orders 12 and 13 of the 6 March 2026 orders, both an anti-suit and an anti-anti-suit injunction were continued as regards the CP estoppel claim and ultimately these orders were continued by further orders on 19 May 2026 until 2 June 2026.
By way of context for those orders, in the NSW proceedings, Christina made a family provision claim under the Succession Act 2006 (NSW), as well as the constructive trust, the IG and the CP estoppel claims, in respect of the estate of her late father, Robert Perez de la Sala (the deceased). In the NSW proceedings, the first defendant was Christina’s mother Felicite Terrill Perez de la Sala, who was the deceased’s wife and is the executor of the deceased’s estate. The second defendant was Elsbeth Turner, the executor of the estate of the deceased’s brother, Perez de la Sala (but the proceedings did not continue against her). The third defendant was Christina’s former husband Morgan Copinger-Symes. The fourth to sixth defendants were, respectively, her siblings Maria- Perez de la Sala, Perez de la Sala, and Harry.
Without admissions, the First and Third to Sixth Respondents [ie the respondents in these appeal proceedings] undertake to the Court that they, either individually or collectively, will not apply for an anti suit injunction in proceedings HC/OC 871/2024 in the High Court of the Republic of Singapore or elsewhere to prevent or otherwise impede the Applicant’s prosecution of these proceedings or of NSW Supreme Court Proceeding Number 2023/21439 until the latter of:
(a) 4 days after judgment of the determination of the Applicant’s summons seeking leave to appeal filed on [XX] June 2026; or
(b) 4 days after judgment of the determination of the Applicant’s proposed notice of appeal filed on [XX] June 2026.
On the last occasion a limited undertaking was provided there were substantial legal costs incurred while your clients pressed for the advancement of the proceedings in Singapore with the filing of witness lists, amended pleadings and evidence. This is consistent with the litigation strategy of your clients to deploy the enormous funds available to them in any available jurisdiction to drain the Plaintiff’s resources and prevent the orderly preparation of the New South Wales proceedings for hearing.
Your clients have repeatedly acknowledged to the Court in Singapore that the amendments they seek to their Statement of Claim are entirely responsive to the findings of the Court in New South Wales and the form of pleading which ultimately proceeds to trial. There is clearly no utility in those proceedings being advanced at the present time, if at all.
Our client will consider refraining from filing the Notice of Motion and approaching the Court on Monday 1 June 2026 if the form of undertaking includes the suspension of the progression of Suit OS871 in any manner during the proposed period.
Please seek your clients’ instructions to expand this scope of the undertaking including to take all steps to approach the Court in Singapore to suspend the progression of those proceedings.
On 1 June 2026 the discharge order was stayed by order of the Court of Appeal Registrar until 4 pm on 9 June 2026.
During the hearing before me the respondents’ counsel confirmed that the respondents’ proposed undertaking to the court, as set out at [7] above, was still offered to the Court on behalf of all five respondents to the appellate proceedings (such undertaking having previously been offered subject to Christina not applying for a stay). Having taken instructions, Christina sought some small amendments, all of which were agreed by the respondents, such that the undertaking given to the Court by the respondents is in the following terms:
Without admissions, the respondents undertake to the Court that they, either individually or collectively, will not apply or press their claim for an anti suit injunction on an interim or final basis in proceedings HC/OC 871/2024 in the High Court of the Republic of Singapore or elsewhere to prevent or otherwise impede the Applicant’s prosecution of these proceedings or of NSW Supreme Court Proceeding Number 2023/21439 until the later of:
(a) 4 days after judgment of the determination of the Applicant’s summons seeking leave to appeal filed on 31 May 2026; or
(b) 4 days after judgment of the determination of the Applicant’s proposed notice of appeal filed in draft on 31 May 2026.
Upon the basis of this undertaking and having taken instructions, counsel for Christina indicated that she was content for me to make orders dismissing the application for a stay and listing the application for leave to appeal and the appeal for an expedited concurrent hearing on 4 August 2026 (a date which was fixed primarily by reference to the available of counsel for Christina).
Accordingly, I made orders to that effect (which are set out more fully below).
These are my reasons for making those orders.
I also ordered that Christina should pay the costs of her motion seeking a stay and gave ex tempore reasons for that order as to costs on 9 June 2026.
Christina’s contention in support of a stay was simple. She contended that if no stay was in place, the respondents would be in a position to apply for an anti-suit injunction in Singapore which would preclude her prosecuting her application for leave to appeal in the NSW proceedings. She also contended that, if this Court were to uphold any of her grounds of appeal there may be a need for the respondents to further amend their pleadings in the Singapore proceedings, and that the continuation of the Singapore proceedings pending the determination of her summons seeking leave to appeal would cause her considerable financial drain.
Christina relied upon an affidavit which she swore on 31 May 2026 in support of the motion. This annexed a number of letters sent by the respondents’ Singapore solicitors Breakpoint LLC to the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Singapore between 19 February 2026 and 22 May 2026. These letters make it clear that the respondents have ongoing claims, including in estoppel and for a common intention constructive trust, against Christina in the Singapore proceedings. The letters also disclose that the Singapore proceedings were adjourned by reason of the anti-suit injunction, there are ongoing case conferences being conducted in the Singapore proceedings, and that the respondents have proposed amending their statement of claim in the Singapore proceedings to reflect developments in the NSW proceedings. In the second most recent letter from Breakpoint LLC, it is said that the respondents “intend to seek the Singapore Court’s permission to give effect to all of Parker J’s judgments dismissing and striking out [Christina’s] claims in New South Wales”.
Christina said that she believed that the respondents might move the High Court of Singapore to grant further interim anti-suit injunctions preventing her from progressing the NSW proceedings if a stay was not granted. She also referred to the substantial costs she had incurred since February 2024, defending multiple proceedings, and said that she believed that it was part of the respondents’ global litigation strategy to deploy their substantial wealth to stifle her access to justice.
The respondents did not dispute that Christina’s application for leave to appeal was arguable but submitted it has weak prospects. They contended that Parker J’s reasoning in J4 and J5 was conventional and that no issues of principle or questions of general public importance were raised. They also contended that there was no real risk that Christina would suffer prejudice if a stay was not granted. In this regard, they contended that the proposed undertaking should have given Christina comfort that there was no risk of an anti-suit injunction being granted in Singapore which would preclude her from prosecuting her application for leave to appeal in this Court. They contended further that, to the extent that Christina might in the interim incur costs in the Singapore proceedings, those costs would be a matter for allocation by the Singapore courts and did not justify a stay. They contended that the balance of convenience operated against the grant of a stay as sought in the motion.
For the purposes of the motion it is unnecessary to rehearse the complicated factual background to the proceedings in any detail. The summary set out below is taken from J4 and J5.
The deceased died in July 2022 at the age of 86. His estate is said to be worth more than $500 million. His wealth derived primarily from an international shipping business mainly run out of Hong Kong and Singapore.
The NSW proceedings were commenced by way of summons filed 5 July 2023 seeking relief against Terrill (in her capacity as executor of the deceased’s estate) by way of a family provision order under the Succession Act. By statement of claim filed 16 October 2023, Christina expanded her claim to include her equitable claims, and Ernest, James and Teresa, Edward and Maria-Isabel as defendants. Ernest died two months after this statement of claim was filed.
The assets of the deceased’s family, including of Ernest, were the subject of litigation commenced in 2012 and culminating in a judgment of Quentin Loh J in the High Court of Singapore in Compania de Navegacion Palomar SA v Perez de la Sala [2017] SGHC 14, and, subsequently, of the Court of Appeal of Singapore in Perez de la Sala v Compania de Navegacion Palomar SA [2018] SGCA 16. There were then further proceedings relating to the family assets, leading to a deed of settlement dated 11 September 2020 (2020 settlement), between the deceased, Ernest and their two siblings, pursuant to which, relevantly, Ernest and the deceased were each to receive hundreds of millions of dollars. In her claims in the NSW proceedings, Christina seeks to share in those assets, including those the subject of the 2020 settlement.
Parker J observed in J4 at [15] that Christina’s equitable claims in the NSW proceedings overlapped with the issues the subject of the litigation in Singapore described above.
On 19 February 2024 James, Edward, Terrill, Marie-Isabel, Teresa and Ms Turner obtained an ex parte anti-suit injunction in the High Court of Singapore restraining Christina’s equitable claims in the NSW proceedings. Later in 2024 the respondents commenced the Singapore proceedings seeking declarations that Christina had no entitlement to the family assets as she claimed in the NSW proceedings. They also claimed anti-suit injunctions against Christina on a final basis. In March 2025 Ms Turner brought equivalent proceedings. One key contention advanced in the Singapore proceedings is that Christina’s claims in the NSW proceedings have already been dealt with in the litigation in Singapore described at [23] above.
In early June 2025 the anti-suit injunctions granted by the High Court of Singapore were discharged but the Singapore proceedings continued as a contested action for final relief.
The equitable claims Christina sought to bring in the NSW proceedings are complicated and turn upon a complex legal and factual background. These claims, and their resolution by Parker J, are set out in broad terms, and without intending comprehensively to capture the detail of either the claims, or his Honour’s analysis, below.
The relief sought in Christina’s constructive trust claim included a declaration that she has a direct entitlement, as a trust beneficiary, to share in the assets of the shipping empire built up by the deceased’s father. Christina alleged that the deceased’s father intended to build up assets of the family business for the benefit of his descendants, including her, and that that common intention was adopted by his wife and children. She thus contended that the assets that the deceased received under the 2020 settlement were impressed with the terms of a common intention constructive trust, which arose between 1957 and 1967, in favour of the descendants of the deceased’s father, such that she had an entitlement, as beneficiary, to a one-quarter share in those assets: J4 at [88]-[91], [95], [199], [204], [213], [229]. Parker J summarily dismissed this claim, in broad terms, because: (1) Christina had not alleged that there was any reliance upon the claimed common intention at the time she contended that the constructive trust arose: J4 at [231]; (2) there was no delineation of the interest that was conferred on Christina under the alleged trust: J4 at [235]-[237]; and (3) Christina’s claim conflated the deceased’s father’s shareholdings in two key companies with the assets of those companies: J4 at [246]-[248].
Christina’s IG estoppel claim was described by Parker J as being intertwined with the pleading of, but independent of, her constructive trust claim. It involved a claim by Christina to be entitled to a one-quarter interest in the deceased’s estate: J4 at [92]. This claim was predicated, in part, upon Christina having acted to her detriment in adopting and relying upon the common intention which formed the basis of her constructive trust claim: J4 at [252]. Parker J found that this claim was “surplusage” and should be struck out on that basis: J4 at [275].
Christina’s CP estoppel claim (as set out in the second further amended statement of claim which she sought to rely upon after this claim was struck out by Parker J in J4) was predicated upon contentions she made as regards the circumstances in which she went to work for, and worked for, family businesses in Singapore. She contended that she did so as a result of an understanding engendered by the deceased that she would receive an interest in the family business consistent with declarations she contends were made to this effect by the deceased’s father. In this regard she relied upon, in particular, two pleaded promises: J5 at [17]. She said that she acted to her detriment in reliance upon these promises, particularising this as involving her personally funding advice, providing instructions and preparing proceedings and rejecting Ernest’s request to remove two of her siblings from boards of companies: J5 at [25]. She claimed a proprietary entitlement to a one-quarter share of the proceeds received by the deceased in the 2020 settlement: J4 at [93]-[95]; J5 at [8]. Parker J found that the manner in which Christina had pleaded detrimental reliance, and one of the promises upon which she relied, were defective, as were her prayers for relief. His Honour observed that, “[t]here would need to be a complete reconsideration of Christina’s proprietary estoppel claim, focussing on the small subset of the existing allegations which might support a viable claim”: J5 at [51]. In those circumstances, given the history, his Honour refused leave to replead: J5 at [53]. His Honour added at J5 at [54]:
Refusal will not close the door completely on a further application which deals with the problems identified in this judgment, if that proves possible. The present application is not, and could not really be, “final” in that sense. But it is final in the sense that the Court will now need to proceed towards trial of Christina’s remaining family provision claim. If the door is to be re-opened on proprietary estoppel, there will need to be very good reasons for doing so.
Christina attached a draft notice of appeal to her summons seeking leave to appeal. As regards J4 she makes the following substantive contentions:
the Primary Judge erred in finding that the Further Amended Statement of Claim (FASOC) pleaded no allegation that during Robert Snr’s lifetime, his wife and children did anything in reliance upon the alleged common intention which would have resulted in detriment to them if he had resiled from it (PJ4 [231]);
the Primary Judge erred in finding that Christina did not identify a common intention that she have a particular and specified interest as a beneficiary of the trust;
the Primary Judge erred in finding that Christina did not identify the time at which her interest in the trust vested;
the Primary Judge erred in finding that the subject matter of the trust conflated an interest in a company with an interest in property owned by a company (PJ4 [238]-[248]); and
the primary judge erred in striking out Prayer for Relief 3 and pleadings paragraphs 35, 35A, 36-37, 38, 39-40A, 58-66, 77 of the FASOC (PJ4 [259]-[275]).
As regards J5 she contends:
the Primary Judge erred in finding that the only promises capable of supporting an estoppel were those pleaded in at [35(J)] and [38] of the proposed SFASOC;
the Primary Judge erred in finding that the SFASOC did not sufficiently identify that Christina relied on the promises to her detriment;
the Primary Judge erred in making a finding of fact that Christina did not rely on any representations after 2017 when she had fallen out with the deceased (PJ5 [27]-[30]);
the Primary Judge erred in making a finding of fact that Christina did not suffer any detriment; and
the Primary Judge erred in failing to grant leave to Christina to file the SFASOC.
The principles governing the grant of a stay pending an appeal are well-settled, as the parties on this application agreed. They are analogous to those which govern the grant of interlocutory relief before trial: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694-5, Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 737; [2002] NSWCA 383 at [18]. A party applying for a stay must show, first, that the appeal raises serious issues for determination by the appellate court; and secondly, that there is a real risk that the appellant will suffer prejudice or damage if the stay is not granted. If an appellant prevails on those two questions, then the Court is to consider the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties: Pamplin v Irwin [2024] NSWCA 112 at [11] per Leeming JA.
The onus lies upon an applicant to demonstrate that a proper basis for a stay that is fair to all parties has been made out: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694.
It was explained in Bolton v WAM Active Ltd [2025] NSWCA 81 at [11] that:
[T]here is no dispute that in an application of this kind the Court does not, generally speaking, speculate as to the strength or otherwise of the prospects of success, although it may make some preliminary assessment so as to exclude an appeal which has been lodged without any real prospect of success so as to gain time: see Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 737; [2002] NSWCA 383 at [18]-[19]; Qasim v PF 473 Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 248 at [10].
As is clear from the brief summary of Christina’s claims, and of the reasoning of Parker J, as set out above, I am not in any position to determine the merits of her application for leave to appeal. In circumstances in which the respondents did not dispute that Christina’s application for leave to appeal is arguable, I do not need to do so for the purposes of this application. In any event, I am satisfied that there are serious issues for determination by this Court raised by Christina’s draft grounds of appeal.
I accept that some prejudice will be caused to Christina if she incurs costs in the Singapore proceedings which might ultimately prove to be unnecessary if she succeeds in her appeal in this Court.
As for the balance of convenience, on the assumption that the respondents give their proffered undertaking to this Court, there is no risk that Christina’s ability to prosecute her summons seeking leave to appeal, and if successful her appeal, would be adversely affected if a stay was not granted as sought by the motion.
Whilst Christina contended that she would incur legal costs if she was required to take steps in the Singapore proceedings during the period prior to the final determination of her appellate proceedings in this Court, she did not adduce any evidence as to what, if any, costs this was likely to entail. Moreover, pursuant to orders I made at the hearing of Christina’s motion, Christina’s application for leave to appeal is be heard concurrently with her appeal on 4 August 2026. In those circumstances, she was only at risk of incurring costs in the Singapore proceedings for a limited period of time. It would also be open to her to make submissions in the Singapore proceedings as to what, if any, steps she should be directed to take pending the final determination of her appellate proceedings in this Court.
Further, it was not clear to what extent costs incurred by Christina in the Singapore proceedings would ultimately be unnecessary in any event. Even if Christina were to succeed in her appeal to this Court, it was not clear on the evidence before me that this would necessarily dispose of the issues in the Singapore proceeding. Nor was it clear to what extent steps taken in the Singapore proceedings, if any, would be wasted.
It was also apparent that the Singapore proceedings have been ongoing since 2024. In those circumstances, I was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice that all litigation between Christina and the respondents relating to the equitable claims made by Christina in the NSW proceedings be resolved with all due expedition. I was satisfied that the appropriate means of progressing the Singapore proceedings should now be a matter to be determined as a matter of case management of those proceedings.
In these circumstances, the risk that Christina would incur legal costs in Singapore if the stay was not continued pending determination of the summons seeking leave to appeal did not tilt the balance in favour of granting the stay Christina sought.
The orders I made at the hearing on 9 June 2026 were that:
Upon the respondents undertaking to the Court that they, either individually or collectively, will not apply or press their claim for an anti-suit injunction on an interim or final basis in proceedings HC/OC 871/2024 in the High Court of the Republic of Singapore or elsewhere to prevent or otherwise impede the Applicant’s prosecution of these proceedings or of NSW Supreme Court Proceeding Number 2023/21439 until the later of:
(a) 4 days after judgment of the determination of the Applicant’s summons seeking leave to appeal filed on 31 May 2026; or (b) 4 days after judgment of the determination of the Applicant’s proposed notice of appeal filed in draft on 31 May 2026,
the application for a stay should be dismissed with costs.
Perez de la Sala
Perez de la Sala
[2026] NSWSC 556
(1985) 2 NSWLR 685
(2002) 55 NSWLR 737
The stay application was dismissed with costs upon the respondents giving the specified undertaking to the Court. The leave application and appeal were listed for concurrent hearing on 4 August 2026, with written-submissions timetables and further preparation directions ([46]).
For convenience, and without intending any disrespect, I will refer to the parties to these proceedings by their first names.
On 6 March 2026 Parker J handed down judgment, relevantly, summarily dismissing Christina’s constructive trust claim and striking out her IG and CP estoppel claims but granting leave to her to replead the CP estoppel claim: Perez de la Sala v Perez de la Sala (No 4) [2026] NSWSC 163 (J4). On 20 May 2026 his Honour refused Christina leave to file a second further amended statement of claim (S****FASOC) in respect of her CP estoppel claim: Perez de la Sala v Perez de la Sala (No 5) [2026] NSWSC 556 (J5). The family provision claim, in which Christina seeks provision in the sum of $20 million, remains on foot in the NSW proceedings.
By notice of motion filed on 31 May 2026, Christina sought a stay of the discharge order pending the determination of her summons, also filed on 31 May 2026, seeking leave to appeal to this Court against that part of J4 which summarily dismissed her constructive trust claim and struck out her IG estoppel claim, and against the whole of J5. The five respondents named in the summons are the first and third to sixth defendants in the proceedings at first instance (see [3] above).
Prior to this, by letter dated 30 May 2026, the solicitor for the second to fifth respondents, Jeremy Mackenzie at Mills Oakley, conveyed that, subject to Christina filing and serving a summons seeking leave to appeal and draft notice of appeal by 6 pm on 2 June 2026 and her providing an undertaking not to seek a stay of the orders of 6 March 2026 and 19 May 2026, without admission, the respondents (being all of the respondents to the appellate proceedings) would give an undertaking to this Court in the following terms (proposed u****ndertaking):
The respondents relied upon an affidavit of Jeremy Terence Mackenzie sworn on 4 June 2026.
On 23 July 2025 Christina obtained interim relief by way of anti-suit injunction in the NSW proceedings: Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala v Felicite Terrill Perez de la Sala [2025] NSWSC 835.
On 8 September 2025 Slattery J determined that the NSW Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction as regards the claims made against Ernest or his estate: Perez de La Sala v Perez de La Sala [2025] NSWSC 1018. I say no more about those claims.
Meanwhile, in the Singapore proceedings Christina was due to file affidavit evidence by 28 November 2025. It was in that context that Parker J made the orders of 17 November 2025. Following this, on 26 November 2025 the respondents sought the summary dismissal, or striking out, of the equitable claims brought by Christina in the NSW proceedings. On 16 December 2025 Parker J convened a hearing and announced his conclusion that the constructive trust and IG estoppel claims should be summarily dismissed and that the CP estoppel claim should be struck out with leave to re-plead. His Honour did not publish reasons for judgment or make orders to this effect until J4 was published, and orders made, on 6 March 2025.