Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala v Felicite Terrill Perez de la Sala [2025] NSWSC 835 | Case summary | Zoe

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Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala v Felicite Terrill Perez de la Sala [2025] NSWSC 835 | Case summary | Zoe

The plaintiff commenced these proceedings by way of a summons filed on 5 July 2023 seeking a family provision order pursuant to s 59 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) out of the estate and/or notional estate of Robert Perez de la Sala (the deceased), the plaintiff’s late father (family provision claim). For convenience and without intending any disrespect, I will refer to family members of the deceased by their first names.
The deceased died on 7 July 2022, aged 85 years. He left a will dated 18 July 2019 and a codicil dated 24 January 2020, probate of which was granted to his widow, Terrill (the first defendant), on 28 October 2022. No provision was made for the plaintiff under that will or codicil.
The deceased is survived by his wife, Terrill (who is also the executor of his estate), and his four adult children, who, in order of date of birth are as follows: Maria-Teresa de la Sala (the fourth defendant), Edward Robert Perez de la Sala (the fifth defendant), Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala (the plaintiff), and Maria-Isabel Harry (the sixth defendant).
As at the date of death, the deceased’s estate consisted of approximately A$504,053,569 in assets both in and outside of New South Wales. After death, distributions of A$429,008,116 were made to Terrill from the deceased’s bank accounts. These distributions may since have been re-transferred to Singapore.
The Commissioner of Taxation has issued an assessment of tax liability on the estate of $358 million which is contested by Terrill.
Property which may be the subject of any prescribed transaction is set out in paragraph 28 of the affidavit of Terrill dated 21 September 2023 and includes $31,236,550 gifted to the plaintiff’s siblings (Teresa, Edward and Isabel) by the deceased and Terrill together with a gift of $20 million on 5 July 2022 to the plaintiff’s former husband, James Morgan Copinger-Symes (the third defendant).
By her statement of claim filed on 16 October 2023, the plaintiff expanded her family provision claim to include further claims that she is entitled to the benefit of a common intention constructive trust and/or an inter-generational equitable estoppel (equity claim) in respect of certain amounts and joined as defendants to the proceedings Ernest Ferdinand Pérez de la Sala (now deceased), a brother of the deceased, her former husband and her siblings.
There have been hearings in this court before Slattery J of a number of interlocutory motions relating to the family provision claim, but there has been no progress in relation to the equity claim. This is because ex parte anti-suit injunctions were granted by the High Court of Singapore on 19 February 2024 and 22 February 2024 in favour of the relevant defendants restraining the plaintiff from prosecuting or maintaining the relief sought in these proceedings other than the family provision claim, and from prosecuting or bringing such proceedings elsewhere (Singapore ASIs). The Singapore ASIs were discharged on 5 June 2025.
Following the discharge of the Singapore ASIs, the plaintiff’s solicitors notified Slattery J and the other parties to these proceedings of her intention to pursue the entirety of the relief claimed in her statement of claim. On 16 July 2025, the solicitors for the defendants notified the plaintiff that unless this position was immediately withdrawn, they would seek fresh anti-suit injunctions in Singapore.

The relevance of the courts of Singapore to the present dispute is explained in the plaintiff’s affidavit as follows. In around 2011 the deceased’s brother, Ernest, transferred out of family companies assets with an estimated value of between US$600 million to US$800 million to two entities associated solely with himself. In 2012, the companies brought proceedings against Ernest in respect of those transactions which were ultimately resolved by the decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal 22 March 2018: Ernest Ferdinand Perez de la Sala v Compañia De Navegación Palomar, SA [2018] SGCA 16. Ernest was held to have wrongfully and in breach of fiduciary duty transferred US$600 million from the companies’ bank accounts to his personal account and was ordered to account for and return the money to the companies. However, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that the companies were not the absolute owners of the assets and that they took the assets subject to a resulting trust in favour of Northern Enterprises Ltd and John Manners & Co Ltd, but made no finding as to the precise distribution of beneficial interests in the companies and their assets as it was not necessary for the purposes of the proceedings to do so.
On 12 March 2019, the companies commenced further proceedings in Singapore for a determination of the precise beneficial ownership of the resulting trust as determined by the Singapore Court of Appeal (Suit No 317/2019). By this stage, the plaintiff had become estranged from her family and was not a party to Suit No 317/2019. She filed an application to be joined as an interested party but her application was not heard because Suit No 317/2019 was stayed and discontinued by reason of a settlement deed entered into on 11 September 2020 (settlement deed).
Given the previous Singapore litigation, and in particular the findings made by the Singapore Court of Appeal referred to above, the defendants in these proceedings essentially argue that the plaintiff’s equity claim is an abuse of process and that the Singapore Court of Appeal has already adjudicated upon the matters raised in the equity claim. Rather than filing a defence to this effect to the plaintiff’s statement of claim in these proceedings, the defendants sought and obtained the Singapore ASIs, on an ex parte basis, to restrain the plaintiff from pursuing her equity claim in these proceedings. The defendants’ position is disputed by the plaintiff on the basis that the Singapore Court of Appeal left open the question of the precise distribution of the beneficial interests in the companies and their assets, and that Suit No 317/2019 was stayed and discontinued before such a determination could be made.
On 4 November 2024, the defendants (other than the executor of Ernest’s estate) filed a fresh originating claim and statement of claim in the High Court of Singapore (Case No 871/2024) seeking negative declarations that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought in the equity claim in these proceedings. The declarations are sought on the grounds of abuse of process and res judicata and also on substantive grounds that the equity claim is not made out in fact or law. On 26 March 2025, the executor of Ernest’s estate filed a similar originating claim and statement of claim in the High Court of Singapore (Case No 237/2025). It is clear from each statement of claim that there is a complete overlap between the subject matter of these new Singapore proceedings and the current proceedings in this court commenced in 2023.

Having regard to the background facts summarised above and the legal principles relevant to the interlocutory relief sought, I was satisfied that this was an appropriate case to grant that relief on an interim basis.
The plaintiff submits that the connecting factors to NSW are as follows: (a) the deceased died domiciled in NSW, made his will in NSW and a grant of probate has been made in NSW; (b) the first defendant who is the executor of the deceased’s estate resides in NSW; (c) the plaintiff grew up in NSW together with her siblings and many of the representations relied upon in relation to the equity claim were made in NSW; (d) all of the living defendants, other than James, are domiciled in Australia; (e) the majority of the wealth that was received by the deceased pursuant to the settlement deed was at the date of his death and/or shortly thereafter located in NSW; (f) the first defendant disclosed in evidence in these proceedings in her affidavit sworn 21 September 2023 that there was then some $430 million in Australia; (g) the plaintiff’s family provision claim has been made in NSW pursuant to s 59 of the Succession Act, and the relevant facts in that claim overlap with the facts of the equity claim.
I accept the plaintiff’s submission that there are sufficient connecting factors to NSW such that it is not a clearly inappropriate forum to bring all of her claims conveniently in one statement of claim in this court.
Turning now to whether there is a serious question to be tried, this depends on whether there is a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is, there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to the relief sought or, put another way, there is a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending final hearing: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 at [19], [65]-[72]. It is generally accepted that this requirement is not particularly onerous, bearing in mind that it is not necessary that the plaintiff show that it is more probable than not that she will succeed at trial: Mobileworld Operating Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 1365 at [21]-[22].
I am satisfied that the plaintiff has a prima facie case for final relief. A well-established category of case for an anti-suit injunction, and an anti-anti-suit injunction, is where the proceedings in a foreign court are vexatious or oppressive in accordance with equitable principles. One such case is where there is a complete correspondence between the two proceedings, or if complete relief is available in the local proceedings: CSR Ltd at 393-394. I am satisfied that there is a complete correspondence between the issues involved in the local and Singapore proceedings so that this test is satisfied in the present case.
In so far as the balance of convenience is concerned, it is necessary to determine what course is best calculated to achieve justice between the parties, bearing in mind the consequences to the defendant of the grant of the injunction in support of relief which the plaintiff might not ultimately obtain and the consequences to the plaintiff of refusing the injunction in support of relief which she might ultimately be held to be entitled: Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533 at 535. I am satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the interlocutory relief, at least on an interim basis as proposed. The plaintiff has moved promptly following the discharge of the Singapore ASIs, the matter is urgent and is to be brought back to the court promptly to give the defendants the opportunity to be heard on whether the interlocutory injunctions should continue until final hearing. I note that the plaintiff provides the usual undertaking as to damages.