1. Following the determination in her favour of her claim for damages against the respondent,[1] the applicant applied for costs, limited to two amounts: Counsel's fees of $6,307.50, and administrative/secretarial fees of $1,880.00 which the applicant paid to a contractor who supplies the services of an executive assistant.
2. As no relevant settlement offers had been made in the proceeding, the claim is made under section 109 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic).
3. Both parties are familiar with that section, as evidenced by the written submissions that they had filed and served, and the submissions they made orally in the hearing of the application.
4. Both parties know that under section 109(1) there is no presumption that one party will be ordered to pay another's costs, but that under sections 109(2) & (3) the Tribunal is empowered to award costs if it is satisfied that it is fair to do so having regard to the criteria set out therein.
5. Applications for costs must be dealt with objectively. On a subjective level, there are differences between the parties and these are alluded to in the Reasons for the Order of 18 February 2026. The respondent is an executive, and whilst English is his second language he filed and served very well-expressed written submissions and Points of Defence. I consider it likely that as a result of his experience in business the respondent was able to understand the Tribunal's procedures which, after all, seek to be simple. In my observation, the applicant found both section 16 of the Water Act 1989 (Vic) and the Tribunal's requirements that documents be well ordered and then filed and served prior to the hearing to be challenging.
6. In the hearing of her costs application, the applicant said that having been relatively overwhelmed by the Tribunal's prehearing timetabling Orders she considered it to be essential to engage the services of an ad hoc administrative assistant, and then to brief Counsel for the hearing. It is clear that the applicant sought to keep her costs to a minimum, and thus indirectly to keep her claim for costs against the respondent to a minimum, by doing as much of the preparatory work as she could and then briefing Counsel directly - and not through a solicitor[2] - quite late. Had the applicant engaged a solicitor, I consider it likely that the solicitor would have briefed Counsel. In that sense the applicant would have incurred higher legal costs. Her case would have been run much more efficiently.
7. From the respondent's perspective, I do not doubt that the respondent suffered from the applicant's disorganisation before she engaged the executive assistant and Counsel. The applicant served documents in a disorganised way and did not comply with the time limits set by the Tribunal. Objectively, it was unfair on the respondent to effectively require him to organise the applicant's documents so that he could understand the case being brought against him and then defend that claim. I am sure that the respondent found the receipt of multiple copies of unorganised documents, in various tranches, rather exasperating.
8. Even in relation to the costs application itself, which was commenced by an Application filed on 20 February 2026, at its hearing on 19 March 2026 the applicant was still saying that she 'could' provide relevant documents.
9. As it happens, the applicant had not filed and served copies of the barrister's fee slip, or the invoice which was presumably issued by the ad hoc executive assistant. The applicant relied upon some EFT payment slips to show that she had spent money but, for example, three of the payments apparently made to the executive assistant contained the narration 'gift'.
10. The respondent does not concede that the applicant has paid the $6,307.50 or the $1,880.00 to the barrister or the ad hoc executive assistant in payment of liabilities.
11. Leaving aside quantum for the moment, I turn to the relevant criteria under section 109(3) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). For that purpose, I have considered the submissions made by the parties. I do not mention irrelevant criteria. In other words, I have considered all criteria in section 109(3), and have concluded that the criteria which I do not mention in these Reasons are inapplicable.
12. Whilst the applicant relied on alleged delays and adjournments in the proceeding before the hearing in February 2026, they are irrelevant because they took place before the applicant had engaged Counsel. Put another way, had an adjournment caused by the respondent led to the applicant wasting fees that she had paid to Counsel, it would have been another matter. However, any adjournments or delays in this case occurred when the applicant was representing herself. Rather than wasting fees, the applicant 'only' wasted her own time. No doubt that was annoying, but it did not cause the applicant to waste costs which are recoverable under section 109.
13. Whilst the respondent has not applied for costs, I would say that the applicant's disorganised way of serving documents could be conduct described in subsections 109(3)(a)(i), and 109(3)(b).
14. Subsection 109(3)(d) favours the applicant because the nature and complexity of the proceeding undoubtedly warranted the applicant retaining Counsel. To a lesser extent it also warranted her to engage the executive assistant.
15. Subsection 109(3)(c) favours the applicant, slightly. First, this subsection does not create a presumption that the loser of a case will pay the winner's costs. Subsection 109(1) makes that abundantly clear. Secondly, whilst the respondent lost the case it could not be said that the respondent's defence had 'no tenable basis in fact or law'. However, the relative strengths of the parties' positions lie with the applicant.
16. Subsection 109(3)(e) decisively favours the applicant. When the Tribunal was established, it was considered by Parliament that Victorians should be able to represent themselves in civil cases, without always needing a lawyer. In some contexts that now appears to have been a naïve exercise in wishful thinking. Sections 16(1) and 16(5) of the Water Act 1989 (Vic) are complicated and there are many ways in which a self-represented applicant with an arguable claim can lose as a result of not understanding that complexity. The applicant has been awarded $11,793.05. Of that sum, $5,693.05 represents the likely cost of repairing water damage which the respondent caused to her apartment. This is money which the applicant will have to spend. The other component of the award was $6,100.00 for loss of amenity,[3] which is a very modest sum. Even in the absence of Counsel's fee slip, I consider it likely that an amount in the order of $6,307.50 would represent a barrister's fee awarded on a standard basis as between parties in litigation, in a claim brought under the Water Act 1989 (Vic).
17. So, in the context of a claim which the Tribunal has found was rightfully brought under a complex Act of Parliament which, objectively, warranted the applicant engaging a lawyer, it would be a most undesirable pyrrhic victory for that successful applicant to be awarded almost $12,000.00 in damages and not to be compensated for legal fees of over half that sum. These points engage subsection 109(3)(e). In case the respondent subjectively thinks that the applicant should not have engaged a barrister when she was 'only' awarded $11,793.05, the logical response is that the respondent could have removed the risk of being ordered to pay costs by offering an appropriate settlement sum rather than forcing the applicant to take the matter through to a contested hearing.
18. I conclude that it is fair to order that the applicant be paid costs in this proceeding, in respect of Counsel's fees and administrative/secretarial fees. The applicant was a self-represented litigant until she retained Counsel, and she has again become a self-represented litigant in this costs application. She was a self-represented litigant when she apparently engaged the contracting executive assistant, but case law establishes that a self-represented litigant can be awarded costs in respect of some necessary expenditure to persons other than lawyers.
19. Now, when the Tribunal awards costs it quite commonly requires those costs to be assessed by the Costs Court. That is entirely appropriate when a party who has engaged lawyers is awarded their costs of a whole proceeding, because the Costs Court has the expertise to work out how much should actually be paid by the party who is liable.
20. In this case, though, the applicant is only seeking payment of two amounts, and it would be uneconomical and unfair to require the applicant to incur the delay and possibly the expense of going to the Costs Court when only those two items are at stake.
21. I will therefore order the applicant to file with the Tribunal and serve on the respondent copies of the barrister's fee slip and any narration describing the work performed by the barrister, and of the contract which the applicant says she had with the executive assistant - which I would expect contains a clause saying how the contractor's fees are to be assessed - and the invoices rendered by the contractor.
22. I will then assess those two claims on the basis of standard costs under the relevant Court Scale as applicable at the dates the services were supplied by the barrister and the administrative assistant. The parties will understand that, for example, in relation to the barrister's fee that I might come to a figure less than the amount set out in the fee slip by applying that objective concept of standard costs.
23. Three aspects of the concept of standard costs require comment.
24. First, the basic idea is that when one party is required to pay another party's costs, they only pay for the costs which were incurred in bringing the case to finality. They do not pay for "icing on the cake". Using solicitors' services as an example, if a solicitor prepares an application, files the application with the Tribunal, and then tells the party that they have filed the application, those three items of work will have been necessary and appropriate, but the opposing party will not be required to pay for the third item. The third item will be seen as a service provided by the lawyer to their own client which was not strictly necessary to bring the case to hearing.
25. Secondly, Scales are published by the Courts, listing items of work and their values. The idea here in relation to solicitors' fees, when one party is required to pay another party's costs, is that an item of work will be seen as having the same value, whether it is performed by the cheapest or the most expensive lawyer in town. That said, older versions of the Scales tended to be quite specific, listing types of letters and types of conferences and other communications and allocating values to each of them, whereas modern work practices has basically compelled the scales to now be far more descriptive.
26. Thirdly, for historical reasons, barristers' fees are treated differently to solicitors' fees. The seniority and eminence of barristers, for example, is a factor. It cannot be said that an item of work performed by two barristers will be seen as having the same value. Perhaps the explanation is that the legal system sees the art in what barristers produce.
27. In addition, as inflation is a fact of life, the values set by the Scales are updated from time to time.
28. The services of the applicant's barrister and the administrative assistant have been provided by them before and after the relevant Scales have been updated.
29. Then, for good measure, rule 1.07(a) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2018 has also been updated.
30. The main concept underlying rule 1.07 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2018 is to provide certainty to parties, by providing that a Court scale of costs will apply "unless the Tribunal otherwise orders". This means that in an exceptional case, the Tribunal could apply another Scale or means of calculation. It is unnecessary to discuss this any further because this proceeding is not an exceptional case.
31. This case was heard on 5 February 2026. It follows that parts of the services supplied by the applicant's barrister were probably supplied before and after 1 February 2026.
32. Until 1 February 2026, rule 1.07 said that unless the Tribunal otherwise ordered, the applicable Scale of costs is the County Court costs scale as defined in Rule 1.13 of Chapter I of the Rules of the County Court as in force on 31 December 2024, being a fee, charge or amount that is 80 per cent of the applicable rate set out in Appendix A to Chapter I of the Rules of the Supreme Court as in force on 31 December 2024.
33. On 1 February 2026, rule 1.07 was amended, so that a new rule 1.07(a) says that unless the Tribunal otherwise ordered, the applicable scale of costs in relation to barristers' fees is 83·68 per cent of an amount specified in item 19 of Appendix A to Chapter I of the Rules of the Supreme Court as in force on 31 December 2024. This change did not merely increase recoverable barristers' fees by 3.68 per cent, because item 19 of Appendix A sets out a 'range' of barristers' fees - the seniority and eminence principle again all.
34. For costs other than barristers' fees a new rule 1.07(b) says the applicable scale is 81·6 per cent of an amount specified in item 19 of Appendix A to Chapter I of the Rules of the Supreme Court as in force on 31 December 2024. The fees applicable to the administrative assistant are in the nature of a 'disbursement', and it will remain to be seen how much assistance can be obtained by referring to that Scale.
35. This proceeding has taken a considerable period of time and because of this I will give the applicant a relatively short time to file and serve the barrister's fee slips and other documents and I will not hear any further arguments in relation to the amounts which I will assess.

[1] Patrick v Yin [2026] VCAT 110.

[2] "Solicitor" is, officially, an obsolete word but it still conveniently alludes to the distinction between the legal practitioner who a person could consult about a range of legal issues, and the legal practitioner who - generally - appears in Court.

[3] The assessment is set out at paragraph 47 of [2026] VCAT 110