Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 393

1. In this matter the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 18 November 2022 which affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) to cancel grant the applicant a Student (Temporary) (class TU) Student (subclass 500) visa (student visa) under s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).

1. On 4 September 2015, the applicant, a citizen of India, first arrived in Australia as the holder of a Student (Class TU) (subclass 573) visa, valid until 15 March 2019, so he could complete a Diploma and Bachelor of Information Technology. The applicant obtained a Diploma of IT on 9 October 2017, however his enrolment in the Bachelor of IT was cancelled on 18 February 2019 for unsatisfactory course progress.
2. The applicant was granted a student visa on 24 May 2019 in relation to another course he was enrolled in, a Bachelor of Business, however his enrolment in that course was cancelled on 30 August 2019 for non-payment of fees.
3. Between 30 August 2019 and 17 January 2022, the applicant was not enrolled in any course of study.
4. On 8 November 2021, the Department provided the applicant with a Notice of intention to consider cancellation (NOICC) of his student visa pursuant to s 116 of the Act, on the basis that the applicant had not complied with condition 8202(2)(a) attached to his visa as he had not been enrolled in a registered course since 30 August 2019.
5. On 22 November 2021, the applicant provided a response to the NOICC.
6. On 15 December 2021, the applicant's student visa was cancelled, and on 22 December 2021, the applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate's decision with the Tribunal.
7. On 18 November 2022, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's student visa under s 116(2)(b) of the Act.

1. At Tribunal Decision (TD) [8] the Tribunal Member identified the issue before it was whether the applicant, as a student visa holder breached condition 8202 of the Schedule 8 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations), and if he did breach the condition, whether the applicant's visa should be cancelled in the exercise of the discretion under s 116(1)(b) of the Act.
2. At TD [9]-[16] the Tribunal recorded that the applicant's student visa was cancelled as he was not enrolled in a registered course, a requirement under condition 8202(2) of the Regulations. The Tribunal noted at the hearing the applicant had confirmed in his oral evidence that he was not enrolled in a registered course from 30 August 2019 up to the date of the delegate's decision. The Tribunal also noted that the applicant did not dispute at the Tribunal hearing that he did not comply with the condition 8202(2).
3. The Tribunal found, based on the evidence before it, that the applicant was neither enrolled nor had a Confirmation of Enrolment (COE) in a registered course of a full-time course or study or training from 30 August 2019 to 15 December 2021 while the holder of a student visa. It found failing to maintain enrolment meant that the applicant has not complied with condition 8202(2) and therefore the Tribunal satisfied that the grounds for cancellation in s 116(1)(b) existed.
4. The Tribunal considered the matter relevant to the exercise of its discretion under s 116(1)(b) of the Act, whether the applicant's visa should be cancelled. At TD [19]-[74] the Tribunal had regard to the circumstances of the case, including matters raised by the applicant, and the matters set out in the Department's Procedural Instruction 'General visa cancellation powers'.
5. After considering all these matters, at TD [73]-[74] the Tribunal concluded:
   1. The Tribunal has considered the applicant's circumstances individually and cumulatively. The Tribunal is satisfied that there are limited aspects that are favourable to the applicant. Although it is accepted that there were events that occurred outside the applicant's control, the Tribunal is also mindful of the seriousness of breaching a visa condition and remaining in Australia on a student visa for a considerable period without studying or maintaining enrolment. Further, that the cancellation of the visa is the intended consequence of breach of the relevant condition. Overall, the Tribunal considers that the limited aspects favourable to the applicant do not outweigh the reasons to cancel the visa. The breach of condition 8202(2) is significant as that condition goes to the core purpose of the grant of a student visa, namely to study in Australia.
   2. Considering the circumstances as a whole, the Tribunal concludes that the visa should be cancelled.

1. In this Court the applicant relies upon an amended application lodged on 20 January 2026. It contains the following two grounds (omitting particulars):
   1. The decision of the Tribunal was illogical, irrational and legally unreasonable, with the result that it fell into jurisdictional error.
   2. The Tribunal, once it had decided that the Applicant was no longer staying in Australia for the purpose of study, denied the Applicant procedural fairness, by failing to reveal its reasoning on what the Tribunal decided was instead the Applicant's purpose for remaining in Australia, and by failing to give the Applicant an opportunity to comment on, and refute that reasoning. In so proceeding the Tribunal denied the Applicant a realistic possibility of a different outcome and so fell into jurisdictional error.
2. On 4 December 2025, I made orders setting the matter down before me for final hearing on 29 January 2026. In accordance with procedural orders made on 22 January 2026, the parties filed written submissions.

1. At the hearing of this matter before me the applicant appeared unrepresented. Mr Wong of Minter Ellison appeared for the first respondent.
2. I asked the applicant if he wanted to make any oral submissions on his written grounds of review in the amended application. He said that he would rather rely upon the written submissions that had been prepared for him by his previous barrister. He did however make some oral submissions after Mr Wong outlined the first respondent's submissions. Those submissions in essence sought to challenge the merits of the Tribunal decision on various factual matters, including the incident when he was robbed at knife point in June 2019 (the robbery) and the mix up in the fees payable for the course he had been undertaking at Universal Business School Sydney (College).
3. Mr Wong made short oral submissions outlining his response to the matters in the applicant's written submissions.

1. To succeed in his application before me the applicant has the onus of establishing that the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error; that is, a serious legal error that results in the Tribunal's decision lacking any legal force: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 at [2] (LPDT). To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: LPDT at [32].
2. As I explained to the parties at the hearing, the Court does not have any power to consider the merits of the Tribunal's decision. The Court does not have the power to re-consider the facts as found by the Tribunal, nor does it have the statutory power remake the decision to grant a protection visa: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic).
3. Based on the amended application, and as identified in the applicant's written submissions, the issues for consideration in this case by this Court are:

(a) Whether Tribunal's finding that the applicant's stay in Australia ceased to be for the purpose of study from 2019 lacked evident and intelligible justification, such that the decision was illogical, irrational, and legally unreasonable.

(b) Whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness, by the Tribunal failing to reveal its reasoning on what the Tribunal decided was the applicant's purpose for remaining in Australia, and by failing to give the Applicant an opportunity to comment on and refute that reasoning.

**Issue (a) Whether the Tribunal decision lacked evident and intelligible justification, such that the decision was illogical, irrational, and legally unreasonable

1. In the applicant's written submissions on this issue the applicant identifies the following "key" findings as lacking an evident and intelligible justification such that the decision was illogical, irrational, and legally unreasonable:

(a) The finding in TD [42] where the Tribunal did not except that from 2019 the applicant's stay in Australia was for the purpose of study.

(b) The finding in TD [44] where the Tribunal was not satisfied that the robbery left the applicant unable to study for the reasons he claims and that his failure to maintain enrolment, particularly from the end of 2019 was as a result of the robbery.

(c) The finding in TD [45] where the Tribunal rejected the applicant's claim he did not know his COE had been cancelled in September 2019, and that the College he had been studying at had refused to return his calls, and he could have, but did not, act on the advice he was given in an email dated 10 September 2019 about contacting the College to re-enrol.

(d) The finding in TD [46] where the Tribunal did not accept that the consequences of the COVID pandemic left the applicant unable to study or that his failure to maintain enrolment in the period was for that reason.

1. The substance of the applicant's written submissions on issue (a) was as follows (quoting from the applicant's written submissions prepared by the applicant's previous barrister):
   1. The overall conclusion of the Tribunal is best summarised by its statement that whilst it accepted that the Applicant's travel to Australia "was for the purpose of study it does not except [sic] ...that from 2019 his stay in Australia was for the purpose of study."
   2. For the reasons given above, most of the key findings of the Tribunal are irrational, illogical and, as they lack an evident and intelligible justification, are legally unreasonable. If those findings had not been made there is every possibility that there would have been a different result. The findings were therefore material, establishing the Tribunal's errors as jurisdictional.
   3. However, the Tribunal has also layered a further material error onto the above. Given that the Tribunal accepts that the Applicant came to Australia for the purpose of study, given that it accepts that he pursued that study from 2015- 2019; given that it accepts that he has good reason to return to India after his studies; given that it accepts that his studies were interrupted by the three traumatic events of the armed robbery, the mix up with fees leading to enrolment cancellation, and the onset of COVID; and given that it accepts that he did finally re-enrol, the Tribunal nonetheless concludes that whilst the Applicant did genuinely come to Australia to study, as from late 2019 till the hearing before the Tribunal in 2022, his stay in Australia ceased to be for the purpose of study.
   4. Then what was his purpose in Australia from 2019-2022, in the opinion of the Tribunal? This has not been addressed or articulated by the Tribunal, and it needed to be. Not to express an opinion on the Applicant's purpose for being in Australia, is to fail to come to grips with the most important aspect of the case. Even putting aside, for the moment, the irrationality, illogicality and unreasonableness of the Tribunal's treatment of the Applicant's evidence, how can the Tribunal say that the Applicant's stated purpose of being in Australia to study is not true, when it does not articulate what it believes his real purpose is?

1. The substance of the first respondent's submissions on this issue was as follows (quoting from the first respondent's written submissions):
   1. The applicant submits the Tribunal accepted he was robbed in June 2019 yet found it was not satisfied he had demonstrated his emotional and mental response to those events left him unable to study, particularly from the end of 2019 (Applicant's submissions (AS) at [6]).
   2. The applicant acknowledges that he gave evidence that he was "over it [the June 2019 robbery] and could work and study by the end of 2019" (AS at [5]), however now complains that the Tribunal should not have accepted that self-diagnosis such that its decision was illogical (AS at [7]). The applicant submits the Tribunal should have taken judicial notice of "the impact of...being the victim of an armed robbery...known to be deleterious, and impactful on the mental health of the victim in the long term" (AS at [9]).
   3. The first respondent respectfully submits this argument has no merit and must fail. It was plainly open to the Tribunal to rely on the applicant's own admissions that he was "over it" by the end of 2019. The Tribunal's decision record at [30] indicates that the Tribunal specifically pressed the applicant on his evidence that he was "over it" by the end of 2019, in the context of seeking help from his friend towards the end of 2020, and records that the applicant gave evidence that "he was able to study and work from the end of 2019". He also gave evidence that he engaged in casual work from August 2019 to September 2021 and worked for Apple from September 2021 onwards (at [33], CB 136-137). It cannot be said that in relying on the applicant's admission and evidence, the Tribunal's finding that the June 2019 robbery did not mean he was unable to study between 2019 to 2021 (at [44], CB 138), rose to the level of "extreme" illogicality necessary to vitiate the decision (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99 at [148]).
   4. Further, the Tribunal rejected the applicant's claim that he had sought help from a friend who worked at Mental Health Stride as a result of the robbery incident, on the basis that if it were true, his evidence in that regard would have been consistent (at [44], CB 138). This finding was not a merely a "credibility problem" (cf AS at [8]), rather it formed a basis for the Tribunal's conclusion that the June 2019 robbery did not mean he was unable to study.
   5. The applicant also submits that the Tribunal accepted there was a mix up in the payment of fees in August 2019, however found that if his purpose of staying in Australia was to study, he would have completed the required statutory declarations and re-enrolled prior to COVID lockdowns in March 2020. The applicant submits that in doing so, the Tribunal illogically failed to consider the impact of the June 2019 robbery, the confusion in the payment of fees, and COVID (AS at [10]-[12]).
   6. The first part of this argument likewise fails if the Court accepts it was open to the Tribunal to find, for the reasons given above, that the June 2019 robbery did not mean he was unable to study. In relation to the balance of the applicant's complaints, the Tribunal acknowledged the mix up in the payment of fees, however found that he was provided with the means of re-enrolling as early as 10 September 2019, some 6 months prior to COVID lockdowns in March 2020, and that he did not make any attempts to do so until June 2020, about 9 months later (at [45] CB 138). These findings were again, plainly open to the Tribunal.
   7. The applicant separately claims that the Tribunal, having found that the purpose of the applicant's stay in Australia between 2019 to 2022 was not to study, erred in failing to articulate what the applicant's purpose of staying in Australia actually was (AS at [17]-[19]). This argument is misconceived.
   8. The Tribunal had regard to the Department's Procedural Instruction 'General visa cancellation powers' (at [18]), which listed ten matters that should be taken into account when deciding whether to cancel the visa, with the matters generally to be weighed in the applicant's favour. One of those matters was "the purpose of the visa holder's travel to and stay in Australia: delegates should assess whether the visa holder has a compelling need to travel to or remain in Australia".
   9. Accordingly, there was no need for the Tribunal to make any finding as to what the applicant's actual purpose of staying in Australia was. It was sufficient for it to find the purpose was not to study (being contrary to the purpose of the student visa that had been cancelled), and that there was not a compelling need to travel to or remain in Australia.
2. At the hearing before me the first respondent re-iterated the written submissions on this ground.

1. The ground of legally unreasonableness is made out where a decision maker comes to a conclusion that no reasonable Tribunal could have reached or makes a decision that is devoid of an "evident and intelligible justification": see Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Gageler JJ) at [68] and [76]).
2. The Tribunal decision may also be legally unreasonable "if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn": Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) (Gummow ACJ, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel And Bell JJ) at [135]).
3. In Djokovic the Full Court of the Federal Court summarised the principles relevant to legal unreasonableness based on illogical or irrational decision-making as follows (citations omitted):

[33] The characterisation of a decision (or a state of satisfaction) as legally unreasonable because of illogicality or irrationality is not easily made: ....

[34] The task in assessing illogicality is not an exercise in logical dialectic. "Not every lapse of logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A Court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case": .... It is the ascertainment, through understanding the approach of the decision-maker and characterising the reasoning process, of whether the decision (or state of satisfaction) is so lacking a rational or logical foundation that the decision (or relevant state of satisfaction) was one that no rational or logical decision-maker could reach, such that it was not a decision (or state of satisfaction) contemplated by the provision in question. Some lack of logic present in reasoning may only explain why a mistake of fact had been made which can be seen to be an error made within jurisdiction. ... [T]he evaluation of whether a decision was made within lawful boundaries is not definitional, but one of characterisation and whether the decision was sufficiently lacking in rational foundation, having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of power, that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes.

[35] Ultimately, the question is whether the satisfaction of the relevant state of affairs or matter was irrational, illogical or not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds: ..., such that it cannot be said to be possible for the conclusion to be made or the satisfaction reached logically or rationally on the available material. It will then satisfy the characterisation of unjust, arbitrary or capricious.

1. Recently, in EUD24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCAFC 128 (EUD24), at [35] the Full Court confirmed that consistent with Djokovic jurisdictional error may be established on the basis of legal unreasonableness, or illogical or irrational findings, "on the way" to the final conclusion: also see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516. That is, they apply to both the outcome of the decision and the process by which it is made (including critical findings of fact and the reasoning that led to that outcome): see also Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Lieu [2023] FCAFC 57; (2023) 297 FCR 162 at [81] (Mortimer CJ).
2. The Court held in EUD24 at [36] (omitting references):

To be clear, this does not mean that any illogical or irrational finding of fact will constitute jurisdictional error: jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result... In this way, the "critical step" approach to the illogicality or irrationality ground has a built-in requirement of materiality and can be readily accommodated with the High Court's discussion of materiality.

1. Applying these authorities, I do not accept the applicant's submissions that the "key [or critical] findings" of the Tribunal made on the way to the outcome, as identified by the applicant, are legally unreasonable, or illogical, or irrational. I will deal with each of the impugned findings below.
2. The first finding challenged is found at TD [42]. The applicant submitted the Tribunal's conclusion in TD [42] that from late 2019 till the hearing before the Tribunal in 2022, the applicant's stay in Australia ceased to be for the purpose of study, was devoid of an evident and intelligible justification. It was submitted the Tribunal's finding was legally unreasonable, illogical or irrational because the Tribunal did not offer an alternative reason why the applicant had been in Australia (other than for study).
3. I do not accept this submission. At TD [42] the Tribunal relevantly found:
   1. While the Tribunal has accepted above that his travel to Australia in 2015 was for the purpose of study it does not except for the reasons outlined below that from 2019 his stay in Australia was for the purpose of study. The Tribunal views the extended length of time he was not enrolled from August 2019 to December 2021, a period of over 2 years to be significant and to undermine his claim his stay in Australia was and is for the purpose of study. The Tribunal is of the view if his intention was to study, he would have enrolled and studied in this period. It also views as undermining that if he is in Australia for the purpose of studying that his enrolment in the Bachelor of information Systems was cancelled for unsatisfactory course progress in February 2019.
4. The reasons for the finding in the first sentence were threefold based on the evidence. First, the period of non-study of 2 years undermined the applicant's claim; second, if it was the applicant's intention he would have enrolled in study during that period, but he did not; and third, the applicant's claim his purpose for staying was for study was further undermined by the cancellation of a course in which he was enrolled in February 2019. These were thus evident and intelligible reasons given for the conclusion the applicant's stay in Australia ceased to be for the purpose of study.
5. Further, as the first respondent submitted, based on the Department's Procedural Instruction 'General visa cancellation powers', there was no need for the Tribunal to make any finding as to what the applicant's actual purpose of staying in Australia was. It was sufficient for it to find the purpose was not to study and that there was not a compelling need to travel to or remain in Australia (see TD [49)). In my view, the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in its consideration of the issue in Department's Procedural Instruction, in particular its consideration of the matters under the heading **"**The purpose of the applicant's travel and stay in Australia, whether the applicant has a compelling need to travel or remain in Australia".
6. The second finding challenged is at TD [44]. Contrary to the applicant's submission, the finding regarding the impact the robbery had on the applicant's ability to study from the end of 2019 was also a finding reasonably open to the Tribunal on the evidence. There were three reasons given by the Tribunal for this finding at TD [30]. They were:

(a) First, that the applicant gave evidence that he had no physical evidence and did not seek help from a GP, a psychiatrist or psychologist.

(b) Second, the applicant gave evidence to the Tribunal that in relation to the robbery, he was "over it by the end of 2019".

(c) Third, as the first respondent submitted, the Tribunal rejected the applicant's claim that in 2020 he had sought help from a friend who worked at Mental Health Stride as a result of the robbery, on the basis that it was inconsistent with his evidence he had got over the event by the end of 2019.

1. It was therefore reasonably open to the Tribunal Member to find (as it did) in TD [44] that:
   1. ...While the Tribunal accepts that there were events that occurred outside the applicant's control, such as the robbery, it is not satisfied that the applicant demonstrated that his emotional and mental response to these events left him unable to study, particularly from the end of 2019 and that his failure to maintain enrolment was as a result of these events. It is of the view that if the mental stress he faced was to the extent that he could not study he would have sought medical or professional help in 2019. It is therefore not satisfied that the applicant demonstrated that this event left him unable to study for the reasons he claims and that his failure to maintain enrolment, particularly from the end of 2019 was as a result of this event.
2. In my view the finding at TD [44], given the evidence of the applicant on the impact of the robbery on him, did not lack an evident or intelligible justification. There was a logical connection between the evidence (he was "over it by the end of 2019") and the conclusion reached on the issue (he was able to study from the end of 2019). It was not illogical, irrational, or legally unreasonable in the sense explained by the Full Court in Djokovic.
3. The third finding challenged in ground 1 is at TD [45], in relation to the inadvertent cancellation of the applicant's COE in September 2019. In my view, again, the finding on this matter that if the purpose of his stay in Australia was to study, he would have been in contact with the relevant College sooner than June 2020, was reasonably open on the evidence. As the first respondent submits, and I accept, the Tribunal acknowledged the mix up in the payment of fees, however it found that the applicant was provided with the means of re-enrolling as early as 10 September 2019 in an email from the College. This was some six months prior to COVID lockdowns in March 2020, and, as the Tribunal found, he did not make any attempts to do so until June 2020, about nine months later. Again, there was a logical connection between the evidence and the conclusion made on the issue. In my view, the finding in TD [45] was not illogical, irrational, or legally unreasonable in the sense explained by the Full Court in Djokovic.
4. The fourth finding challenged in ground 1 is at TD [46], the finding the Tribunal did not accept that the consequences of the COVID19 pandemic left the applicant unable to study or to re-enrol. At TD[46] the Tribunal found:
   1. ...the Tribunal questions this when he was able to obtain enrolment in December 2021 to start in January 2022 after receiving the NOICC and prior to the delegate's decision. The Tribunal is of the view while COVID may have impacted study in person, there were many online IT courses available for the applicant to enrol in and does not accept that his failure to maintain enrolment was as a result of the COVID pandemic and his ability to become enrolled due to his study history and the Department decision to cancel the visa. It does not accept these circumstances left him unable to study and his failure to maintain enrolment in the period was for this reason.
5. I consider this conclusion on the impact of the COVID pandemic was also reasonably open on the evidence. It was based on the finding that while it may have impacted "in person" study, there were many online IT courses available for the applicant to enrol in during COVID19. As French CJ said in Li, the requirement of reasonableness is not a vehicle for challenging a decision on the basis that the decision-maker has made an evaluative judgment with which a court disagrees even though that judgment is rationally open to the decision-maker. I consider the finding in TD [46], like in all the key findings made by the Tribunal discussed above, had an evident and intelligible justification in the sense explained in Li.
6. I do not consider any of the findings of the Tribunal challenged by the applicant (as outlined above) to be illogical, irrational, or legally unreasonable as they were each based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds. None of the findings challenged by the applicant satisfy the characterisation of being "unjust, arbitrary or capricious" and the decision, in my view, was one that was "within the range of possible lawful outcomes": Djokovic at [35].
7. Issue (a) does not establish the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error.

**Issue (b): Whether the Applicant was denied procedural fairness, by the Tribunal failing to reveal its reasoning on what the Tribunal decided was the Applicant's purpose for remaining in Australia, and by failing to give the Applicant an opportunity to comment on and refute that reasoning

1. The substance of the applicant's written submissions on this issue were as follows (omitting footnotes):
   1. By definition, if the Applicant's purpose in Australia is not to study, then he must have another purpose for being here. The number of alternative purposes which could have been in the Tribunal's mind are limited. Did the Tribunal think that the Applicant was staying in Australia for work opportunities, or for residency opportunities? It is difficult to imagine what other possibilities the Tribunal may have contemplated. In any event, whatever was its reasoning, that reasoning should have been revealed to the Applicant, so that he had the opportunity to refute it. However all we have from the Tribunal is: "The Tribunal questioned whether he is in Australia to study and he says he wants to study." By failing to reveal its reasoning to the Applicant on this central aspect of the matter, and giving him an opportunity to address it, the Tribunal denied the Applicant procedural fairness.

1. In Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80, at [33] Kiefel CJ, Keene and Gleeson JJ said: "There will generally be a realistic possibility that a decision-making process could have resulted in a different outcome if a party was denied an opportunity to present evidence or make submissions on an issue that required consideration." Here, had the Tribunal revealed its reasoning on what it thought the Applicant's purpose for being in Australia had become, and the Applicant had had a chance to address and refute that 'issue that required consideration', a very different outcome may have resulted. Thus the denial of procedural fairness to the Applicant was material, indicating that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.

1. As outlined above, the applicant relied upon the written submissions and did not make any oral submissions on this ground.

1. The substance of the first respondent's submissions on this issue were as follows:
   1. The Tribunal's review was pursuant to Part 5 of the Act, noting the delegate's decision to cancel the visa pursuant to s 116 of the Act was a Part 5 reviewable decision (s 338(3) of the Act).
   2. Division 5 in Part 5 of the Act (in force at the time of the Tribunal's decision) was taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it dealt with (s 357A of the Act).
   3. The Tribunal's procedural fairness obligations were accordingly limited to the need to invite the applicant to comment on, or respond to, "information" that it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review (s 359A of the Act). "Information" for the purposes of s 359A of the Act relates to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, such that there was no obligation for the Tribunal to provide the applicant with a running commentary of its subjective appraisals, thought processes, or determinations, nor the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in weighing up the applicant's evidence (see SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; 147 CLR 297 at [18]).
   4. The Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant's purpose in staying in Australia was not to study therefore did not fall within the scope of s 359A of the Act, such that no error arises.
2. At the hearing before me the first respondent re-iterated the written submissions on this ground.

1. I do not accept the applicant's submission the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by not revealing its reasoning on what the Tribunal decided was the Applicant's purpose for remaining in Australia, and by failing to give the Applicant an opportunity to comment on and refute that reasoning in advance of its decision.
2. As the first respondent submitted, and I accept, the Tribunal's procedural fairness obligations for reviewing s 116 decision are set out in Part 5 of the Act. Any procedural fairness obligation to invite the applicant to comment on information that the Tribunal considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review, was set out in s 359A. The Tribunal had no other general procedural fairness obligation relating to giving the applicant advanced notice of what that the Tribunal was considering would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.
3. In SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [1981] HCA 26; (2007) 147 CLR 297 (SZBYR) at [18] the High Court considered the cognate provision to s 359A under the Act, s 424A, and held that "information" in s 424A (or s 359A) did not include the Tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes and determinations, findings of inconsistency, defects, gaps or lack of detail in an applicant's evidence. In other words, the Tribunal was not required to provide the applicant with a running commentary on any of its preliminary subjective assessments of the applicant's evidence, or any inconsistencies in that evidence: see MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483; [2008] FCA 319 at [29]; SZTGV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FAR 90; [2015] FCAFC 3 at [24].
4. Therefore the Tribunal was not under any obligation in s 359A to give to the applicant for comment its preliminary thought processes on, or assessment of, the applicant's evidence as to his purpose for staying in Australia. As it did not fall within the scope of s 359A, no obligation arose or was enlivened to provide that type of information for comment in advance of the Tribunals' decision. There was no jurisdictional error based a denial of procedural fairness as pleaded in ground 2.
5. Ground 2 is rejected.

1. The applicant has not established that the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error.
2. As the applicant is unrepresented, I am required to consider whether any arguable substantive jurisdictional error in the decision sought to be reviewed arises from the material before me: see MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [112] and [113]. I am satisfied that no arguable substantive jurisdictional error arises from my review of the Tribunal decision in this matter.
3. The application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Cleary.