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[2003] NSWSC 365
Supreme Court of NSW
2003-05-05
Nicholas J
Original judgment source is linked above.
The application of this principle is not limited to curial proceedings. Contrary to the Plaintiff's submissions, they apply to adjudications under the Act. 37 It seems to me wrong in principle that in these circumstances and where, after communication of the determination, the Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement of either s 23(1)(a) or (b) of the Act it should be open to it to assert that the payment claim was invalid as a ground for refusal of summary judgment in these proceedings. In my opinion the submissions should be rejected. Ultra vires 38 It was submitted that the Adjudicator acted ultra vires s 22(2)(b) in that:
(a) in the course of construing the contract he made a finding in para 11 of his reasons concerning the existence of implied terms;
(b) he made a finding in para 26.12 of his reasons that the contract included an oral term;
(c) he made a finding in para 25.17 of his reasons that, upon its proper construction, the contract obliged the Plaintiff to pay GST. 39 At the conclusion of his oral submissions to the court Mr Newton, counsel for the Plaintiff, summarised the questions as to ultra vires this way (T.page 46):
(a) The Adjudicator stepped outside his powers insofar as he resorted to "findings of law" in deciding the existence or otherwise of oral or implied terms of the contract.
(b) He acted ultra vires in that he received, and ruled upon, evidence in relation to the existence or otherwise of the terms of the contract.
(c) He acted ultra vires in that, in effect, he acted as a tribunal of fact in dealing with evidence concerning the appropriate rate or rates to be applied in respect of some parts of the claim and in making findings based upon his preference of "one set of evidence against another where he had no power to do so".
(d) He made a finding of law as to the date on which an obligation to make payments fell due.
40 Importantly, during the hearing Mr Newton acknowledged that he was unable to show that any conduct said to be ultra vires was relevant to, or affected, the determination of any component of the adjudicated amount. It was not put that in reaching his decision the Adjudicator illegitimately took into account matters outside the issues arising from the payment claim, the payment schedule and the submissions. To the best of my understanding the gravamen of the complaint as elicited in arguendo was that it was not open to the Adjudicator to decide whether or not the contract contained an implied term, and it was not open to him to construe the provisions of the contract to determine whether the Plaintiff was obliged to pay GST. 41 The Adjudicator's powers are found in s 22(2) of the Act which provides: "22 (2) In determining an adjudication application, the adjudicator is to consider the following matters only: (a) the provisions of this Act, (b) the provisions of the construction contract from which the application arose, (c) the payment claim to which the application relates, together with all submissions (including relevant documentation) that have been duly made by the claimant in support of the claim, (d) the payment schedule to which the application relates, together with all submissions (including relevant documentation) that have been duly made by the respondent in support of the schedule, (e) the results of any inspection carried out by the adjudicator of any matter to which the claim relates". 42 Thus, in the process of determining an adjudication application the Adjudicator is, at least, obliged to consider the provisions of the relevant contract (s 22(2)(b)), the payment claim and submissions and relevant documentation in support (s 22(2)(c)) and the payment schedule and submissions and relevant documentation in support (s 22(2)(b)). From these provisions it is perfectly clear that the legislature envisages that parties will raise disputed issues, and requires the Adjudicator to resolve them in the course of making a determination of the amount and date pursuant to s 25(1). 43 It is impossible to accept that the proper exercise of power and discharge of function would not ordinarily require an adjudicator to interpret contractual documents and/or evidence as to the existence of an oral contract or oral terms, and/or to make findings as to the existence and effect of contractual provisions whether express, implied, written or oral. (In passing, it is to be observed that by s 7 the Act applies to any construction contract, whether written or oral, or partly written and partly oral). It seems clear enough from the Minister's statement referred to in para 32 above, and as a matter of plain common sense having regard to the terms of s 22, these are likely to be necessary steps to be taken in the course of deciding a dispute the ambit of which is evidenced by the payment claim and the payment schedule. Acceptance that the process is not judicial and that there is no power to call for witnesses or to give evidence under oath provides no support for the Plaintiff's submissions. 44 In my opinion it was properly within the Adjudicator's powers and functions to consider, and to come to a view about, each of the matters relied upon by the Plaintiff as being conduct ultra vires, and the submission must be rejected. In any event, the acknowledgement that none of these matters affected the determination of any component of the adjudicated amount is tantamount to an acknowledgment that the ultra vires question raises no triable issue. Conclusion 45 Having regard to s 25(4) of the Act, I am satisfied as to the existence of the circumstances referred to in subs (1) that:
(a) the Plaintiff has failed to pay the whole or any part of the adjudicated amount to the Defendant; and
(b) the Plaintiff has failed to give security for payment of the whole or any part of the adjudicated amount to the Defendant. 46 For the reasons given I hold that the Plaintiff has failed in its opposition to the relief sought in the notice of motion. I am satisfied that the Defendant is entitled under s 25(2)(a) to recover the whole of the adjudicated amount from the Plaintiff as a debt due to it, and is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Pt 13 r 2 for the sum of $71,086.52. 47 I expect the parties to agree on the amount of interest, if any, payable in respect of the claim. In the circumstances it is appropriate that I direct the Defendant to bring in short minutes of orders which give effect to the reasons for decision. The parties may also address me in relation to costs. Directions may also be given in relation to the further conduct of the issues arising on the summons and the cross claim. Arrangements should be made with my Associate by 9 May 2003 for the relisting of this matter.
Last Modified: 05/14/2003 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Parist Holdings Pty Ltd
WT Partnership Australia Pty Ltd
CITATION : Parist Holdings Pty Ltd v WT Partnership Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 365 HEARING DATE(S) : 22/04/03; 23/04/03; 24/04/03 JUDGMENT DATE : 5 May 2003
CATCHWORDS : CONSTRUCTION, SECURITY OF PAYMENT ADJUDICATION, Whether Adjudicator acted ultra vires in adjudication and determination - whether Adjudicator's determination a nullity - whether payment claim is foundation of jurisdiction of Adjudicator - whether serious issues to be tried - whether Defendant entitled to declarations and summary judgment - HELD: Defendant entitled to recover adjudicated amount from Plaintiff as debt due to it and entitled to summary judgment of $71,086.52 LEGISLATION CITED : Building Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) ss 4-7, s 13, s, 13(2), s 13(2)(a)-(b), s 14, s 17, s 17(2), s 19(2), s 20, s 20(2), s 21, s 22, s 22(1), s 22(2), s 22(2)(b)-(d), s 23(1)(a)-(b), s 25, s 25(1), s 25(2), s25(1)(a)-(b), s 25(2)(a), s 25(4), s 25(5)(a) Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 94 Beckhaus v Brewarrina Council (2002) NSWSC 960 Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 Cowling Construction Ltd v CFW Architects (a firm) [2002] EWHC 2914 (TCC) CASES CITED : Hawkins Construction (Aust) Pty Ltd v Mac's Industrial Pipework Pty Ltd (2002) NSWCA 136 Liftronic Pty Ltd v Unver (2001) HCA 24; (2001) 75 ALJR 867 Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 Walter Construction Group Ltd v CPL (Surry Hills) Pty Ltd (2003) NSWSC 266 PARTIES : Parist Holdings Pty Ltd - Plaintiff WT Partnership Australia Pty Ltd - Defendant FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 55010/03 COUNSEL : R K Newton - Plaintiff M Christie - Defendant SOLICITORS : Summit Law - Plaintiff Deacons - Defendant
(1986) 162 CLR 1
(2001) 75 ALJR 867
(1992) 26 NSWLR 234