1. In this proceeding the applicant, Rohit Panjla, ('Mr Panjla') sought review of a decision by the respondent, the Transport Accident Commission ('TAC') to deny him compensation for an incident in which he was the driver of a motor vehicle and sustained very serious injuries.
2. That TAC decision was dated 12 March 2024 and is the reviewable decision in this proceeding.
3. Mr Panjla was denied compensation on the basis the TAC claimed the incident was not a transport accident as defined in the Transport Accident Act 1986 ('the Act').
4. The parties filed a joint Tribunal Book.[1] References to evidence are generally references to material in the joint Tribunal Book unless otherwise indicated. Mr Panjla gave evidence at the hearing.
5. The Tribunal has decided to affirm the decision under review.
6. What follows are the reasons of the Tribunal for the decision.

1. The following description of what happened is drawn primarily from a statement Mr Panjla gave to the Victoria Police on 9 January 2024 and which was adopted by him at the hearing.[2]
2. On 5 October 2023 Mr Panjla was driving a van from his home in Tullamarine to Mildura. He had driven the van from a warehouse owned by Lazy Moes in Campbellfield to Tullamarine, to collect some of his possessions and take them to Mildura where he was going to start work in a café.
3. He stopped the van at a service station to buy some fuel. He intended putting diesel fuel in a plastic container. While filling the container, he realised he was filling it with petrol, not diesel. He stopped filling the container and paid for the petrol. Mr Panjla estimates the container was half full. He is unsure about the volume of the container but thinks it was between about 10 and 20 litres capacity. He placed the container on the floor of the front passenger side of the van. He then started to drive to Mildura. He was travelling alone.
4. He did not stop along the way. The weather was cold so he did not open the van windows.
5. His evidence is that after he had passed the town of Sea Lake, he opened both the front passenger and driver's windows and lit a cigarette. He did this using a cigarette lighter. Shortly after lighting the cigarette, he realised there was a small fire on the floor to the left of his left foot.
6. He threw the cigarette out of the window and tried to find a place to safely pull the van over to the side of the road. The evidence is that he was then travelling at about 100kph.
7. He recalls 'a big fire, like an explosion' in the front set of the van before he came to a stop. When he stopped, he 'had a bit of trouble getting out of the van because of the fire and my seatbelt'.
8. After he stopped and got out of the van, he recalls two other cars stopping and being helped by people from those cars. The evidence is that at least one of those people called an ambulance and was told how to help Mr Panjla.[3] Mr Panjla's clothes were burning. His body was on fire. The van was also on fire and several explosions came from the van. A tree caught on fire. Mr Panjla was screaming in pain. While waiting for an ambulance one of the callers was advised to pour cold water on Mr Panjla.
9. Eventually, an ambulance arrived. Mr Panjla received some treatment from the paramedics. An air ambulance was called. It took Mr Panjla to the Alfred Hospital in Melbourne. Police also attended the scene of the incident.
10. Mr Panjla was admitted to the Alfred. He remained in hospital for several weeks. He had multiple surgeries. He started rehabilitation and is still having to undergo surgeries.

1. On 24 October 2023 a Patient Liaison Officer completed a hospital TAC Claim Form on Mr Panjla's behalf.[4] This describes Mr Panjla's injuries as being 'under further medical investigation 50% [Total Body Surface Area] full thickness burns to head, neck, bilateral upper limbs circumferentially, back and bilateral thighs.'[5]
2. The TAC rejected Mr Panjla's claim for compensation in a letter dated 12 March 2024. In summary, the TAC said it was unable to accept the claim because the accident was not directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle.
3. The TAC described the key factors as being that Mr Panjla lit a cigarette in the vehicle; petrol fumes were ignited within the vehicle; and the fumes came from a fuel container located in the vehicle's cabin.
4. Mr Panjla sought a review of the TAC decision by the Tribunal.

1. At the hearing Mr Panjla was represented by Mr Madder of Counsel. Mr Madder made submissions to the Tribunal and relied on a written Outline of Submissions[6] and a Supplementary Outline of Submissions[7]. Mr Panjla gave oral evidence to the Tribunal and was cross examined.
2. Mr Madder said that the key factors of the incident included that:
   • Mr Panjla put a can of petrol on the passenger side of the floor of the cabin;
   • he lit a cigarette;
   • he noticed a small fire;
   • he was travelling at about 100kph;
   • he had to slow down before he cold safely stop;
   • he came to a stop by the side of the road;
   • he struggled to get out of the vehicle, being hindered by the heat and his seatbelt; and
   • the 'placing of the can of fuel is the relevant factor'.

1. Mr Panjla gave evidence and was cross examined. He told the Tribunal he had managed to establish his café in Mildura and was now working there.
2. His evidence included that:
   • his birthdate was 14 December 1993;
   • he was working as a full time chef;
   • he adopted the written statement he gave to police dated 9 January 2024_;_
   • he bought fuel from a Campbellfield petrol station;
   • he put the fuel can on the floor of the van near the passenger door;
   • the van had a high roof and was refrigerated;
   • the floor of the van was flat and there was no console dividing the driver's side from the passenger's side;
   • he started driving at about 3.30 or 4:00pm;
   • the road surface had lots of potholes;
   • the speed limit was 100 or 110kph;
   • after passing Wycheproof the speed limit was 110kph;
   • he thinks he was travelling at 100 to 105kph;
   • he lit a cigarette near Sea Lake;
   • he used a cigarette lighter which he carried in his pocket;
   • he noticed the flame to his left;
   • it was small, like a gas jet;
   • he tried to stop the van as quickly as possible;
   • he was travelling too fast to jump out of the van;
   • the fire grew bigger as he pulled the van over;
   • the van became completely engulfed in flames;
   • he couldn't move because of his seatbelt and the van door;
   • he noticed flames on himself;
   • when he got out of the van he rolled on the ground; and
   • after he left the van he heard sounds like firecrackers.
3. In cross examination he said, among other things, that:
   • he was an experienced driver;
   • he had collected the van from Lazy Moe's in Tullamarine and the red plastic fuel container from home;
   • he had accidentally half filled it with petrol, for which he paid;
   • the photos in the Tribunal Book at pages 102 to 103 (which showed the burnt out cabin of the van) were accurate;
   • the cabin was divided from the rear of the van;
   • he lowered the windows by about four inches because he wanted to smoke a cigarette;
   • he placed his cigarette lighter near the steering wheel, to his right, in the place where you could put coins;
   • he could not see what was burning;
   • he did not smell petrol;
   • he threw the cigarette out of the window;
   • he moved the van to his left; and
   • the fuel container was plastic and it closed with a screw top.

1. Mr Madder's submissions to the Tribunal included that:
   • Mr Panjla's injury was a transport accident;
   • causation under the Act was relevant;
   • fault was not relevant;
   • when examining the requirement that the incident had to be 'directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle' (as required by the definition of a transport accident) there could be more than one proximate cause, as was held in TAC v Iacuone[8].
2. Mr Madder referred the Tribunal to the decision in Larson v TAC.[9] The facts of the case involved a woman, Ms Larson, who was on a quad bike checking cattle and was charged by a cow. She had dismounted from her bike to inspect a cow, which became agitated as she approached it. Ms Larson got back on her bike. The cow attacked her while she was on the bike. At that time, the bike was immobile but the engine was running and Ms Larson was about to engage reverse gear to drive away. She and her bike were thrown into the river by the impact of the cow. Ms Larson suffered serious injuries.
3. Mr Madder submitted the question that had to be answered in that case was similar to the question in this case: whether what happened to Ms Larson was a transport accident within the meaning of the Act.
4. Mr Madder put the following propositions, derived from the decision in Larson v TAC, to the Tribunal:
   • an analysis of the facts is the vital ingredient in determining whether an incident was directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle;
   • the driving does not have to be the sole cause of the incident;
   • the reason why an incident occurs is multi-factorial; and
   • whether, on the basic facts, there is such a direct and sufficient non-coincidental nexus to enable it to fairly be said that the incident was directly caused by the driving.[10]
5. Mr Madder drew the Tribunal's attention to the ruling in Larson v TAC that the driving of the vehicle was inextricably linked with the incident and the resultant injury. The incident involving Ms Larson was directly caused by the driving of the bike.[11] Mr Madder submitted that in Larson v TAC there had been a necessary temporal connection and the same applied to Mr Panjla's incident.
6. Mr Madder referred to the decision by the Court of Appeal in Foursquare Construction Management Pty Ltd v VWA (Foursquare)[12] for the propositions that:
   • whether circumstances fall within or outside the definition of a transport accident in section 3 of the Act is determined by the particular factual matrix in a case;[13]
   • the driving of a vehicle is the propulsion and movement of the vehicle, including its movement to a stop, by the control and management of those functions; and
   • an incident which happens after the driving is completed may be directly caused by the driving, within the meaning of the definition, if the incident is intermediate in terms of space and time to the driving, but even then, the question is one of fact in every case.[14]
7. Mr Madder put the proposition that, based on Foursquare, Mr Panjla had to show that he was not spatially and temporarily removed from the driving of the vehicle.[15]
8. Mr Madder put to the Tribunal that Mr Panjla's injuries were directly caused by the driving, unlike the driver in the Foursquares case.[16] He said Mr Panjla was in the van when it caught fire. There was a spatial and temporal connection between Mr Panjla's injuries and the driving of the van, and it was an intimate connection.
9. Mr Madder referred next to Van der Wolf v TAC (Van der Wolf).[17] He submitted the Court of Appeal stated that the law requires a direct causal link between a feature of the driving (in the sense of movement or propulsion of the vehicle) and the incident that produces the injury.[18] He argued that the statutory test (for whether the injury arose out of the driving of a motor vehicle) was not an exclusionary test; and the Court of Appeal had stated that factual circumstances can vary and will necessarily determine the answer.[19]
10. Mr Madder said that it was part of Mr Panjla's case that the fuel had escaped the container. When challenged by the Tribunal that there was no evidence of fuel escaping from the container, he argued that the Tribunal could draw an inference that fuel had escaped. Mr Madder also said Mr Panjla did not need that inference to be drawn to succeed in his claim because having a fire in the vehicle when travelling at over 100kph is intimately connected with the driving of the vehicle.[20] In other words, the fact Mr Panjla was driving at 100kph and noticed the fire in the cabin of the vehicle is, of itself, intimately connected with the driving of the vehicle.
11. Mr Madder referred to Devi v TAC,[21] where a light pole falling on a car while it was being driven was accepted by the Tribunal to be a transport accident, as defined in the Act.
12. Mr Madder also referred to Havis v TAC,[22] where the Tribunal accepted that a driver was entitled to compensation where a tree fell on his vehicle while it was being driven.
13. These cases were relied upon to argue that if such random events, such as a falling tree or a falling light pole, gave an entitlement to compensation without considering the cause of these events, Mr Panjla was entitled to compensation because his situation was 'indistinguishable' from those cases.[23] Fault should not be considered as the TAC scheme is a 'no-fault' scheme.
14. It was argued for Mr Panjla that because he was driving the vehicle when the fire started and he could not safely pull over but had to keep driving while the fire burned, that his injuries are attributable to that continued driving of the vehicle.[24] It was argued that his inability or failure to take evasive action sooner so as to avoid his injuries was an 'essential component' of the incident to make the incident one that 'was directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle'.[25]
15. The fire could 'only have arisen' because a small amount of petrol escaped from the canister. That the amount of petrol was small explains why Mr Panjla did not smell it. The fuel 'must' have travelled across the floor of the vehicle.[26]
16. It is further argued that an inference can be drawn that the driving of the vehicle over the journey 'caused the petrol to "slosh" around sufficiently to escape the canister and to travel from the left hand side of the truck to the right'.[27]

1. The TAC was represented at the hearing by Ms Golshtein of Counsel. Ms Golshtein made oral submissions to the Tribunal and relied on a written Outline of Submissions[28].
2. Ms Golshtein's submissions included that:
   • this dispute is about whether the incident involving Mr Panjla was a transport accident;
   • and whether Mr Panjla is entitled to compensation under the Act;
   • were his injuries directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle, Mr Panjla bears the onus of proving his claim;
   • this is not a transport accident;
   • the incident is not captured by the definition in the Act; and
   • the Tribunal should affirm the decision under review as it is the correct and preferable decision.

1. Among other things, Mr Madder said if fumes had been building in the van Mr Panjla would have smelt those fumes.
2. He said the obvious explanation is that petrol escaped from the can due to the driving of the of the van and noted Mr Panjla gave evidence about the pot-holes in the road which he had to drive over.
3. Mr Madder said there is sufficient material for the Tribunal to draw an inference.

1. The Act includes provisions about the entitlement to compensation.

Section 35(1) of the Act relevantly reads: > > (1) A person who is injured as a result of a transport accident is entitled to compensation in accordance with this Act if -

1. Any entitlement to compensation depends on the injury resulting from a transport accident. This term is defined in section 3(1) of the Act:

transport accident means an incident directly caused by the driving of a motor car or motor vehicle, a railway train or a tram;

(Italics added)

1. Also relevant is section 3(3)(c) of the Act which states that:

(c) a reference to an injury or death in or as a result of or resulting from a transport accident, or to a person who is injured or dies in or as a result of a transport accident, is a reference to an injury or death directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle, a railway train or a tram or to a person who sustains injuries that were, or whose death was, directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle, a railway train or a tram. (Italics added)

1. The issue in this proceeding is whether the incident involving Mr Panjla was a transport accident within the meaning of the Act. There are two questions which need to be answered.
2. The first question is whether the incident giving rise to Mr Panjla's claim is a transport accident as defined in section 3(1) of the Act? This question focuses on the incident being a transport accident.
3. The second question, related to the first question, is whether Mr Panjla's injuries were directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle as specified in section 3(3)(c) of the Act? This question focuses on the cause of the injury resulting from a transport accident.
4. The Act requires that the injury 'be directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle'.
5. Mr Panjla has to prove that he is entitled to receive compensation. He bears the onus of proof.[29]
6. In summary, it was argued for Mr Panjla that:
   • the incident in which he was involved was a transport accident;
   • the injuries he sustained were caused by a transport accident; and,
   • if required, the Tribunal could draw all necessary inferences to enable that to be done.
7. It is true the TAC scheme is a no-fault scheme, but the TAC is not suggesting Mr Panjla was at fault.
8. The incident involving Mr Panjla is clearly distinguishable from the facts of both Devi and Havis which were referred to by Mr Madder. The incidents in both those cases were caused by things outside the vehicle which interacted with the vehicle while it was being driven. It is not particularly relevant to consider whether M Panjla took sufficient evasive action. The fact that Mr Panjla's incident occurred because of a fire inside his vehicle is relevant. This means that the cause of the fire has to be examined, as does any connection between the fire and the driving of the vehicle.
9. Neither is it particularly relevant to consider the way Mr Panjla drove to the side of the road and attempted to bring his vehicle to a safe stop. That matter does not address how the fire started and how it spread inside the vehicle. These are important facts. To seek to establish these facts is not to attribute blame but simply to establish facts necessary to deciding if this was a transport accident as defined by the Act.
10. In TAC v Treloar[30] the Court of Appeal held the injuries must be directly caused by the driving of the motor vehicle. The same approach was adopted by a single judge of the Court in Ross v TAC.[31]
11. The decision in Insurance Commission (WA) v Container Handlers Pty Ltd[32] (Container Handlers) makes clear that 'directly caused by the driving' is a narrower test than 'caused by the driving'. Relevantly, McHugh J said '... when the Act refers to a consequence of the 'driving' of the vehicle, it refers to a consequence of the actual operation and control of the direction and speed of the vehicle.'[33]
12. The Tribunal was referred to several cases which dealt with the meaning of 'directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle'.
13. In Kaan v Transport Accident Commission[34] (Kaan) the applicant was injured by glass when an object smashed the windscreen of his vehicle. The Tribunal said 'There is no evidence of any causal link between the driving of the motor vehicle or any aspect of the driving and that incident. Insofar as the applicant suffered any injury from the smashed windscreen that is not an injury caused by the driving and thus not an injury suffered in a transport accident.'[35] (Italics added.)
14. Similarly, in Burton v Transport Accident Commission[36] (Burton) the Tribunal said 'The fact that the incident occurred 'in the event' of driving is not sufficient. While there was in this case a temporal connection between the incident and the car being driven, the Act does not define a transport accident as an incident occurring 'in the course of driving'; it requires the incident to be 'directly caused by' the driving. More is required than that the incident have a connection with the use of a motor vehicle, or arise out of the driving of a motor vehicle.'[37] (Italics added.)
15. Mr Panjla was driving a motor vehicle when he was injured by the fire in his vehicle. He needs to show that his injuries were directly caused by the driving of the motor vehicle.

1. The Tribunal is satisfied the following facts occurred.
2. Mr Panjla was driving from Melbourne to Mildura on 5 October 2023. He purchased a quantity of petrol which he put in a plastic container on the floor of the van, on the passenger side. The container had a screw top lid.
3. When he was in the vicinity of Sea Lake, Mr Panjla opened the windows of the van he was driving. He lit a cigarette in the cabin of the van and a small flame was observed on the floor of the cabin, to the left of his left foot. He threw the cigarette out of the window. Fire soon engulfed the van. He was desperate to get out of the van but first focused on bringing the van to a safe stop by the side of the road. Once this was done, and with some difficulty, perhaps caused by his seatbelt, he got out of the van. He was on fire.
4. There is no suggestion of a collision having taken place with either another vehicle or any other object. There is no suggestion that Mr Panjla was at fault.

1. It was argued for Mr Panjla that facts about how the fire started and how it spread can be inferred by the Tribunal. Drawing an inference is more than guessing what happened. When the Tribunal draws any inferences as part of making its decision, it is engaging in a process governed by recognised legal requirements.
2. It was put to the Tribunal that various inferences could be drawn. It was argued that the Tribunal could infer that petrol had escaped from the container. It was argued that it could be inferred that in the course of driving over potholes on the surface of the road petrol came out of the container and sloshed over the floor of the cabin.
3. The law about drawing inferences was considered in Lemac v Transport Accident Commission.[38] (Lemac). To summarise the law on what inferences I can draw and can rely on:
   • First, any inference must be established by evidence.
   • Secondly, the process of reasoning must constitute a valid inference. It cannot rely on speculation or guesswork.
   • Thirdly, the conclusion must be the more probable inference from those facts. The inference drawn must reasonably be more likely than any competing inference.
   • Fourthly, I must give effect to the totality of the established facts.[39]
4. This means that before I can draw any inference, I must be satisfied about what facts do exist and what the facts are on which I can base any inference. If I am not satisfied about what the facts are, I cannot proceed to the second, third and fourth steps.
5. In this instance, the evidence necessary to allow inferences to be drawn has not been established. There was no evidence of a petrol leak, or of how petrol came to leak from the container. I was told the container was closed with a screw top lid. There was no explanation offered as to how that failed to work, which would have been necessary to establish that petrol escaped from the container. To draw an inference from that would have been speculation or guesswork.
6. I was told that driving over pot-holes in the road may have caused petrol to 'slosh' over the floor of cabin. This was an assertion not supported by evidence. In effect, this was speculation.
7. Things which rely on speculation or guesswork cannot be used as a substitute for evidence and cannot lay the foundation for inferences to be drawn. It follows that I cannot draw the suggested inferences.
8. I was told that petrol fumes in the cabin may have been ignited by Mr Panjla lighting a cigarette, but Mr Panjla gave evidence that he had not smelt any petrol fumes.

1. There is no doubt there was a fire which severely injured Mr Panjla, but it is unclear how the fire started. Despite having sympathy for what Mr Panjla suffered, and continues to endure, the Tribunal is bound by the words in the Act.
2. The Act requires that an incident giving rise to a claim for compensation must be directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle. I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the incident involving Mr Panjla was directly caused by him driving his motor vehicle.
3. Further, I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Panjla's injuries were directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle. His injuries occurred in the course of driving a motor vehicle but that is not the test in the Act.
4. The answer to the first question I asked above, is that Mr Panjla's claim cannot be considered a transport accident as defined in section 3(1) of the Act.
5. The answer to the second question I asked above, is that Mr Panjla's injuries were not directly caused by the driving of a motor vehicle as specified in section 3(3)(c) of the Act.
6. It follows that the decision under review must be affirmed.

[1] The Tribunal Book was dated 4 March 2025.

[3] The Tribunal Book contains audio recordings of four calls made to the emergency operator.

[6] Outline of Submission dated 18 September 2025.

[7] Supplementary Outline of Submissions dated 30 October 2025.

[8] [1998] VSC 192; (1998) 28 MVR 505.

[9] [2004] VCAT 537.

[10] [2004] VCAT 537 at [53] - [56].

[11] [2004] VCAT 537 at [59].

[12] [2022] VSCA 237; (2022) 68 VR 415.

[17] [2025] VSCA 24.

[19] Applicant's Outline [12] - [14].

[21] [2024] VCAT 111.

[22] [2006] VCAT 448.

[26] Applicant's Supplementary Outline at [8].

[27] Applicant's Supplementary Outline at [9].

[28] Respondent's Outline of submissions dated 10 October 2025.

[30] [1992] VicRp 31; [1992] 1 VR 447 at [20].

[31] Ross v TAC [2000] VSC 112.

[32] (2004) 218 CLR 89.

[34] [2006] VCAT 234.

[36] [2017] VCAT 1783.

[38] [2024] VCAT 690.

[39] See Lemac at [33] and [34], citing Simmonds-Thatcher v Kamari [2021] VSCA 133 at [72], which cited Masters Home Improvement Pty Ltd v North East Solution Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 88; (2017) 372 ALR 440, 446 at [101].