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[2024] WASC 322
Supreme Court of WA
2024-09-10
Lundberg J
Original judgment source is linked above.
P J Dunning KC, H Cooper, S F Gaussen, & S Palaniappan
P Dunning KC, H Cooper, S F Gaussen, & S Palaniappan
(a) QNI Proceeding: This is action CIV 2072 of 2017, which is the oldest of the four proceedings, having been commenced by the Mineralogy Parties in June 2017.
(b) Palmer Petroleum Proceeding: This is action CIV 1267 of 2018, commenced by the Mineralogy Parties in February 2018.
Together the QNI Proceeding and the Palmer Petroleum Proceeding are referred to as the Indemnity Proceedings.[1] These proceedings have been managed together in my list, and orders have previously been made that both actions be heard together at trial, by the same judge. I refer to the order to this effect made by Kenneth Martin J on 14 September 2020. There remain good grounds to continue with this approach, and no party is seeking to vary that order.
(c) 2023 MCP Proceeding: This is action CIV 2336 of 2023, commenced by the CITIC Parties on 27 November 2023. This action needs to be distinguished from the 2017 MCP Proceeding heard at trial by Kenneth Martin J in 2022, which was the subject of lengthy reasons delivered by his Honour in March 2023.[2] That decision is presently the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal which was heard over several days commencing on 12 August 2024 (which was after the hearing of these applications), with the Court having reserved its decision.[3]
(d) Fulcrum Proceeding: This is action CIV 2425 of 2023, which is the most recent of the actions filed, having been commenced by the Mineralogy Parties on 15 December 2023.
(b) orders to facilitate the use of evidence at trial across multiple actions (in the event concurrent trials are ordered);
(d) programming directions to progress the matters to trial.
I will explain each of these in some more detail below.
(a) for the 2023 MCP Proceeding and the Indemnity Proceedings to be case managed together by the same judge towards a trial being heard between April and June 2025; and
(b) for the sequencing applications to be adjourned, with liberty to apply at an appropriate juncture.
C. Relevant materials on the applications (1) Affidavit evidence
D. Relevant principles (1) Existence of the power
In my opinion, consolidation is desirable and should be allowed where, as here, the issues are substantially the same, and the evidence is to all intents and purposes identical. I would, however, hesitate to lay down any inflexible rule. Consolidation is intended to save time and expense, as well as to avoid the awkward consequences of contrary findings on the same set of facts. Because it cannot be shown to have been done before in a like instance, it does not follow that the course of procedure which was ordered is not a proper one.
A pragmatic approach requires close attention to the nature of the claims in each set of proceedings and the likely course of the litigation if the proceedings are consolidated or jointly heard, compared with the course of litigation if the proceedings remain separate. A pragmatic approach involves the Court bringing to bear its experience in the conduct of hearings and case management, taking into account such matters as the potential savings of time and expense of one outcome compared with the other, and also the basic imperative that every litigant is entitled to a fair opportunity to present his or her case to the Court. I was referred to s 56(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), but in my view the articulation of the overriding objective of facilitating the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real dispute between the parties simply confirms the approach to be taken to such matters as consolidation or joint hearing of proceedings.
(a) whether there are common questions of law or fact or a common transaction or series of transactions, of sufficient importance which renders it desirable that the whole of the matters should be disposed of at the same time;
(b) whether it is convenient to hear the actions together, including whether it will prevent a multiplicity of actions and ensure savings of time and cost;
(c) whether the court is satisfied it is unlikely to result in unfairness to any party, or to prejudice a party's ability to conduct their case;
(d) whether it will be conducive to a just resolution of the issues; and
(e) whether there are any relevant practical matters which may make it inexpedient to adopt this course.
[95] If substantially similar questions have to be resolved in three sets of proceedings, with substantially similar evidence adduced separately on three occasions, there will be a risk of conflicting decisions on questions of fact. That risk could be avoided by ordering a joint hearing before a single judge. But it is correctly pointed out on behalf of Mr Ghose that the risk of inconsistent findings is one of the factors to be weighed up by the Court in exercising its discretion on an application for a joint hearing. Eliminating every possibility of inconsistent findings is not an overriding imperative.
[96] In their reply submissions the Insurers contended that while the avoidance of inconsistent findings may be one of a number of factors that the Court will consider, the importance of this factor cannot be overstated, and in an applications such as this it should be treated as a significant or even determinative factor. They cite no fewer than eight cases to support these propositions. But the cases do not say more, in my view, than that this is an important matter. I have done my best to take it into account but I believe, in the circumstances of this case, that other factors outweigh it. (emphasis added)
[3] ...In our view, the primary judge failed (in the circumstances confronting him) to appreciate or take into account the hypothetical observer's understanding that whilst a judge has an ability to discard irrelevant information, the 'human frailty' of the decision maker and the subconscious effect the extraneous information might have in influencing the primary judge's final decisions nevertheless continue to be material.
[4] We should say at the outset that the primary judge carefully considered the various issues in deciding not to disqualify himself. He appreciated the "unusual need for caution" (J [48]), and in fact gave leave to appeal appreciating that the decision he made gave rise to issues of some general importance. However, this appeal shows that it may be more prudent for an independent mind (or minds) to consider disqualification applications on some occasions. This approach may assist to promote confidence in the legal system, which after all is a key rationale for the apprehended bias rule. As the primary judge understood, despite any countervailing issue of public policy and case management, if "the law requires disqualification then so be it" (J [52]).
[5] The primary judge was properly and selflessly motivated by a desire to achieve great economies if one docket judge could case manage and hear both regulatory proceedings and a class action when they involve consideration of the same underlying facts. The primary judge was mindful of the circumstance where the trial judge in Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1144; (2011) 202 FCR 439 ('Centro (No 2)') disqualified himself from hearing the class action after delivery of his judgment in the regulatory proceeding, a circumstance the primary judge wanted to avoid. The fact that the primary judge was concerned that he would find himself in the position of the trial judge in Centro (No 2) says something about the gravity of his concern.
The absolutist approach is myopic in its focus on only one aspect of justice: the perceived purity of having a fresh judge deal with each separate manifestation of the same controversy. The absolutist approach ignores other fundamental normative priorities, for example: avoiding undue delay, considerations of efficiency and cost, and avoiding inconsistent outcomes on the same or similar questions.
E. The Cape Preston Proceedings (1) The Indemnity Proceedings
Mr Dharmananda SC likened to a Nietzschean loop of endless repetition and recurrence, is highly unsatisfactory. The Court has power to vary its previous interlocutory orders, of course. But that power has limits. I do not propose to accede to this order.
... there is, up at Cape Preston, a real live operating project. It has provided employment and income for approximately 3000 full-time positions, income which flows to the workforces, families and communities. It had, to the end of last calendar year, generated royalties for the State of Western Australia of nearly A$1 billion, at a rate of approximately A$45 million per quarter. And as has been found by Martin J in earlier proceedings, decided between these parties, it is a project that the CITIC parties have invested more than US$12 billion to develop. It is a fully integrated operation for the mining, processing and export of magnetite. The importance of magnetite to the future industrial development of this state is notorious. The project operates under a State agreement. It cannot continue to operate without the submission by Mr Palmer's company, Mineralogy, jointly with Sino and Korean, of further proposals to the State and the approval of those proposals by the State under that agreement.
And that is, relevantly, because, to continue mining and processing operations, it is necessary to expand the areas approved for the mine pit, waste rock dumps and tailing storage facility. These constraints, imposed by the existing approved proposals, are already having a present and damaging impact on this project. Among other things, the mine pit is now so deep and so narrow that the rate at which the project can mine and, therefore, process ore will be one-third lower this calendar year than last calendar year.
And that is because the limited space within the mine pit limits the rate at which activities necessary for mining can be carried out, including drilling, blasting, scraping, loading, hauling, dewatering - they are all competing for the same limited space. That present reduction has a flow-on impact on the project's workforce and the income and royalties generated by this project. That impact will only worsen as the mine pit gets even deeper and narrower, further reducing the rate of mining and production to the point where it becomes uneconomic and, ultimately, physically impossible to continue mining operations.
Further, even if the project were to continue operating at those reduced rates, within the next few years, the project's tailings storage facility would be full, making it physically impossible to continue processing ore. As your Honour would appreciate, Sino and Korean have provided State agreement proposals to Mineralogy to enable the project to continue operating for a time, the 2023 MCPs. Those proposals involve no new tenure, avoiding the issues which arose in the last MCP proceeding.
Mineralogy has refused to submit them. The CITIC parties have been forced to bring a proceeding in this court, seeking relief in the nature of specific performance or mandatory injunctive relief to compel Mineralogy to do so. The CITIC parties sought that that proceeding be expedited, based on proper material and a full hearing before [Cobby J]. And [Cobby J] accepted that they are urgent - our learned friends say "reasonably urgent" but, in our submission, "reasonably urgent" still means urgent - and considered that they can and should be brought to trial either later this year or early next year, along with the FCD indemnity proceedings. To that end, as your Honour will have seen from our submissions, the CITIC parties have proposed that the 2023 MCP and FCD indemnity proceedings be heard between April and June next year. And to achieve that in the 2023 MCP proceedings, the CITIC parties have proposed timetabling orders which seek to bring that proceeding to trial in the first part of that period.
(a) at the time of commencement of the proceeding and at all material times thereafter:
(i) Sino Iron was in breach of the Sino MRSLA;
(ii) Korean Steel was in breach of the Korean MRSLA;
(iii) CITIC, Korean Steel and Sino Iron were in breach of the FCD,
(b) by reason of any, or any combination, of the allegations in paragraphs 37 to 99 inclusive of the substituted reply to the substituted defence filed 6 March 2024 (as amended from time to time) of the plaintiffs in Supreme Court of Western Australia Proceeding CIV24252072/20232017, Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC breached (or one or some of them):
(i) clause 27(b) of the Sino MRSLA and Korean MRSLA as the allegations constituted acts or the contemplation of acts that adversely affected the interests of Mineralogy in the Project Area;
(ii) clause 37.4 of the Sino MRSLA and Korean MRSLA, as the conduct alleged therein was a failure to act in good faith towards Mineralogy in relation to the performance of the Sino MRSLA and the Korean MRSLA;
(iiA) clause 11.5(c) of the FCD, as CITIC has not indemnified Mineralogy against loss it has suffered or incurred in relation to:
(A) Sino Iron's and Korean Steel's failures to perform their obligations in clauses 27(b) and 37.4 of the Sino MRSLA and Korean MRSLA; or
(B) CITIC's failure to cause Sino Iron and Korean Steel to so perform,
(iii) by operation of clause 25 of the FCD, the obligations of CITIC under the FCD are joint and several with Sino Iron and Korean Steel and are liable and responsible for the other's obligations under the FCD. A breach by CITIC of the FCD is a breach by Sino Iron and Korean Steel;
(iv) the conduct of the agents of Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC as alleged therein were the conduct of Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC pursuant to clause 1.6 of the MRSLAs;
(c) [deleted];
(d) by reason of any, or any combination, of the allegations in Supreme Court of Western Australia Proceeding CIV2072/2017, Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC were in breach of clause 11.5 of the FCD;
(e) by reason of any, or any combination, of the allegations in Supreme Court of Western Australia Proceeding CIV1267/2018, Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC were in breach of clause 11.5 of the FCD;
(f) the breaches were serious and of essential terms of the respective instruments;
(g) further or alternatively, the breaches were of interdependent obligations in the respective instruments, in that:
(i) the carrying out or participating in, Mining Operations for mining and extracting Magnetite Ore from the Mine Area (as defined in the MRSLAs) under clause 3.2(c) of the Sino MRSLA and the Korean MRSLA relied on by the plaintiff at paragraph 31 of the statement of claim, is dependent on, and interdependent with, clauses 27(b), 37.4 and the implied obligation of cooperation of the MRSLAs because it:
(A) constitutes relevant acts that would adversely affect the interest of Mineralogy in the Project Area or in any property, license or title, to which Mineralogy is the beneficial or legal owner under clause 27(b) of the MRSLAs;
(B) constitutes the performance of the MRSLAs in which Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC must act in good faith towards Mineralogy under clause 37.4 of the MRSLAs;
(C) encompassed by the mutual obligations under the implied obligation of cooperation pleaded at paragraph 32 of the statement of claim;
(D) is expressly granted subject to the balance of the Sino MRSLA and the Korean MRSLA;
(ii) the obtaining of Government Approvals and the assistance of Mineralogy in obtaining Government Approvals under clause 15.1 of the of the Sino MRSLA and the Korean MRSLA relied on by the plaintiff at paragraph 31 of the statement of claim is are dependent on, and interdependent with, clauses 27(b), 37.4 and the implied obligation of cooperation of the MRSLAs because the Government Approvals:
(A) constitute relevant acts that would adversely affect the interest of Mineralogy in the Project Area or in any property, license or title, to which Mineralogy is the beneficial or legal owner under clause 27(b) of the MRSLAs;
(B) constitute the performance of the MRSLAs in which Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC must act in good faith towards Mineralogy under clause 37.4 of the MRSLAs;
(C) are encompassed by the mutual obligations under the implied obligation of cooperation pleaded at paragraph 32 of the statement of claim;
(D) are Legal Requirements compliance with which, and subject to which, Mineralogy grants a Mining Right and Site Lease;
(iii) pursuant to clause 25 of the FCD, the obligations and liabilities of Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC under the Sino MRSLA, Korean MRSLA and FCD are joint and several and each is liable and responsible for the others' obligations;
(iv) further or alternatively, clause 4.1(b) of the FCD is dependent on and interdependent with clause 11.5 of the FCD because:
(A) the indemnity and guarantee under clause 11.5 is expressly granted by CITIC in consideration for Mineralogy granting the right under clause 4.1(b);
(B) the indemnity and guarantee under clause 11.5 is an essential term of the FCD and specific performance of clause 4.1(b) would not be granted which while the plaintiffs are in breach of it;
(C) it is encompassed by the mutual obligations under the implied obligation of cooperation pleaded at paragraph 34 of the statement of claim.
(h) the breaches were matters to which Mineralogy was entitled to have regard in considering the 2023 MCPs;
(i) by reason of the said breaches, Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC:
(i) are not able to establish an element of the causes of action pleaded in the statement of claim;
(a) the plaintiffs are not able to establish that they were ready and willing to perform the MRSLAs and FCD at the commencement of the proceeding;
(b) the plaintiffs are not able to establish that they were not in breach of essential terms of the MRSLAs and FCD at the times of the alleged requests and conduct pleaded in the statement of claim;
(c) the plaintiffs are not able to establish an obligation on Mineralogy to perform at all times material to this proceeding the alleged terms of the MRSLAs, FCD, Direct Agreement, Takeover Agreements and State Agreement;
(ii) were and are precluded from instituting proceedings for specific performance of the Sino MRSLA, Korean Steel MRSLA, State Agreement and FCD;
(j) Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC are disentitled from the relief sought in the claim;
81 As can be seen from the foregoing, the pleader has incorporated in [1(b)] the various allegations pleaded at [37] - [99] of the Mineralogy Parties' reply in the QNI Proceeding. Those pleas are of the 'Fulcrum Allegations', in essence, which form part of the disentitling conduct on the part of the CITIC Parties. The pleader has also incorporated in [1(d)] and [1(e)] the allegations which are to be found generally in the QNI Proceeding and the Palmer Petroleum Proceeding.
...demonstrate any willingness to negotiate in good faith for terms on which measures could be proposed to the State to enable the continued operation of the Sino Iron Project for the life of the mine
The CITIC parties' application for expedition of these proceedings
[158] Following Mineralogy's filing its application for these proceedings to be stayed, the CITIC parties formally applied for their expedition by way of chamber summons.
[159] In a sense, that application is unnecessary, because the matter has already been admitted to the court's Commercial and Managed Cases List. The pace at which the action proceeds is accordingly subject to control by the judge managing the proceedings.
[160] Having said that, I accept that there is a need to ensure that these proceedings are determined with reasonable urgency, although the position is complicated by the dismissal of the CITIC parties' strike out application.
[161] I accept Mr Goodwin's evidence to the effect that the present mining operations will be constrained within the next year or two by the inability to store the waste rock produced from mining operations and tailings produced by the concentration process. Given that the existing mine continuation proposals were approved in January 2010 and were intended to provide for five years of operation, with the first ore being shipped in 2013, it is not surprising that there is now a need to have the State approve new mine continuation plans.
[162] On the evidence, essentially all steps to prolong the operation of the mine have either already been taken, or are in the process of being taken.
[163] I also accept Mr Goodwin's evidence to the effect that it will take approximately two and a half years from the time that the 2023 MCPs are approved by the Minister, assuming that is what occurs, to obtain remaining government approvals and to construct the necessary additional mine infrastructure in order to continue mining operations.
[164] In my view, that means that the mine, all other things being equal, is likely to cease operations within the next few years.
[165] Mineralogy contends that the CITIC parties are principally concerned with their mining operations becoming unprofitable, as opposed to being unable to physically continue mining operations, such that the situation is not as urgent as claimed.
[166] Assuming that is correct, I cannot see why it is in anyone's interest, including Mineralogy, to delay the resolution of these proceedings. The CITIC parties contend, and Mineralogy did not appear to seriously contest, that a reduction in mining operations or their cessation will have a substantial impact on the number of people employed at the mine, which presently comprises approximately 3,000 people, and in the royalties payable to the State.
[167] In my view, those considerations favour the court taking steps to reduce the time the Project may operate at a reduced capacity. I consider that there is a real public interest in the ongoing disputes between these parties regarding the submission of new mine continuation plans to the Minister being resolved as soon as possible.
[168] Further, the court presently has the resources to determine the FCD Proceedings and this action in the near term, without necessarily delaying the determination of other litigants' claims.
[169] I therefore consider it is unnecessary to reach a final determination in relation to the CITIC parties' application for expedition, because I consider that the same outcome can be achieved through case management in the court's Commercial and Managed Cases List.
...
Future conduct of the proceedings
[171] My assessment of the issues in these proceedings is that they involve similar, but not identical, issues of fact to those raised before K Martin J in the 2017 MCP Proceedings, with the exception that the present proceedings do not involve any question of the grant of further access and use rights to tenements by Mineralogy to the CITIC parties, which was a central issue in the 2017 MCP Proceedings.
[172] As the FCD Proceedings have now been on foot for more than six years, I assume that they will be ready for trial this year or early in 2025, as had previously been indicated to Lundberg J.
[173] Because of the dismissal of the strike out application, these proceedings [i.e. the 2023 MCP Proceeding] will now have to await the determination of the FCD Proceedings.
[174] However, as I have accepted that these proceedings are reasonably urgent, and should proceed to a hearing as soon as can be accommodated by the court, I presently consider that the trial of this action should be held either concurrently with, or immediately following upon, the trials in the FCD Proceedings.
[175] As I have said, the resources available to the parties appear to be vast, such that they have the ability to prepare this action for trial within the time required for that to occur.
[176] Further, the court presently has the resources available to hear all three matters in the near future. For that reason, it appears to me that the case management of the current proceedings should be undertaken by the same judge as the judge who has case management of the FCD Proceedings.
[177] The parties will be advised which judge is to be the case manager once that has been determined by the court.
[41] The purposes of the Fulcrum Group (Fulcrum Purposes) were:
(a) to achieve the Contract 'Alteration' Objective;
(b) to recoup the additional costs of developing the Sino Iron Project in paragraphs [36](b) to [36](d) above from Mineralogy;
(c) to seek to sterilise Mineralogy's other valuable mining tenements; confound the evident commercial intent of the sophisticated contractual arrangements the parties agreed to; and render the CITIC Parties the one and only miner that Mineralogy must sell its other rights to, the other tenements having been rendered unsaleable and unusable by Mineralogy as a miner.
[36] By no later than May 2010, by reason of the matters alleged in paragraph [25] to [35], CITIC had determined that steps were required to be taken to alter the parameters in which the Sino Iron Project was operating, including the contractual regime and the area allocated to the Sino Iron Project under the CITIC Negotiated Agreements, to parameters more favourable to CITIC and any subsidiary company, and less favourable to Mineralogy and Mr Palmer (the Contract 'Alteration' Objective), by reason of each of:
(a) it having negotiated what it considered to be an unfavourable bargain to it and any subsidiary companies, compared to the position of Mineralogy and Mr Palmer, under the CITIC Negotiated Agreements;
(b) it and its subsidiary companies had suffered significant losses by reason of the foreign exchange hedging pleaded in paragraph [29] to [35] above, and as recorded in the CITIC FX Losses Announcement;
(c) it and its subsidiary companies could not recover from MCC the cost overruns in developing the Sino Iron Project or as a result of the Sino Iron Project Construction Delay, as MCC was also an entity ultimately owned by the People's Republic of China;
(d) consequently, the additional costs of developing the Sino Iron Project in (b) and (c) above were to be recouped from Mineralogy.
F. The parties' competing submissions (1) Mineralogy Parties
[6] The overlapping factual issues concerning the Fulcrum Allegations, arising from Mineralogy and Mr Palmer's pleadings across the different Proceedings, creates the risk of inconsistent findings of fact should the Fulcrum Proceeding be determined after the 2023 MCP Proceeding and the Indemnity Proceedings. But that (theoretical) risk is entirely of Mr Palmer's and Mineralogy's making. It is a risk capable of being managed.
[7] Such risks do not control the exercise of the Court's discretion. Eliminating every possibility of inconsistent findings is not an overriding imperative. Here, those risks are outweighed, comfortably, by the potential for delay in resolving the current impasse concerning the Project. The Court can keep a watchful eye on all Proceedings to in effect reduce or eliminate any undue risks of inconsistent findings.
(a) The CITIC Parties accept that the 'Fulcrum Allegations' are raised in the Mineralogy Parties' defence to the 2023 MCP Proceeding, but say that the defence is 'at best a minor issue in the proceeding and has already been described by the Court as weak'.[80]
(b) Similarly, the CITIC Parties submit that the 'Fulcrum Allegations' are a minor issue in the Indemnity Proceedings, having been raised in November 2022 only in reply to the Anshun estoppel and abuse of process defences pleaded by the CITIC Parties.[81]
(c) The 'Fulcrum Allegations' are thus said by the CITIC Parties to be 'peripheral (at best)' to the Indemnity Proceedings and to the 2023 MCP Proceeding.[82]
...wholly inimical to the interests of justice for the resolution of the 2023 MCP Proceeding, with its urgency and real-world consequences for that State and community of Western Australia, to be delayed by such peripheral issues... The urgency and public interest which inheres in the resolution of the 2023 MCP Proceeding is entirely absent from the Fulcrum Proceeding, which consists of nothing more than further (fanciful) money claims by Mineralogy and Mr Palmer based on allegations now recycled in more than ten proceedings.
It follows from what I said in opening in regard to case management that this Court must be alert to the wider ramifications of such a situation, and to endeavour, as far as possible, to find a way through the various complexities. The solution must be cost effective and fair both in terms of the progress of the Court's business and in terms of the litigants' interest in the outcome.
...the deliberate forensic choice to couple their pleaded case in just about every proceeding to the Fulcrum Allegations, and now to pursue separate money claims against the CITIC parties, their employees and their solicitors based on those allegations. Mineralogy and Mr Palmer cannot be permitted to manufacture the potential for inefficiency in this way.
(1) The 2023 MCP Proceeding requires swift resolution
Mr Goodwin to this effect has not been answered by the Mineralogy Parties. The Court can accommodate a trial of the action commencing in April 2025. 2. There is also general agreement among the parties that the damages claim pleaded at [95] of the Statement of Claim in the 2023 MCP Proceeding may be separately tried to all other issues in the proceeding. As the balance of the action requires prompt determination, I consider there is merit in bifurcating the action such that damages questions are separately determined, if necessary.
(3) The Fulcrum Proceeding will need to be re-assessed following the interlocutory hearing in October 2024
(4) The Indemnity Proceedings are well behind schedule and should not be further delayed
(5) The Indemnity Proceedings should not be split as to quantum
(6) There is a high degree of commonality across the actions
(a) The primary participants across the Cape Preston Proceedings are the Mineralogy Parties and the CITIC Parties. I have identified in these reasons the additional parties whose interests must also be borne in mind. There is the State of Western Australia, which is a party to the 2023 MCP Proceeding. In the Fulcrum Proceeding, two executives of the CITIC Group are named as defendants, together with Allens, a law firm which represents the CITIC Parties, and the contractor FBIS.
(b) Of all these additional parties, only FBIS took an active role in relation to the sequencing applications. On my assessment, while the interests of the State are relevant in the 2023 MCP Proceeding, I do not anticipate the State would take an overly active role in the progress of the proceedings to trial, or at trial.
(c) As to the executives and the law firm named in the Fulcrum Proceeding, their interests would appear to be aligned with that of the CITIC Parties. I do not assess those parties as having differential interests in the action, and no submissions to that effect were made during the hearing of the applications. The FBIS party remains concerned about being drawn into a trial involving broader issues of no relevance to its position, with consequent costs burdens.
(d) It must be borne in mind that any findings of fact made in the Indemnity Proceedings or the 2023 MCP Proceeding will not necessarily bind the additional parties who are named in the Fulcrum Proceedings. That is a factor to be weighed in the balance.
(7) The Fulcrum Allegations have already been the subject of findings by the Court
(8) The risk of inconsistent findings is relevant but not an overriding imperative
(9) The Fulcrum Proceeding should not be the lead action
(10) A concurrent trial of all Cape Preston Proceedings would be unwieldy
Extracts from Kenneth Martin J's reasons delivered in relation to the 2017 MCP Proceeding, in Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 15] [2023] WASC 56, commencing at [2435]:
[2435] By reference to an interlocutory observation by the Court of Appeal at [129] towards what was then observed to be arguable (and so, was allowed to proceed to a final trial evaluation) - it is my conclusion, if ever needed, that an assumed holding of such 'Fulcrum Purposes', or of the corporate wish or desire if assumed (but which I do not find proved on the balance of probabilities upon the trial evidence, especially given an absence at the Primary Trial of any relevant witness evidence on behalf of the CITIC plaintiffs as to a holding of such alleged corporate purposes) goes nowhere in the end. Assumed corporate intentions to recoup back over time from Mineralogy the capital cost overrun loss amounts, or to recover back from Mineralogy the incurred foreign exchange losses - from out of what the CITIC plaintiffs would otherwise be contractually remitting to Mineralogy as royalty payments over time would not provide, even so assumed, a legitimate basis for Mineralogy to reasonably refuse a reasonable request for extra tenure otherwise validly given to it.
[2454] Two main factors influence me to that negative view as to the effects of so-called 'Fulcrum Purposes'. First, for a longer term mining project conducted as between participants in a commercial world, changes in the underlying financial circumstances must invariably emerge or evolve over time. Deals representing a status quo are always open to a consensual renegotiation and so then, to a long term consensual variation. Assume, for instance, that a greatly expanded in scope iron ore volume Sino Iron Project ever came to be perceived as being viable - say, of economic proportions enough to warrant capital outlay expense in the billions of dollars towards establishing a deep water port at Cape Preston, to thereby facilitate direct loading of export bulk ships, rather than by the current double handling by transhipment arrangements. Naturally, the participant parties under that changed Sino Iron Project hypothesis might then review their existing commitments and possibly seek to adjust and revise them by consensus.
[2455] Potentially changed commodity demand horizons might then deliver another perfectly legitimate hypothetical opportunity for a renegotiation of earlier agreed MRSLA levels of royalty rates - so as to accommodate an objective of better adjusting the Sino Iron Project's internal rate of return for the CITIC plaintiffs' financiers over time. All of that would be perfectly understandable in a rational business world. So then, there is a world of difference between some broadly held but benign long term rate of return recoupment objective directed at outlaid funds over time - measured against the means of an implementation and achievement of such a goal.
[2456] A corporate objective or desire to achieve such a goal under a proper commercial bargaining process in future would not offend a rational and objectively assessed counterparty. The mere objective if held would not, by itself, provide a sufficient platform to reasonably refuse a request for additional tenure areas shown to be necessary. A contractual relationship must be rationally assessed at a commercial level, not as if it were being conducted between immature children - seeking out perceived slights to be mortally offended at every opportunity, to gain advantage.
[2457] Second, the ongoing long-term MRSLA royalty revenue stream benefits that look to be beneficially enjoyed by Mineralogy well into the future by way of the MRSLAs - arising from out of the ongoing Sino Iron Project export operations of magnetite concentrate and its obligations to the State under the State Agreement - need to be carefully weighed in a 'not unreasonably refused' evaluation over a refusal decision to provide additional tenure by Mineralogy.
[2458] Even if subjective concerns can be assumed as being properly held by Mineralogy over such 'Fulcrum Purpose' recoupment or recovery objectives assumed as held by CITIC (although I heard no direct evidence about that at the Primary Trial from Mineralogy) that alone, in my view, would still not be enough to reasonably refuse the additional tenure. Wider considerations are in play - including that denial of additional tenure shown as being genuinely necessary, possibly 'cutting off Mineralogy's nose to spite its face' - by thereby jeopardising the future royalty stream - by denying essential extra tenure areas for waste usage to permit the Sino Iron Project's continued future operation.
[2459] A negative additional tenure refusal stance by Mineralogy could also detract against the capital value assessed to the worth of Mineralogy's royalty stream as an asset - were it ever to be marketed for sale.
[2460] A refusal of tenure based solely on those assumed Fulcrum Purposes being so held could not by itself, by my assessment, be assessed as either reasonable, or as commercially rational. Public considerations by regard to the many benefits that could then be lost to the State by rendering the Sino Iron Project into some jeopardy of non-continuance, would only reinforce my prima facie views to that end.
[2461] So in the end, the Fulcrum Purpose arguments of Mineralogy do not, on my view, provide it with a stand-alone platform to validly support a reasonably based refusal by Mineralogy of a tenure request otherwise properly made to Mineralogy. The point, however, was not reached at the Primary Trial. Consequently, these brief observations as to assumed circumstances are mere obiter.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] Which I have, in previous decisions, also referred to collectively as the FCD Proceedings.
[2] Being CIV 1915 of 2019, which was determined by Kenneth Martin J following a 33 day trial: Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 15] [2023] WASC 56.
[3] CACV 35 of 2023, which is consolidated with CACV 37 of 2023.
[4] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 242 [161] (Cobby J).
[12] Emails from the solicitors for the Mineralogy Parties sent on 5 August 2024 and 29 August 2024.
[13] Relatedly, I have put to one side the contentious email from FBIS' solicitors which formed part of the correspondence concerning the status of the Iskander Affidavit. See the email from the solicitors for FBIS sent on 7 August 2024.
[14] The CITIC submissions are said to have been filed on behalf of the third, fourth and fifth defendants to the Fulcrum Proceeding, which is Sino Iron, Korean Steel and CITIC Limited, not on behalf of Ms Dillon, Mr Zeng, or Allens. I do not understand anything turns on this point.
[15] Index of documents dated 2 August 2024.
[16] Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Easterday [2009] WASC 191 [65] (Le Miere J); Moondancer Holdings Pty Ltd v Navarac Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 250 [3] (Allanson J); and Nelson v Thompson [2020] WASC 261 [18] (Smith J).
[17] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 80 [410]; (2019) 55 WAR 89 (Buss P, Murphy and Beech JJA).
[18] Ghose v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2010] NSWSC 110 [27] (Ghose).
[19] Cousins v Cousins [1948] WALawRp 20; (1948) 51 WALR 57, 60.
[23] Humphries v Newport Quays Stage 2A Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 699 [11] (Humphries). See also, on this point, Moondancer Holdings Pty Ltd v Navarac Pty Ltd [6] - [7] (Allanson J); Espanol Holdings Pty Ltd v Banning [2000] WASC 192 [4] (Sanderson M); and Nelson v Thompson [20] (Smith J).
[25] Walthamstow Pty Ltd v Caratti [2023] WASC 76.
[26] Moyle v Quarles as executor of the estate of Leslie Moyle [2024] WASC 17.
[27] Lois Nominees Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2011] WASC 208 [81]; [2011] WASC 208; (2011) 42 WAR 75 (Lois Nominees). See also Sanderson M in Saker v Creative Land Management Pty Ltd [2000] WASC 44 [2].
[29] GetSwift Limited v Webb [2021] FCAFC 26 (Middleton, McKerracher and Jagot JJ) (GetSwift).
[37] Which was the subject of Kenneth Martin J's decision in Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd [No 6] [2017] WASC 340 (confirmed on appeal).
[38] QNI Proceeding, Amended Substituted Defence [80] - [86]; Palmer Petroleum Proceeding, Amended Substituted Defence [69] - [73].
[39] QNI Proceeding, Reply to the Substituted Defence [41] - [70]; Palmer Petroleum Proceeding, Reply to the Substituted Defence [37] - [66].
[40] QNI Proceeding, Reply to the Substituted Defence [71], [81], [82] - [99]; Palmer Petroleum Proceeding, Reply to the Substituted Defence [67], [77], 78] - [94].
[41] Palmer v CITIC Ltd [No 9] [2023] WASC 238.
[43] Indemnity Proceedings, Mineralogy minute of proposed orders dated 27 July 2023, [17].
[45] Indemnity Proceedings, CITIC Position Paper for Strategic Conference dated 21 July 2023, [17] ‑ [19].
[46] Indemnity Proceedings, CITIC Position Paper for Strategic Conference dated 21 July 2023, Attachment A.
[47] Palmer v CITIC Ltd [No 10] [2023] WASC 417 [84].
[49] Indemnity Proceedings, ts 847 - 849.
[50] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd (Cobby J).
[52] 2023 MCP Proceeding, Amended Defence [64(c)] and [76(bA)].
[53] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [171] - [177] (Cobby J).
[54] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [167] (Cobby J).
[55] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [176] (Cobby J).
[56] Fulcrum Proceeding, Amended Defence [36].
[57] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 15] [2449] - [2452] (Kenneth Martin J).
[58] Iskander Affidavit, Attachment SMI-4, at [8].
[59] Iskander Affidavit, Attachments SMI-6 and SMI-7.
[60] Mineralogy primary submissions filed in CIV 2425 of 2023 [3].
[61] Mineralogy primary submissions [14].
[62] Third Amended Statement of Claim dated 28 June 2024 in the Fulcrum Proceeding [12] - [15], [16] - [24], [25] - [38A], [41] - [43], and [134] - [139P].
[63] Third Amended Statement of Claim dated 28 June 2024 in the Fulcrum Proceeding [134] and [138].
[64] Third Amended Statement of Claim dated 28 June 2024 in the Fulcrum Proceeding [116] - [133C].
[65] Third Amended Statement of Claim dated 28 June 2024 in the Fulcrum Proceeding [139L] and [139P].
[66] Reply to Amended Substituted Defence dated 1 June 2024 in the QNI Proceeding [41] - [70], [71], [81], [82] - [94]; and Reply to Amended Substituted Defence dated 1 June 2024 in the Palmer Petroleum Proceeding [37] - [66], [67], [77], [78] - [94].
[67] Amended Defence dated 11 March 2024 in the 2023 MCP Proceeding [1(b)], which incorporates by reference the allegations in the reply filed by the Mineralogy Parties in the QNI Proceeding at [37] - [99].
[69] Mineralogy primary submissions [22(a)].
[70] Mineralogy primary submissions [22(b)].
[71] Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23; (1939) 62 CLR 464, 531 (Dixon J).
[72] UBS AG v Tyne [2018] HCA 45; (2018) 265 CLR 77.
[74] CITIC submissions [6] and [7].
[77] CITIC submissions [35] - [36].
[83] CITIC submissions [40] - [41].
[84] Grainger v Williams [2002] WASC 262.
[90] Grainger v Williams [60] - [64].
[94] Humphries [11] (Besanko J); Ghose [27] - [28] (Austin J); Lois Nominees [81] (Beech J); and Grainger [34] (Hasluck J).
[95] Humphries [11] (Besanko J); Ghose [27] - [28] (Austin J); and Grainger [34] (Hasluck J).
[97] Epic Games, Inc v Apple Inc (Case Management) [2022] FCA 341 [25] - [26].
[103] ts 76 (5 August 2024). See [194] of these reasons.
(2018) 265 CLR 77
(2011) 202 FCR 439
(2019) 55 WAR 89
(2011) 42 WAR 75
(1939) 62 CLR 464