(a) On 4 April 2022, the Patient called the practice to cancel her appointment with Mr Caminiti and was booked in for an alternative appointment with another practitioner that day.

(b) The Patient did not at any time provide Mr Caminiti with her mobile phone number.

(c) Sometime on or around 4 April 2022, Mr Caminiti accessed and retrieved the Patient's mobile phone number from her confidential patient record held by the practice.

(d) On Monday, 4 April 2022 at approximately 10.28 am, Mr Caminiti sent a SMS text message from his personal mobile phone number to the Patient's personal mobile phone number, which stated:

"Hello [name of patient], its Daniele here. I am sorry if I text you personally. I wanted to do so since last week. I want you to know how ashamed and sorry I feel for what happened. I am not that kind of person, I have never done anything like that before. I feel very much sorry and if I only could I would rewind and never do that. I am not expecting you to come and see me again, but please don't mention this to anyone, it could jeopardise my entire career, destroy my family. I am very very sorry and I hope inside your heart you can forgive what I did. You are a very nice person and I hope you will understand how bad I feel for that. I will not contact you anymore. This was just to let you know my feelings. Take good care and all the best. Daniele."

(e) The Patient did not respond to the text message.

(f) Later on 4 April 2022, the Patient attended an appointment at the practice with another practitioner. During the consultation Mr Caminiti tried to enter the treatment room and tried to speak to the Patient. The other practitioner prevented Mr Caminiti from entering.

1. I find, as the Board submits, that Mr Caminiti's conduct in accessing the Patient's mobile telephone number without her consent and messaging her on it for a private purpose, which included asking her not to disclose his conduct to others, was inconsistent with the following paragraphs of the Code of Conduct:

(a) Paragraph 1.2, which provides practitioners must be ethical and trustworthy. That paragraph also provides that patients or clients trust practitioners because they believe that, in addition to being competent, practitioners will not take advantage of them and will display qualities such as integrity, truthfulness, dependability and compassion. It states that patients or clients also rely on practitioners to protect their confidentiality.

(b) Paragraph 3.4, which provides that practitioners have ethical and legal obligations to protect the privacy of people requiring and receiving care. It also provides that patients or clients have a right to expect that practitioners and their staff will hold information about them in confidence.

(c) Paragraph 8.1, which provides that in professional life, practitioners must display a standard of behaviour that warrants the trust and respect of the community. This includes observing and practising the principles of ethical conduct.

(d) Paragraph 8.2, which provides that good practice involves maintaining professional boundaries.

1. I am comfortably satisfied that the Board has established the allegations in Ground 2.

1. The Board submits that the Tribunal should make a finding that Mr Caminiti engaged in:

(a) professional misconduct within the meaning of paragraphs (a) and (c) of the definition in section 5 of the National Law (ground 1); and

(b) professional misconduct within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition in section 5 of the National Law (ground 2).

1. The conduct the subject of Ground 1, being serious sexual misconduct, falls substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a practitioner of equivalent training or experience as Mr Caminiti, within paragraph (a) of the definition of "professional misconduct." It is also conduct which is inconsistent with Mr Caminiti being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession, within paragraph (c) of the definition of "professional misconduct".
2. As the Board submits, the conduct the subject of Ground 2 also warrants a finding of professional misconduct. I accept the Board's submission that, while not all circumstances of misuse of patient information and breaches of patient boundaries necessarily amount to professional misconduct, this breach is particularly egregious in that it flows from the conduct in Ground 1. Mr Caminiti had the explicit goal of discouraging the Patient from reporting the incident on 28 March 2022.
3. Registered health practitioners are mandatory reporters under the National Law. A registered health practitioner who, in the course of practising his or her profession, forms a reasonable belief that another registered health practitioner has behaved in a way that constitutes notifiable conduct, must notify the National Agency of that conduct.[14] "Notifiable conduct" includes engaging in sexual misconduct in connection with the practice of the practitioner's profession.[15]
4. Mr Caminiti's conduct in attempting to suppress the disclosure of his own notifiable conduct is contrary to the purpose of the mandatory notification provisions, even though they did not apply to him, on their terms, in that situation. It was also antithetical to the main guiding principle of the national registration and accreditation scheme, being that protection of the public and public confidence in the safety of services provided by registered health practitioners and students are paramount.[16]
5. I find that Mr Caminiti's conduct in obtaining the Patient's personal contact details and contacting her for a non-clinical purpose, in the circumstances of this case, falls substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a practitioner of equivalent training or experience as Mr Caminiti, within paragraph (a) of the definition of "professional misconduct".
6. For these reasons, I have decided, under section 196(1)(b)(iii) of the National Law, that in relation to the conduct the subject of Grounds 1 and 2 of the application for disciplinary action, Mr Caminiti has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct.

1. The purpose of determinations is protective. As Presidential Member McCarthy observed in Dental Board of Australia v Pathmaperuma [2024] ACAT 49 at [23], the law relating to the making of determinations was extensively considered in Medical Board of Australia v Jansz.[17] It may be summarised as follows:

(a) the purpose of the imposition of determinations is to protect the public;

(b) determinations are intended to maintain proper ethical and professional standards for the protection of the public and also for the protection of the profession in the sense of maintaining stature and integrity in the eyes of the public;

(c) determinations should in no way be punitive;

(d) the objectives of determinations can be achieved by specific deterrence, that is, the deterrence of the person concerned from further inappropriate conduct; by general deterrence, that is, the deterrence of other practitioners minded to conduct themselves similarly; and by facilitation of rehabilitation on the part of the practitioner;

(e) personal matters such as shame, personal ordeal, and financial difficulty are of little relevance save insofar as they contribute to the specific deterrence of the practitioner;

(f) the likelihood of recidivism, or, put another way, an assessment of the ongoing risk posed by the practitioner, should be central to the imposition of a determination;

(g) the degree to which the practitioner has acquired insight into his or her conduct is relevant to the assessment of the continuing risk posed by the practitioner;

(h) insight can include as an understanding of the nature of the conduct, an acceptance that the conduct was wrong, an appreciation of why the practitioner engaged in that conduct;

(i) empathy with the consequences, and/or a willingness to take measures to identify risk factors and to do what is necessary to avoid further transgressions; and

(j) any form of official censure is of consequence. It has been observed by the Courts that a reprimand is a serious matter for a professional person and should not be considered a "slap over the wrist".[18]

1. Those considerations are not exhaustive.
2. I have decided to take a global approach to determinations, by imposing determinations in response to the conduct the subject of both grounds, considered together. This is appropriate as the conduct the subject of each ground is so closely connected, as to be "inextricably interwoven".[19]
3. I accept the Board's submission that, if proven to the criminal standard, the conduct the subject of ground 1 could have constituted the criminal offence of sexual assault. Further, Mr Caminiti's conduct in accessing and misusing the Patient's personal details amounts to a gross breach of trust.
4. Mr Caminiti did not engage with APHRA's investigation, nor with the tribunal proceedings. Although he apologised to the Patient, this apology was followed by an inappropriate request that she keep his conduct secret. I accept the Board's submission that Mr Caminiti's text message to the Patient should not be taken as a genuine expression of remorse or insight as it was self-serving and sent for the purpose of discouraging a report.
5. Mr Caminiti's conduct has the capacity to significantly erode trust in the profession, particularly among female and vulnerable patients.
6. It is appropriate to reprimand Mr Caminiti for his conduct. A reprimand indicates to the public, patients and other practitioners that the standards expected of a practitioner have not been met and that the practitioner has been censured.[20]
7. I am also satisfied that cancellation of Mr Caminiti's registration is an appropriate determination in this matter, given that the conduct the subject of Ground 1 amounts to serious sexual misconduct, in relation to which Mr Caminiti has not shown any genuine insight or remorse. On the contrary, he has left the country and continued to practise elsewhere, and has not taken part in the disciplinary process. He also denied the allegations against him to his employer.
8. The Board submits, and I accept, that disqualifying Mr Caminiti from applying for registration for a lengthy period in the range of 5 - 8 years would serve the functions of both specific and general deterrence. The Board submits, and I accept, that this would serve a protective function for the public, in circumstances where Mr Caminiti has provided no evidence of insight, remorse or rehabilitation, and therefore there may be a significant risk of him engaging in further misconduct were he to return to Australia and seek to resume practice as an osteopath.
9. It is useful to refer to some comparable cases in which practitioners have been disqualified for a period of time from applying for registration.
10. In Pharmacy Board of Australia v Tan [2016] VCAT 1653, a pharmacist sexually assaulted his victim under the pretext of needing to inspect a rash for which she had been prescribed treatment. After the incident, he attempted to leave the country and he attempted to persuade others not to notify the Board. He was convicted of rape and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a 3 year community corrections order. The tribunal accepted he regretted and was remorseful for his conduct. He was disqualified for 4 years, the tribunal noting that he was relatively young and if he could be rehabilitated, it may be in the public interest for him to return to practice.
11. In Medical Board of Australia v Cukier [2017] VCAT 109, Dr Cukier engaged in inappropriate behaviour, including physical conduct of a sexual nature, in relation to Patient A, during a medical consultation at Dr Cukier's place of practice. He also misused his position to access Patient A's personal information, including her telephone number and home address rang and spoke to her including asking her not to tell anyone what happened and went to her home. He also engaged in conduct that was inappropriate in that it was unwanted physical contact and of a sexual nature with Patient B, and accessed and misused Patient B's personal information, placing pressure on her not to complain about his conduct.
12. The tribunal imposed a period of 18 months disqualification from re-applying for registration. It noted:[21]

In fixing that period, we have taken into account Dr Cukier's cooperation with the Board in this matter and given him credit for having saved the complainants from attending; those matters reduce the period of disqualification which would otherwise have been imposed.

1. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Safi (No 4) [2017] NSWCATOD 102, the practitioner rubbed the victim's clitoris for 1-2 minutes and her vaginal opening for 2 minutes during a vaginal examination, followed by him hugging and kissing her at the end of the consultation. He was acquitted in the criminal proceedings. The tribunal found that conduct was proven on the balance of probabilities. The tribunal cancelled his registration and disqualified him for 18 months, as the tribunal lacked substantive information concerning insight, contrition and remorse.
2. In Chinese Medical Board v Zhou [2020] SACAT 23, a registered Chinese Medicine Practitioner was convicted of rape after he digitally penetrated a patient whilst giving her a massage. The practitioner denied the allegations and did not demonstrate any insight or remorse. He was disqualified from applying for registration for a period of 15 years, backdated to the date of the hearing.
3. In Medical Board of Australia v Gopal [2024] VCAT 380, a general practitioner was charged and convicted of raping two patients (digitally) and was sentenced to four years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 21 months. He also inappropriately examined the breasts and nipples of a third patient. The practitioner did not engage with the proceedings and returned to India after completing his sentence. The tribunal cancelled his registration and disqualified him from applying for registration for a period of 15 years.
4. These cases and others to which the Board referred me[22] provide some guidance as to the length of disqualification imposed in other cases, although there are significant differences in the length of the period for which practitioners, found to have sexually assaulted patients, have been disqualified from applying for registration. Ultimately the determination in each case must be made according to its particular circumstances, having regard to the objectives of protecting the public, and of providing for adequate deterrence.
5. Mr Caminiti's conduct was very serious. It caused a significant amount of distress to his victim. Although he apologised to her, this was followed by a request that she conceal his misconduct. Mr Caminiti denied the allegations when his employer put them to him and did not participate in the AHPRA investigation or the tribunal proceedings. A significant period of disqualification from applying for registration is appropriate in circumstances where there is no evidence that Mr Caminiti is remorseful or that he has any insight into his behaviour.
6. The conduct occurred just over three years ago and Mr Caminiti's registration has been suspended since that time, due to the Board's immediate action decision. Having regard to the period of time for which he has already been suspended, I consider that a disqualification period of seven years is appropriate. That recognises the seriousness of his conduct, whilst also allowing for the possibility of insight and rehabilitation, noting that the conduct occurred very early in Mr Caminiti's career.

1. The Board sought its costs of the application.
2. Section 195 of the National Law provides that the Tribunal may make any order about costs it considers appropriate for the proceedings. The general principle is that costs follow the event.[23] The presumption that the successful party in proceedings will receive their costs is generally displaced only in circumstances where there has been some disentitling conduct by the successful party.[24]
3. There has been no disentitling conduct on the Board's part in this matter. As the Board successfully sought determinations against Mr Caminiti, it is appropriate that he be ordered to pay the Board's costs in this proceeding, pursuant to section 195 of the National Law.

[1] Osteopathy Board of Australia v Caminiti [2024] ACAT 72

[2] Medical Board of Australia v Bradshaw [2020] VCAT 584 at [95]

[3] Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (ACT) Act 2010, s 8

[9] See the discussion on jurisdiction in Osteopathy Board of Australia v Caminiti [2024] ACAT 72. For a decision as to a tribunal's jurisdiction in comparable circumstances, see Medical Board of Australia v Gopal [2024] VCAT 380 at [19]

[10] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v R (a pseudonym) [2025] ACAT 8 at [18]

[11] See, for example, Hoyle v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 42 at [223]

[17] [2011] VCAT 1026 at [358]- [373]

[18] Dental Board of Australia v Pathmaperuma [2024] ACAT 49 at [23]

[19] Stirling v Legal Services Commissioner [2013] VSCA 374 at [72] and [75]

[20] Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Lakicevic (Corrected) (Review and Regulation) [2020] VCAT 2 at [42]

[21] [2017] VCAT 109 at [123]

[22] Other cases to which the Board referred include Health Care Complaints Commission v Ng [2015] NSWCATOD 139 (digital penetration of victim; 18 months); Medical Board of Australia v Moschou [2021] SACAT 30 (vaginal examination without informed consent, permanent prohibition); Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Espedido (No 2) [2023] VCAT 1056 (touching of genitals without clinical justification, 6 years); Medical Board of Australia v Hmood [2023] VCAT 603 (unnecessary physical examinations for a sexual purpose; 8 years).

[23] Medical Board of Australia v CDA [2023] ACAT 64 at [19]; Medical Board of Australia v McClymont [2025] ACAT 32 at [125]- [131] and Howard v Psychology Board of Australia [2018] ACAT 127 at [22]

[24] Medical Board of Australia v CDA (Occupational Discipline) [2023] ACAT 64 at [20]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Cain (No.2) [2017] NSWCATOD 171 at [32] (albeit in relation to a different costs provision); Medical Board of Australia v McClymont [2025] ACAT 32 at [3], [131]-[136]; Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11 at [40]