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[2026] ACTSC 307
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-08-21
Ainslie-Wallace AJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: Osborne (a pseudonym) v Vaughn (a pseudonym) Citation: [2026] ACTSC 307 Hearing Date: 10 August 2026 Decision Date: 21 August 2026 Before: Ainslie-Wallace AJ Decision: (1) Appeal against the orders of Magistrate Lawton made on 26 April 2026 is dismissed (2) If the Appellant wishes to be heard on the question of the Respondent’s costs of the appeal, he must file a submission of no more than 5 pages length within 7 days of the publication of these reasons. Catchwords: APPEAL – CIVIL LAW – Appeal from Magistrates Court – where appellant appeals from a decision refusing to make protection orders – leave to adduce further evidence – no evidence of personal violence – the magistrate did not err – frivolous, vexatious and in bad faith – appeal dismissed Legislation Cited: Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 660 Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 11 Personal Violence Act 2016 (ACT), ss 26, 85 Cases Cited: [Citation redacted: s 98 Personal Violence Act 2016 (ACT)] [Citation redacted: s 98 Personal Violence Act 2016 (ACT)] House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 [Citation redacted: s 98 Personal Violence Act 2016 (ACT)] Parties: Trent Osborne (a pseudonym) (Appellant) Charlie Vaughn (a pseudonym) (Respondent) Representation: Counsel Self-represented (Appellant) G Bashir SC (Respondent) Solicitors Self-represented (Appellant) Hugo Law Group (Respondent) File Number: SCA 18 of 2026 Decision Under Appeal: Court: ACT Magistrates Court Before: Magistrate Lawton Date of Decision: 29 April 2026 Case Title: Trent Osborne (a pseudonym) v Charlie Vaughn (a pseudonym) Court File Number: PPO 1023 of 2025 AINSLIE-WALLACE AJ: Introduction
“Trent Osborne” (the Appellant) appeals against a decision of a Magistrate to summarily dismiss his application for Personal Violence orders against “Charlie Vaughn” (the Respondent).
The Respondent is a barrister, the Appellant is a legal practitioner.
The Nature of the Appeal
The appeal, brought pursuant to s 85(1) of the Personal Violence Act 2016 (ACT), is to be determined by this court based on the evidence before the Magistrate. The court has a discretion to admit further evidence on the appeal. Here, the Appellant seeks to adduce further evidence on the appeal. The evidence was admitted provisionally pending consideration of it.
The appeal is in the nature of a rehearing and because the decision appealed from is a discretionary one, the Appellant must establish error of the kind referred to in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 in which it was said: The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred. The Application for Personal Protection Orders
On 17 December 2025 the Appellant sought personal protection orders against the Respondent.
The Appellant sought that an interim personal protection order be made. That application was made ex parte before Magistrate Stewart on 22 December 2025. The Magistrate declined to make the order, finding no basis for a personal protection order against the Respondent had been made out.
The Appellant pressed his application for final orders.
On 27 March 2026 the Respondent filed an application for orders that the application be rejected as an abuse of process, that it be rejected pursuant to s 11 of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) and that the application be summarily dismissed or permanently stayed.
That Application was heard by Magistrate Lawton on 29 April 2026 and the Appellant’s application for personal protection orders was dismissed. The Appellant was ordered to pay the Respondent’s costs.
It is from that order that the present appeal arises.
The Respondent filed a Notice of Contention in the Appeal in which it was asserted that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to make orders for personal protection because no material part of the cause of action arose in the ACT. Secondly, the Notice contends that the Appellant’s application was brought outside the time limit provided in s 11 of the Limitation Act being six years since the cause of action accrued.
For the reasons which follow, the appeal will be dismissed, there is no reason to have regard to the Notice of Contention.
To give context to the consideration of the grounds of appeal, it is necessary to give some detailed background.
Background [Redacted]
The Appellant’s application for Personal Protection Orders
The Appellant filed an application for personal protection orders on 17 December 2025. He set out the basis on which he sought the order: During 2015 the Respondent dishonestly and knowingly falsely represented that the [Appellant] made “threats” to one[redacted]. The Respondent did not at any time contact nor attempt to contact the [Appellant] prior to making the dishonest and knowingly false representations, the Respondent also dishonestly and falsely represented that [the Appellant] had[redacted]. The [Appellant] continues to be harassed and continues to feel harassed by the Respondent’s behaviour including as a result of the publication of the article[redacted].
The Appellant wrote on the form that he sought an order of 5 year’s duration and explained: The Respondent has done nothing to cease his harassment of the [Appellant] for 10 years therefore there is no evidence that he shall cease.
The Appellant sought the order exclude the Respondent from being “where the [Appellant] is likely to be including any court of the Commonwealth of Australia”
The hearing for summary dismissal before the Magistrate Lawton
Both the Appellant and the Respondent provided written submissions on the hearing and the Appellant filed and relied on two affidavits sworn 8 April 2026 and 28 April 2026.
The affidavit of 8 April 2026 comprises the Appellant’s submissions. He said at (4) that he feels “harassed, intimidated, offended and threatened by every single one of the false and dishonest statements and representations of the Respondent in[redacted]”.
The affidavit of 28 April 2026, filed on the eve of the hearing before Magistrate Lawton, asserts that the Appellant was seeking the Respondent be excluded from all courts in the Commonwealth because he was “likely to be in those courts”. The Appellant attached part of an Amended Application in a Case filed in the Family Court 4 days before the filing of the affidavit, in which he seeks orders that when collecting his children to spend time with them, they be delivered to the steps of the High Court of Australia. Equally on 17 April 2026 the Appellant obtained information from the ACT Law Society about obtaining a practising certificate in the Territory. He further asserted that he has appeared in courts of all jurisdictions in most states, thus bolstering his contention that he was “likely” to be in courts at which the Respondent could be expected to appear.
At the hearing the Magistrate asked the Appellant to take him to the “first incident of harassment” by the Respondent. The Appellant responded: I would say that it was the false and dishonest statements that were made in the decision of [redacted].
The Appellant was taken to the decision and the comments of[redacted]. His Honour said [redacted]: …[redacted] published that decision, didn’t he
To which the Appellant said: Yes, but only on the basis of the representations and statements made by [the Respondent]. There would have been no decision unless there had been those statements made.
The Magistrate invited the Appellant to direct him to where in [redacted] decision the statements of the Respondent appeared. The Magistrate took a short adjournment to allow the Appellant to find the representations. On his Honour’s return, the Appellant took him to paragraph 72 of the reasons, which refers to the invoice [[redacted] said the Appellant sent to him and his Honour’s comments about that which were as follows: [redacted]
The Magistrate drew the Appellant’s attention to this being a remark of the judge and asked the Appellant where that comment can be attributed to the Respondent who said that it was a “statement put to the court” by the Respondent.
When the Magistrate pointed out that the comments represented a finding by[redacted], the Appellant replied that “there can be no finding of fact, I was not before the court…”. The Appellant maintained to the Magistrate that there could be no finding of fact because he was not in court and said: … given the nature of the allegation which was made. Turning around and saying that I had sent …and outrageously extortionate but quite in keeping behaviourally. Absolutely I have to be before the court. That is a fundamental tenet of procedural fairness, which is the very basis of the law.
The Appellant continued and said: But the fact of the matter is that that comment could not have been made by his Honour. If you wish to turn around and call it a finding, that finding could not have been made unless the counsel who were acting for [redacted] put that to the court.
The Appellant asserted that all paragraphs in [redacted] judgment that referred to him were false and were based on the representations of the Respondent.
His Honour then asked the Appellant: Prior to your application on 2 December 2025 can you take me to any other act that you assert that was carried out by [the Respondent] with an intention to harass you?
The Appellant said that those instances would include “refusing to apologise” and “doing nothing to correct his fraud”.
The Appellant told the Magistrate that the Respondent had had no direct or indirect communication with him before 22 December 2025. The Appellant said: Which is one of the problems. Prior to making the representations and statements he made, he was under an obligation in law to contact me before he made those statements…
The Appellant continued and submitted that the Respondent had done nothing to remove the offensive comments. The Appellant further submitted that the Respondent had never denied he had been fraudulent.
The Appellant submitted that without him being in court when the [redacted] matter was heard[redacted]: … could therefore never know whether or not what was actually being said by him was true. The only person who has the requisite knowledge to be able to determine whether or not something is true before the court is the individual in respect of whom the allegation is made. No one can attest to my knowledge. There can be conclusions drawn but no one else can attest to it.
In answer to the Magistrate’s proposition that [redacted] was entitled to give evidence about what the Appellant may have said and done, the Appellant agreed but said that he, the Appellant, was the only person who could refute that evidence.
When [redacted] comment about the [redacted] not calling the Appellant as a witness was raised with the Appellant, he said that the judge could have called him as could the Respondent and said: “… but the fact of the matter is that [the Respondent] didn’t. And the person who made the comments is [the Respondent]”.
The Magistrate said: …you have (sic not) established a single piece of evidence from the judgment to establish that [the Respondent] intended to harass you, or indeed evidentially made any of the statements that …you’ve attributed to him. …I find no evidence to support your assertion in that judgment that [the Respondent] made any statement at all. Given it is a judgment of [redacted] and including his findings as to credibility and fact
The Magistrate asked the Appellant whether there was other evidence on which he relied to support his application that [the Respondent] has harassed him.
The Appellant said: So it’s not just harassed. I’m also offended. And I’ve extensively dealt with that as well.
The Appellant also relied on what he said was an admission by the Respondent during a directions hearing before Registrar Kew on 18 March 2026.
The Magistrate concluded that the Respondent had not established any evidence on which his Honour could be satisfied that the Respondent had done any conduct which would constitute harassing or offensive.
His Honour referred to s 26 of the Personal Violence Act which sets out the grounds for making a personal protection order and concluded that the Appellant had not established on the balance of probabilities the two bases provided by the section.
The Magistrate then turned to the application for summary dismissal and the Respondent’s submissions that the Appellant’s application was not only frivolous but also vexatious and brought in bad faith.
In support of that submission and in addition to the submissions already before the court, Senior Counsel for the Respondent observed that following service on the Appellant of the Respondent’s application, the Appellant deposed to being in the process of seeking Constitutional Writs from the High Court, that he had approached the ACT Law Society seeking details of obtaining a practising certificate on which he relied to imply that he will shortly be admitted to practice and will appear in courts throughout the Commonwealth. Counsel pointed to the recently filed amended application in his Family Law proceedings to seek orders that his children be delivered to him on the steps of the High Court for the purposes of contact with them.
It was submitted that none of the steps to be taken by the Appellant would be successful but he raised them to use against the Respondent.
In further support of the submission that the application was brought vexatiously and in bad faith, counsel for the Respondent noted that the Appellant said he proposed to bring a private criminal prosecution for fraud against the Respondent.
The Magistrate’s reasons
His Honour delivered ex tempore reasons. His Honour noted that the basis on which the Appellant sought the personal protection order was that the Respondent had harassed and offended him.
His Honour said: The primary evidence that [the Appellant] relied upon was the judgment of[redacted], published some time ago, in respect to matters in which [the Respondent] appeared. And that findings of fact were made by his Honour about [the Appellant]. [The Appellant] asserts that essentially every paragraph of that judgment is both offensive and harassing. And that he again asserts that essentially [redacted] could not have made those findings, firstly without evidence having been adduced on behalf of [redacted] by [the Respondent] and secondly on the basis of submission by [the Respondent]. There is no evidence of [the Appellant’s] assertion. And indeed it is contrary to common sense in as much as that the judgment of [redacted] makes findings about the evidence adduced before him. I do not accept, as I’ve already indicated, [the Appellant’s] assertion that the fact that [the Respondent] conducted the case in which his credibility was in issue, although he was not a witness, leads to the conclusion that he has been harassed and offended by the actions of [the Respondent] in conducting the case. There is a fundamental flaw in the application before the court today … [the Appellant] has sought to rely upon the conduct of [the Respondent] during the course of directions hearings in this matter as further evidence of offensive or harassing or intimidating behaviour. That seems to be predicated upon a belief of [the Appellant] that [the Respondent] has engaged in fraudulent conduct during the course of conducting that case in 2015. I do not accept the submission by [the Appellant] that [the Respondent] has engaged in such conduct.
His Honour then referred to the grounds necessary to be established to obtain an order under the Personal Violence Act, that there is a two-part threshold which must be satisfied – first that he must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent has used personal violence in relation to the Appellant and secondly that the Respondent may engage in personal violence in relation to the person if the order is not made.
His Honour was not satisfied of either matter and said that he was not satisfied that the Respondent had used personal violence in relation to the Appellant and was not satisfied that the Respondent would engage in personal violence if the order was not made.
His Honour then referred to the Appellant’s affidavits and found that his application is vexatious and his Honour noted that it included prohibitions on the Respondent attending places and entering court houses where he obviously engages.
On the application of the Respondent, his Honour made a costs order against the Appellant in the sum of $22,999.75.
The Application to adduce further evidence
The Appellant sought leave to adduce further evidence on the appeal pursuant to s 87 of the Personal Violence Act. The evidence proposed to be adduced is an extract said to be from a report prepared by Mr Chafic Awit and dated 4 May 2026, prepared for use in Family Law proceedings between the Appellant and his former wife. The other evidence sought to be relied on is the [redacted] and the article written by[redacted].
The [redacted] decision is not evidence, and I indicated to the Appellant that he was free to refer to it.
The article in [redacted] was relied on by the Appellant to demonstrate that the Respondent continued his harassment of him by failing to have the article withdrawn or correct its contents. I will admit that document to assist the understanding of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal.
The paragraphs from Mr Awit’s report were said to be relevant to the appeal because Mr Awit refers to the Appellant’s presentation on interview including Mr Awit’s opinion that the Appellant demonstrated no evidence of thought disorder or evidence of perceptual disturbances.
The excerpts from the report will not be admitted. The Appellant’s personal and mental characteristics have not been put in issue in the appeal and the excerpts have no relevance to the determination of the appeal.
Grounds of appeal
Ground 1 His Honour erred in law in finding that [redacted] made adverse findings in respect of and/or against the Applicant [Appellant] in the case of[redacted]. (case citations omitted) Ground 2 His Honour erred in holding that [redacted] and/or the [redacted] made adverse findings of fact in the case of [redacted] in respect of and/or as against the Applicant as proved by and/or given the decision of [redacted] in the proceedings [redacted] [the Appellant] where [redacted] found that no such findings of fact were made by [redacted] but only “comments”. Ground 3 His Honour erred in holding that [redacted] could have made findings of fact in the case of [redacted] in respect of and/or as against the Applicant in the absence of the Applicant providing evidence. Ground 4 His Honour erred in holding that [redacted] could have made findings of fact in the case of [redacted] in respect of and/or against the Applicant in the absence of the Applicant providing evidence as proved by and/or given the decision of [redacted] [the Appellant] where [redacted] found that no findings of fact were made by[redacted], only “comments”. Ground 5 His Honour erred in holding that findings of fact in respect of and/or as against the Applicant were made by [redacted] in the case of [redacted] as to the credit, credibility and/or character of the Applicant, and which were binding on his Honour and/or the Applicant as proved by and/or given, the subsequent findings of [redacted] [the Appellant] in which [redacted] found as a fact that the Applicant committed no wrong-doing of any kind upon[redacted], nor anyone else for that matter. Ground 6 His Honour erred in holding that findings of fact in respect of and/or as against the Applicant were made by [redacted] as to the credit, credibility and/or character of the Applicant, and which were binding on his Honour and/or the Appellant, as the respondent and/or the respondent’s legal representatives acted dishonestly in not disclosing to the court the finding of [redacted] [the Appellant] in which [redacted] found as a fact that the Applicant committed no wrong-doing of any kind upon[redacted], nor anyone else for that matter.
Ground 7 His Honour erred in finding that the respondent did not, in fact, make the false and dishonest statements, representations and publications constituting the harassing, intimidating, offensive and threatening behaviour complained of by the appellant given that the respondent admitted making the said dishonest statements and representations to Deputy Registrar Kew of the Australian Capital Territory Magistrates Court. Ground 8 His Honour erred in finding that the respondent did not intend to offend, harass, intimidate and threaten the appellant in committing the false and dishonest representation, statements and publications when the reasonably foreseeable consequence of so committing the false and dishonest representations, statements and publications is to offend, harass, intimidate and threaten. Ground 9 His Honour erred in finding that the false and dishonest statements, representations and publications could be anything but false, dishonest statements, representations and publications given that they could not be said true as the Applicant (sic) was never called before the Court to establish the truth of the false and dishonest statements, representations and publications.
Ground 10 His Honour erred in finding that the false and dishonest statements, representations and publications could be anything but false, dishonest statements, representations and publications given that they could not be said true as the Applicant (sic) was never called before the Court to establish the truth of the false and dishonest statements, representations and publications as proved by, and/or given, the decision of [redacted] [the Appellant], where [redacted] found that no findings of fact were made by[redacted], but only “comments” as the Applicant was not before the Court. Ground 11 His Honour erred in holding that the respondent did not breach the Rule of Law in offering no procedural fairness to the Applicant prior to committing the false and dishonest statements, representations and publications. Consideration
The thrust of the appeal is that the Magistrate erred in failing to find that the respondent had made false and dishonest representations about the Appellant and in so doing harassed and offended the Appellant and continues to do so by his inaction, in failing to apologise and in failing to correct the false and dishonest representations.
The contentions underlying the Grounds are, in summary, that: (a) [redacted] could not make “findings” about the Appellant’s conduct because the Appellant was not called to give evidence to refute the evidence of[redacted]. (b) [redacted] “findings” were, in fact, “comments” which is how the [redacted] decision referred to them (c) The [redacted] decision completely exonerated the Appellant in relation to any “wrong-doing” in relation to [redacted] (d) The Respondent admitted making the false and dishonest statements to [redacted] and (e) The Appellant was not afforded procedural fairness because he was not called to give evidence by the Respondent and neither did the Respondent speak to him before he made the false and dishonest representations.
There is no doubt, as the submissions contend, that the Magistrate considered that [redacted] made findings about the Appellant. Nor is there any doubt that the Magistrate did not consider the [redacted]decision which was not raised with him by the Appellant. Although the Appellant contended that it was a manifestation of the Respondent’s dishonesty that the Respondent did not bring it to the Magistrate’s attention, given that the Appellant relied on the decision as being a vindication of him in relation to [redacted] findings, it is difficult to understand why he did not raise it with the Magistrate.
The assertion in the Grounds made at various places that [redacted] made no findings but made “comments” is drawn from the [redacted] decision and the reference made to that decision by[redacted]. The Appellant maintains that the reason [redacted] referred to his Honour’s findings is because, where the Appellant was not called to give evidence before[redacted], his Honour was unable to make findings about the truth of [redacted] assertions about the Appellant.
The Grounds further proceed on the basis that the [redacted] decision conclusively vindicated the Appellant in relation to “any wrong-doing against[redacted]”.
In submissions, the Appellant contended that the [redacted] decision was not merely about his compliance with the s 660 notice but said that had the Tribunal thought that there was any misconduct on his behalf, it would have extended time as being in the public interest.
A reading of the [redacted]decision demonstrates that any investigation into the Appellant’s conduct arising from the findings of [redacted] required first the provision of the information sought pursuant to s 660. In the result, because time was not extended in which the Law Society could bring an application against the Appellant, there was no investigation and, it follows, no basis on which the Tribunal would exonerate the Appellant in relation to findings made by[redacted].
It first must be observed that the Tribunal had not read [redacted] judgment and the reference by [redacted] as to whether the criticism of the Appellant by [redacted] was substantiated in the [redacted] was couched as speculation. That circumstance alone points away from the Appellant’s contention that the Tribunal was also investigating his alleged misconduct. The conclusion of the Tribunal not to extend the time for the commencement of the proceedings is clearly demonstrated in the findings set out in [50] which related to what [redacted] seems to have considered an unreasonable press for the information which the Appellant was making attempts to provide it.
So too it is plain on the face of[redacted] reasons that his findings about the Appellant’s conduct were based in the affidavit and oral evidence of [redacted] which he accepted.
There is nothing in [redacted] reasons which lends a scintilla of support for the Appellant’s assertion that those findings were based on or resulted from anything said by the Respondent.
Indeed, during the hearing before the Magistrate, the Appellant was invited to take the court to any place within [redacted] reasons to support his assertion that the Respondent had made “false and dishonest” submission or representations about him. As is set out in [50] above, the Appellant’s response is: But the fact of the matter is that that comment could not have been made by his Honour. If you wish to turn around and call it a finding, that finding could not have been made unless the counsel who were acting for [redacted] put that to the court.
The Magistrate rejected the Appellant’s assertion that [redacted]judgment demonstrated that the findings about the Appellant were as a result of submissions or representations made by the Respondent. That finding was not only open to his Honour, it was compelled by the evidence before him.
His Honour did not err in making that finding.
[redacted]The Appellant also relied on the article written by [redacted] as being further evidence of the Respondent’s harassment and intimidation of him.
His Honour found that there is nothing in that article that supports the Appellant’s assertion that it is based on something the Respondent said with the intention of harassing him. His Honour was clearly correct.
The admission
As to the “admission” by the Respondent relied on by the Appellant, the words of the Respondent said to constitute the admission arose during a listing hearing before Deputy Registrar Kew on 18 March 2026. The Appellant relied on those words as evidence of further harassing conduct by the Respondent.
By way of context and as was submitted on behalf of the Respondent, at this time, the Respondent had been served with the Appellant’s application for orders (the allegations said to give rise to the need for the orders have been set out at [38] of these reasons). The application represented the sum total of information then available to the Respondent about the Appellant’s claim.
Although there had been an application for urgent orders heard by Magistrate Stewart, that application was made ex parte.
During the listing hearing before Deputy Registrar Kew, when discussing a suitable date for hearing, the Respondent said: But you’ll appreciate there is something very odd about this. It has to do with what I did as [redacted] in court, nearly 12 years ago, in Brisbane.
The Appellant said that by those words, the Respondent admitted he had made the “false and dishonest” representations to[redacted].
The Magistrate rejected the Appellant’s submission the Respondent’s comments to the Registrar amounted to further evidence of offensive, harassing or intimidating conduct.
In the context of the limited information then available to the Respondent about what the Appellant was contending, his words could not possibly bear the meaning asserted by the Appellant nor could they in any event. It was a statement about the source of the complaint, not an admission of the conduct asserted by the Appellant.
On his Honour’s rejection of the Appellant’s assertions that it was the Respondent who made the false and dishonest representations to [redacted] which resulted in the findings adverse to the Appellant, the foundation of the application for a personal protection order fell away.
His Honour said It seems to me fundamentally, as a matter of evidence, [the appellant] has not established any conduct on behalf of [the Respondent], then (sic that) I could be satisfied to constitute harass, being harassing or offensive
His Honour’s decision was clearly correct and no error has been established.
Summary dismissal
His Honour then turned to the Respondent’s application that the proceedings be summarily dismissed. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant’s application was not only frivolous but vexatious and brought in bad faith.
In support of that proposition, senior counsel for the Respondent submitted that in addition to the other evidence, the affidavit filed by the Appellant on the eve of the hearing repeats the claims against the Respondent of false and dishonest conduct. In particular, counsel for the Respondent noted the events to which the Appellant deposed in that affidavit to support his contention that the Respondent should be restrained from being in any court of the commonwealth because the Appellant was likely to be there. It was submitted that these actions of the Appellant were unlikely to result in success, represent evidence of bad faith and an abuse of process. Counsel also pointed to the assertion by the Appellant that he intended to commence a private criminal prosecution of the Respondent for fraud.
The Magistrate said: As noted by Ms Bashir, on behalf of [the Respondent], the most recent affidavits filed by the Appellant are largely submission as to law asserting that the court should accept certain findings of fact made by other courts and/or his assertions. I respectfully reject the submission made by [the Appellant] in those submissions but do not that [the Appellant] has repeatedly asserted that [the Respondent] has engaged in fraudulent conduct. This leads me to a conclusion, objectively, that [the Appellant’s] application is vexatious, noting that it includes prohibitions on [the Respondent] attending places and court houses where he obviously engages.
In his submissions, the Appellant contended that his application for personal protection orders should have been dealt with at a hearing. The Appellant submitted that there was a “real question to be tried” and that there are factual issues which require resolution in a hearing of the application and its merits.
As has been demonstrated by the Magistrate’s reasons and as is plain on the evidence, there was no basis at all for the Appellant’s application for orders and nothing to ventilate at a hearing. The Magistrate did not err in dismissing the application summarily. Conclusion
His Honour’s findings that there was no evidence to establish that the Respondent had made the representations alleged was entirely correct as was the necessary conclusion that the Appellant had not established the basis for the making of a personal protection order against the Respondent. His Honour’s finding that the application was brought vexatiously and in bad faith was supported by the evidence and was, again entirely correct.
The Appeal will be thus be dismissed.
The Respondent sought an order for professional costs in the event that the appeal was dismissed.
The Appellant did not address the question of the Respondent’s costs in the event that the appeal was dismissed. If the Appellant wishes to be heard on the question of the Respondent’s costs he must file a submission of no more than five pages in length within 7 days of publication of these reasons.
Additional Information
On 13 August 2026, following the conclusion of the proceedings, the Appellant sent a document by email to the court requesting that it be received “… to assist her Honour …”.
The email contained what appears to be a screen shot of the Appellant’s application for a constitutional writ and bearing the endorsement that the Registrar of the High Court is directed “… to refuse to issue or file this document without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained by the party seeking to issue or file it.”
The Appellant’s comment in relation to this was that his application for a Constitutional Writ “… is evolving from moment to moment.”
The Respondent did not object to the application for the writ being before the court. The Respondent did not consent to the balance of the document being considered and it will not be taken into account.
It is not at all clear why providing this document would assist the determination of the appeal, although it demonstrates that it had been lodged with the High Court Registry. It is to be observed that the major part of the matters sought to be dealt with by the High Court concerns the conduct of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia between the Appellant and his former wife.
It does not cause me to change or alter the findings and conclusions set out in the reasons.
Orders
1 I certify that the preceding one hundred [100] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Acting Justice Ainslie- Wallace. Associate: MG Malouf Date: 10 September 2026
1 This Judgment has been republished having been redacted on 9 September 2026
Osborne (a pseudonym)
Vaughn (a pseudonym)
[1936] HCA 40