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[2007] VSC 1
Supreme Court of Victoria
2007-01-25
HABERSBERGER J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CONTRACT - Identity of contracting parties - Whether individual or his private company was the contracting party - Construction of termination bonus provision - Whether expression "termination of this contract for any reason" included termination by effluxion of time - Meaning of "three preceding financial years" - Computation of time - Construction of performance bonus provisions - Meaning of "non/limited resource financing" - Meaning of "The Village Roadshow Group" - Meaning of "7.5% ownership interest" - Rectification - Calculation of claim to a share of profits.
TRADE PRACTICES - Misleading and deceptive conduct - Representations by officer of corporation to fellow officers about terms of, and likely financial results of, proposed transaction - No loss and damage established - No reliance - Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss.52, 87 - Fair Trading Act 1985, ss.11, 41 - Fair Trading Act 1999, ss.9, 158.
CORPORATIONS - Applicable legislation - Transitional provisions - Whether agreement to pay, or payment of, termination bonus in breach of the retirement from office provisions of corporations legislation - Board or managerial office - In connection with retirement - Possible exceptions - Whether agreement to pay, or payment of, performance bonuses and profit shares in breach of the related party financial benefit provisions of corporations legislation - Onus of proof possible exceptions - At arm's length - Reasonable terms - The consequences of a contravention - Validity and enforceability of the agreement - Ex turpi causa non oritur actio - Exculpatory provisions - Directors' duties - [1990] Corporations Law, ss.60, 79, 103, 109E, 109F, 232, 232A, 237, 243A, 243C, 243D, 243F, 243G, 243H, 243N, 243ZE, 1317HD, 1317JA, 1318, 1324 - [2000] Corporations Law, ss.103, 180, 181, 182, 183, 191, 195, 200A, 200B, 200D, 200E, 200F, 200G, 200J, 207, 208, 209, 210, 228, 229, 1317E, 1317S, 1318, 1324, 1470, - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss.1370, 1400, 1401.
LEGAL PRACTITIONERS - Prohibition on engaging in legal practice without holding a practising certificate - Whether consultant to company engaged in legal practice - Taxation advice - Whether given as solicitor or as accountant - Briefing counsel - Drafting documents - Relevance of claim for legal professional privilege - Whether there could be recovery of amounts in respect of anything done during the course of a contravention - whether there must be repayment of amounts received in respect of anything done during the course of a contravention - Legal Practice Act 1996, s.314 - Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s.251L.
EVIDENCE - Standard of proof - Contravention of civil penalty provisions of Corporations Law - Civil proceeding - Expert evidence - Obligations of expert witness.
Introduction
1 These reasons for judgment involve a detailed consideration of a number of contractual entitlements claimed by the plaintiff, Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd ("Orrong"), against the defendant, Village Roadshow Limited ("VRL") pursuant to an agreement made in November 1995 (or, as pleaded by VRL, pursuant to an agreement made in May 1993 as varied by the agreement made in November 1995) whereby Orrong agreed to provide certain consultancy services to VRL for a five year period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 2001, and pursuant to further agreements, or variations of the agreement made in November 1995, respectively made in September 1997 and June 2000. Orrong is a company owned by the second defendant to VRL's counterclaim, Mr Peter Ziegler, and his wife. VRL is a public company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
2 When this proceeding commenced on 23 September 2003, Orrong, in its statement of claim, sought payment by VRL of an amount in excess of $148 million. In addition, Orrong sought declarations that it was entitled "in perpetuity" to "a 7.5% share of the net profits" of Village Roadshow Pictures ("VRP"), a division of VRL, and "a 7.5% share in the assets of VRP." The amount of $148.682 million consisted of a termination bonus of $139.047 million, a performance bonus of $3.75 million for raising a $75 million "non/limited recourse" finance facility for the Roadshow Distributors Group, performance bonuses totalling $530,900 for "taxes saved" in the financial years ended 30 June 2001 and 30 June 2002 and the 7.5% share of VRP's profit in each of the financial years ended 30 June 2000 to 30 June 2003 which, after allowing for a payment by VRL of $283,000 in respect of the 2000 financial year, was said to total $5.354 million.
3 At the time the hearing commenced on 30 March 2005, Orrong amended its claim to increase the amount sought for the termination bonus to over $208 million. This, together with earlier amendments brought the total amount claimed in the third further amended statement of claim to nearly $220 million. This figure consisted of a termination bonus of $208.427 million, the Roadshow Distributors Group performance bonus of $3.724 million, the "taxes saved" performance bonuses totalling $530,900 and the unpaid balance of the 7.5% profit share for the financial years ended 30 June 2000 to 30 June 2004 said to total $7.089 million. In addition, Orrong had included an alternative claim that if, by reason of the defences raised by VRL, the claims relating to the 7.5% share of VRP failed then it was entitled to performance bonuses totalling $65.567 million for "non/limited recourse" finance raising which in turn resulted in a termination bonus of $44.792 million being payable, a total of $110.359 million.
4 By its defence and counterclaim, delivered on 23 December 2003, VRL raised numerous defences including defences under the relevant corporations legislation from time to time and the Legal Practice Act 1996 and sought repayment from one or more of Orrong and the other two defendants to the counterclaim, Mr Ziegler and Remut Pty Ltd ("Remut"), of the sum of approximately $25.68 million, which it alleged it had paid to one or other of the three defendants to the counterclaim over the six years between 1 July 1996 and 30 June 2002.
5 The stakes were, therefore, very high and accordingly both sides devoted considerable resources to this litigation. VRL pleaded a raft of defences to each of Orrong's claims, which raised a multitude of both factual and legal questions. The hearing lasted for 71 sitting days with virtually every possible issue explored in detail.
6 Although in final submissions both parties reduced the sums claimed by them, the amounts in dispute were still significant. The final principal monetary figure sought by Orrong was approximately $85.09 million, consisting of a termination bonus of $76.814 million, the Roadshow Distributors Group performance bonus of $3.724 million, the "taxes saved" performance bonuses totalling $530,900 and the outstanding amount of the 7.5% profit share for the financial years ended 30 June 2000 to 30 June 2002 and the financial year ended 30 June 2004 said to total $4.024 million. The reduction was largely due to the lower amount sought for the termination bonus - $76.814 million compared with the original claim of $139.047 million and the amended claim of $208.427 million. By now the alternative claim had been reduced to $59.719 million for the performance bonuses and $42.598 million for the termination bonus, a total of $102.317 million.
7 Depending on which, if any, of VRL's many defences and counterclaims might be found to be successful and depending on the manner of calculating the various claims for loss and damage or statutory entitlements to repayment, the maximum final figure sought by VRL in its counterclaim came to approximately $18.28 million.
The Parties and Their Witnesses
Orrong, Mr Zielger and Remut
8 As previously stated, Orrong was Mr Ziegler's private family company. He purchased the recently incorporated shelf company, then known as Commercial and Taxation Services Pty Ltd, in May or June 1993. Shortly thereafter the company changed its name to Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd. On 27 November 2002 it changed its name to Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd. Mr Ziegler and his wife, Andrea Ziegler, became and have remained the only directors and shareholders of Orrong.
9 Mr Ziegler obtained honours degrees in Commerce and Law from the University of Queensland in 1982 and 1983, respectively, and a Masters degree in Financial Management from the same University in 1983. His studies focused on accounting, corporate finance and law. From 1984 to 1988 Mr Ziegler was a lecturer and then senior lecturer in the Department of Commerce at the University of Queensland. He lectured in commercial law, taxation law and corporate finance to both undergraduate and post-graduate students.
10 In December 1988, Mr Ziegler joined Ernst & Whinney in Melbourne. He became a partner in the tax division of that firm's successor, Ernst & Young, in 1992. He had been a Certified Practising Accountant since 1986. He became a Fellow of the Taxation Institute of Australia and an Affiliate of the Securities Institute of Australia in 1990 and a Chartered Accountant in 1992.
11 Mr Ziegler was admitted to legal practice in Queensland in 1984 and in Victoria on 3 September 1990. Since that date he has held a Victorian corporate practising certificate.
12 VRL was already a major client of the tax division of Ernst & Whinney when Mr Ziegler joined that firm. He said that through his work on VRL's tax affairs he "came to know most of the senior executives of VRL well and to understand intimately VRL's business operations and imperatives." He worked extremely hard on VRL's tax matters whilst he was with Ernst & Young and its predecessor. In 1993 he left Ernst & Whinney and commenced working full time for VRL. The circumstances in which that arrangement came about will be examined in the next part.
13 Remut is the trustee of the Remuneration Unit Trust which in 1995 became the vehicle for the payment by VRL of personalised employee share plan subscriptions. Mr Ziegler and certain other VRL executives had entered into such arrangements with VRL. Pursuant to the arrangement between Orrong and VRL, the payment for some of the services provided by Orrong was made to Remut as trustee for the Remuneration Unit Trust. Mr Ziegler agreed that this had "beneficial tax consequences."
The Village Roadshow Group
14 The history of the Village Roadshow Group started in 1954 when Mr Roc Kirby became the proprietor of a drive-in cinema in Croydon, an outer suburb of Melbourne. Mr Roc Kirby's two sons, John and Robert, are both executive directors of the public company, VRL, and they have alternated as Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors for a number of years. The managing director, Mr Graham Burke, has been with the Village Roadshow Group since the late 1950s. (As Mr Robert Kirby played a greater role in these events and was called as a witness, any reference hereafter to "Mr Kirby" means Mr Robert Kirby. Mr John Kirby, who was not called as a witness, is always referred to hereafter as "Mr John Kirby".)
15 VRL listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 1988. It appeared to be common ground that at all material times the Kirby family and Mr Burke, through their ownership of Village Roadshow Corporation Limited ("VRC"), controlled VRL. VRC owned around 60% of VRL's ordinary shares. The Village Roadshow Group has five main divisions - a cinema or exhibition division; a film distribution division; a film production division; a theme park division; and a radio division. It operates in 13 countries through numerous subsidiary companies, partnerships, joint ventures and trusts.
16 The film production division is VRP. It operated as though it were a separate business, with its own Board of Directors and management accounts. Since VRL's Annual Report for the financial year ended 30 June 1998, VRP's results have been reported separately in the Segment Reporting section. VRP was made up by a large number of companies, partnerships, trusts and other entities, not all of which were wholly owned by VRL.
17 Mr Robert Kirby, Mr John Kirby and Mr Burke effectively acted as the joint Chief Executive Officers of VRL. Mr Burke said that he had the primary executive responsibility for the film production division or VRP.
18 Mr Peter Foo joined the VRL Group in the finance area in 1978. He was appointed Group General Manager in 1992, an alternate director of VRL in 1995 and the Finance Director of VRL in 1998. Between 1991 and 2000 he was also a Company Secretary of VRL.
The Witnesses
19 Not surprisingly Mr Ziegler was the principal witness called by Orrong and many of its claims depended virtually entirely on his evidence being accepted.
20 At first blush, Mr Ziegler appeared to be a reliable witness with an impressive recall of events and conversations. His initial witness statement dated 11 March 2005 was 153 pages and 829 paragraphs in length. However, closer examination revealed that this first impression was not necessarily correct. As will be seen, Mr Ziegler added important pieces of evidence in the witness box which had not been mentioned in his lengthy witness statement served only five or six weeks before. Further, at times, his oral evidence contradicted that witness statement. Finally, it turned out that his memory was not that good as he was unable to recall details of conversations with Orrong's expert valuer, Mr Paul Lom, only days before he gave evidence. This was a significant contrast to his purported ability to remember in great detail conversations occurring up to ten or more years before. Thus, Mr Ziegler's memory was not as good as represented or he was deliberately pretending inability to recall the detail of his discussions with Mr Lom.
21 In its closing written submissions VRL mounted a most forceful attack on Mr Ziegler's credibility. For example, it was submitted that:
"Ziegler's evidence in the witness box cannot be considered in isolation. It is just a small part of a much bigger picture. That bigger picture is Ziegler's ambition to be wealthy. VRL submits that Ziegler's conduct while at VRL and during this proceeding demonstrate that he is an individual whose driving motivation is the accumulation of significant quantities of money. In the single minded pursuit of this ambition he has demonstrated a willingness to cross normal moral lines, including deceiving people who trusted him, manipulating his work colleagues, setting out to avoid the requirements of the Corporations Law and being dishonest with the ATO. For Ziegler, telling untruths in the witness box is just another necessary part of the fulfilment of his ambitions.
Ziegler spent much of his time at VRL in the pursuit of personal gain. His ambition outstripped his market value, so from the very outset he was careful to document his entitlements in a way that allowed him 'flexibility' for adapting to future circumstances. When circumstances arose that Ziegler could exploit for personal gain, he took advantage of the situation. When VRL resisted, he became aggressive and demanding."
22 The tone of the submissions by VRL is illustrative, in my opinion, of the depth of ill-feeling manifested between the parties during the hearing. Clearly Mr Ziegler believed that his work had brought great benefit to VRL and he was greatly aggrieved that Orrong had not received what he perceived to be its just rewards. On the other hand, those executive directors of VRL who gave evidence were obviously upset at what they saw to be the unjustified claims by Orrong, when it had been very generously remunerated for the work done by Mr Ziegler, and at what they perceived to be manipulative attempts by Mr Ziegler to embarrass VRL and its directors in the public arena through the litigation.
23 I do not accept that Mr Ziegler has been as devious, manipulative or far sighted as VRL submitted. Nevertheless, as will be seen, on many occasions his evidence conflicted with that of the principal factual witnesses called by VRL - Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo. Whilst criticisms can be made of aspects of these witnesses' evidence, I have concluded that, with respect to quite a number of issues, some critical, others less so, I should accept the evidence of Messrs Kirby, Burke and Foo in preference to that of Mr Ziegler.
24 Apart from Mr Ziegler, Orrong called only two witnesses. One was Mr Lom, Orrong's expert valuer, who gave evidence about the value of Orrong's claimed termination bonus. The remaining witness was Mr Darryn Hugo, a former employee of Roadshow Distributors Pty Ltd, who gave evidence about Orrong's claim for a performance bonus in respect of a Roadshow Distributors Group facility of $75 million arranged in June 2001. The reliability of each of those witnesses will be considered when I deal with the respective topics on which they gave evidence.
25 Apart from Messrs Kirby, Burke and Foo, VRL called factual evidence from another nine witnesses. They were Mr William Conn, a non-executive director of VRL and former investment banker with Potter Warburg Limited and McIntosh Securities Limited; Mr Brian Wilson, an investment banker formerly and relevantly with Salomon Smith Barney Australia Limited; Mr Anton Le Rutte, who at the relevant time was an Executive Director in Australia of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Mr Peter Buzzard, a Chartered Accountant and a partner in the firm of Ernst & Young, the auditors of VRL; Ms Julie Raffe, the Chief Financial Officer of VRL and a member of its Executive Committee; Mr Philip Leggo, the Group Company Secretary of VRL; Mr Shaun Driscoll, the co-Company Secretary of VRL; Mr Leigh Butterworth, the senior business analyst for the production division of VRL; and Mr Bryce Wolfe, the finance director of the production division of VRL; Mr Richard Mereine, a partner in the firm of Clayton Utz, Mr Ziegler's former solicitors; and Mr Dane McLeod, a former employee solicitor with Clayton Utz. It also called evidence from five expert witnesses. They were Mr Cullimore Gower, a Chartered Accountant and director of GCA Gower & Co Pty Ltd; Mr Gregory Meredith, a Chartered Accountant and partner in the firm of Ferrier Hodgson; Mr Christopher Costello, the Chairman and Managing Director of Remuneration Planning Corporation Pty Ltd and then of RPC Group Pty Ltd; Mr Roy Salter, the Principal of the Salter Group, LLC, an American financial and strategic advisory firm to the entertainment and media industry; and Mr Richard Williams, an Associate Director of Pricewaterhouse Coopers' Computer Investigations and Forensic Services group. The reliability of each of these witnesses will be considered when I deal with the respective topics on which they gave evidence.
26 Orrong submitted that VRL had failed to call, without explanation, evidence from a number of relevant witnesses. They included Mr John Kirby, who at some relevant times was Chairman of VRL and Mr Greg Basser, a partner with Herbert Geer & Rundle, a firm of solicitors acting for VRL, and who later joined VRL as its senior legal officer. Orrong submitted that the failure to call these witnesses or explain their absence was an additional basis for rejecting the attack on Mr Ziegler's credibility.[1] Where I have considered it relevant, I have taken into account this submission when dealing with the respective topics on which these witnesses might have given evidence.
Standard of Proof
27 Before embarking on any findings of fact it is necessary that I say something about the standard of proof applicable in this proceeding. As with a multitude of other issues, the parties had conflicting positions even on this question.
28 Counsel for Orrong submitted that, given the serious nature of the many contraventions of the corporations legislation and of the Legal Practice Act 1996 and other misconduct alleged against Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler, the question of whether there should be any adverse findings against Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler in respect of such allegations were serious matters which required proof by VRL at least to the higher level of satisfaction required by Briginshaw v Briginshaw[2]. Reliance was frequently placed by Orrong on the following statement by Dixon J (as his Honour then was) in that case:
"Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters 'reasonable satisfaction' should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences."[3] (Emphasis added)
29 On the other hand, counsel for VRL submitted that there were only two standards of proof, the criminal and the civil, and that as this proceeding was undoubtedly a civil dispute the appropriate standard of proof was on the balance of probabilities. VRL relied on what was said by Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ in Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd[4]:
"The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears the onus in civil litigation in this country is proof on the balance of probabilities. That remains so even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the other hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have often been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary 'where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found'. Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct. As Dixon J. commented in Briginshaw v Briginshaw:
'The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved ...'
There are, however, circumstances in which generalisations about the need for clear and cogent evidence to prove matters of the gravity of fraud or crime are, even when understood as not directed to the standard of proof, likely to be unhelpful and even misleading. In our view, it was so in the present case." (Citations omitted)
30 Part of Orrong's argument relied on the fact that some of the provisions of the corporations legislation which were said to have been contravened by Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler involved civil penalty provisions. These were described in Orrong's submissions as "quasi-criminal" in nature. Whether or not that is an appropriate description does not matter because the situation in this case is that there are no claims by a regulatory authority for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty or for disqualification orders, and even in those cases where such orders have been sought, it has been held that the standard of proof was the civil standard on the balance of probabilities, although the seriousness of the allegations and the consequences thereof in terms of the orders sought were matters that "should be taken into account in deciding whether there has been proof on the balance of probabilities.[5]
31 As I have said, this proceeding was not one brought by a regulatory authority. It is simply an ordinary civil proceeding in which VRL seeks in its counterclaim declarations that corporations law provisions have been contravened, and orders for damages and compensation. Therefore, insofar as VRL's case against Orrong and Mr Ziegler alleged breaches of the corporations legislation and other instances of misconduct, it is, in my opinion, a proceeding in which the civil standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities, is applicable. However, both common sense and authority such as Briginshaw, as explained by Neat Holdings, dictate that findings of serious misconduct should not be made lightly.
32 As the argument about the standard of proof in respect of alleged breaches of the Legal Practice Act 1996 had its own special issues, I will deal with it separately when I come to consider that topic.
The Factual Background
33 In order to understand the many legal issues discussed in this judgment, it is necessary to set out in some detail the factual background to this litigation.
The 1993 Agreement
34 Mr Ziegler said in his witness statement that in March 1993 Mr Kirby asked him at a lunch whether he would be interested in joining VRL in some capacity. Mr Ziegler expressed interest. He then had several conversations with Mr Foo. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Foo suggested that he should resign from Ernst & Young and provide taxation advice to VRL through a consultancy company. Mr Foo mentioned a $300,000 per annum retainer plus certain performance bonuses which would provide explicit incentives to achieve what VRL wanted. Mr Ziegler gave evidence that Mr Foo said that the provision of consulting services to VRL through an incorporated entity would limit liability, help VRL capitalise the expenditure incurred and provide flexibility in the way in which the remuneration arrangements could be entered into. Mr Foo disputed much of the detail of this evidence.
35 What is clear is that following the discussions between them, Mr Foo wrote to Mr Ziegler a letter dated 4 May 1993 which relevantly read as follows:
"This confirms our discussions today with respect to your consultancy agreement with Village Roadshow Limited. Effective from 1st July, 1993, your new consultancy company will be paid a retainer fee of $300,000 per annum for an initial period of three years. In this $300,000 package you are expected to provide your own vehicle and superannuation cover, etc. Village Roadshow will, however, reimburse you for your reasonable entertaining expenses, travelling and car running costs such as petrol and car parking. In addition, consideration for any share options will be given as if you were an employee of Village Roadshow Limited.
In addition to this fixed retainer, we agree to pay a fee of 5% of tax savings instigated by you in terms of sales tax, stamp duty/refunds and income tax for our group. Peter, as you are aware the determination of these savings can be somewhat subjective, however, I undertake to negotiate in good faith to determine a fair and reasonable outcome in this respect."
36 Mr Ziegler responded by a letter dated either 12 or 13 May 1993. I consider below the dispute about which letter was sent and conclude that it was the letter dated 12 May 1993. Because of the importance of this exchange of correspondence between the parties, I set out below virtually the whole of the letter dated 12 May 1993 from Mr Ziegler to Mr Foo:
"RE TAXATION CONSULTANCY AGREEMENT WITH VILLAGE ROADSHOW LIMITED ("VRL")
I refer to our recent discussions, and your letter of 4 May 1993. As requested, by this letter I confirm my acceptance of the proposed arrangements to commence on 1 July 1993.
In order to obviate the need for a formal contract to be executed, and to avoid any later concerns, this letter more fully outlines my understanding of the arrangements, and addresses some operational issues. (Obviously, should a formal contract be required, I can draw one up for you.) Please come back to me if any of the following points are not in keeping with what you envisage, or cause any concerns.
Consultancy Fee Package
$300,000 package per annum (able to be taken by cash, 'Menzies' arrangement, motor vehicle, superannuation, etc.) by way of retainer to my new consultancy company for an initial three year period, capable of extension for a further two years.
This $300,000 per annum retainer to be payable in monthly instalments, and adjusted annually for inflation over the previous 12 months period.
Four weeks holiday per annum plus declared public holidays.
Reimbursement of Other Outgoings
Reimbursement of all out of pocket expenses reasonably and properly incurred in the course of the business of the Village Roadshow Group, including travelling costs and entertainment expenses.
Reimbursement of motor vehicle running costs (including insurance, registration, maintenance, petrol, car parking, etc.)
Eligibility for Share Options
Consideration given to the issue of share options as if an employee of VRL of similar standing.
Performance Bonus
(a) 5% of tax refunds (income tax, sales tax, payroll tax, stamp duty, etc.) obtained for the Village Roadshow Group.
(b) 5% of 'non-recourse' financing raised by the Village Roadshow Group as a direct result of my efforts (and, of course, exclusive of the present Village Roadshow film finance raising.)
(c) 5% of tax savings made for the Village Roadshow Group in terms of income tax, sales tax, payroll tax, stamp duty, etc. with negotiation in good faith to determine a fair and reasonable outcome given the somewhat subjective nature of these savings.
Elements (a) and (b) to be paid as received, with (c) to be determined and paid annually after the preparation of the Village Roadshow Group financial statements.
Other Resources Required
It is expected that approx. $20,000 per annum will be required to be expended by VRL to provide the necessary taxation library resources.
... office, secretarial support ... and a personal computer running Microsoft Word, to be provided.
Annual professional subscriptions, and attendance at conferences and educational courses as reasonably required.
...
Peter, I am confident that the present quality of taxation advice rendered to the Village Roadshow Group can be maintained, if not enhanced, under our new arrangements.
I regard this move as a major career opportunity to join an exciting organisation that is pre-eminent in its chosen fields. I really do look forward to joining the Village team on a long term basis, and contributing to its long term growth and success."
37 The reference to a " 'Menzies' arrangement" was to the term in one of two agreements (an Employment Agreement and a Profit Share Agreement) between a number of VRL and Warner Bros subsidiaries and Mr John Menzies, the chief executive officer of VRL's theme park businesses on the Gold Coast. A term of the Profit Share Agreement provided for payment of "Employee Profit Shares" by way of share subscription by the VRL entities in an entity controlled by Mr Menzies and for payment of an "Employee Termination Profit Share" upon termination. Mr Ziegler said that this was one of the matters which Mr Foo and he had discussed. Mr Ziegler knew about the arrangement because he had advised on certain income tax aspects associated with them in mid 1992.
38 Mr Ziegler said that shortly after 13 May 1993, Mr Foo told him that the letter was fine and that they were agreed. I refer to this agreement hereafter as "the 1993 Agreement." Mr Ziegler then purchased the company Orrong as his corporate vehicle to perform the 1993 Agreement.
The May 1993 Letters
39 As previously mentioned, there was a dispute about whether Mr Ziegler had replied to Mr Foo's letter by a letter dated 12 May 1993, which had been discovered by both Orrong and VRL, or one dated 13 May 1993, which had been discovered only by VRL. The differences in the wording of the two letters were very minor. This otherwise unimportant dispute deserves consideration only because of the impact it has on the credibility of Mr Ziegler and Mr Foo.
40 Orrong did not refer to the 1993 Agreement in any of its numerous amended statements of claim. It simply pleaded an agreement made in November 1995 ("the 1995 Agreement"). VRL in its defence and counterclaim pleaded the 1993 Agreement and the 1995 Agreement as a variation or extension of the earlier Agreement. Originally VRL pleaded that the 1993 Agreement had been made "on or about 13 May 1993." In its reply and defence to counterclaim Orrong asserted that the 1993 Agreement was made "on or about 12 May 1993." Subsequently, VRL amended its plea to substitute the date "12 May 1993."
41 In his witness statement Mr Ziegler referred to his letter of 13 May 1993. In cross-examination he denied any knowledge of the letter of 12 May:
"In fact I can't even recollect the 12 May document"; and
_"_I have never seen this document before."
42 Mr Foo gave evidence that some years after Mr Ziegler commenced working for VRL he looked for a copy of Mr Ziegler's letter, the one dated 12 May 1993, but not being able to locate it he asked Mr Ziegler for a copy. Some time later Mr Ziegler handed him a copy of the letter, dated 13 May 1993. Mr Foo subsequently found his copy of the letter dated 12 May 1993. It had a series of ticks down the right hand margin by Mr Foo and the words "Film tax" in Mr Foo's handwriting. He said these had been added by him at the time of the 1993 negotiations. Mr Ziegler denied this evidence. He said:
"I gave him [Mr Foo] the letter of 13 May, and to the best of my knowledge he never asked for another copy of my contract and I never gave him one."
43 When taxed with the situation of two letters, Mr Ziegler said that the earlier letter was a draft, even though it had been signed. Mr Foo emphatically rejected that suggestion. I reject Mr Ziegler's evidence that the signed version of the letter could have been a draft. VRL pointed out that, significantly, when Mr Ziegler's computer was examined, although copies of his 12 May letter were located, there was no copy of the 13 May letter found. Why he would have saved his draft but not his final version of the letter was not explained by Mr Ziegler.
44 VRL drew attention to two documents from Mr Ziegler which, it submitted, supported its contention that the letter dated 12 May 1993 had been sent and had formed the basis of the 1993 Agreement. One document was an undated facsimile from Mr Ziegler to a solicitor, Mr John Atanaskovic, referring to a telephone conversation and attaching "copies of letters constituting my company's (Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd), consultancy agreement with Village Roadshow Limited." It also said:
"The first letter, dated 12 May 1993 constituted the basis of the arrangement for the three year period commencing 1 July 1993 to 30 June 1996. A further 5 year contract was entered into with effect from 1 July 1996 (expiring 30 June 2001), with the same being constituted by two letters dated 2 October 1995 and 27 November 1995."
The second document was a memorandum from Mr Ziegler to Mr Wilson which appeared to have been dated in handwriting "18 May 2000" in which Mr Ziegler asserted:
"In summary, PZ & Co entered into a consultancy agreement with VRL on 12 May 1993 (copy attached) as extended in October/November 1995 (copies attached)."
45 In the light of this evidence I am satisfied that the evidence of Mr Foo should be accepted. It is entirely credible and explains why there were two almost identical letters dated 12 and 13 May 1993. I conclude that the 12 May letter was the one forwarded by Mr Ziegler at the time of the negotiations in May 1993.
46 VRL submitted that not only had Mr Ziegler lied about the date of the letter but he had deviously planned ahead, and seized an opportunity to bolster his position. It pointed to the addition to the 12 May letter found in the 13 May version under the heading "Other Resources Required." After talking about expenditure on a taxation library, the following was added:
"(Obviously, total resources required will be a reflection of Village Roadshow Group activities from time to time.)"
VRL submitted that whilst the difference in the letters was marginal, the words in brackets had a subtle purpose as they supported the argument, that as long ago as 1993 it was contemplated that Mr Ziegler would move beyond tax based fundraising. VRL argued that by about 1995 or 1996 when Mr Ziegler probably produced the 13 May version he was undoubtedly thinking in terms of earning massive bonuses from insurance backed film financing and that perhaps he wished to show that such activity had been contemplated as early as 1993.
47 I am not persuaded by this Machiavellian interpretation. In my opinion, it is far more likely that there is some innocent explanation, such as that Mr Ziegler also could not find his final version of the 12 May letter and that he attempted to reconstruct it from an earlier draft. Whatever the reason, Mr Ziegler stoutly denied forwarding the 12 May version of the letter. That was evidence I could not accept and was evidence which, as far as I am concerned, damaged his credibility.
Service under the 1993 Agreement
48 When the 1993 Agreement commenced in July 1993, Mr Ziegler's initial focus was, he said, primarily on completing the taxation assignments he had been undertaking for VRL whilst at Ernst & Young. The services he performed for VRL involved income tax and other tax minimisation and planning strategies, recovery of taxes previously overpaid by VRL and other entities in the Village Roadshow Group, and the raising of finance for the production of films. Mr Ziegler was first appointed to the position of Chief Tax Counsel and later of Group Counsel of VRL "responsible for fiscal and legal affairs and advising on group strategies" according to VRL's 1995 Annual Report.
49 Mr Ziegler explained that at this time VRP was operating on a business model of producing predominantly Australian low-budget films. These films were usually pre-sold to film distributors prior to completion of production in an attempt to cover the financial risk. But in return for providing a guaranteed minimum financial return, the film distributors charged high distribution fees. According to Mr Ziegler, in the 1990s the film distributors reduced the amounts they were prepared to advance by way of their minimum guarantee with the result that VRP was increasingly exposed to the risk of a loss on a film unless it was a box office hit.
50 At this time the Australian taxation system provided specific tax incentives for certain types of investment in film production pursuant to Division 10B and Division 10BA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 ("the ITAA") in addition to the ordinary allowable deductions for losses or outgoings incurred in the gaining of assessable income.
51 Mr Ziegler played an important role in obtaining significant funding from third party investors in a tax effective way. Mr Ziegler said that a typical VRP film-related investment was structured so that the third party investor only contributed 20% of the investment from its own money with 80% borrowed from a VRL subsidiary. The terms of the loan were such that it was only repayable out of any proceeds received by the investor from the exploitation of the film. The investor was able to claim a deduction for 100% of the investment, whilst the consequent increase in VRL's assessable income could be offset against VRL's tax losses. If the film was unsuccessful then any losses would be added to VRL's tax losses. Mr Ziegler described this funding as "non-recourse" or "limited recourse" funding.
52 However, according to Mr Ziegler, by the mid-1990s this type of limited recourse investment financing was becoming unpopular with the Australian Tax Office ("the ATO"). It started disallowing a deduction for the borrowed 80% of the investment unless the investor was at full legal and economic risk of repaying the principal and interest. This meant that the tax benefit of the investment was reduced by 80% or that the risk of the investment was substantially increased if the loan became full recourse. As a consequence, this form of tax advantaged film financing was drying up.
The 1995 Agreement
53 According to Mr Ziegler, on 26 September 1995 Mr Kirby and Mr Burke approached Mr Ziegler about renewing the existing consultancy agreement, some nine months prior to the end of its three year term. Mr Kirby told Mr Ziegler that he wanted him to agree to a new five year consultancy commencing after the expiration of the existing agreement. Mr Kirby said that he wanted Mr Ziegler to take a more commercial role in VRL's affairs than previously and not to concentrate as heavily on tax planning and structuring. He wanted Mr Ziegler to become more directly involved in the development of overall VRL strategy and to explore new ways of raising non/limited recourse financing for VRL's businesses. Mr Zeigler said that Mr Burke said that he agreed with what Mr Kirby had said.
54 Mr Ziegler said in his witness statement that he replied that he would be interested in exploring new ways of raising finance and that he would expect to have his company paid performance bonuses in relation to raising that finance. Mr Ziegler also said that he rejected the suggestion of a five year contract saying that five years was a long time and that he did not know what the future might hold. He explained that his daughters were then still very young and that he wanted to be able to enjoy being with them when they were growing up and reaching school age.
55 Mr Ziegler said that in response to Mr Kirby saying that he wanted to be sure that Mr Ziegler would be there for "the long haul", he then said that, as an inducement for him to enter into a five year agreement, rather than his preferred three year agreement, he would require VRL to agree to a termination bonus to be paid at the end of that five year period so that he would have a concrete incentive to be available and to provide consulting services through his company to VRL for the longer term. He referred to the termination bonus in the Menzies contract and said to Mr Kirby and Mr Burke that that was an example of VRL having agreed to pay that type of bonus. He said to both Mr Kirby and Mr Burke that if VRL agreed to pay a termination bonus at the end of the period, he would be prepared to commit to a new five year term commencing on 1 July 1996. He said, further, that a termination bonus would "incentivise" him to remain fully committed to VRL for that longer five year term period which is what they both said they wanted.
56 According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby then asked him how the termination bonus would be calculated, and he replied that he wanted to ensure that any termination bonus would be "performance" rather than "profit_"_ based. Mr Ziegler said that the termination bonus should be a five times multiple of the average performance bonus of the three preceding financial years and that Mr Kirby replied, without hesitation, that that would be fine and that Mr Burke said that he agreed.
57 According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby then asked in what circumstances the termination bonus would be payable prior to 30 June, 2001. Mr Ziegler replied in words to the effect that:
"Obviously, in addition to termination occurring because of my death, because I don't think anyone else from my side can then provide the services, if VRL wishes to terminate the agreement earlier than 30 June, 2001, the termination bonus will then become payable. Also, if VRL is taken over and the consultancy agreement is terminated early by new management, the more so if the two of you and John are no longer involved in the business, I would expect the termination bonus to be paid."
58 For emphasis, Mr Ziegler said that he added that "you could all decide to retire or you could get shot: anything is possible." Mr Burke commented that the traditional example was being run over by a bus.
59 According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby then said that he thought that early termination was remote and that he thought that a termination bonus seemed reasonable overall if Mr Ziegler was prepared to give a five year commitment to VRL. Mr Ziegler then said that obviously the termination bonus would not be payable if the new five year agreement had to be terminated by VRL because of his company's or his "gross misconduct" and that Mr Kirby replied that "Naturally this would be the case."
60 Both Mr Kirby and Mr Burke disputed Mr Ziegler's evidence that they had agreed that the termination bonus would be payable at the end of the five year period. Mr Kirby said that "there was no discussion about what might happen at the end of the five year period." Mr Burke said that Mr Ziegler "never said that he was seeking a payment upon the expiration of his agreement." I examine this dispute further when I come to deal with the question of whether a termination bonus is payable.
61 According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby then concluded the discussion, saying that he looked forward to a continuation of his long and happy association with him, that "VRL and Mr Ziegler both stood to gain a lot through this new arrangement" and that he recognised what a significant commitment Mr Ziegler was prepared to make. Mr Ziegler replied that "Hopefully this will be the case." Mr Kirby then again said that, because of that commitment, the termination bonus which they had just agreed to was "fair, reasonable and appropriate."
62 Mr Ziegler said that the meeting concluded with handshakes all round and the customary "brotherly" hug from Mr Burke who then asked Mr Ziegler to send him, as VRL's Managing Director, a memorandum outlining what had been agreed and that he copy it to Mr Kirby.
63 As requested, Mr Ziegler wrote to Mr Burke (with a copy to Mr Kirby) the following letter dated 2 October 1995:
"Re: Continuation of Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd Consultancy Agreement with Village Roadshow Limited ("VRL") July 1, 1996 - June 30, 2001
I refer to our meeting of September 26, 1995 with Robert Kirby in connection with the continuation of my consultancy arrangements with VRL post-June 30, 1996.
As requested, by this memo I outline my understanding of the revised arrangements, and confirm my acceptance of the same for a five year period to commence on July 1, 1996 and ending June 30, 2001, and subject to the terms of this letter.
Before doing so, I would like to say how pleased I am with my offer of appointment as an Alternate Director of VRL. This appointment should enable me to better represent the VRL Group in seeking to achieve its objectives. At the same time, it demonstrates career progression from a personal perspective - an attribute to which I accord high priority.
Secondly, I am still exploring for a new job title more reflective of the increasing commercial/strategic role envisaged for me within VRL, with less emphasis on straight tax/legal matters. I will revert back to you in this regard.
In terms of the discussed remuneration arrangements, please come back to me if any of the following points are not in keeping with what is envisaged, or cause any concerns.
Consultancy Fee Retainer
Initial $400,000 basic package for the financial year July 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997 (able to be taken by cash, employee share scheme arrangement, motor vehicle, superannuation etc.) by way of retainer to my consultancy company, with this fee to be formally reviewed at the expiration of each 12 months period in light of my performance, then prevailing conditions within VRL, and the broader market place.
Ability for PAZ to request reconsideration of retainer (and other aspects of total package) if material change in present circumstances, with parties to discuss any proposal in good faith to determine a fair and reasonable outcome.
The agreed per annum retainer to be payable in monthly instalments, and (subject to increase in line with the above terms) adjusted annually for inflation over the previous 12 months period.
Four weeks holiday per annum plus declared public holidays, sick leave, etc. with the same able to be accumulated and taken as circumstances permit/require.
Allocation of Share Options
All future allocations of VRL share options to PAZ to be determined by applying PAZ's existing VRL option holding as a percentage of the average number of options presently held by RGK, JRK, and GWB in VRL, with these options to be issued to PAZ on the same terms (in all respects including financing) and at the same time as further VRL option issues are made to RGK, JRK, and GWB.
The parties acknowledge that for this purpose PAZ has a proportionate interest of 40% of the average number of VRL options issued to RGK, JRK, GWB (calculated and ignoring past exercise of options, as 800,000 VRL options issued to PAZ divided by 2 million VRL options, being the average number of options issued to RGK, JRK, and GWB.)
Likewise in the event of any allocation/issue of share options in companies other than VRL (e.g., Austereo, etc) a similar percentage proportion of options (40% of the average number of options allocated to RGK, JRK, GWB) would be issued to PAZ, and so forth. (In other words, 'we are all of the same bus', albeit in different proportions.)
Performance Bonus
Performance bonus elements (a) (b) and (c) below are the same as within my existing contract with VRL, and are restated for completeness. Element (d) is a new provision reflecting our discussion of September 26 (and the change in emphasis in finance raising to remove any residual tax risk from VRL).
(a) 5% of tax savings made for the Village Roadshow Group in terms of income tax, customs duty, sales tax, payroll tax, stamp duty, etc. with negotiation in good faith to determine a fair and reasonable outcome given the somewhat subjective nature of these savings.
(b) 5% of tax refunds (income tax, customs duty, sales tax, payroll tax, stamp duty, etc.) obtained for the Village Roadshow Group.
(c) 5% of 'non/limited recourse' financing raised by the Village Roadshow Group in the event that existing Village Roadshow Group tax losses are utilised (permanently or temporarily) in the raising of the finance.
For example, the previous Clipsal and ASQA Partnership, and Perth Pay TV, transactions, fall within this category.
The parties acknowledge that these transactions, as presently structured, are now unlikely to occur in the future as third party tax losses, or off-shore structures, are expected to be utilised in the raising of finance (covered by (d) below).
The quantum of the bonus payable under scenario (c) reflects the fact that the balance of any taxation risk associated with this type of transaction resides with the Village Roadshow Group.
(d) An agreed percentage of 'non/limited recourse' financing raised by the Village Roadshow Group where existing Village Roadshow Group tax losses are not utilised in the finance raising.
An example of this type of transaction would be Austrian equipment financing, where no VRL tax losses are utilised as the profit component within the transaction does not give rise to Australian (or other) assessable income.
It is understood that all parties agree that this basis is now the desired approach for fund raising as there will be either no taxation liability resulting for the Village Roadshow Group as a consequence of the finance raised, or any residual tax risks will reside with non-Village Roadshow Group entities.
Left unresolved at our meeting of September 26 is the exact percentage performance bonus applicable in the circumstances covered by scenario (d). What percentage do you have in mind?
I believe that the percentage bonus figure for scenario (d) should reflect the fact that the financing benefit raised for the Village Roadshow Group will not rely on the use of the Group's taxation attributes, or risk capital. Rather, the Village Group is a beneficiary of the finance raised in much the same way that Michael Lake produces profit for the Studios as a result of his creative endeavours with VRP Production Services without the further commitment of VRL capital, resources, etc..
Bonus element (a) to be determined and paid annually after the preparation of the Village Roadshow Group financial statements, and elements (b) (c) and (d) to be paid as received.
Termination Bonus
PAZ to receive a termination bonus of 5 times his average performance bonus over the three preceding financial years upon the termination of this contract for any reason (including death) other than, of course, gross misconduct resulting in termination.
Reimbursement of Other Outgoings
The following provisions are the same as within my existing contract with VRL, and are restated for completeness.
Reimbursement of all out of pocket expenses reasonably and properly incurred in the course of the business of the Village Roadshow Group, including travelling costs and entertainment expenses.
Reimbursement of all motor vehicle running costs (including insurance, registration, maintenance, petrol, car parking, etc.)
***
Graham, I have truly enjoyed my time to date with the Village Group - both personally and professionally - and I am confident that I will continue to do so well into the future. I look forward to contributing to the Group's long term growth and success.
Please confirm/advise your thoughts on the above matters."
64 Just what entitlements paragraphs (c) and (d) of the performance bonus provision gave rise to, will be examined when I come to deal with the meaning of the term "non/limited recourse" financing.
65 Mr Ziegler said that he did not receive any immediate response from either Mr Burke or Mr Kirby, no doubt because they both went away shortly after 2 October 1995. He was, however, appointed an alternate director of VRL on 3 October 1995. Mr Ziegler said that eventually he met with Mr Kirby on either 23 or 24 November 1995. According to Mr Ziegler, at that meeting Mr Kirby said that the letter of 2 October 1995 fully recorded what they had discussed and agreed at their earlier meeting, but that having thought about it further he wanted to change the agreed termination bonus multiple from five times to three times the average performance bonus of the preceding three years, because five times would be too much and "could be a large amount of money payable on termination." Mr Ziegler said that Mr Kirby told him that he should bear in mind all of the agreed performance bonuses together with the entitlement to be issued options. Mr Kirby added that as he wanted Mr Ziegler to agree to reduce the multiple payable on termination he would throw in death and disability insurance. Mr Ziegler agreed to the reduction of the multiplier from five to three.
66 Mr Ziegler stated that at this meeting Mr Kirby also said that with all of the incentives already provided, a 5% fee for finance falling within scenario (d) was adequate compensation. Mr Ziegler agreed with that percentage figure. He said that he then told Mr Kirby that he wanted his new job title to be "Director, Fiscal, Legal and Strategic Objective", to which Mr Kirby agreed and Mr Ziegler was subsequently given that title.
67 In his witness statement, Mr Kirby said that Mr Burke also attended the meeting with Mr Ziegler after the letter of 2 October 1995 was received. Mr Kirby said that Mr Ziegler did not point out the differences in the wording of the performance bonuses between the 1993 and the 1995 letters. He said that he did not notice them at the time. He believed that performance bonuses (c) and (d) continued to refer to the tax based financing arrangements Mr Ziegler was putting in place. Mr Kirby said that he recalled saying something about being happy to share creative new sources of profit for the Group.
68 At the request of Mr Kirby, Mr Ziegler then sent to Mr Burke (with a copy to Mr Kirby) the following letter dated 27 November 1995:
"Re: Continuation of Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd Consultancy Agreement with Village Roadshow Limited ("VRL")
I refer to my letter of October 2, 1995 and subsequent discussions, following our meeting of September 26, 1995 with Robert Kirby, in connection with the continuation of my consultancy arrangements with VRL post-June 30, 1996.
As requested, this memo updates my letter of October 2 in three significant aspects, and thereby confirms the agreed arrangements between us. (Subject to this letter, all other provisions are as specified in my letter of October 2, 1995.)
As discussed with Robert and you, I am pleased to be going forward on the basis of being truly, to quote your words, 'one of us.' This gives me both personal and financial comfort for my future.
1. Performance Bonus
Element (d) to be fixed as to 5% of 'non/limited recourse' financing raised by the Village Roadshow Group (where existing Village Roadshow Group tax losses are not utilised in the finance raising.) Accordingly, elements (a) (b) (c) and (d) are all fixed at the 5% level.
2. Termination Bonus
PAZ's contract termination bonus to be 3 times his average performance bonus, rather than 5 times as specified in my letter of October 2.
3. Death & Disability Insurance
PAZ to be provided with $5 million death and $5 million disability insurance - a similar policy to that of GWB/RGK/JRK.
Other Details
Having had an opportunity to consider my letter of October 2, 1995, the following refinements/clarifications (which do not impact the agreed commercial deal) have suggested themselves.
Issue of Options
In the event that, for whatever reason, further issues of options, as outlined in my October 2 letter, cannot be easily accommodated for me bearing in mind Corporations Law approvals, perceptions, etc., I am just as happy with a 'notional' allocation of options in the agreed percentage, with the profit arising paid to me on the relevant option exercise dates. (This is, in effect, what presently happens with our existing VRL options.)
Village Roadshow Creative Trust
My letter of October 2 omitted to confirm my present entitlement to 4% of the net profit of the Village Roadshow Creative Trust (i.e., 1% of VRP's net profit) and I mention this for the avoidance of doubt.
Job Title
Finally, in terms of the required new job title, I confirm the following:
'Director,
Fiscal, Legal & Strategic Objectives'
69 Mr Ziegler said in his witness statement that shortly after he sent the letter of 27 November 1995, Mr Burke came into his office with Mr Foo and that Mr Burke said that Mr Foo wanted a few further small changes to the letter of 2 October 1995. Mr Foo gave Mr Ziegler the original of that letter on which he had made a few handwritten comments. Mr Foo had written "subject to tax requisit'ns, who bears risk" on page 1 at the start of the topic "Consultancy Fee Retainer", "excludes Roc's share" on page 2 in respect of the topic "Allocation of Share Options" and "5% net after costs apportioned" at the bottom of page 2 relating to Performance Bonus (d). Mr Ziegler said that Mr Foo explained the first handwritten annotation by saying that in the event of a change in the tax system, the manner in which the retainer and bonuses were packaged might have to be revisited. The other two annotations are self-explanatory. At Mr Foo's suggestion both Mr Burke and Mr Ziegler initialled (with a black pen) those three amendments which Mr Foo had made (with a blue pen).
70 In his witness statement Mr Foo said that he had made these annotations after he first received a copy of Mr Ziegler's letter of 2 October 1995 from Mr Burke. Mr Foo further said that it was he who had negotiated the three unresolved issues with Mr Ziegler. Given the wording of the letter of 27 November 1995 this appears to me to be unlikely and I prefer Mr Ziegler's evidence on this latter point.
71 More importantly, a photocopy of the letter of 2 October 1995 had two further handwritten additions made by Mr Foo (with a blue pen) at some time. In his witness statement, Mr Ziegler said that before the three amendments were initialled, Mr Foo explained that:
"the handwritten reference to '*RGK' on page 2 and to '5%' on page 3 was a reference to what he understood that Robert Kirby and I had already agreed upon a few days earlier as the percentage fee for scenario (d) finance raising."
72 This cannot be correct, in my opinion. It is obvious from the documents themselves, which were tendered in evidence, that the two additions just described were made after the three amendments had been initialled and that document photocopied. When asked about this when giving his evidence, Mr Ziegler said that he could not really explain it but speculated that they were made by Mr Foo during further discussion at that time after the original letter of 2 October 1995 had been initialled and photocopied. As will be seen, Mr Foo's evidence was that these two additions were made in about September 1997 when he faxed a copy of the letter to Mr Kirby in New York prior to Mr Kirby tackling Mr Ziegler about a performance bonus of US$10 million, being 5% of the US$200 million to be raised by an arrangement known as Project Ballarat.
73 At the end of the meeting with Mr Burke and Mr Foo, Mr Ziegler asked Mr Burke to confirm in writing that the letters correctly recorded the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, Mr Burke wrote to Mr Ziegler, in his inimitable style, a letter dated 30 November 1995:
"It is with great pleasure that I acknowledge your letters of October 2 and November 27 confirming our new pact together as outlined in those letters. Everything is agreed including the alterations required by Peter Foo that you and I initialled.
The important thing now, Dear Brother, is let's go punch a hole in the sky."
I refer to this agreement hereafter as "the 1995 Agreement."
74 The 1995 Agreement was not reproduced in a formal document. Nor was it referred to VRL's Remuneration Committee for its consideration or approval. This is despite the fact that VRL's Annual Report for the financial year ended 30 June 1996 contained the following statement about the Remuneration Committee:
"A Remuneration Committee of the Board has been in operation since 1994. The Committee's terms of reference provide for the review of remuneration packages and policies including the remuneration of non-executive directors. The Committee also obtains independent advice from external consultants and utilises benchmarks from comparable organisations."
Project Ballarat
75 In his witness statement Mr Ziegler said that he outlined his proposed new financing model for VRP at a meeting of the VRP Board on the Gold Coast on 18 and 19 November 1995. Present were the two Kirbys, Mr Burke, Mr Foo and a number of other senior executives including Ms Raffe. Mr Ziegler suggested that VRP should consider undertaking a Hollywood style film business in conjunction with studio partners (most likely Warner Bros., but also other film studios) utilising a film portfolio - rather than a film-by-film approach - in order to gain film industry average financial returns, and to mirror film industry economics, with a non/limited recourse financing facility to be established to cater for this business model. This would avoid VRP having to pre-sell its films in order to finance them.
76 Mr Ziegler said that Mr Kirby said at the meeting that it was essential that any financing facility should be on terms that limited the lender's right of recourse to VRL. He said that VRL could not continue funding VRP productions on a full recourse basis. Mr Ziegler said that he explained that structures could be adopted to make the proposal attractive to lenders whilst at the same time limiting recourse to VRL. Mr Ziegler said that at the meeting the VRP Board decided to pursue the new business model as an adjunct to its existing film presale business model. He gave evidence that Mr Kirby asked him to explore this non/limited recourse financing alternative as a matter of urgency.
77 Mr Ziegler said that on 20 November 1995 this proposal was also discussed at meetings of the VRL Executive Committee and the VRL Board on the Gold Coast. At Mr Burke's suggestion the new VRP financing model and business plan was given the name "Project Ballarat."
78 Mr Ziegler thus embarked on a task which over the next 20 or so months took him overseas for approximately a third of his time. He travelled the world negotiating with insurance brokers, insurance companies, bankers, other financial institutions and eventually lawyers.
79 By a memorandum dated 24 January 1996 Mr Burke invited Mr Ziegler to become the Chairman of VRP and "the Executive in charge of Village Roadshow production from the Home Office."
80 Mr Ziegler said that, as a first step in implementing Project Ballarat, he contacted Mr Stephen Streeter, then at Ernest & Young in Los Angeles and subsequently a principal at his own firm, Montecito Investments Inc. Mr Ziegler said Mr Streeter and he had previously discussed the usefulness of film revenue insurance policies in the financing of films. They formulated a financial model that was able to demonstrate to insurance companies that, on the basis of a sufficiently large portfolio of films, the risks involved could be readily quantified on a portfolio, rather than a film-by-film, basis. The model demonstrated that the probability and severity of loss could be priced so that it was a risk that could prudently be underwritten by insurance companies. Mr Ziegler agreed in cross-examination that the idea for the model was in fact Mr Streeter's.
81 Mr Ziegler then approached insurance brokers to place the risk in the insurance markets. The brokers identified multiline insurance companies that might be interested in writing this type of insurance cover in conjunction with others. Mr Ziegler approached many multiline insurance companies in all major insurance centres - London, New York, Los Angeles, Zurich and Sydney - to provide film revenue insurance to partially cover a portfolio of Hollywood films' production and releasing costs. Ultimately, on 27 May 1997 an insurance policy known as "Ballarat I" was placed on behalf of Village Roadshow Films (BVI) Limited ("VRF"). It had a limit of indemnity of US$55 million. Subsequently, other film revenue insurance policies with increased limits of indemnity were also placed on behalf of VRF.
82 The Ballarat I insurance policy provided that five "qualifying films" had to be produced or acquired and then released in accordance with pre-agreed criteria before the insurer was "on risk" for payment of a claim. The criteria included a total budget per film of between US$15 million and US$50 million; release by a major studio in the US and Canada on a minimum number of screens; a certain minimum level of prints and advertising expenditure in the international territories based on box office results achieved in the US and Canada; and release in a minimum number of international territories within a specified time period. If five qualifying films were not acquired and released in the agreed time period, the insurer was not at risk for any claim.
83 At the same time as he was seeking the insurance support for the new VRP business model, Mr Ziegler sought out lenders that might be interested in funding the film sector through a non/limited recourse facility of the type he had in mind. According to Mr Ziegler he had to contact many banks and lenders because it was very difficult to find a financial institution prepared to provide limited recourse funding for films. Often the response was that the lender was only interested in providing financing provided an unconditional guarantee of repayment was provided by VRL.
84 Eventually on 22 October 1996, Mr Ziegler made contact with the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ("CIBC"). He then met with Mr Britt Fletcher, who was a Director (and is now a Managing Director) in CIBC's Securitisation Group in its New York office. Mr Fletcher responded positively to the idea of providing the finance on the terms sought. These were that recourse for repayment of the bank's debt was limited to net film proceeds providing certain structural protections, designed to ensure that a portfolio of marketable films could be acquired, could be achieved. He said that a non/limited recourse financing transaction for VRP was possible in the event that a AAA-rated monoline insurer provided an irrevocable guarantee of the bank's debt position (principal and interest). This would be in addition to the multiline insurer revenue insurance policies referred to previously.
85 CIBC did its own modelling, relying on its own data, together with data provided by VRP and third parties, as a result of which it indicated that further equity support, in addition to a US$4 million equity investment that VRL was prepared to make in the borrower, would also need to be obtained. CIBC undertook to help Mr Ziegler identify a willing monoline insurer and identify likely sources of additional equity. The borrowing entity was to be VRF.
86 On 9 May 1997, VRL accepted the terms of a letter from CIBC dated 5 May 1997 and mandated CIBC to provide a US$200 million revolving debt facility for VRF, and to source the required US$16 million in third party equity for that company.
87 The Project Ballarat financing was completed on 31 October 1997. VRF became a party to a US$200 million revolving debt facility. It issued US$16 million of equity to third parties with a further US$4 million equity investment being made by VRL. With the introduction of the third party equity, VRL held only 19.9% of the issued capital of VRF. This enabled VRL to treat the VRP borrowings as off-balance sheet so far as VRL was concerned. From an accounting perspective, VRL's investment in VRF was treated purely as an investment, rather than VRF being consolidated or equity accounted in VRL's financial accounts. The terms of the equity issued to the shareholders in VRF provided for a 12% per annum cash paid coupon. In addition, the third party equity holders were entitled to receive an effectively capped profit participation in the event of film portfolio financial success, with the balance of profits going to VRP/VRL after repayment of third party debt and interest.
88 The world's second largest monoline insurer, Ambac Assurance Corporation ("Ambac"), provided the required monoline guarantee of CIBC's US$2000 million debt facility (and interest). A monoline insurer is an insurance company whose sole business is the provision of financial guarantees. There are only five or six monoline insurers throughout the world. They are supervised by the Insurance Commission of the State of New York and are regulated under the laws of the State of New York. Monoline insurers are permitted to issue surety bonds guaranteeing the payment of principal and interest on bonds and other similar types of financial obligations. The monoline insurer is bound by its irrevocable, primary, absolute and unconditional promise to pay timely principal and interest in connection with the financial obligation in the event of a borrower's default free and clear of any deduction or set off. Monoline insurers are also effectively regulated by the credit rating agencies because they determine how much capital a monoline insurer needs to reserve in its accounts in order to provide its surety bond.
89 The insurance agreement entered into by Ambac in favour of the financing parties provided that as a condition precedent to the issue of the surety bond, Ambac "shall have received written confirmation from Standard & Poor and Moody's that, as of the date hereof, the transaction contemplated by the Transaction Documents, without giving effect to the Surety Bond, would be rated at least 'BBB-' by Standard & Poor and at least 'Baa3' by Moody's."
90 In summary, the monoline insurer, through the use of its balance sheet, "wraps" a borrower's existing creditworthiness to a AAA level, and ensures that it will remain at that level through the term of the guaranteed financial obligation and until it is discharged. The advantage of having Ambac wrap the Project Ballarat financing was that the borrower, VRF, having the benefit of the Ambac AAA credit rating behind it, could then access the United States Commercial Paper market for its borrowings. This resulted in a much lower cost of funds (interest rate including the Ambac insurance premium of 75 basis points per annum) and a greater debt-to-equity ratio than would otherwise have been possible if VRF's creditworthiness had been assessed on a stand alone basis. As a result of Ambac's surety bond, VRF was treated by the financial markets as a "AAA" borrower, whereas VRL was considered only an investment grade borrower (being rated "BBB-" by Standard & Poor and "Baa3" by Moody's).
Board and Executive Approval of Project Ballarat
91 Mr Ziegler said that the VRP and VRL Boards and the VRL Executive Committee approached the decision to borrow US$200 million with great care. He said that Mr Burke reported on progress to the Board of VRL on many occasions. Mr Ziegler also frequently reported in detail on his progress to the VRL Executive Committee. Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo all said that they relied heavily on what Mr Ziegler told them about the transaction.
92 In Mr Ziegler's report to the VRL Executive Committee dated 17 February 1997 there was a reference to his efforts to obtain "relatively low cost funding with limitation of recourse to VRL." In his 7 April 1997 report, Mr Ziegler stated that the remaining task was "to obtain limited recourse, off-balance sheet financing to enable production of the films."
93 On 23 April 1997, as the transaction was taking shape, CIBC and Ambac prepared a briefing document for potential debt investors. That document was scrutinised by Mr Greg Basser, who was then a partner at Herbert Geer & Rundle, VRL's solicitors. Mr Basser subsequently left Herbert Geer & Rundle and joined VRL. He became "Director - Commercial and Legal" and "VRL Group Executive in Charge of Production." In conjunction with Mr Burke, he was responsible for dealing with Warner Bros. in connection with matters pertaining to the VRL/Warner Bros. co-production and co-financing arrangements.
94 On 5 May 1997, Mr Ziegler wrote a report to the Executive Committee updating the then position with respect to the proposed Project Ballarat fundraising. The report was headed "VRP - Limited Recourse, Off Balance Sheet, Funding." It read as follows:
"This note updates the position with respect to our efforts to obtain limited recourse, off-balance sheet funding for VRP's film production and acquisition activities from CIBC Wood Gundy as supported by the Standard & Poors 'AAA' rated monoline insurer, AMBAC Indemnity Corporation. (GWB and RGK, you have met CIBC and AMBAC in Los Angeles and New York, respectively.)
Terms
In a nutshell, it is proposed for the newly incorporated British Virgin Islands company, Village Roadshow Films (BVI) Ltd ('VRF') to obtain approx. $US 216 million in funding; a seven year (five year revolving) $US 200 million US commercial paper facility drawn down as and when required, and $US 16 million in equity - to enable the acquisition of all foreign rights (and funding of foreign P&A in connection therewith) for 20 films to be obtained from either VRP or third party producers/distributors. Total structuring, placement, and risk management fees, etc., to be satisfied by VRF out of proceeds received, should not exceed 3% of total funding.
Qualifying Films
Each film to be acquired by VRF must comply with qualifying criteria inter alia stipulated in the film insurance policy recently acquired by VRF from AMP, GIO and HIH; the major criteria being: distribution in the US and/or Canada on a minimum of 700 screens, minimum foreign P&A spend dependent on US box office, and a minimum budget per film of $US I5 million.
$US 4 Million VRL Investment
Upon settlement of the financing transaction which could occur in early June, VRL would be required to invest $US 4 million in VRF for 19.99% of its then issued share capital, with third party equity investors (most likely associated with the debt providers) holding 80.01% of VRF's issued capital in return for their $US 16 million equity investment.
VRL would have a call option to acquire the third party equity held in VRF based on a formula intended to provide the external investors with a pre-agreed rate of return.
Limited Recourse to VRL
In order for VRF to obtain the aforementioned funding from debt and third party equity holders, VRL must undertake to:
1. defer its distribution fees (not fees owing to third party sub-distributors), and
2. fund up to between 10% to 15% (the exact funding percentage still being negotiated) of foreign P&A required in connection with the films (assuming peak loss, a minimum number of $US 28.4 million and a maximum number of $40.9 million, respectively)
in the event that VRF fails to pay its scheduled debt amortisation payments and equity return.
(In terms of 2., it should be noted that the return of any VRL funded P&A will be subordinated behind debt and equity holders. In addition, assuming peak loss, $US 3.2 million of VRL's equity in VRF will be lost.)
Apart from I. and 2. above, no party will have any recourse to VRL for any payment; i.e., VRL's loss position is fixed, with, ultimately, AMBAC assuming residual risk after the insurance and equity layers have been exhausted.
Chart 2 'Aggregate Loss Sharing' illustrates VRL's truncated loss position assuming funding of P&A at the 15% level (and including clawback of VRL's distribution fees) vis a vis the insurance companies, AMBAC and third party equity in the event of commercial failure.
The y axis indicates the total loss breakup between the various parties across differing levels of film performance - 'Negative Cost Coverage' - indicated on the x axis. 'Negative Cost Coverage' is utilised to standardise performance across the slate of 20 films, and is the ratio of foreign net receipts (after distribution fees and residuals) divided by total costs (inclusive of production period interest and overhead, but excluding foreign P&A) attributable to the acquisition of the foreign rights.
On the other hand, (and not illustrated on Chart 2) VRL will be entitled to be paid an executive producer fee of $US 1 million and an overhead fee of $US 1.5 million per film (a total of $US 50 million for a slate of 20 films), together with other fees - determined on an arm's length basis for services performed, irrespective of the financial success of VRF. In other words, VRL's position will be totally covered by these fees in the event of 'Armageddon.'
Other Matters
* AS VRF can only acquire the foreign rights of completed films, cash flowing of VRP (and third party?) productions, prior to their acquisition by VRF, must still be undertaken. I am presently addressing this production funding issue with Natwest Bank/Coutts & Co.
* VRF has to be rated a 'AAA' credit from S&P in order for AMBAC to be able to insure any shortfall and thus allow the company access to the US commercial paper market. S&P would visit the VRP office in Los Angeles later in May to undertake their due diligence. Based on the insurance policy held by VRF, this is not expected to be a major problem.
* In the event that the insurers fail to renew VRF's insurance policy after the first slate of five films, and in the absence of AMBAC electing to insure this risk slice, the debt facility would become repayable after the first five films have been exploited.
In these circumstances, and assuming VRL was required to fund 15% of the P&A spend, VRL's peak loss would amount to $US 4.9 million, with a loss on its equity investment of $US 2.8 million. Against this loss would be offset at a minimum, $US 5 million earned in executive producer fees and $US 7.5 million earned in allocated overhead expense.
* The commercial (& now insurance and financing) requirement for VRP to obtain certainty of US distribution for the films acquired/produced on reasonable terms is clearly paramount, and GWB's strategy for the same needs to be urgently implemented.
* It is not considered that, properly documented, the above funding proposal will have any adverse impact on the VRL ANZ senior secured borrowing. Obviously, a sign off would be required on this issue, together with consideration of the accounting impact of the structure.
I strongly endorse the above proposal. It will enable VRL to participate in film production at third party risk, while maintaining significant upside and the ability to build a (hopefully) profitable film library in the foreign world.
A copy of the penultimate detailed Book of Terms for S&P and the debt raising is being separately circulated. (The proposed terms for the equity are still being negotiated.)"
95 VRL's Executive Committee discussed Mr Ziegler's report dated 5 May 1997 at a meeting held on the same day. Mr Ziegler said that he explained to the Executive Committee that VRL's risk was limited to its US$4 million equity investment, to its net film profits from exploitation and to the 10% to 15% contingent liability for foreign prints and advertising expenditure. Ambac took the lender's residual risk in the event that those amounts, together with the third party's US$16 million equity investment, were insufficient to allow for timely payment of principal and interest. The VRL Executive Committee approved the proposal for submission to the VRL Board and recommended its adoption. The Executive Committee considered that this was a worthwhile business model for VRP to further pursue as it was not reliant on Australian tax based financing which could not be certain as a long term means of funding for VRP's business going forward.
96 At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr Kirby asked Mr Ziegler to refresh his report to the Executive Committee and to abbreviate it where possible and, as a matter of urgency, to give him that redrafted report so that he could circulate it amongst the VRL Board. Mr Ziegler prepared a very similar report dated 5 May 1997 for submission to the Board. One significant deletion was the reference to what would happen if the insurers failed to renew VRF's insurance policy after the first slate of five films.
97 Mr Kirby sent Mr Ziegler's further report to the VRL Board members under cover of a memorandum also dated 5 May 1997. In his memorandum Mr Kirby told the Board that VRL was pursuing Project Ballarat in an endeavour to "lay off" film risk. Mr Kirby said that the proposed transaction was intended to provide for off-balance sheet funding with "zero net recourse to VRL." Mr Kirby endorsed the proposal and went on to say that "it will assist Village Roadshow Pictures to maintain significant upside in the films it produces, whilst at the same time eliminating our risk."
98 According to Mr Ziegler, at the VRL Board meeting Mr Kirby was asked to explain what he had said in his memorandum. Mr Kirby said that he had "netted off" the certainty that VRL would receive Executive Producer and Overhead fee income of at least US$2.5 million per film against the possibility that VRL might be called upon to disgorge a roughly similar amount under its foreign releasing costs contingent liability if VRF had insufficient funds to be able to make its scheduled debt servicing and amortisation payments. He said that, accordingly, this justified his conclusion that there would be "zero net recourse" and that the transaction would maintain VRL upside whilst "eliminating our risk." He also said that any other amounts repayable by VRL would be amounts previously received by VRL as a result of the financing transaction undertaken.
99 At that Board meeting, and at Mr Kirby's request, Mr Ziegler explained in detail the Project Ballarat concept, the objectives sought to be achieved, where the negotiations were up to with the relevant parties, the perceived financial risks and benefits to VRL, together with overviewing outstanding issues. After the VRL Board meeting finished, Mr Kirby wrote to all Board members seeking any dissent from the decision to go forward with Project Ballarat. Nobody dissented and, accordingly, on 9 May 1997 Mr Foo on behalf of VRL accepted and agreed to engage CIBC by signing a letter of mandate. In his memorandum dated 9 May 1997 to the Kirbys, Mr Burke and Mr Foo seeking the execution of the mandate letter Mr Ziegler stated that "the total fees payable" would be US$5.41 million or 2.5% of the funds raised and that he thought that this was "very reasonable in all of the circumstances." He also pointed out that of the US$5.41 million, Mr Streeter's consulting company was to receive a US$1 million success fee for "the valuable services" he rendered "throughout the 18 month period of this task."
100 In his witness statement, Mr Kirby said that he relied very much on Mr Ziegler's professional expertise and the overview by Mr Foo. He said that in light of the documents he saw and the discussions he had his understanding was that there was no significant financial risk and that there was potentially significant upside. Mr Kirby said that at no stage prior to the events of September 1997 did Mr Ziegler disclose to him that he expected to be paid 5% of whatever funding was raised. It was never factored into any of Mr Ziegler's calculations or projections. Mr Kirby said that he would have approached his review of the Ballarat transaction differently if he had been aware Mr Ziegler was anticipating such a large bonus.
101 Following VRL's execution of the mandate letter, on 22 May 1997 Mr Skip Stern from Sidley & Austin, CIBC's lawyers, sent Mr Basser a list of envisaged documents required to be negotiated and executed in order to implement the Project Ballarat transaction. Mr Stern's document was faxed by Mr Basser to Mr Foo for his review. Mr Foo gave Mr Ziegler a copy and requested a meeting with him to discuss what was envisaged to be covered by the various agreements mentioned in Sidley & Austin's list. According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Foo focussed on any document that identified any issue that might be likely to cause recourse to or liability for VRL and was concerned to ensure that he understood the likely structure of the transaction as early as possible. Mr Foo said to Mr Ziegler that he should be aware that VRL could make no commitment to the Project Ballarat transaction until all transaction documents were negotiated and ready for execution. He said that until that time, VRL was prepared to expend necessary legal fees and the like in getting the transaction to that point, but ultimately, only on a consideration of the totality of the documents would a decision be made on whether or not to proceed with the financing. Mr Ziegler agreed. Mr Foo reminded Mr Ziegler that the VRL Board decision authorising him to sign the CIBC mandate letter did not authorise the expenditure of VRL funds on films - it merely provided for the execution of the mandate letter and the go-ahead to more formally pursue the transaction. This meeting with Mr Foo occurred in the week commencing 28 May 1997. During the course of the meeting, Mr Foo went through each of the items in Mr Stern's list and made handwritten comments (mainly ticks) on a copy of that list which he had in front of him.
102 The Project Ballarat transaction was raised and discussed at almost every meeting of the Boards of VRP and VRL, and at the weekly or fortnightly meetings of the Executive Committee between November 1995 and the completion of the transaction in October 1997. According to Mr Ziegler, he was repeatedly asked in these meetings to report on the progress of the deal, the structure of the deal, emerging issues, and (by Mr Burke in particular) "when will the money be available?" Mr Ziegler said that he also had many individual meetings with Mr Burke, Mr Kirby and Mr Foo. In addition, he gave briefings to VRL's independent directors, Mr Conn and Mr Terry Jackman. At these meetings, he discussed the progress of the Project Ballarat transaction, the then structure of the deal, circumstances of recourse to VRL, and the likely time period within which the financing would be available for draw-down.
103 VRL's auditors were Ernst & Young. Mr Peter Buzzard, was the audit partner of that firm. He attended meetings of VRL's audit committee during the period that Project Ballarat was being developed and finalised. According to Mr Ziegler, during this period he explained the Project Ballarat transaction in depth to Mr Buzzard, and had numerous meetings with him as it progressed from idea to drafted reality. During these meetings Mr Buzzard approved the treatment of the US$200 million loan to VRF as being an off-balance sheet transaction so far as the VRL group was concerned. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Buzzard said to him that only if the contingent liability was expected to be realised (rather than, at best, being a "remote possibility") would its existence need to be reported in the notes to the financial accounts of VRL. He said if this situation arose it would, depending on its timing and quantum, most likely then be a liability that would need to be stated on the face of VRL's accounts, rather than merely in the notes to the accounts. Mr Buzzard said to Mr Ziegler that the issue of disclosure of the contingent liability was a function of how certain VRL could be about the probability of the contingent liability "coming home" to VRL and its quantification.
104 According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Basser was involved in scrutinising the transaction documents on VRL's behalf from an Australian legal perspective. He had input in their review and, to some limited extent, their development. The firm of Debevoise & Plimpton was engaged by VRL to do the same from a U.S. legal perspective given that the Project Ballarat documents were governed by New York State law.
105 Mr Ziegler said that as a result of the Project Ballarat transaction, VRP obtained funding to acquire and release a large portfolio of films to enable it to replicate Hollywood film industry economics and strictly limit its downside exposure should the films prove commercially unsuccessful. This was to be contrasted with VRL's financing approach under its pre-existing film pre-sale business model where all the assets of VRL were at risk for the repayment of the relevant film production loan plus interest and where the interest rate charged was substantially in excess of that payable by VRF. In addition, as a result of the film pre-sale model that had to be pursued in an attempt to lower VRL's financial risk profile, high distribution fees were charged by film distributors prior to VRL/VRP achieving any film exploitation proceeds in excess of the advance minimum guarantee that was contracted for.
106 Contrary to this position, Mr Ziegler said, under the Project Ballarat financing arrangements, VRP could obtain fees from each and every qualifying film acquired and released by VRF, with these fees exceeding any VRL contingent liability in a failure scenario based on the envisaged required 20 films being released. At the same time, VRL had a real prospect for commercial success if the portfolio of films released were financially successful due to the reduced film distribution fee payable to third party film distributors.
107 According to Mr Ziegler, completion of the Project Ballarat transaction directly paved the way for the finalisation of the negotiation of the co-production/co-financing agreement with Warner Bros. which had been discussed from mid-1997 (and which was finalised as to material terms in December 1997), and the subsequent production of films in partnership with Warner Bros. VRP also subsequently entered into similar types of co-production/co-financing arrangements with other Hollywood studios on similar terms.
108 The arrangement with Warner Bros provided in essence that VRP and Warner Bros. would equally share the cost of production of the co-produced films. In return for this expenditure VRF would acquire the film copyright in the "international" world (that is, outside of the USA and Canada) and Warner Bros. would own the film copyright in the "domestic" territories (the USA and Canada). VRP would then provide funds to satisfy prints and advertising costs for the film's release in the international territories. Warner Bros. was appointed as the distributor of the films in perpetuity in all international territories excluding Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Greece where distribution was to be handled by the Village Roadshow Group.
109 The co-production/co-financing agreement reached with Warner Bros. provided a "crossing" on the pool of films co-produced intended to approximately "true up" the financial results between domestic and international releases. Any liability for a crossing payment to be made was a responsibility of VRL rather than that of the off-balance sheet company, VRF. So far as VRF was concerned it was only participating in the international profits (and losses) of films released, with any crossing payment or receipt being solely to VRL's account. (In other words, any crossing payment to be made by VRP would have to be funded by VRL from sources other than VRF's limited recourse facility provided by Project Ballarat. On the other hand, any payment received by VRL would not form part of VRF's collateral pledged pursuant to the Project Ballarat financing arrangements).
110 Mr Ziegler said that the agreement for a Warner Bros. crossing payment was proposed by Mr Burke in his presence to Mr Jim Miller, then President of Business Affairs at Warner Bros. The meeting occurred at Warner Bros. Studios in Burbank, California on 17 October 1997. Mr Miller immediately agreed with Mr Burke's crossing proposal. According to Mr Ziegler, after the meeting, Mr Ziegler asked Mr Burke why he had been so quick to offer the crossing payment. He told him that he thought that it was very imprudent (and that that was why Mr Miller had accepted the offer so quickly). Mr Burke replied that he considered that a crossing between international and domestic territories would make a better alignment of interests between VRP and Warner Bros., albeit that any results of this approach would be to VRL's account and not to VRF's. This was a risk that he said he was prepared to bear on VRL's behalf as he considered that domestic and international film performance would even out in the longer term. Mr Ziegler told Mr Burke that he thought he would ultimately regret his decision but Mr Burke told Mr Ziegler that he thought he was right.
111 Mr Burke denied this post-meeting conversation. He said that Mr Ziegler was all in favour of the crossing and that as he, Mr Burke, relied on Mr Ziegler, he went ahead with the proposal. It is unnecessary to attempt to resolve this factual dispute between Mr Ziegler and Mr Burke.
112 According to Mr Ziegler, having a film studio invest in approximately 50% of the budget of a film ensured that the studio had sufficient incentive to market the film in the USA to the best of its ability in terms of such matters as film promotion and scheduling against competing film releases. In addition, by VRF providing the funding for the foreign prints and advertising expenditure for the territories outside of the USA and Canada, this provided the co-financing partner with the incentive to fully exploit the film in the foreign world (i.e. outside US and Canada). It enabled the negotiation of film distribution fees significantly lower than if the studio co-financier had to risk this foreign prints and advertising expenditure on its own account.
113 Mr Ziegler gave evidence that the decision to enter into the crossing payment agreement had had the impact of directly increasing VRL's financial risks in two ways. First, from a commercial upside perspective, it reduced VRP's profit-making potential because revenues in the international world were in excess of revenues in the domestic territories with the split of revenues of 55% international and 45% domestic likely to increase in subsequent years as penetration of Hollywood films in countries such as China and India and in the former Soviet Republics increased, together with the increasing affluence of consumers in those countries. As a result, it was more likely that in any crossing payment, VRP would end up owing its studio co-financing/co-producing partner a net amount. Secondly, this obligation for a crossing payment was a VRL/VRP obligation only. It was not an expense borne by, let alone financed by, VRF. Accordingly, this decision to agree to a crossing payment had resulted in a risk to VRL in addition to its 15% of foreign prints and advertising contingent liability and net film proceeds received. This risk was not envisaged by Project Ballarat or the business model for VRP. The total crossing payment owing by VRL (already paid and still payable) to its studio partners (principally Warner Bros.) was in excess of US$150 million.
The 1997 Agreement
114 By the end of August 1997 the negotiations concerning Project Ballarat were approaching completion. In his managing director's report included in the papers for the VRL Board meeting on 4 September 1997, Mr Burke referred to "Ballarat Films" as being "the pseudonym for our insurance based financing" and stated:
"Peter Ziegler flies into New York on August 26 and is 99% certain all outstanding points on the deal will be finalised at that time."
Mr Ziegler said that by this stage: "We were aiming for an October 31 close."
115 Mr Kirby said that he was in the United States of America in early September 1997 to sign documents which would, if not in total execute the deal, put it virtually on a committed basis and that he thought the Project Ballarat transaction would happen in a very short time, perhaps even in the week following his trip.
116 According to Mr Kirby and Mr Foo, whilst the former was in New York he was contacted by Mr Foo to tell him that he thought Mr Ziegler might be expecting a performance bonus of 5% of the US$200 million finance raised for Project Ballarat. At Mr Kirby's request, Mr Foo faxed him a copy of Mr Ziegler's contract (the letter of 2 October 1995) with the relevant clause highlighted by the addition of a handwritten "*RGK" alongside it and the subsequently agreed "5%" written in the margin on the following page.
117 Mr Foo said that at some stage, he thought it was following a Board meeting, Mr Ziegler had come into his office and started talking about his aspirations in terms of generating wealth. Mr Foo said that as a result of this conversation he became concerned that Mr Ziegler might be intending to claim a performance bonus of US$10 million for Project Ballarat. Rather surprisingly, Mr Foo did not immediately raise this issue with Mr Kirby or anyone else at VRL. It was only subsequently that he thought it appropriate to communicate his concerns to Mr Kirby in New York. I find this delay in raising the issue rather strange, although I accept Mr Foo's evidence that he made the additions on the copy of the letter of 2 October 1995 at the time prior to faxing it to Mr Kirby. It seems to me that this evidence is more credible than the convoluted attempt by Mr Ziegler to explain how these additions came to be on the copy of the letter. The fact that Mr Ziegler had a copy of the alleged September 1997 form of the letter prior to discovery was satisfactorily explained by VRL. It was said that this form of the letter was circulated to the Board on a number of occasions. Also, I am not persuaded by the absence of any relevant facsimile records to reject Mr Foo's evidence. These could easily have been thrown out after use.
118 In any event, it was common ground that Mr Kirby and Mr Ziegler met in New York in the lobby of the Four Seasons Hotel on 4 September 1997 and in Mr Kirby's suite at the Four Seasons Hotel in Los Angeles on 8 September 1997 at which times they discussed the issue of a performance bonus in respect of Project Ballarat.
119 Mr Kirby said that, following the telephone call from Mr Foo warning him that Mr Ziegler might be expecting a performance bonus of 5% of the US$200 million finance raised for Project Ballarat, he decided to find out what Mr Ziegler's intentions were, "from his mouth." He said that in the meeting on 4 September 1997, after discussing Project Ballarat generally, he introduced the topic of the performance bonus by saying that VRL respected the extraordinary contribution that Mr Ziegler had made in creating the opportunity for VRL to play in the "big league" of film production without risk or substantial investment and that he told Mr Ziegler that prior to leaving for New York he had discussed with Mr John Kirby and Mr Burke giving Mr Ziegler a percentage of the new production company and a share of the profits. Mr Kirby gave evidence that Mr Ziegler responded by referring to his percentage, the percentage he had under his contract.
120 Mr Ziegler said in his witness statement that at the meeting with Mr Kirby on 4 September 1997, after discussing the Project Ballarat transaction Mr Kirby said, without any prior notice to Mr Ziegler, that he did not believe that Mr Ziegler's company was entitled to a 5% performance bonus on the Project Ballarat transaction because that transaction was not within the scope of the consultancy agreement. Mr Ziegler said that, in addition, Mr Kirby said that the performance bonus would be "unacceptably large by any measure" and that it was far in excess of what he had envisaged would be payable when he agreed on that consultancy agreement in September 1995. Mr Kirby agreed that he did say words to the effect that the performance bonus would be "unacceptably large by any measure" but denied making the second statement. Mr Ziegler said that he responded by saying that he would not have embarked on this sizeable endeavour if he thought the result would not have been included in the 5% of finance-raised performance bonus for non/limited recourse funding. Mr Ziegler alleged that Mr Kirby further said that he was surprised that there had been no reference to Mr Ziegler's expectation of a 5% performance bonus payable by VRL for the Project Ballarat transaction until "comparatively recently." Given that there had been no disclosure at all by Mr Ziegler about his claim to a US$10 million fee, this last phrase seems unlikely.
121 Mr Ziegler gave evidence that he said to Mr Kirby that it was not at all surprising that the performance bonus had not been mentioned, given that this non/limited recourse finance raising was as problematical as any other non/limited recourse finance raising attempted by him, be it tax based or otherwise, and that "given the limitation on recourse to VRL" this was the most difficult transaction that Mr Ziegler had ever "attempted to execute on VRL's behalf." Mr Ziegler said that he explained to Mr Kirby that the difficulties were immense due to the many players involved in the financing - multiline insurers, monoline insurers, bankers and third party equity providers - and all of the lawyers participating in the drafting of the financing documents transaction. This made the task almost impossible. Mr Ziegler said that he told Mr Kirby that whilst he remained hopeful of a successful completion of the Project Ballarat transaction, prior to late August 1997 he was not confident that a transaction would, in fact, be consummated in spite of everyone's best efforts and that prior to having a degree of certainty he thought it was academic to discuss the 5% performance bonus payable as a result of the Project Ballarat transaction. Mr Kirby denied that Mr Ziegler expressed any doubt about the successful completion of Project Ballarat. He said that Mr Ziegler said words to the effect that he was highly confident that the Ballarat transaction would proceed.
122 According to Mr Ziegler's oral evidence, in January 1997 he had discussed Project Ballarat with Mr Kirby and told him that they would both be "financially pleased" if the transaction was successful and that Mr Kirby had replied that he had given Mr Ziegler "every incentive to do just this type of transaction and it could be a transformational one for Village Roadshow." Mr Ziegler said that he reminded Mr Kirby of this conversation in the meeting on 4 September 1997 and that Mr Kirby said he remembered it. There was no mention of any of this in Mr Ziegler's witness statements. Mr Kirby denied that any such discussion had occurred in January 1997 or that Mr Ziegler referred to it in their meeting in New York.
123 Mr Ziegler said that he told Mr Kirby that he regarded the performance bonus as constituting part of VRL's ordinary corporate overheads just as any fee/profit-share/performance bonus was payable to other executives who were successful in achieving the specific goals and objectives that VRL had set for them. Mr Kirby said that given the size of the performance bonus, this should have been explicitly brought to his attention. Mr Ziegler replied that, given the size of the financing and the advantageous terms to VRL, the fee was more than reasonable.
124 Mr Kirby gave evidence that he had said that he was "staggered" (rather than surprised) that there had been no reference to Mr Ziegler's claim to such a fee payable by VRL for the Project Ballarat transaction and that in reply, Mr Ziegler said words to the effect that _"_you don't highlight your salary entitlement or cost in any VRL business deal." Mr Kirby's evidence was that in reply to this statement, he said that this was entirely different because of the magnitude of the fee and how VRL would have assessed the whole very complex transaction. Mr Kirby also gave evidence that he said to Mr Ziegler words to the effect that an upfront cash bonus incentive of the magnitude he was claiming was at an unprecedented level, not just in VRL but anywhere elsewhere in business.
125 It was common ground that no agreement was reached on any issue during the discussion on 4 September 1997.
126 Mr Ziegler said that he met Mr Kirby again over breakfast at his request at the Four Seasons Hotel in New York on 7 September 1997. According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby again said that he did not want VRL to pay the 5% fee on Project Ballarat. Mr Ziegler told him again that he was not prepared to waive it. In a spirit of compromise, he offered to take the 5% fee as part of each draw down under the Project Ballarat facility on a per picture basis rather than all up-front. Mr Kirby said that the 5% fee was still too large in the aggregate and that he did not believe it was covered by Mr Ziegler's company's consultancy agreement. He said that he was disappointed that Mr Ziegler was seeking a performance bonus for this finance raising. Mr Ziegler told him that he was disappointed that VRL was not prepared to pay it as it was obliged to do so. Mr Ziegler said that this meeting ended without further discussion but with a bad feeling between the participants. This conversation was mentioned for the first time in Mr Ziegler's witness statement. It was not referred to in any of the versions of the particulars of this Agreement pleaded by Orrong before then. Mr Kirby said that he recalled having breakfast with Mr Ziegler on 7 September 1997. He said that he also recalled that they organised to meet in Los Angeles, but did not believe that they otherwise discussed the issue of Orrong's claim to a 5% fee at that breakfast.
127 On 8 September 1997, Mr Ziegler again met with Mr Kirby, this time in his suite at the Four Seasons Hotel in Los Angeles. Mr Ziegler had arrived in Los Angeles from New York late that evening and found a recorded message at his hotel from Mr Kirby asking him to come at once to his hotel "to discuss your fee for Project Ballarat." Mr Ziegler immediately went to meet Mr Kirby.
128 Mr Ziegler said that they again discussed aspects of Project Ballarat. When the conversation turned to the question of the performance bonus, Mr Ziegler said that he told Mr Kirby that the claimed US$10 million definitely fell within the terms of that agreement and that he remained surprised that Mr Kirby still thought otherwise. Mr Kirby queried why Mr Ziegler had not referred to his fee in his memorandum dated 5 May 1997. Mr Ziegler said that this memorandum did not intend to imply that the performance bonus was part of the 3% fees that were mentioned or that it was otherwise to be waived. He said that he reminded Mr Kirby that the 3% fees and their makeup were discussed at the VRL Board meeting on 6 May 1997. He told Mr Kirby that he believed that all VRL's Board members understood, or should have understood, that the fee under the consultancy agreement was not, and was not intended to be, included within that 3% figure.
129 Mr Kirby gave slightly different evidence. He said that he said to Mr Ziegler that Mr Ziegler had previously told the VRL Board that the total fees to be paid out of the proceeds received should not exceed 3% of the total financing raised and that Mr Ziegler had responded in the above terms. Mr Kirby said that he then queried how the VRL Board could know that Mr Ziegler's fee was not included in the 3% when they did not even know the fee was being claimed. Given the total lack of any evidence that Mr Ziegler had disclosed his claim to US$10 million before those meetings with Mr Kirby in early September 1997, it seems to me that Mr Kirby's account of this part of the conversation makes more sense than Mr Ziegler's recollection.
130 Mr Ziegler said that he said to Mr Kirby that the fees payable under the consultancy agreement had never previously been regarded by VRL as third party and that he was surprised that Mr Kirby would suggest otherwise.
131 Mr Kirby gave evidence that Mr Ziegler said that his incentives were part of normal overheads and not included or normally highlighted in such business transactions. Mr Kirby said that he responded by saying that irrespective of what might be normal, a fee of the magnitude of US$10 million was so significant that it represented an entirely different situation. Mr Kirby further said that the upfront nature of the fee would have totally changed the way VRL would have assessed Project Ballarat and that Mr Ziegler either knew that or should have realised that.
132 Mr Ziegler said that, without further discussion, Mr Kirby then said words to the effect that "VRL will not pay the fee and in lieu you must accept a 5.25% in perpetuity, indefeasibly vested, equity interest in VRP." Mr Kirby said that unless he was prepared to accept that offer "VRL will not go ahead with the deal and all parties can go home."
133 Mr Kirby said that he told Mr Ziegler that:
(a) Mr Ziegler had created an extraordinary business opportunity for VRP and the opportunity to participate in an entirely new business and "we were highly confident the profitability would be as portrayed in the model";
(b) it was the Village group and family philosophy to reward people who created new businesses and new profits and hence Mr Burke had his interest in the Village Roadshow Group;
(c) this was a difficult situation and he and Mr Ziegler had to resolve it otherwise VRL would not go forward with the Ballarat transaction;
(d) to pay Mr Ziegler US$10 million was simply not viable in any commercial context and was "against the philosophy of our family and the group";
(e) there was a difference between the Ballarat finance and the tax based transactions in respect of which Mr Ziegler had been paid 5% and that those funds represented profit to VRL;
(f) the $US200 million raised by Ballarat was not "profit" but true finance and that the money did not stay in VRL but would be used to hopefully create profits and assets; and
(g) he would give Mr Ziegler a 5% share of the business he was helping to create and that this would be a long term asset and give value over time far in excess of what he was expecting that day.
134 Mr Kirby also said that he told Mr Ziegler that the situation was that, irrespective of differing interpretations of the agreement, Mr Burke, Mr John Kirby and he were all in unison and that VRL would not proceed with the Ballarat transaction if he and Mr Ziegler could not find a solution. Mr Kirby gave evidence:
(a) that after a long silence he said to Mr Ziegler that this was the position and asked him what he wanted to do, that Mr Ziegler asked if he accepted the 5% how would it work and that Mr Kirby told him that it would be 5% of the production business that they were creating;
(b) that he told Mr Ziegler that how it was finally documented would be up to Mr Ziegler to work out with Mr Foo; and
(c) that Mr Ziegler said for tax and other reasons he may want flexibility to have his interest in the form of "shadow equity" and that even though Mr Kirby did not understand what Mr Ziegler meant by "shadow equity", Mr Kirby said that "we" were nothing if not flexible and he was sure something could be worked out so Mr Ziegler had an effective 5% ownership of the business he was helping to create.
Mr Ziegler disputed much of this evidence and gave varying evidence in respect of his use of the phrase "shadow equity." This will be examined in more detail in a later part.
135 Mr Ziegler said that given the amount of effort and resources that had been expended by him, by VRL and by third parties in getting the Project Ballarat transaction to that point, and the loss of his personal and VRL's corporate credibility if the transaction did not proceed, he told Mr Kirby that he left him with few choices. Mr Kirby once again said that the "in lieu" offer was "final and not negotiable." He then said that the equity interest would remain vested in Mr Ziegler's company whether or not VRL used part or all of the Project Ballarat facility.
136 Mr Kirby gave evidence that he used words to the effect of "final and not negotiable" but denied that he used the terms "in perpetuity" and "indefeasibly vested." He said in cross-examination: "They are not my words."
137 Mr Ziegler said that he then asked Mr Kirby "why 5.25?" to which Mr Kirby said words to the effect that "as far as profit sharing is concerned, 5.25% is one quarter of what you, John, Graham and I get under the Creative Trust." Mr Ziegler then said to Mr Kirby "But we are not just talking about profit" and he replied, "No, we are talking about equity." Mr Ziegler said that he asked Mr Kirby if he envisaged imposing any restriction on any dealing with that equity and he said not. Mr Kirby denied that he said, "No, we are talking about equity."
138 Mr Ziegler said that Mr Kirby then said words to the effect that "this equity is going to generate capital and income value to you for a long time into the future and if Project Ballarat works and your business model is a success, this equity is going to be worth much more than a fee of 5% on the $200 million you are going to raise." Mr Kirby denied using the words "capital" and "income" in addition to the word "value."
139 Mr Ziegler said that he said to Mr Kirby that "You give me no choice but to accept your proposition." He also said to Mr Kirby that he regarded this "in lieu of" arrangement as being "a one-off" and as having no impact on the terms of his company's ongoing consultancy agreement with VRL and, in particular, on any other bonus payable under it. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Kirby said that he agreed on this being "a one-off" deal. Mr Kirby denied that this statement had been made by Mr Ziegler or that he had replied in the manner alleged by Mr Ziegler. During cross-examination Mr Ziegler agreed that he had not expressly said that the 5.25% interest would be included in the calculation of the termination bonus. In fact he later agreed that "an issue left outstanding was the impact of this revised arrangement on the termination bonus."
140 Mr Kirby gave evidence that at the 8 September 1997 meeting, Mr Ziegler also said there was something else that was important, which was being a director of VRL and that it would assist greatly if he could present himself to banks throughout the world as a director of VRL. Mr Kirby said that he indicated to Mr Ziegler that he would support him in relation to a directorship of VRL and that he also said to Mr Ziegler that he would have a prime responsibility for achieving the financial success of the new VRP. Mr Ziegler denied that he told Mr Kirby that there was something else important which was him becoming a director of VRL for the reason set out above although he agreed that such an appointment was in fact "absolutely helpful" for this purpose. It was common ground that the meeting ended with Mr Ziegler and Mr Kirby shaking hands on the agreement reached. Mr Ziegler said that he went back to his hotel "feeling a little battered and bruised for the experience." Just what entitlements the agreement gave rise to will be examined below. I refer to this agreement hereafter as "the 1997 Agreement."
141 Contrary to what appeared to be Mr Ziegler's standard practice of confirming in writing the details of agreements "for the avoidance of doubt", the agreement about Orrong's interest in VRP was never documented. Mr Ziegler said in his witness statement that he had Mr Kirby's word "that it was agreed" and that he considered Mr Kirby's "word sufficient for my purposes." He said that despite Mr Kirby's "take it or leave it" ultimatum in what had been a very difficult meeting, he had no reason to doubt Mr Kirby's word and that he considered him not just a colleague and a boss but also a friend. I find this view more than a little surprising given that, according to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby had just broken his earlier agreement about Orrong's entitlement to receive a performance bonus for him raising non/limited recourse financing.
142 Meanwhile, by a letter dated 9 December 1997 Mr Burke wrote to Mr Greg Coote, the then Chief Executive Officer of VRP, emphasising "how critical the VRP situation really is." Mr Burke continued:
"Without the private investors, solely sourced by Peter Ziegler, VRP will have lost AU$55 million in the last nine years and this year alone you are headed for a loss in the vicinity of AU$12 million."
143 Perhaps not coincidentally, shortly afterwards VRL announced that it had entered into a long-term agreement with Warner Bothers "for the production and worldwide distribution of theatrical motion pictures produced by Village Roadshow Pictures which plans to produce a minimum of 20 pictures over the initial 5 year term of the deal", and that Mr Bruce Berman, former Warner Brothers President of Worldwide Theatrical Production, had been appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of VRP. In a memorandum to the non-executive directors dated 10 December 1997, Mr Burke informed them of the above and continued:
"Add this to the Ballarat funding arranged by Peter Ziegler without risk to our Group, the significant pieces of the jigsaw that Greg Coote has put in place and now the addition of Bruce Berman and his ability to access major quality product within the Warner system and I truly believe we have a real chance of achieving our ultimate goal of building an asset of substance and value."
Project Bendigo
144 The apparent success of Project Ballarat led to Mr Burke requesting Mr Ziegler to investigate the possibility of raising more finance in order to acquire bigger budget films. At Mr Burke's request, Mr Ziegler wrote a memorandum dated 17 December 1997 to VRL's Executive Committee concerning what was called "Project Bendigo." It read as follows:
"This note outlines the possibility of increasing the recently completed $US 200 million limited recourse, off-balance sheet funding available for VRP's film production and acquisition activities through Village Roadshow Films BVI Ltd (VRF) to enable the production/acquisition of larger budget films in the $US 50 million to $US 80 million range per film: 'Project Bendigo.' ...
Based on discussions to date ... it should be possible to increase the size of VRF's facility by $US 500 million up to $US 700 million.
Terms
In a nutshell, it is proposed for VRF's expanded facility to be available over a seven year (five year revolving) period drawn down as and when required, to enable the acquisition of all foreign rights (and funding of foreign P&A in connection therewith) for the previously contemplated 20 films in the $US 15 to $US 50 million budget range (Project Ballarat) with funding for a further 20 films in the $US 50 million to $US 80 million budget range with these films to be obtained from either VRP or third party producers/distributors. An agreement to increase the VRF debt facility should be able to be finalised by March/April 1998.
Total third party structuring, placement, and risk management fees, etc., to be satisfied by VRF out of proceeds received, should not exceed 3% of additional funding obtained.
Qualifying Bendigo Films
Each bigger budget film to be acquired by VRF would need to comply with qualifying criteria which will be stipulated in the film insurance policy to be acquired by VRF from third party insurers.
I have had detailed discussions and meetings with our Ballarat insurers in Australia and Europe and believe that the required insurance coverage for Bendigo can be obtained.
Each Bendigo insurance policy would specify that 5 qualifying films must be released within 3 years of the initial foreign theatrical release of the first qualifying film of that slate. There would be a need for 4 such policies to enable the funding of the envisaged 20 Bendigo films.
The Bendigo insurance policy would largely mirror the Project Ballarat policy with the major differences being that each film must contain within it an 'A' list director, producer or actor (see the attached lists). In addition, distribution in the US and/or Canada would be required on a minimum of 1000 screens for Bendigo films, rather than the 700 screen minimum for Ballarat films.
...
Up to an Additional $US 10 Million VRL Investment May Be Required
VRL may be required to invest up to an additional $US 10 million in VRF in order to maintain its 19.99% of its then issued share capital, with third party equity investors holding 80.01% of VRF's issued capital in return for up to an additional $US 40 million equity investment.
As presently exists, VRL would continue to have a call option to acquire the third party equity held in VRF based on a formula intended to provide the external investors with an approx. 35% p.a. return over the term of their investment.
The exact quantum of further equity required to be invested by VRL in VRF (above the present $US 4 million invested) is not known at this time, and is the subject of further negotiation with CIBC and AMBAC Indemnity Corporation Inc as the insurer of the commercial paper facility.
As presently exists, VRL could reborrow any additional equity contribution together with the equity subscribed by third parties so long as it was not in default under the facility.
Limited Recourse to VRL
As it has under the original Ballarat financing, in order for VRF to obtain the aforementioned $U5 500 million additional debt funding (and additional third party equity, if required), VRL would be required in the event that VRF fails to satisfy its scheduled debt amortisation payments and equity return to:
1. defer its distribution fees (not fees owing to third party sub-distributors), and
2. fund up to 15% of foreign P&A required in connection with the Bendigo films (assuming peak loss with an average budget of $US 75 million per picture, a total of $US 66 million).
(In terms of 2., it should be noted that the return of any VRL funded P&A would be subordinated behind debt and equity holders. In addition,. assuming peak loss, VRL's additional equity investment in VRF (up to $US 10 million) may be lost.
Apart from I. and 2. above, and the following indemnified events, no party will have any recourse to VRL for any payment:
(a) VRL must indemnify VRF for any withholding taxes withheld to the extent that there are insufficient proceeds in the cash flow waterfall to discharge debt and equity obligations.
(b) VRL must not suffer a two notch downgrade by Standard & Poors' (from BBB- to BB) and Moodys' (from Baa3 to Ba2) or a three notch downgrade by one agency otherwise, at the option of the debt providers, VRL would be responsible for full repayment of the debt facility and equity invested.
(In the event that both rating agencies downgraded VRL by one notch, VRF could only continue funding at the option of the debt providers, and the transaction would wind down as the films are exploited, but with no recourse to VRL.)
See the attached summary of the impact of credit rating downgrades.
Economic Impact
As against the incremental $US 66 million at risk for unfunded foreign P&A and its additional up to $US 10 million equity investment (total $US 76 million), VRL would be entitled to be paid an executive producer fee of at least $US I million and an average overhead fee of $US 3.75 million per Bendigo film (a total of $US 95 million for a slate of 20 Bendigo films), together with other fees determined on an arm's length basis for services performed, irrespective of the financial success of VRF.
In other words, VRL's position would be covered by its executive producer and overhead fees in the event of 'Armageddon', with an expected profit in a failure scenario of $US 19 million over the slate of 20 Bendigo films.
Other Matters
* As VRF can only acquire the foreign rights of completed films, cash flowing of VRP (and Warner Bros./third party?) Bendigo (and Ballarat) productions, prior to their acquisition by VRF, must still be undertaken. I am continuing to address this production funding issue in terms of both Ballarat and Bendigo films with CIBC and Westdeutsche LandesBank.
* As with Ballarat, in the event that the insurers fail to renew VRF's Bendigo insurance policy after the first slate of five films, and in the absence of AMBAC electing to insure this risk slice, the debt facility would become repayable after the first five films have been exploited.
In these circumstances, and assuming VRL is required to fund 15% of the P&A spend, VRL's peak loss would amount to $US 16.5 million, with a loss on its equity investment of up to $US 5 million (a total of $US 21.5 million). Against this loss would be offset at a minimum, $US 5 million earned in executive producer fees and $US 18.75 million earned in allocated overhead expense (a total of $U5 23.75 million), yielding a net profit of $US 2.25 million.
* It is considered that, properly documented, this Bendigo funding proposal will not have any adverse impact on the VRL ANZ senior secured borrowing. Obviously, a further sign off would be required on this issue from the ANZ. Likewise, a further sign off from Ernst & Young as to the continuing off- balance sheet impact of the structure would also need to be obtained.
I strongly endorse this proposal for Project Bendigo. Now that Bruce Berman is on board, it will enable VRL to safely further participate in film production at third party risk, while maintaining significant upside and the ability to build a (hopefully) profitable film library in the foreign world.
..."
145 By a letter dated 28 January 1998 Mr Burke wrote to Mr Ziegler raising some concerns he had about Project Bendigo and Project Popcorn, in particular that they might result in VRL losing its credit rating. The letter began:
"I am first and foremost in awe of the brilliance of your construction and deeply appreciate the commitment and pure sweat that has brought Bendigo and Popcorn to the point where they are looming as a real option in our bigger future."
Project Popcorn was a proposal to borrow up to US$2 billion for the securitisation of cinemas owned, or to be acquired, by the VRL exhibition division. Mr Ziegler responded by a lengthy memorandum dated 20 February 1998.
146 At the VRL Board meeting on 12 March 1998 Mr Ziegler was made a director on the motion of Mr Kirby. Mr Ziegler distributed another memorandum similar to that of 17 December 1997.
147 The half year figures to 31 December 1997 produced a record result for VRL. In its announcement of the results VRL commented on the position of the production division:
"Another highlight of the period was the signing of a deal with Warner Brothers to produce a series of 20 major films, the first five of which have a combined budget of US$200m. Village has no financial exposure, with the funding provided externally, but will receive production fees, distribution fees and potentially a share of the film profits."
148 At the VRL Board held on 5 May 1998 there was some discussion of both Ballarat and Bendigo financing and Project Popcorn. Mr Charles Stern, a non-executive director of VRL, expressed reservations about Project Bendigo. Following that meeting, Mr Burke advised Mr Miller of Warner Brothers that there had been unanimous approval for the recommendation "to move to the bigger fund that provides for 20 pictures between $50m and $80m over five years." This was not correct because any approval was subject to Salomon Smith Barney Australia Limited ("Salomon Smith Barney") expressing a favourable opinion. As Mr Burke wrote to Mr Stern on 13 May 1998:
"In relation to Bendigo financing, as agreed at the Board Meeting we will obtain Salomons' views and before any final decision is made will consult with you."
149 Later in May 1998 when Mr Foo expressed his concern about the fact that Mr Burke and Mr Kirby had committed to the funding of the film "The Deep Blue Sea" before there had been Board approval of Project Bendigo, Mr Burke sent him the following handwritten note:
"We have committed with WB [Warner Brothers]. But it is the safest bet we've ever undertaken in production. Could be a genuine blockbuster."
The word "could" had then been crossed out and replaced with the word "should."
150 By a memorandum dated 23 June 1998 to the non-executive directors of VRL, Mr Burke addressed the question of alternative funding for "The Deep Blue Sea." Part of the memorandum stated:
"In Production we have entirely re-constituted the business. We now have:
• Leadership/creative
• Guaranteed distribution/clout
• Risk elimination
• Non recourse funding
Bruce Berman
WB deal
Ballarat/Bendigo/Insurance
CIBC/Union Bank California."
151 Mr Wilson of Salomon Smith Barney prepared a report on Project Bendigo dated 25 June 1998. The following conclusions were stated in the report:
"• Based on our understanding of the Project Bendigo structure and the representations made to us, we believe that the Village Roadshow exposure to risks of loss is manageable in the context of the company's overall business and size.
• The main area of risk in the structure is in a cash flow timing sense, where a VRL Event causes repayment requirements to be made in the short term, notwithstanding the potential for future cash flows, leading to liquidity pressures on the group.
• Based on the assumptions we have made and assuming that in respect of its other businesses Village Roadshow remains essentially in its present financial condition, these risks appear reasonable and manageable in the context of the overall Village Roadshow group."
152 At the VRL board meeting held on 29 September 1998 the Board decided that the new business model for VRP based on Project Ballarat financing would become VRP's only business plan and that other VRP activities would be wound down or closed.
153 VRL's Annual Report for the financial year ended 30 June 1998 contained the following statement about VRP:
"Following a lengthy period of strategic planning, Village Roadshow Pictures has emerged from being a small independent to a major producer. This direction was masterminded by Director, Fiscal, Legal and Strategic Objectives - Peter Ziegler and incoming Chairman and CEO - Bruce Berman."
The Annual Report also had a new statement about the Remuneration Committee:
"The Committee's Terms of Reference provide for the review of Executive Committee recommendations on senior divisional and corporate executive remuneration packages and Village Roadshow group policies. In particular the Remuneration Committee reviews Executive Director remuneration including equity participation and makes appropriate recommendations thereon to the Company's full Board.
The Committee periodically obtains independent advice from external consultants and utilises benchmarks from comparable organisations."
154 In early February 1999 Mr Ziegler responded to 14 detailed questions about Project Bendigo from Mr Tim Newman, Group Treasurer of United News and Media, one of the largest shareholders in VRL at that time. It was represented on the Board by Mr Charles Stern and Mr Charles Gregson. Mr Newman was seeking to understand the merits and risks of Project Bendigo so he could advise Messrs Stern and Gregson. Mr Ziegler circulated the questions and answers to the VRL Executive Committee and the Board.
155 At a meeting on 9 February 1999, the VRL Board endorsed the Project Bendigo transaction in principle subject to examination of the documentation. Mr Ziegler was asked to leave the meeting while the directors discussed the implications of Orrong's Agreement on the decision whether to proceed with Project Bendigo.
156 Following that meeting, a VRL director, Mr Terry Jackman, wrote to the Chairman, Mr John Kirby, by letter dated 11 February 1999 querying the merits of proceeding with Project Bendigo. Mr Burke gave Mr Ziegler a copy of Mr Jackman's letter. Mr Ziegler sent a memorandum dated 16 February 1999 responding to Mr Jackman's concerns.
157 According to Mr Ziegler, extensive testing of the Project Bendigo model was carried out by VRL staff, in particular Mr Stuart Boxer, the finance director of VRP. Mr Boxer's work indicated a possible mismatch between cash inflows and the amortisation of VRF's debt facility. By a memorandum dated 22 February 1999 Mr Foo asked Mr Burke to obtain further statistics from Warner Bros. to assist in the analysis of the viability of Project Bendigo, "based on extrapolating Ballarat actuals." According to Mr Foo they were "all working feverishly" on this task. Without the further information Mr Foo said that he could not "recommend anything to anybody."
158 The requested information was provided by Warner Bros. On 24 May 1999 Mr Boxer and other VRL accounting and finance personnel produced a 375 page detailed analysis of the potential risks and benefits of Project Bendigo.
159 Much of this further information was provided to Mr Wilson at Salomon Smith Barney in order for him to prepare an updated report on Project Bendigo. That report was dated 13 August 1999. It concluded that:
"the conclusions we reached, on the assumptions employed, in the 25 June 1998 review of Project Bendigo remain valid."
Mr Wilson participated in the VRL Board meeting held on 17 August 1999 via telephone. According to the minutes, Mr Ziegler confirmed that once the 20 films were completed in respect of Project Bendigo there would be "no recourse to the company."
160 Following further analysis by CIBC of the required sizing of the proposed Project Bendigo debt facility and further work on the same topic by VRP and VRL personnel, it was proposed that Projects Ballarat and Bendigo be combined so that VRF had only the one combined facility of US$500 million rather than two separate facilities of US$200 million and US$500 million respectively.
161 In November 1999 Mr Wilson was asked to advise on Project Castlemaine, as the revised Project Bendigo was sometimes called. By a report dated 18 November 1999 Mr Wilson concluded that:
"the extension of the Ballarat facility to accommodate Bendigo sized films will result in a lower overall financial risk to Village Roadshow than operating the Ballarat and Bendigo facilities in parallel."
162 On 22 November 1999 the VRL Board gave approval for the modified Project Bendigo transaction (Project Castlemaine) to be finalised.
The 1998 Negotiations
163 In early 1998, according to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby asked him to put forward proposals for an alternative fee arrangement as he was still unhappy with the 5% fee on all finance raisings. Mr Ziegler responded with a memorandum dated 1 March 1998 headed "Amendment to PAZ Remuneration Arrangements." It proposed a yearly consultancy fee of $600,000 from 1 July 1997, a bonus of "10% on Funds Raised other than Securitisation Debt Funding" and a bonus of "5% of Taxes Saved After Settlement of Tax Audit." Under the sub-heading "Securitisation" the following was stated:
"$10 million non-recourse loan for purchase of VRL preference shares pursuant to VRL Loan Plan, but not repayable for 10 years, and shares fully vested subject only to outstanding loan liability; or economic equivalent of this loan.
All Securitisations - in perpetuity - 5.25% of Special Purpose Company equity, VRL yearly profits, & capital gain arising from securitised investments and operations."
Other points worth noting were that it was stated that these fees and bonuses were cumulative, "with no cap on total remuneration, etc. payable", that Herbert Geer & Rundle were to "draft long form agreement within 21 days" and that Mr Ziegler would "meet with Remuneration Committee if required/desirable."
164 At a meeting on 2 March 1998 Mr Kirby told Mr Ziegler that the memorandum was not acceptable. On 3 March 1998 Mr Ziegler sent Mr Kirby a revised memorandum. It contained very few changes. One of them, in respect of the $10 million non-recourse loan to purchase VRL preference shares was to add after the words "or economic equivalent of this loan" the words "if unwilling to seek shareholder approval." Mr Ziegler said in evidence that the addition reflected Mr Kirby's wishes, which perhaps gains some support from Mr Kirby's handwritten note alongside this sentence on the memorandum of 1 March 1998 of the words "if not to shareholders." Then, at the request of Mr Kirby, Mr Ziegler sent him "a one pager" dated 4 March 1998 summarising the "Existing PAZ Remuneration Arrangements" as at 1 July 1997.
165 On 4 March 1998 Mr Ziegler met with Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo. Concern was expressed by Mr Burke at the level of remuneration paid to Mr Ziegler. He said that it was inappropriate for an executive to be paid more than the chief executive officer. For his part, Mr Ziegler justified his level of compensation as "largely performance driven" and he was "performing." He also requested a reconsideration of the base retainer which had not been increased since the commencement of the consultancy agreement, contrary to the provision for annual review.
166 On 7 March 1998 Mr Ziegler sent Mr Robert Kirby, Mr John Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo yet another memorandum on the same topic. This proposed a yearly consultancy fee of $500,000 from 1 July 1997 with annual increases "equal to the average increase in RGK/JRK/GWB/PEF base salary." The only other change worth noting was that under the sub-heading "Securitisation" the following appeared:
"All Securitisations - in perpetuity - 7.5% of Special Purpose Company equity, VRL yearly profits, & capital gain arising from securitised investments and operations excluding profits and capital gain from VRL's existing non-film assets which may be securitised (e.g. existing cinema assets, existing radio assets, etc.)"
167 This memorandum was discussed at a meeting with Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo held at the Jam Factory on the Labour Day public holiday on 9 March 1998. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Kirby asked him to agree to a lesser fee for "non/limited recourse finance raising under your contract." Mr Kirby gave Mr Ziegler an undated document headed "PAZ Amended 5 Year Deal." The proposal outlined in that document was that VRL would establish a new Village Roadshow Financial Services Company in which "PAZ" (meaning presumably Mr Ziegler or his company) would have a "20% Equity" and that that company would pay the "PAZ Consultancy Package", the details of which were as follows:
1. Economic equivalent of 5.25% of what the VRCT would have earned (from & including 1997/98 onwards).
If and when VRP is listed or sold 5.25% effective equity (Per BB deal).
2. Extra 0.5% of VRL after tax profit plus equivalent VRCT pay out. (possibly $1m).
Popcorn
$12m non-recourse loan for purchase of VRL pref. shares - 10 year loan etc. ... contingent on a min. of $500m transaction ... below this threshold $12m will be in proportion to transaction(s) ... i.e. $250m = $6m shares/loan.
$500,000 or ave. increase JRK/GWB/RGK/PEF of their base salary ... Whichever is higher.
C. AUSTRIAN-TYPE TRANSACTIONS/NO VRL RECOURSE OR USE OF TAX LOSSES, I.E. STRAIGHT PROFIT
10% on such funds/profits raised.
Currently 0.5% ... Discussion with PEF on who and what
* ALL SUBJECT TO VRL REMUNERATION COMMITTEE (& POSSIBLY BOARD)
168 Part of the discussion was about the fee on Project Popcorn. Mr Ziegler said that he was told that if he did not agree to reduce the fee payable on Project Popcorn from 5% to 2.5% Project Popcorn would not proceed. He said that on a one-off basis he would agree to 2.5% if it was put in writing so that there was no ambiguity. It was then suggested that an approach could be made to the Remuneration Committee to see if they thought 2.5% was reasonable.
169 On 9 April 1998 Mr Foo sent a memorandum to Mr Conn and Mr Jackman, the non-executive members of the Remuneration Committee, informing them of the discussions which had been held with Mr Ziegler "on his consultancy deal." Mr Foo asked for their comments on the proposal that the performance bonus for Project Popcorn be reduced from 5% to 2.5% flat fee, the retainer be increased from $400,000 to $500,000 per annum and that "the deal" be extended for a further five years. It should be noted that Mr Foo referred to Mr Ziegler's "bonus on the net outcome (result) of the Ballarat funding" as 5%, not 5.25%.
170 On 18 August 1998 Mr Kirby wrote a memorandum to the VRL Remuneration Committee, then consisting of non-executive directors, Mr Conn and Mr Jackman, setting out the details of the proposal negotiated at the meeting on 9 March 1998 to reduce the performance bonus for Project Popcorn to 2.5% of the finance raised. That memorandum read as follows:
"I have been delegated by the Chairman and the Executive Committee to put to the Remuneration Committee the renegotiated consultancy agreement with Peter Ziegler.
Attached is the current agreement signed in 1995 (including Peter's memo in November '95 clarifying certain points).
We are all aware of the extraordinary work ethic and sheer productivity of Peter's years with Village Roadshow. Simply stated, no-one in the group has contributed more to the financial substance and success of VRL than Peter Ziegler.
The degree of compensation reflected this extraordinary contribution.
The one area of some debate was the applicability of Peter's 5% of 'non/limited recourse funding' covered under clause C on page 2. The debate of course centred around the finance raised by Ballarat/Bendigo and Popcorn.
In good faith and recognition of his commitment to our group and the future we share together, Peter agreed to forego his claim for a 5% commission on such production finance in return for a 5.25% profit participation in VRP. This fairly reflected the unique value of Peter's innovative finance (in tandem with new Bruce Berman management and the Warner Bros. deal) in resurrecting future viability of VRP.
With Popcorn, Graham and I reached an agreement with Peter to a reduced contractual commission of 2.5%. In this instance it was not possible to easily define 'profit' derived from the financing transactions as most likely existing operating assets would be involved.
Popcorn financing has the potential to transform the entire financial landscape for VRL. It can provide funding of billions of dollars for our cinema exhibition (and potentially our other businesses) without extraordinary complication of new equity raisings or re-structuring (per the Murdoch initiative with Fox Entertainment, etc.).
Apart from the sheer magnitude of the Popcorn financing, the effective cost of the money, i.e. the interest rate, will be significantly below market comparable finance. The savings in interest costs (i.e. profits) to the VRL bottom line will be in the order of 10's of millions of dollars year after year.
This negotiated agreement with Peter was subject to Remuneration Committee/Board approval, which the Executive Committee now seeks with its full endorsement."
171 Mr Conn responded in the strongest possible terms by a memorandum dated 26 August 1988 which he sent to the Kirbys and Mr Burke. Mr Conn dealt with two topics, the proposed share issue to executive directors and "the arrangements" with Mr Ziegler, both of which he vehemently opposed. Mr Conn said that his principal concern was "the lack of market understanding or judgment by the three of you" which was "very evident in the Peter Ziegler contract, which you are now asking the Remuneration Committee to recommend to the Board." Mr Conn's letter continued:
"Peter is a wonderful creative person with great ability, drive and enthusiasm. He has much to contribute to the development of the company and should be fairly and reasonably compensated. However, the arrangements that you have entered into are not now appropriate or proper for someone who is now both a Director of VRL and a member of the Executive Team and who's [sic] job specification has changed over time.
Peter Ziegler's contract concerns me and, I would suspect, all the non-Executive Directors for a number of reasons:
1. The magnitude of the potential payments to Peter Ziegler are outside of the ability of shareholders, the Board and the marketplace to accept as reasonable compensation for an executive of VRL. If I am interpreting it correctly, you are asking the Board to approve, potentially, a 2.5% fee on Popcorn finances. On a $1,000 million raising, this would mean a fee of $25 million. This is an extremely generous figure by any benchmark and especially for someone employed by the company and raising the funds without risk.
Peter is a full-time executive of the company, irrespective of the legal niceties. He is on the main Board, a member of the Executive Committee and has all the appearances of a full-time employee. He receives a salary, holiday pay, long-service leave entitlements and pays fringe benefit taxes. Furthermore, I understand that Peter spends the overwhelming majority of his time on VRL matters. The company is underwriting his costs. At no point is Peter at risk.
Given Peter's position as a Director of VRL and the size of the potential payments, the Board will have no alternative than to provide full disclosure to shareholders. The public criticism of both Ross Wilson and TABCORP will be mild in comparison to the outcry we are likely to experience when Peter's arrangements are disclosed to shareholders. This will result in great harm to the company.
2. The proposal is for Peter to be paid on the gross amount to be raised and payment made at the time of raising rather than when the benefits are received by VRL. The structure of the raisings through Ballarat, Bendigo or Popcorn, has been developed by Peter. If for some reason this structure proves difficult to either implement or to continue with after some time, the full benefit of the raising will not flow to VRL. However payment will be made to Peter irrespective of the outcome to VRL. While it might not be in Peter's character to do so, there is the potential for Peter to collect his fees and then resign, leaving the company with all the problems of implementation.
3. Over the past 12 months, the resolution of the corporate governance issues concerning Roc Kirby Theatres Pty Ltd, the Creative Trust and Roadshow Home Video was confrontational and traumatic for all associated with these issues. The non-Executive Directors insisted that these matters be wound up because they created a conflict for the relevant Executive Directors. Also, the non-Executive Directors were upset because the existence of some of these arrangements had not been disclosed to the Board.
Peter's contract has a similar inherent conflict and the problem of non-disclosure.
Peter's compensation is so geared towards fundraising that it has the potential to divert his time and energy from discharging his responsibilities to the wider VRL group as a member of the Executive Committee and Board.
Against the background of the corporate governance issues, it is of real concern that the nature of Peter's contract was not disclosed at the time Popcorn and Bendigo were considered by the Board. How can Peter objectively present the Bendigo or Popcorn proposals to the Board if he is secretly, and enormously incentivised to get approval and raise the funds. This non-disclosure is likely to widen the gulf that presently exists between the Executive Directors and non-Executive Directors.
4. There is a requirement of the Australian Stock Exchange listing rules (Section 10.17) that 'an executive director's salary or director's fees must not include a commission on, or percentage of, operating revenue.'
While Peter's arrangements are clearly outside the letter of this rule, they clearly breach the spirit of the rule.
If Peter's contract is disclosed in its present form and the company raises a large sum of money under the Popcorn structure, the company will lose considerable respect and credibility in the eyes of shareholders and the wider investment community. Also, the Board will be subject to much criticism of giving 'lip service' to such issues as corporate governance and the spirit of the Stock Exchange rules. The non-Executive Directors will not allow the company to be placed in a position to warrant such public criticism.
With Peter's contract, I suspect that the original intention of the arrangements bears little resemblance to the circumstances or needs presently facing VRL. In other words, it is a contract entered into in good faith by all parties to cover a certain set of circumstances, but is now being used to cover a series of events which were not contemplated by the parties at the time of signing. In such a case, there is a clear need to sit down and talk through the issues. Before such a meeting, it might be appropriate if a legal opinion was obtained on certain aspects of the contract as I found parts of it rather confusing.
I have not discussed Peter's arrangements with other non-Executive Directors, with the exception of Terry Jackman. Terry shares my stance, if anything he is more vehement and disillusioned. If you insist that this matter be shown to the full Board, I will of course do so, but in its present form it will not carry the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee.
We must meet and find an equitable and justifiable solution to solve this issue."
172 In March 1998, Orrong claimed payment of a number of performance bonuses totalling $2,022,924, including a 5% performance bonus of $1,203,008 for the US $16 million (or A$24,060,150) third party equity raised from John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance and Ambac as part of Project Ballarat. VRL paid $2 million on account in April 1998, but disputed its liability for the fee on the US$16 million. Mr Kirby told Mr Ziegler that this fee was covered by the agreement made in September 1997 and that the 5.25% equity interest in VRP was also intended to cover any other fee for non/limited recourse finance raised for VRP in connection with Project Ballarat. Mr Ziegler disagreed, telling Mr Kirby that the 1997 agreement was a "one off" and that he had reserved all rights to claim a fee on all non/limited recourse finance raisings for VRP or otherwise. Ms Raffe subsequently deducted the amount of the fee, $1,203,008, from the payment for Orrong's July 1998 invoice of $1,792,117 for a performance bonus for raising non/limited recourse film finance of $35,842,345 net. Mr Ziegler pressed Mr Kirby, Mr Foo and Ms Raffe for payment and he and Mr Kirby continued to debate whether or not a performance bonus was payable for the US$16 million equity raising. Eventually, on 10 September 1998 Mr Ziegler accepted Mr Kirby's proposal that they split the claimed fee down the middle. The reduced fee of $601,504 was paid by VRL on 15 September 1998.
173 In November 1998, Orrong submitted an invoice to VRL for $612,937, which was said to be a 5.25% share of VRP's profit for the financial year ended 30 June 1998. This invoice was approved by Mr Foo and paid on 10 December 1998 to the Remuneration Unit Trust without query. A handwritten note by Ms Raffe on the invoice read: "Per RGK [Mr Kirby] in March 1998, this represents PAZ profit share."
The 1999 Negotiations
174 In late 1998 and early 1999 Mr Conn took over the negotiations on VRL's behalf with Mr Ziegler on behalf of Orrong. Mr Conn gave evidence that he proposed to Mr Ziegler that Orrong receive a further 2.25% equity interest in VRP as its performance bonus for Project Bendigo. The 2.25% equity interest was to be of the same nature and quality as the 5.25% equity interest already held by Orrong. The Board of VRL was informed of this proposal by Mr Conn in February 1999. In the absence of Mr Ziegler, the Board resolved to accept Mr Conn's recommendation to grant Orrong a further 2.25% equity interest in VRP to bring Orrong's equity in VRP to 7.5%. Although the Board's resolution to this effect was contained in both of Mr Leggo's handwritten versions of the minutes, it was omitted from the typed form of the minutes. This was apparently done on the basis of legal advice given by Mr Basser. Nevertheless, despite this rather unusual omission, Mr Conn said that he subsequently met with Mr Ziegler and "outlined in detail ... what had taken place during the Board meeting", including that the Board "had approved the proposed in principle commission/bonus arrangement in respect of the Bendigo transaction."
175 On 26 April 1999, Mr Burke wrote a memorandum to Mr Ziegler, copied to the Kirbys and Mr Foo, in which he reported on a "long and very frustrating meeting" that he and Mr Robert Kirby had held with Mr Conn at Mr Kirby's home concerning the 2.5% performance bonus proposed by Mr Kirby in respect of Project Popcorn limited recourse cinema financing. Mr Burke reported that Mr Conn was adamantly opposed to such a bonus and had said that he would resign from the VRL Board if it were approved. Mr Burke proposed a further discussion with Mr Ziegler and Mr Kirby concerning the amount of the Project Popcorn fee.
176 However, the performance bonus in respect of Project Bendigo seems to have been agreed, because on the same day, 26 April 1999, the VRL Remuneration Committee wrote a memorandum to the Board advising it of the negotiations taking place over the Project Popcorn fee. Part of the memorandum read as follows:
"In the context of the Ballarat financing a compromise was reached, Peter accepting a 5.25% equity in VRP.
In the case of Bendigo, the equity increased to 7.5% and an up front payment of US$5m (repayable in proportion to funding not utilised)."
177 Mr Ziegler said that an offer along those lines was made by Mr Conn in one of the many meetings he had with Mr Conn at this time, but that he did not accept it, maintaining the claim to the 5% fee.
178 By a memorandum dated 25 May 1999, Mr Foo advised members of the VRL Board, including Mr Ziegler, that:
"I thought it appropriate to notify you that Peter Ziegler has a significant related party commission arrangement with the abovementioned project [Project Bendigo.]"
179 The Remuneration Committee next met on 2 September 1999. The minutes of that meeting noted:
"PEF [Foo] asked for clarification on the 3 times multiplier payment to PAZ in the event of his leaving the group. PAZ is entitled to 7.5% (after Bendigo) of VRP equity, this in perpetuity - it therefore should not also be part of the multiplier to be paid on termination. WJC [Conn] and PTJ [Jackman] agree that this should be the case and it was agreed to ensure that PAZ be made aware that this was their view."
180 Mr Foo said that he had raised this issue because Mr Ziegler had said to him that "these guys, Kirby, Burke and Conn" were "screwing" him but that they better not "try and screw me out of my kicker when I leave." This led Mr Foo to seek clarification of Mr Ziegler's entitlements from the Remuneration Committee. Mr Ziegler denied that such a conversation ever occurred.
181 The minutes of the meeting of the Remuneration Committee held on 9 September 1999 recorded that Mr Foo was appointed as the Committee's agent to discuss the relevant issues with Mr Ziegler. They included:
"VRP equity share is to be excluded from PAZ calculation of performance kicker in the event of a contract termination ... PAZ share of VRP equity to increase to 7.5% when first draw down under the Bendigo facility is made."
182 As a director of VRL Mr Ziegler received a copy of the minutes. By a memorandum dated 17 September 1999, he wrote to members of the Remuneration Committee, with a copy to Mr John Kirby who was then Chairman of VRL, telling them that the Committee had "misdirected itself on a number of issues involving my remuneration" and that "in any event, the terms of my consultancy are covered by my contract, the interpretation of which is a strictly legal matter."
183 The minutes of the meeting of the Remuneration Committee held on 22 November 1999 recorded that the Committee were of the view that the change to the Bendigo deal was so substantial that amendment was required to "the agreed remuneration package offered" to Mr Ziegler. The minutes also noted that Mr Foo "mentioned" that in the event that Mr Ziegler was successful in:
"finding an equity partner for VRP, he wished his equity to be part of that disposed of. The Committee decided that this was acceptable to them but it should be a company decision made at the time a partner is found."
184 Thereafter, in November 1999 Mr Foo and Mr Ziegler exchanged memoranda concerning the fee payable on completion of Project Bendigo.
185 On 22 December 1999 Mr Ziegler was asked to attend a meeting at Mr Robert Kirby's home. Mr Burke was the only other person present. Mr Kirby told Mr Ziegler that he would cease to be a director of VRL but that he would be appointed a director, and deputy chairman, of VRC. Mr Jackman was also to resign from the VRL Board. Mr Ziegler said in his witness statement that Mr Kirby said that these changes would make the VRL Board smaller and therefore more workable but that it would at the same time reduce pressure on VRL over the disclosure of large remuneration packages for VRL executives, including Mr Ziegler's company's remuneration.
186 VRL paid in full on 22 October 1999 the amount of $1,137,038, being 5.25% of VRP's operating profit for the financial year ended 30 June 1999.
187 VRL's Annual Report for the financial year ended 30 June 1999 contained the following statement about VRP:
"Village Roadshow Pictures' (VRP) first full year of operation, in its co-production joint venture with Warner Bros. has been highly successful in the fiercely competitive world of studio feature film product. The 10 movies VRP either completed or gave a green light to in its first 18 months, have provided the company with a robust and stable platform for the future."
188 The Annual Report also disclosed that in the relevant financial year VRL had paid Orrong more than $3.1 million in consulting fees. The following statement also appeared in the Annual Report:
"In the opinion of Directors, remuneration paid to Directors and senior executives is considered reasonable and fair having regard to comparable companies and the performance and responsibilities of each respective Director and senior executive."
Proposals for the Sale of VRP
189 In December 1999 Mr Ziegler discussed with representatives of the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank AG ("the DG Bank") the possibility of a float of VRP in the Neuer Market in Germany. According to Mr Ziegler, the Neuer Market was the high growth section of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange where many film and media companies had listed and the DG Bank was the leading underwriter on the Neuer Market.
190 On 14 January 2000 Mr Burke sent to Mr Berman and a number of senior VRL executives a paper entitled "Re-direction Village Roadshow Pictures", in which he stated that: "Now is the time to aggressively pursue our trade sale or IPO [Initial Public Offering.]" Mr Burke listed a number of options, German IPO, US IPO and private sale, to be explored "urgently." On the same day Mr Burke sent another memorandum to Mr Berman advising that "we have delegated Peter Ziegler as responsible to co-ordinate the sale of equity in V.R.P."
191 In April 2000 Mr Barry Reardon, a non-executive director of VRL, Mr Berman and Mr Ziegler met with representatives of the Telemunchen Group. According to a facsimile from Mr Berman to the Kirbys and Mr Burke dated 17 April 2000, the VRL representatives had valued VRP at US$1 billion and Dr Herbert Kloiber, the Chairman of the Telemunchen Group, had agreed to take a 20-25% minority stake, subject to Telemunchen gaining the German pay and free television rights from Warner Bros. By a letter dated 11 May 2000 Dr Kloiber wrote to Mr Berman offering to purchase either 20% or 25% of VRP which he valued at US$750 million, subject to the same condition about distribution rights. Mr Berman responded with a counter proposal which valued VRP at US$937.5 million. According to Mr Burke, Warner Bros. was not prepared to relinquish the German TV rights for VRP pictures which were very valuable at that time. Telemunchen therefore did not pursue the proposal.
192 Mr John Kirby sent a memorandum to Mr Burke on 19 April 2000 expressing some concerns about the sale of equity in VRP. One concern was that:
"Next year, VRP may be even more valuable with the imminent release of Matrix 11 and 111."
193 On 15 June 2000 DG Bank prepared a "First Indicative Valuation" of VRP of between $2 and $5 billion on the basis of the information provided to it.
194 In August 2000 VRL decided not to proceed with the proposed IPO of VRP. The minutes of the meeting of the VRL Board held on 15 August 2000 record that:
"GWB reported that the scripts for Matrix II and Matrix III looked outstanding. Video sales of The Matrix were up to US$300 million with over 5 million DVD's being sold worldwide. The proposed IPO of the Production division into the German market was discussed at length particularly in light of current market conditions and the expectation of at least US$50 million flowing through to the group this year in overhead and fee reclamation. Directors agreed that the current proposal would not generate sufficient cash for the group and proposals would be re-submitted to the investment bankers with a view to raising a minium of A$300 million which may result in the proposal being reconsidered. GWB confirmed that whilst Mr Bruce Berman had a 15% equity in VRP, this would need to be cut back to 7.5% in the event that an IPO was to proceed."
195 According to Mr Ziegler, each of Mr Kirby and Mr Burke told him at a meeting on 17 August 2000 that he thought VRP was far more valuable than indicated by DG Bank. Mr Kirby denied this allegation. He said that he told Mr Ziegler that he did not place any weight on the DG Bank valuation which he described as "hysterical." Mr Kirby also said that Mr Burke and Mr Foo, who were present at this meeting, also expressed doubts about the DG Bank valuation.
196 In his witness statement Mr Burke denied Mr Ziegler's allegation. He said that:
"The real reason I gave to Ziegler for not proceeding with the IPO was a combination of the following: that the valuation was ridiculous, that the Neuer Markt was likely to implode, that we did not wish to spend the money (approximately $3 million) to take it to the point where the IPO could be real, and that we did not want to be part of what I saw to be a group of dunces and scoundrels."
Mr Burke said that subsequent events proved that he was right to doubt the Neuer Markt.
197 Mr Foo also denied that the IPO of VRP did not proceed because it was determined that VRP was far more valuable than indicated by the DG Bank. He said that he never heard that view expressed by anybody, including Mr Ziegler, at any VRL Board or Executive Committee meeting. He said that he told Mr Ziegler that the forecast figures were "nonsense." Mr Ziegler disagreed.
198 Nevertheless, by an email dated 18 August 2000 from Mr Basser but under the names of Mr Ziegler and Mr Basser, the representatives of DG Bank were advised as follows:
"Over the last few weeks since our meetings in Frankfurt, we have been analysing the VRP business model and forecasts as part of the preparation for the company's IPO.
As a result of our own internal due diligence we have reached the conclusion that VRP is in fact at a less mature stage in its development that we initially had thought. Accordingly, the VRL Board considers that it would be premature to proceed with the IPO at this time.
The Board felt that the values to be realised by an IPO later this year/yearly next year would not fully reflect the true potential for VRP."
199 The DG Bank responded by a facsimile dated 21 August 2000 in which an offer was made to do a preliminary due diligence without any obligation or costs for VRP. In a memorandum dated 22 August 2000 Mr Ziegler urged the Kirbys, Mr Burke and Mr Foo that it would be useful for this exercise to be carried out. He added:
"This is especially the case given, as discussed last week, the diversity of views as to the present and future value of VRP's business."
200 Mr Burke sent a memorandum to Mr Ziegler on the same day in which he said:
"The Board was quite resolved in its view not to proceed and I do not believe there is any point in re-opening at this time."
201 Also on the same day an email was sent on behalf of Mr Antonie to the Kirbys and Messrs Burke, Foo, Basser and Ziegler regarding the letter from the DG Bank. It read:
"While the review by the bankers would give us greater clarity in relation to value (for which we should send realistic numbers) it does not address the key issues as to why we have postponed the transaction being executive participation, complexity, investment market exposure given the quality of the comps [comparable companies] and amount of cash out."
Mr Burke circulated a copy of this email with handwritten alterations suggesting that "executive participation" related only to Mr Berman and that the "order of issues" should have been the "other way around."
The Alleged Anti-Semitic Remark
202 During evidence in chief, Mr Ziegler said that it was at this time that Mr Burke had said to him when discussing the reasons for not proceeding with a proposal to float VRP, including that Mr Bruce Berman would benefit from his equity participation:
"...that fucking Jew isn't getting $500 million of our money, he never expected it, and we don't intend to give it to him under his contract that he entered into in 1998."
"Peter, it is not you, it is Berman, and we are happy for you to have a couple of hundred million dollars for having created this opportunity for us."
203 In cross-examination Mr Ziegler agreed that neither part of Mr Burke's alleged statement had been mentioned in his initial witness statement or the first version of his amended witness statement, served on the morning of 18 April 2005. He said that he had deliberately suppressed it with "Mr Burke's interest in mind". The second part of Mr Burke's alleged statement was referred to in Mr Ziegler's second version of his amended witness statement, served on the afternoon of 18 April 2005. Mr Ziegler said that he gave "a potted version of what was said". He further said that the first part of Mr Burke's alleged statement was not mentioned because:
"I saw no reason to cause scandal with Mr Burke in terms of what he had said, and that is why I didn't put it in the witness statement. ... Mr Burke is not anti-Semitic, but on this occasion they were the words he used and I saw no reason to inflame anyone by saying it."
Mr Ziegler then said that he had been advised that day if he was "going to recount conversations directly, I couldn't just leave off the first part of the sentence."
204 Mr Burke vehemently denied saying "fucking Jew". However, as Orrong pointed out, significantly Mr Burke accepted that he "most likely" would have made the rest of the statement as recounted by Mr Ziegler. In Orrong's submission, this was corroboration of the substance of Mr Ziegler's evidence and recollection, albeit that there was conflict about a poisonous but ultimately immaterial part of Mr Burke's comments. Orrong submitted that Mr Ziegler's evidence of this conversation with Mr Burke should be accepted in whole, including the anti-Semitic remark, and Mr Burke's denial rejected.
205 I do not agree. The circumstances in which this evidence was given by Mr Ziegler give me no confidence that what he eventually said about the alleged anti-Semitic remark was correct. In my opinion, Mr Burke is entitled to a finding, on the balance of probabilities, that the anti-Semitic part of that conversation did not occur.
The 2000 Agreement
206 Mr Ziegler said that in late March 2000 he told Mr Burke that he wanted the position with regard to his company's remuneration clarified. The amount of the fee for Project Bendigo was still unresolved. Mr Burke responded by instructing Mr Foo to complete the negotiations promptly.
207 In April 2000 Mr Foo and Mr Ziegler agreed to approach Mr Wilson "to arbitrate on the issue." Mr Foo said in his letter to Mr Wilson dated 7 April 2000 that because of Mr Wilson's in-depth involvement with both Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo and his:
"understanding of arm's length commissions payable in the Salomon Smith Barney world, etc., your advice will be valuable."
Mr Foo told Mr Wilson that he was not being asked to give a ruling but "more as an independent person" to give both parties "a reality check on our different perspectives."
208 On 18 May 2000 Mr Ziegler sent Mr Wilson a note outlining his position under the consultancy agreement which "PZ&Co [Orrong] entered into ... on 12 May 1993 ... as extended in October/November 1995."
209 On 20 May 2000 Mr Ziegler, Mr Foo and Mr Wilson participated in a telephone conference call. According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Wilson said that an overall fee of US$3 million (being 1% of US$300 million), with a further fee of US$2 million if no further funding was required to complete the envisaged 40 films, or in the event that additional financing above US$500 million was required an additional fee of 1% of any extra financing on the next draw down of the facility, and an additional 2.25% equity interest in VRP, but with no further equity component in the event of the need for further upsizing of the facility, was market based and appropriate in all the circumstances and that it would be considered an arm's length fee in the Salomon Smith Barney world in light of the features of the financing and the limitation on recourse to VRL. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Foo said that he agreed with this view.
210 In respect of the termination bonus calculation, Mr Ziegler said that Mr Wilson stated that both the cash component and the equity component of the Project Bendigo performance bonus should be taken into account, as they were "both of the same character." Mr Wilson said that it was the value of the equity in VRP rather than the income earned from that equity that should enter into the termination bonus calculation. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Foo agreed and gave an example involving AMP shares.
211 According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Wilson also said that another issue was what was meant by "3 preceding financial years" in the termination bonus provision. He suggested that on one view the 5.25% equity interest would not have to be taken into account. Mr Ziegler said that he immediately told Mr Wilson and Mr Foo that the termination bonus provision had been deliberately worded by him to cover the financial years "preceding" the financial year ending 30 June 2001 and that the 5.25% equity interest would have to be taken into account. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Foo said that this issue would have to be resolved later.
212 Following the telephone call, Mr Foo wrote to Mr Ziegler a memorandum dated 23 May 2000 setting out his understanding of what had been agreed. It was headed "Re: Clarification of Changes to Your Contract." On the same day Mr Foo sent Mr Ziegler a document which he described as a "sideletter." That read as follows:
"Re: Your Contract
Dear Peter
I just want to have this sideletter in my file for the next Finance Director (lucky man whoever he will be) in case I drop dead.
It is implicit that I have agreed to this settlement and you will be paid your money despite not having the final insurance policy in place. Your words (prompted by me) with regards the insurance policy was that it was virtually certain and in "Armageddon" we could fall back to the Ballarat insurers in any event.
Secondly, unfortunately, the US$3m payment will be required to be disclosed as a related party transaction unless as you previously agreed that [sic] this would be paid off balance sheet. We really have three choices here:
i) pay you in an off balance sheet non disclosable manner;
ii) don't pay you until July;
iii) pay you now in some other form - perhaps by way of a loan.
Any thoughts?"
213 Mr Ziegler gave evidence that he was "indifferent as to the manner in which the money was paid." He said that it did not matter to him if it was done in such a way that it did not have to be disclosed "provided I got the economic equivalent of what I was bargaining for."
214 Mr Ziegler replied to Mr Foo by memorandum dated 30 May 2000 concerning "certain issues relating to Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd's ("PZ & Co") existing consultancy arrangements with Village Roadshow Limited ("VRL") ..." On 21 June 2000 Mr Foo presented Mr Ziegler with another memorandum dated that day. It was again headed: "Re: Clarification of Changes to Your Contract." Mr Ziegler said that after going through it carefully with Mr Foo and making one handwritten addition, they agreed that the memorandum correctly reflected what had been agreed. Mr Ziegler then countersigned the memorandum as "agreed and approved." I refer to this agreement hereafter as "the 2000 Agreement." For present purposes the relevant parts of the memorandum provided as follows:
"Para 1: Given the chequered history of your contractual arrangement I think it best we have a letter that we both sign off on that represents the meeting of the minds that we came to on Saturday May 20 and your subsequent letter (attached) dated May 30. This letter represents a hybrid of that letter and our meeting. I confirm that I do not wish to entertain issues of your contract that are currently not in dispute only those that are, and it is not my intention in any way for this letter to supersede it. Further, I confirm I act with authority to bind the company.
Para 2: You had previously had an albeit conditional compromise agreement with Bill Conn for Bendigo. Our new agreement supersedes this for what we now call Castlemaine. You will be entitled to your 21/4 % of VRP immediately. However, the previously agreed up front US$5m fee is to be replaced. You will now be entitled to a US$3m fee up front and to the extent the current US$500m (ie: US$200m Ballarat/US$300m Part Bendigo) facility is capable of completing the 40 pictures, upon completion you will then become entitled to the additional US$2m. As an either/or, however, to the extent that additional facilities are required to finish the 40 movies, that you will receive 1% for each increase or part thereof per US$100m obtained. To the extent that this represents an additional US$200m, then you would receive the US$2m at that time. However, you would not also be entitled to the extra US$2m upon completion of the 40 movies. This 'either/or' may be best expressed by way of an example. Let's say the current US$500m facility is inadequate. You will then organise for an extra US$100m facility. You would receive US$1m upon the draw down of the facility (now totalling US$600m) and upon completion of the 40 movies a further US$1m. We also agreed that you would be entitled to sell your interest in VRP on a pro rata basis or if you wish a lesser amount, however, in the event that Village wishes to sell 100% of its interests you will not withhold your share capriciously to hinder a bona fide sale by VRL.
Para 3: In the event of the termination bonus being triggered upon termination (refer to letter attached dated June 2 2000 as to agreement on definition of termination), it was agreed that the granting of the VRP profit share percentage should be included in the bonus calculation and not the ongoing annuity that arises from it. The example we used was if we were to have settled your bonus with AMP shares it would be the granting of the shares and the value of those shares at that time that would be the bonus and not the ongoing dividend stream that flowed from it. We both agreed that this would give rise to a valuation issue given the difficulties in valuing the worth of VRP. We both agreed that Brian Wilson will do a valuation based on mutually agreed instructions for both 5.25% and 2.25% and that both parties will be bound by his valuation.
Para 4: In relation to your base retainer, you stated that you had not had an increase for the last four years and that in a Jam Factory meeting several years ago we agreed that this would be increased by A$100,000. Now that the foregoing matters have been essentially agreed, Village Roadshow agrees that with effect for the 1997/1998 year that your salary be increased by A$100,000 and thereafter each year by 10% per annum to June 30 2000. The review for 2000/2001 still needs to take place and be agreed.
...
Para 8: Loan facilities in relation to Bendigo type facilities up to and beyond the US$500-700m level would be at 1% and it was agreed that this would be on the facility increase as opposed to the rolling of the facility balance.
...
Para 10: In relation to the taxes saved component and due to the complexity of calculating and attributing both the amount and responsibility, we have agreed that the existing practice of equating this to 0.5% (1/2 of one percent) of the net profit after tax and abnormals as the basis for calculation both retrospectively and prospectively."
215 The US$3 million fee referred to in paragraph 2 of the memorandum of 21 June 2000 was paid "up front" to Remut on behalf of Orrong on 5 July 2000. It converted to a payment of $5,055,626.99.
216 The 2 June 2000 letter referred to in paragraph 3 of the memorandum of 21 June 2000 was a memorandum from Mr Ziegler to Mr Burke and Mr Foo, which after amendment was signed as agreed by both Mr Ziegler and Mr Foo. The relevant part read as follows:
"I refer to my conversation and agreement with Peter Foo this afternoon. I confirm that we agreed, without any impact on any other matter or agreement, that, in the event that the proposed Kloiber/Tele-Munchen VRP equity purchase is consummated, then the following shall take place.
Brian Wilson will be requested to provide a bona fide and independent determination which will be binding on both Village Roadshow Ltd and Peter Ziegler & Co as to the question of the termination bonus including whether or not the value of PZ & Co's interest in VRP (either in whole or in part) enters into the calculation.
Peter and I have agreed to make submissions to Brian in a similar manner to that recently undertaken with respect to some other contractual issues.
In the event that the proposed Kloiber/Tele-Munchen VRP equity purchase is not consummated, the above agreement will be of no effect whatsoever."
217 The increase in the retainer referred to in paragraph 4 of the memorandum of 21 June 2000 took place on 27 June 2000 when VRL paid Orrong a lump sum of $455,000, consisting of the following retrospective increases - $100,000 for the 1998 financial year taking the retainer to $500,000 per annum; $150,000 for the 1999 financial year taking the retainer to $550,000 per anum; and $205,000 for the 2000 financial year taking the retainer to $605,000 per annum. Following the review for the 2001 financial year, also referred to in paragraph 4 of Mr Foo's memorandum, the retainer was increased to $700,000 per anum.
218 On 5 September 2000, Mr Ziegler wrote to Mr Wilson advising him of the agreement Mr Ziegler had reached with Mr Foo on 21 June 2000 for him to make the necessary valuation of both the 5.25% and 2.25% interests. Mr Ziegler also said that the parties would appreciate Mr Wilson's "views on the meaning of the contractual provision providing for the 'Termination Bonus'." However, Mr Zielger said that Orrong had not agreed to be bound by Mr Wilson's opinion as to the legal meaning of that clause, although both parties had resolved to be bound by Mr Wilson's valuation.
219 On 12 September 2000, Mr Burke sent a memorandum to Mr Ziegler and Mr Foo advising that:
"I have spoken to Brian Wilson and told him that the issue of Peter's contract will be put in abeyance for the time being.
The priority now is the part of the process agreed at an earlier Board meeting to present the position from Peter's point of view and VRL's point of view as to Popcorn. It is important that we get this resolved as a matter of urgency so that it can be factored into the model."
In his witness statement, Mr Ziegler said that he returned a copy of Mr Burke's memorandum to him with a handwritten note on it saying that he saw no connection between the termination bonus and any fee for Project Popcorn and asking Mr Burke to instruct Mr Wilson to proceed. Mr Burke immediately came to see Mr Ziegler and, according to Mr Ziegler, said that he did not want to consider the termination bonus at that time and that Mr Wilson had been instructed to do nothing further on this matter. Mr Ziegler queried why this had been done but received no response.
220 On 26 September 2000, Mr Burke told Mr Ziegler that VRL had decided to put Project Popcorn on hold. Mr Ziegler sent Mr Burke a memorandum on that day saying that this decision left the way clear for resolution of the termination bonus issue. Mr Burke replied by a memorandum dated 28 September 2000 saying that he was happy to let Mr Wilson "referee on the quantum", but that they first needed to clarify the meaning of "termination", as agreed between them "when the Kloiber consideration was on the table."
221 In September 2000 Orrong submitted an invoice to VRL for $283,000, being 6.375% of VRP's operating profit for the financial year ended 30 June 2000. After discussion between Mr Ziegler and Ms Raffe, VRL paid the Remuneration Unit Trust the sum of $283,000. Mr Ziegler said that this was only a payment on account, whereas Ms Raffe maintained that it was made in full and final settlement of Orrong's claim for the profit share in that year. Mr Ziegler sought 7.5% of the profits because that had become Orrong's entitlement by 30 June 2000. On the other hand, Mr Foo had said that only half of the extra 2.25% should be counted for this year as it was only payable from 31 December 1999 when Project Bendigo was completed. I examine the dispute about whether the $283,000 was paid in full and final settlement below.
222 VRL's Annual Report for the financial year ended 30 June 2000 contained the following statement about VRP:
"In 1998 Village Roadshow Pictures embarked on an ambitious strategy to become one of the leading independent movie producers in Hollywood. Two years later that vision is close to reality and Village Roadshow Pictures is now comparable with, and in many cases superior to, a number of Hollywood's best production houses.
...
Production is now a strong contributor and an exciting business that is not only positioning Village Roadshow as a leading producer, but creating a valuable source of earnings growth."
The Annual Report contained another new statement about the Remuneration Committee:
"The Remuneration Committee of the Board of Directors, which has been in operation since April 1994 and is comprised of a majority of Non-executive Directors in accordance with its Terms of Reference, is responsible for determining compensation arrangements for the Directors. The Remuneration Committee assesses the appropriateness of the nature and amount of emoluments on a periodic basis by reference to relevant employment market conditions (with the assistance of external consultants) with the overall objective of ensuring maximum shareholder benefits from the attraction and retention of a high quality Board."
The Annual Report also made the following disclosure concerning Mr Ziegler under the related party provisions:
"Subsequent to P.A. Ziegler resigning as a Director, consulting fees totalling $654,908, a success fee of $5,191,477 mostly relating to the arrangement of a non-recourse US$300 million (A$560 million) production film financing facility for the group and a 7.5% film production profit share of $277,375 were paid to P.A. Ziegler and his directly related entities. Mr Ziegler retains his profit share in the film production division in perpetuity in return for providing financing for the ongoing slate of Village Roadshow Production pictures, which included The Matrix."
223 The wording of this disclosure note led to a further discussion between Mr Ziegler and Mr Foo and the sending of a memorandum dated 23 October 2000 by Mr Ziegler to Mr Foo. It read as follows:
"I refer to our discussion this morning pertaining to the above topic. As discussed, given the disclosures made in the Village Roadshow Limited ('VRL') Financial Accounts for the financial year ended 30 June 2000 referring to Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd's ('PZ & Co' or 'the Company') interest in Village Roadshow Pictures ('VRP') as a 'film production profit share', I thought it would be useful to outline the nature of the Company's interest in VRP for the avoidance of any doubt.
Culminating in the May 2000 discussions with you, PZ & Co and VRL reached agreement that the Company has a 7.5% equity interest in VRP.
The terms of PZ & Co's interest in VRP can be briefly stated as follows:
• PZ & Co's interest in VRP is indefeasibly vested in the Company (i.e., it is not impacted by any termination of PZ & Co's agreement with VRL, the termination of VRP's business, a lack of continued funding of VRP, or otherwise whatsoever), and can be dealt with by PZ & Co in its absolute and unfettered discretion for all purposes as if it was a 7.5% shareholding or entitlement in all companies/activities comprising the VRP Division of VRL from time to time.
• For completeness, it is understood that in order to minimise accounting, administrative and taxation complexities for VRL, there has been no actual issue of shares in the VRP group to PZ & Co. Nonetheless, it is expressly agreed between PZ & Co and VRL that the Company's VRP interest should be regarded for all purposes as if PZ & Co held its interest in VRP in a certificated form as the Company at its election has the right to cause the same to occur.
• Please advise if the forgoing does not accurately represent the position between us."
224 Mr Foo replied by a memorandum dated 27 October 2000 saying that he would have to talk to Mr Burke and Mr Kirby and get back to Mr Ziegler as his letter "could raise about 18 issues that I am either unaware of or need clarification." On the back of the memorandum Mr Foo wrote: "No rush (but I will fix)."
225 In October 2000, VRL obtained a further US$250 million funding facility for the production division, which increased the limit of the facility, now called Project Castlemaine, from US$500 million to US$750 million.
Shareholder Querying of Executive Remuneration
226 On 13 November 2000, representatives of Westpac Investment Management, Deutsche Asset Management and Rothschild Australia Asset Management wrote to Mr John Kirby, as chairman of VRL, in their capacity as major shareholders of VRL. Apart from VRC, these three VRL shareholders were then the first, third and fourth largest shareholders in VRL. They copied their letter to all of the then directors of VRL - Graham Burke, Peter Foo, Peter Harvie, Julian Beale, Bill Conn, Barry Reardon and Charles Stern. The letter read as follows:
"We are shareholders in Village Roadshow Limited (Village). We are seeking your written explanation of the following remuneration arrangements for executives and directors as revealed in the 2000 Annual Report (the Benefits):
(a) Total directors' remuneration - generally.
(b) Total directors' remuneration - top 4 directors' remuneration and payments in respect of Roadshow Unit Trust, controlled by a Village related party, Roadshow Distributors Pty Ltd.
(c) Total directors' remuneration - payments to P Ziegler.
(d) Total directors' remuneration - payments to R Kirby.
(e) Payments to companies associated with directors.
(f) Total directors' remuneration - payments to GW Burke in respect of management of Roadshow Unit Trust.
(g) Profit share arrangements for the film business with P Ziegler.
We regard many of the Benefits as potentially excessive. We consider the success fee paid to Mr Ziegler to be particularly excessive in light of the profit-sharing arrangement he has with the film production business. We query the quantum of the Benefits at a time when Village has conspicuously failed to deliver earnings per share growth, acceptable returns on its asset base or positive share price performance.
We believe that the Benefits are disproportionately large relative to the size of Village and its earnings profile. They appear to be far higher than comparable remuneration levels paid by similar companies in Australia.
Therefore, we request that you specifically comment on the following Corporations Law issues as they relate to the Benefits:
Financial benefits to a related party
1. Items (a)-(f). Please provide evidence that the financial benefits referred to in Items (a)-(f) were approved by Village members or, alternatively, advise why they did not require member approval, in accordance with Corporations Law s208.
2. Item (e). Please provide evidence that contracts with stationery and printing firms associated with JR Kirby, RG Kirby and GW Burke were either at arm's length or were on terms less favourable than arm's length terms, in accordance with Corporations Law s210. Otherwise such contracts require member approval. If this is the case, please provide evidence that such approval was obtained or, alternately, advise why approval was not obtained.
3. Items (a)-(d) and (f). Please provide evidence that the payment of the directors' remuneration was reasonable given the circumstances of the company and of the directors. Otherwise such remuneration requires member approval under s211(1). If this is the case, please provide evidence that such approval was obtained or, alternately, advise why approval was not obtained.
4. Items (a)-(d) and (f). Please provide evidence that the payment of benefits to directors, where such benefits are characterised as expense reimbursement, was reasonable given the circumstances of Village and of the directors. Otherwise such remuneration requires member approval under s211(2). If this is the case, please provide evidence that such approval was obtained or, alternately, advise why approval was not obtained.
5. Items (a)-(f). In making the payments and contracting with the stationery and printing firms associated with JR Kirby, RG Kirby and GW Burke (without alleging that they are financial benefits), what assurance can Village give that its directors have:
(a) exercised their duty of care and diligence, in accordance with s180(1);
(b) exercised their duty of good faith, in accordance with s181(1); and
(c) not improperly used their position to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else, or cause detriment to Village, in accordance with s182(1)?
Termination provisions
6. Item (d). Please provide evidence that the termination payment to R Kirby was approved by Village members, or did not require such approval, in accordance with s200B.
We look forward to your written response to the six matters raised above, which may include any relevant comments from each of the independent directors."
227 On 17 November 2000, John Kirby replied to these shareholders. After a number of general comments about VRL's businesses and the difficult times they were experiencing, he continued:
"As to remuneration this should be considered in light of the above. Our ethic is in building businesses to create new shareholder value rather than maintaining existing businesses. This requires unique people that are in demand and in short supply. We cannot just be compared with Australian companies as we compete, especially in production and exhibition, in an international environment. We have in place the leadership and executive strength essential to build a global entertainment company, and while this costs, it will pay dividends once we get over the exhibition hurricane.
I have asked our Investor Relations Manager Andrew Bowden to reply to the more specific and detailed issues you have raised. Fundamentally though, the directors of Village Roadshow Limited are fully aware of their obligations under the corporations law and are of the opinion that they have complied with these obligations. However, the in principle and philosophic points I address as follows:
1. Our key directors remuneration is appropriate to market forces. It is benchmarked by a number of external consultants and determined by our Remuneration Committee.
2. The Roadshow Unit Trust revenue received by Graham Burke relates to his ownership in this vehicle that goes back to the 70's. Graham Burke as Founder of Roadshow sold his then shares to Village Roadshow Corporation but the deal included that he retain a part equity ownership in television. This, of course, pre-dated the public listing and was fully detailed at that time. In summary, Graham Burke's revenue from the Roadshow Unit Trust relates solely to his equity as a founder of this business in the 70's.
The management fees are a device to pay his equity share of television distribution funds earned out of New Zealand.
3. Peter Ziegler has always been a consultant to the Village Group and worked on the basis of an agreed incentive package to develop and implement non-recourse funding package of a substantial scale for our film production business. At the time of negotiation Village Roadshow Pictures was worth zero. This negotiation included 71/2% of profit and fees on monies raised. Peter Ziegler Pty Ltd put together a package of $1,000m in funding and I say without reservation that no one else in the world would have been able to arrange such attractive financing which is a mixture of off balance sheet debt and equity. If, and I emphasise, if, one of the financial houses would have been able to put this financial package together it would have cost us significantly more. And the real point is that to the best of our knowledge, such a valuable package is not available anywhere else in the world. It is unique and tailored to our prudent risk portfolio.
Again, we have been in film production since the early 70's, and the hard lessons of experience remain with us today. Production is an entity that will in the medium haul, I believe, have a value greater than our existing total equity capitalisation. Last year we had two expressions of interest from third parties to buy a minority share that give credence to this statement. We truly believe, accordingly, that the arrangements with Peter Ziegler Pty Ltd are sound and commercial.
...
Don, I say without reservation there is no team anywhere more committed to achieving success. Our people from the top down are as one in the energy, passion, loyalty and experience they bring.
Certainly they are well paid but without exception they could earn this and in many instances significantly more elsewhere. ..."
228 Whether the foreshadowed letter from Mr Bowden was ever sent to these shareholders is not clear. Certainly, none was put into evidence. However, on 17 November 2000, Mr Bowden sent Mr Ziegler for his information a list of shareholder questions and proposed answers to a series of hypothetical questions that shareholders might ask directors about executive salaries at the forthcoming annual general meeting of VRL scheduled for late in November 2000**.** Some of the proposed answers were as follows:
"Question: Payments to Peter Ziegler.
Answer: Peter Ziegler was never an employee of the company, he was a consultant who was also on the Board. Peter created the film financing structure in his capacity as a consultant which has uniquely enabled the group to build a valuable asset for shareholders and considerable future income streams.
The $5.2 million payment to Peter by way of fees was totally performance based, his work for the company is similar to that of an investment banker sourcing funds for the group. Peter raised those funds (US$300m) efficiently and the fees paid to him were less than half of what would be demanded by an investment banking team. Accordingly his efforts represent great value.
With the production profit share, Peter has been the architect behind VRP and its production deals without which the business would not have even got off the ground. We made $16 million last year and are expecting big things from this business in the future.
...
Question: Executive Salaries.
Answer: Executive salaries and bonuses are performance based. Performance is measured on a number of key performance indicators (KPIs) including shareholder value related measures such as earnings per share ...
...
Question: Related party transactions.
Answer: As outlined in our annual report, all transactions are conducted on normal commercial terms on an arms-length basis."
229 At the Annual General Meeting of VRL held on 21 November 2000 Mr John Kirby addressed the shareholders in his capacity as Chairman. Relevantly, he said:
"SALARY MATTERS
Ladies & Gentlemen, Village Roadshow is, in an industry where it is necessary to be, a high paying company. It always has been, and is essential, to create the foundations the company has today. Actually, there wouldn't be such a company as Village Roadshow, but for the founder's tradition of sharing profits and equity with its executives. This is primarily the result of building a small private company into one of note in Australia. The final test for the Board and the Remuneration Committee is however the value added and key performance indicators for the VRL group. There are many other reference points such as market rates and consultant opinions, along with supply and demand factors. These are all used, but the final test is company benefit. And not necessarily in an overall group sense, but more importantly related to key performance indicators or targets in specific areas of responsibility.
Some shareholders have asked me about Bruce Berman and Peter Ziegler's equities in Village Roadshow Pictures and Robert Kirby's equity in our Online Division. Bruce did not just join Village as an employee. Village Roadshow acquired his business which included a significant and valuable development portfolio. Accordingly, as part of this transaction a share in the success of Village Roadshow Pictures was seen as more than reasonable for the very real value Bruce brought to this company. Similarly Peter Ziegler who has always been a consultant to the group has uniquely crafted and put in place nearly $1b low risk funding mechanisms which have enabled the group to build a valuable asset for shareholders and considerable future income streams. Also fees paid to Peter represent considerably less than what would be commanded by an investment banking team and therefore, his efforts represent real value."
The Roadshow Distributors Facility
230 The details of this transaction will be examined later when considering Orrong's claim for a $3.724 million fee for arranging the $75 million facility. It is sufficient at this stage to note that in his witness statement Mr Ziegler said that on 19 January 2001 Mr Burke asked him to begin work on establishing a new limited recourse debt facility for Roadshow Distributors Pty Ltd. That company is 50% owned by VRL and 50% owned by a wholly owned subsidiary of Amalgamated Holdings Ltd. At Mr Ziegler's suggestion, CIBC were approached. In late June 2001, the financing was completed.
231 Mr Ziegler said in his witness statement that on 23 April 2001 he met with Mr Kirby and Mr Burke where the issue of the fees for future non/limited recourse finance raisings for the Village Roadshow Group was discussed. They both told Mr Ziegler that his company should forgo all fees on future finance raisings due to the large amount that had already been paid by way of performance bonuses in the past, and the continuing scrutiny of these payments by VRL shareholders and market analysts. Mr Ziegler said that he replied that he was not prepared for his company to waive any fees or performance bonuses for services performed or to be performed. The specific parts of this conversation which were said to refer to the Roadshow Distributors financing will be examined later when dealing with this particular topic. Mr Ziegler said that he asked whether Mr Kirby and Mr Burke wanted him to stop working on his various tasks. They said no, but asked him to reconsider his stance on performance bonuses. They said that he was being unreasonable, that he was one of the highest paid executives in Australia and that VRL was as a result coming under unwelcome scrutiny. Mr Ziegler reiterated that as the major part of his compensation was performance based, the only reason for the high remuneration was his successful performance which had benefited the Village Roadshow Group.
232 Mr Ziegler and Mr Burke had a similar conversation on the following day. Mr Ziegler refused to waive any entitlement to future performance bonuses for VRL finance raisings.
233 On 6 August 2001, Orrong submitted an invoice to VRL for $3.75 million for its performance bonus of 5% of the limited recourse financing of $75 million arranged for Roadshow Distributors Pty Ltd. Mr Foo rejected the claim. Later in that month Mr Ziegler spoke with Mr Burke about payment of the invoice. Again, the details will be examined later when considering this particular topic.
The 2001 Agreement
234 In his managing director's report for the VRL Board meeting to be held on 29 May 2001, Mr Burke stated:
"Our contract with Peter Ziegler expires June 30 and I have commenced initial discussions for renewal. Peter has made a massive contribution not only in tangible achievements but his prodigious work ethic. While at the same time he is human like all of us and made mistakes. However, his personal P&L to the company is very positive and I am anxious to renew. Given the controversy in the media surrounding payments to Peter Ziegler in the past, the parameters of the proposed conditions will be approved by the Remuneration Committee before any official negotiation. I am confident however the issues will be resolved mutually advantageously."
235 On 14 June 2001, Mr Ziegler attended a meeting with Mr Burke and Mr Kirby at their request to discuss the prospect of a new consultancy arrangement with VRL after the existing agreement ended on 30 June 2001. At that meeting, Mr Burke and Mr Kirby tabled a document headed "PROPOSALS NEW CONSULTANCY AGREEMENT VRL/P ZIEGLER & CO PTY LIMITED" in which the terms of a new five year consultancy agreement were proposed. Included in the document under the heading "Incentives" was the following:
• VRL agreeable PZ sell down pari-passu in event trade sale/IPO.
According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby spoke to each point in the document. Mr Ziegler said only that he would need to take the proposal away, consider it and respond in writing. In concluding the meeting, Mr Kirby said words to the effect that "Peter, you have some negatives. VRP is a problem but you still have a positive balance sheet and we still want you."
236 On 25 June 2001, Mr Ziegler sent a memorandum to Mr Kirby and Mr Burke, offering a new one year consultancy between VRL and his company. On 26 June 2001, Mr Ziegler had a meeting with Mr Kirby and Mr Burke when they went through each of Mr Burke's handwritten points made on a copy of the memorandum dated 25 June 2001. On 27 June 2001, Mr Ziegler had further discussions with Mr Burke about the proposed new agreement which culminated in a verbal agreement. Mr Burke asked Mr Ziegler to put that agreement in writing and to provide Mr Basser with a copy so that Mr Basser could "check it out and sign it off." Mr Ziegler did so the same day by a further memorandum. Mr Basser saw Mr Ziegler and said that he was happy to recommend to Mr Burke to sign the memorandum provided there was one very minor addition made. Mr Ziegler agreed and submitted the redrafted memorandum to Mr Burke with a copy to Mr Basser. Mr Burke came into Mr Ziegler's office a short while later and said that Mr Basser and he were happy with the memorandum. Mr Ziegler and Mr Burke then signed the memorandum as "agreed and accepted." I refer to this agreement hereafter as "the 2001 Agreement."
237 The 2001 Agreement provided that this new consultancy agreement would be on exactly the same terms as the existing consultancy agreement save that:
(a) the retainer would be $1 million per annum;
(b) there would be no termination bonus provision;
(c) the term of the agreement would be 12 months; and
(d) there would be no right to the issue of options.
The 2001 Agreement further provided that Mr Ziegler would resign from the Board of VRC with effect from 20 June 2001 and from the Board of VRF with effect from 1 January 2002. From 1 July 2001 his roles were to be the financial advisor to the Boards of VRP and VRL. It was specifically agreed that the 2001 Agreement was without prejudice to, and did not affect or alter in any way whatsoever, Orrong's (and its employees') rights under the existing consultancy agreement save that Orrong agreed that there was no obligation on VRL to issue options under the existing agreement.
238 In evidence, both Mr Kirby and Mr Burke explained that they were keen to retain Mr Ziegler's services because of the then anticipated problems with the film financing and the ATO. They said that they felt that they needed Mr Ziegler's knowledge of those matters.
239 VRL's Annual Report for the financial year ended 30 June 2001 described VRP as enjoying "a solid year, increasing the number of movies produced and successfully released", which helped the division grow its earnings for the year. It was also stated that VRP would continue to produce 10 to 12 movies a year.
240 The following disclosure was made in the Annual Report:
"During the year, P.A. Ziegler, a former Director, and his directly controlled entities, were paid consulting fees totalling $1,377,216 and a success fee in advance of $4,741,134 relating to the arrangement of an additional non-recourse US$250 million production film financing for the group. A 7.5% film production profit share estimated at $950,012 was accrued to P.A. Ziegler and his directly related entities. Mr Ziegler retains his profit share in the film production division in perpetuity in return for arranging the financing for the ongoing slate of Village Roadshow Production pictures."
241 VRL's 2001 Annual Report was the first to refer to VRL's 15% of international prints and advertising expenditure contingent liability associated with its film financing facility. The relevant note read:
"As part of the financing arrangements for the film production division, the economic entity may be required to contribute a portion of the cumulative international prints and advertising expenditure relating to released films in the event that receipts from film exploitation are insufficient to meet third party investor repayment requirements. If subsequent receipts are sufficient, the economic entity will be repaid any such contributions. While such contributions and subsequent repayments are likely from time to time, based on the films released to 30 June 2001 and the continuation of its business by the division, the Directors do not believe that any material permanent difference will result from this arrangement."
The Breakdown in the Relationship
242 Communication between the parties in October and November 2001 reveal that positions were hardening with respect to Orrong's claims that performance bonuses and the termination bonus under the 1995 Agreement were outstanding. This disputation continued in March and April 2002. Despite the breakdown in the relationship, Mr Kirby and Mr Burke sought to renew the 2001 Agreement which was due to come to an end on 30 June 2002. These attempts failed. Nevertheless, Mr Ziegler said that he told Mr Burke that as Orrong had a 7.5% equity interest in VRP he would be happy to provide limited services in connection with VRP and the proposed transition to the MBIA insurance policy on an ex gratia basis subject to circumstances then permitting.
243 VRL's Annual Report for the financial year ended 30 June 2002 made the following disclosure:
"7.5% film production profit share currently accrues to P.A. Ziegler and his directly related entities."
244 The Annual Report also included the following note:
"As part of the financing arrangements for the Film Production Division, the economic entity may be required to contribute a portion of the cumulative international Prints and Advertising expenditure relating to released films in the event that receipts from film exploitation are insufficient to meet third party investor repayment requirements. If subsequent receipts are sufficient, the economic entity will be repaid any such contributions. While such contributions and subsequent repayments are likely from time to time, based on the films released to 30 June 2002 and the continuation of its business by the division, the Directors do not believe that any material permanent difference will result from this arrangement. As further support for the calculations relating to the financial impact of ultimate film performances, the Company has obtained independent valuations from 3 parties, which support the above statement."
245 According to Mr Ziegler, the final breakdown occurred at a meeting with Mr Burke on 25 March 2003 at VRL's head office in Bourke Street, Melbourne. Mr Burke told Mr Ziegler that there would be no payment to his company on any account whatsoever because it was not entitled to any payment, including the termination bonus. He said that several VRL directors believed that Mr Ziegler had been negligent in the performance of his assignments and that he should be required to arrange a refund to VRL of all performance bonuses and fees that had been received over the nine year period of the engagement. Mr Burke said to Mr Ziegler "I do not share this view. However, it is something that you should be aware of." He produced what he said were two draft "invoices" that had been prepared by VRL to be sent to Mr Ziegler if he intended to pursue any of the outstanding claims. He showed these invoices to Mr Ziegler for a very brief moment and then took them back without him being able to read them in detail.
246 As previously stated, this proceeding was commenced by Orrong on 23 September 2003.
Summary of Payments to Orrong and Remut
247 My analysis of the relevant invoices and other accounting records, including reference to the list of payments under the 1995 and later Agreements exhibited to Ms Raffe's witness statement, reveals the following situation.
248 In the 1996 financial year all invoices were issued by Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd, as Orrong was then called, and all payments, totalling $1,494,953, were made to Orrong. In the 1997 financial year all invoices were issued by Orrong and all payments, totalling $1,617,692, both by way of monthly retainer instalments ($333,330) and performance bonuses ($1,284,362) were made to Orrong.
249 In the 1998 financial year the monthly retainer instalments, which totalled $433,333, were invoiced by and paid to Orrong. The performance bonuses, which totalled $3,093,064,were invoiced by and paid to either the "Remuneration Unit Trust" or "Remut Pty Ltd as trustee for the Remuneration Unit Trust." Included in the figure for performance bonuses was an amount of $300,000 for the 1997 "Annual Bonus ... in connection with Advice on Tax Issues" and for other tax related film finance raisings. The total amount paid to Orrong or at its direction in the 1998 financial year was therefore $3,526,397.
250 In the 1999 financial year the monthly retainer instalments, which totalled $400,000, were invoiced by and paid to Orrong. The other payments, which totalled $2,176,804, were invoiced by and paid to the "Remuneration Unit Trust." Included in the latter figure was a performance bonus of $350,330 for the 1998 "Annual Bonus ... in connection with Advice on Tax Issues", a performance bonus of $601,504 for the raising of the US$16 million equity in Project Ballarat and performance bonuses for other tax related film finance raisings and a payment of $612,937 for a 5.25% share of VRP's profit in the previous financial year. The total amount paid to Orrong or at its direction in the 1999 financial year was therefore $2,576,804.
251 In the 2000 financial year the monthly retainer instalments, which totalled $399,996, and the retrospective increase in the retainer for the 1998, 1999 and 2000 financial years, totalling $455,000, were invoiced by and paid to Orrong. The other payments, which totalled $1,694,693, were invoiced by and paid to the "Remuneration Unit Trust." Included in the latter figure was a performance bonus of $135,850 for the 1999 "Annual Bonus ... in connection with Advice on Tax Issues" and performance bonuses for other tax related film finance raising and a payment of $1,137,038 for a 5.25% share of VRP's profit in the previous financial year. The total amount paid to Orrong or at its direction in the 2000 financial year was therefore $2,549,689.
252 In the 2001 financial year only three monthly retainer instalments, totalling $175,000 not counting reimbursement of expenses, were invoiced by and paid to Orrong. The remaining monthly retainer instalments of $466,667, not counting reimbursement of expenses, and other payments of $11,246,053, were invoiced by and paid to either the "Remuneration Unit Trust" or "Remut Pty Ltd as trustee for the Remuneration Unit Trust." Included in the other payments figure was a performance bonus of $377,585 for the 2000 "Annual Bonus ... in connection with advice provided to the Company, its Subsidiaries, Affiliates & Related Entities", a performance bonus of $5,055,626.99 being 1% of Project Bendigo's US$300 million, a performance bonus of $5,215,247.49 being 1% of Project Castlemaine's US$250 million and performance bonuses for other tax related film finance raising and a payment of $283,000 for a 6.375% share of VRP's profit in the previous financial year. The total amount paid to Orrong or at its direction in the 2001 financial year was therefore $11,887,720.
253 In the 2002 financial year only two monthly retainer instalments, totalling $166,667, apart from reimbursement of expenses, were invoiced by and paid to Orrong. The remaining monthly retainer instalments of $808,333, not counting reimbursement of expenses, and a performance bonus of $55,000 for a tax related film finance raising were paid to the "Remuneration Unit Trust" although actually billed by "Remut Pty Ltd as trustee for the Remuneration Unit Trust." The total amount paid to Orrong or at its direction in the 2002 financial year was therefore $1,030,000.
254 In the 2003 financial year two amounts were invoiced by and paid to "Remut Pty Ltd as trustee for the Remuneration Unit Trust." I have assumed that the first was a payment of the final monthly retainer instalment of $83,333.33, apart from reimbursement of expenses. The second was a payment of $275,000 for "accrued but untaken leave entitlement." The total amount paid to Orrong or at its direction in the 2003 financial year was therefore $358,333.
255 The above information can be summarised in the following table.
256 Orrong's invoices for 7.5% of VRP's operating profit for the financial years ended 30 June 2001 and 30 June 2002 were sent but never paid. A claim for the profit shares in the next two years, 30 June 2003 and 2004, was made in this proceeding.
Employ.doc
257 I now turn to an issue which has not been mentioned in the preceding part in order not to divert for too long a period from the chronological account of the factual background.
258 Mr Ziegler gave evidence that on about 30 June 1993 he entered into a written agreement with Orrong (then known as Commercial and Taxation Services Pty Ltd) ("the 1993 Employment Agreement"). He said that he typed the document himself on his personal computer at home. It had been saved under the name "Employ.doc". The reason for preparing this Agreement was because:
"I wanted to make clear the responsibilities of the company on one hand and me as the provider of the services on the other."
"I wanted to be very clear that in the event of any dispute as to the services rendered that it was Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd that was the contracting party, and that the employee, being me, was not going to be assuming any responsibility."
259 Mr Ziegler also said that the 1993 Employment Agreement was associated with an employee share acquisition scheme. An entry in Mr Ziegler's diary for 24 June 1993 read:
260 Mr Ziegler's evidence was that he conferred with Mr Forsyth QC on 24 June 1993 in relation to his employee share acquisition scheme. Orrong therefore submitted that this diary entry provided a contemporaneous link to the 1993 Employment Agreement which was executed six days later.
261 It was a matter of heated disagreement between the parties whether this Agreement was prepared in 1993, as Mr Ziegler maintained, or much later and backdated, as VRL contended.
262 The existence of the 1993 Employment Agreement only came to light shortly before the hearing commenced, following an ASIC search of Orrong by VRL's solicitors which revealed that two securities registrable as a charge had been created on 3 November 2004 and registered on 17 December 2004. The first was an assignment by Orrong to Mr Ziegler of its interest in this proceeding. The second was a fixed and floating charge granted by Orrong to Mr Ziegler over the proceeds of this litigation. Both documents provided that the security was granted to better secure obligations owing by Orrong to Mr Ziegler under the 1993 Employment Agreement.
263 Despite requests by VRL's solicitors, Orrong refused to discover either the original or a copy of the 1993 Employment Agreement. On 16 March 2005, I ruled that the 1993 Employment Agreement was discoverable. It was relevant to issues such as the identity of the party with whom VRL had contracted and the defences raised under the Legal Practice Act 1996.
264 On the following day Orrong produced an unsigned copy of the 1993 Employment Agreement. When pressed as to what had happened to the original, Mr Ziegler swore in an affidavit that the original of the 1993 Employment Agreement had been taken by the ATO on 6 August 2002, when it had seized documents from VRL and Mr Ziegler, and never returned. VRL asserted that this evidence was false. It pointed out that subsequently, when asked in cross-examination how he knew this Mr Ziegler's answer was: "Because I can't find it now." Further, VRL submitted that a review by an independent firm of solicitors, Coadys, of the contemporaneous record of the documents removed by the ATO revealed that the 1993 Employment Agreement was not referred to in that list.
265 Mr Ziegler's evidence about what had happened to the original of the 1993 Employment Agreement gained some support from the evidence given by Mr Richard Mereine, a partner of Clayton Utz, the solicitors acting for Mr Ziegler at the time of the ATO access visit. Mr Mereine, who was called by VRL, said that the ATO seized 54 boxes of documents and other material from Mr Ziegler's home. The boxes, which contained birthday cards and children's toys as well as documents, were in a "total state of disarray." According to Mr Mereine, it looked as though drawers had been pulled out of desks and the contents just "thrown into boxes." He said that the ATO did not provide any list or inventory of the documents it had seized or of the documents delivered to the offices of Clayton Utz pursuant to the protocol put in place following the seizure. Mr Mereine also said that the ATO did not provide any list or inventory of the documents it had photocopied or scanned and he was not aware of which documents had been photocopied or scanned. The only lists which were prepared were of the documents in respect of which legal professional privilege had been claimed. Mr Mereine further said that the documents returned by the ATO to Clayton Utz were in the same state of disarray and were not listed. Clayton Utz returned them to Mr Ziegler in the same state of disarray.
266 Mr Mereine's evidence, which I accept, also undermined VRL's reliance on the review by Coadys. If the only lists prepared were of the documents in respect of which legal professional privilege had been claimed, then it was not correct for VRL to submit that there was "a contemporaneous record of the documents removed by the ATO." Further, as Orrong submitted, it is apparent from exhibit 32 that Coadys did not review all of the documents seized by the ATO and there was no evidence that the contents of Mr Ziegler's personal computer were included in the electronic media such as floppy disks, zip drives and compact disks searched by Coadys.
267 I therefore reject VRL's submission that Mr Ziegler's explanation for his inability to produce the signed original of the 1993 Employment Agreement was false.
268 On 18 April 2005, after further disputation, I ordered that VRL be given access to the electronic copy of the 1993 Employment Agreement, together with any drafts or copies of it. VRL engaged Mr Richard Williams, an Associate Director of Pricewaterhouse Coopers' Computer Investigations and Forensic Services group to examine the contents of Mr Ziegler's personal computer and its electronic files. Mr Williams produced a number of reports, the final one of which was dated 31 May 2005.
269 Mr Williams' conclusion was as follows:
"The analysis of the FAT 16 behaviour patterns indicates that the file 'EMPLOY.doc' was probably not created in the 'C:\MSWORD' directory during 1993. The file is [sic] most probably created or modified on this system at some point after 1993.
Analysis of the physical location of the file 'EMPLOY.doc' indicates the file was probably created on this hard drive with documents containing hard coded dates of 2003."
270 One of the reasons Mr Williams was not able to be more definitive was that the internal clock on Mr Ziegler's computer was faulty. Indeed, Mr Williams said in evidence that in his experience he had not seen a clock so incorrect as the one on Mr Ziegler's computer. Therefore, it was not possible to identify the date of documents by reference to time data.
271 However, Mr Williams was able to ascertain significant information about the creation of the document named "Employ.doc" from its position in the file directory table and the position of the file in "clusters" of information on the hard drive of the computer. Mr Williams said that, with certain exceptions where files were randomly written to a pre-existing earlier gap on the hard drive, files were allocated to the file directory and to clusters on the hard drive in the order they were created. The files in the directory on Mr Ziegler's computer were generally in chronological order, according to their "hard coded date" or the date written in the text of the document itself, with occasional seemingly random exceptions. This was not the case, however, with the 1993 Employment Agreement and other related documents in the nature of employment agreements. Employ.doc appeared late in the file directory (at position 434 of 566) together with other employment agreements with hard coded dates in 1993 or 2002. The surrounding documents were all dated in late 2003. The employment agreements sat exactly where documents created in late 2003 would be expected to sit within the broad overall pattern of dates from 1991 to 2004. On the other hand, without exception, all documents dated 1993 which were neither privileged nor in the nature of employment agreements appeared in the position in the file directory and hard drive clusters that would be expected of a document created in 1993, having regard to the general trend in the hard coded dates of the documents on the computer.
272 Mr Williams agreed in cross-examination that the operating system on Mr Ziegler's computer, and in particular the FAT 16 file system, only recorded one time and date value, being the time and date that the file was last written to, which could be the date that the file was last modified and not the date that it was created. The FAT 16 file system on Mr Ziegler's computer did not distinguish between those two dates. Mr Williams therefore conceded that he had incorrectly stated in his report that:
"FAT 16 has behaviour patterns in regards to the recording of file information which enable an estimate of file creation dates to be made."
273 The suggestion that a later modification of Employ.doc may have accidentally caused it to be moved in the directory was one of the possibilities put to Mr Williams in cross-examination. Mr Ziegler had given evidence that in recent years he had cut and pasted from Employ.doc "at least a couple of times" while creating other documents. Mr Williams agreed that the process of cutting and pasting could lead to modification of the file. He also agreed that it would be possible for Employ.doc to be "modified" many years after it had been created in a variety of ways which did not result in any visible change to the text of the document. Although his evidence on the point was rather confusing, it seemed to me that Mr Williams accepted that modifying a document could lead to it changing its position in the directory.
274 VRL submitted that Orrong's hypothesis was unlikely because the cutting and pasting would probably have been done in 2002 or earlier and not 2003 because there were no employment agreements dated 2003. Further, all of the employment agreements, Mr Ziegler's 1993 and 2002 contracts and Mrs Ziegler's 1993 and 2002 contracts, were located together in file positions surrounded by documents with hard coded dates in late 2003. VRL submitted that it was implausible that all of these agreements would have been used as a source template for drafting in 2003. One would have been sufficient.
275 Another suggestion put to Mr Williams in cross-examination was that the files happened to land in that space as a quirk of replacing the hard drive and copying over the files. Mr Williams gave evidence that the hard drive he found on Mr Ziegler's computer had been manufactured after 1995, so it could not have been the original. Mr Ziegler had given evidence that the hard drive may have been replaced three or four times. Mr Williams agreed that there were many ways of copying a disk, that he did not know the way or ways Mr Ziegler's files were copied from one hard drive to another, that there was a certain unpredictability in the way in which files were copied and that it was possible that the resulting position on the new hard drive of Employ.doc could be just a quirk of the copying process from one hard drive to another.
276 VRL pointed out that Mr Williams had also said that generally the copying was done in a structured manner, reproducing the data in the way it appeared on the disk, copying it cluster for cluster. It therefore submitted that it was implausible that a copying quirk could explain the order of the documents on Mr Ziegler's computer.
277 A third suggestion put to Mr Williams in cross-examination was that the computer allocated a position in an available space in the hard drive clusters away from the other 1993 files on a random basis. Mr Williams agreed that where a file was deleted from the hard drive, the operating system not only freed the directory table entry previously allocated to that file, it also freed up all of the clusters on the hard drive disk which contained parts of that file, that where an existing file was modified and it was written to the disk recently freed up clusters on the hard drive were available to hold the newly saved file and that this operated in a manner analogous to using the directory slot in the directory table. He also said that there was "no rhyme or reason" why the computer would sometimes fill in spaces and sometimes not.
278 VRL submitted that Mr Williams had given evidence that while files could be randomly slotted into earlier gaps on a hard drive, the computer would not skip over empty space to randomly occupy a much later position. I agree that Mr Williams gave this evidence. However, I do not agree with the conclusion which VRL sought to draw from it, which was that this hypothesis could not explain the presence of the 1993 and 2002 employment agreements existing among files dated 2003 and that it would only explain their position if they were among files dated prior to 1993. This conclusion is only correct if the hypothesis about later modification and replacement of the hard drive are completely ignored. Otherwise, one or both of those suggestions could give credence to the random misallocation into available space suggestion.
279 I agree with VRL's submission that notwithstanding the concessions Mr Williams made in cross-examination about possibilities, the cross-examiner never challenged his conclusion, nor asked Mr Williams whether, in the light of the possibilities which he conceded, he had changed or in any way varied his opinion. Mr Williams was clearly both honest and expert in giving his opinion evidence. Orrong accepted in its final submissions that his evidence was "generally presented in a balanced and measured fashion." All in all, Mr Williams was an impressive witness. Nevertheless, I am not satisfied to the appropriate standard of proof that Employ.doc was not created in 1993 and that Mr Ziegler was accordingly giving false evidence when he said that this was when he prepared the 1993 Employment Agreement. Mr Williams failed to persuade me that one or more of the three suggested explanations for the location of Employ.doc was not more likely than not to be correct.
280 I am strengthened in this conclusion by the lack of any apparent motive for Mr Ziegler to belatedly prepare an employment agreement between Orrong and himself and to back date it. In its final written submissions VRL suggested that Employ.doc may have been created "in an attempt to bolster Orrong's case against VRL or to bolster Orrong's and Ziegler's case in relation to disputes with the ATO."
281 Orrong described this contention as "fanciful." As Orrong pointed out, if the document was created in order to bolster Orrong's case against VRL, why did Orrong not discover it rather than waiting on the off chance that VRL would learn of its existence and demand its production? And why did Orrong so doggedly resist its production? If the document was created for use against the ATO, then as Orrong also pointed out, how could Mr Ziegler explain to the ATO the sudden appearance of a 1993 agreement when the ATO had, as VRL maintained, seized every document in Mr Ziegler's possession in August 2002. Neither reason strikes me as a likely explanation and I am therefore left in the situation that Mr Ziegler had no apparent motive to produce this false document.
282 One final matter must be noted. As VRL pointed out, whenever it was prepared, it was significant that the agreement between his company and himself which Mr Ziegler drafted was far more detailed and precisely expressed than the exchange of correspondence between Mr Foo and Mr Ziegler constituting the 1993 Agreement. The same observation applies to the 1995 Agreement.
283 Following this lengthy introduction I now turn to consider the various legal issues arising out of Orrong's claim and VRL's defence and counterclaim.
The Contracting Parties
284 In its defence and counterclaim, VRL pleaded that the 1993 Agreement and what it called "the 1995 Extension Agreement" were made by it with Orrong "and/or" Mr Ziegler. In its reply and defence to counterclaim, Orrong pleaded that these references were "vague and embarrassing" and "ought to be struck out." No such application was ever made and VRL has maintained throughout the proceeding that it is a real issue whether Orrong was the proper plaintiff. Obviously, if the pleaded causes of action belong to Mr Ziegler and not Orrong, then Orrong's claim, as presently framed, must fail.
285 Thus, the first legal issue to be decided is who were the contracting parties to the 1995 Agreement and subsequent Agreements. In its closing submissions VRL submitted that there were a number of possibilities in respect of this issue. The 1995 Agreement could be between VRL and Orrong, or between VRL and Mr Ziegler, or between VRL and both Orrong and Mr Ziegler jointly or between VRL and Orrong with the agreement providing for some benefits payable to Orrong and some payable to Mr Ziegler.
286 VRL's primary position was that both the 1993 Agreement and the 1995 Agreement were between it and Mr Ziegler. It submitted that the 1993 and 1995 correspondence bore the hallmarks characteristic of a relationship between VRL and Mr Ziegler personally, rather than VRL and Orrong. VRL pointed to provisions in both agreements such as holiday pay, reimbursement of all out of pocket expenses including travelling costs and entertainment expenses and reimbursement of all motor vehicle running costs as indicative of the personal relationship. It also pointed to the requirements in the 1993 Agreement for provision of "a personal computer" and for payment of "annual professional subscriptions and attendance at conferences and educational courses" as appropriate only for Mr Ziegler. Even the retainer to "my consultancy company" was in the form of a package to be taken in the case of the 1993 Agreement "by cash, 'Menzies' arrangement, motor vehicle, superannuation etc" and in the case of the 1995 Agreement "by cash, employee share scheme arrangement, motor vehicle, superannuation, etc." VRL submitted that these were personal matters. The "Menzies" arrangement was a "personalised share plan", according to Mr Ziegler.
287 VRL also emphasised the personal language used by Mr Ziegler in that correspondence. In the letter of 12 May 1993 Mr Ziegler said that he confirmed "my acceptance of the proposed arrangements" (emphasis added). In the letter of 2 October 1995 he used language such as "the continuation of my consultancy arrangements with VRL post-June 30, 1996", "all future allocations of VRL share options to PAZ to be determined by applying PAZ's existing VRL option holding", "these options to be issued to PAZ", "for this purpose PAZ has a proportionate interest" and "PAZ to receive a termination bonus" (emphasis added). In the letter of 27 November 1995 he again referred to "the continuation of my consultancy arrangements with VRL" and talked about "PAZ's contract termination bonus", "PAZ to be provided with $5 million death and $5 million disability insurance", the profit arising from any "notional" allocation of options to be "paid to me on the relevant option exercise dates" and confirmed "my present entitlement to 4% of the net profit of the Village Roadshow Creative Trust" (emphasis added). VRL also relied on such statements as "I regard this move as a major career opportunity to join an exciting organisation ..." in his letter of 12 May 1993 and "I would like to say how pleased I am with my offer of appointment as an Alternate Director of VRL. This appointment should enable me to better represent the VRL Group in seeking to achieve its objectives. At the same time, it demonstrates career progression from a personal perspective - an attribute to which I accord high priority" in his letter of 2 October 1995 and "I am pleased to be going forward on the basis of being truly, to quote your words 'one of us.' This gives me both personal and financial comfort for my future" in his letter of 27 November 1995.
288 VRL also relied on the language used by Mr Ziegler when giving evidence. For example, it was said that during cross-examination Mr Ziegler used the phrase "my contract" on 18 occasions and "my consultancy" on three occasions. In evidence in chief, when referring to the September 1997 negotiations with Mr Kirby, Mr Ziegler stated that he said to Mr Kirby that the 5% performance bonus was "definitely covered by my agreement" (emphasis added), and that in response to a challenge by Mr Kirby about non-disclosure Mr Ziegler drew the distinction between the "arm's length fees to third parties" and "my performance bonuses" (emphasis added).
289 Subsequent correspondence between the parties was also relied on by VRL in support of its contention that the 1993 and 1995 Agreements were between VRL and Mr Ziegler. It drew attention to three memoranda written by Mr Ziegler in the course of the March 1998 negotiations. The first two, dated 1 March 1998 and 3 March 1998 were headed "Amendment to PAZ Remuneration Arrangements." The proposed remuneration arrangement included "purchase of motor vehicle of PAZ choice", and made reference to "other benefits contained in PAZ's consultancy agreement." The 4 March 1998 memorandum was entitled "Summary of Existing PAZ Remuneration Arrangements." None of the documents made any reference to Orrong.
290 VRL also emphasised that when it came to the 2000 Agreement the language employed again referred to Mr Ziegler in his personal capacity. For instance, the heading to the letter dated 21 June 2000 from Mr Foo to Mr Ziegler referred to "Your Contract"; in paragraph 1 of the letter Mr Foo said "given the chequered history of your contractual arrangement" and subsequently used the phrase "your contract"; in paragraph 2 of the letter Mr Foo said "you will be entitled to your 2.25% of VRP immediately" and used the phrase "you will be entitled" later in the same paragraph; and in paragraph 4 of the letter Mr Foo used the phrases "your base retainer" and "your salary." VRL pointed out that Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd, ("PZ&Co"), as Orrong was then known, was referred to in only one of the ten paragraphs contained in the letter, and that Mr Ziegler signed the agreement in his personal capacity. However, this submission ignores the fact that in Mr Ziegler's letter of 30 May 2000, the consultancy agreement is constantly referred to as one between "VRL" and "PZ & Co" (at least 15 times) with at least another 18 references to "PZ & Co."
291 Finally, VRL submitted that two other agreements executed by Mr Ziegler contradicted his assertion that Orrong was the contracting party with VRL in the 1993 and 1995 Agreements. The first, which was prepared by Mr Ziegler, was an "Employment Agreement" between VRC as "the Company", Mr Ziegler as "the Consultant" and VRL as "the Principal" dated 7 April 1994, but said to have effect from 19 November 1993 ("the VRC Employment Agreement"). Recital B stated that VRC "wished to secure the services" of Mr Ziegler as an employee for VRC for the purposes of its business. By the agreement VRC undertook to employ Mr Ziegler as an executive of VRC "for the remainder of the period of his current consultancy agreement with" VRL and thereafter until such consultancy was "determined", Mr Ziegler accepted such employment and VRL consented to the arrangement. The purpose of this agreement may be gleaned from the statement recorded in Recital D that "as a condition" of the agreement Mr Ziegler had at or prior to the date of effect of the agreement transferred to VRC all his interest in the VRL options issued to him pursuant to the 1993 VRL Executive and Employee's Option Plan and from the method of calculating the amount of Mr Ziegler's remuneration which centred around option exercise prices and which was payable within 30 days of each option exercise date. Mr Ziegler said that he was paid all of this remuneration in cash.
292 The second agreement, which was prepared by VRL's then solicitors, Herbert Geer & Rundle, was executed on an unknown date, but was said to have effect from 6 May 1995. It was between Mr Ziegler as "the Employee", VRC as "the Company" and VRL as "the Present Employer." This agreement ("the VRL Employment Agreement") was said to be made:
"On The Basis That:
A. The Employee is an employee of the Present Employer.
B. By agreement made with effect from 19 November 1993, the Present Employer, the Employee and the Company amended the terms of the then existing employment agreement or relationship between the Employee, the Present Employer and the Company ..."
Recital C then went on to again record that Mr Ziegler had transferred to VRC all his interest in VRL options previously issued to him.
293 VRL submitted that each of these agreements, made after May 1993 and having effect prior to November 1995, was consistent only with Mr Ziegler being an employee of VRL and the person with whom VRL had relevantly contracted and was inconsistent with the assertion that Orrong was the consultant. VRL further submitted that Mr Ziegler's evidence in respect of these two agreements was unsatisfactory. It was said that this was because he tried unsuccessfully to find a path between the only two possible, but equally unhelpful to him, explanations of these two agreements. Either they were false or they correctly recorded the relationship.
294 Before being taken to these agreements, Mr Ziegler agreed in cross-examination that he was not "a consultant or an employee of VRL", and that to maintain in any document for any purpose that he was would have been false. When asked the point of the VRC Employment Agreement, Mr Ziegler's first response was that:
"The intended purpose of the agreement was for VRL to agree that I as an individual could provide services to Village Roadshow Corporation Limited."
He agreed that he was a free agent, but said that he "wanted to put it beyond doubt that there would be no conflict of interest between VRL and VRC." This seems to me to be an unlikely explanation.
295 Mr Ziegler then gave evidence that Recital B in the VRC Employment Agreement was true because VRC wanted to make him its employee:
"to make sure that any payment that it made in connection with the options which are referred to in this agreement would be an allowable outgoing for it."
He agreed that the purpose of the agreement was "to facilitate suitable tax treatment" for VRC and that "it was tax driven or tax planned." He also agreed that he advised the Village Roadshow Group executives to enter into this agreement.
296 Mr Ziegler agreed that Recitals A and B of the VRL Employment Agreement "would appear to be incorrect." He was unable to explain the reason for the existence of this agreement, except to point out, correctly, that it was similar to the VRC Employment Agreement and that he thought it was made for the same reason. Mr Ziegler agreed that the VRL Employment Agreement had beneficial tax consequences for both VRC and him, but resisted the suggestion that this was why he had been prepared to be a party to an agreement which contained false statements. He said:
"I don't knowingly execute documents which I know to be wrong, or untrue, false or whatever."
Mr Ziegler further said that at the time he did not turn his attention to the question of whether it was he or Orrong who had contracted with VRL.
297 I cannot accept Mr Ziegler's claims of innocence. I find that he must have known that these two short and simple agreements falsely stated that he was a consultant or employee of VRL. This is particularly the case with the VRC Employment Agreement which he drafted, but the VRL Employment Agreement clearly recited the incorrect relationship and Mr Ziegler was prepared to execute it.
298 On the other hand, the existence of these agreements does no credit to those at VRL involved in their execution, such as Mr Foo, who also must have known that it did not accurately represent, what I consider to have clearly been, the actual situation. The desire to minimise tax, it would seem, ruled supreme.
299 Nevertheless, despite the existence of these agreements, I cannot accept the submission that the 1993 and 1995 Agreements were made between VRL and Mr Ziegler. It simply cannot stand in the face of Mr Foo's introduction of the concept of payment of a retainer fee to Mr Ziegler's "new consultancy company" in his letter of 4 May 1993, Mr Ziegler's acceptance of a "consultancy fee package" for his "new consultancy company" in his letter of 12 May 1993 and the heading of both letters dated 2 October and 27 November 1995, namely:
"Continuation of Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd Consultancy Agreement with Village Roadshow Limited ('VRL') July 1, 1996 - June 30, 2001."
300 Further, in a letter dated 3 February 2004 from Mr Tony Pane, VRL's Tax Counsel, to the ATO the position was unequivocally adopted by VRL that the ATO was not correct to treat Mr Ziegler as an employee of VRL for withholding tax and fringe benefits tax purposes. Mr Pane said:
"At all material times my client has considered itself as contracting with Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd (formerly Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd) in relation to the provision of consultancy services by Mr Ziegler. The agreements referred to in the position paper represent agreements entered into with Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd and do not represent employment agreements entered into with Mr Ziegler. While the terms of the first two mentioned agreements are evidenced by correspondence between officers of my client and Mr Ziegler, it was my client's position that Mr Ziegler was corresponding on behalf of Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd and both parties have always conducted themselves on the basis that it was Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd who was the relevant party to the consultancy agreement with my client."
As Orrong pointed out, it is significant that this letter was written after this proceeding commenced.
301 I discount the importance of the expressions used by Mr Ziegler in the correspondence. In my opinion, these statements were nothing more than a recognition by Mr Ziegler that he was going to be working for the Village Group, albeit with his services being provided through a consultancy agreement rather than being in an employee contractual relationship.
302 I accept Mr Ziegler's evidence that he and Mr Foo had discussed on 4 May 1993 that the new relationship between VRL and Mr Ziegler could be put into effect by means of a consultancy company. Mr Foo's letter of that date makes it clear that this subject had already been discussed and agreed. I reject Mr Foo's evidence that he told Mr Ziegler that the arrangement could be structured however he liked and that there was no further discussion about the issue. I also reject Mr Kirby's evidence that "no corporate vehicle was mentioned." Clearly there was reference to a corporate vehicle in all of the 1993 and 1995 correspondence.
303 The more difficult question remains whether, even though the 1993 and 1995 Agreements were made between VRL and Orrong, some of the benefits were to be paid to Mr Ziegler personally. VRL submitted that the employee share options were an obvious example of a benefit to Mr Ziegler personally. VRL further submitted that, although it was not expressly spelt out in the 1993 and 1995 Agreements whether the performance bonuses were payable to Orrong or to Mr Ziegler, it was quite clear that the termination bonus was not payable to Orrong given that the provision commenced:
"PAZ to receive a termination bonus of [3] times his average performance bonus ..." [emphasis added]
In addition, VRL submitted that this provision suggested that the performance bonuses were also payable to Mr Ziegler and not Orrong, given the reference to "his average performance bonus."
304 I consider that the frequent references to "PAZ" and to personal pronouns are no more than sloppy drafting or careless use of language. Given the obvious reasons behind the introduction of Orrong as the contracting party, it would have been quite illogical then to provide that any performance bonuses or termination bonus would be paid not to Orrong but to Mr Ziegler. It seems to me that in using this language Mr Ziegler fell into an error commonly made by non-lawyers of failing to distinguish between himself and his corporate alter ego. As a lawyer Mr Ziegler should have been more precise. The employee share options were an exception to the rule that the benefits were to be received by Orrong, no doubt because the eligibility for the same was said to arise "as if an employee of VRL."
305 VRL also drew attention to the manner in which it was invoiced for performance bonuses. It referred, by way of example, to the various ways in which the "taxes saved" component of the performance bonus was billed using Mr Ziegler's name:
(a) the invoices for the financial years ending 30 June 1994 and 30 June 1995 were issued by "Peter Ziegler (Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd)";
(b) the invoices for the financial years ending 30 June 1997, 30 June 1998, 30 June 1999 and 30 June 2000 were issued by "Remuneration Unit Trust (Peter A Ziegler)"; and
(c) the invoices for the annual bonus for the financial years ending 30 June 2001 and 30 June 2002 were issued by "Remut Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Remuneration Unit Trust (Peter A Ziegler)."
306 However, I do not consider that the fee billing and payment arrangements really assists resolution of this question. The inclusion of Mr Ziegler's name on the invoices was, in my opinion, no more than a form of identification for VRL's internal purposes. Further, as the above analysis of the relevant invoices and other accounting records under the 1995 and later Agreements indicates, prior to 30 June 1997 all invoices were issued by, and all payments were made to, Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd, as Orrong was then known. (With two possible exceptions, this was also the situation under the 1993 Agreement. The first possible exception was the payment of the February 1995 invoice from "Peter Ziegler (Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd)" for $378,440, for three performance bonuses including the annual bonus for "taxes saved" in the 1994 financial year, which in accordance with the request on the invoice was possibly made to Pierce Bay Pty Ltd, which was another of Mr Ziegler's companies and which was the predecessor of Remut as the recipient of the personalised employee share plan subscriptions. The second possible exception was the payment of the August 1995 invoice from "Peter Ziegler (Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd)" for $253,750, for five performance bonuses, which in accordance with the request on the invoice was to be made to Mr Ziegler personally. However, VRL's records would suggest that it was in fact paid to Orrong.) It was not until the 1998 financial year that any payments were made to the "Remuneration Unit Trust" or to "Remut Pty Ltd as trustee for the Remuneration Unit Trust."
307 It seems to me, therefore, that insofar as one can gain any relevant assistance from this history, it shows that initially the parties treated the monthly retainers and performance bonuses as payable to Orrong, thus indicating that it was the party entitled to receive them under the 1995 Agreement, and that subsequently although these amounts were all payable to Orrong, at the request of Mr Ziegler, acting on behalf of Orrong, they were paid by VRL and other companies in the Village Roadshow Group to the Remuneration Unit Trust or Remut Pty Ltd as trustee for that Trust.
308 Therefore, in my opinion, the performance bonuses and any termination bonus were all payable to Orrong and not Mr Ziegler.
The Termination Bonus
309 It is clear that the construction of the termination bonus term of the 1995 Agreement is one of the most important issues in this dispute. Not surprisingly the provision received considerable attention. Orrong's position was that the 1995 Agreement terminated on 30 June 2001, because it came to an end or expired by the effluxion of time on that date. VRL disputed that the term applied in this circumstance. It submitted that the termination bonus was only payable when the contract was terminated early "for any reason" including death but excluding gross misconduct.
310 Before dealing with the question of construction of the written term it is necessary to consider whether there was any oral agreement or discussion concerning the termination bonus being payable on the expiration of the 1995 Agreement. In his witness statement Mr Ziegler said that he had specifically discussed with Mr Kirby and Mr Burke in the 26 September 1995 conversation that he required a termination bonus payable on the expiration of the term of the contract. He said that he introduced the requirement as the price to be paid by VRL for him agreeing to a five year term rather than his preferred three year term. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Kirby and Mr Burke agreed with this requirement.
311 This evidence was disputed by both Mr Kirby and Mr Burke. They denied that there had been any discussion about the termination bonus being payable at the end of the five year term. They said that the termination bonus was raised by Mr Ziegler in the context of him expressing concern that if he committed himself to VRL, one of them might get shot or the company be taken over and he would find himself out of a job before the end of the agreed five year term. Both Mr Kirby and Mr Burke stated that it was their understanding and intention that the termination bonus would only be payable if Mr Ziegler died or VRL terminated the agreement before the expiration of its term. However, Mr Kirby conceded that he said that he wanted to ensure that Mr Ziegler would be there for the "long haul".
312 The evidence of Mr Kirby and Mr Burke was that the object of the termination bonus provision was to protect Mr Ziegler in the unlikely event that he was sacked or fired during the course of the agreement. Mr Kirby's evidence was that Mr Ziegler repeatedly emphasised that the clause was designed to give Mr Ziegler "protection for me and my family" in the event of an "early severance." Mr Kirby and Mr Burke both said that Mr Ziegler described the termination bonus provision as a "standard" clause. Further, they both said that they would not have agreed to the termination bonus provision had Mr Ziegler suggested at the time that it was payable upon expiry. Mr Kirby said "at no stage during the meeting did Ziegler say that the termination bonus was payable when the agreement expired naturally, and I did not believe it had such an effect; nor did I intend it to do so." Mr Burke expressed a view that "it would not have made commercial sense to pay him a bonus just on the expiry of his agreement, and I would not have agreed to it."
313 VRL pointed out that if Mr Ziegler had said the words alleged and received the assent of Mr Kirby and Mr Burke, one would have certainly expected, given Mr Ziegler's history of recording the details of conversations, to have seen this clearly spelt out in his letter of 2 October 1995. But it was not. Instead, there was the potentially ambiguous reference to payment of the bonus "upon the termination of this contract".
314 It is difficult to think of a more critical conversation from the plaintiff's perspective, because if Mr Ziegler was correct in saying that Mr Kirby and Mr Burke had specifically agreed to payment of the termination bonus on the expiration of the five year period then the construction question disappears and the termination bonus is clearly payable. Mr Ziegler agreed that it was a "critical meeting". However, it was not until the first version of Mr Ziegler's witness statement was served on 11 March 2005 that there was any reference made in any document to this alleged part of the conversation.
315 VRL emphasised the absence of any such reference in the pleadings in this proceeding. The 1995 Agreement was pleaded in paragraph 3 of the original statement of claim. The particulars given were that the 1995 Agreement was partly in writing and partly oral. The letters dated 2 October and 27 November 1995 were referred to as was a conversation between Mr Ziegler and Mr Kirby and Mr Burke on 26 September 1995, the material substance of which "was to the same effect as the letter of 2 October 1995", and conversations between Mr Ziegler and Mr Kirby on or about 23 or 24 November 1995 and 27 November 1995, the material substance of which "was to the same effect as the letter of 27 November 1995."
316 When asked for the usual further and better particulars of these conversations, Orrong responded on 11 November 2003 by simply repeating the particulars already given.
317 VRL served its defence and counterclaim on 15 December 2003. Paragraph 4(1)(c) of the defence pleaded that it was a term of the 1995 Agreement that the termination bonus would be paid "in the event of early termination of the agreement prior to the expiry of its term." The particulars given were the letters of 2 October 1995 and 27 and 30 November 1995.
318 Paragraph 42 of VRL's counterclaim pleaded that there was a common intention that the termination bonus "would only be paid where the agreement was terminated before the expiration of its term and that it would not be payable" in circumstances where the agreement came to an end by reason of the effluxion of time. The particulars given referred to the conversations between Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby and Mr Burke in about October 1995 and to "the absence of any suggestion" by Mr Ziegler at or before the time of entering into the 1995 Agreement that the termination bonus was or might be payable upon the expiration of the agreement by the effluxion of time. Paragraph 45 of the counterclaim pleaded representations by Orrong and Mr Ziegler about the termination bonus to the above effect and paragraph 52 pleaded that those representations constituted conduct that was misleading and deceptive.
319 Orrong, in its reply and defence to counterclaim dated 23 December 2003, and Mr Ziegler, in his defence to counterclaim dated 11 February 2004, simply denied the above allegations. That is, there was no positive response by Orrong or Mr Ziegler to the allegation that prior to the making of the 1995 Agreement there had been no "suggestion" that the termination bonus would or might be payable upon the expiration of the agreement by the effluxion of time.
320 I cannot accept that the pleaders would not have expressly referred to this alleged discussion about the termination bonus rather than simply denying VRL's allegations if such information had been contained in their instructions. While Mr Ziegler several times said that he was "guided by my lawyers as to what went into those documents", it seemed to me that he carefully refrained from saying that he had told his lawyers about the alleged conversation at the time the pleadings were drawn. This suggests to me that Mr Ziegler had yet to give any instructions about his agreement with Mr Kirby and Mr Burke concerning payment of the termination bonus on the expiration of the agreement by the effluxion of time.
321 Despite various amendments to the pleadings throughout 2004 and despite VRL giving further and better particulars of its defence and counterclaim on 23 April 2004 which made it quite clear that VRL was alleging that Mr Ziegler did not state or suggest to Mr Kirby and Mr Burke prior to the making of the 1995 Agreement that the termination bonus was payable upon the expiration of the agreement by the effluxion of time, neither Orrong nor Mr Ziegler amended their defences to VRL's counterclaim to specifically plead that such a statement was made at the time by Mr Ziegler.
322 I have set out the relevant parts of the pleadings in some detail because I consider that the omission of any mention of the alleged discussion to be quite significant. I agree with Orrong's submission that it should be remembered that the omission was only from pleadings and not some earlier statement by Mr Ziegler. Nevertheless, I do find that it is troubling that the first reference to this issue did not occur until March 2005.
323 In cross-examination Mr Ziegler was challenged to point to any contemporaneous document where he had referred to his alleged discussion. He identified two documents. The first was his memorandum to Mr Kirby dated 4 March 1998 headed "Summary of Existing PAZ Remuneration Arrangements." In my opinion, there was nothing in this document which provided any support for Mr Ziegler's evidence. Indeed, the document actually drew a distinction between "Expiry Date" and "Termination Bonus."
324 The second document identified by Mr Ziegler was his memorandum to Mr Wilson dated 5 September 2000. The particular passage relied on by Mr Ziegler was as follows:
"PZ & Co considers that expiration of its contract through the passage of time is (and was considered by the parties at the time of the negotiation to be) the most likely manner by which the termination of its contract with VRL will occur and falls correctly within the ambit of the clause."
Whilst Mr Ziegler thought that this could not have been said "any clearer", he did not mention that he had discussed, and reached agreement on, this topic with Mr Kirby and Mr Burke. Thus, after referring to VRL's view on when the termination bonus was payable, Mr Ziegler stated in his memorandum to Mr Wilson that:
"PZ & Co rejects this interpretation as being totally baseless, and without any foundation whatsoever." (Emphasis added)
325 It is true that Mr Ziegler went on in his memorandum to say that:
"PZ & Co asserts that the Termination Bonus was proffered by VRL as an inducement for the Company to continue its consultancy arrangement for a further five year period upon the expiration of the three year term of the original agreement on June 30 1996. ..."
But, as VRL submitted, one would have expected that sentence to be followed by a reference in the memorandum to Mr Wilson to the discussion in which Mr Ziegler told Mr Kirby and Mr Burke that the termination bonus was payable at the end of the contract. Mr Ziegler eventually conceded that you would not find such a reference "in those clear terms." The absence of any such reference is telling, in my opinion.
326 I have, therefore, concluded that there was no discussion between the parties concerning the question of whether or not the termination bonus was payable on the expiration of the agreement by the effluxion of time.
327 This means that it is necessary to construe what objectively[6] was meant by the relevant paragraph in the letter of 2 October 1995, as amended by the change noted in the letter of 27 November 1995. With that alteration, the provision read as follows:
"Termination Bonus
PAZ to receive a termination bonus of [3] times his average performance bonus over the three preceding financial years upon the termination of this contract for any reason (including death) other than, of course, gross misconduct resulting in termination."
328 It was common ground between the parties that in construing the termination bonus, regard could be had to the relevant surrounding circumstances.[7]
329 The construction issue is whether "termination for any reason" includes termination by expiry or effluxion of time, as maintained by Orrong. VRL submitted that Orrong's construction was wrong. First, it was submitted that the letter did not say that the bonus was payable "upon termination"; it said "upon termination for any reason." Thus a "reason" is required. It was not sufficient that the 1995 Agreement merely ran its course. VRL submitted that effluxion of time was not "a reason."
330 Secondly, VRL submitted that the expression "the termination of this contract for any reason (including death) and other than, of course, gross misconduct resulting in termination" referred to two "reasons." One "reason" ("death") was included and another "reason" ("gross misconduct resulting in termination") was excluded. Both were "events." The effluxion of time was not an event. Furthermore, VRL submitted, both of the reasons referred to were reasons that relevantly occurred before the expiration of the term of the agreement. The termination bonus would not be payable if Mr Ziegler died after the expiration of the agreement. Equally termination for gross misconduct involved termination during the term of the agreement. Therefore, the "termination" with which the clause was concerned was termination before the due date for expiry.
331 One of the reasons why I consider that the termination bonus was not payable on the expiration of the agreement by the effluxion of time is that the agreement refers to the five year contractual period "ending June 30, 2001" as well as referring to "termination for any reason." In accordance with the principle that where the parties have used different words in the one agreement it is presumed that they intended to refer to different things, the difference in terminology suggests to me that the draftsman, Mr Ziegler, saw a distinction between a contract ending or expiring at the end of an agreed period and "termination." It is interesting to note, however, that in his memorandum to the proposed arbitrator, Mr Wilson, dated 18 May 2000, explaining the disagreements between Orrong and VRL, Mr Ziegler referred to the termination bonus:
"being the amount payable by VRL on the termination or expiry of the consultancy agreement on June 30, 2001."
332 Further, in his memorandum to Mr Foo dated 30 May 2000, Mr Ziegler stated that:
"PZ & Co's termination bonus is triggered upon the expiration or other termination of PZ & Co's existing contract with VRL, i.e. assuming PZ & Co's contract runs its course, June 30, 2001."
333 It should be noted that in the Menzies Employment Agreement, the draftsperson had drawn the distinction between early "termination" of the agreement for cause and "expiration of the Term" of five years, both of which could result in the agreement coming to an end. Mr Ziegler had referred to the "Menzies arrangement" in his 1993 correspondence. He also relied on the existence of the Menzies "Employee Termination Profit Share" as a prior example of VRL agreeing to pay something like his termination bonus, because it was payable "forthwith upon termination of" the Profit Share Agreement. However, that agreement was able to be terminated by either side giving notice in writing immediately upon "the expiration of the Term of the Employment Agreement" or "the date of lawful termination of the Employment Agreement" pursuant to its provisions by either the employer or the employee. Thus, the distinction between "termination" and "expiration" was maintained in the drafting of the Menzies Profit Share Agreement.
334 Mr Ziegler did not draw the same distinction in drafting the 1995 Agreement, if his version is to be accepted. VRL submitted that if there were any ambiguity, then this brought into play the contra proferentum rule.
335 I consider that it has to be accepted that the use of the word "termination" was unclear. Courts have held the words "terminate" or "termination" to be ambiguous. They may have a number of meanings, depending on context. In Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [8], Lord Radcliffe said that:
" 'Terminate' is an ambiguous word, since it may refer to a termination by a right under the agreement or by a condition incorporated in it or by a deliberate breach by one party amounting to a repudiation of the whole contract."
336 In R v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte Kahn[9], the employer failed to "confirm" the "renewal" of the appointment of a medical assistant. The contract provided that the appointment was for 2 years "reviewable, subject to confirmation, for an indefinite period." The Court of Appeal held that this was not a "termination." Lord Denning MR said:
"The rival arguments are nicely balanced. I think that the word 'terminate' or 'termination' is by itself ambiguous. It can refer to either of two things - either to termination by notice or to termination by effluxion of time. It is often used in that dual sense in landlord and tenant and in master and servant cases. But there are several indications in this paragraph to show that it refers here only to termination by notice. (1) The main heading speaks of 'Notice of Termination.' (2) The cross-heading is 'Representations against dismissal.' (3) The words 'is being unfairly terminated' point to some positive action on the part of the board by way of termination, such as by giving notice or shutting him out, as distinct altogether from an automatic coming to an end. (4) The words 'the Board's decision to terminate the appointment' are to the same effect. (5) The words 'before the expiry of the notice given' contemplate that the employment will be terminated by notice, and not by an automatic ending."[10]
337 VRL submitted that the third of these "indications" was particularly applicable here because all of the references to "termination" pointed "to some positive action on the part of [VRL] by way of termination ... as distinct altogether from an automatic coming to an end."
338 In Kahn, Buckley LJ (who with Karminski LJ agreed with Lord Denning) added:
"As counsel for the Secretary of State has pointed out, the verb 'terminate' can be used either transitively or intransitively. A contract may be said to terminate when it comes to an end by effluxion of time, or it may be said to be terminated when it is determined at notice or otherwise by some act of one of the parties. Here in my judgment the word 'terminated' is used ... in the transitive sense, and it postulates some act by somebody which is to bring the appointment to an end, and is not applicable to a case in which the appointment comes to an end merely by effluxion of time."[11]
339 VRL submitted that this was the case here too, having regard to the context especially the references to death and gross misconduct.
340 The need to refer to the context was emphasised by Northrop J in Victoria v Australian Teachers' Union[12]. His Honour noted:
"The word 'terminate' is defined to mean, in the relevant sense 'to bring to an end, put an end to.' This definition is given in both the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and the Macquarie Dictionary. Essentially the word 'terminate' means to bring to an end. Of itself, the word is not determinative of how the end is brought about. It is neutral in this regard. In this respect the word 'terminate' is ambiguous. Its true meaning can only be ascertained from the context in which it appears_._"
341 "Termination" was also found to have a transitive sense and to postulate "some act by the employer which brings the employment to an end" in Teachers' Pensions Agency v Hill[13].
342 In Victoria v The Commonwealth (The Industrial Relations Act Case)[14] the High Court of Australia was concerned with statutory provisions that regulated the "termination of employment." Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ said:
"The relevant words of each prohibition are that '[a]n employer must not terminate an employee's employment.' ... As a matter of ordinary language, an employer does not terminate an employee's employment when his or her term of employment expires. Rather, employment comes to an end by agreement, or, where the term is fixed by award or statute, by operation of law.
There is nothing in the Act to suggest that the words '[a]n employer must not terminate an employee's employment' are to be construed other than in accordance with their ordinary meaning. So construed, they do not apply to the situation where employment comes to an end because its term has expired. To put the matter another way, the prohibitions are concerned with termination for reasons unconnected with the term of employment. And that is manifestly clear when regard is had to ss.17ODC, 170DE(I) and 17ODF. The prohibitions effected by those sections are directed, respectively, to termination for a specified reason and termination for one or more specified reasons, none of which includes the expiry of the employee's term of appointment."[15]
343 VRL submitted that this was precisely the case here: the termination that attracted the payment here was death, or termination by VRL for a reason other than gross misconduct. It did not include expiry.
344 In Fisher v Edith Cowan University (No. 2)[16] a like distinction was drawn by the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia between "termination of employment ... effected by the expiration of the period specified in the contract" and "termination of employment at the initiative of the [employer]."[17]
345 In Griffin v Australian Postal Corporation[18] a majority of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia drew the same distinction. There the employment had ceased when the employee reached the compulsory retiring age of 65. It was held that this was not "termination at the initiative of the employer."[19]
14. In Coleman v Mirror Newspapers Ltd[20] the Commonwealth Industrial Court agreed that a contract of employment which ceased by effluxion of time was one which was "terminated":
"Counsel submitted firstly that the Journalists' Agreement did not supersede the service agreement but the two could stand together, the Journalists' Agreement merely filling in blanks not covered by the service agreement. Furthermore, the termination of services provisions of c.10 of the Journalists' Agreement refer to action by either the employer or the employee but is not covered with a contractual situation whereby an employment is terminated by effluxion of time without the intervention of either party. Authority, if authority be necessary, is to be found in a case of Byars v Giorgio (1963) 30 SAIR 265 where a comparable contract was dealt with and the President of the Industrial Court of South Australia, Pellew J had this to say:
'There appears to be no evidence whatever that the employer gave these employees notice and in view of the defendant's evidence there was no necessity to do so. On the evidence before me there was neither a termination by the employer nor a termination by the employee but a contract of definite duration. See JH Tinniswood v G & J Gilmore Pty Ltd (1958) 52 QJP 132. Can it be said that if a period of employment is agreed between an employer and employee that at the end of that working period a contract can be said to have been terminated by the employer? Let us suppose that an employer agrees with an employee for a four weeks engagement. Could it be said that upon completion of such a period there had been a termination by the employer? I think not. It is terminated by the terms of the contract itself and by the effluxion of an agreed period of time."[21]
346 Thus, VRL submitted that the word 'termination' was used in the termination provision to mean "to bring to an end" not "to come to an end automatically or by the effluxion of time." VRL pointed out that the word "termination" was defined in the Macquarie Dictionary to mean "the act of terminating" (emphasis added). A similar definition was to be found in the Oxford Dictionary, which defined termination first as "the action of determining ..." and secondly as "the action of ending ..." VRL submitted that inherent within each of these definitions was the concept of an "act", or some positive action being taken, or an active step which leads to termination.
347 On the other hand, Orrong submitted that there was no doubt that the words "terminate" or "termination" could apply to the conclusion of a contract by the expiry of the period for which it was provided that it would operate. It submitted that in this context the phrase "termination by effluxion of time" was often used. Such a termination was an example of termination by (prior) agreement.[22] For example, a lease which had reached the end of its period was one which "terminates by effluxion of time." [23]
348 In support of its argument, VRL pointed to what it called the commercially absurd results of Orrong's desired construction. For example, it would mean that the termination bonus, constituted by a second payment of the last three years' bonuses, would be paid even if the "expired" or "terminated" agreement was replaced by one or more agreements under which Mr Ziegler was engaged for a further term or for successive terms for his whole working life. VRL emphasised that in fact Mr Ziegler did keep working for VRL subsequent to 30 June 2001, all the while demanding payment of Orrong's "termination" bonus.
349 Another absurd result put forward by VRL was that if the termination bonus operated as Orrong maintained and it was payable upon expiry of the 1995 Agreement then Orrong would be entitled to receive any performance bonuses falling within the preceding three years twice. Thus, just in respect of Project Ballarat alone, Orrong would have been entitled to receive US$10 million as a performance bonus (5% of US$200 million finance raised) and another US$10 million as part of the termination bonus. However, it must be remembered that if there were no performance bonuses paid in the three preceding financial years then the termination bonus would also be nil.
350 VRL also submitted that, by way of contrast, it was commercially sensible for a termination bonus to be payable if VRL terminated the agreement early, because VRL might well have had a liability in damages. In that case, the termination bonus could be regarded as a form of liquidated damages. Equally, it was commercially sensible for a termination bonus to be payable if the agreement was terminated as a result of Mr Ziegler's death. Nevertheless, in both situations, there was still an element of risk in the calculation of the termination bonus. It could be nil or it could be quite substantial depending on how many performance bonuses had been paid in the three preceding financial years.
351 In all the circumstances, I have concluded that the better view is that the meaning of the termination bonus clause is that it is payable if the Agreement is prematurely brought to an end by some positive act on the part of VRL or by some other event such as the death of Mr Ziegler. The result is, therefore, that in my opinion no termination bonus was payable on the expiration of the 1995 Agreement by the effluxion of time and Orrong's claim for payment of $76.955 million or any other sum accordingly fails.
352 However, in case I am wrong in that conclusion it is appropriate that I continue to deal with all of the issues relating to the termination bonus, in particular the components to be included in its calculation and its amount. Thus, the next issue to address is the period over which the termination bonus is to be calculated.
The Meaning of "Three Preceding Financial Years"
353 Orrong submitted that because termination of the 1995 Agreement by effluxion of time occurred at the last moment on the last day of the five year term, namely 30 June 2001, the expression "three preceding financial years" meant those ending 30 June 1998, 30 June 1999 and 30 June 2000. VRL, on the other hand, contended that the three relevant financial years were those ending on 30 June 1999, 30 June 2000 and 30 June 2001. This is potentially an important issue because if Orrong is correct, then the value of Orrong's 5.25% interest in VRP (or its alternative claim of US$10 million) and other performance bonuses paid in the 1997-1998 financial year would be included in the calculation of the termination bonus and any performance bonuses, including the Roadshow Distribution fee of $3.724 million, payable in the 2000-2001 financial year would be excluded.
354 Mr Ziegler said that he "deliberately worded" his memorandum of 2 October 1995 to exclude performance bonuses earned during the year ending 30 June 2001. VRL submitted that this was not a credible assertion. It submitted that it was plain that Mr Ziegler had subsequently contrived this argument because he wanted his 5.25% interest in VRP agreed during the year ending 30 June 1998 (or the alternative claim of US$10 million) to be included in the calculation of the termination bonus.
355 In his witness statement, Mr Ziegler said that he "distinctly specified" the three preceding years point in the 26 September 1995 conversation:
"so that, in the event of an early termination by VRL of the new consultancy agreement, a full three years of performance bonuses would have already accrued (even if not by then paid)."
I do not understand this reasoning as having anything to do with the meaning of "three preceding financial years". It is really to do with giving substance to the amount of the termination bonus in the event of a termination in the first year of the 1995 Agreement.
356 Mr Ziegler also said that he made it clear to Mr Kirby and Mr Burke what was meant by the "three preceding financial years":
"I said that the termination bonus should be calculated on the basis of the three preceding financial years, in terms of the performance bonuses earned in that period, and - because I wanted three full years in the event of an early termination."
In cross-examination Mr Ziegler confirmed that it was these statements which he relied on to justify his assertion that the meaning of "three preceding financial years" was made clear to Mr Kirby and Mr Burke. I fail to see how this can be. Nowhere in the above passage was it suggested that if the contract expired by the effluxion of time on 30 June 2001, that the "three preceding financial years" meant the financial years ended 30 June 1998, 1999 and 2000. Rather, the focus was on "early termination."
357 In his witness statement Mr Ziegler referred to a telephone conversation between himself, Mr Wilson and Mr Foo on 20 May 2000. He stated that, during this call, Mr Wilson referred to the 3 preceding financial years being the years ending 30 June 1999, 2000 and 2001 and that on that interpretation the 5.25% equity interest would not have to be taken into account in determining the termination bonus. Mr Ziegler said:
"I immediately told Peter Foo and Brian Wilson that the termination bonus had been deliberately worded by me to cover financial years 'preceding' the financial year ending 30 June 2001 and that, in my view, the three preceding 'financial years' meant the years ending 30 June 1998, 30 June 1999 and 30 June 2000. I then said that, as a consequence, the 5.25% equity interest would have to be taken into account."
358 Mr Wilson did not recall that Mr Ziegler said this, nor any discussion of an assumption that termination would take place on 30 June 2001 or at any other particular date. Mr Wilson was not cross-examined about his evidence in this respect. Further, Mr Ziegler's later memorandum to Mr Wilson dated 5 September 2000, which purported to summarise the areas in dispute over the termination bonus clause, made no reference to Mr Ziegler saying this. Mr Foo did not have a recollection of the meeting, except to say that the outcome was recorded in his memorandum dated 23 May 2000**,** which did not include any reference to Mr Ziegler so telling Mr Foo. Mr Foo also was not cross examined about this point.
359 Therefore, there has to be real doubt, in my opinion, about Mr Ziegler's evidence on this point.
360 Further, the supposed rationale for excluding the year ending 30 June 2001 does not bear close scrutiny. Assuming the contract expired at midnight on 30 June 2001 and a termination bonus was then payable, Mr Ziegler would have had bonuses for the last full year to include in any such calculation. It is not credible that, in October 1995, Mr Ziegler deliberately excluded the bonuses he expected to earn during the last full year of his contract from his termination bonus.
361 Apart from the evidence referred to above, Mr Ziegler did not suggest that he reached agreement with Mr Kirby and Mr Burke in October 1995 that the "three preceding financial years" were to be those ending 30 June 1998, 1999 and 2000 in the event that the contract went its full term. The question therefore is what meaning would be given to that expression by an objective reading of the termination bonus provision.
362 Orrong submitted that its contention was supported by the decision of Warrington J in English v Cliff[24]. In that case a settlement required the trustees to hold property on trust for 21 years and at the expiry of that period to sell the trust property and hold the proceeds on different trusts. The question arose as to whether the trust was void for perpetuity on the ground that the interest would not vest for more than 21 years. Warrington J held that the trust was valid. He said:
"The trust in the present case is to arise at the expiration of the term of twenty-one years, and if looked at from one point of view that trust arises coincidently with the last moment of the term, although, if looked at from another point of view, it may be said to arise at some infinitesimally small fraction of time after the last moment of the term. In my opinion, however, the only sensible view to be taken of such a limitation is that the term determines and the trust arises at the very same moment of time, and if looked at in that way it is impossible to say that the trust arises at a later period than that allowed by law. It seems to me therefore that the term determines and the trust arises at mathematically and identically the same moment, and so far as that objection goes I am of the opinion that the trust is a good one." [25]
363 Orrong submitted that in this case the 1995 consultancy agreement terminated at the last moment of the five year term, being the last moment on 30 June 2001. The termination bonus fell to be calculated upon termination, that is, at that moment. The "three preceding financial years" upon termination could not, therefore, include the financial year ending 30 June 2001, since termination occurred at the last moment of that financial year. Accordingly, Orrong submitted, the three preceding financial years must be the financial years ending 30 June 2000, 30 June 1999 and 30 June 1998.
364 VRL agreed that the 1995 Agreement ended at midnight on 30 June 2001. So did the 2000-2001 financial year. As Windeyer J said in Prowse v McIntyre[26]:
"the instant of midnight ... [was] both the end of one day and the beginning of the next, for there are no rests in time."
365 In Associated Beauty Aids Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[27], Barwick CJ, in dealing with the question of from when a notice of election by a shareholder to convert preference shares into ordinary shares would operate, stated that one possible time on and from which the change in the relevant rights of the shareholder could take place was "the end" of the day on which the notice was left at the company's office, "or the beginning of the next, these being descriptions of precisely the same point of time."[28] Windeyer J followed what he had said in Prowse v McIntyre in holding that:
"the consequences of the delivery of the notice should commence from the last moment of the day of the date of delivery, which is the same as saying from the first moment of the day following."[29]
366 In Amco Wrangler Ltd v Sukkar[30] the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the word "upon" in the context of the Workers' Compensation Rules and held that it meant "after." Kirby P[31] referred to R v Arkwright[32] where the Court had held that the words "on" and "upon" may "either mean before the act done to which it relates, or simultaneously with the act done, or after the act done, according as reason and good sense require with reference to the context in the subject matter of the enactment." In Arkwright the Court had held that "upon" meant "after." The Court of Appeal considered a variety of other cases where the word "upon" had also been held to mean "after." Therefore, VRL submitted that the words "upon the termination of the contract" meant either "after" or "simultaneously with." Obviously they could not in this context mean "before." Thus, VRL submitted, whether one looked at the "three preceding financial years" as being ascertained immediately after midnight on 30 June 2001 or simultaneous with midnight on 30 June 2001 the result was the same - the 2000-2001 financial year was included.
367 The situation therefore is that both parties agreed that it was established by authority that midnight, being the end of one day was precisely the same moment as the start of the next. Orrong relied on this proposition to argue that it meant that the financial year ending at the same time could not be a "preceding" financial year, whereas VRL relied on the same proposition to argue that the right to the termination bonus only arose at a time when both the agreement and the current financial year had expired, so that the 2000-2001 financial year was the last of the "three preceding financial years."
368 In Re North; Ex Parte Hasluck[33] Lord Esher MR said:
"No general rule exists for the computation of time ... where time is mentioned in a contract, the rational mode of computation is to have regard ... to the purpose for which the computation is to be made."
369 This passage was quoted with approval by Barwick CJ in Associated Beauty Aids[34]. Applying this principle to the facts of this proceeding, it seems to me that "the purpose for which the computation is to be made" was to have a termination bonus calculated on the basis of the most recent performance bonuses, which in the normal course could be expected to grow from year to year. I regard it as quite implausible that Mr Ziegler would have deliberately chosen to have his company's termination bonus calculated on the basis of the performance bonuses earned during years 2, 3 and 4 of the five year term. The justification given by Mr Ziegler for this alleged decision was that he did not want to have any dispute about the quantum of the performance bonuses to be used in the calculation of the termination bonus and that if he chose years 2, 3 and 4 then they would all be known. This does not ring true to me. I see no reason why he would have been concerned about the delay in calculating and agreeing on the quantum of the termination bonus when that would also be the case with respect to the performance bonuses earned in year 5. This is particularly the case where, on Mr Ziegler's construction of the 1995 Agreement, the entitlement to the termination bonus arose even though Orrong continued to provide Mr Ziegler's services to VRL beyond 30 June 2001.
370 I therefore conclude that if the termination bonus was payable the "three preceding financial years" to be taken into account in calculating the amount of the termination bonus were those ending 30 June 1999, 30 June 2000 and 30 June 2001, which means that the 5.25% interest in VRP is not a relevant performance bonus.
What Constituted a Performance Bonus?
371 VRL advanced other arguments why the 5.25% interest in VRP should not be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of the termination bonus. First, it submitted that neither Project Ballarat nor Project Bendigo satisfied the relevant requirement for payment of a performance bonus, namely the raising of non/limited recourse financing.
372 Secondly, VRL submitted that the 1997 Agreement was a negotiated settlement of Orrong's disputed claim for a US$10 million performance bonus, so that the resultant 5.25% interest in VRP was outside the terms of the 1995 Agreement and not a performance bonus. Orrong disputed this interpretation. It submitted that the 1997 Agreement encompassed the grant of the 5.25% interest in VRP as a performance bonus in lieu of payment of the performance bonus of US$10 million and that otherwise the terms of the 1995 Agreement remained the same. I favour this construction. In my view, the 1997 Agreement was to the effect that one form of performance bonus was to be made in lieu of another.
373 In any event, I consider that, under the terms of the 2000 Agreement, VRL and Orrong agreed that both the 5.25% interest and the 2.25% interest should be treated as performance bonuses for the purposes of any relevant calculation of the termination bonus. What was not agreed, however, was which years were meant by "three preceding financial years."
374 Moreover, at the end of the day, it seemed to me that VRL accepted that if the financial year ended 30 June 1998 is relevant to the calculation of the termination bonus, then the 5.25% interest should be taken into account. In due course, I will consider the question of the valuation of the 5.25% interest and the 2.25% interest.
The Meaning of "Non/Limited Recourse Financing"
375 The next issue for consideration is what was meant by the term " 'non/limited recourse' financing" in paragraphs (c) and (d) of the performance bonus provision in Mr Ziegler's letter of 2 October 1995. This also involves consideration of the term " 'non-recourse' financing" in paragraph (b) of the performance bonus provision in Mr Ziegler's letter of 12 May 1993.
376 It was common ground between the parties that the meaning of the term " 'non/limited recourse' financing" was not relevant to Orrong's claim to a 7.5% equity interest in VRP, as this was based as to 5.25% on the 1997 Agreement and as to 2.25% on the 2000 Agreement. However, the phrase in question was still relevant to three other issues:
(a) Orrong's claim that as the $75 million Roadshow Distributors Group facility was "non/limited recourse" finance within the meaning of the 1995 Agreement it was entitled to be paid a performance bonus of $3.724 million;
(b) Orrong's alternative claims that as the Ballarat and Bendigo film financings were "non/limited recourse" finance within the meaning of the 1995 Agreement it was entitled to be paid the US$10 million and US$15 million performance bonuses; and
(c) VRL's counterclaim that Orrong and Mr Ziegler engaged in misleading conduct, or were negligent, in representing that the Ballarat and Bendigo film financings were "non/limited recourse" finance.
377 Both sides pointed out in their final submissions that the "non/limited recourse" part of the term " 'non/limited recourse' financing" appeared within quotation marks in Mr Ziegler's letters of 2 October 1995 and 27 November 1995. The same applied to the term " 'non-recourse' financing" in the letter of 12 May 1993. However, Orrong and VRL sought to draw different conclusions from this use of quotation marks.
378 Mr Ziegler gave evidence that expressions "non-recourse financing_",_ "limited recourse financing" and "non/limited recourse financing" were used interchangeably at VRL. That could possibly explain the use of quotation marks. Another explanation could be that the use of the slang composite and, in a sense, contradictory expression "non/limited recourse" required the quotation marks.
379 Mr Ziegler said that although these expressions were used interchangeably by the Kirbys, Mr Burke and Mr Foo, Mr Robert Kirby used the term "non/limited recourse" more frequently than the other terms and Mr John Kirby and Mr Foo used the term "non-recourse" more frequently than the others. He said that:
"I have heard non-recourse used where it really means limited recourse, I have [heard] limited recourse used where it means limited, or sometimes non-recourse. These terms were used at Village interchangeably ..."
380 In the May 1993 letter, Mr Ziegler said, he used the expression "non-recourse" because that was the term Mr Foo had used in their discussions preceding the exchange of correspondence. He understood that by this term Mr Foo also meant "limited recourse". That was why he put the expression in quotation marks.
381 Mr Ziegler said that in the October 1995 letter he used the expression "non/limited recourse" because he was "trying to be as faithful" as he could to the conversation he had with Mr Kirby and Mr Burke on 26 September 1995. It was "meant to be a quote" of Mr Kirby. Mr Ziegler agreed that he did not point out the change in wording between the 1993 and the 1995 letters to Mr Kirby or Mr Burke.
382 Orrong therefore submitted that the use of the quotation marks also indicated a descriptive or shorthand term, the meaning of which was well understood by those within VRL. Thus, Mr Ziegler said that Mr Foo used these expressions to refer to:
"any finance raising where the security obtained by the lender was of a constrained or limited nature to certain asset or assets which were either within the group or which would be acquired by the group, or where the recourse arose in only limited circumstances, such that the liability [of] the Village borrower would only occur for interest and/or principal in certain defined circumstances ... as distinct from full recourse where all the assets of the group were available to the lender."
383 On the other hand, VRL submitted that the use of quotation marks connoted that the words were being used in a special or peculiar sense, different to their ordinary meaning. It submitted that the quotation marks meant that the term quoted was a euphemism or pseudonym.
384 Thus, VRL pleaded in its defence and counterclaim in substance that the "non/limited recourse" finance in paragraph (c) in the 2 October 1995 letter meant:
(a) the funds (net of costs) that were obtained by the Village Roadshow Group;
(b) in part, by reason of tax benefits available to the providers of the fund; and
(c) in circumstances where the actual benefit of those funds was permanently retained by the Group without recourse.
In the case of paragraph (d) in the letter, two additional criteria were pleaded, namely that:
(d) the raising of the funds did not use or rely on the Group's taxation benefits or attributes, or risk the Group's capital or other resources; and
(e) the funds resulted from transactions substantially similar in effect to the Austrian equipment financing transaction or the Michael Lake transactions.
VRL submitted that these definitions were in fact consistent with the evidence as to what was intended.
385 According to Mr Ziegler, the reference to the "Austrian equipment financing" in the letter of 2 October 1995 was to a limited recourse financing transaction which had been successfully undertaken prior to the September 1995 negotiations. Under the Austrian equipment transaction, the Austrian investors obtained a geared investment in VRL's theme park rides and leisure centre games with the debt component funded by VRL on a limited recourse basis. They were responsible for the equity component of their investment. In essence, the Austrian investors acquired the legal rights to these items and immediately disposed of them back to VRL. In return, VRL contracted to provide them with a royalty stream. This royalty was calculated by reference to VRL's operation of the financed items, or the location in which they were situated. VRL then immediately effectively defeased its liability to pay this royalty stream to the Austrian investors. In return for the release of VRL from its royalty obligation, VRL procured the effective discharge of the limited recourse debt owing to it by the Austrian investors.
386 As a result of the structure of the transaction and the nature of the underlying businesses, VRL received the Austrian investors' equity component, not just as a form of limited recourse financing, but also as profit because the investors' equity was never returnable to them. Due to the then operation of the Controlled Foreign Corporation provisions of the ITAA, this profit did not give rise to an Australian tax liability for VRL for Australian income tax purposes. As a result, there was no permanent or temporary use of VRL's Australian income tax losses in connection with the financing raised. From the Austrian investors' perspective, they obtained an immediate deduction of the purchase price of the equipment acquired for Austrian income tax purposes, both the equity component provided by the investor and the limited recourse debt component provided by VRL.
387 Mr Ziegler said that the example which he gave in paragraph (d) of his letter, and which Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and he had discussed on 26 September 1995, was given in relation only to identifying a transaction where the profit component did not create assessable income which would have to be offset against or absorbed by VRL's then accrued losses. He said that the example was never given in relation to the unique (and additional) result of the Austrian equipment transaction producing non assessable profit.
388 Mr Ziegler also said that the reference in paragraph (d) of his letter to "Michael Lake" was not a reference to, or an example of, financing (full recourse, limited recourse, non-recourse or otherwise) at all. Rather, it was a reference to the fact that Mr Lake, VRL's Australian, Los Angeles based executive received a 25% share of profits from Village Roadshow Production Services, the VRL business which was responsible for providing services to foreign film producers which utilised the 50% VRL owned Warner Roadshow Studios on the Gold Coast in Queensland. Mr Ziegler said that he had told Mr Kirby and Mr Burke that he thought that Mr Lake's 25% interest in the VRL Production Services business provided a good numerical template for the percentage performance bonus which he should be paid by VRL for transactions falling within scenario (d) of his letter. By way of comparison, he said to Mr Kirby and Mr Burke that he considered that these types of advantageous transactions for VRL should be rewarded with a higher fee than the 5% performance bonus provided for by scenarios (a) to (c) in his letter relating to the 1993 Agreement.
389 Messrs Kirby, Burke and Foo all agreed in their evidence that they now understood that in their ordinary usage:
(a) the term _"_non-recourse finance" meant finance which was not repayable except out of the value and receipts of the assets involved in the transaction; and
(b) the term "limited recourse finance" meant finance where there was a degree of recourse to other assets, other than the assets involved in the transactions.
However, they all said that at the time of the 1993 and 1995 correspondence from Mr Ziegler they understood these terms to have a more restricted or special meaning.
390 Mr Kirby said that, in the period prior to the Ballarat transaction, he understood "non-recourse financing" to have a special meaning. It referred to certain "tax-based financial transactions" where money received by VRL was accounted for as profit because it was "money that stuck" with VRL. In cross-examination he agreed that in October 1994 he understood the term "non-recourse financing" as interchangeable with the term "limited recourse financing" and that, prior to the Ballarat transaction, his understanding of the terms "non-recourse financing", "limited recourse financing" and "non/limited recourse financing" "sort of blended in together" in his mind and he did not draw precise distinctions between them. Mr Kirby further said that within VRL, before the period of the Ballarat transaction, he understood "non-recourse" and "limited recourse" to mean something different from his present understanding, and that his understanding of these terms "changed in the period of the Ballarat transaction" and he had "a sudden new interpretation" of them.
391 Mr Kirby agreed that the minutes of a directors' meeting of VRL held on 9 August 1994 recorded Mr Foo stating with respect to the possible purchase of Sea World that:
"Offers were being assessed from financiers for a $75 million, ten year, non-recourse facility which would pay out existing debts to Sanwa and Tricontinental and provide working capital for the Park."
Mr Kirby agreed that he had chaired the meeting and signed the minutes as being a true and correct record of the meeting. Rather surprisingly, he said that he could not recall his understanding of the term _"_non-recourse" at that time. However, in response to a question from me, agreed that it would be fair for the Court to conclude that if Mr Foo had used the term "non-recourse" in the meeting and Mr Kirby had not understood it, he would have queried him, and similarly he would have queried the meaning of the term before signing the minutes.
392 Another example of Mr Kirby seeing the term being used in its ordinary meaning was a memorandum from Mr Ziegler to him in October 1994 reporting on his "recent trip to Singapore in search of non-recourse film production finance." Mr Kirby said that he did not recall receiving that memorandum.
393 An example of Mr Kirby himself using the term "non-recourse" in its ordinary meaning was found in the terminology used in the agreement which Mr Kirby negotiated with a Mr Charles Wesoky in November 1995. Mr Kirby eventually agreed that the agreement ultimately executed by a VRL entity and Mr Wesoky in October 1996 provided for Mr Wesoky's company, ICFC, LLC, to be given a "non-recourse" loan to enable it to acquire an equity interest in certain assets within the VRL Group. Mr Kirby said that he had one understanding of "non-recourse" in his dealings with Mr Wesoky in November 1995 and a different understanding of _"_non-recourse" in his dealings with Mr Ziegler at the same time. He said that the use of the expression "non-recourse" in the Wesoky agreement accorded with his present understanding of the meaning of that term, namely, where the finance itself was not repayable except out of the value and receipts of the assets involved in the transaction.
394 I note in passing that Mr Kirby's evidence of his purported inability to recall the details of his negotiations with Mr Wesoky was one of the more unsatisfactory aspects of his performance as a witness. Mr Kirby agreed that these negotiations had been conducted by him in the first instance as to all major issues and that he had executed the agreement on behalf of the VRL entity. He also agreed that he had been a witness in the proceeding brought by Mr Wesoky's company in the Federal Court of Australia in December 2000. Despite this, Mr Kirby maintained that it was only during the proceeding in this Court that he learned of the fact that the agreement with ICFC, LLC had provided for the "non-recourse" loan. I find this claim to be quite extraordinary.
395 In his evidence, Mr Burke stated that:
(a)
the terms "non-recourse financing", "limited recourse financing" and "non/limited recourse financing" were not used, or used interchangeably, at VRL;
(b)
he first recalled seeing the words "non/limited recourse financing" used when he received the letter from Mr Ziegler dated 2 October 1995; and
(c)
he understood and intended sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of Mr Ziegler's letter of 2 October 1995 to refer to tax based transactions which Mr Ziegler had been undertaking and which Mr Ziegler had described as generating "money VRL would get for nothing" or "pure profit".
(a) he did not use or understand the terms _"_non-recourse", or _"_limited recourse" in 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996;
(b) he was not aware of others in VRL using those terms in 1994, 1995 or 1996;
(c) he had no understanding in 1995 or 1996 of what a non-recourse loan was; and
(d)
it was not his practice to use expressions that he did not understand.
397 This was rather surprising given that in March 1996 Mr Burke wrote in his Managing Director's report in respect of "Production":
"We do not contemplate a major allocation of capital to this area but intend to fund modestly and access o.p.m. [other peoples' money] Peter is currently investigating some taxation driven and other inventive financing schemes that will be non recourse and should see this Division become a major profit provider in the medium term."
398 When he was taken to the documents referred to above, Mr Burke said that he could not recall the _"_non-recourse" facility referred to in the VRL Board minutes of 9 August 1994 and that he could not recall the terms on which VRL had agreed to finance Mr Wesoky's equity interest. More importantly, when confronted with his use of the expression _"_non-recourse" in his managing director's report of March 1996 he said that it was intended to refer to "money for nothing" and was not used as a technical term.
399 Orrong submitted that, to the extent that Mr Foo's intentions were relevant, his evidence presented a further layer of confusion and inconsistency in VRL's case. In his evidence, Mr Foo said that he understood the term "non-recourse financing" in the letter of 12 May 1993 as meaning the money that would be paid to VRL but would remain with VRL and would never be required to be repaid at any stage to investors. Mr Foo said that he discussed Mr Ziegler's letter of 12 May 1993 with him shortly after receiving it. He had written the note "film tax" beside it and wanted to clarify this paragraph. He said to Mr Ziegler that he understood paragraph (b) to refer to the tax assisted film financing arrangements he had been involved in such as the Silver Screen prospectus, and that "non recourse financing" meant the money that would be paid to Village would remain within Village and would never be required to be repaid at any stage to the investors. Mr Ziegler said this was correct. Mr Foo said that Mr Ziegler regularly used the descriptions "money that stuck" or "free money" and Mr Foo used these expressions in his discussions with Mr Ziegler. He said that Mr Ziegler said to him on more than one occasion words to the effect that there was a "barrel of money which spins around which represents the economy and he put his hands into the barrel and the money that sticks to his hands was ours to keep."
400 Mr Foo also said that:
(a)
in 1995, shortly prior to receiving Mr Ziegler's letter of 2 October 1995, he received invoices from Mr Ziegler using the expression "non-recourse financing" and he said to Mr Ziegler that the tax based financing schemes referred to were actually _"_limited recourse" at best because it was limited to the tax based transactions being successful;
(b)
the use of the expression _"_non/limited recourse" in the letter of 2 October 1995 was consistent with his contemporaneous discussions with Mr Ziegler on the possible disallowance of the tax-based transactions; and
(c)
at no time prior to the disputes over his entitlement relating to Ballarat/Bendigo/Castlemaine did Mr Ziegler say to Mr Foo that the expression _"_non/limited recourse" meant something different to the meaning discussed in his conversation with Mr Ziegler in 1995.
Mr Foo denied that he and Mr Ziegler used the terms _"_non-recourse", "limited recourse" and "non-limited recourse" interchangeably.
401 The fact that Mr Foo used the term "non-recourse financing" in 1994 and 1995 in the "wider" sense understood by Mr Ziegler is clear from his involvement in the Wesoky negotiations and his use of the term _"_non-recourse" facility recorded in the August 1994 board minutes.
402 I accept that the tax-based financial transactions on which Mr Ziegler worked prior to 1995 were referred to as producing "money that stuck" or "money for nothing" or "pure profit". I also find that these transactions may on occasions have been referred to as "non-recourse" or "limited recourse" or "non/limited recourse". That is, I do not accept the denials that these terms were used interchangeably at VRL. A good illustration of this occurring was Mr Kirby's use of the phrase "zero net recourse to VRL" in his memorandum to the Board dated 5 May 1997 which forwarded Mr Ziegler's memorandum of the same date which had described the proposed funding as "limited recourse".
403 More importantly, I do not accept the evidence that these terms were only used in their restricted or special meaning. As has been seen from the documents referred to above, some of these terms were clearly used in their wider or ordinary meaning by Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo prior to, or at the same time as, the late 1995 discussions. In my opinion, each of these gentlemen had an understanding of, and used, these terms in the same way as Mr Ziegler.
404 Mr Ziegler gave evidence that on 26 September 1995 Mr Kirby stated that:
(a) VRL wanted Mr Ziegler to take a more commercial role in VRL's affairs than previously and no longer concentrate as heavily on tax planning and structuring;
(b) he wanted Mr Ziegler to become more directly involved in the development of overall VRL strategy and in raising non/limited recourse funding for VRL's businesses; and
(c) Mr Ziegler should explore new ways of raising non-recourse financing for the production and exploitation of VRP films and the financing of other VRL assets and businesses.
Mr Ziegler also gave evidence was that, at the very time that the 1995 Agreement was being negotiated, he outlined a proposal to the VRP and VRL Boards on 18, 19 and 20 November 1995 for VRL to raise non/limited recourse finance to enable VRP to undertake Hollywood style film production.
405 Mr Burke agreed in cross-examination that in September 1995 Mr Ziegler had told him that he would need to be more inventive and find other means of funding for films that was different to tax based finance. I have already set out above what Mr Burke wrote in his March 1996 Managing Director's report concerning Mr Ziegler "currently investigating some taxation driven and other inventive financing schemes that will be non recourse." In the same report under the heading "Village Roadshow Pictures", Mr Burke also wrote:
"While simultaneously addressing the permanent objective of producing quality commercial material, Peter is sourcing o.p.m. through taxation driven opportunities and in other innovative and creative ways."
406 Mr Burke agreed that the first of the quotations from his report was consistent with what Mr Ziegler had told him in September 1995. Despite Mr Burke's denial, I consider that this reference to Mr Ziegler investigating "other inventive financing schemes that will be non recourse" was a reference to the Ballarat transaction.
407 Mr Burke continued this theme in his May 1996 Managing Director's report when he wrote that:
"Peter Ziegler is currently investigating a number of means of funding VRP projects. One of these is a creative financing deal with an insurance group and there are other tax driven possibilities ... Progress on these fronts is looking very positive."
(a)
the parties' use of the term "non/limited recourse" at the time they negotiated the 1995 Agreement;
(b)
the fact that Mr Kirby told Mr Ziegler at that time that VRL wanted him to broaden his role at VRL and explore new ways of raising financing for the production and exploitation of VRP films and the financing of other VRL assets and businesses; and
(c)
the fact that Mr Ziegler told Messrs Burke and Kirby at that time that he would need to be more inventive and find other means of funding for films that was different to tax based finance and raised with them the possibility of raising finance to enable VRP to undertake Hollywood style film production,
I have concluded that the expression " 'non/limited recourse' financing" in paragraphs (c) and (d) of the performance bonus provision in the letter of 2 October 1995 meant any finance raising where the recourse was of a limited nature, in the sense of being limited to certain assets of the borrower such as a particular class of assets or assets acquired with the funds provided by the financing.
409 Thus, by memorandum dated 5 October 2001 Mr Foo wrote to Mr Ziegler as follows:
"In relation to other VRP raisings, the principle is simple. If we raise monies where VRL equity (direct or subsidiary), assets or guarantees are at risk, this is not qualifying limited non recourse financing and therefore not subject to a fee. VRP equity raising is sale of equity and not financing; i.e. non-recourse financing means zero recourse to VRL and limited means limited to the assets acquired by the financing."
Mr Ziegler responded by memorandum dated 10 October 2001:
"To my mind the meaning of the expression 'limited recourse funding' is clear. This financing arises for VRL (be it directly or through its subsidiaries etc.) when recourse of the lender is limited to a pool of assets of the relevant borrower, be they presently in existence and/or subsequently acquired by the borrower.
In other words, limited recourse funding is considered to mean funding obtained by the relevant VRL entity where less than the total assets of the borrower are subject to a security interest granted in favour of the lender.
I see no justification for limiting the expression 'limited recourse financing' to 'assets acquired by the financing'."
410 I do not accept VRL's argument that the "non/limited recourse" financing had to be substantially similar in effect to the Austrian equipment financing transaction or the Michael Lake transactions. Given the diverse nature of those arrangements, neither of which involved funding film production, such a construction is nonsensical in my opinion. I accept Mr Ziegler's evidence that he referred to the Austrian equipment financing simply as an example of a transaction where existing Village Roadshow Group tax losses were not utilised and that he referred to Michael Lake as an example of someone receiving a higher than 5% fee in support of his claim for a higher than 5% performance bonus in paragraph (d).
411 I also do not accept VRL's argument that it was very significant that while Mr Ziegler's pre-1993 Agreement activities involved tax advantaged financing, the activities did not involve the provision of finance to any part of the Village Group from third parties. Rather, the finance was provided from the Village Group to private investors who then obtained a larger tax deduction through the gearing. That is, VRL submitted, by investing $20 of their own money, and borrowing $80 from VRL, the investors received a tax deduction in respect of $100. The finance was 'non-recourse' because it was always intended that the private investors would not repay the loans, which VRL would write off as bad debts. VRL further submitted that when Mr Ziegler came to draft the 1995 Agreement (and indeed when he had drafted the 1993 Agreement) the only experience that the parties had of "non-recourse" finance was this type of "non-recourse" finance. It involved no recourse to the private investors because they were not required to repay the finance. It involved no recourse to VRL, because it was a lender, not a borrower.
412 As Orrong submitted, in advancing this argument VRL was focusing on the wrong aspect of the transaction. In the case of tax-based financing the 5% performance bonus was only payable in respect of the finance raised from investors (that is, the $20 component). Such finance was non/limited recourse because VRL only had to repay the finance out of proceeds arising from the exploitation of the underlying asset acquired or funded by the investor. The investor would only be repaid the $20 component where sufficient money was raised from such exploitation, and only after the $80 had first been repaid to VRL. Under the 1995 Agreement, Orrong would only be paid a 5% performance bonus in respect of finance raised by VRL, not in respect of finance provided by VRL to investors. That was what the Agreement expressly provided.
413 It will be necessary to return to this expression " 'non/limited recourse' financing" when considering Orrong's Roadshow Distributors Group facility performance bonus claim and its alternative performance bonus cash claims and VRL's misleading conduct and negligence counterclaims.
Rectification
414 Although rectification was raised as an issue by VRL's counterclaim (which is dealt with separately below, having considered the questions of the meaning of the termination bonus provision and the meaning of the term " 'non/limited recourse' financing", it is convenient to deal now with the topic of rectification.
415 VRL pleaded in paragraph 42 of its defence and counterclaim that Mr Ziegler, Orrong and VRL entered into the 1995 Agreement relevantly "with the common intention" that:
(a) the termination bonus would only be payable in circumstances where Mr Ziegler died, or the Agreement was terminated by VRL, before the expiration of its five year term; and/or
(b) the termination bonus would not be payable in circumstances where the term of the Agreement, or the Agreement itself, came to an end by reason of the effluxion of time; and
(c) " 'non/limited recourse' financing" in performance bonus (c) of the 1995 Agreement meant funds (net of costs) obtained, in part, by reason of tax benefits available to the providers of the funds, in circumstances where the actual benefit of those funds was permanently retained by the Village Roadshow Group without recourse; and
(d) " 'non/limited recourse' financing" in performance bonus (d) of the 1995 Agreement meant funds (net of costs) obtained where the actual benefit of those funds was permanently retained by the Village Roadshow Group without recourse and
(i) raising the funds did not use or rely on the Group's taxation benefits or attributes, or risk the Group's capital or other resources; and
(ii) resulted from transactions substantially similar in effect to the Australian Equipment Financing transaction or the Michael Lake transaction.
416 VRL further pleaded that if the 1995 Agreement did not have these meanings, then the parties entered into the 1995 Agreement under material and common mistakes of fact, alternatively under unilateral mistakes of fact which were known to, or ought to have been known to, Mr Ziegler and Orrong, alternatively were induced by Mr Ziegler and Orrong, and that VRL was entitled to have the 1995 Agreement rectified to embody the appropriate terms and to accord with the common intention and understanding, alternatively the intention and understanding of VRL.
417 Orrong submitted that rectification was available to correct instruments which did not accurately reflect the continuing common intention of the parties. What was rectified was not a mistake in the transaction itself, but a mistake in the way in which that transaction had been expressed in writing.[35] A contract cannot be rectified on the ground that it did not represent the common intention of the parties unless it appeared clearly what their common intention was and that that intention existed at the time of the execution of the instrument sought to be rectified.[36] Orrong further submitted that the party seeking rectification must establish "by convincing proof" that the instrument ought to be rectified[37] and that since the alleged intention of the parties contradicted the written instrument signed by them, a high degree of proof was required.[38] Orrong further submitted that in a case of unilateral mistake a party seeking rectification must establish that it made an agreement under a misapprehension that the agreement contained a particular provision which it in fact did not and that the other party knew of the omission and of the mistake on the part of the first party and allowed that party to remain under the misapprehension and conclude the agreement on the mistaken basis. Orrong argued that on the evidence VRL had not made out a case of either common or unilateral mistake of fact.
418 Orrong also pointed out that VRL sought rectification of the 1995 Agreement more than eight years after it was entered into and only after Orrong sought to enforce that agreement. VRL had been aware for almost all that time that Orrong claimed an entitlement to a termination bonus where the agreement came to an end by effluxion of time and to performance bonuses for finance raisings. Orrong submitted that despite that awareness, VRL had only sought rectification of the agreement as a defensive ploy after this proceeding was commenced
419 It is, however, unnecessary to consider these contentions further because in considering the termination bonus provision, I have concluded that it means what VRL said it means, and that that construction accorded with the common intention of the parties at the time. There is, therefore, no need for VRL to seek rectification of that part of the 1995 Agreement. However, if I am found to be wrong in my construction of the termination bonus provision, then I consider that VRL would be entitled to rectification of that part of the 1995 Agreement because, in my opinion, the contrary construction would not reflect what I find to have been the common intention of the parties at the time they entered into that Agreement. I do not accept that Mr Ziegler had an intention or understanding, never communicated to either Mr Kirby or Mr Burke, that the termination bonus provision was to be read as entitling Orrong to the payment where the Agreement came to an end by the effluxion of time.
420 Further, in considering the meaning of the expression " 'non/limited recourse' financing" in the 1995 Agreement I have concluded that it did not mean what VRL said it meant, and that Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo understood it in the same way as Mr Ziegler said he used the term. There is, therefore, no room for an argument by VRL that the 1995 Agreement failed to reflect the common intention of the parties and that there should be rectification of those parts of the 1995 Agreement. This also involves rejection of any argument for rectification based on unilateral mistake. If I am wrong in these conclusions then the performance bonus provisions mean what VRL says they mean and there is no need for VRL to seek rectification.
The Equity Interests
421 Another matter which engendered considerable debate was the nature of the 5.25% interest in VRP which Orrong received under the 1997 Agreement and the nature of the 2.25% interest which it received under the 2000 Agreement. Together they constituted Orrong's claim to a 7.5% equity interest in VRP.
422 In the prayer for relief in the fifth further amended statement of claim, Orrong sought a declaration that upon the proper construction of the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement it was entitled to an equity interest in VPP, consisting of:
(a) (i) a 7.5% ownership interest in VRP; and
(ii) the right to 7.5% of the profits of VRP;
alternatively
(b) (i) a beneficial interest in, and the right to a transfer from VRL of, 7.5% of the shares held by VRL in the wholly owned companies in VRP;
(ii) the right to compel VRL to take all necessary steps to cause each VRP company (other than a wholly owned company) to transfer to Orrong 7.5% of the shares it held in any other VRP company; and
(iii) the right to receive from VRL 7.5% of the profit derived by VRL through VRP.
Under the alternative declaration, consequential orders were also sought in respect of the transfers.
423 VRL admitted in its defence and counterclaim that by the 1997 Agreement Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler and VRL "purportedly agreed" that Mr Ziegler, alternatively Orrong, would receive "a 5.25% interest in relation to" VRP, and that by the 2000 Agreement Mr Ziegler, alternatively Orrong, and VRL agreed, in part, that Mr Ziegler, alternatively Orrong, would received "a further 2.25% interest in relation to VRP." However, VRL then pleaded that each of the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement was void or unenforceable for uncertainty. In its final submissions VRL maintained this position. Alternatively, it submitted that Orrong's entitlement under the 1997 Agreement was limited to 5.25% of the profits and that any entitlement beyond that was void or unenforceable for uncertainty. In the further alternative, VRL submitted that Orrong's rights, apart from a profit share, were limited to participation in any capital gain resulting from a sale or float of VRP.
The 5.25% Interest
424 VRL submitted that the 1997 Agreement was legally uncertain, primarily because Mr Kirby and Mr Ziegler never reached any consensus as to what the "equity interest" would be. It submitted that this uncertainty was reflected in the fact that the nature of the interest was still being debated between Mr Ziegler and Mr Foo years later in the exchange of memoranda in May, June and October 2000. The uncertainty was further reflected, it was submitted, in the numerous varied and often contradictory attempts to articulate the nature of this interest in Orrong's pleadings and submissions.
425 I am satisfied that both Mr Kirby and Mr Ziegler intended to enter into a binding agreement on 8 September 1997, when they concluded their difficult negotiation. Both of them said that they shook hands when agreement was reached. Nevertheless, the question remains whether sufficient elements of that negotiation had been agreed.
426 One clear difference between the evidence of Mr Ziegler and Mr Kirby concerning the agreement reached on 8 September 1997 in Los Angeles was the size of the interest in VRP to be given to Orrong. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Kirby offered 5.25% whilst Mr Kirby maintained that it was only 5%, although he agreed that it was later increased to 5.25%. VRL submitted that the 5% figure was consistent with the claim for a 5% performance bonus.
427 However, I find that the figure initially offered by Mr Kirby was 5.25%. The most credible explanation for this rather strange figure is that it was calculated by Mr Kirby in the way in which Mr Ziegler said Mr Kirby explained it to him, when he said, in response to Mr Ziegler's query about the future, that as far as profit sharing was concerned, 5.25% was one quarter of what Mr Ziegler, Mr Burke, Mr John Kirby and Mr Robert Kirby received under the Village Roadshow Creative Trust ("the Creative Trust").
428 In fact, the Creative Trust, which Mr Ziegler had drafted in January 1994, did not include Mr John Kirby as one of its beneficiaries. Of the Creative Trust's 25% interest in the profits of VRP, Mr Robert Kirby and Mr Burke were each entitled to 40% of the Creative Trust's interest, or 10% overall and Mr Coote to 20% or 5% overall. Subsequently, 1% of Mr Coote's 5% was transferred to Orrong/Mr Zeigler. (A further 1% of Mr Coote's 5% was offered to Mr Foo but he refused). According to VRL's 1998 Annual Report the Creative Trust ceased operations on 1 July 1997. The beneficiaries were said to be Mr Robert Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Coote. The agreement with VRL was "for the purpose of producing motion pictures."
429 Nevertheless, it seems to me that the Village Roadshow Group treated Mr John Kirby as a participant in the Creative Trust. For example, when the Board of VRL decided in July 1998 to terminate the Creative Trust it resolved "to compensate" both of the Kirby brothers and Mr Burke "for their interest in the Creative Trust" by retrospectively increasing their salaries.
430 Thus, if Mr John Kirby did share in some way in his brother's 10% and Mr Burke's 10%, there were four people, including Orrong/Mr Ziegler and its/his 1%, sharing 21% of the profits of VRP, and one quarter of 21% is 5.25%. Orrong was therefore to be rewarded by Mr Ziegler's work on Project Ballarat by increasing its share of the profits of VRP from 1% to 5.25%.
431 This explanation also gains some support, in my opinion, from the following statement by Mr Burke in his facsimile to Mr Kirby dated 8 September 1997:
"If you would like me to speak to him I can point out that two weeks before this issue was flagged you had spoken with John and myself reference giving Peter the same share of production profit as us."
432 However, whilst this may explain how the figure of 5.25% was reached, it does not really assist in determining what figure was offered at the September 1997 meeting. My main reason for accepting Mr Ziegler's evidence on this point is that neither Mr Kirby nor any of VRL's other relevant witnesses could explain how or when or why the extra 0.25% was added to Mr Kirby's alleged initial offer, other than it had something to do with the winding up of the Creative Trust. Somehow or other the figure was increased. Another reason is that it appears from the very few early documentary references to Orrong's entitlement that the figure was 5.25%. That is, the change would have had to occur very quickly if 5.25% had not already been agreed.
433 The only point of this issue is that it may assist in my assessment of the more important parts of the differing accounts of Mr Ziegler and Mr Kirby, to which I now turn. Orrong submitted that the critical part of Mr Ziegler's evidence was that:
(a) Mr Kirby said words to the effect that VRL would not pay the fee and that "in lieu you must accept a 5.25% in perpetuity, indefeasibly vested, equity interest in VRP";
(b) Mr Kirby said that the equity interest would remain vested in Mr Ziegler's company whether or not VRL used part or all of the Project Ballarat facility;
(c) he, Mr Ziegler, then said to Mr Kirby "but we are not just talking about profit" and Mr Kirby replied, "No, we are talking about equity";
(d) he, Mr Ziegler, asked Mr Kirby if Mr Kirby envisaged imposing any restriction on any dealing with that equity and Mr Kirby said he did not; and
(e) Mr Kirby then said words to the effect that "this equity is going to generate capital and income value to you for a long time into the future and if Project Ballarat works and your business model is a success, this equity is going to be worth much more than a fee of 5% on the $200 million you are going to raise."
434 Orrong submitted that the critical part of Mr Kirby's evidence was that:
(a) he said that he offered Mr Ziegler 5% "of the business he was helping to create" and said that "this would be a long term asset and give value over time far in excess of what he was expecting that day";
(b) when Mr Ziegler asked if he accepted the 5% how would it work, Mr Kirby replied that it would be "5% of the production business that we are creating";
(c) he told Mr Ziegler that he, Mr Ziegler, would have "an effective 5% ownership of the business he was helping to create";
(d) he did not use the terms "in perpetuity" or "indefeasibly vested" in his discussions with Mr Ziegler;
(e) he did not say that the interest would generate capital and income over time but instead he said that the interest would generate value;
(f) in answer to a question from me, he said that he had offered Mr Ziegler "5% of ownership" of the new VRP and that VRL would be flexible as to the way in which that equity would be reflected and that aspect was to be discussed with Mr Foo; and
(g) he said that prior to leaving for New York he had discussed with Mr John Kirby and Mr Burke giving Mr Ziegler a percentage of the new production company and a share of the profits.
435 Orrong submitted that this evidence established that an agreement had been reached concerning the fundamental nature of the interest granted by VRL to Orrong. It consisted of a 5.25% ownership interest in VRP and the right to 5.25% of the profits of VRP. Thus, the essential terms of the agreement were clear.
436 Orrong further submitted that both of these concepts were well known to Mr Kirby and Mr Ziegler in September 1997. Equity interests in the nature of an ownership interest had been granted by VRL or its subsidiaries to other senior executives within the Village Roadshow Group. The agreement with Mr Wesoky's company, ICFC LLC, was an example of this. Similarly, entitlements to share in the profits of a division within VRL had also been granted.
437 Therefore, Orrong submitted that the argument that the 1997 Agreement was void or unenforceable for uncertainty was without merit. The only possible uncertainty lay in giving practical effect to the ownership interest of Orrong. In any event, Orrong submitted, the Court will strive to uphold contracts that are made between parties even when there is a lack of clarity.[39]
438 In Vroon BV v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd[40], Ormiston J said:
"I would accept that in commercial transactions the court should strive to give effect to the expressed arrangements and expectations of those engaged in business, notwithstanding that there are areas of uncertainty and notwithstanding that particular terms have been omitted or not fully worked out ...
For myself I would doubt that businessmen would see it to be commercially unrealistic that there could be no contract where a 'vital' term had not been agreed upon or was omitted. However, they might well see it as unrealistic if the court were to treat as uncertain a term which they had agreed upon though in language which would not appeal to equity conveyancers. It is unreasonable to look at a business transaction and try to see how many difficulties could arise in the working-out of the contract where some minor term or other had not dealt with all those eventualities."
439 More recently, in Ipex Software Services Ltd v Hosking[41], Eames AJA confirmed this approach:
"... Hansen J was correct to conclude there was an intention to enter a binding agreement. Where there is such an intention between parties to an agreement the court will, if possible, give effect to that intention by overcoming difficulties said to arise from uncertainty or incompleteness.[42] Where businesspeople have reached agreement between themselves the courts should be slow to conclude that the words they have used, 'considered however broadly and untechnically and with due regard to all the just implications, fail to evince any definite meaning on which the court can safely act.'[43] The mere fact that the person seeking to enforce the agreement may have been improvident in the terms in which he permitted the agreement to be couched, and that the form of words adopted may allow the other party a latitude of choice as to the manner in which the stipulation will be carried into effect does not render the agreement void.[44] Nor does the fact that there may be more than one interpretation of what was meant render the agreement void for uncertainty; so long as the relevant term is capable of being assigned a meaning then the meaning is that which the court so assigns it.[45] The task of the court is to ascertain the intention of the parties and in so doing 'no narrow or pedantic approach is warranted, particularly in the case of commercial arrangements'."[46]
440 In my opinion, there is really no issue about Orrong's right to 5.25% of the profits of VRP. At one stage, VRL seemed to be arguing that even that part of the 1997 Agreement was uncertain because for a whole lot of reasons it was not clear how the "profits" were to be calculated, but in the end I understood that this point was but faintly pressed. This was understandable, in my opinion, given that VRL had acted on the agreement by calculating (without any apparent difficulty) and paying 5.25% of VRP's profits to Orrong for the 1998, 1999 and 2000 financial years. Further, as will be seen in the next part, even when these matters become disputed, it is still possible for them to be resolved.
441 The main issue, in my opinion, is what is meant by the 5.25% ownership interest which Orrong has in VRP. Here the differences in the evidence of Mr Ziegler and Mr Kirby concerning the terms of the 1997 Agreement become very important. Orrong relied on Mr Kirby's alleged description of a 5.25% "in perpetuity, indefeasibly vested, equity interest in VRP." In this context, I note that the terms "equity interest in perpetuity" and "indefeasibly vested" did not appear in the particulars given of the 1997 Agreement until June 2004.
442 As previously stated, Mr Kirby denied using the terms "in perpetuity" and "indefeasibly vested." They were not his words. I accept his denial. As VRL submitted, the terms in question are legal language. Having seen Mr Kirby in the witness box, I consider that they are not terms that he would ordinarily use. In my opinion, these terms were used by Mr Ziegler much later in the continuing dispute to explain what he understood he was entitled to under the 1997 Agreement rather than reflecting the actual terms of the offer made. See, for example, the wording of Mr Ziegler's memorandum to Mr Foo dated 23 October 2000 where he stated:
"The terms of PZ & Co's interest in VRP can be briefly stated as follows ... PZ & Co's interest in VRP is indefeasibly vested (i.e. it is not impacted by any termination of PZ & Co's agreement with VRL, the termination of VRP's business, a lack of continued funding of VRP, or otherwise whatsoever) ..."
443 I am strengthened in this conclusion by the terms of Mr Ziegler's own memo to Brian Wilson dated 18 May 2000, which included the following statement:
"PZ & Co. pursuant to its consultancy agreement, was entitled to a consultancy fee of 5% of US$216m - a sum of US$10.8m. This was rejected by VRL in September 1997 as being 'too large a fee', and VRL disputed the Company's entitlement to the same on the basis that '5% of finance raised' meant '5% of profits earned' rather than 5% of financing obtained.
PZ & Co was given an ultimatum:
'Project Ballarat would be cancelled unless PZ & Co accepted 5 1/4% of Village Roadshow Pictures ("VRP") in lieu of the abovementioned performance bonus.'
VRL having committed to CIBC and the insurers and with PZ & Co's reputation also on the line, PZ & Co had no alternative but to accept the proposal for this equity in VRP. ..."
Consistent with Mr Kirby's evidence of his offer to Mr Ziegler in the 8 September 1997 meeting, there was no reference in Mr Ziegler's account in this memorandum to a "5.25% in perpetuity, indefeasibly vested, equity interest in VRP." It is quite surprising, in my opinion, for these words not to have been repeated in the memorandum to Mr Wilson, if in fact they had been said by Mr Kirby.
444 Nevertheless, although Mr Kirby may not have said that he was offering an "in perpetuity, indefeasibly vested" interest in VRP, he did say that he offered a "5% ownership of the business" Mr Ziegler was "helping to create", the new VRP, which would "give value over time". In the light of this evidence, I reject VRL's argument that the equity interest should be restricted to a profit share entitlement. "Ownership" carries with it something more than a right to share in the profits. It involves something in the nature of capital, not just income.
445 VRL placed great reliance on the repeated references to "profit share" in Mr Ziegler's letter to Mr Jackman dated 16 February 1999. Orrong submitted that this was in no way a concession that the 5.25% equity interest was confined to a profit share. It was not relevant for Mr Ziegler to mention the ownership (or capital) aspect of Orrong's 5.25% equity interest in that letter, which dealt with the profit to be earned by VRL under Project Bendigo. I agree with this reading of Mr Ziegler's letter to Mr Jackman. It is made even clearer when the preceding letter is read.
446 Next, it is clear, in my opinion, that the 5.25% ownership or equity interest in VRP did not mean an actual shareholding by Orrong. As VRL submitted, the payment of a profit share to or at the direction of Orrong since 1998 was entirely inconsistent with a shareholding, which carries with it the right to the payment of a dividend. "Profit share" and "dividend" are quite distinct concepts.
447 Moreover, giving effect to the alternative declaration sought by Orrong of a 7.5% (or 5.25%) shareholding in all of the wholly owned subsidiaries and in all of the other VRP companies would mean, in practice, that Orrong would end up with more than a 7.5% (or 5.25%) interest in the shares of many of the companies in VRP because of the interlocking nature of the existing shareholdings. I therefore reject the argument that Orrong gained any shareholdings under the 1997 Agreement.
448 If the ownership or equity interest could not be represented by a shareholding, then I consider that it must have been intended to be an informal holding. I accept Mr Kirby's evidence that Mr Ziegler said that he may want flexibility to have his interest in the form of "shadow equity". However, I do not accept Mr Kirby's denial that he did not understand what Mr Ziegler meant by "shadow equity". It seems to me that in the context of this fiercely fought negotiation it is most unlikely that Mr Kirby would agree to something said by Mr Ziegler which he did not understand. Moreover, as one would expect of an experienced company director, it appeared from other correspondence that Mr Kirby well understood the concept. Thus, despite Mr Ziegler's varying evidence concerning taking the ownership interest in the form of shadow equity, I consider that this was what was agreed with Mr Kirby. In cross-examination, Mr Ziegler conceded in relation to the phrase "shadow equity" that he "might have said that" and that while he "really can't recall ... it would be something that I might say." Mr Ziegler later reversed his evidence on this point, saying "we didn't have the shadow equity conversation at all." Mr Ziegler later changed his position once more and gave evidence that "I don't think" that the phrase "shadow equity" was used. Mr Ziegler conceded that there were important benefits of shadow equity. He said: "It is more flexible to have shadow equity than actually shares, and it is easier to deal with in terms of minimisation of taxation impost, be they income tax or stamp duty." A desire by Mr Ziegler to take the interest as "shadow equity" would also be consistent with a reference to "a 'notional' allocation of options" in Mr Ziegler's letter of 27 November 1995 regarding the 1995 Agreement and his later references to his willingness to accept "economic equivalents" in relation to other matters in his memoranda dated 1 March 1998 and 3 March 1998. There was sense in such an arrangement. VRL could not afford to issue Orrong with 5.25% of the shares of the relevant VRP companies because this would mean that they were no longer wholly owned subsidiaries. Orrong did not need to hold the shares in order to receive dividends because it was already entitled to 5.25% of the profits of VRP, not merely 5.25% of any dividends. In my opinion, what Mr Ziegler was interested in was receiving 5.25% of the proceeds of any sale or float of VRP. This could be achieved by VRL paying Orrong that amount at the appropriate time in recognition of Orrong's 5.25% "ownership" interest.
449 Thus, I have concluded that under the 1997 Agreement, Orrong's rights, apart from a profit share, were limited to receiving 5.25% of the proceeds of any sale or float of VRP. I reach this conclusion because it seems to me that, even accepting Mr Kirby's version of the terms of the 1997 Agreement, he intended and agreed that Orrong would receive something more than simply a 5.25% share of VRP's profits.
450 Certainly this seems to be how Orrong's interest was treated thereafter within VRL. For example, in a memorandum dated 24 November 1999 from Mr Foo to Mr Ziegler concerning the 2000 Agreement negotiations Mr Foo referred to the "equity" which Mr Ziegler was "originally promised" and to Mr Ziegler having "71/2% of the go-forward benefit of the business." Further, in a memorandum dated 28 March 2000 again from Mr Foo to Mr Ziegler the former stated:
"We really should somewhere in the accounts note that Bruce Berman and yourself have a real equity participation in VRP. Certainly upon re-reading the accounts it was something that, given you are a director, should have been disclosed in the last couple of years and hasn't been."
Then, in a memorandum dated 19 April 2000 from Mr John Kirby to Mr Burke concerning a possible sale of equity in VRP, Mr John Kirby stated in respect of "the financial covenants that fund VRP" that:
"100% of the obligation is carried by VRL for 78.5% [sic] equity (after BB [Bruce Berman] and PAZ)."
The 2.25% Interest
451 Orrong submitted that the 2000 Agreement gave it a right to a further 2.25% of the profits of VRP and a right to a further 2.25% of the capital of VRP. It submitted that the 2.25% interest was of the same nature and quality as the 5.25% interest already held by Orrong.
452 Once again, although VRL admitted in its defence that on or about 21 June 2000 Mr Ziegler, alternatively Orrong, and VRL agreed in part that Mr Ziegler, alternatively Orrong, would receive, as previously agreed, a further 2.25% interest in relation to VRP, it then pleaded that the 2000 Agreement was void or unenforceable for uncertainty insofar as it purported to grant the 2.25% interest. Similar submissions in the alternative were made in relation to the 2.25% interest as were made in relation to the 5.25% interest.
453 It seems to me to be clear from the terms of Mr Foo's letter to Mr Ziegler dated 21 June 2000, which constituted the 2000 Agreement, that the 2.25% interest, like the 5.25% interest, comprised both an ownership interest in VRP and a right to receive profits. I note in particular that Mr Foo referred to an agreement "that you would be entitled to sell your interest in VRP on a pro rata basis" and that "in the event that Village wishes to sell 100% of its interests you will not withhold your share capriciously to hinder a bona fide sale by VRL."
454 The 7.5% ownership interest of Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler was similarly recognised by Mr Burke when he said in a memorandum dated 21 August 2001 to the Kirbys, Mr Foo, Mr Ziegler and Mr Basser concerning a possible sale of VRP:
"There could be a buyer that would be interested at a 50% threshold so they have equal say. This would mean our 50% viz 42.5% VRL and 7.5% PZ in a VRC style entity so it is a true joint venture ..."
I therefore find that the 2.25% interest was the same as the 5.25% interest.
455 I reject VRL's submission that because the parties subsequently disputed what had been agreed in June 2000 this meant that no agreement had in fact been reached. For example, the attempt by Mr Ziegler in his memorandum to Mr Foo dated 23 October 2000 to put a gloss on Orrong's interest went beyond what has been agreed. Mr Ziegler asserted that "PZ & Co's interest in VRP" would be dealt with:
"by PZ & Co in its absolute and unfettered discretion for all purposes as if it was a 7.5% shareholding or entitlement in all companies/activities comprising the VRP Division of VRL from time to time."
456 As VRL pointed out, this document was the first time that there is any written record of Mr Ziegler claiming on behalf of Orrong an entitlement to shares in VRP. It was not stated in his memorandum to Mr Jackman dated 16 January 1999, nor in his communications with Mr Wilson, nor in the 21 June 2000 signed agreement. Yet this was more than three years after the conversation with Mr Kirby on 8 September 1997. Thus, I cannot accept this part of Mr Ziegler's version of what had been agreed. But equally, as I have already said, just because this dispute arose subsequently does not mean that agreement had not been reached in June 2000.
The Declarations Sought by Orrong
457 As discussed above, there is considerable difficulty with the wording of the declarations sought by Orrong with respect to its claim to a 7.5% interest in VRP. With this in mind, VRL made the sensible suggestion that submissions concerning the formulation of any such declarations should be considered by the parties after they have had an opportunity to consider these reasons for judgment.
The Profit Share Claims
458 I turn then to consider the question of the profit shares claimed by Orrong, in particular the dispute over the calculation of the amount of those claims. As previously stated, VRL had paid Orrong its share of VRP's profit in respect of the 1998 and 1999 financial years and had paid a further $283,000 in respect of the profit share for the 2000 financial year, but nothing thereafter. Moreover, there was a dispute over whether the $283,000 was a part payment only or whether it had been paid "in full and final settlement" of the claim in respect of that year, as pleaded by VRL in paragraph 39 of its defence and counterclaim.
459 Thus, at the time the hearing commenced, Orrong sought payment of the balance of the 7.5% profit share for the 2000 financial year and the 7.5% profit share for each of the 2001 to 2004 financial years, with the amounts for the latter two years adjusted by Orrong for an alleged excessive rate of interest charged by VRL to VRP on capital invested (by way of equity or loan) in VRP (see paragraph 30A of the fifth further amended statement of claim). The actual amounts sought were as follows:
460 By the time of final submissions, after taking account of the evidence, Orrong's claim for unpaid profit shares had been reduced as follows:
The above profit figures have been calculated before tax and after significant and abnormal items.
461 VRL objected to the late revision in the amount of the VRP profit alleged by Orrong in the financial years ended 30 June 2002 and 2004. It argued that the increases should only be allowed after the formal granting of leave upon application by Orrong and that the Court should consider the prejudice caused to it by the failure to make the amendments earlier and to file expert evidence in support of the new calculations. However, it seems to me that Orrong's new figures were based on the expert evidence called by VRL itself, as adjusted for or reconciled with the disputed issues which were well known to VRL. I therefore consider that there is nothing in this objection.
462 VRL called evidence from a Chartered Accountant, Mr Gregory Meredith, who was a partner in the firm of Ferrier Hodgson. Mr Meredith had been instructed by VRL to prepare certain calculations and express his opinion on issues relating to the quantum of the profit shares.
463 Orrong's figures are to be compared with those put forward by VRL, based on Mr Meredith's calculations:
The figures in the right hand column are my calculations because VRL always maintained that it had other valid defences to any claim by Orrong for payment of the profit shares. Of course, Mr Meredith reached the same result, although he rounded to thousands of dollars.
464 One such defence was that even the agreement relating to profit shares was too uncertain to be enforceable. VRL submitted that it had never been agreed exactly how Orrong's profit share was to be calculated. For example, was it to be measured on an annual basis, with no allowance for losses, or were accumulated losses to be carried forward and offset against profits in later years? Mr Meredith prepared his report, on which VRL relied, on the basis that losses were not carried forward.
465 It seems to me that in the end the parties agreed that the differences between them in respect of the calculation of the profit share claims came down to four issues. They were:
(a) the Berman profit share,
(b) the VRL corporate allocation,
(c) the internal rate of the interest charged by VRL, and
(d) the adjustment for incorrectly calculated interest.
Each of these issues will be considered in turn.
466 Further, Orrong eventually accepted that no profit share was payable in respect of the 2003 financial year because there was no profit made by VRP in that year. It acknowledged that this would still be the case even if the disputed adjustment for interest was decided in Orrong's favour. Thus, no issue remained in respect of the year ended 30 June 2003.
The Berman Profit Share
467 The issue here is whether the profit share payable to Mr Berman should be added back to VRP's profit figure before calculating Orrong's 7.5% share.
468 Mr Meredith was instructed by VRL's solicitors that VRL conceded that in calculating Orrong's profit share, Orrong's profit share accrual as shown in VRP segment reporting should be added back, but no such instruction was given in respect of the Berman profit shares. Orrong submitted that VRL should also have conceded that in order to properly calculate Orrong's profit share, Mr Berman's profit share accruals should have been added back.
469 Mr Meredith did not inquire into this matter, or query his instructions from VRL's solicitors, which he simply accepted. Orrong submitted that Mr Meredith provided no reason for not adding back Mr Berman's profit share. It submitted that self evidently, if there were two recipients of shares of profit, unless there was some agreement to the contrary (and there was none here), each recipient's share was to be calculated by reference to 100% of the profit. Mr Raffe confirmed that VRL accounting staff followed this approach in calculating Orrong's profit share for 2000. Orrong pointed out that Mr Gower also regarded Mr Berman's profit share as indistinguishable from Orrong's profit share for the purpose of adjusting his December 1999 projection.
470 However, VRL submitted that the two profit shares were not the same. It submitted that a review of the profit share calculation in Mr Berman's employment contract revealed that it was based upon part only of the VRP business, namely that funded by Project Ballarat. This profit share payment to Mr Berman formed part of his remuneration as an employee and was simply an additional cost of the VRP division. The profit share payable to Mr Berman was not a "splitting" between VRL and Mr Berman of the overall profit of VRP.
471 I consider that, for the reasons advanced by it, VRL was correct in characterising the payment to Mr Berman as an additional cost which had to be deducted in order to arrive at the true VRP profit figure.
472 If I am wrong in concluding that the Berman profit share should not be added back, the parties were agreed that the outcome would be that VRP's profits would be improved by $1,982,000 for the 2000 financial year and by $879,000 for the 2002 financial year, being the amounts of Mr Berman's profit share in those respective years.
The VRL Corporate Allocation
473 This issue arose out of an adjustment made by Mr Meredith in reducing the profits of VRP by allocating certain corporate overheads to VRP in respect of each of the 2000 to 2002 financial years.
474 VRL submitted that in calculating the profits of VRP, and consequently any profit share of Orrong, account should be taken of overheads of VRL properly attributable to VRP. As Ms Raffe explained, allocation of central overhead expenses in the management accounts (red folder) commenced in the year ended 30 June 2000 (although not in the segment results because the Accounting Standards required that they be excluded). Prior to that, central overhead expenses were not allocated because VRP was very small and it had not been treated as a separate entity. Thus, Ms Raffe agreed that Orrong's profit share in the 1998 and 1999 financial years had been calculated and paid "on the basis of the company's [VRL's] published accounts." However, she made the point that in those years the figures in the segment reports and the management accounts would have been the same.
475 Although Ms Raffe said that allocation of central overhead expenses in the management accounts commenced in the 2000 financial year, she also said that they were not included in the segment reporting for the 2000 to 2002 financial years. Ms Raffe said that:
"the VRL consolidation information, which is used for the preparation of segment reporting, does not provide for comprehensive allocation of overhead expenses incurred by VRL at a corporate level but attributable to the VRP division."
476 Corporate overheads were charged to VRP in the 2003 and 2004 financial years and this was not disputed by Orrong. Accordingly, Ms Raffe said that there should be an allocation of corporate overheads before calculating Orrong's share of VRP profits for the preceding three years. Ms Raffe denied that the motivation behind the raising of this issue was to decrease the amount payable to Orrong for its profit share. She said that overheads should always have been charged.
477 Mr Meredith expressed the view that having allocated expenses for the 2003 and 2004 financial years it was appropriate that "an allocation should also be made for FY 2000 to FY 2002 for overhead charges from VRL to VRP."
478 Mr Meredith referred to the change to AASB 1005 Segment Expenses which applied from 1 July 2001. He said that this justified allocating such expenses in the 2002 financial year. He suggested that the later version was "narrower" or "more restrictive" and therefore that this justified the overhead allocation also being made for the 2000 and 2001 financial years.
479 Orrong submitted that there should be no adjustment for corporate overheads. It pointed out that the published accounts of VRL for the 2000 to 2002 financial years, which had all been approved by VRL management, the VRL Board and VRL's external auditors, did not include these additional charges to VRP.
480 Orrong submitted that Mr Meredith's suggestion that a change to the accounting standard concerning segment reporting was a basis for adding overheads for the 2000 to 2002 financial years was plainly contrived and unsupportable. The revised accounting standard applied from 1 July 2001 not 1 July 1999, and in any event it was not "narrower."
481 VRL argued that the fact that the audited financial statements for the 2000 to 2002 financial years did not include overhead allocations was of little or no weight. The question for the Court was whether the proper calculation of VRP's profit, within the meaning of the 1997 and 2000 Agreements, required that such overheads be allocated in the financial years in question. VRL made the obvious point that to calculate the profits of VRP without allowance for such overheads would overstate the profits and thus Orrong's share.
482 VRL further argued that the expert evidence of Mr Meredith was that the overheads should be allocated. No expert evidence was led by the plaintiff contradicting this opinion.
483 I have reached the view that, notwithstanding that the published accounts of VRL for the 2000 to 2002 financial years do not contain any allocation of corporate overheads to VRP, this is an item which VRL would be entitled to take into account when calculating Orrong's profit share in those years. The question must always be what was VRP's profit in the relevant year and whilst the published accounts are the starting point they may not be conclusive. If they were, Orrong would not be able to challenge the alleged excessive interest charge in the 2004 financial year.
484 The next question is the amount of corporate overheads which should be used in the calculations of the profit share for each of the 2000 to 2002 financial years. VRL submitted that they should be $2.3 million, $2.602 million and $3.406 million respectively. These figures were based on Mr Meredith's report, which in turn was based on a document given to him in his instructions (Appendix Z to his report). This document was subsequently identified by Ms Raffe as "information prepared by Stuart Boxer in November 2002 being prior to the commencement of this proceeding and for unrelated reasons." Mr Boxer was the chief financial officer of VRP at the time. Ms Raffe later agreed that the Boxer document was produced in January 2002. It was not produced for any accounting purpose. She "guessed" that it was produced in response to a request from Ambac. She was not provided with a copy of the document at the time but only "as part of this proceeding." She was not "entirely sure" what VRL did with the document at the time. She did not believe it was acted on.
485 Orrong submitted that the Boxer document was effectively the unsubstantiated and unsourced opinion of a VRL employee who was not called as a witness. No explanation was given for not calling Mr Boxer. There was no evidence provided of the method of compilation or basis of assessment. No evidence was led from witnesses concerning their view as to the reasonableness of the allocation of their time spent on VRP matters in the 2000 to 2002 financial years. VRL pointed out that Ms Raffe had said that the document reflected a reasonable allocation of the time and charges incurred and reasonably expected to be incurred.
486 VRL also sought to rely on Mr Meredith's evidence that it was "a reasonable document to use" in making these calculations. Mr Meredith had said in his report that he "assessed the overhead expenses incurred by VRL in FY 2000 to FY 2002 that should be allocated to VRP on the basis of the Overheads Summary Sheet ..." and on the basis that he had "no other documentation on which to make such an allocation." He had "assumed that the allocation to VRP in the Overheads Summary" represented "a fair and reasonable allocation of VRL overheads costs attributable to VRP." But, as Orrong submitted, Mr Meredith did not make any assessment of the reasonableness of the information contained in the document. He simply accepted the document at face value:
"I was instructed that it was, it was provided in my instructions, and I was instructed that it was a proper analysis, and on the face of it it appeared to be a document which wasn't prepared in recent times as a hindsight reconstruction, that it was prepared at a time relevant prior to the proceeding, and on the basis that I was instructed that it was a, as to what it was I formed the view that it is a reasonable document to use."
His opinion was therefore, in my opinion, totally unsubstantiated.
487 I am not persuaded that I can place any reliance on this document. In the absence of any evidence from Mr Boxer himself as to the purpose of the document, how he went about compiling the figures, what role he played in assessing the reasonableness of the figures, and whether the document was final or only a draft, and in the absence of any evidence from the senior executives who were in fact called as to whether the allocation of their time to VRP matters was reasonable, I do not consider that VRL has discharged the onus on it of establishing the amount of overhead expenses which should be deducted from VRL's previously published figures of VRP's profits in each of the 2000 to 2002 financial years. Ms Raffe's evidence was not sufficient to overcome all of the above omissions, in my opinion.
488 It therefore seems to me that the deductions of $2.3 million, $2.602 million and $3.406 million respectively made by VRL for corporate overhead expenses in its calculation of VRP's profits for the financial years 2000 to 2002 were not correct. There should be no adjustments to VRP's profits for this item.
The Internal Rate of the Interest Charged by VRL
489 It goes without saying that in calculating VRP's profits for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of Orrong's profit share VRL cannot introduce baseless or fictitious internal charges simply to reduce the amount of VRP's profits and thus the amount payable by VRL to Orrong. It was submitted by Orrong that VRL's charging of interest at the rate of 18% per annum compounding monthly on the amount allegedly owed by VRP to VRL in respect of film financing in the 2003 and 2004 financial years was an example of such an improper charge. Orrong accepted that interest on capital invested by VRL (by way of equity or loan) in VRP could be charged, but submitted that it should only be 6.25% per annum, which was said to be the average rate charged by VRL to other of its business divisions in the 2004 financial year (the loss making 2003 financial year no longer being relevant). Orrong submitted that this change would result in an improvement of $14.175 million in VRP's results for the 2004 financial year.
490 Ms Raffe explained in her witness statement that as part of the restructure of the film financing facility in February 2003, VRL made, amongst other things, an inter-company loan to VRP of US$100 million by way of subordinated debt akin to equity and in addition made available the sum of US$70 million as funds on deposit. These arrangements were not the subject of documentation, but were nonetheless agreed between the companies. She said that the interest on the inter-company loan was charged at the rate of 18% compounding monthly (that is, 19.08% per annum in 2003 and 19.56% per annum in 2004) for the period 11 February 2003 to 30 June 2003 and for the subsequent year ended 30 June 2004. She also noted that there was an overcharge for interest in the 2004 financial year and that this was corrected in the segment results for the six months ending December 2004.
491 Mr Foo said that the decision to charge an interest rate on the lending of 18% was made by him in about April or May 2003 "as part of his responsibilities as Finance Director" after investigations of sourcing third party funding at that time revealed the fact that they would be seeking a return of between 19 and 23%. Documents were produced which supported this assertion.
492 Mr Foo gave evidence in respect of using a different interest rate than the one regularly employed in inter-company loans from VRL:
"You have never used a third party benchmark for any money employed at any time before 1 July 2003, have you? --- Yes, I have. I mean if you look at the New Zealand loan, the New Zealand loan had a 3.5 per cent margin, when I was lending to Roadshow we would charge 4.5 per cent margins, it is all about the profile of that particular subsidiary or business we were lending to.
Village Roadshow, sorry, Roadshow Distributors is only 50 per cent owned by Village Roadshow Limited? --- That is correct, and at times we funded Roadshow because they required money, and the other partner didn't have any money, so we lent them money and on that basis I would charge them a 4.5 per cent premium to market."
493 Ms Raffe also gave oral evidence that particular charges were sometimes at other than usual inter-company loan rate:
"So there, rather than passing on to the Exhibition division the average cost of raising funds across the whole company, you passed on to the Exhibition division the particular cost of raising a particular kind of finance because it was directed to Exhibition? --- That is correct.
In other words, the reason why those particular funds were raised was because Exhibition needed funds? --- That is correct.
And that was a basis upon which you passed on the cost at that somewhat higher rate to Exhibition? --- That is correct."
"This is, the decision to employ some of Village Roadshow Limited's funds in the part of its business which is called VRP is just a decision to employ funds, isn't it? --- It is a decision to employ funds based on risk and I have never, I have to say to you, Mr Dreyfus, I have never had to cut a cheque for a division for US$177 million, almost $300 million, and for me to just say, that is just normal business, it wasn't, it was something unusual, I had done a lot of the negotiation on the transaction with the third party players, and I say to you the charge of that interest at 18 per cent is cheap compared to what those guys were going to charge us for that equity.
But what did the funds cost Village Roadshow Limited, Mr Foo? --- Mr Dreyfus, the funds did actually cost Village Roadshow a lot of money indirectly, because it had to sell its Korean business, and it sold its UK business to be able to support this injection of funds into Village Roadshow Pictures.
I will ask the question again. What did the funds cost Village Roadshow Limited? --- It didn't cost the Village - at that stage it didn't cost the Village Roadshow Limited anything, it cost Village Roadshow the opportunity cost of the interest that it wasn't earning on those funds."
495 In his report Mr Meredith supported the interest charge of 18%:
"In respect of the interest charged on the Subordinate Loan:
• An appropriate rate of interest reflects the risk of the investment.
• The best guide to an appropriate rate is the market.
• On the information available to me, the market at the relevant time required an interest rate in the region of 19% to 22%.
• Accordingly an interest rate of 18% does not appear to be unreasonable.
• The interest charge from VRP to VRL in the profit and loss account for FY 2003 and FY 2004 does not warrant adjustment on account of the subordinated debt interest rate.
• A further interest adjustment is required for FY 2004 of AUD 6.889m."
496 Mr Meredith compared the amount of the inter-company loan with the five other potential sources referred to by Mr Foo. He gave oral evidence on the point:
"And do we understand from your report that you conclude from looking at these documents that if one or more third party investors had been prepared to lend money for the purposes of VRP, they would have been seeking interest rates of varying amounts between, I think your lowest is 20 per cent and your highest is 36 per cent, is that right? --- I think the lowest is 19 per cent, which is reflected in the Ira Shaw email where he says, talks 19 to 21 per cent for I think it was a base return, and then numbers up to 36 per cent are talked about in respect of the ABRY proposal."
497 Orrong submitted that there was clear evidence that:
(a) the funds allocated by VRL to the operation of its VRP division in 2004 did not cost VRL anything because they came from VRL's cash reserves (apart from Mr Foo's unfounded claim that there was an "opportunity cost lost of not being able to earn interest on those funds");
(b) VRL had never used "opportunity cost" as a basis for charging interest on funds provided to or by its divisions: on the contrary, before July 2003 the practice of VRL, in keeping with accounting principles, was to charge interest by reference to the actual cost of obtaining the funds, with a small margin for administration;
(c) the decision to charge 18% compounding interest was made purportedly by Mr Foo, but was completely undocumented;
(d) the charging of 18% compounding interest was not justified by any accounting practice, accounting standards or VRL's existing practice and Ms Raffe, the Chief Financial Officer of VRL, said that she could not provide any justification for it; and
(e) the 18% compounding interest charge to VRP was an internal accounting entry. It did not appear in the published VRL accounts at all, because it was eliminated on the group consolidation and interest was excluded from the segment analysis.
498 Orrong further submitted that the opinion evidence of Mr Meredith concerning the alleged "reasonableness" of the 18% compounding interest charge was irrelevant and should be disregarded. Mr Meredith made no inquires about the actual cost of funds to VRL, or "opportunity cost" to VRL. The "cost of debt" stated in the VRL calculations Mr Meredith used was 6.15% for June 2004. His evidence was that he had not considered mark ups or margins in recording expenses in the segment reporting process. He had not considered the interest charge spreadsheets for 2001-2004.
499 Orrong submitted that there was simply no basis for imposing an interest charge of 18% compounding for funds provided by VRL not to an external partner, or third party, but to one of its own divisions for use in VRL's own business when that rate was completely unrelated to any actual cost or expense incurred by VRL. To put it another way, there was no basis for creating some notional expense for VRP to incur when VRL in fact incurred no such expense.
500 Orrong accordingly submitted that the 2004 VRP profit calculated by VRL should be adjusted to reflect the interest rate used for other divisions.
501 In response, VRL submitted that the basis upon which Orrong disputed the higher interest charge was quite unclear. It argued that Orrong did not allege any contractual or other right to limit the interest rate and that it was not alleged that the charge was not in fact made. VRL also referred to the unproductive cross-examination as to whether the charge was permitted by the applicable accounting standards.
502 VRL rejected the criticism of Mr Meredith's independent opinion, based on the fact that he himself was not involved in the transactions or had not separately sourced market statistics from the relevant time. VRL submitted that it would be an absurd result if VRL was only able to charge the other entities within the Group the cost of the debt actually incurred by it, when it was able to reduce the cost of debt by lending the money itself (providing it had the funds available) at slightly below market price so as to produce a win-win situation for VRL and the borrowing entity.
503 VRL further submitted that there was no evidence cited by Orrong for the proposition that VRL charged interest on capital invested by it (by way of equity or loan) in its other divisions at an average rate of 6.25% per annum. It pointed out that previously Orrong had alleged that the figure was 7%. VRL's documents showed that there had been a range of interest rates charged by it, some well in excess of 6.25%.
504 In my opinion, the evidence given by Mr Foo and Ms Raffe showed that this high interest rate was not arbitrary. It was based on what VRP would have had to pay if the money had been borrowed from outside sources. In the circumstances, it seems to me to be reasonable to charge a higher than normal rate for the funds invested by VRL in VRP. This was what had occurred previously, although the differential was never that great. I therefore reject the submission that the interest charged by VRL was improper.
505 If I had reached the opposite conclusion, then other uncertainties remained because I agree with VRL's submission that Orrong had not made out any justification for using an interest rate of 6.25%.
506 If the interest of $14.175 million is not added back, then VRP has made a loss in the 2004 financial year and no profit share is payable to Orrong for that year.
Incorrectly Calculated Interest
507 Mr Meredith gave evidence that although VRL may have thought that it was charging interest at 19.56% per annum during the 2004 financial year, in fact the amount of interest charged worked out to be an effective rate of interest for that year of 15.12%. VRL therefore sought to charge a further expense of $6.889 million representing the amount of the difference between interest at 19.56% and interest at 15.12%
508 In my opinion, it follows from my finding that VRL was justified in charging interest at 19.56% that this extra amount could legitimately be taken into account. VRL's calculation of VRP's profit in the 2004 financial year having been challenged by Orrong, I see no reason why VRL should not now be entitled to correct its earlier arithmetic error.
509 However, this issue is no longer relevant given that the result of my finding in favour of VRL on the charging of the higher rate of interest was that VRP made a small loss of $51,000 in the 2004 financial year. Whether that small loss should be increased by the extra $6.889 million is not to the point once VRP is shown to have made a loss in the 2004 financial year.
Summary
510 The result of the above analysis of the four disputed issues is that, after adding back the amounts of the corporate overheads, the amounts of Orrong's 7.5% profit shares would be as follows:
Full and Final Settlement
511 There is one rather unusual issue which remains to be considered in respect of this topic. In its defence and counterclaim VRL pleaded that a further reason why there was nothing owing to Orrong in respect of the profit share for the 2000 financial year was that in about September 2000 VRL agreed to pay and Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler agreed to accept the sum of $283,000 in full and final settlement of the claim for the profit share in that year. In its reply and defence to counterclaim Orrong denied the allegation that the $283,000 had been paid in full and final settlement.
512 It seemed to me that the evidence that there was such an agreement was compelling.
513 Ms Raffe said in her witness statement that in or around August 2000, Mr Ziegler told her that his percentage interest in VRP was 7.5% and that this needed to be factored into the calculation of his profit share for the year ended 30 June 2000. Ms Raffe said she informed Mr Ziegler that she would check this and that she spoke with Mr Foo who told her that the effective date should be 31 December 1999, as that was the date the Castlemaine facility became effective.
514 By a memorandum dated 29 August 2000 Mr Foo wrote to Mr Ziegler explaining this decision, copying the memo to Ms Raffe. He said to Mr Ziegler:
"For the sake of expediency in trying to finalise the year-end numbers and your profit share, I have taken an executive decision to make this with effect from the 31/12/99. The rationale for this is simple. It is approximately the time the Castlemaine facility was first utilised. I hope you agree with this simple allocation."
After receiving the memorandum and the calculation of his entitlement in an amount of $283,000 utilising the rate of 6.375% mentioned by Ms Raffe, Mr Ziegler rendered a September 2000 invoice for $283,000. Mr Foo authorised the payment of this invoice. Ms Raffe then approved the drawing of a cheque for $283,000 on or about 11 October 2000 and payment was made on 17 October 2000.
515 Although in his witness statement Mr Ziegler mentioned, without further comment, having received the $283,000 he gave no other evidence in respect of this issue in his subsequent witness statements. When cross-examined he said for the first time that his invoice for $283,000:
"was prepared and served by me because that was the minimum amount I would receive as profit in the year ending 30 June 2000. Mr Foo and I were still discussing the fact that he wanted pro rata the 2.25% for one half of the year, I said no, it should be 2.25% for the whole of the year as profit could only be established at the end of the year. He said, Peter, lets discuss it, and in the interim put in an invoice for one half of 2.25% added to the 5.25 meaning 6.375, and I will pay that, and we will talk about it."
Mr Ziegler said that he disagreed with Ms Raffe's witness statement.
516 There was no documentary evidence to support Mr Ziegler save for his handwritten note to Mr Foo on the invoice that they "were going to also talk about 'time value of money' bearing in mind the 6.375% rather than 7.5%." In my opinion, this was an entirely different matter. The time value of money related to when an entitlement was paid, not to what the entitlement was. Indeed, Mr Ziegler's note on the invoice indicated an acceptance of the 6.375% calculation. Viewed objectively, there had been an offer to treat the payment in that manner and that offer had been accepted. If Mr Ziegler did not agree with this approach, he should not have banked the cheque, or at the very least have made it clear that it was accepted only "on account."
517 Mr Ziegler admitted that he had never rendered a subsequent invoice relating to the profit share for the year 30 June 2000. Further, as Ms Raffe said during her cross-examination in respect of Mr Ziegler's September 2000 invoice:
"generally if Mr Ziegler had a problem with one of his invoices he would let me know, and I would mark it as being on account. Didn't do so in this case so I wasn't aware there was anything outstanding."
"He continued to press for payment I suggest to you, Ms Raffe, in respect of the 2000 year going forward into the future? --- Not with me he didn't."
518 The question that then arises is what flows from this finding. As previously stated, Orrong rejected that there was any such agreement which meant that given its new profit figure for that year it had to concede that there was a credit of $25,525 due to VRL. On my findings, this would now become a credit of $174,175. On the other hand, VRL played down its previous suggestion that there had been full and final settlement and was apparently content to accept the amount of any credit conceded by Orrong.
519 In my opinion, there was a compromise reached between VRL and Orrong in respect of the quantum of the profit share payable in respect of the 2000 financial year. The $283,000 was paid and accepted in full and final settlement which meant that Orrong could not claim anything more for that year, but equally VRL could not claim any of it back, regardless of what later calculations of VRP's profit might reveal.
Conclusion
520 Therefore, the 2000 financial year becomes irrelevant and the amount of the 7.5% profit shares which, subject to the defences discussed below, would be payable to Orrong are $927,750 for the 2001 financial year and $1,996,650 for the 2002 financial year, a total of $2,924,400.
The Roadshow Distributors Group Facility Performance Bonus Claim
521 Orrong claimed that it was entitled to receive a 5% performance bonus of $3.724 million in respect of the $75 million Roadshow Distributors Group facility provided by CIBC in June 2001 ("the RDG facility"). The amount of the fee claimed was reduced from $3.75 million after deducting the legal costs and establishment fees from the amount of the facility for the purposes of calculating the fee. Orrong submitted that the RDG facility was a " 'non/limited recourse' financing" raised by the Village Roadshow Group within the meaning of performance bonus (d) in the 1995 Agreement.
522 The background to this dispute is that in late 2000 Westpac unexpectedly decided to terminate its relationship with the Roadshow Distributors Group which had existed for more than 30 years. That decision by Westpac, together with its conduct in the interim of charging a significantly higher interest rate and requiring substantial reductions in the outstanding debt as well as additional shareholder guarantees, placed the Roadshow Distributors Group in a very difficult position. It was required to arrange alternative finance at very short notice. Because of this, it would appear Mr Burke approached Mr Ziegler in late 2000 or early 2001 and asked him to become involved in the efforts to raise a new facility for the Roadshow Distributors Group. Mr Ziegler said that Mr Burke asked him to establish a new "limited recourse debt facility", which was denied by Mr Burke. Given the existing disputes about Orrong's claims for significant bonuses, in particular for " 'non/limited recourse' financing", it is inherently improbable, in my opinion, that Mr Burke would have made such a request.
523 In his witness statement Mr Ziegler said that in a meeting with Mr Kirby and Mr Burke on 23 April 2001 the issue of fees payable to Orrong for future non/limited recourse finance raisings for the VRL Group was discussed. According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby said that Orrong should forego all future fees on finance raising due to the large amount that had already been paid by way of performance bonuses and the continuing scrutiny of these payments by shareholders and market analysts. Mr Ziegler told Mr Kirby and Mr Burke that Orrong was not prepared to waive any fees for services performed or to be performed and that he expected Orrong to be paid a 5% fee on the Roadshow Distributors financing that was then being negotiated, if it was successful. Mr Ziegler asked Mr Kirby and Mr Burke if they wanted him to discontinue providing services which would be remunerated in accordance with the 1995 Agreement and both Mr Burke and Mr Kirby said that Mr Ziegler should continue to work on the various tasks that had been assigned to him. Mr Ziegler said that on the next day, 24 April 2001 he had another conversation with Mr Burke. According to Mr Ziegler, Mr Burke said that Mr Ziegler should waive all future performance bonuses for VRL finance raisings due to the large amount of compensation that Orrong had already received in the 2001 financial year but that he refused.
524 Both Mr Kirby and Mr Burke denied that there was any specific reference to the Roadshow Distributors fee in their conversation on 23 April 2001.
525 In his oral evidence Mr Ziegler was far less specific about the Roadshow Distributors fee. He said that Mr Kirby and Mr Burke said:
"Peter, we think you are overpaid, we want you to waive your fees. I said, no, I am not waiving my fees, Roadshow Distributors, VRP or anything, tell me if you want me to cease work. They said, no, no, keep working. I said, fine."
In a memorandum dated 7 August 2001 Mr Ziegler responded to Mr Foo's rejection of Orrong's invoice for the Roadshow Distributors performance bonus. He said:
"You should further note, that Graham Burke and Robert Kirby on Monday 23 April 2001 suggested for various reasons that PZ & Co. should forgo its fees on Village Roadshow Pictures and other capital raisings for the Village Roadshow Group. This was unequivocally rejected. In a follow up conversation on Tuesday 24 April with Graham Burke a similar proposition was put which was once again rejected."
The lack of any specific reference in this contemporaneous communication to Mr Ziegler stating that he expected Orrong to be paid its fee on the Roadshow Distributors financing is significant, in my opinion. I therefore find that there was no specific mention or acceptance that Mr Ziegler's work on the Roadshow Distributors financing would entitle Orrong to a 5% performance bonus.
526 Mr Foo said that upon receipt of the invoice for this fee he quickly told Mr Ziegler that he was not entitled to it. He said that Mr Ziegler replied words to the effect "Because VRL screwed me elsewhere I have issued the invoice." Mr Ziegler denied this. Mr Foo sent Mr Ziegler a memorandum dated 6 August 2001 in which he rejected the claim. He said that it:
"does not constitute non recourse borrowings of the nature intended nor embodied in your contract."
"Peter, I have not verbalised this with you as I find it necessary to have this issue in writing."
This rather contradicted Mr Foo's evidence about an earlier discussion.
527 Mr Burke said that he did not hear about Orrong's claim for a performance bonus on the RDG facility until August 2001, probably when he received Mr Ziegler's email of 20 August 2001 seeking Mr Burke's assistance in arranging for Mr Foo to pay the invoice. Mr Burke said that he then had a discussion with Mr Ziegler during which Mr Ziegler agreed that Orrong had no entitlement to a performance fee in relation to the RDG financing and that Mr Ziegler said that "he withdrew his request for the fee". Mr Burke said that he told Mr Ziegler that "he had restored my faith in him" and the two of them shook hands.
528 On 21 August 2001, following this meeting, Mr Burke wrote to Mr Ziegler. Despite purportedly having reached such an agreement, Mr Burke made no mention of it. Instead, he set out a number of reasons why a performance bonus was not payable and "confirmed" what he had said that morning that he "saw this transaction as part of the retainer that we pay you from Village and is just a service VRL did for the Roadshow group." There was also no mention by Mr Burke of this "agreement" in his further memorandum to Mr Ziegler on 16 November 2001. Nor did Mr Foo make any mention of Orrong having agreed to withdraw its claim for a performance bonus in respect of the RDG facility when he wrote to Mr Ziegler rejecting his claim for such a bonus on 30 October 2001. I agree with Orrong's submission that, if such an agreement had been reached, it is extraordinary that Mr Burke and Mr Foo would not have referred to it in their memoranda to Mr Ziegler between August and November 2001. Therefore, I do not accept Mr Burke's evidence about having reached an agreement with Mr Ziegler that the claim would be withdrawn. In any event, VRL did not rely on any such agreement as preventing or defeating Orrong's claim. It relied on other defences to which I now turn.
529 Apart from its general defences, VRL specifically pleaded that Orrong was not entitled to receive a performance bonus in respect of the RDG facility because it was:
(a) not finance raised for the Village Roadshow Group, but finance raised for Roadshow Distributors Pty Ltd ("Roadshow Distributors");
(b) not raised as a direct result of the efforts of either Mr Ziegler or Orrong;
(c) not "non/limited recourse" finance;
(d) not new finance but rather finance to replace an existing facility; and
(e) not fully drawn down in any event.
530 Each of these contentions will be examined in turn.
The Meaning of "The Village Roadshow Group"
531 Orrong submitted that at all material times VRL treated Roadshow Distributors and its subsidiaries, the Roadshow Distributors Group, as part of the Village Roadshow Group, in particular, as part of the Distribution Division. The corporate structure charts reflected this approach. So did the Annual Reports of VRL. At all material times the Roadshow Distributors Group had the same corporate logo as the Village Roadshow Group. The Roadshow Distributors Group offices were located within offices of the Village Roadshow Group.
532 On the other hand, VRL pointed out that Roadshow Distributors was in fact 50% owned by VRL and 50% owned by Amalgamated Holdings Ltd, both through wholly owned subsidiaries. Roadshow Distributors had its own Board of Directors with an equal number of representatives from both parent companies, and its own management team. VRL emphasised that its Annual Reports described Roadshow Distributors as an "Associated Entity" of VRL and not a controlled entity. Thus, VRL submitted that although Roadshow Distributors was a company in which VRL had a significant investment, it was not an investment which gave it a controlling interest. As Mr Foo explained, although VRL sometimes invoiced Roadshow Distributors for expenses incurred on its behalf, Roadshow Distributors did not always agree with the invoice or pay it.
533 In my opinion, a partial explanation for some of the close involvement of VRL personnel, such as Mr Foo and Mr Philip Leggo, the Group Company Secretary of VRL, in management of the Roadshow Distributors Group lay in the fact that by agreement with Amalgamated Holdings Ltd, VRL managed the Roadshow Distributors Group on behalf of both parent companies. This also explained why VRL personnel were involved in the negotiation of the RDG facility. The Management Agreement would also explain why the moneys advanced under the RDG facility in June 2001 were paid directly to a VRL subsidiary, Village Roadshow Treasury Pty Ltd.
534 Thus, it appears to me that none of the above matters could be considered conclusive. Further, it must be remembered that it is not a question of whether as a matter of strict definition in accounting or legal terms the Roadshow Distributors Group of companies was part of the Village Roadshow Group, but what was the meaning of the expression "the Village Roadshow Group" when used in the relevant correspondence.
535 In this regard, Orrong drew attention to an undated account from Orrong in respect of its performance bonus for taxes saved in the financial year ended 30 June 1995. One of the items listed in the calculation of the amount of the performance bonus was:
"Degrouping of the Roadshow Group from VRL for NSW and Victorian payroll tax purposes."
Mr Foo agreed in cross-examination that his handwritten note alongside that item indicated that the relevant amount was to be recharged to Roadshow Distributors. Mr Foo subsequently authorised payment of the agreed amount of this account, $250,000, in full when it was re-submitted by an invoice dated January 1996.
536 Thus, Orrong submitted that one of the extrinsic facts known to the parties at the time of the making of the 1995 Agreement was that under the 1993 Agreement taxes saved on behalf of the Roadshow Distributors Group were subsumed under, or accepted as coming within, the expression "the Village Roadshow Group" for the purpose of calculating Orrong's performance bonuses.
537 Further, even though it was after the making of the 1995 Agreement, it is interesting to observe that in March 1998 a claim for a performance bonus of $89,683 in respect of "the refund of overpaid stamp duty on film hire from the Victorian and Tasmanian State Revenue Offices" was paid by VRL to Remut and then recharged to Roadshow Distributors. Orrong emphasised that at no time had VRL asserted that the performance bonus was not payable because the tax refunds were obtained for the Roadshow Distributors Group and not "the Village Roadshow Group."
538 More importantly, in his witness statement Mr Foo referred to a conversation he had with Mr Ziegler prior to Mr Foo writing his letter of 4 May 1993 to Mr Ziegler. Mr Foo said that in that conversation they discussed the terms of the incentives payable in respect of tax savings for the Village Roadshow Group. Mr Ziegler gave as an example "the stamp duty refunds he had been working on for the Roadshow Group of companies." Mr Foo did not dispute this suggestion that a stamp duty refund for the Roadshow Distributors Group would be an example of a tax saving for the Village Roadshow Group in respect of which a performance bonus would be payable. Instead, he said that he agreed with Mr Ziegler's proposal.
539 This suggests to me that at the time of the making of the 1993 Agreement Mr Foo accepted and understood that the Roadshow Distributors Group was to be considered part of the Village Roadshow Group. This view is borne out by Mr Foo's conduct in 1995 referred to above (prior to the making of the 1995 Agreement) in accepting that taxes saved on behalf of the Roadshow Distributors Group came within the expression "the Village Roadshow Group."
540 I am therefore satisfied that at the time of the making of the 1995 Agreement the parties intended that the Roadshow Distributors Group was to be treated as coming within the meaning of the expression "the Village Roadshow Group."
Mr Ziegler's Efforts
541 The second reason advanced by VRL in support of the contention that no fee was payable in respect of the RDG facility was that the finance was not raised "as a direct result of the efforts" of either Mr Ziegler or Orrong. In fact, these words do not appear in the 1995 Agreement. Nothing is said as to precisely what Orrong had to do to earn the performance bonuses. However, the words "as a direct result of my efforts" do appear in respect of performance bonus (b) in the 1993 Agreement, which became performance bonus (c) in the 1995 Agreement. Thus, in the 1993 Agreement a distinction was drawn between Mr Ziegler's role in respect of "tax savings made" and "tax refunds ... obtained", on the one hand, and " 'non-recourse' financing raised ... as a direct result of my efforts", on the other. This could well have been because the former would undoubtedly result from Mr Ziegler's efforts in his role as VRL's taxation adviser, whereas many people would probably be involved in the raising of finance. In my opinion, the use of the expression "as a direct result of my efforts" in the 1993 Agreement was intended to allow a performance bonus to be claimed for the raising of finance only where Mr Ziegler had played such a primary or dominant role that it could be said to have resulted in the raising of the finance. Mere participation in the transaction along with many others was not sufficient.
542 VRL submitted that this distinction was picked up for the 1995 Agreement by the introductory words "performance bonus elements (a), (b) and (c) below are the same as within my existing contract with VRL." But, as Orrong pointed out, performance bonus (d) was new in the 1995 Agreement. I consider, however, that an appropriate reading of performance bonus (d) was to import into it the concept that the particular finance raised had to be "as a direct result of [his] efforts."
543 VRL drew attention to the Oxford and Macquarie Dictionary definitions of "direct" which both gave as one of its meanings "without intervening factors or intermediaries." However, I reject any suggestion that in order for Orrong to claim a performance bonus in respect of the RDG facility, Mr Ziegler must have brought about the raising of the finance without any other persons intervening, or being involved in, the process. Such a scenario is rather unrealistic, in my opinion. Moreover, as Orrong pointed out, any such submission by VRL would be inconsistent with their abandonment of the same argument in relation to the fees claimed in respect of Projects Ballarat, Bendigo and Castlemaine, when clearly many others apart from Mr Zeigler were involved in those transactions.
544 Nevertheless, Orrong accepted, as was clearly correct, that there had to be some causal nexus between Mr Ziegler and the raising of the finance for any performance bonus to be payable. It submitted that there had to be some substantial involvement by Orrong, through Mr Ziegler, in the initiating or conceiving of the transaction and in progressing it to completion. The test suggested by Orrong was stated to be: Can it be said that without the involvement of Orrong (through Mr Ziegler) the finance would not have been raised? Alternatively, the test was expressed as follows: But for the involvement of Orrong (through Mr Zeigler) would this finance have been raised? The "but for" test in the other contexts has been the subject of criticism in that it does not really advance consideration of the matter. I prefer to approach the question in a commonsense way by asking whether Mr Ziegler's involvement in the transaction was so substantial that it caused or brought about or resulted in the finance being raised. Alternatively, was Mr Zeigler's role in the transaction such a primary or dominant one that it caused or brought about or resulted in the finance being raised?
545 I turn then to consider Mr Ziegler's role in the successful raising of the $75 million RDG facility. Orrong submitted that Mr Ziegler (acting on its behalf) was able, over a period of several months, to arrange alternative finance for Roadshow Distributors utilising his close relationship with CIBC. It pointed out that Mr Ziegler introduced Mr Darryn Hugo of Roadshow Distributors to Mr Anton Le Rutte of CIBC's Sydney office. It submitted that thereafter, Mr Ziegler was intimately involved in the transaction from late 2000 until June 2001 when the facility was executed. He had numerous direct communications with Mr Le Rutte. Further, Mr Hugo felt it appropriate to keep Mr Ziegler apprised of all developments in relation to the negotiation, copying Mr Ziegler on all relevant communications with CIBC. He said that he kept Mr Ziegler informed of his discussions with Mr Le Rutte because "from Peter's point of view he had been running with the introduction and the process of generating that funding." Mr Hugo also said that in January 2001 he understood that Mr Ziegler "obviously had a relationship with CIBC that he was trying to foster and drive a deal for Roadshow." Mr Ziegler attended several meetings with CIBC representatives. Mr Le Rutte sent CIBC's draft presentation document to Mr Ziegler for his review. Mr Ziegler made numerous hand-written amendments to the document, all of which were subsequently incorporated by CIBC into its final presentation documents. Similarly, Mr Le Rutte sent CIBC's slide presentation to Mr Ziegler in advance of formally presenting it to Roadshow Distributors.
546 Orrong submitted that VRL had deliberately chosen not to call Mr Hugo, even though he was a critical witness in relation to this issue, and that VRL had offered no explanation for its failure to call Mr Hugo. Orrong therefore submitted it should be inferred that VRL knew that Mr Hugo would not support its case in relation to the RDG facility. As a result of VRL's failure to call Mr Hugo, Orrong was forced to subpoena him to give evidence. Mr Hugo explained that, because his wife was currently employed by VRL, he did not wish to voluntarily give evidence for Orrong. He said that he was prepared to give evidence voluntarily if requested to do so by VRL. He said that he had in fact conferred with VRL's solicitors prior to trial and expected to be provided with a draft witness statement, but that none was provided.
547 Mr Hugo said that the proposed funding to be provided by CIBC was "something quite different to what Roadshow had been engaged in previously and not something I had been exposed to." Mr Hugo rejected the suggestion (made in Mr Le Rutte's original witness statement) that "essentially, Mr Ziegler interposed himself in the initial stages before the transaction went ahead." That statement was later deleted in Mr Le Rutte's amended witness statement. Mr Hugo said that, from his point of view, Mr Ziegler was "the key person on the deal_."_
548 Orrong submitted that Mr Le Rutte, in his witness statement, sought to downplay Mr Ziegler's involvement in arranging the RDG facility with CIBC. In cross-examination of Mr Le Rutte, however, it became clear that he had made his witness statement while overseas after being shown only part of Mr Ziegler's witness statement and only selected documents. Mr Le Rutte agreed that in preparing his witness statement he had not been given all of the contemporaneous correspondence or documents surrounding the arrangement of the RDG facility. He conceded that in expressing opinions in his witness statement about Mr Ziegler's role in relation to the transaction he did not have the benefit of seeing all of the communications with Mr Ziegler. Mr Le Rutte agreed that, with the benefit of looking at all the documents and seeing all of his own communications with Mr Ziegler and communications that Mr Ziegler had with others, Mr Ziegler was, from beginning to end, very much involved in the transaction.
549 Mr Le Rutte further said that:
(a)
at all points in time between January and June 2001 he regarded Mr Ziegler as his principal point of contact on this transaction;
(b)
the facility was initiated with CIBC by Mr Ziegler;
(c)
he communicated regularly with Mr Ziegler concerning the facility and provided Mr Ziegler (and Mr Ziegler alone) with advance copies of documents and slide presentations;
(d)
Mr Ziegler was involved in shepherding the transaction through, but not in its construction or design which was very much CIBC driven;
(e)
CIBC ultimately provided the facility to Roadshow Distributors Group as a one-off transaction due to its close relationship with the VRL Group; and
(f)
a special relationship existed between VRL and CIBC and Mr Ziegler was an important part of that relationship.
550 Orrong further submitted that, in his witness statement, Mr Leggo also attempted to downplay Mr Ziegler's involvement in the RDG facility. In his original witness statement, Mr Leggo stated that "Ziegler initiated contacts with CIBC", "was involved in internal discussions with the VRL Executive as to the structure of the financing" and "did not have a role in negotiation of the terms of the transaction or the documentation of the transaction." In his amended witness statement Mr Leggo said instead that he was not aware of Ziegler undertaking any role in the negotiation of the pricing of the transaction or the documentation of the transaction.
551 However, in cross-examination Mr Leggo conceded that:
(a)
until this litigation began he was not aware of the full extent of Mr Ziegler's communications with Mr Le Rutte and Mr Hugo in relation to this transaction;
(b)
prior to being shown documents during cross-examination, he had not seen other correspondence between Mr Ziegler and Mr Le Rutte in relation to this transaction, in particular communications in relation to the pricing of the facility;
(c)
in 2001 he did not have a complete understanding of Mr Ziegler's role because he had not seen all of the communications that Mr Ziegler had had with Mr Le Rutte and Mr Hugo;
(d)
he had not previously seen documents that showed that Mr Ziegler was involved in negotiating pricing directly with Mr Le Rutte;
(e)
he now knew that Mr Ziegler had a greater involvement in the transaction than he had appreciated at the time;
(f)
"up until the point of documentation and negotiation on pricing ... Mr Ziegler was the main ... instigator of the contact with CIBC";
(g)
on 30 April 2001, he sent a fax to Mr Ziegler attaching draft representations and warranties because "Mr Ziegler was the major or the main, he had the relationship with CIBC from day one, and my process will always be with any financing deal with anybody that is involved from day one should be kept informed, from day one as much as possible, as to exchange of documents_"_; and
(h)
VRL had a very close relationship with CIBC and Mr Ziegler was responsible for forging that relationship.
552 Orrong further submitted that Mr Foo also attempted to downplay Mr Ziegler's involvement in the RDG facility. In his witness statement, Mr Foo stated that "Ziegler had little involvement in the negotiation process which was undertaken by Darren (sic) Hugo and Phil Leggo, who reported to me_._"
553 Before leaving Orrong's submissions, it is interesting to note how Mr Ziegler described his role in his memorandum to Mr Foo dated 7 August 2001 in which he asserted Orrong/Remut's entitlement to the fee. Mr Ziegler said:
"As part of this task, I liaised extensively with CIBC Sydney and New York in order to get the bank comfortable with the Roadshow credit risk on a limited recourse basis without the need for parental guarantees being provided by VRL and Greater Union. To this end, you will be aware that I managed to bring one of my key contact at CIBC, Mr Britt Fletcher, to Village's Melbourne offices on Monday 19 March 2001 and Roadshow's Sydney office on Wednesday 21 March 2001 for the purposes of their due diligence. In addition I arranged for Graham Burke to meet the chairman of CIBC World Markets in Toronto in April 2001."
554 VRL submitted that there was a team of people involved in establishing the RDG facility. Mr Ziegler made the initial contact. Mr Hugo did most of the day-to-day legwork in providing CIBC with all the information it required. Mr Leggo negotiated the price and instructed the lawyers in respect of documentation. Others, including Mr Burke, attended meetings and presentations. The individuals kept each other informed of progress to ensure, as Mr Hugo put it, that they were all _"_singing from the same hymn book." Yet Mr Ziegler alone sought to take a level of credit that simply did not reflect his involvement. VRL submitted that his claim of $3,724,000, for the introductory call, a few meetings, some telephone calls, and minor reviewing of documentation, effort that could be counted in the hours over a six month period, lacked reality. No-one else received (or claimed) a bonus in respect of the establishment of the facility.
555 VRL argued that Mr Le Rutte did not think Mr Ziegler had done anything of substance in respect of the RDG facility. He thought Mr Ziegler's primary role was introducing the Roadshow Distributors Group to CIBC and his evidence was that he was primarily dealing with Mr Hugo and Mr Leggo. During cross examination he was shown some documents that demonstrated that Mr Ziegler had been in contact more often than Mr Le Rutte could recall, but it did not alter his opinion about the substance of Mr Ziegler's involvement. VRL pointed out that Mr Le Rutte was, for instance, shown an email from his secretary to Mr Ziegler dated 24 April 2001 which showed that Mr Ziegler had inquired about pricing and asked Mr Le Rutte to confirm the inquiry in writing. Mr Le Rutte could not even recall the conversation (though he had said in his witness statement that he may have spoken to Mr Ziegler about pricing issues). Further, and interestingly, there was no evidence from Mr Ziegler that he actually informed anyone of his conversation with Mr Le Rutte, nor that he even bothered to pass on the email he received. Nevertheless, Mr Ziegler kept a copy of the email for his own use.
556 VRL submitted that the evidence of both Mr Leggo and Mr Le Rutte was that Mr Ziegler's involvement was peripheral and that an examination of his role confirmed this. It asked the rhetorical question, what was it, of substance, that Mr Ziegler did? Beyond making the initial contact, Mr Ziegler forwarded presentations prepared by others to CIBC. He amended a presentation that CIBC were proposing to make to VRL. Mr Le Rutte said these amendments were matters of form and not substance. VRL submitted that it was notable that Mr Ziegler even went to the effort of removing relevant experience from the curriculum vitaes of relevant CIBC personnel. He also amended the title of the presentation from "Presentation to Village Roadshow Corporation on the Trade Receivables" to "Presentation to the Roadshow Distributors Group Limited Recourse funding of their Film Receivables" and made corresponding amendments to the text. Mr Ziegler telephoned Mr Le Rutte from exotic locations to be briefed on the status of negotiations that others were undertaking. He inquired about, but did not negotiate, pricing. There was no evidence that Mr Ziegler was involved in the legal negotiations in respect of the transaction documents. Mr Le Rutte maintained throughout his cross examination that Mr Ziegler's role was in shepherding the transaction through, but not "in its construction or design." He also thought much of Mr Ziegler's involvement was form over substance.
557 Ultimately, once the transaction documents were signed, Mr Leggo sent an email to various VRL personnel dated 26 June 2001 in which he thanked Mr Hugo for the "fantastic job" he had done "in putting together all the detail for this very complex transaction and it would not have been completed in the timeframe achieved without his tireless efforts." Mr Hugo modestly acknowledged that this statement was "not untrue". VRL agreed that Mr Hugo's evidence was that Mr Ziegler was the "key person on the deal." However, it submitted that Mr Hugo's understanding that Mr Ziegler had "been running with the introduction" influenced his attitude to Mr Ziegler.
558 In respect of pricing, however, Mr Hugo candidly acknowledged Mr Leggo's specialist role. He said that Mr Leggo was "ultimately involved" in negotiating the fine points of the commercial terms, not necessarily the structure, but the percentage, rates, the limit. Mr Hugo said that Mr Leggo was an expert in that field.
559 In my view, there is substance in VRL's submission that once Mr Ziegler had performed the important task of making the initial contact with CIBC, his subsequent involvement was less important and was largely limited to following how matters developed as a result of the work performed by others, such as Mr Hugo and Mr Leggo, on behalf of the Roadshow Distributors Group. In my opinion, what Mr Ziegler did means that, in terms of my tests, his involvement in the transaction was not so substantial that it caused or brought about or resulted in the finance being raised, or that his role in the transaction was not such a primary or dominant one that it caused or brought about or resulted in the finance being raised. Mr Ziegler's own description of the part he played supports this conclusion.
560 Moreover, even if one accepted Orrong's argument that Mr Ziegler was "intimately involved in the transaction from late 2000 until June 2001 when the facility was executed" and agreed with Mr Hugo's assessment of Mr Ziegler as being "the key person on the deal", I still do not consider that my tests would be met. Unlike the Ballarat and Bendigo film financing projects, Mr Ziegler's role in this transaction was not so substantial or primary or dominant that it could be considered to have caused or brought about or resulted in the finance being raised. Others played an equally important role.
"Non/Limited Recourse" Finance
561 The next reason pleaded by VRL as to why Orrong was not entitled to a performance bonus in respect of the RDG facility was that it was not "non/limited recourse" finance within the meaning of performance bonus (d) in the 1995 Agreement. This discussion proceeds on the assumption that "non/limited recourse" finance has the meaning attributed to it in the above part dealing with the meaning of that term. Even so, VRL submitted that the RDG facility was not "non/limited recourse" finance.
562 Much of the documentation prepared by CIBC in relation to the RDG facility described the facility as "limited recourse." In his evidence, Mr Le Rutte described it in the following terms:
"The special purpose vehicle made a loan to Roadshow Distributors with the security limited to the receivables themselves, which meant that if the special purpose vehicle made a loss, it could not claim that loss against any other asset of the Roadshow Distributors company."
Mr Leggo agreed with that description of the RDG facility. Further, Mr Le Rutte described the facility as "limited recourse_"_ in correspondence. Similarly, Mr Hugo's summary of the RDG facility described it as "limited recourse_."_
563 On the other hand, VRL argued that the fact that the RDG facility was not "non/limited recourse" finance was in effect conceded by Mr Zeigler in cross-examination It was put to Mr Ziegler that "the only limit on recourse was in respect of the interest of the four subsidiaries of Roadshow Distributors and the receivables that were put up as security." He agreed with that proposition. It was then put to him that "there was no limit on the recourse to Roadshow Distributors, the borrower, under the loan facility agreement." Mr Ziegler did not agree with that proposition. However, after having had the opportunity to review the transaction documents to see whether he could identify the limitation or recourse to Roadshow Distributors, Mr Ziegler said that he could not identify any such limitation. He admitted that the limitation on recourse which he had in mind was in the Roadshow Distributors Debenture Holders Charge (which related only to the security put up by the four subsidiaries). Nevertheless, Mr Ziegler still maintained that the facility was "limited recourse."
564 However, as VRL itself emphasised, the important point was what the transaction documents provided not what witnesses said about them. Five separate documents need to be considered. They were:
(a) the Loan Facility Agreement dated 26 June 2001 between Roadshow Distributors and ASBC No 17 Limited ("ASBC") ("the Loan Facility Agreement");
(b) the Roadshow Distributors Debenture Trust Deed dated 26 June 2001 ("the Debenture Trust Deed");
(c) the Roadshow Distributors Debenture Holders Charge dated 26 June 2001 ("the Debenture Holders Charge");
(d) the Roadshow Distributors Future Property Charge dated 26 June 2001 ("the Future Property Charge"); and
(e) the Cross Guarantee and Indemnity dated 26 June 2001 ("the Cross Guarantee").
565 Fortunately, it is not necessary to spend too long examining the terms of each of these documents because, in the end, the parties essentially agreed about what they provided. Where they differed was in how they characterised the final arrangement in terms of whether or not the facility was "limited recourse".
566 There was no limit in the Loan Facility Agreement on the ability of the lender to enforce against the borrower (Roadshow Distributors) in event of default. Clauses 4.3 and 5.4 of the Loan Facility Agreement required repayment of each advance by Roadshow Distributors. There was no limitation on this obligation other than time. Clause 9.1 of the Loan Facility Agreement provided that upon an event of default, the lender might cancel the facility and the borrower (Roadshow Distributors) would pay each outstanding advance immediately. Thus, there was nothing under the Loan Facility Agreement which limited the lender's ability to recover the entirety of the outstanding monies from Roadshow Distributors. There was full recourse to Roadshow Distributors.
567 The Debenture Trust Deed was between Roadshow Distributors and Guardian Trust Australia Limited ("Guardian"). It established a trust settled by Roadshow Distributors of which Guardian was the trustee in favour of debenture holders, such debentures to be issued under the terms of the Deed. Clause 1.5(a) contained a covenant to pay by Roadshow Distributors to Guardian all amounts due to the debenture holders in respect of or arising in connection with the transaction documents and the debentures. The transaction documents include the Loan Facility Agreement. Further, as at the time of a draw of funds under the facility, a debenture was issued by Roadshow Distributors to ASBC, it obtained, as a debenture holder, the benefit of the security that Guardian held.
568 Third party security was given over certain assets by four subsidiaries of Roadshow Distributors, effectively as guarantors of the loan. The Debenture Holders Charge was between Guardian (as chargee) and the four subsidiary companies of Roadshow Distributors (as chargors). Those subsidiaries were Roadshow Home Entertainment Pty Ltd, Roadshow Film Distributors Pty Ltd, Roadshow Television Pty Ltd (in its own capacity and in its capacity as trustee of the Roadshow Unit Trust) and Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd. The "Secured Property" was charged to the chargee for the purpose of securing to the chargee payment of the "Secured Money." The "Secured Property" was effectively the current and future receivables of the four chargor companies. "Secured Money" meant all amounts that were payable; that were owing but not currently payable; that were contingently owing; or that remained unpaid. Under clause 1.4 of the Debenture Holders Charge, there was an obligation on the chargee to pay on demand the Secured Money.
569 The effect of these documents was that the lender could take any action it chose to enforce the repayment of the loan against Roadshow Distributors. The lender could also take action as a secured creditor under the charges and if the security (the receivables of the four subsidiaries) was insufficient to meet the amount owing by Roadshow Distributors under the Loan Facility Agreement or the Debenture Trust Deed, the lender could enforce against Roadshow Distributors as an unsecured creditor and get access via this method to the remaining assets of Roadshow Distributors.
570 The Debenture Holders Charge established that the security provided by the four subsidiary companies was limited. Clause 2.3 provided that:
"The Chargee may enforce its rights against the Chargor arising from non-compliance with the Limited Recourse Obligations only to the extent necessary to enforce its rights in relation to the Secured Property."
"If the Chargee does not recover all money owing to it in connection with the non-compliance with the Limited Recourse Obligations by enforcing the rights referred to in clause 2.3 ('Limited recourse'), it may not seek to recover the shortfall by:
(a) bringing proceedings against the Chargor; or
(b) applying to have the Chargor wound up; or
(c) proving in the winding up of the Chargor, unless another creditor has initiated proceedings to wind up the Chargor."
571 However, this limitation on recourse only applied to the four subsidiary companies and did not apply to Roadshow Distributors' obligations under the Loan Facility Agreement. It was this Charge that Mr Ziegler said contained "the limitation on recourse." However, this limitation was not directed at the obligations of Roadshow Distributors, but those of its four subsidiary companies. Roadshow Distributors remained fully liable to repay the loans.
572 The Future Property Charge was to the same effect but related to future receivables.
573 Under the Cross Guarantee, Roadshow Distributors and its four subsidiaries provided a cross guarantee and indemnity to Guardian, as trustee of the Debenture Trust Deed. The Cross Guarantee was in respect of each Roadshow company's obligations of all of their mutual obligations to the trustee. It covered all moneys due to the lender.
574 Ultimately, therefore, the only limitation of the RDG facility was in respect of the security provided. VRL submitted that having "security" over assets in the event of default was a matter of importance to lenders because they were not usually satisfied by the prospect of having to undertake the tedious task of suing companies, obtaining judgment and then attempting to enforce that judgment against the general assets of the company (potentially competing for the spoils with all the other creditors the company might have). It was not hard to understand, VRL argued, why people such as Mr Le Rutte and Mr Leggo had the issue of security at the front of their minds when negotiating the facility. It was apparent from their evidence that when they referred to the "limited recourse" nature of the facility they were referring to the limited nature of the securities given. This was, however, not necessarily the same limitation as the one Orrong had to make out to prove its case.
575 As previously discussed, I have held that the meaning of " 'non/limited recourse' financing" in the 1995 Agreement was finance raised where the recourse obtained by the lender was of a limited nature, being limited to certain assets of the borrower, such as a particular class of assets or assets acquired with the funds provided by the financing.
576 Orrong submitted that the RDG facility was "limited recourse" finance because:
(b) although under the Loan Facility Agreement, Roadshow Distributors had an obligation to repay outstanding advances in the event of default, the security provided in respect of the facility was limited to certain identified receivables of Roadshow Distributors' subsidiaries.
(c) if the lender was not able to recover all money owing to it by enforcing its rights in relation to the secured property, it was not able to recover the shortfall by bringing proceedings against the subsidiaries or applying to have the subsidiaries wound up.
Orrong submitted that this meant that under the RDG facility, the lender had no recourse to the most valuable assets within the Roadshow Distributors Group, namely the pre-paid film rights (that is, the film library) in the event of default under the facility.
577 In the context of a borrowing by the Roadshow Distributors Group, I do not consider that the fact that there was no recourse to VRL is significant when the liability of Roadshow Distributors, the principal company in the Group in question, was unlimited. Orrong's argument was based on the fact that the security was limited, with the result, it was claimed, that there was no recourse to the valuable film library held by the four subsidiaries of Roadshow Distributors. But, in my opinion, that so-called limitation was in fact illusory when there was full recourse against the owner of the subsidiaries, which in the event of default could be wound up and its assets, including the shares in the subsidiaries, sold. Thus, the film library was not safe from the lender. Moreover, by letter dated 5 June 2001 from Mr Le Rutte and Mr McIntosh to Mr Leggo, it was "confirmed" that CIBC had provided credit approval for the $75 million facility "subject to the additional condition that the disposal/sale of the film library, without the prior approval of CIBC/ASBC, will be an Event of Default." That is, Roadshow Distributors had to retain the film library in case the lender needed it to enable its loan to be recovered.
578 A limitation on security is not in these circumstances, in my opinion, enough to constitute the RDG facility as "non/limited recourse" finance within the meaning of performance bonus (d) in the 1995 Agreement.
New Finance
579 VRL submitted that the $75 million RDG facility provided by CIBC was not new finance, in that it replaced an existing facility that the Roadshow Distributors Group had with Westpac. Although this was pleaded as a further reason why no performance bonus was payable, it was never really explained why the RDG facility was not new finance.
580 Orrong submitted that the RDG facility was, in every sense, a new financing facility. It further submitted that, in any event, there was no provision in the 1995 Agreement that resulted in no performance bonus being payable where the "non/limited recourse" finance raised was in replacement of an existing financing facility.
581 In my opinion, there is no substance in VRL's submission. As a result of Westpac's unexpected decision to terminate its facility, a new facility had to be arranged. It seems to me to be quite clear that where there is a new lender and new terms and conditions of the facility including a new limit of $75 million, the facility comes within the expression "financing raised" in the wording of performance bonus (d) in the 1995 Agreement.
Not Fully Drawn Down
582 The final reason pleaded by VRL in answer to the claim for a 5% performance bonus in respect of the $75 million RDG facility was that the finance was not fully drawn down. VRL submitted that Mr Ziegler initially tried to make the facility limit larger, but that it was reduced at the insistence of others within the Roadshow Distributors Group. This emphasis on Mr Ziegler's involvement is to some extent inconsistent with VRL's submissions seeking to downplay his role, in my opinion. Nevertheless, it is clear that $75 million was the smallest limit that CIBC would consider in respect of the facility. The reduction in the facility caused other changes in the pricing and almost caused the deal to founder.
583 VRL submitted that $75 million was not "raised" in any meaningful sense because everybody in the Roadshow Distributors Group understood that the funding request was only about $40 million. Nevertheless, the fact is that Roadshow Distributors entered into a facility with a limit of $75 million, not $40 million. The Westpac facility had been between $34 and $38 million. Although it was not entirely clear, it appears that during the life of the facility, the maximum level of the drawdown did not exceed $40 million. Presumably, therefore, VRL would have to accept that if the other criteria for the performance bonus were met, Orrong would be entitled to a performance bonus calculated on the $40 million drawn down rather than on the $75 million limit.
584 However, I do not accept that any performance bonus would be properly calculated under the 1995 Agreement by reference to the amount drawn down. The wording was "financing raised" and it is not to the point, in my opinion, that the Roadshow Distributors Group did not draw down all of the available $75 million. That was the amount of the "financing raised" by the Roadshow Distributors Group when the facility was accepted. Further, if one is to read in a reference to the amount drawn down, the question arises whether this is to be the maximum amount ever drawn down during the life of the facility or, if the facility is a revolving facility, the total amount drawn down from time to time during the life of the facility. Therefore, in my opinion, if a performance bonus had been payable the amount would be calculated on the basis that the amount of the "financing raised" was $75 million, being the limit of the facility.
Conclusion
585 For the two reasons discussed above, namely that the RDG facility was not raised as a direct result of the efforts of Mr Ziegler on behalf of Orrong and that it was not "non/limited recourse" finance within the meaning the 1995 Agreement, I have concluded that Orrong's claim for a performance bonus of $3.724 million fails.
Other Performance Bonus Claims
586 The only other performance bonus claims made by Orrong are under the "taxes saved" clause. They are as follows:
(a) $275,395, being 0.5% of VRL's net profit, after tax and abnormals, of $55.079 million for the financial year ended 30 June 2001; and
(b) $255,505, being 0.5% of VRL's net profit, after tax and abnormals, of $51.101 million for the financial year ended 30 June 2002.
587 There was no dispute by VRL that the 5% of "taxes saved" performance bonus in the 1995 Agreement had been varied to a "taxes saved" performance bonus of 0.5% of VRL's net profit, after tax and abnormals, first as a "proxy" as agreed by Mr Ziegler and Mr Foo in early 1996 and then permanently as set out in Mr Foo's memorandum of 21 June 2000 to Mr Ziegler. There was also no dispute that by Mr Zeigler's memorandum dated 27 June 2001 to Mr Burke it was agreed that the consultancy would continue for a further term of one year on virtually the same terms as the 1995 Agreement, but specifically excluding any termination bonus. Further, VRL agreed with the relevant profit figures for VRL and the 0.5% calculation.
588 However, VRL denied that these two amounts were payable to Orrong because of the defences raised under the corporations legislation and the Legal Practice Act 1996, which are considered below, and the issue of whether Orrong was the correct person entitled to make this claim, which has been considered above. Alternatively, VRL submitted that if anything was held to be payable to Orrong for these two claims, then VRL was entitled to set them off against any amount found to be owing under its counterclaims against Orrong and that such set-off extinguished the two claims totalling $530,900.
589 I will return to the issues of the claim for unpaid profit shares and the claim for the unpaid "taxes saved" performance bonuses when considering VRL's further defences and counterclaim.
Misleading Conduct and Negligence
590 In its defence and counterclaim VRL pleaded that Orrong and Mr Ziegler engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, in contravention of s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the TPA") and equivalent provision in s.11 of the Fair Trading Act 1985 ("the 1985 FTA") and in s.9 of the Fair Trading Act 1999 ("the 1999 FTA"). VRL also relied on the same conduct as constituting negligent misstatement by Orrong and Mr Ziegler.
591 VRL alleged three different categories of representations said to constitute the misleading conduct and negligence. They related to:
(a) the termination bonus provision;
(b) Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo; and
(c) the claimed interest of 5.25% in VRP.
592 The first category can be dealt with quickly. I have previously concluded that no termination bonus was payable to Orrong on the expiration of the 1995 Agreement on 30 June 2001. Therefore, no question of any false representation that the termination bonus was payable only upon Mr Ziegler's death, or upon early termination by VRL, and no question of any misrepresentation by silence in failing to state that the termination bonus would or might mean that the preceding three years' performance bonuses would be payable again as of 30 June 2001, arises.
593 The third category can also be dealt with relatively quickly. VRL pleaded that Mr Ziegler and/or Orrong represented to VRL that the 5.25% VRP interest:
(a) did not form part of any performance bonus for the purpose of any calculation of performance bonuses under the 1995 or 1997 Agreements; and
(b) was not relevant to the termination bonus provisions and/or was not to be taken into account in the calculation of the termination bonus should any such entitlement be triggered by termination.
594 In dealing with the 1997 Agreement I have found that it encompassed the grant of the 5.25% interest in VRP as a performance bonus in lieu of payment of the performance bonus of US$10 million and that otherwise the terms of the 1995 Agreement remained the same. However, apart from the question of whether or not the 5.25% interest in VRP is to be taken into account in the calculation of the termination bonus, nothing turns on this distinction sought to be made by VRL.
595 As I have said, in my opinion the 5.25% interest in VRP was agreed by Mr Kirby and Mr Ziegler to be a substituted form of performance bonus in lieu of the US$10 million and that it could be taken into account, if appropriate, if the amount of the termination bonus had to be calculated. That has not occurred, because no termination bonus was payable and even if it were, I have concluded that the "three preceding financial years" in the formula did not include the financial year ended 30 June 1998, which means that the 5.25% interest in VRP is not a relevant performance bonus. Moreover, I have also held that under the terms of the 2000 Agreement VRL and Orrong agreed that the 5.25% interest should be treated as a performance bonus for the purpose of any relevant calculation of the termination bonus.
596 That leaves the second category of misleading conduct and negligence. VRL in effect pleaded 12 separate representations in respect of Project Ballarat ("the Ballarat representations") and 15 separate representations in respect of Project Bendigo ("the Bendigo representations"). Of the 15 Bendigo representations, eight repeated Ballarat representations, four were similar to Ballarat representations and three were separate misrepresentations. Alternatively, VRL said that Mr Ziegler and Orrong were negligent in respect of their advice about the Ballarat and Bendigo facilities.
597 The twelve common or similar representations alleged by VRL were said to have been made, in respect of the Project Ballarat, on about 5 May 1997 and continuing and, in respect of Project Bendigo, in about December 1997 and continuing. The eight common representations were that:
(a) the Project Ballarat/Project Bendigo finance was and/or would be non-recourse and/or limited recourse finance;
(b) VRL's loss position was fixed, with Ambac (the insurer) assuming the residual risk after the insurance and equity layer had been exhausted;
(c) the Project Ballarat/Project Bendigo transaction and the Project Ballarat/Project Bendigo finance was and/or would be self-funding, alternatively substantially self-funding;
(d) Project Ballarat/Project Bendigo enabled and/or would enable VRL to participate/safely further participate in film production at third party risk whilst maintaining significant upside;
(e) the Project Ballarat/Project Bendigo transaction was essentially or substantially risk free for VRL;
(f) even if all films made in Project Ballarat/Project Bendigo failed, VRL would still make money.
(g) the Project Ballarat/Project Bendigo transaction did not involve, contemplate or require any payment to Mr Ziegler and/or Orrong of any fee or amount by way of performance bonus under the 1995 Agreement, alternatively the 1997 Agreement;
(h) the Project Ballarat/Project Bendigo transaction did not involve, contemplate or require any payment to Mr Ziegler and/or Orrong of any fee or amount as part of any termination bonus under the 1995 Agreement, alternatively the 1997 Agreement, in the event that any entitlement to a termination bonus arose under the said agreements.
It can be seen that the first of these common representations raised the issue of the meaning of non-recourse and limited recourse finance. The next five related to the likely financial results or profit and loss outcomes of Project Ballarat or Project Bendigo whereas the last two representations were concerned with the relationship between Orrong's and/or Mr Ziegler's entitlements under the 1995 or 1997 Agreements and Project Ballarat or Project Bendigo.
598 The four remaining Ballarat representations pleaded were that:
(a) under the Project Ballarat transaction no party had or would have any recourse to VRL for any payment except that, if VRF failed to meet its scheduled debt amortisation payments and equity return, VRL would be required to:
(i) defer receipt of its distribution fees (but not fees owing to third party distributors);
(ii) fund up to between 10 to 15% of foreign print and advertising in connection with films, the return of which to VRL would be subordinated behind debt and equity holders;
(iii) forego a maximum of US$3.2 million;
(b) irrespective of the financial success of VRF and/or the films, a subsidiary of VRL would receive an executive producer fee of US$1 million per film and US$1.5 million per film for overhead fees, giving a total of US$50 million for a slate of 20 films together with other fees determined on an arms length basis for services performed;
(c) VRL's liability for the amounts referred to in sub-paragraph (a) and its risk position was and/or would be totally covered by its executive producer and overhead fees in the event of complete failure of all films;
(d) all relevant or material risks and costs, or potential risks and costs, in the Project Ballarat Transaction were referred to or identified in the memorandum from Mr Ziegler and/or Orrong dated 5 May 1997.
599 The four Bendigo representations pleaded, which were similar to Ballarat representations, were that:
(a) under the Project Bendigo transaction no party had or would have any recourse to VRL for any payment except that, if VRF failed to meet its scheduled debt amortisation payments and equity return, VRL would be required to:
(i) defer receipt of its distribution fees (but not fees owing to third party distributors);
(ii) fund up to between 10 to 15% of foreign print and advertising in connection with films, the return of which to VRL would be subordinated behind debt and equity holders;
(b) irrespective of the financial success of VRF and the films, a subsidiary of VRL would receive an executive producer fee of US$1 million per film and US$3.75 million per film for overhead fees, giving a total of US$95 million for a slate of 20 Bendigo films together with other fees determined on an arms length basis for services performed;
(c) VRL's risk position in relation to the fees and losses referred to in sub-paragraph (a) was and/or would be covered by its executive producer and overhead fees in the event of complete failure of all films, with an expected profit in a failure scenario of US$19 million over the slate of 20 Bendigo films;
(d) all relevant or material risks and costs or potential risks and costs in the Project Bendigo transaction were referred to or identified in memoranda from Mr Ziegler and/or Orrong dated 5 May 1997, 17 December 1997, 12 March 1998 and 1 February 1999.
The four similar Ballarat and Bendigo representations also related to the likely financial results or profit and loss outcomes of the two Projects.
600 The basis of the three separate representations relating to Project Bendigo was that:
(a) on about 28 October 1997 and continuing, Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler represented that VRL would return a minimum net profit of US$5 million irrespective of the performance of the films involved;
(b) in about February 1999 and continuing, Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler represented that in the event of the complete failure of all films the profit to be received by VRL in such a failure scenario was and/or would be US$35 million;
(c) in about February 1999 and continuing, Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler represented that a realistic upside scenario for Project Bendigo was US$100 million over the 20 films.
Again, these separate Bendigo representations related to the likely financial results or profit and loss outcomes of Project Bendigo.
601 VRL pleaded that relying upon the Ballarat representations, it entered into and undertook the Project Ballarat transaction, raised the Project Ballarat finance, made certain payments to Mr Ziegler, Orrong and/or Remut, and entered into the 1997 and 2000 Agreements. It further pleaded that relying upon the Bendigo representations it entered into and undertook the Project Bendigo transaction, raised the Project Bendigo finance, made certain payments to Mr Ziegler, Orrong and/or Remut, and entered into the 2000 Agreement. VRL then pleaded that insofar as the Ballarat and Bendigo representations related to future matters, it relied upon s.51A of the TPA and/or s.10A of the 1985 FTA and s.4 of the 1999 FTA, and that insofar as the Ballarat and Bendigo representations related to existing matter of fact they were false and untrue.
602 Damages were sought by VRL for the alleged misleading conduct and for negligence. The loss and damage said to have been suffered by VRL included amounts paid in connection with the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement, any further amounts for which it may be held liable under the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements, costs and expenses associated with this proceeding and the payment of certain other amounts.
603 In my opinion, VRL cannot succeed in its claim for damages for misleading conduct or negligence even if the other parts of the respective causes of action were made out. This is because VRL made no attempt to establish that it had in fact suffered loss and damage apart from referring to certain payments it had made, or might have to make, as a result of entering into the 1997 and 2000 Agreements in reliance on the Ballarat and Bendigo representations. But VRL also alleged that in reliance on the same representations it entered into the Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo transactions. There was simply no evidence concerning what was the overall financial outcome of these transactions. Unless it was demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that VRL was worse off as a result of these transactions, including in those calculations the amount of the payments it now complained about, no loss was proved.
604 The closest VRL got to addressing this issue was the following comment by Mr Foo during cross-examination, when it was put to him that VRL had made hundreds of millions of dollars of profit from the two projects which produced films such as "The Matrix" Mr Foo said:
"Mr Dreyfus, Village Roadshow Limited hasn't made hundreds of millions of dollars of profit. From 1998, and I did some rough calculations, from 1998 to 2005, if we take the actual profit of the VRP division, net profit, after tax, applying all of the various write-offs that we have had to take, the division has made nothing. In fact I think it has made a loss. So the hundreds of millions of profit just aren't there."
That vague claim by Mr Foo, which was never supported by a detailed, or even any, analysis of the financial results to VRP and VRL flowing from the Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo transactions goes nowhere near proving that any loss was suffered.
605 Although VRL sought other relief in respect of the alleged misleading conduct such as orders under s.87 of the TPA and/or s.41 of the 1985 FTA and/or s.158 of the 1999 FTA setting aside the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement wholly or to the extent that they respectively entitled Orrong to the 5.25% interest and the 2.25% interest or varying those Agreements to that extent, these claims must also fail as they presuppose that the party seeking such relief has proved that it has suffered or is likely to suffer, loss and damage. The lack of proof of loss and damage means that the claim in negligence must also fail.
606 Although it is, therefore, not strictly necessary to examine other disputed issues involved in these causes of action, I will briefly consider some of them in case I am wrong about the loss and damage point.
607 First, it seems to me that VRL did, in any event, fail to make out the misleading conduct and negligence causes of action because it was not established to my satisfaction that VRL relied on one or more of the Ballarat representations in deciding to enter into the Project Ballarat transaction or the 1997 or 2000 Agreements or that it relied on one or more of the Bendigo representations in deciding to enter into the Project Bendigo transaction or the 2000 Agreement.
608 Particulars were given of the Ballarat representations in VRL's defence and counterclaim. Insofar as the representations were in writing they were said to be "evidenced by, inter alia, memoranda from Ziegler and/or the plaintiff dated 5 May 1997, 17 December 1997, 12 March 1998 and 1 February 1999." As Orrong pointed out, given that the Project Ballarat transaction was finalised on 31 October 1997, the later memoranda referred to by VRL are irrelevant. Further, whilst I find that many of the statements contained in the Ballarat representations were to be found in Mr Ziegler's memorandum of 5 May 1997, despite Orrong's non-specific assertions to the contrary, a further six months of investigation, scrutiny, consideration and refinement of the proposal by VRL's own accounting and finance staff and its external advisers such as Ernst & Young, Ambac, CIBC, Herbert Geer & Rundle and various lawyers in the USA took place before it was finally decided to proceed. In the circumstances, it seems extraordinary to me for experienced businessmen such as Messrs Kirby, Burke and Foo to maintain that their decision to agree to enter the Project Ballarat transaction was in any way dependent on what had been said by Mr Ziegler six months earlier rather than on their own understanding of what the proposal meant for VRL based on their own and others' consideration of all of the issues in the intervening six months. VRL's case would require me to conclude, for example, that if the representation that the Project Ballarat finance was "non-recourse" or "limited recourse" finance was false, that this statement in the memorandum of 5 May 1997 was to some extent relied on by Mr Kirby, Mr Burke or Mr Foo when deciding, nearly six months later, to commit VRL to proceeding with the Project Ballarat transaction, rather than on their own consideration of what the transaction entailed for VRL in terms of financial obligations and downside risks. I do not accept that this was the case. This lack of reliance, in my opinion, destroys any argument that there was a "causal connection between the contravention and loss and damage."[47] VRL has not even demonstrated that one or more of the representations was "a cause of the loss or damage sustained."[48] Given the work done on Project Ballarat by Mr Basser of Herbert Geer & Rundle, I agree with Orrong's submission that the failure by VRL to call him as a witness enables me to more readily reach the conclusion that there was no such reliance.
609 VRL strongly disputed the submission that there was no reliance on, and thus no causal connection between, Mr Ziegler's representations and VRL's decision to enter into the Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo transactions. It submitted that while other advisers were engaged in relation to the arrangements, most if not all of the advice came to the Board via Mr Ziegler. VRL also submitted that, notwithstanding partial reliance on people other than Mr Ziegler, VRL still materially relied on his representations. For example, Mr Foo said:
"I did not have direct communications with our lawyers or other advisers in relation to how the scheme worked or the risks that were involved. Ziegler dealt with the lawyers, the banks and advisers. I made the statements I did to the Board and supported Ballarat based upon the information that I got from Ziegler, upon whom I relied. As mentioned, I told Ziegler I was relying on him."
Although Mr Foo withdrew during cross-examination some of his sillier allegations about the failure by Mr Ziegler to tell him about various features of the structure of the Project Ballarat transaction, the main thrust of his complaints remained. Moreover, Mr Ziegler agreed that he was the major adviser to the Board in relation to the Project Ballarat transaction. He also agreed that he was the man doing all the negotiating with the insurance companies, the banks, the lenders.
610 Nevertheless, it does not follow, in my opinion, that I should find that the Board was misled by anything said by Mr Ziegler. For example, although Mr Conn said in his witness statement that Mr Ziegler "consistently referred to the financing as being without risk to VRL", he did not go on to say that he took that statement literally and relied on it. On the contrary, Mr Conn said that he "preferred to accept the views of Foo that there was risk but that it was manageable." Mr Conn also said that "in deciding to approve the Ballarat transaction" he relied upon "the various briefings by Ziegler, Burke and ... Foo."
611 Further, the majority of VRL's Board of Directors were not called to give evidence, so it is not known whether they would also have said that they relied on Mr Ziegler's representations when they decided that VRL should enter into the Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo transactions. Project Ballarat was finalised on 31 October 1997. According to VRL's 1998 Annual Report, of the directors at that time Mr John Kirby had been a director since August 1988, Mr Alan Rydge since August 1988, Lord Puttman since June 1989, Mr Terence Jackman since July 1993, Lord Hollick since February 1997 and Mr John O'Neill had only joined the Board in October 1997. None of these gentlemen gave evidence. A similar situation existed with respect to the Project Bendigo transaction, which was finalised in December 1999. According to VRL's 2000 Annual Report Mr John Kirby was still a director, Lord Puttman ceased to be a director in November 1999, Mr Jackman ceased to be a director in December 1999, Mr Charles Stern had been a director since December 1998 and Mr Barry Reardon a director since March 1999. None of these five gentlemen gave evidence.
612 Insofar as the Ballarat representations were said in the particulars to be oral, they were limited to statements made by Mr Ziegler to Mr Kirby and Mr Burke the material substance of which was said to be to the effect referred to in sub-paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of the Ballarat representations referred to above. Essentially, these were an allegation that Mr Ziegler represented that the Project Ballarat transaction would make money and was risk free for VRL. Again, I find it extraordinary that Mr Kirby and Mr Burke would say that their decision was based, even if only partly, on Mr Ziegler's statements rather than on their own considered opinion of the possible advantages and potential risks of the proposed transaction based on all of the information provided to them. That is, their decision in favour of proceeding with the Project Ballarat transaction relied not on Mr Ziegler's statements to them but on their own considered opinion.
613 Insofar as the Ballarat representations were said in the particulars to be implied, they were "to be implied from, inter alia, the terms of the said documents and by Ziegler's silence in relation to any other risks that did or may exist ..." In my opinion, this does not add anything to what was actually said in the 5 May 1997 memorandum.
614 It was also said that the representations referred to in sub-paragraphs (g) and (h) of the Ballarat representations were to be implied from Mr Ziegler's silence in relation to these matters. These two alleged representations related not to the likely financial results or profit and loss outcomes of Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo but to the relationship between Orrong's and/or Mr Ziegler's entitlements under the 1995 and 1997 Agreements and the two Projects.
615 With respect to the first of these representations (sub-paragraph (g)), it was common ground that Mr Ziegler never mentioned to the VRL Executive Committee or the Board that he was expecting to receive a US$10 million performance bonus in respect of the Project Ballarat transaction until it was raised in his meeting with Mr Kirby in New York on 4 September 1997. The only indirect reference was Mr Ziegler's claim, when giving evidence, that in January 1997 he had told Mr Kirby that they would both be "financially pleased" if the Project Ballarat transaction was successful and that Mr Kirby had replied that he had given Mr Ziegler "every incentive to do just this type of transaction and it could be a transformational one for Village Roadshow." Mr Kirby denied that this conversation had taken place. Given that this evidence was not referred to in Mr Ziegler's lengthy witness statements and given his evidence that on 4 September 1997 he had told Mr Kirby that he thought it was academic to discuss the 5% performance bonus payable on a successful completion of the Project Ballarat transaction until he felt certain that this very difficult transaction could be consummated, I do not accept Mr Ziegler's evidence about the January 1997 conversation. Nevertheless, I am also not persuaded that the claim of the 5% performance bonus was as unexpected as Messrs Kirby, Burke and Foo maintained. They were aware of the terms of the 1995 Agreement. Mr Foo conceded that he suspected that Mr Ziegler was of the view that the 1995 Agreement gave rise to an entitlement in respect of Project Ballarat. That was why he faxed the document to Mr Kirby in New York.
616 However, this is all past history. The claim that Orrong was entitled to a 5% performance bonus in respect of Project Ballarat was disclosed to Mr Kirby before the transaction in question was finalised. Mr Kirby agreed that he said that Project Ballarat would not go ahead unless Mr Ziegler gave up the claim. It was agreed in Los Angeles on 8 September 1997 between Mr Kirby and Mr Ziegler acting on behalf of their respective companies that in lieu of the US$10 million performance bonus, Orrong would receive a 5.25% equity interest in VRP, meaning a 5.25% ownership interest in, and a right to 5.25% of the profits of, VRP. I have found that the agreement was that the disputed performance bonus would be replaced by this new form of performance bonus and that otherwise the 1995 Agreement remained the same. Thus, in my opinion, the allegation that VRL entered into and undertook the Project Ballarat transaction, raised the Project Ballarat finance, made any payments or entered into any 1997 or 2000 Agreements in reliance on the representation by silence on the part of Mr Ziegler that no fee or performance bonus was payable under the 1995 Agreement fails on the facts.
617 With respect to the second of these representations (sub-paragraph (h)), that concerning the termination bonus, the findings of fact I have already made concerning the 1997 and 2000 Agreements, mean that this claim also fails.
618 Similar particulars were given of the Bendigo representations. Insofar as they were in writing they were said to be "evidenced by, inter alia, the memoranda from Ziegler and/or the plaintiff dated 17 December 1997, 12 March 1998 and 1 February 1999." Yet the Project Bendigo transaction was not finalised until November 1999 nearly two years after the earliest of these documents . This transaction was clearly subjected to greater scrutiny and discussion than Project Ballarat. Three reports were obtained from Mr Wilson of Salamon Smith Barney in June 1998, August 1999 and November 1999, for example, I therefore do not see any reason not to conclude that VRL did not rely on Mr Ziegler's alleged representations when deciding to enter into the Project Bendigo transaction.
619 Insofar as the Bendigo representations were said in the particulars to be oral, they were limited to the same statements made by Mr Ziegler to Mr Kirby and Mr Burke as was considered above in respect of the Ballarat representation. Again, I consider the same conclusion should be reached in respect of these representations.
620 With respect to the allegation of general implied Bendigo representations, the documents and conversations speak for themselves.
621 Finally, with respect to the Bendigo representations said to have been made by silence on the part of Mr Ziegler concerning the performance bonus (sub-paragraph (g)) and the termination bonus (sub-paragraph (h)) the same result must follow. As the above discussion of the protracted negotiations leading up to the 2000 Agreement shows, VRL was well aware that Mr Ziegler was claiming that Orrong was entitled to a performance bonus of 5% of the finance raised on the successful completion of the Project Bendigo transaction. The parties eventually negotiated a compromise of that claim. The termination bonus representation also fails on the facts.
622 Given the failure by VRL to prove that it has suffered any loss or damage as a result of the alleged misrepresentations, there seems to be no point in examining whether VRL was correct in asserting that the Ballarat and Bendigo representations relating to the likely financial results or profit and loss outcomes of the respective Projects were false. I do propose, however, to consider whether it was accurate to describe the Project Ballarat finance and the Project Bendigo as "non-recourse" or "limited recourse" finance. As with the RDG facility documentation, it seemed to me that, in the end, the parties were not disputing what the complex Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo documentation provided. Where they differed was in how they characterised the arrangements in terms of whether or not the finance raised was "non-recourse" or "limited recourse."
623 VRL submitted that the Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo transactions involved full recourse to VRL and therefore that they were neither "non-recourse" or "limited recourse". VRL illustrated its point by referring to the Undertaking and Guaranty dated 31 October 1997, being one of the documents in the Project Ballarat transaction. Mr Ziegler signed the document on behalf of VRL. It was an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee by VRL of the punctual payment and performance when due of all obligations of Village Roadshow Pictures (BVI) Limited ("VRPB") and Village Roadshow Distribution (BVI) Limited ("VRD")[49] in favour of VRF and other Indemnified Parties, including the Lenders and the Equity Holders. The guarantee was "absolute"[50] and was enforceable against VRL.[51] The Guaranteed Obligations included those of VRD under the Master Agreement.[52] As it was these obligations of VRD which, VRL submitted, exposed VRL to potential full recourse, it is necessary to look briefly at them.
624 Under section 5 of the Master Agreement VRD, as the Master Distributor, had numerous obligations including obligations:
(a) to incur at least the minimum releasing costs on each transferred film within 2 years of its release;
(b) to fund the releasing costs, with a right to claim reimbursement of 85% upon certain conditions; and
(c) to fund the insurance costs, with a right to claim reimbursement upon certain conditions.
625 Section 7 of the Master Agreement dealt with the allocation of cash flows ("the waterfall"). It provided that, subject to there being no default, VRD was entitled to be reimbursed from the net proceeds a number of specified amounts, after payment of interest, scheduled debt amortisation and coupon on the equity (12% of $20 million). However, if there was a "VRL Event" which was a widely defined event of default, and the funding had accordingly stopped, then VRD was not entitled to be reimbursed most of the specified amounts until all debt and equity has been recovered with full interest and coupon respectively. Further, most of the specified amounts were subject to "clawback" under section 11.
626 The Retransfer and Cash Flow Obligations of VRD were dealt with in sections 8 to 10. If the specified 20 films were not transferred by the due date, VRD was obliged to take a retransfer of all the films then owned by VRF. Upon the retransfer VRD was obliged to pay the greater of:
(a) the market value of any films then owned by VRF; and
(b) the "Aggregate Retransfer Amount", being the sum of:
(i) unpaid interest
(ii) outstanding debt to banks
(iii) unpaid coupon
(iv) unrecovered equity, and
(v) any tax distributions due to equity holders.
Thus, VRL, as guarantor of VRD, was liable in certain circumstances to pay 100% of the outstanding debt, any accrued interest, the $20 million of equity and any unpaid coupon on the equity. VRD was also obliged (supported by the guarantee of VRL) to take the retransfer of individual films in certain other circumstances.
627 The next relevant obligation was the clawback obligation under clause 11. The effect of this clause was that VRD, guaranteed by VRL, was obliged to make available for payment of:
(iv) 50% of un-recouped equity (that is up to US$10 million), and
(v) tax distributions to equity holders under the equity operating agreement;
(b) the aggregate of certain specified amounts received by VRD or any VRL company under section 7.
This meant that VRD, guaranteed by VRL, might need to repay much of the expenditure for which it had been reimbursed.
628 I therefore conclude that, contrary to Orrong's submissions and Mr Ziegler's evidence, the Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo finance was neither "non-recourse" finance nor "limited recourse" finance. It was certainly not financing where recourse was limited to the assets acquired with the funds provided by the financing nor was recourse limited to a particular class of assets. Neither were the lender's rights of recourse limited to recourse against subsidiaries of VRL but not against VRL itself. However, for the reasons already given, this conclusion does not assist VRL with its claims of misleading conduct and negligence against Orrong and/or Mr Ziegler.
The Corporations Legislation
629 VRL raised three issues under the corporations legislation by way of defence to Orrong's claim. They were:
(a) the legality of the claimed termination bonus, which was said to be in breach of both the "retirement from office" and "related party financial benefits" statutory provisions as enacted from time to time, because there was no shareholder approval of the 1995 Agreement, the 1997 Agreement or the 2000 Agreement;
(b) the legality of various claims paid or payable under the 1995 Agreement, the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement, namely, the 7.5% profit share and ownership interest in VRP, the RDG facility performance bonuses and a variety of other performance bonuses and the alternative claim for performance bonuses by way of cash, which were said to be in breach of the "related party financial benefits" statutory provisions as enacted from time to time, because there was no shareholder approval of either the Agreements or the payments themselves; and
(c) alleged breaches both of statutory and common law directors' duties and cognate fiduciary duties in the making of the Agreements.
The Applicable Legislation
630 There was considerable debate between the parties as to the time at which the application of the corporations legislation provisions should be considered. This was important because of changes in the form of the legislation over time. Orrong submitted that in each case the relevant time was the making of the particular Agreement whereas VRL submitted that in respect of the "retirement from office" provisions the relevant time was when the payment was made or it fell due and in respect of the "related party financial benefits" provisions the relevant time was either the making of particular Agreements or the times when payments were made or fell due under the Agreement in question. It is therefore necessary to look at what the corporations legislation was from time to time.
631 In late 1995 the applicable corporations legislation was the Victorian Corporations Law. That law, the text of which was set out in s.82 of the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth), as in force for time being, was applied in Victoria by s.7 of the Corporations (Victoria) Act 1990.[53] I refer hereafter to this statutory regime as the "Corporations Law 1995-1999."
632 On 13 March 2000 the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) ("CLERP") came into force. CLERP amended the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) and, by operation of s.7 of the Corporations (Victoria) Act 1990, the amendments made to the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) operated as amendments of the Victorian Corporations Law.[54] I refer hereafter to this statutory regime as the "Corporations Law 2000". On 15 July 2001 the current regime, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), came into force.
633 Certain transitional provisions of the corporations legislations apply. I note that although s.1470 of the Corporations Law 2000 stated that the related party provisions in the old law (the Corporations Law 1995-1999) continued to apply in certain circumstances including if "(c) the benefit is given under a contract made before commencement", there was no specific preservation of the retirement from office provisions.
634 Part 10.1 of the Corporations Act 2001 contains further relevant transitional provisions. Section 1370 of the Corporations Act 2001 states that the object of this Part is to provide for a smooth transition from the old cooperative scheme to the new Commonwealth regime, so that all persons are placed by the new legislation, to the greatest extent possible, in the same position they would have been under the old legislation.
635 Section 1400 of the Corporations Act 2001 is an important provision. It provides that, where a right or liability was acquired, accrued or incurred under a "carried over provision" immediately in force before the commencement of the Corporations Act 2001 (such as section 208 of the Corporations Law 2000 in force from 13 March 2000 until midnight on 14 July 2001), a person acquires, accrues or incurs a right or liability equivalent to the pre-commencement right or liability under the corresponding provision of the Corporations Act 2001, "as if that provision applied to the conduct or circumstances that gave rise to the pre-commencement right or liability."
636 Section 1401 provides that where a right or liability was acquired, accrued or incurred under a pre-commencement provision which had been repealed prior to commencement of the Corporations Act 2001 on 15 July 2001 where the right or liability continued to exist immediately before the commencement of the Corporations Act (that is the Corporations Law as it relevantly operated between 1995 and 1999), the Corporations Act 2001 is taken to include the repealed provision under which the pre-commencement right or liability was acquired, accrued or incurred and any other repealed provisions which applied in relation to the pre-commencement liability.
637 In summary, pursuant to ss.1400 and 1401 of the Corporations Act 2001, the rights and liabilities arising under the Corporations Law 1995-1999 and Corporations Law 2000 are preserved. However, different sections will apply depending on the time when the right or liability was acquired, accrued or incurred. This means that reference will need to be made to obligations and entitlements which arise pursuant to the Corporations Law 1995-1999, the Corporations Law 2000 or the Corporations Act 2001.
The Purpose of the Relevant Statutory Provisions
638 VRL submitted that the purpose behind relevant statutory provisions was clear. They were enacted to protect the interests of minority shareholders. It was submitted that the "retirement from office" provisions and the "related party financial benefits" provisions were directed towards preventing the dilution of company resources without the prior approval of shareholders. VRL further submitted that it was also clear that these provisions were specifically designed to protect the interests of shareholders as a whole (which includes not only existing members, but also future interests and the continuing enterprise). This was particularly true for a public company which is listed on the stock exchange.
639 When speaking of the "retirement from office" provisions in the Corporations Law 2000 Walton J observed in Fox v GIO Australia Ltd[55]:
"It is clear that s 200B seeks to counter the obvious potential for abuse by those who control a company in relation to what are colloquially known as 'golden handshakes.' The mechanism for controlling the abuse is adroit - since it is the shareholders who are exposed to the most direct loss, what is required to authorise such a payment is their informed consent."
640 Part 3.2A of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 (in which the related party prohibitions were contained) was enacted following the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee's "Report on Reform of the Law Governing Corporate Financial Transactions" in July 1991. That report relevantly noted that:
"It has become evident that some corporate controllers abuse their positions of trust by arranging for the shifting of assets around and away from companies and corporate groups, and into their own hands. They achieve this by various means, including remuneration payments, asset transfers or loan arrangements, on terms highly advantageous to themselves but to the detriment of these companies."
641 The Explanatory Memorandum for the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 which introduced Part 3.2A of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 stated as follows:
"One cannot prevent dishonesty by legislation. What can be done, though is to establish an environment which makes dishonesty less likely to result in losses for the investor. Better enforcement is a key aspect of this but the content of the law can also help, by establishing simple rules with a bias in favour of disclosure. The proposed Part 3.2A accordingly seeks to establish such a set of simple rules. It says to the honest director, 'if the related party transaction which is proposed is on ordinary commercial terms, it can be approved by the Board. But if it is an uncommercial transaction, it must be referred to shareholders, and shareholders must be fully informed of the details'."
642 Section 243A of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 which was contained within Part 3.2A read as follows:
(a) a public company's resources (in particular those available to pay the company's creditors); and
by requiring that, in general, financial benefits to related parties that could diminish or endanger those resources, or that could adversely affect those interests, be disclosed, and approved by a general meeting, before they are given."
643 Section 207 of the Corporations Law 2000 disclosed a similar objective:
"The rules in this Chapter are designed to protect the interests of a public company's members as a whole, by requiring member approval for giving financial benefits to related parties that could endanger those interests." (Emphasis added)
The Termination Bonus and Retirement from Office Provisions
644 Although I have concluded that no termination bonus was payable to Orrong on the expiration of the 1995 Agreement on 30 June 2001, it is appropriate to consider what the result of the corporations legislation defences would be, if I am wrong in my conclusion. Before deciding which form of the "retirement from office" provisions of the corporations legislation is applicable, it is necessary to set out the relevant sections.
645 Section 237(1)(a) of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 relevantly provided that:
"a company ... shall not give a prescribed benefit to a person in connection with the retirement of a person from a prescribed office in relation to the company."
646 Section 237(19) contained the following relevant definitions:
• "give" was defined as including making a payment or transferring an interest in property;
• "prescribed benefit" meant "a payment or other valuable consideration or any other benefit";
• "prescribed office" meant "(a) an office of director of the company or of a related body corporate; and ... (c) any other office in connection with the management of affairs of the company or of a related body corporate that is held by a person who also holds, or who has, at any time within the 12 months immediately before the loss of, or retirement from, that office, held an office mentioned in paragraph (a)"; and
• "prescribed person" was defined to include "a person who holds or has at any previous time held, a prescribed office in relation to the company."
647 By s.237(14)(a) it was provided that "a reference to the giving of a prescribed benefit by a person includes a reference to the giving of a prescribed benefit that the person is obliged under a contract to give." By s.237(14)(d) it was provided that "a reference to retirement of a person from an office" included a reference to:
"(i) loss by the person of the office; [or]
(ii) resignation by the person from the office ..."
648 The introductory heading of s.237(15) was "[Intermediaries not severing connection with retirement]." It provided that the giving of a "prescribed benefit" by a person to another person for purposes including the purpose of assisting a person to give to a relevant person a prescribed benefit in connection with the retirement of the relevant person from an office, was to be taken as the first person giving a "prescribed benefit" in connection with the retirement of the relevant person from that office.
649 Section 237(2) of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 permitted a retirement payment where it had been approved in a general meeting of the shareholders of the company making the payment. Section 237(3) required certain information about the payment to be provided to the shareholders prior to the meeting. It was common ground that no such approval was given.
650 Section 237(10) provided that:
"A prescribed person shall not receive a prescribed benefit if the giving of the prescribed benefit contravenes sub-section (1)."
Section 237(11) deemed a wrongful payment to be received by the person in trust for the company concerned.
651 Section 200B of the Corporations Law 2000 provided:
"(1) The following must not give a person a benefit in connection with that person's, or someone else's, retirement from a board or managerial office in a company, or a related body corporate, without member approval under s 200E:
"A person who:
(a) holds, or has at any previous time held, a board or managerial office in a company or related body corporate;
... must not receive a benefit if the giving of the benefits contravenes s.200B ..."
653 Section 200A contained relevant definitions and concepts and was as follows:
"(1) For the purposes of this Division:
(a) a benefit is given in connection with a person's retirement from an office if the benefit is given:
(i) by way of compensation for, or otherwise in connection with, the loss by the person of the office; or
(ii) in connection with the person's retirement from the office; and
(i) if the benefit is a payment - making the payment; and
(ii) if the benefit is an interest in property - transferring the interest; and
(c) a person gives a benefit even if the person is obliged to give the benefit under a contract; and
(d) a pension or lump sum is paid or payable in connection with the person's retirement from an office if the pension or lump sum is paid or payable:
(i) by way of compensation for, or otherwise in connection with, the loss by the person of the office; or
(ii) in connection with the person's retirement from the office; and
(i) loss of the office; and
(ii) resignation from the office; and
(2) For the purposes of this Division, if:
(a) a person (person A) gives another person a benefit (benefit A); and
(b) person A gives benefit A for the purpose, or for purposes including the purpose, of enabling or assisting someone to give a person a benefit in connection with the retirement of a person (person B) from an office;
person A is taken to give benefit A in connection with the person B's retirement from that office."
654 A board or managerial office was relevantly defined in s.9 as follows:
(a) an office of director of the body corporate; and
(b) any other office in connection with the management of the body corporate's affairs that is held by:
(i) a person who also holds an office of director of the body corporate or a related body corporate; or
(ii) a person who has held an office of director of the body corporate or a related body corporate at any time within the 12 months immediately before the loss of, or retirement from, that office."
655 Section 200E permitted a retirement payment if approved by a resolution of the shareholders passed at a general meeting of the company, although there was no dispute that there had been no member approval in this case. That section provided that details of the benefit had to be set out in, or accompany, the notice of the meeting at which the resolution was to be considered and that the details had to include, if the proposed benefit was a payment, the amount of the payment or if that amount could not be ascertained at the time of the disclosure, the manner in which that amount was to be calculated and any matter, event or circumstance that would, or was likely to, affect the calculation of that amount.
656 Section 200J provided that where giving a benefit to a person contravened s.200B the benefit or monies were taken to be received by the person in trust for the company.
657 In my opinion, it is the Corporations Law 2000 which is the applicable legislation in respect of the issue whether the termination bonus provision breached the "retirement from office" provisions, because, as VRL submitted, the definitions of "prescribed benefit" and "give" in s.237(19) of the Corporations Law 1995-1999, and the definitions of "benefit" and "give" in s.200A of the Corporations Law 2000, all lead to the conclusion that it is the act of payment (whether pursuant to a contractual obligation or otherwise) to which both sets of provisions are directed. I also consider that s.237(14)(a) of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 and s.200A(1)(c) of the Corporations Law 2000 point to the same conclusion. The termination bonus allegedly became due and payable on 1 July 2001 and on that date, it was the Corporations Law 2000 which was in force.
658 I do not accept Orrong's argument that ss.109E and 109F of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 had any role to play in this situation. Section 109E(c) provided that
"Where a provision of this Law is repealed, the repeal does not:
(a) ...
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any provision so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repeal had not taken effect."
659 As VRL submitted, s.109E did not preserve contractual rights, it preserved statutory rights under repealed provisions of the corporations law. Orrong had no relevant statutory right under the corporations law to be preserved.
660 Support for the conclusion that the proper construction of the legislation is that it is the contractual date of payment of the termination bonus which determined the law to be applied is to be found in several cases.
661 In Fox v GIO Australia[56], Walton J held, in respect of termination bonuses, that:
"The definition of 'giving a benefit' strengthens my view that it is not until a company actually makes a payment (or otherwise gives a benefit) that any transgression occurs. Otherwise it could always be asserted that the company intended to seek member approval. It is only once the benefit has been given that it is clear that the company did so without approval."
662 In Sali v SPC Ltd[57] Ormiston J when referring to s.233 of the Companies (Victoria) Code said:
"It is at the time of payment or transfer that the section must be considered and that payment or benefit then approved in general meeting, unless it falls outside the operation of the section. Of course that approval might be given in advance, although the calculation of benefit for the purpose of the exception in subs(2A) could not be effectively made until close to retirement or removal from office. Likewise an exempt benefit may result from the operation of an agreement previously entered into and approved in general meeting (subs(7(c)) or was part of the terms of the director's original engagement (subs(7(e))."
663 In Whitlam v Insurance Australia Group Limited[58], Einstein J stated that:
"the payment to Mr Whitlam of a retirement benefit under the retirement policy approved on 4 April 2001, was the giving of a benefit in connection with Mr Whitlam's retirement from the board of IAG." (Emphasis added)
664 Further, I consider that it was the Corporations Law 2000 which was applicable, even if Orrong was correct in its submission that the legislation to be applied is that in force at the time the Agreement is made. Whilst it was obviously the Corporations Law 1995-1999 which operated when the 1995 Agreement was made, that Agreement was, as pleaded by Orrong in paragraph 10 of the fifth further amended statement of claim, varied by the 2000 Agreement made in June 2000 after the Corporations Law 2000 came into effect. It seems to me that when considering the making of an Agreement containing the termination bonus provision it is the final form of that part of the Agreement which is the critical date and the 2000 Agreement altered the formula for calculating the amount of the termination bonus.
665 The issue for determination is, therefore, whether Orrong's claim for payment of the termination bonus would be in breach of s.200B of the Corporations Law 2000 because it would be the company (VRL) giving a person (Orrong) a benefit in connection with someone else's (Mr Ziegler's) retirement from a board or managerial office in a company (VRL) or a related body corporate (VRC) without member approval under s.200E.
Board or Managerial Office
666 I turn then to consider whether Mr Ziegler's role came within the definition of "a board or managerial office" in s.200B of the Corporations Law 2000.
667 In Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht[59], Ormiston J dealt with the concept of "management" in the context of s.227 of the Companies (Victoria) Code which prohibited an insolvent person under administration being a director of taking part "in the management" of a company. His Honour quoted with approval from the judgment of Shaw LJ in Re a Company[60]:
"The expression 'manager' should not be too narrowly construed. It is not to be equated with a managing or other director or general manager. As I see it, any person who in the affairs of the company exercises a supervisory control which reflects the general policy of the company for the time being or which is related to the general administration of the company is in the sphere of management. He need not be a member of the board of directors. He need not be subject to specific instructions from the board. If he fulfils a function which touches the central administration of the company, that is sufficient in my view to constitute him an 'officer' or 'manager' of the company ..."
"... the concept of 'management' ... comprehends activities which involve policy and decision making, related to the business affairs of a corporation, affecting the corporation as a whole or a substantial part of that corporation, to the extent that the consequences of the formation of those policies or the making of those decisions may have some significant bearing on the financial standing of the corporation or the conduct of its affairs."[61]
668 In Re New World Alliance Pty Ltd; Sycotex Pty Ltd v Baseler (No 2)[62] one of the issues involved in an application under s.592 of the Corporations Law was whether the company secretary was a person who "took part in the management of the company, at the time when the debt was incurred." The trial judge, Gummow J, held that taking part in the management of a company required "that the person have some decision-making role in the company."[63] Thus, the company secretary who, it was held, was a mere employee who took orders from those who actually made the management decisions and whose role at most involved the making of suggestions of an accounting nature which might or might not be acted upon by the directors, was held not to be a person who "took part in the management of the company."
669 VRL submitted that what these and other authorities made clear was that taking part in management was not confined to matters performed by the board of directors or a managing director although it involved more than carrying out day to day routine functions in accordance with pre-determined policies. As Orrong submitted, the term "manage" is suggestive of control and means taking an active part in running the operations of a business, being responsible for decision making and the direction of a business. Further, as Austin, Ford and Ramsey[64] point out, some guidance was to be found in s.206A which specified the circumstances when a person who was disqualified for managing corporations under Part 2D.6 committed an offence. These included making, or participating in making, "decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation" or exercising "the capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing."
670 VRL submitted that Mr Ziegler's conduct clearly satisfied these requirements. It argued that Mr Ziegler, whilst carrying out his duties under the 1995 Agreement, was involved in the management of VRL. He effectively ran VRP, a division of VRL. His own evidence, and that of VRL's witnesses, clearly established his "management" role. His new job title of "Director, Fiscal, Legal & Strategic Objectives", which he sought, was descriptive of such a role. VRL pointed to the fact that Mr Ziegler was appointed Chairman of VRP in January 1996; he was a director (alternate or actual) of VRL from 3 October 1995 to 22 December 1999; and was a director of the related body corporate, VRC, from 22 December 1999 to 30 June 2001.
671 In my view, a number of contemporaneous documentary references support the conclusion that Mr Ziegler was involved in the management of VRL. His appointment as Chairman of VRP and Executive in charge of "Village Roadshow production from the Home Office" was made in a memorandum from Mr Burke to Mr Ziegler on 24 January 1996. In this memorandum Mr Burke said that "there is no-one in our Group who is better at 'sculpturing' and strategising deals. This is the core of the success of the business" and referred to it being "very good for you to have a business to run." In the managing director's report of Mr Burke for the Board Meeting in March 1996 Mr Burke referred to the Production division and said that in order to ensure breadth and spread of management, "senior cabinet minister Peter Ziegler has taken on the Chairmanship [of VRP] and will be Executive Director's (Greg Coote's) running mate in building this business."
672 In VRL's 1996 Annual Report Mr Ziegler was described as "Director, Fiscal, Legal and Strategic Objectives" and as the "Alternate Director to Gregory Coote." He was said to be responsible for fiscal and legal affairs and advising on group strategies. He was described as the Chairman of VRP and an Executive Committee Member. The terms of reference of the Executive Committee set out in the 1996 Annual Report included:
"― development of the strategic plan which encompasses the Company's vision, mission and strategy statements and stakeholders' needs;
― implementation of operating plans and budgets by management and monitoring progress against budget as well as monitoring all significant areas of business, ..."
673 Similar descriptions of Mr Ziegler's role were contained in VRL's Annual Report for the next two years. In VRL's 1999 Annual Report Mr Ziegler was similarly described and it was also said of him that he had "responsibility for the formulation and implementation of strategies for the Group with emphasis on film production and exhibition divisions."
674 On the day Mr Ziegler ceased to be a director of VRL with effect from 22 December 1999 and a member of the Executive Committee, his appointment as a director of VRC was announced. The press release noted that Mr Ziegler would "continue in his role as a consultant to VRL in a number of areas, including Film Production, Exhibition of special projects" and stated that he "has led Village's move into becoming a major international film production company, including a co-venture with Warner Bros."
675 In a memorandum dated 14 January 2000 from Mr Burke to Mr Ziegler, Mr Burke confirmed Mr Ziegler's "on-going role" as including "VRP Management - to be the point person for VRP as to all issues. Bruce Berman will effectively report to you except as to creative decisions ..." In an undated document entitled "Re-direction Village Roadshow Pictures", which Mr Burke circulated to Mr Berman and a number of senior VRL executives, it was said: "So that within Village Roadshow Limited VRP has a champion, it has been agreed that as part of his consultancy Peter Ziegler will be our point person as to all aspects of running the business except creative ..." On 18 February 2000 a confidential memorandum from Mr Burke to numerous persons (including a copy to Mr Ziegler) noted that in relation to "the forthcoming IPO" of VRP the "buck will stop" with Mr Ziegler. Mr Ziegler himself referred to his _"_ongoing role as the person responsible for the funding of VRP's operations" in a note to Mr Burke on 16 May 2001.
676 I therefore consider that up until 30 June 2001 Mr Ziegler was holding a managerial office with VRL and a board and managerial office with VRC, a related body corporate to VRL.
In Connection With Retirement
677 The next question is whether Mr Ziegler retired from those board or managerial offices at that time, and if so, whether the termination bonus claimed by Orrong was one made "in connection with" his retirement from such an office. Although the 1995 Agreement ended on 30 June 2001 Mr Ziegler continued to work for the Village Roadshow Group for another year pursuant to the 2001 Agreement. Thus, Orrong submitted that there was no relevant retirement bringing s.200B of the Corporations Law 2000 into play. Orrong further submitted that none of the managerial roles or positions relied on by VRL both commenced on 1 July 1996 and concluded on 30 June 2001.
678 VRL maintained that there was a significant change in Mr Ziegler's role after 30 June 2001 with the result that he had retired from his managerial office with VRL on that date. It pointed out that Mr Ziegler resigned as a director of VRC on that date. Further, it submitted that the 2001 Agreement made on or about 27 June 2001 provided clear evidence of a contemplated change to Mr Ziegler's role within VRL in that it provided that Mr Ziegler would resign from the Board of VRC, would resign from the Board of VRF with effect from 1 January 2002 and would take on new job titles, namely "Financial Advisor to the Board - Village Roadshow Pictures" and "Financial Advisor to the Board - Village Roadshow Limited". VRL argued that the change to an advisory role indicated that Mr Ziegler was no longer in a managerial role.
679 I do not consider that Mr Ziegler retired from his managerial role with VRL on 30 June 2001. He in fact continued as a director of VRF, obviously an important company within the Village Roadshow Group, until 30 June 2002. The word "retirement" means a cessation or "withdrawal from an office or occupation".[65] Mr Ziegler's services continued to be provided by Orrong to VRL, this time pursuant to the 2001 Agreement, until 30 June 2002.
680 Nevertheless, Mr Ziegler did retire from a board or managerial office with VRC on 30 June 2001. The question therefore is whether the termination bonus was payable "in connection with" this retirement from his managerial role with VRC, or from his managerial role with VRL if I am wrong on my view of him continuing to occupy a managerial office with that company.
681 VRL submitted that there was the necessary connection between Mr Ziegler's retirement from his managerial office and the giving of the benefit. It pointed out that the benefit was called a "termination bonus" in the agreement. This was the word expressly used in the heading by the legislation. VRL argued that Orrong's case was that the right to a "termination bonus" arose because the engagement under the 1995 Agreement had expired. Unless Mr Ziegler's "office" was terminated, Orrong was not entitled to the bonus. It was the fact of this "retirement" which activated the clause pursuant to which the termination bonus was payable.
682 I do not agree. The termination bonus was purportedly payable because the 1995 Agreement came to an end with the effluxion of time. It had nothing to do with whether or not Mr Ziegler retired from a managerial office. I have found that Mr Ziegler continued to perform such a role after 30 June 2001, but under a different Agreement, not the 1995 Agreement. The 2001 Agreement was not, according to its terms, a variation or extension of the 1995 Agreement. It was an entirely new Agreement.
683 In Whitlam v Insurance Australia Group Limited[66] Einstein J considered the operation of the very similar provisions of ss.200B to 200G of the Corporations Act 2001 in the context of whether a particular superannuation payment was made "in connection with" a person's retirement as a director. His Honour quoted the statement by Hudson J in Lincoln Mills (Aust) Ltd v Gough[67] that "the nature and circumstances of the payment must be looked at with a view to determining its true character" and reiterated that "mere contemporaneity will not establish a sufficient connection." Einstein J said that "to put it colloquially, there will be a connection where the superannuation payment 'had [something] to do with' Mr Whitlam's resignation."[68]
684 I consider that the termination bonus, if it had been payable on 1 July 2001 because the 1995 Agreement terminated on that date, would not have been a payment made "in connection with" Mr Ziegler's retirement from his board or managerial position with VRC. There was no relevant connection between any retirement from office and the payment of the termination bonus. As Orrong pointed out there was nothing in the 1995 Agreement which required or pre-supposed, or was contingent upon, Mr Ziegler holding any particular "office." Orrong's right to receive the termination bonus and VRL's obligation to pay it "was in no way dependent upon" Mr Ziegler's loss of or retirement from any office held by him.[69] There was no causal nexus between them. My conclusion would, however, have been different if I had held that Mr Ziegler had retired from his managerial position, and ceased all involvement, with VRL on 30 June 2001. In that case, there would have been a connection, in my opinion, between Mr Ziegler's change of role and the termination bonus becoming payable as they would both have resulted from the 1995 Agreement coming to an end. The claimed payment would "have had something to do with" his retirement.
Possible Exceptions
685 Although it is not strictly necessary, given the conclusion I have just reached, I briefly consider two responses by Orrong to VRL's reliance on the "retirement from office" provisions. Orrong pleaded in its reply that in any event the payment of the termination bonus came within a relevant statutory exception. Section 200F(a)(iii) stated:
"Subsection 200B(1) does not apply to:
(a) a benefit given in connection with a person's retirement from an office in relation to a company if the benefit is:
...
(iii) given to the person under an agreement made between the company and the person before the person became the holder of the office as the consideration, or part of the consideration, for the person agreeing to hold the office; ..."
686 However, it was submitted by VRL that before the agreement was made on 27 November 1995, Mr Ziegler had already assumed managerial functions pursuant to the 1993 Agreement. It was argued that this was evidenced by the fact that VRL's 1995 Annual Report described Mr Ziegler as an "executive committee member" and also as "Group Counsel responsible for fiscal and legal affairs and advising on group strategies." Further, Mr Ziegler was appointed as an alternate director of VRL on 3 October 1995. VRL referred to the evidence which showed that Mr Ziegler had attended the VRL board meetings held on 10 August and 3 October 1995 by invitation and that he attended the VRL board meeting held on 20 November 1995 as alternate for Mr Coote. Thus, Mr Ziegler already held an "office" at the time of entering the 1995 Agreement. Accordingly, VRL submitted that s.200F(a)(iii) had no application, as it applied only to benefits given under an agreement before the person became the holder of the office in question. In any event, the "person" with whom the agreement was made was Orrong, not Mr Ziegler. Orrong never held an "office" from which it could retire. Thus, s.200F(a)(iii) was irrelevant.
687 On the other hand, Orrong submitted that the office in question was not held by Mr Ziegler until he was appointed a director of VRL on 12 March 1998. Orrong's alternative submission was that even though Mr Ziegler might have acted as a director of VRL, he was not such on 27 November 1995. Orrong further submitted that the words "person" and "prescribed person" were used interchangeably so that s.200F(a)(iii) could still apply to Orrong.
688 It is sufficient to note that I consider that s.200F(a)(iii) would not have assisted Orrong for the reasons advanced by VRL.
689 Orrong also sought to rely on s.200G which was concerned with a payment by way of pension or lump sum payment in respect of "past services" rendered by the person. Again, I consider that this argument fails because it is Orrong and not Mr Ziegler who has provided the contractual services. Section 200G(5) talked of the "eligible employee" being "a genuine full-time employee of the company" which was neither Orrong's nor Mr Ziegler's situation.
The Position Under the Corporations Law 1995-1999
690 Given my conclusion that, in the circumstances, s.200B of the Corporations Law 2000 would not have been breached by the payment of the termination bonus on the expiration of the 1995 Agreement, if that was what was required, it is not really necessary to examine the position with respect to the payment of the termination bonus under the Corporations Law 1995-1999, which was the legislation which Orrong maintained was applicable. It is sufficient simply to note that, in my opinion, the result would have been the same because there was no relevant difference between the provisions of the two statutory regimes, in particular the meaning of "prescribed office" in s.237(1)(a) of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 and "board or managerial office" in s.200B of the Corporations Law 2000. Both were concerned to prohibit the payment of an unapproved benefit "in connection with" the retirement of a person from that office.
The Related Party Financial Benefit Provisions
691 The next topic is what effect the "related party financial benefits" provisions in the corporations legislation had on a number of performance bonus and profit share payments and claims, including the termination bonus claim. Again, for present purposes I am proceeding on the assumption that I am wrong in my conclusion that no termination bonus was payable on 1 July 2001.
692 Once again there was disagreement between the parties concerning which was the applicable legislation for the issue of related party transactions. Orrong submitted that it was the corporations law in force in November 1995, when the 1995 Agreement was made, which was applicable, whereas VRL contended that it was that form of the corporations legislation which was in force at the dates of both the various Agreements and payments. VRL submitted that there was no inconsistency or contradiction between its position on this point in respect of the "retirement from office" provisions and in respect of the "related party financial benefits" provisions. It argued that the definitions were different and that the wording of the same had to be carefully scrutinised. It submitted that the phrase "giving a financial benefit" in s.229 of the Corporations Law 2000 was defined more broadly than the phrase "giving a benefit" in s.200A(1)(b) of that Law and that the same applied with respect to the definitions in the Corporations Law 1995-1999. I agree that with respect to "related party financial benefits" one has to look at the corporations legislation both at the time an Agreement was entered into and at the time a payment was made or fell due.
693 The principal dates would seem to be as follows:
(a) 27 November 1995, when the 1995 Agreement was made;
(b) 8 September 1997 or 31 October 1997 when the 5.25% interest in VRP was agreed or took effect pursuant to the 1997 Agreement;
(c) March 1998, when Orrong rendered its invoice for a number of performance bonuses including the 5% fee on US$16 million equity; $601,504 was paid on 15 September 1998;
(d) 1 July 1998, the first date on which the 5.25% profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 1998 could have been due; $612,937 was paid on 10 December 1998;
(e) 1 July 1999, the first date on which the 5.25% profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 1999 could have been due; $1,137,038 was paid on 22 October 1999;
(f) 21 June 2000, when the 2.25% interest in VRP was agreed pursuant to the 2000 Agreement;
(g) 1 July 2000, the first date on which the 5.25%, 6.375% or 7.5% profit share payable for the financial year ended 30 June 2000 could have been due; $283,000 was paid on 17 October 2000;
(h) 5 July 2000, when the Project Bendigo performance bonus of $5,055,626 was paid;
(i) 8 March 2001, when the Project Castlemaine performance bonus of $5,215,247 was paid;
(j) 26 June 2001, the first date on which the 5% Roadshow Distributors' performance bonus of $3,724,000 could have been due; or 6 August 2001, when the invoice was sent;
(k) 1 July 2001, when (according to Orrong) the termination payment became payable; and the first date on which the 7.5% profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 2001 and the "taxes saved" performance bonus of $275,395 could have been due;
(l) 1 July 2002, the first date on which the 7.5% profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 2002 and the "taxes saved" performance bonus of $225,505 could have been due;
(m) 1 July 2003, the first date on which the 7.5% profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 2003 could have been due;
(n) 1 July 2004, the first date on which the 7.5% profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 2004 could have been due.
694 As VRL pointed out, the above Agreements and payments occurred either before or after 13 March 2000, but were all before 15 July 2001. This means that in respect of matters occurring before 13 March 2000 it is the Corporations Law 1995-1999 as incorporated by s.1401 of the Corporations Act 2001, which applies regardless of whether the relevant event is the entering into the Agreement or the making of the payment. In respect of matters occurring between 13 March 2000 and 14 July 2001 it is the Corporations Law 2000 as incorporated by s.1400 of the Corporations Act 2001, which applies. Orrong, of course, argued that the earlier provisions applied to these matters because the relevant event was the entering into the 1995 Agreement. But as I have already held that it is the 2000 Agreement, which varied the 1995 Agreement by providing for a new performance bonus which is relevant and it was entered into after 13 March 2000, even on Orrong's argument it is the Corporations Law 2000 which applies to all of the Agreements and the payments occurring on or after 21 June 2000. In respect of matters occurring after 15 July 2001, they are all claims to be paid the 7.5% profit share. If VRL is right then the Corporations Act 2001 would apply. If Orrong is right, it will be the Corporations Law 2000 which applies to these claimed payments. However, for practical purposes, it makes no difference whether it is the Corporations Law 2000 or the Corporations Act 2001 which applies.
The Provisions Before 13 March 2000
695 Relevantly, s.243H of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 provided that:
"(1) A public company must not give a financial benefit to a related party except as permitted by Division 4 or 5."
These two divisions refer to exceptions (Division 4) and shareholder approval (Division 5). Again, there was no dispute that shareholder approval had not been obtained.
696 Section 243F defined "a related party" as follows:
"(1) Each of the following is a related party of a public company:
(a) a director of the public company;
(b) a director of a body corporate that is a parent entity of the company ...
(2) An entity is also a related party of a public company at a particular time if the entity was a related party of the public company because of subsection (1) at any time within the previous 6 months.
(3) An entity is also a related party of a public company at a particular time if:
(a) the entity believes at that time, or has at that time reasonable grounds to believe, that it is likely to become an entity of a particular kind at some future time; and
(b) by becoming an entity of that kind, it would become at that future time a related party of the public company because of subsection (1)."
"An entity is a parent entity of another entity if:
(a) both are bodies corporate and the first entity is a holding company of the other; or
(b) the first entity has control over the other."
"Each of the following is an entity:
(a) a body corporate ...
(d) an individual ..."
697 The meaning of giving a "financial benefit" was set out in s.243G as follows:
"(1) A reference to an entity giving a financial benefit:
(a) is intended to operate broadly, even though criminal or civil penalties may be involved: and
(b) includes a reference to giving a financial benefit indirectly (for example through one or more interposed entities) or by making or giving effect to a relevant agreement (as defined in section 9).
(2) In deciding whether an entity has given a financial benefit:
(a) the economic and commercial substance and effect of what the entity has done is to prevail over its legal form; and
(b) any consideration that has been or may be given for the benefit is to be disregarded, even if it is full or adequate."
698 A "relevant agreement" was defined in s.9 of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 as "an agreement, arrangement or understanding" which can be "formal or informal", "written or oral" or "whether or not having legal or equitable force."
699 VRL submitted that Mr Ziegler was at all relevant times a director of either the public company which gave the financial benefit (VRL) and thus within s.243F(1)(a), or of a parent entity (VRC) and thus within s.243F(1)(b). It submitted that when VRL entered into the 1995 Agreement on 27 November 1995, Mr Ziegler, who was appointed as an alternate director of VRL on 3 October 1995, was clearly a related party because the definition of "director" in s.60 of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 included an alternate director. Orrong denied this but admitted in its defence that Mr Ziegler was a related party between 12 March 1998, when he was appointed a director of VRL, and 22 June 2000, being six months after his resignation from VRL on 22 December 1999. Both parties agreed that Mr Ziegler's directorship of VRC, the controlling entity, made him a related party from his appointment on 22 December 1999 until six months after his resignation on 30 June 2001, that is, to 31 December 2001.
700 Orrong disputed that s.60 of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 applied to alternate directors. That section relevantly provided:
"(1) Subject to subsection (2), a reference to a director, in relation to a body corporate includes a reference to:
(a) a person occupying or acting in the position of director of the body, by whatever name called and whether or not validly appointed to occupy, or duly authorised to act in, the position; ..."
I reject VRL's submission that s.60(1)(b) was also relevant because Mr Ziegler was "a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the body [were] accustomed to act." That is not a correct characterisation of Mr Ziegler's role, in my opinion. VRL's argument really came down to the assertion that the directors routinely acted in accordance with his advice. Even if this were factually correct, it is not the same concept as the directors acting in accordance with someone else's "directions or instructions". See also s.60(2) which specifically excluded the situation of the directors acting on advice given by a person acting in that person's "professional capacity."
701 Nevertheless, it seems to me that for the purposes of the "related party financial benefits" provisions, once Mr Ziegler started to attend Board meetings as an alternate director then he was "acting in the position of director" of VRL and was therefore a "related party" from 20 November 1995. It would be a nonsensical approach, in my opinion, to hold that after this date Mr Ziegler was a related party only on the days he attended Board meetings as an alternate director and not otherwise. Because of the different factual situations, I do not consider decisions such as Anaray Pty Ltd v Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd[70], Markwell Bros Pty Ltd v CPN Diesels (Qld) Pty Ltd[71] and Playcorp Pty Ltd v Shaw[72] to be of assistance on this point. Nor do I consider s.238 of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 to be relevant.
702 Mr Ziegler was also a related party when the 1995 Agreement was entered into by virtue of s.243F(3). I agree with VRL's submission that given that Mr Ziegler had recently been appointed an alternate director, that he was a member of VRL's Executive Committee, that he had sought the title "Director, Fiscal, Legal & Strategic objectives" and that he had referred in his letter of 2 October 1995 to "the increasing commercial/strategic role envisaged for me within VRL", that Mr Ziegler believed, or had reasonable grounds to believe, that he would become a director of VRL "at some time in the future." He was a star on the rise and the logical progression was for him to become a director of VRL, a position which he sought and obtained in March 1998.
703 The argument that Mr Ziegler was a related party by virtue of his appointment as an acting director is stronger when one considers the situation at the time of the making of the 1997 Agreement. Since the 20 November 1995 Board meeting, Mr Ziegler had attended a meeting on 7 August 1996, had attended as an alternate for Mr Coote on 11 September 1996 and 6 May 1997, had joined the meeting although not listed as an attendee on 27 May 1997, was listed as an apology although Mr Coote was in attendance on 1 July 1997 and was listed as an apology together with Mr Coote on 12 August 1997.
704 It is clear that what was a "financial benefit" was to be defined broadly. It included the concept of "giving" and encompassed indirect giving or the making of or giving effect to a relevant agreement. Thus, both the making and the implementation of the 1995 and 1997 Agreements constituted "giving." Accordingly, both entering into these two Agreements and making all the payments referred to above pursuant thereto constitute the "giving" of a financial benefit within the meaning of s.243H. Further, as the economic and commercial substance and effect of what an entity has done is to prevail over legal form it cannot be argued that the making of the Agreement with Orrong could prevent the receipt of payments by Mr Ziegler and/or third parties nominated by him from being caught by s.243H(1) of the Corporations Law 1995-1999.
The Provisions After 13 March 2000
705 The relevant prohibition on "related party financial benefits" after 13 March 2000 was found in Part 2E.1 of the Corporations Law 2000. Section 208 provided:
"(1) For a public company, or an entity that the public company controls, to give a financial benefit to a related party of the public company:
(a) the public company or entity must:
(i) obtain the approval of the public company's members in the way set out in section 217 to 227; and
(ii) give the benefit within 15 months of the approval; or
(b) the giving of the benefit must fall within an exception set out in sections 210 to 216."
706 Section 228 defined "related party". It stated :
"(1) An entity that controls a public company is a related party of the public company.
(2) The following persons are related parties of a public company:
(a) directors of the public company
(b) directors (if any) of an entity that controls the public company ..."
Section 9 of the C__orporations Law 2000 relevantly defined "director" as meaning a person who "is appointed to the position of an alternate director and is acting in that capacity regardless of the name that is given to their position." Section 228(5) extended the concept for six months after the control ceased.
707 Further, giving a "financial benefit" was defined broadly in s.229 of the Corporations Law 2000 as follows:
"(1) In determining whether a financial benefit is given for the purposes of this Chapter:
(a) give a broad interpretation to financial benefits being given, even if criminal or civil penalties may be involved; and
(b) the economic and commercial substance of conduct is to prevail over its legal form; and
(c) disregard any consideration that is or may be given for the benefit, even if the consideration is adequate.
(2) "Giving a financial benefit" includes the following:
(a) giving a financial benefit indirectly, for example, through 1 or more interposed entities;
(b) giving a financial benefit by making an informal agreement, oral agreement or an agreement that has no binding force'
(c) giving a financial benefit that does not involve paying money (for example by conferring a financial advantage)."
708 In accordance with the approach set out above, entering into the 2000 Agreement and making all the payments referred to above pursuant thereto, or pursuant to earlier Agreements after this Act came into force, constituted a "financial benefit" in contravention of s.208 of the Corporations Law 2000.
Possible Exceptions
709 Nevertheless, Orrong submitted that, depending on timing, either the exceptions under s.243N of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 or under s.210 of the Corporations Law 2000 applied.
710 Section 243N of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 was as follows:
"(1) A public company, or a child entity of a public company, may give a financial benefit to a related party of the public company if it does so on terms and conditions no more favourable to the related party than those on which it is reasonable to expect that the company or entity, as the case may be, would give the benefit directly if dealing with the related party at arm's length in the same circumstances."
711 Section 210 of the Corporations Law 2000 was as follows:
" Member approval is not needed to give a financial benefit on terms that:
(a) would be reasonable in the circumstances if the public company or entity and the related party were dealing at arm's length; or
(b) are less favourable to the related party than the terms referred to in paragraph (a)."
712 Both of these sections used similar terminology. For example, they both refer to the public company "dealing" with the related party "at arm's length." Although the wording is not quite so similar, I consider, and the parties seemed content to proceed on the basis, that the concept of "terms and conditions no more favourable to the related party ... in the same circumstances" in s.243N(1) was equivalent to "terms that ... would be reasonable in the circumstances" in s.210. I therefore propose to deal with these two sections together.
Onus of Proof
713 VRL submitted that the onus of establishing the exceptions rested squarely on Orrong. It argued that in accordance with normal practice, it was for the party making the allegation to satisfy the court that the statutory exceptions applied. It submitted that support for this contention was to be found in the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission[73]. In that case it was held, in the context of the "related party financial benefits" provisions, that it was for the party seeking to rely on the arm's length exceptions to elicit evidence in order to establish the applicability of the statutory exception.
714 Orrong submitted that in accordance with normal principles of statutory construction the onus was on VRL to show that the breach of the section was established and that part of this task involved countering any statutory exception. It relied on the decision by Einstein J in Randall v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd[74] that the onus was on a party relying on s.208(1) "to establish that that section, and none of its exemptions, apply." Orrong also relied on the decision of Master Bredmeyer, albeit on a pleading summons, in Westchester Pty Ltd v Triton Resources Ltd[75] that it was "fair to impose the burden on the defendant because s.243H is not a simple prohibition that 'a public company must not give a financial benefit to a related party'." Rather it was a prohibition "except as permitted" by certain provisions.
715 In Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd[76] McHugh J said:
"When a statue imposes an obligation which is the subject of a qualification, exception or proviso, the burden of the proof concerning that qualification, exception or proviso depends on whether it is part of the total statement of the obligation. If it is, the onus rests on the party alleging a breach of the obligation. If, however, the qualification, exception or proviso provides an excuse or justification for not complying with the obligation, the onus of proof lies on the party alleging that he falls within the qualification, excuse or proviso: Vines v Djordjevitch[77]. Whatever form the statue takes, the question has to be determined as one of substance: Vines[78]; Banque Commerciale SA, en Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd.[79]
It seems to me that the sections in question were "an excuse or justification" for the giving of a financial benefit to a related party, rather than "part of the total statement of the obligation". In any event it is appropriate that I follow the approach adopted by the New South Wales Court of Appeal. Therefore, I hold that the onus was on Orrong to establish that the statutory exceptions applied. In a sense this conclusion is not that important because wherever the onus lies I am satisfied to the requisite standard of proof that the relevant prohibitive section, and none of its exceptions, applied.
"At Arm's Length" and "Reasonable"
716 The first point to note about the concept of a dealing "at arm's length" is that, as VRL submitted, the concept of "arm's length" negotiations is not an end in itself. It is the means whereby objectively what was "reasonable in the circumstances" might be assessed. VRL further submitted that it must be borne in mind that even in an arm's length negotiation, the result may be unreasonable. The test was not entirely objective; as there was a subjective element; namely, the "circumstances." In other words, against the background of the relevant facts found by the Court, the Court determines what is objectively reasonable.
717 In Australian Trade Commission v WA Meat Exports Pty Ltd[80] the Full Court of the Federal Court held that a consultant under a consultancy agreement with a company in which he had formerly had a large shareholding was "at arm's length", as neither party, in negotiating the agreement, had any interest to pay more or receive less than was necessary to secure the consultant's service, and neither had any claim to the profits or assets of the other's business. Neither of them had the ability to exert personal influence or control over the other.
718 In determining the ordinary meaning of "arm's length" the Full Court referred to the definition of "arm's length" in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary[81] as:
"The relationship which exists between parties who are strangers to each other, and who bear no special duty, obligation, or relation to each other, vendor and purchaser ..."
Further, they referred to the definition in Black's Law Dictionary[82]:
"Arm's length transaction; said of a transaction negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own self-interest; the basis for a fair market value determination. ... The standard under which unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own best interest, would carry out a particular transaction - For example, if a corporation sells property to its sole shareholder for $10,000, in testing whether $10,000 is an arm's length price it must be ascertained for how much the corporation could have sold the property to a disinterested third party in a bargained transaction."
719 In a series of tax cases, aspects of what is "at arm's length" in different provisions in the income tax legislation have been considered. Two points come out of those decisions. First, in the words of Jenkinson J in Collis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[83]:
"The question is not whether the parties were at arm's length but whether they were dealing with each other at arm's length."
720 This is because as Hill J said in Copperart Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[84]:
"... in a particular fact situation related parties may deal with each other at arm's length in relation to a transaction and unrelated parties may deal with each other not at arm's length in relation to a particular transaction."
721 The second aspect is the objective nature of the test. In Trustee of the Estate of the late AW Furse (No. 5) Will Trust v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[85] Hill J said:
"What is required in determining whether parties dealt with each other in respect of a particular dealing at arm's length is an assessment whether in respect of that dealing they dealt with each other as arm's length parties would normally do, so that the outcome of their dealing is a matter of real bargaining." (Emphasis added).
The reference to what parties "would normally do" clearly is an objective test.
722 In Granby Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[86] Lee J said:
"The expression 'dealing with each other at arm's length' involves an analysis of the manner in which the parties to a transaction conducted themselves in forming that transaction. What is asked is whether the parties behaved in the manner in which parties at arm's length would be expected to behave in conducting their affairs. Of course, it is relevant to that inquiry to determine the nature of the relationship between the parties, for if the parties are not parties at arm's length the inference may be drawn that they did not deal with each other at arm's length. ... If the parties to the transaction are at arm's length it will follow, usually, that the parties will have dealt with each other at arm's length. That is, the separate minds and wills of the parties will be applied to the bargaining process whatever the outcome of the bargain may be. ..."
723 These and other authorities were recently reviewed by Dodds-Streeton J in ACI Operations Pty Ltd v Berri Limited[87]. Her Honour concluded that:
"The above authorities indicate that an arm's length relationship is that of strangers, or parties who are unaffected by existing mutual duties, liabilities, obligations, cross-ownership of assets, or identity of interests which present a capacity in either party to influence or control the other, or an inducement to serve that common interest, which might operate to modify the terms on which strangers would deal.
The concept of an arm's length relationship is distinct from that of an arm's length dealing or transaction, despite the potential overlap. Unrelated parties may collude or otherwise deal with each other in an interested way, so that neither the dealing nor the resultant transaction may properly be considered arm's length.
Where the parties are not in an arm's length relationship, it is recognised that the inference may be drawn that they did not deal with each other at arm's length.[88] It may further be inferred that the resultant transaction is not arm's length.
Related parties may nevertheless, in some circumstances, demonstrate a dealing which displaces the inference based on their relationship. They may engage in the disinterested bargaining characteristic of strangers, applying independent separate wills. The circumstances of the impugned transaction may be such that, despite the parties' connection or common interest, the interposition of some independent process (such as the sale of shares on the stock exchange) ensures that the transaction itself is arm's length, in the sense that it could equally have been concluded by unrelated parties, consulting their own self-interest and uninfluenced by any particular association or interest in common."[89]
724 VRL submitted that these authorities established that the relationship between the parties does not determine the issue. Whether they be strangers or not, and whether they bargain or not, the question remains, have they reached a result which could be described as, to use the words of s.210, "reasonable in the circumstances."
725 VRL in effect conceded that the relevant Agreements all resulted from "hard negotiations", that is hard bargaining. But it maintained that such a situation did not determine whether the financial benefits which resulted from those negotiations were "reasonable in the circumstances." It submitted that the termination bonus provisions and the performance bonus provisions, in particular the finance raising performance bonus provisions and the substituted percentage equity interests in VRP, to be found in one or more of the 1995 Agreement, the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement meant that all of those Agreements failed the test of reasonableness. VRL contended that it was not to the point that senior executives agreed to confer these benefits. If they had not done so, the need to submit a proposal for the approval of shareholders would not have arisen. Nor was the matter determined by the fact that agreement was reached. That would result in the sections having an entirely subjective field of operation.
726 In my opinion, there clearly was hard bargaining between Mr Ziegler and the various representatives of VRL. Thus, it may be accepted that the parties were acting "at arm's length."
727 VRL submitted that the important question whether the remuneration arrangements made were "reasonable in the circumstances" depended on findings as to those circumstances, as to which the evidence of Mr Christopher Costello was clearly of importance. That evidence was led subject to objection as to its admissibility and it will be necessary to consider the issues raised by Mr Costello's evidence in due course.
728 However, apart altogether from any reliance on Mr Costello's evidence, I consider that there were certain aspects of the 1995 Agreement, the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement, or perhaps more accurately the 1995 Agreement as varied by the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement, which meant that, in my opinion, they were not "reasonable in the circumstances."
729 One valid criticism of the Agreements was that they were completed, in the words of Giles JA in Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission[90], "without any legal documentation whatsoever." By that expression I understand his Honour to be referring to the lack of any formal contractual documentation prepared by lawyers acting for each party. Here, the 1995 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement were constituted by correspondence exchanged between the parties, but in the case of the 1997 Agreement it was never reduced to writing. It is, therefore, not surprising that there has been considerable debate between the parties about what actually was agreed between them. Thus, I do not consider that this criticism was simply one going to form and not to the substance or the "terms" of each Agreement. Precisely what financial benefits the related party was entitled to receive should have been carefully spelt out in each Agreement. VRL placed great emphasis on the fact that most of the contractual correspondence emanated from Mr Ziegler, which placed him in a conflict of interest position given that he was drafting contractual terms both on behalf of VRL and his own company Orrong. This invidious situation would have been avoided if lawyers, apart from Mr Ziegler, had been engaged to formalise the agreements negotiated with Mr Ziegler by Mr Kirby, Mr Burke, Mr Foo and Mr Conn.
730 Secondly, the original agreement to give Orrong a performance bonus of 5% of any "non/limited recourse" finance raised was an excessive reward, in my opinion. This up front payment was in no way dependent on a profitable use of that money by VRP. It simply came straight out of the funds raised. Orrong's entitlement was not small. If, for example, the performance bonus of 5% had been paid on the US$750 million raised for Projects Ballarat, Bendigo and Castlemaine, Orrong would have been entitled to receive US$37.5 million as a performance bonus for the work of one man over the course of several years. Moreover, if Project Popcorn had proceeded and raised US$1000 million, as was contemplated, this would have led to Orrong being entitled to receive a further US$50 million. These performance bonuses were payable on top of the existing reasonable base payment or retainer plus expenses. In the circumstances, I consider that this level of remuneration could not be described as "reasonable."
731 Thirdly, the variations to the 1995 Agreement to give Orrong an entitlement first to a 5.25%, and then to a 7.5% interest in VRP was still excessively generous, in my opinion, particularly where the addition of the extra 2.25% was coupled with a payment of US$3 million plus a deferred payment of another US$2 million and an agreement to pay 1% of any further "non/limited recourse" finance raised. At least under this arrangement, there was an alignment to some extent of the interests of VRL's shareholders with those of Orrong, as both would be keen to see VRP producing profits. Nevertheless, to agree to pay forever 7.5% of the profits, not dividends, simply for performing the difficult task of raising limited recourse funding does not seem to me to be appropriately described as a "reasonable" term or condition. On top of this Orrong was to receive 7.5% of the capital gain on any sale or float of VRP. One might well ask what was being left for the shareholders.
732 Fourthly, the Agreements were not reasonable because they provided for numerous performance bonuses without any cap. It is true, of course, that if Mr Zeigler did not "perform" then very little or nothing at all would be payable by way of bonuses. However, the potential was there for Orrong to receive very substantial rewards in any one year without any limit at all. Thus, in the financial year ended 30 June 2001, for example, Orrong received performance bonuses totalling $11.246 million, as well as its retainer of $700,000 plus expenses. In addition, Orrong made a claim in this proceeding for its 7.5% VRP profit share for that financial year of $2,157,750, which was later reduced to $927,750. Further, under the alternative cash claim scenario relied on by Orrong, instead of receiving US$5.5 million or about A$10.27 million in cash plus a 2.25% interest in VRP for its Project Bendigo and Project Castlemaine performance bonuses, it will be seen that Orrong claimed to be entitled to receive US$27.5 million or between A$45 million and A$51 million, depending on the exchange rate used in the calculations. These are quite extraordinary amounts to be paid on top of a retainer. Thus, uncapped or unlimited financial benefits are not the hallmark of a "reasonable" agreement, in my opinion.
733 Fifthly, I consider that the term or condition relating to the "tax savings" performance bonuses was also unreasonable in that there was no means for VRL to set-off or recover any payment made for a claimed "tax saving" which later turned out not to be the case.
734 In considering this question of reasonableness, I have assumed that the terms and conditions are those which I have found them to be. Thus, there is no termination bonus payable on the expiration of the five year term. If this claim had been upheld, then the above arguments about the unreasonableness of the terms and conditions would have been even more persuasive. A termination bonus payable on the expiration of an agreement rather than as a form of liquidated damages for early termination was not "reasonable." The potentially generous nature of the formula for calculating the amount of the termination bonus was also unreasonable, in my opinion. The fact that Orrong's various calculations of the claimed amount of the termination bonus ranged from nearly $42 million to over $208 million is a clear illustration of this point.
735 Orrong submitted that there were a number of matters which militated in favour of the reasonableness of the 1995 Agreement between VRL and Orrong. The relevant "circumstances" applicable to VRL were said to be:
(a) the fact that it was VRL's practice to provide an incentive to its executives and consultants to offer substantial equity entitlements in the various divisions and subsidiaries of VRL in which such executives were involved as a form of performance bonus;
(b) the fact that before Orrong and Mr Ziegler procured the finance covered by the Project Bendigo and Project Ballarat transactions, VRP's film production ability was limited to erratically producing small budget domestic films;
(c) the fact that as a direct result of the Project Bendigo and Project Ballarat transactions VRP's film production ability was enhanced to enable it to participate in the acquisition and distribution of major Hollywood block-buster scale films such as the Matrix trilogy;
(d) the fact that as a direct result of the Project Bendigo and Project Ballarat transactions, VRP has acquired an extensive and valuable film library providing it with ongoing worldwide rights (other than North America); and
(e) the fact that as a direct result of the Project Bendigo and Project Ballarat transactions, VRP has become an extremely valuable entity in its own right as established by the evidence of Mr Lom.
736 The relevant "circumstances" applicable to Orrong were said to be that:
(a) from the very commencement of the consultancy between Orrong and VRL, VRL used the device of "performance bonuses" in the form of percentage payments to Orrong of any limited or non-recourse funding raised by Orrong and Mr Ziegler;
(b) Mr Ziegler and Orrong were the originators of the Project Bendigo and Project Ballarat concepts and were the persons who almost single-handedly pushed these transactions through to the huge ultimate advantage of VRL and VRP; and
(c) in procuring the Project Bendigo and Project Ballarat transactions Orrong's actions were analogous to those of external merchant bankers or financiers whose charges, as VRL itself recognised, would have greatly exceeded the emoluments due to Orrong under the 1995 consultancy agreement.
737 VRL disputed the accuracy of some of these assertions, for example, that VRP had become an extremely valuable entity in its own right and that it was Mr Ziegler who originated the Project Ballarat concept. But even assuming that the relevant "circumstances" relied upon by Orrong are correct, it seems to me that they are not an answer to the criticisms made of the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements. In my opinion, it is not to the point that VRL may have had the policy or practice of providing an incentive to its executives and consultants by offering substantial equity entitlements in the various divisions and subsidiaries of VRL in which such executives were involved as a form of performance bonus. The question is whether the giving of a financial benefit to a related party was "reasonable in the circumstances" because if it was not then shareholder approval must be obtained. Thus, it is not being said that the practice of rewarding executives with performance bonuses in the form of substantial equity entitlements was wrong. It is simply that if the terms and conditions of the agreement are not objectively considered to be "reasonable" then the financial benefits cannot be given unless the informed consent or approval of the shareholders has been obtained. They will be the ones to decide whether the potential benefits to them as shareholders of the proposed performance indicators or hurdles warrant the cost of them of paying the objectively "unreasonable" or "uncommercial" performance bonuses. Reference to other examples of such performance bonuses, for example the 12.5% equity granted to Mr Kirby in "Village Online", does not answer the question of whether the corporations legislation required shareholder approval to be obtained for Orrong's 7.5% equity interest in VRP. After all, shareholder approval may have been, or should have been, obtained for these other performance bonuses.
738 Orrong also sought to justify the quantum of the benefits which could potentially be received by it under the Agreements by referring to the commission which might have been payable to merchant bankers or investment brokers to perform finance raising services. Both Mr Wilson and Mr Conn gave some general evidence about the variety of ways in which these fees might have been calculated, for example, fixed retainers either as a flat fee or on a periodic basis, success fees in cash or equity, and even time based charges. Not surprisingly, this evidence was qualified because of the uncertainty of factors such as the size of the client, the size of the transaction, the nature of the transaction, the probability of the transaction succeeding, and the size of the bankers themselves.
739 However, it seemed to me that when Mr Wilson and Mr Conn were asked to make comparisons with the fees charged by Orrong, their evidence confirmed that the amounts claimed by Orrong exceeded the fees chargeable by investment bankers. Thus, Mr Wilson said, in answer to a hypothetical question, that his company, Salomon Smith Barney, would probably have charged a success fee of between US$5 million and US$10 million for raising in the United States market US$500 million on similar terms to Projects Ballarat and Bendigo for investment in large budget Hollywood films. There might also have been a retainer which would probably be "rebated" against the success fee. Conceivably part of the success fee could have been taken in the form of equity. Mr Conn said that he believed that Merrill Lynch had charged a fee of between 3% and 3.5% for acting as the lead underwriter in relation to the float of VRL's radio division, Austereo, on the Australian Stock Exchange which raised about $350 million.
740 These fees compare favourably with the amounts payable to Orrong under both the 1995 Agreement and the 1997 and 2000 Agreements. A success fee of between US$5 million and US$10 million for raising US$500 million represents a fee of between 1% and 2%. Under the 1995 Agreement Orrong's claim would have been 5% of US$500 million or US$25 million if Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo, in its original form, had been completed. Although Merrill Lynch's fee of between 3% and 3.5% was closer to Orrong's 5%, it is significant that this success fee carried the underwriting risk, whereas there was no risk taken by Orrong and it was receiving in addition its retainer and the payment of all expenses.
741 Thus, even if it is appropriate to compare Orrong's situation with that of an investment or merchant banker, which I doubt, it seems to me that the evidence establishes just how unreasonable or uncommercial Orrong's potential remuneration was.
742 Further, in the Project Ballarat transaction itself VRL agreed to pay CIBC a structuring and placement fee of US$5.3 million and Mr Streeter's company a fee of US$1 million. However, apart from the sum of US$250,000 payable to CIBC regardless of the outcome, both of these fees were only payable if there was a successful outcome.
743 Orrong also placed considerable weight upon what it described as the "glowing unprompted indorsement" of Orrong contained in Mr John Kirby's letter dated 17 November 2000 to a number of shareholders who had queried the executive remuneration. Orrong pointed out that, surprisingly, Mr John Kirby had not been called to give evidence.
744 VRL submitted that the witnesses who were cross-examined about the letter, Mr Robert Kirby, Mr Burke, Mr Foo and Mr Conn, all distanced themselves from it. Disagreement with the contents of the letter were expressed to varying degrees. VRL further submitted that the most important thing to bear in mind when considering this letter was the date upon which it was written. As at 17 November 2000 VRL did not consider that it was liable to pay the termination bonus on the expiration of the 1995 Agreement and the values of the 5.25% and 2.25% equity interest in VRP as at the date of grant had not been valued and therefore the amounts now claimed by Orrong as part of the termination bonus were not known.
745 Other arguments were advanced by VRL in an attempt to restrict the potentially damaging nature of Mr John Kirby's statements to the shareholders. However, all of this is really not to the point, in my opinion. Orrong cannot prove the reasonableness of the relevant Agreements by referring to what one or other of the senior executives said at the time. Clearly, those executives thought the Agreements were reasonable and in the interests of VRL, as otherwise they would not have entered into them, given that it has not been suggested that they were forced by Mr Ziegler to make these Agreements.
746 The question for the Court is whether, as a matter of law, pursuant to the Corporations Law 1995-1999, the financial benefits given by VRL to Orrong were on terms and conditions no more favourable to Orrong than those on which it is reasonable to expect that VRL would have given the benefits directly if dealing with Orrong, at arm's length in the same circumstances, and whether as a matter of law, pursuant to the Corporations Law 2000, the financial benefits given by VRL were on terms that would be reasonable in the circumstances if VRL and Orrong were dealing at arm's length or were less favourable to Orrong than if VRL and Orrong were dealing at arm's length. As I have said, that is not decided by what VRL's senior executives said then, any more than it is by what they might now say.
747 I respectfully adopt what Palmer J said in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Investors Forum Pty Ltd (No. 2)[91]"
"The test prescribed by s.210(a) is expressed broadly and I am aware of no decision of the Courts which gives it consideration. It is clear, nevertheless, that in applying the test the Court is required to assess the terms of the subject transaction against objective standards: what the parties themselves thought about the reasonableness of the terms is relevant as an explanation of the transaction but is not decisive as to whether the terms were reasonable for the purposes of the section.
In applying the test the Court assumes that the transaction is being entered by a public company which is:
- unrelated to the other party to the transaction in any way, financially or through ties of family, affection or dependence;
through its relevant decision-makers, sufficiently knowledgeable about the circumstances of the transaction, sufficiently experienced in business and sufficiently well advised to be able to form a sound judgment as to what is in its interests;
concerned only to achieve the best available commercial result for itself in all of the circumstances.
The terms of the transaction, as would reasonably be achieved by the hypothetical public company in this position, are the standard against which the terms of the transaction in question are measured.
What is a reasonable commercial result for the public company in the transaction is, of course, in itself a matter of judgment upon which honest and experienced commercial minds may legitimately differ. The Court may receive expert evidence as to what would be within the range of reasonable outcomes of the transaction for the public company. Common experience or usual terms of trade in a particular market may sometimes prove a useful guide.
The Court is not, however, bound to rely only upon such expert evidence and to blind itself to common sense and obvious commercial prudence. A transaction may be so clearly improvident from the public company's point of view that the Court can see for itself that the transaction could never have resulted from an arm's length dealing in which the public company was able to advance and protect its own commercial interests."
748 In my opinion, the hypothetical public company acting in a commercial, prudent and businesslike manner would and should have been able to obtain Mr Ziegler's services at a far less extravagant and unlimited potential cost than it did, particularly if lawyers had been engaged by VRL rather than it relying on Mr Ziegler's drafting in correspondence. Therefore, in my opinion, the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements, or the 1995 Agreement as varied by the 1997 and 2000 Agreements, cannot be regarded as "a reasonable commercial result" for VRL. The shareholders may well have reached a contrary conclusion but they were never given the opportunity to express a view.
749 It is this failure to allow the shareholders to decide the question of reasonableness which, in my view, undermines the attempts by Orrong to justify its claims. Thus, in its final submissions, Orrong, whilst acknowledging that its claim was "large", submitted that VRL's accusations of "greed" on the part of Mr Ziegler and Orrong ignored "the huge benefit that VRL and VRP have received, and through VRL its shareholders, as the direct and essentially sole product of the actions of Mr Ziegler and Orrong." As I have said, the terms and conditions of the various Agreements were so "unreasonable" or "uncommercial" that the shareholders should have had the opportunity to decide that they would not be approved or that they nevertheless wanted to proceed given the potential benefits to them if Mr Ziegler "performed".
The Evidence of Mr Costello
750 Following the receipt of the first two witness statements by Mr Costello, Orrong served a Notice of Objection and an Outline of Submissions objecting to the witness statements. Five general objections were identified in the outline. They were that:
(a) the first and second statements by Mr Costello sought to give evidence as to the ultimate question, in particular as to the application of legal standards of "reasonableness" and "arm's length" negotiations;
(b) the first and second statements by Mr Costello did not address the relevant issues raised by the corporations legislation nor did they address the particular circumstances of the Orrong (and Mr Ziegler) or VRL;
(c) Mr Costello was not qualified to express any opinion as to the remuneration of officers or executives of companies engaged in major internationl film acquisition and distribution nor any company "in the circumstances" of VRL nor any officer "in the circumstances" of Mr Ziegler;
(d) the relevant assumptions of fact relied upon by Mr Costello were neither clearly identified nor stated in any intelligible fashion; and
(e) the question of whether the relevant level of remuneration was reasonable or equivalent to arm's length terms was not a proper subject matter for expert evidence.
751 VRL accepted that the criticism outlined in sub-paragraph (d) above was "not entirely misplaced". However, it submitted that the point was answered by Mr Costello's supplementary statement dated 1 July 2005. Orrong maintained the objection, arguing that even if the assumptions set out in the third statement were those genuinely relied upon by Mr Costello, rather than those suggested by VRL's solicitors as the real author of the statement, they did not support or justify Mr Costello's purported conclusions. Orrong submitted that in cross-examination Mr Costello proved all too willing and ready to jettison any assumptions that he had previously accepted, particularly where documents were concerned, if they refuted his opinions in support of VRL.
752 I reject the submission that Mr Costello's third statement was prepared, not by him, but by VRL's solicitors. Further, I do not accept that this criticisim about Mr Costello's failure to identify his relevant assumptions of fact rendered his evidence inadmissible. It is now well established, as Heydon JA (as his Honour then was) said in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowlesr[92]; that:
"The basal principle is that what an expert gives is an opinion based on facts. Because of that, the expert must either prove by admissible means the facts on which the opinion is based, or state explicitly the assumptions as to fact on which the opinion is based. If other admissible evidence establishes that the matters assumed are 'sufficiently like' the matters established 'to render the opinion of the expert of any value', even though they may not correspond 'with complete precision', the opinion will be admissible and material... One of the reasons why the facts proved must correlate to some degree with those assumed is that the expert's conclusion must have some rational relationship with the facts proved."[93]
"In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of 'specialised knowledge'; there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be 'wholly or substantially based on the witness's expert knowledge'; so far as the opinion is based on facts 'observed' by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on 'assumed' or 'accepted' facts, they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert's evidence must explain how the field of 'specialised knowledge' in which the witness is expert by reason of 'training, study or experience', and on which the opinion is 'wholly or substantially based', applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert's specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight."[94]
754 In Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd[95] Weinberg and Dowsett JJ observed that:
"It may well be correct to say that such evidence is not strictly admissible unless it is shown to have all of the qualities discussed by Heydon JA. However, many of those qualities involve questions of degree, requiring the exercise of judgment. For this reason it would be vary rare indeed for a court at first instance to reach a decision as to whether tendered expert evidence satisfied all of his Honour's requirements before receiving it as evidence in the proceedings. More commonly, once the witness's claim to expertise is made out and the relevance and admissibility of opinion evidence demonstrated, such evidence is received. The various qualities described by Heydon JA are then assessed in the course of determining the weight to be given to the evidence. There will be cases in which it would be technically correct to rule, at the end of the trial, that the evidence in question was not admissible because it lacked one or other of those qualities, but there would be little utility in so doing. It would probably lead to further difficulties in the appellate process."
755 I therefore conclude that, subject to Mr Costello satisfying the other requirements of expert evidence, his third statement overcame the objection to the admissibility of his evidence based on a failure to identify the relevant assumptions of fact.
756 The next objection to consider is that set out in sub-paragraph (a) above, namely, that Mr Costello sought to give evidence as to the ultimate question, in particular as to the application of legal standards of "reasonableness" and "arm's length" negotiations. The first and second statements by Mr Costello were certainly full of statements by him that the terms and conditions of the 1995 Agreement were "more favourable to Orrong than if the parties had dealt at arm's length" and that the 5.25% and 2.25% VRP interests were "not given on terms that would be reasonable if VRL and Orrong were dealing at arm's length".
757 Orrong submitted that in giving such evidence Mr Costello had breached the rule against an expert giving evidence as to the application of a legal standard,[96] particularly where it went to the ultimate question.[97] VRL submitted, on the other hand, that there was reason to doubt that any such ultimate question rule or objection still existed.[98] It submitted that the true rule was one of relevance, and that if the rule operated at all, it only operated to prevent an expert applying a legal standard.[99] If the expert was purporting to give evidence applying a legal standard then that evidence is not based on the expert's specialised knowledge and is therefore inadmissible as is other non-expert opinion.
758 It seems to me that read literally Mr Costello's evidence did purport to offer views as to legal standards which did go to the ultimate question of whether or not these Agreements contravened either s. 243H of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 or s. 208 of the Corporations Law 2000. As Orrong pointed out in its written submissions, this problem was largely brought about by the fact that he was asked by VRL's solicitors to express an opinion in those terms. As Mr Costello was not a lawyer he had no expertise to give legal opinions on the application of legal standards, even if they did not go to the ultimate question. Therefore, those conclusions are irrelevant and therefore inadmissible.
759 However, that is not the end of the matter, in my opinion. On a close examination of the criticisms made by Mr Costello of the Agreements between Orrong and VRL what he was saying was that there were aspects of the Agreements which were not in accordance with Australian market remuneration practice. It was these observations which formed the basis of his inappropriate entry into the area of legal conclusions.
760 Nevertheless, Mr Costello's views about Australian market remuneration practice and its application to the Agreements relied on by Orrong would be admissible if that is an area of relevant expertise and Mr Costello is an expert in that area. I turn then to consider these questions, which were in essence raised by sub-paragraphs (c) and (e) of Orrong's five general objections.
761 VRL called Mr Costello as a witness on the basis that he was an expert in Australian market remuneration practice, including for those companies with staff located overseas as well as in Australia. Mr Costello also gave evidence that he had some experience in, and familiarity with, United States market remuneration practice. Orrong submitted that Mr Costello should not be accepted as an expert both because Mr Costello did not give evidence of any particular industry standard or practice and did not identify any particular specialist field of knowledge or expertise and because he had no specialist knowledge or qualification of "the international film acquisition and distribution industry" or "the Hollywood film industry".
762 I have no doubt that Mr Costello was an expert in Australian market remuneration practice. For nearly 30 years he had been engaged in that field as an employee and partner of an employee remuneration advisory firm and then as founder and director of his own employee remuneration advisory company. It is therefore unnecessary to say anything more about his broad experience in that field. I also reject Orrong's submission that "remuneration planning is not at all a science or body of learning or practice capable of founding opinion evidence", at least as far as remuneration practice goes.
763 The real question it seems to me, is whether Mr Costello's undoubted general expertise in Australian market remuneration practice qualified him to express opinions about the terms of the Agreements between Orrong and VRL. In my opinion it did, and for a number of reasons I reject Orrong's submission that the appropriate area of expertise was "the international film acquisition and distribution industry" or "the Hollywood film industry".
764 First, I agree with VRL's submission that there was no evidence that any international film industry standard or practice as to remuneration of employees existed, let alone any such international film acquisition and distribution industry standard or practice. Further, there was no evidence that any Hollywood film industry standard or practice as to remuneration of employees existed. If Orrong wanted to confine the comparison to such an extraordinarily narrow field as "the international film acquisition and distribution industry" then it was required, in my opinion, to establish not only that there was such a recognised standard or practice but also what it was. This it failed to do.
765 Secondly, I also accept VRL's submission that at the relevant times, perhaps apart from the making of the 2000 Agreement, VRL was not engaged in the international film acquisition and distribution industry or the international or Hollywood film industry. It was not until, at best for Orrong, late 1998 when the first film was made with funding provided by Project Ballarat that VRL could be said to have been engaged in the international film industry. Orrong's argument that this funding was produced after two years of effort of seeking to obtain large off shore insurance related film financing does not answer the point, in my opinion.
766 Thirdly, I agree with VRL's submission that Mr Ziegler, and thus Orrong, were not engaged in the creative side of film production which might have resulted in significant remuneration internationally. Rather, Mr Ziegler was a consultant to VRL, resident in Australia, with particular expertise in Australian tax law and accounting principles, who had been asked to perform the specific task of raising substantial funds for financing films in the international market. There was, therefore, no basis for suggesting that the remuneration payable under the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements was to be benchmarked in accordance with United States levels, whatever they might have been.
767 The remaining general objection to Mr Costello's evidence was that in sub-paragraph (b), namely that his first two statements did not address the relevant issues raised by the corporations legislation and did not address the particular circumstances of Orrong (and Mr Ziegler) or VRL. I find the first part of this objection rather puzzling given that Orrong also submitted that Mr Costello had improperly given evidence about the ultimate question. I have said enough above to indicate why I do not consider that this objection to the admissibility of Mr Costello's evidence has any validity.
768 A further criticism of Mr Costello's evidence made by Orrong in its final submissions was that he "played the role of advocate and not an impartial expert". Numerous alleged examples of this inappropriate conduct were referred to by Orrong. In my opinion, Mr Costello did on occasions appear to abandon the position of impartial expert as he sought to justify his views under a very aggressive cross-examination. I consider that on occasions he also reacted to this cross-examination by overstating his propositions, for example, that he "had more expertise than anyone else in the area" of termination bonuses and that he was the leading world wide expert in that field. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms there was some helpful evidence given by Mr Costello and it is to this that I now turn.
769 Given the opinion I have already expressed about the reasonableness of the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements, I do not propose to spend time considering the merits and criticisms of all of the views expressed by Mr Costello. What follows is a summary of what I consider to be some of the more helpful evidence given by Mr Costello. Based on the survey entitled "the Top 350 Report: Executive & Director Remuneration April 1995", Mr Costello gave evidence that only 3.6% of senior executives in Australia at that time received remuneration of over $400,000, and thus he expressed the view that with Orrong's initial retainer of $400,000 it was being paid reasonably and competitively for providing Mr Ziegler's services. Whatever the criticisms of the gaps in Mr Costello's survey, it seems to me that it provided sufficient material on which to reach this conclusion.
770 Next, Mr Costello stated that best Australian remuneration practice in 1995 was to keep total remuneration reasonable by limiting short term incentives and long term incentives each to 100% of the fixed remuneration, either on a yearly basis or over the term of the contract. Even with the retrospective increases in the annual retainer, in each of the five years of the 1995 Agreement the performance bonuses paid to Orrong were more than double the fixed remuneration, as the following table illustrates:
771 This situation was largely a result of Mr Costello's next point which was that contrary to Australian remuneration practice there was no cap on any of the performance bonuses, including the termination bonuses. Mr Costello also said that normal Australian remuneration practice was to include appropriate clawback conditions in the bonus provisions.
772 In his second report Mr Costello stated that in his experience remuneration planners in Australia did not use market remuneration practices in the United States to provide remuneration advice in Australia. There were significant differences between the two.
773 He also expressed the view, based on his experience, that an executive or consultant based in Australia who travelled extensively overseas primarily conducting business out of Australia should not be benchmarked against executives or consultants engaged in activities outside Australia.
774 None of the matters referred to by Orrong either by way of criticism of Mr Costello's evidence or as justification for the extraordinary remuneration obtained by Orrong causes me to change the opinion I reached about the unreasonableness of the terms and conditions of each of the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements.
The Consequences of a Contravention
775 As part of its defence to VRL's arguments under the corporations legislation, Orrong called in aid s.103 of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 and s.103 of the Corporations Law 2000. The former s.103 provided as follows:
"103(2) An act, transaction, agreement, instrument, matter or thing is not invalid merely because of:
(a) a contravention of section 112, 126, 232A, 232B, 243H, 243ZE, 340 or 343 or of Chapter 8 or;
(b) a failure to comply with a requirement of this Law that a person cause a notice, or a copy of a document, to be published in the Gazette or in a news paper.
(4) In this sections invalid includes void, voidable and unenforceable."
776 The later section contained identical wording except that the references to the sections contravened was different. Thus, s.103(2)(a) of the Corporations Law 2000 read:
"a contravention of sections 115, 208, 209, 601CA or 601DC."
The difference is immaterial. The point to note is that both forms of s.103, both before and after 13 March 2000, referred to a contravention of the related party provisions (s.243H and s.208).
777 VRL submitted that s.103 did not assist Orrong as any reliance ignored the application of public policy and the maxim "ex turpi causa non oritur actio." As expressed by Lord Mansfield in Holman v Johnson[100]:
"The principle of public policy is this ... No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act."
778 VRL submitted that s.103 in both sets of legislation would only be of assistance to Orrong if these sections went irresistibly to enforceability as well as validity. The distinction between invalidity and enforceability has been well recognised. In Yango Pastoral Company Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd[101] the High Court of Australia held that neither a mortgage nor a guarantee given to a body corporate carrying on unauthorised banking business in breach of s.8 of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth) was void or unenforceable. Mason J, with whom Aickin J agreed, said:
"The principle that a contract the making of which is expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute is illegal and void is one of long standing but it has always been recognized that the principle is necessarily subject to any contrary intention manifested by the statute. It is perhaps more accurate to say that the question whether a contract prohibited by statute is void is, like the associated question whether the statute prohibits the contract, a question of statutory construction and that the principle to which I have referred does no more than enunciate the ordinary rule which will be applied when the statute itself is silent upon the question. Primarily, then, it is a matter of construing the statute and in construing the statute the court will have regard not only to its language, which may or may not touch upon the question, but also to the scope and purpose of the statute from which inferences may be drawn as to the legislative intention regarding the extent and the effect of the prohibition which the statute contains."[102]
"In this context there is little to be said for the view that the statute intends to prohibit contracts made by unauthorized banks in the course of carrying on banking business. To do so would be to prejudice depositors, not to protect them. The implication of such a prohibition would deny to innocent depositors the right to recover moneys deposited unlawfully with persons carrying on banking business because ex hypothesi the prohibited contract would be illegal and void. To place the defendants' interpretation upon the statute would confer an extraordinary advantage on the wrongdoer in enabling it to resist repayment of moneys deposited with it. In this respect the advantage given to the wrongdoer might conceivably go some distance towards outweighing the punishment imposed upon it by way of penalty under s.8.
It is not rational to suppose that the Parliament intended to inflict such dire consequences on innocent depositors. Nor is it rational to suppose that the Parliament intended to advantage innocent borrowers whilst penalizing innocent depositors. Even less is it to be supposed that the Parliament intended to invalidate the wide range of commercial and other securities which are brought into existence in the course of carrying on a banking business and thereby to inflict loss on the many persons acquiring such securities. I therefore conclude that the purpose of the Act is adequately served by the imposition of the very heavy penalty which is prescribed for a contravention of section 8 and that it does not prohibit and thereby invalidate contracts and transactions entered into in the course of carrying on banking business in breach of the section."[103]
780 Subsequently in Nelson v Nelson[104] Toohey J referred to Yango and said:
"It is true that there is a distinction between statutory prohibition of a contract and consequential invalidity, on the one hand, and the court's refusal to enforce the contract, on the other hand. 'The former is a matter of statutory construction ... the latter is a matter of public policy'[105]".
781 The considerations referred to by Mason J are not present in this case. On the contrary, to allow Orrong to enforce the Agreements, which I have held were made in contravention of either s.243H of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 or s.208 of the Corporations Law 2000, would render these prohibitions ineffective. Adopting the words of Mason J, to do so would be to prejudice the shareholders, not to protect them. It is true that there are civil penalty or even criminal consequences for persons involved in contraventions of these sections, but in my opinion the purpose of the prohibition would not be adequately served by relying solely on these consequences and otherwise allowing the contravening agreement to be enforced. The phrase "merely because" in s.103(2) is obviously important because it preserves the possibility of a finding of unenforceability based on public policy considerations. This was the approach adopted by Master Bredmeyer in Westchester Pty Ltd v Triton Resources Ltd[106], in which he stated that:
"I think it is arguable that section 103(2) ... which in essence says that an agreement is not invalid merely because of a contravention of section 243H, means that the agreement is not automatically invalid because of the contravention, but may be if the court so decides."
This decision was not followed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Winpar Holdings Ltd v Goldfields Kalgoorlie Ltd[107]. However, in my opinion, the two decisions are distinguishable. Winpar dealt with a capital reduction which had already been made, whereas Westchester involved moneys still to be paid under an allegedly illegal contract. In Winpar Giles JA held that a challenge to the validity of the capital reduction failed by force of s.256D(2)[108] (which is analogous to s.209(1)(a)). However, his Honour also stated that "until it was made, a proposed capital reduction could be restrained if s.256B(1) of the Law was or would be contravened." Thus, different policy considerations applied because his Honour held that once the capital reduction was made, the legislation "preferred certainty over invalidity."[109] That is not this case.
782 Orrong also pleaded reliance on s.209 of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 and s.209 of the Corporations Law 2000. The reference to the former s.209 was obviously a mistake as prior to 13 March 2000 that section was concerned with the register and index of members. The point was not pursued by Orrong.
783 Section 209 of the Corporations Law 2000 relevantly stated:
"209(1) If the public company or entity contravenes section 208:
(a) the contravention does not affect the validity of any contract or transaction connected with the giving of the benefit; and
(b) the public company is not guilty of an offence.
Note: A Court may order an injunction to stop the company or entity giving the benefit to the related party (see section 1324).
(2) A person contravenes this subsection if they are involved in a contravention of section 208 by a public company or entity.
Note 1: This subsection is a civil penalty provision.
Note 2: Section 79 defines 'involved.'
(3) A person commits an offence if they are involved in a contravention of section 208 by a public company or entity and the involvement is dishonest."
Thus Orrong, while not seeking to recover monies under void contracts, is nonetheless seeking to recover monies under contracts made in breach of specific legislative provisions. Once again, the distinction between invalidity and enforceability is important. Like s.103, s.209 does not automatically require that an agreement entered into in contravention of s.208 will be enforced by a court. As I have said, it is my opinion that the purpose of the prohibition would not be adequately served by relying solely on the civil penalty or criminal consequences of the contravention and otherwise allowing the contravening agreement to be enforced.
784 There is no limitation problem here, in my opinion, because although the 1995 and 1997 Agreements were entered into more than six years before the commencement of this proceeding on 23 September 2003,[110] all of the performance bonuses sought by Orrong were payable on or after 1 July 2001 (or on or after 26 June 2001 in the case of the RDG facility). Thus, there is no impediment to the Court refusing to enforce the claims made by Orrong because they arise out of Agreements entered into in contravention of the applicable related party financial benefit provisions.
785 In any event, VRL submitted that it would have been entitled to obtain an injunction under section 1324 of the Corporations Law 2000 to prevent payments being made pursuant to Agreements the making or performance of which contravened those provisions.
Exculpatory Provisions
786 Finally, Orrong sought to avoid the consequences of the contraventions of s.243H of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 and s.208 of the Corporations Law 2000 by reliance on the exculpatory provisions of s.1318 of the Corporations Law 1995 -1999 or the Corporations Law 2000. Section 1318 (1) provided that:
"If, in any civil proceeding against a person to whom this section applies for negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty in a capacity as such a person, it appears to the court before which the proceedings are taken that the person is or may be liable in respect of the negligence, default or breach but that the person has acted honestly and that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with the person's appointment, the person ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default or breach, the court may relieve the person either wholly or partly from liability on such terms as the court thinks fit."
787 In Daniels v Anderson[111], Clarke and Sheller JJA said:
"The purpose of the section is to excuse company officers from liability in situations where it would be unjust and oppressive not to do so, recognising that such officers are businessmen and women who act in an environment involving risk in commercial decision-making: see the Company Law Amendment Committee (Reid Committee Report) 1906 (UK) par 24 and the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, Company Director and Officers, Indemnification Relief and Insurance, Discussion Paper No 9, 1989 at 42 and following. The courts have a wide discretion to relieve in whole or in part."
788 In Re Wave Capital Ltd[112], French J said:
"Sections 1318, 1322 and 1325D, however, may be taken to reflect a broad legislative policy that the law should not inflict unnecessary liability or inconvenience or invalidate transactions because of non-compliance with its requirements where such non-compliance is the product of honest error or inadvertence and where the court can avoid its effects without prejudice to third parties or to the public interest in compliance with the law. That broad policy does not authorise the court lightly to set aside the requirements of the Act where they have not been observed. Each application for the exercise of the court's relieving power will require consideration of all the circumstances of the case to ensure that the indulgence sought is appropriate and does not undermine the requirements of the Act."
789 In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich,[113] the relevant exculpatory section was not applied in favour of a director, notwithstanding that he was a non-executive and part-time director, that he was unpaid, that as a director of the company he was motivated by a desire to involve himself in a useful community service and that he did not stand to gain personally by the contravention. On the other hand, his conducted was described by Tadgell J (as his Honour then was) as being "of the utmost folly" and involving "clear and flagrant breaches of both the letter and intent of the Code". Tadgell J also held that although the legislation no longer required that the person had acted reasonably as well as honestly:
"having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it will be permissible and appropriate, and usually necessary, to consider whether the defendant had acted reasonably in those circumstances"[114]
790 Orrong referred to a large number of matters which, it submitted, supported its case for relief from the consequences of the contraventions. In my opinion, all of those matters which depended on the claimed benefits to VRL of Mr Ziegler's work are simply irrelevant. The criteria set out in s.1318, that "the person has acted honestly" and that "having regard to all the circumstances of the case the person ought fairly to be excused", do not encompass a matter such as a favourable outcome of work performed by the officer in question. Further, as French J said, relief may be given where the "non-compliance is the product of honest error or inadvertence", so that the focus is on the conduct of an officer of the company
791 In my opinion, it cannot be said that the failure to obtain shareholder approval for the 1995, 1997 or 2000 Agreements came about as a result of "honest error or inadvertence". I am quite satisfied that Mr Ziegler was well aware of the relevant provisions of the corporations legislation He was an expert taxation law and corporations law lawyer and a highly qualified and experienced accountant. Despite the fact that he attempted, quite implausibly in my opinion, to downplay his knowledge of, and expertise in , corporations law Mr Ziegler conceded in evidence that at the relevant times he understood what the phrase "related party" referred to, that he knew that a related party had to deal with a company at arm's length, and that he knew that directors had to have the approval of shareholders to receive options. In his witness statement he had said that in 1994 he had had many conversations regarding the related party provisions and their "potential impact on VRL remuneration policies". Moreover, in the 1993 Employment Agreement (otherwise know as Employ. doc), which Mr Ziegler swore was drafted by him in June 1993, the term "related party" is used in three separate clauses and the term "arm's length" once.
792 I am also satisfied, to the appropriate standard, that Mr Ziegler was prepared to ignore these provisions. For example, in his letter of 27 November 1995 to Mr Burke he stated that:
"In the event that, for whatever reason, further issues of options, as outlined in my October 2 letter, cannot be easily accommodated for me bearing in mind Corporation Law approvals, perceptions etc, I am just as happy with a 'notional' allocation of options in the agreed percentage."
In September 1997 Mr Ziegler told Mr Kirby that he may want flexibility to have his promised interest in VRP in the form of a "shadow equity". Then in his memorandum to Mr Kirby dated 3 March 1998 one of the forms of remuneration proposed by Mr Ziegler was a $10 million non-recourse loan to purchase VRL preference shares "or economic equivalent of this loan, if unwilling to seek shareholder approval". And finally Mr Ziegler did not dispute Mr Foo's assertion in his memorandum dated 23 May 2000 that Mr Ziegler had "previously agreed" that the US$3 million payment "would be paid off balance sheet" as otherwise it would "be required to be disclosed as a related party transaction". Mr Ziegler said in evidence that he was "indifferent as to the manner in which the money was paid."
793 In my opinion, this conduct means that the non-compliance cannot be described as "the product of honest error or inadvertence" and Mr Ziegler cannot be said to have "acted honestly". It also means that one of the matters relied on by Orrong as supporting its case for relief, namely that there could be "no suggestion that the failure to seek shareholder approval was in any way related to any default on Orrong's or Mr Ziegler's part", simply cannot be sustained. Mr Ziegler and the other executive directors, Mr Kirby, Mr Burke, Mr Foo and Mr John Kirby, who played a part in negotiating one or more of the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements, or at least approved the informally documented or oral Agreements, were all at fault, in my opinion. Whilst VRL stressed that Mr Ziegler was the trusted expert lawyer, Messrs Kirby, Burke and Foo were all experienced businessmen who knew and understood the requirements of the corporations legislation with respect to related parties. I consider that the correspondence and their conduct demonstrates that each of Mr Ziegler, Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo was prepared to ignore the requirements of the corporations legislation when it suited their immediate purposes.
794 One of the other matters relied on by Orrong does deserve consideration. This was that "had shareholder approval been sought, given the controlling interests of the Messrs Kirby and Mr Burke, all of whom were privy to and approved of the arrangements with Orrong, obtaining such approval would have been a formality".
As I have said previously, the Kirby family and Mr Burke controlled VRL, through their ownership of VRC, which owned around 60% of VRL's ordinary shares.
795 However, it does not follow, in my opinion that this controlling interest means that obtaining shareholder approval would have been a formality. A range of possible scenarios could have ensued if the decision had been made, at the appropriate time, to seek the approval of the shareholders to one or more of the 1995, 1997 or 2000 Agreements. Lawyers might have been instructed to negotiate and draft the terms of those Agreements so that a formal document was available to be put before the shareholders. This may well have resulted in different terms. Or the reaction from other significant shareholders may have been such that VRL may have had to re-think its approach to remunerating Orrong (and Mr Ziegler). Or the Australian Securities and Investment Commission may have become involved, with similar results. It therefore seems to me that it is not persuasive for Orrong to argue that shareholder approval would have been obtained. The fact is that it was not sought when, in my opinion, it should have been.
796 A related point made by Orrong, which has some relevance here, is that the major beneficiaries of the conclusion that Orrong's Agreements with VRL are unenforceable because shareholder approval was not obtained, include the very men who, as discussed above, participated in the failure to seek that shareholder approval. Nevertheless, this circumstance still does not, in my opinion, provide a justification for "excusing" the non-compliance. To do so would be, in my opinion, to "undermine the requirements of the Act."[115]
797 Orrong also relied, in the alternative, on the exculpatory provisions of s.1317JA of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 or s.1317S of the Corporations Law 2000. However, as the criteria for a favourable exercise of the Court's discretion are the same in each of these sections as in s.1318, namely, that "the person has acted honestly" and that "having regard to all the circumstances of the case the person ought fairly to be excused", the same result follows. The non-compliance is not to be excused.
Payments After 15 July 2001
798 On 15 July 2001 the Corporations Law 2000 was replaced by the Corporations Act 2001. However, there was no relevant difference in the sections discussed above between the two pieces of legislation. Thus, any claims by Orrong for payment of profit shares or other performance bonuses after 15 July 2001 are governed by the same principles applicable to the payments made and claimed in the period between 13 March 2000 and 14 July 2001.
Conclusion
799 In my opinion, as a result of the contraventions of the "related party financial benefits" statutory provisions, the Court should not aid Orrong in its attempt to enforce the 1995, 1997 or 2000 Agreements by ordering payment of the "taxes saved" performance bonuses or of the 7.5% profit shares or by making any declarations concerning the ownership interest in VRP.
Directors' Duties
800 As a further basis for the Court refusing, on public policy grounds, to enforce the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements, VRL submitted that Mr Ziegler had breached directors' duties and common law fiduciary duties. The relevant statutory provisions are to be found in ss.232 and 232A of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 and ss.180 to 183, 191 and 195 of the Corporations Law 2000. The duties of directors or officers of a corporation can be summarised as:
(a) the duty of acting honestly and in good faith (s.232(2) and s.181(1) of the respective statutory regimes);
(b) the duty of exercising care and diligence (s.232(4) and s.180(1));
(c) the duty not to make improper use of information or position (s.232(5) and (6) and ss.183(1) and 182(1));
(d) the duty not to be present at a directors' meeting while a matter in which the director has a material personal interest is being considered and not to vote on that matter (s.232A(1) and s.195(1)); and
(e) the duty to notify other directors of material personal interest when conflict arises (only s.191(1) of the Corporations Law 2000).
801 VRL submitted that ss.232 and 232A of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 applied to Mr Ziegler from at least October 1995 to 13 March 2000. Section 232(1)(a) relevantly defined "officer" as meaning "a director, secretary or executive officer of the corporation". Section 9 defined an "executive officer" as "a person, by whatever name called and whether or not a director of the body or entity, who is concerned, or takes part, in the management of the body or entity." Thus, VRL submitted that by the time the negotiations for the 1995 Agreement were concluded in November 1995, Mr Ziegler was an "officer" of VRL because he was an alternate director and a member of the executive committee as well as "group counsel responsible for fiscal and legal affairs and advising on group strategies." I accept these submissions.
802 VRL further submitted that ss.180 to 183, 191 and 195 of the Corporations Law 2000 applied to Mr Ziegler between 14 March 2000 and 15 July 2001. Although he was no longer a director of VRL, s.9 relevantly defined an "officer" as meaning:
(i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or
(ii) who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing;..."
VRL submitted that Mr Ziegler's role with VRP as well as his position of a director of VRC satisfied one or both of these requirements and, therefore, that Mr Ziegler was an "officer" of VRL during the period the 2000 Agreement was negotiated. I accept these submissions.
803 As I understood VRL's case, a number of events were said by it to be illustrative of Mr Ziegler's breach of his duties as an officer of VRL. They were:
(a) the drafting of, and entry into the 1995 Agreement, without having it considered by VRL's lawyers or approved by the shareholders;
(b) the making of the Ballarat representations;
(c) the failure to advise VRL of the relevant risks and other matters associated with Project Ballarat;
(d) the failure to disclose to VRL his claim to a 5% commission on the funds to be raised by Project Ballarat;
(e) the entry into the 1997 Agreement, without having it considered by VRL's lawyers or approved by the shareholders;
(f) the making of the Bendigo representations;
(g) the failure to advise VRL of the relevant risks and other matters associated with Project Bendigo;
(h) the failure to disclose to VRL his claim to a 5% commission on the funds to be raised by Project Bendigo;
(i) the drafting of, and entry into, the 2000 Agreement, without having it considered by VRL's lawyers or approved by the shareholders; and
(j) being present at directors' meetings while matters in which he had a material personal interest were being considered.
804 The drafting by Mr Ziegler of the 1995 Agreement and the entry into the 1995 Agreement without having it considered by VRL's lawyers or approved by the shareholders was not, in my opinion, a breach by him of any of his duties as an officer of VRL because he was acting on behalf of himself and his company and not VRL. Mr Ziegler negotiated over a lengthy period with several directors of VRL who should have been well able to look after that company's interests. The decision not to have VRL's lawyers draft a formal agreement was made by them not Mr Ziegler. Nevertheless, the failure to obtain the approval of the shareholders of the 1995 Agreement was, as I have held, not an "honest error" by Mr Ziegler.
805 Similar conclusions can be drawn in respect of VRL's complaints about the 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement.
806 The allegations by VRL that the making of the Ballarat representations and the Bendigo representations and the failure to advise VRL of the relevant risks and other matters associated with each of these Projects were breaches of the duty to exercise care and diligence really leads nowhere. I have already dealt with these issues above when considering VRL's misleading conduct and negligence claims. As I said there, unless it was demonstrated that VRL was worse off as a result of these transactions, rather than extraordinarily better off as claimed by Orrong, then VRL's complaints are not made out.
807 Mr Ziegler's failure to disclose to VRL at an early stage his claim to a 5% commission on the funds to be raised by Project Ballarat was a breach of his duty to act honestly and in good faith. In my opinion, Mr Ziegler should have disclosed right from the start of any consideration of Project Ballarat that he had a conflict of interest, in that Orrong stood to gain US$10 million if US$200 million was successfully raised. Such a large amount inevitably affected the economics of the proposal and yet Mr Ziegler remained silent about Orrong's performance bonus even when he was discussing the amount of the fees to be paid to other advisers. Mr Ziegler left the required disclosure so late that one suspects that, despite his protestations, the claim was not going to be mentioned until after the transaction had been finalised.
808 And yet VRL did become aware of Orrong's claim to a performance bonus of US$10 million before the Project Ballarat transaction was entered into, but not, of course, as a result of Mr Ziegler disclosing it but as a result of Mr Foo raising his suspicions with Mr Kirby. Nevertheless, this complaint also goes nowhere because VRL completed the Project Ballarat transaction with the knowledge of Orrong's claimed commission and of the agreed substitute performance bonus in the form of a 5.25% ownership interest in VRP.
809 It is rather surprising, in my opinion, given this history, that VRL should allege a breach of duty on the part of Mr Ziegler in not disclosing to VRL Orrong's claim to a 5% commission on the funds to be raised by Project Bendigo. The history of the matter is that VRL was aware of this claim well before the consideration of the Project Bendigo transaction was concluded.
810 Finally, there is the general allegation that Mr Ziegler was present at directors' meetings while matters in which he had a material personal interest were being considered. I say general because this matter received very little attention. For example, there was no attempt to show that Mr Ziegler voted on any such matters. It seems to me, however, that Mr Ziegler must have been present at directors' meetings while matters, such as Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo, in which he had a material personal interest were being considered.
811 I am not satisfied, therefore, that this additional ground for refusing to enforce the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements is made out. In my opinion, the argument based on the alleged breaches of directors' duties and cognate fiduciary duties adds nothing to the valid claim that the failure to obtain shareholder approval of these Agreements means that they will not be enforced by the Court.
The Legal Practice Act 1996
812 An alternative basis put forward by VRL for the Court refusing to enforce any of the Agreements between Orrong and VRL was founded on the provisions of the Legal Practice Act 1996 (" the LPA"). Section 314 of that Act provided as follows:
(1) A person must not engage in legal practice in Victoria unless the person-
(a) is a natural person who -
(i) is admitted to legal practice; and
(ii) holds a practising certificate; or
(b) is an incorporated practitioner that holds a practising certificate; or
(c) is an interstate practitioner (other than an interstate practitioner who is suspended or prohibited from engaging in legal practice in Victoria).
Penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years.
(2) A person must not represent or advertise that they are qualified to engage in legal practice unless the person-
(a) is a natural person who-
(i) is admitted to legal practice; and
(ii) holds a practising certificate; or
(b) is an incorporated practitioner that holds a practising certificate; or
(c) is an interstate practitioner (other than an interstate practitioner who is suspended or prohibited from engaging in legal practice in Victoria).
Penalty: 240 penalty units.
(3) A person who is authorised to engage in legal practice only as an employee of another legal practitioner or firm or as a corporate practitioner must not engage in legal practice as a sole practitioner, a partner of a firm or a director of an incorporated practitioner.
(4) For the purposes of this section, engaging in legal practice may consist of a single act.
(5) A person who contravenes sub-section (1), (2) or (3) commits a contempt of the Supreme Court and is liable to be punished for that contempt in addition to, or instead of, being prosecuted for the contravention.
(6) A person who contravenes sub-section (1) or (3) is not entitled to recover any amount in respect of anything done during the course of that contravention and must repay any amount so received to the person from whom it was received.
(7) If a person does not repay an amount required by sub-section (6) to be repaid, the person entitled to be repaid may recover the amount from the practitioner or firm as a debt in a court of competent jurisdiction."
813 In its counterclaim VRL asserted that all of the work carried out or services provided by Orrong pursuant to the 1993 Agreement, the 1995 Agreement, the 1997 Agreement, the 2000 Agreement and the 2001 Agreement constituted "engaging in legal practice" within the meaning of the LPA. As Orrong was not "at any time an incorporated practitioner or the holder of a practising certificate", VRL pleaded that Orrong contravened s.314(1) of the LPA and claimed relief under sub-ss.(6) and (7). VRL alleged that Orrong was not entitled to recover any amount in respect of any of that work or services, alternatively such work or services that comprised or constituted the engaging in legal practice, and that Orrong must repay any amount received from VRL, alternatively such amounts as were referable or related to the engaging in legal practice.
814 By the close of final submissions VRL had reduced its claim for repayment under s.314(6) of the LPA to amounts totalling $5,979,511 as set out in the following table.
33 monthly retainer payments in respect of virtually all months from July 1997 to June 2000
Retrospective increase in retainer for the 1998 to 2000 financial years
Commission on $16 million Project Ballarat equity raising
The substantial reduction in the amount claimed to be repayable may have had something to do with one or more of the following matters - the acceptance by VRL that recovery of any amount paid before 23 September 1997 was statute barred[116]; that at least three of the largest payments ($5,055,626.99 on 5 July 2000 for the 1% commission on Project Bendigo, $5,215,247.49 on 7 March 2001 for the 2% commission on Project Castlemaine and $1,137,038 on 22 October 1999 for the 5.25% share of VRP's profits in the 1998 financial year) were made by Village Roadshow Production Limited, not VRL; and the difficulty of linking other payments in the period following 23 September 1997 to the alleged contravention by the unqualified Orrong of the requirement that it "must not engage in legal practice" (for example, the three payments for the share of VRP's profits in the 1998, 1999 and 2000 financial years).
815 VRL stated in its written closing submissions that in its counterclaim it had pleaded breaches of the LPA by both Orrong and Mr Ziegler and that it sought the repayment of monies paid in the course of Orrong or Mr Ziegler conducting a legal practice. This was not correct. There was no plea that Mr Ziegler had "engaged in legal practice" in breach of the LPA even though all of the conduct relied on by VRL was conduct by Mr Ziegler. Nevertheless, VRL submitted that as Orrong could only act through Mr Ziegler and as Mr Ziegler was only carrying out work for VRL because of Orrong's consultancy agreement with VRL, everything relevantly done by Mr Ziegler was done on behalf of Orrong. Therefore, it seems to me that it is necessary to decide, first, whether Mr Ziegler was "engaging in legal practice" and, secondly, if he was, whether he was doing so on behalf of Orrong.
816 Both Orrong and Mr Ziegler in their defences to the counterclaim pleaded that at all material times Mr Ziegler had held a practising certificate authorising him to engage in legal practice as a corporate practitioner. It was common ground at the trial, however, that a corporate practising certificate only permitted the holder to provide legal advice and services to his or her corporate employer, and no one else.
817 It was also common ground that Orrong did not at any time hold a practising certificate. It was not eligible to do so under Part 10 of the LPA. Section 294 requires that each director of an incorporated practitioner must be a "current practitioner", that is a legal practitioner holding a current practising certificate. Similarly, s.295(1) of the LPA says that a share in an incorporated practitioner may be held only by a current practitioner who is a director or employee of the incorporated practitioner, or by a registered foreign practitioner who is an employee of the incorporated practitioner or another incorporated practitioner. At all relevant times, Mr Ziegler's wife was a director and shareholder of Orrong and there was no evidence that she met these requirements.
Standard of Proof
818 In its written closing submissions Orrong submitted that, given the serious nature of a contravention of s.314 of the LPA, being a criminal offence subject to imprisonment for two years or a fine of up to 240 penalty units depending upon the actual contravention, the question of whether Orrong had contravened s.314, the extent of any such contraventions and the relief flowing therefrom were serious matters which required proof by VRL at least to the level of satisfaction required by Briginshaw v Briginshaw[117]. Reference was made to the following statement by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Kekatos v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales[118], a case involving alleged unqualified legal practice:
"It was common ground that the Law Society had to satisfy the civil onus of proof on the balance of probabilities. However, the nature and consequences of the proceedings and the gravity of the Law Society's allegations had to be taken into account: Evidence Act 1995 s.140; cf Briginshaw v Briginshaw; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd." (Citations omitted)
819 I have reached a similar conclusion on the question of the standard of proof in a proceeding such as this at the commencement of these reasons.
820 However, Orrong further submitted that, given that a person who contravened s.314(1), (2) or (3) committed a contempt of court and was liable to be punished for that contempt in addition to, or instead of, being prosecuted for the contravention, it was strongly arguable that VRL must in fact prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that insofar as VRL sought to rely upon inferences, then the inference that a person was engaging in unqualified legal practice must be the only inference which could reasonably be drawn from that person's activities.[119] Thus, in The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Seymour[120], which was an action for contempt of court alleging breach of an order restraining the respondent from acting or purporting to act as a solicitor, the criminal standard of proof was applicable.
821 It is clear that a contempt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt[121], but that is not this case. As VRL submitted, this is a civil proceeding in which VRL is seeking to resist Orrong's monetary claims and to obtain repayment of monies by, in part, asserting that there has been a breach of s.314 of the LPA. In relation to the Legal Practice Act claims VRL is not seeking imprisonment and/or the imposition of a fine. It is not even seeking a penalty or any order tantamount to disqualification from acting as a solicitor. Therefore, in my opinion, the applicable standard of proof in this part of the case is on the balance of probabilities but, as with the allegations of breaches of the corporations legislation or other serious misconduct, findings of contravention of the LPA should not be made lightly, bearing in mind what the High Court said in Briginshaw as explained by Neat Holdings[122].
Engage in Legal Practice
822 VRL submitted that many of the services provided by Orrong through Mr Ziegler constituted engaging in legal practice. It argued that services by Mr Ziegler such as briefing counsel to advise, interpreting and advising on the effect of legislation including the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), particularly with respect to tax returns**;** preparing or advising on documents which created, transferred or modified the rights and/or liabilities of VRL or VRP; and providing advice, opinions or 'sign off' on the legal effect of particular documents or arrangements all constituted engaging in legal practice.
823 The LPA does not define the expression "engage in legal practice." In Felman v Law Institute of Victoria[123], it was noted that the explanatory memorandum to the Legal Practice Bill (which became the LPA) contained the following passage:
"The concept of 'engaging in legal practice' is used throughout the Bill. This concept is the same as 'acting or practising as a legal practitioner' and other similar phrases used in other jurisdictions and is intended to invoke the common law learning on what defines the practice of a lawyer."[124]
824 The meaning of the expression "acting as a solicitor" was considered by Cussen J in Re Sanderson; ex parte the Law Institute of Victoria[125]. His Honour held that:
"If a person does a thing usually done by a solicitor, and does it in such a way as to lead to the reasonable inference that he is a solicitor - if he combines professing to be a solicitor with the action usually taken by a solicitor - I think he then does act as a solicitor."[126]
825 In Cornall v Nagle[127] JD Phillips J, as his Honour then was, was dealing with an application to have the defendant punished for alleged disobedience of an earlier order by the Court, made under s.90(7) of the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 ("the LPPA"). Having reviewed the earlier decisions, his Honour said:
"Based upon the foregoing, I conclude that a person who is neither admitted to practise nor enrolled as a barrister and solicitor may "act or practise as a solicitor" in any of the following ways:
(1) by doing something which, though not required to be done exclusively by a solicitor, is usually done by a solicitor and by doing it in such a way as to justify the reasonable inference that the person doing it is a solicitor. This is the test in Sanderson.
(2) by doing something that is positively proscribed by the Act or by Rules of Court unless done by a duly qualified legal practitioner. Examples of such prohibitions in a statute are ss.93 and 111 of the LPPA.
(3) by doing something which, in order that the public may be adequately protected, is required to be done only by those who have the necessary training and expertise in the law. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to go beyond the example of the giving of legal advice as part of a course of conduct and for reward.
While in the first of these three, the conduct is forbidden in circumstances only where the inference is justified that the actor is a solicitor, it is surely otherwise in the other two cases. If something be the exclusive province of a duly qualified lawyer, then it is the doing of the act by someone not so qualified that will constitute the offence and, in such circumstances, it can scarcely matter that the actor states plainly that he is not a qualified lawyer ..."[128]
826 The question facing the Court of Appeal in Felman[129] was the status, after the enactment of the LPA, of proceedings commenced under the LPPA to restrain the defendant from practising as a solicitor. One of the arguments advanced by the defendant was that there was an inconsistency within the meaning of s.109 of the Commonwealth Constitution between, on the one hand, Part VIIA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), Part XI of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) and Part 3 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and, on the other, the LPPA and the LPA. That involved the Court of Appeal considering the meaning of the expression "to act or practise as a solicitor" in s.90(7) of the LPPA and the expression "engage in legal practice" in s.314 of the LPA. In the principal judgment, Kenny JA (with whom Winneke P and Brooking JA agreed) referred to passages from the judgment of JD Phillips in Cornall v Nagle and said:
"It is clear ... that his Honour was not saying that any person who, in the lawful pursuit of an occupation other than law, gives advice (for reward) on matters lying within his or her area of occupational expertise necessarily acts as a solicitor or a legal practitioner simply because the advice involves the expression of an opinion about the requirements of relevant legislation, statutory rules or the like. A person who, in his or her capacity as a tax agent, customs agent or migration agent, proffers advice which touches such matters, does so on account of his or her knowledge of and experience in the fields of taxation, customs, or migration (as the case may be). In this regard, he or she is in no different a position from anyone else who, in the pursuit of an occupation, advises upon a matter within and by virtue of his or her expertise, as, for example, an architect who advises upon the legal ramifications of his proposed design. Pursuing Phillips J's approach, the giving of advice in the course of carrying on an occupation other than a solicitor's (or legal practitioner's) would not fall within either limb 1 or limb 3 of his Honour's test. (Limb 2 is not presently material.) The advice would not, in the circumstances, be given in such a way as to justify the inference that it was given by a solicitor, as required by limb 1, and it could not be said that, in order to protect the public, it had to be given by a lawyer, as required by limb 3. For much the same reasons, the preparation, as an accepted part of an occupation, of a document giving rise to legal rights and obligations would not fall within either limb. In any event, where a statute has (as in Pt VIIA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), Pt XI of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) and Pt 3 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)) permitted the carrying on of an occupation by non-lawyers which involves the provision of advice or documents of this kind, there is no basis for saying that the protection of the public requires that the occupation be carried on by lawyers. This is so because Parliament has made a contrary determination.
...
As I have endeavoured to show, a person who gives advice touching legal matters or who prepares documents having legal effect does not act as a solicitor (or legal practitioner) by reason of those acts alone. Some aspects of litigation too can be conducted by a law clerk (providing it can be said that the clerk acts on behalf of his employing solicitor). In limiting his focus simply to the activities of conducting litigation, giving advice and drafting legal instruments, the appellant fails to describe sufficiently fully what is signified by the expression 'engaging in legal practice.' One may need to examine who performs these activities, as well as how, when and where they perform them.
...
In my opinion, the expression to 'engage in legal practice' in s. 314 and elsewhere signifies 'to carry on or exercise the profession of law.' Reference to the definitions of 'engage' and 'practice' in the Oxford English Dictionary supports the view that this is the ordinary and natural meaning of the expression. The carrying on of the profession of law is done by none other than a 'legal practitioner.' Accordingly, in my view the expression 'engage in legal practice' means 'engage in legal practice as a legal practitioner', the italicised words being implicit in the notion of legal practice. This construction is supported by the fact that the expression 'engage in legal practice' was evidently intended to cover both sides of the profession, namely, barristers and solicitors (collectively legal practitioners): see s.8, Sch.2 cll.15 and 17 of the 1996 Act."
Her Honour then noted the part of the explanatory memorandum to the Legal Practice Bill which I have already quoted.
827 Thus, in Felman the Court of Appeal concluded that the expression "engage in legal practice" in s.314 of the LPA signified conduct which was done in carrying on the profession of law "as a legal practitioner." Accordingly, a person who, in the lawful pursuit of an occupation other than law, gives advice for reward on matters lying within his or her occupational expertise involving the expression of an opinion about requirements of relevant legislation, statutory rules and the like, does not necessarily act as a solicitor or engage in legal practice.
828 Orrong submitted that a very similar approach to that of the Court of Appeal in Felman as to the meaning of the expression "engage in legal practice" in s.314 of the LPA, had been endorsed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Seymour[130], under the equivalent legislation applicable in that State. In Seymour Fitzgerald JA (with whom Priestley and Stein JJA agreed) considered Sanderson, Cornall v Nagle and Felman. His Honour posed two questions extracted from Sanderson which he said must both be answered in the affirmative before, in that case, Mr Seymour could be found guilty of contempt. The questions were:
"1. Did he perform activities which, although not required to be done by a solicitor, are usually performed by a solicitor?
2. If he did perform such activities, did he perform those activities in such a way as to lead to the reasonable inference that he was a solicitor."
"While some activities regularly performed by solicitors are also frequently lawfully performed by persons who are not solicitors, other activities regularly performed by solicitors, including activities which may be lawfully performed by a person who is not a legal practitioner with a current practising certificate, might seldom, if ever, be performed by any person who is not a solicitor. Although activities which fall into either category are material, an affirmative answer to the second question drawn from Sanderson, will likely be difficult to arrive at if the only relevant activities are in the first category and are limited in their number and nature."
In a footnote to this passage his Honour identified accountants, merchant bankers, and financial advisers as examples of persons who were not solicitors but who frequently lawfully performed activities regularly performed by solicitors.
829 Fitzgerald JA also said:
"The inference required by the second question based on Sanderson, must be considered by reference to a reasonable person with knowledge of the material activities, which will include any statement by which the person performing the activities misrepresents that he or she is a solicitor or explains that he or she is not a solicitor. The reasonable person to be considered is a person dealing with the person alleged to have acted as a solicitor. When activities may lawfully be carried out by a person who is not a solicitor, his or her knowledge that the person with whom he or she is dealing is aware that he or she is not a solicitor, even if not based on his or her acknowledgment of the true position, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to be satisfied that the only reasonable inference open is that he or she acted as a solicitor."
830 This approach was followed by Giles JA (with whom Handley and Powell JJA agreed) in the subsequent New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Kekatos.[131]
831 In Victorian Lawyers RPA Ltd v Bailey[132] the defendant conducted a business as an industrial relations advocate operating under the title "Gary Bailey & Co, Advocates and Consultants" and his letterhead described his premises as "Law Offices, 1st Floor, 253 Lonsdale Street, Dandenong, Vic, 3175." The defendant sought to justify the description of "law offices_"_ as being due to the occasional attendance at his office of a solicitor, an explanation which Ashley J said struck him as "sheer humbug."[133] His Honour's conclusion that he had no doubt that the defendant had contravened s.314 of the LPA was based upon findings that:
(a) the defendant had rendered an account which took the form of a solicitor's bill of costs and was for professional costs;
(b) the defendant had arranged a conference with counsel on behalf of a client and charged a fee for his services even though the defendant claimed he had acted for the client as a "friend";
(c) the defendant issued three Magistrates' Court complaints on behalf of clients, in which his office was given as the plaintiff's address for service and costs were claimed;
(d) the defendant advertised his business as "Lawyers, G S Bailey & Co_";_
(e) the defendant wrote letters to solicitors asserting that "we have instruction (sic) to issue legal proceedings in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria without further notice";
(f) the defendant had signed a lease of premises, the use of which was specified to be as a "solicitor's office"; and
(g) the defendant had described himself to at least one person as _"_an industrial relations solicitor."
832 The application of s.314 was also considered by Heerey J of the Federal Court of Australia in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Murray[134]. That was a case involving a prosecution by the ACCC of a person for engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct in franchising a will writing business and marketing that franchise to potential franchisees. Heerey J concluded that the business sold to the complainants was one that could not be carried on lawfully in that it involved would be franchisees giving legal advice to will maker clients and in fact provided for a warranty to be given to such persons that the will produced would not only be legally valid, but suitable for the particular customer. His Honour described that conduct as "the essence of legal practice", because it involved:
"the advising of a particular person in a particular situation and the production of a document which affects legal rights and which is tailored to the particular needs of that person."[135]
833 The most recent authority in this area is Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v Nagle[136]. In that case Gillard J relied upon several matters in concluding that the defendant before him had contravened the earlier order of McGarvie J and breached the undertakings previously given by him. These matters relevantly included:
(a) the defendant describing himself as an "attorney";
(b) the defendant writing "without prejudice" correspondence on behalf of clients;
(c) the defendant describing clients to third parties as being his "principal"; and
(d) the defendant claiming costs in correspondence with third parties and threatening to seek orders for such costs against those third parties.
834 Accordingly, Orrong submitted that it was incumbent on VRL to establish by convincing proof to the appropriate level of satisfaction, that Orrong had in the circumstances of this case "carried on or exercised the profession of law." It submitted that the mere fact that Orrong, or Mr Ziegler on its behalf, had given legal advice or drawn a document in the course of an otherwise lawful profession or business did not, in itself, constitute "engaging in legal practice." These otherwise lawful activities would have to be performed in such a way as to lead to the reasonable inference that Orrong, or Mr Ziegler on its behalf, was acting as a solicitor and "engaging in legal practice."
835 Orrong further submitted that a common thread running through each of the decisions referred to above was the question of whether the person said to have contravened the relevant legislation in fact represented himself to be a legal practitioner or at least conveyed that impression to persons with whom he dealt. Orrong contended that none of the witnesses called by VRL gave any evidence that they ever believed Orrong to be an incorporated legal practitioner or that they were ever led to believe that Orrong was qualified to engage in legal practice or was in fact engaging in legal practice. As will be discussed below, this was not quite correct given that Mr Foo had signed a letter dated 29 August 2002 to Mr Ziegler to be sent to the ATO asserting a claim for legal professional privilege in respect of communications between the Village Roadshow Group and Mr Ziegler of Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd (as Orrong was then called). Further, in his witness statement, in speaking of the 1993 Agreement, Mr Foo said:
"Ziegler was the first person to come to VRL as Specialist Tax Counsel. Prior to this these services had been provided by E&Y [Ernest & Young], primarily by Ziegler and Leigh Devine. Tony Pane now occupies that role. I cannot recall if Ziegler was ever specifically entitled 'Legal Counsel' however he provided general legal advice within the VRL Group. For example he prepared legal documentation for the Village Roadshow Creative Trust, various share option based contracts with executives, VRL share option contracts and other various tax effective financing transactions. He also instructed external solicitors such as Herbert Geer & Rundle and a range of US firms, including Skadden Arps, and Counsel."
The facts were that Mr Ziegler was initially referred to by VRL as "Chief Tax Counsel" and then as "Group Counsel" and that he later sought and obtained the title of "Director, Fiscal, Legal & Strategic Objectives."
836 Orrong also contended that, similarly, VRL called no such evidence from any third parties with whom Orrong dealt in the course of its activities on behalf of VRL. Orrong therefore submitted that in accordance with the comments of Fitzgerald JA in Seymour, the absence of such evidence made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to be satisfied that the only reasonable inference open was that Orrong, or Mr Ziegler on its behalf, engaged in legal practice.
837 However, VRL submitted that the discussion in Seymour was limited to "when activities may lawfully be carried out by a person who is not a solicitor", and that for the reasons discussed below, this was not such a case.
838 VRL emphasised that in his witness statement Mr Ziegler referred to his legal qualifications, his holding of a Victorian Corporate Practising Certificate and then made the following assertion:
**"**My company has never provided legal services to VRL (or, for that matter, to any other party), and my company has accordingly never been remunerated for providing legal services. My company has provided commercial and taxation services to VRL; and, on the limited occasions when legal services have been required to be provided (almost exclusively with respect to briefing counsel), I personally performed that role as a licensed practitioner, rather than that role having been performed by my company. I have received no separate remuneration from VRL for my performance of that role."
VRL submitted that this paragraph contained both a false denial and an unintended admission of performing legal work. It would appear that Mr Ziegler was acting under a misapprehension because, as previously stated, by the time of final submissions it was common ground that the holder of a corporate practising certificate could only provide legal advice and services to the corporation that employed him, and not otherwise. Thus, VRL submitted that for Mr Ziegler to perform the role of briefing counsel on behalf of VRL went beyond that which was permitted, was something that Orrong could not have done anyway, and amounted to an admission of the performance of legal services.
839 VRL further submitted that the supposed 30 June 1993 Agreement between Orrong and Mr Ziegler clearly showed that Orrong contemplated providing legal services. It recited that the employer "undertakes the business of providing commercial, legal, fund raising, structured finance, taxation and other advice and services ..." and that the employee has "commercial, legal, fund raising ... skills" (emphasis added). VRL submitted that this showed that both Orrong and Mr Ziegler were contemplating providing legal services and that Mr Ziegler was qualified to do so or, if the agreement was prepared at a later date, it showed that Mr Ziegler believed these services had already been provided. Mr Ziegler said that originally when the agreement was drafted it was intended that Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd would undertake the business of providing legal advice, but that he then spoke to the Law Institute and was told that he could not have a company providing both legal and non-legal services, so the company did not provide any legal services. It would appear that Mr Ziegler did not ask the Law Institute about what he was entitled to do as the holder of a corporate practising certificate.
840 A different agreement dated 30 June 2002, between Mr Ziegler and Henderson Avenue Pty Ltd (later renamed Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd), contained identical recitals.
841 VRL also submitted that the pleadings included an admission of the provision of legal services. In the further and better particulars of paragraph 3 of the statement of claim, when asked to particularise the consultancy services referred to therein, the particulars provided (on 11 November 2003) included the following:
"3) Consultancy services with respect to commercial, legal and taxation issues including giving advice to the Defendant's executive committee in relation to the strategic direction of each operating division of the Defendant, with principal emphasis on the exhibition division and the film production division; raising funds on a limited or non-recourse basis, principally for the exhibition division and the film production division; and reviewing, and on occasion drafting, contracts in relation to numerous facets of the Defendant's business."
842 In order to resolve this dispute it is necessary, in my opinion, to examine closely just what legal work Mr Ziegler is alleged to have done when "engaging in legal practice" in contravention of the LPA.
Taxation Advice
843 I propose to begin by looking at Mr Ziegler's role in the giving of taxation advice to the Village Roadshow Group. VRL maintained that this was a clear example of legal services being provided by Mr Ziegler or where he was otherwise engaged in legal practice whilst at VRL. First, reference was made to three memoranda from Mr Ziegler to Mr Foo which all related to matters of taxation advice. They were:
(a) an internal memorandum dated 23 August 1993 which was concerned with a "strategy for reducing the taxable income" of a company in the Village Roadshow Group;
(b) an internal memorandum dated 7 March 1995 which was concerned with the "taxation impact" of a sale of a film library by another company in the Group;
(c) an internal memorandum dated 16 March 1999 which dealt with the Australian Capital Gains Taxation ramifications of a possible form of financing.
844 Secondly, VRL referred to Mr Ziegler's evidence that he gave advice about issues relating to the tax returns of Village Roadshow Group companies by, for example, answering specific questions and sometimes "vetting" the tax returns.
845 Thirdly, VRL referred to the fact that the words "taxation advice" were very frequently used in the description of the work for which "professional fees" were being charged in the invoices rendered by Orrong or Remut. Although neither of the invoices for the "taxes saved" performance bonus for the 2001 and 2002 financial years and neither of the invoices for the 7.5% share of VRP's profit for the same two financial years (being Orrong's only remaining claims) fall into this category, the point is amply illustrated by reference to the wording of the invoices, in respect of which VRL is seeking repayment of the fees paid by it, pursuant to s.314(6) of the LPA.
846 In the period from July 1997 to June 2000, all of the monthly retainer invoices rendered by Orrong contained the words "taxation advice" in the description of the work for which the "professional fees" were being charged. (This was the only period relied on by VRL apparently because the recovery of fees paid any earlier than 23 September 1997 was statute barred and in the period after 30 June 2000 there was a significant change in the description of the work set out in Orrong's invoices). Of the 32 monthly retainer invoices rendered in this period:
(a) 12 of the first 17 contained the description: "Taxation advice pertaining to Cinema Financing";
(b) the third contained the description: "Taxation advice pertaining to Film Financing";
(c) the eighth contained the description: "Taxation advice pertaining to Tax Audit"; and
(d) the remaining 18 contained the description: "Taxation advice pertaining to Income Tax Audit."
847 The invoice for the retrospective increase in the annual retainer was also rendered in this period. The description of the work on this invoice was as follows:
"To: Professional Fees for taxation advice.
Re: Adjustment for period July 1 1997 through to June 30 2000."
848 All of the other invoices, in respect of which VRL was seeking repayment of the fees paid by it, contained some reference to "tax issues" in the description of the work. Thus, there were three invoices for the "Annual bonus for financial year ending 30 June 1997 [and 1998 and 1999] in connection with advice on tax issues" and three invoices for "Advice on tax issues associated with the raising of limited/non recourse finance associated with film production" from various parties, one of which also referred to "Advice associated with the raising of US$16 million of third party equity for Village Roadshow Films (BVI) Ltd from Ambac Indemnity Corporation and John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company ..." and "Advice on tax issues pertaining to the refund of overpaid stamp duty ..."
849 VRL placed great emphasis on the references to the giving of taxation advice because in the period of the above invoices, s.251L of the ITAA provided that:
"(1) A person, other than a person exempted under this section, shall not demand or receive any fee for or in relation to the preparation of any income tax return or objection, or for or in relation to the transaction of any business on behalf of a taxpayer in income tax matters, unless he is a registered tax agent. Penalty: $2000."
Neither Mr Ziegler nor Orrong was a registered tax agent. There was, however, an exception in favour of solicitor or counsel acting in the course of his or her profession because sub-s.(4) provided:
"Subsection (1) shall not apply to any solicitor or counsel acting in the course of his profession in the preparation of any objection or in any litigation or proceedings before a board, the Tribunal or a court, or so acting in an advisory capacity either in connexion with the preparation of any income tax return or with any income tax matter."
850 With effect from 1 July 2000, the wording of s.251L changed to requiring a broader range of matters, including specifically "giving advice about a taxation law", to be performed by a registered tax agent if a fee was charged. The only other significant change was that the provision of "a BAS service" was not required to be done by a registered tax agent. The exception for lawyers was now to be found in sub-s.(8). Perhaps not coincidentally, it was after the date of the change in the wording of s.251L that the description of the work set out in Orrong's invoices changed to expressions such as: "Advice pertaining to the affairs of the company, its subsidiaries, affiliates and related entities."
851 VRL submitted that for Mr Ziegler, or Orrong, to lawfully charge for work such as providing taxation advice, he must have been acting either as a lawyer or a registered tax agent and that as neither of them was a registered tax agent, neither could charge for the taxation advice and work, unless it was done in the capacity of solicitor or counsel acting in the course of his profession. In the result, VRL submitted, Mr Ziegler the accountant could not have charged for the tax work because of the prohibition in the income tax legislation. Mr Ziegler could only legally have done the work as a solicitor, but as he did not hold an appropriate practising certificate at the time a fee should not have been demanded for it. VRL therefore submitted that Mr Ziegler, on behalf of Orrong, had both given taxation advice and charged for it as a solicitor engaged in legal practice.
852 In its written submissions in reply, Orrong complained about VRL relying on the s.251L argument which it said was not pleaded, opened, put to Mr Ziegler or otherwise the subject of evidence. Nevertheless, it submitted that as the argument was without merit it could be dealt with quickly. Orrong submitted that the wording of this legislation at least in its earlier form did not prohibit the mere provision of advice affecting taxation matters or tax effective investment or structuring advice per se. Rather, it focussed upon the preparation of returns and objections and the actual "transaction of any business on behalf of a taxpayer in income tax matters", none of which Mr Ziegler did. Orrong also submitted that Mr Ziegler came within the exceptions in the current form of this legislation. Section 251L(6)(a) provides that sub-s.(1) does not apply to the provisions of "a BAS service" on behalf of a taxpayer by "a member ... of a recognised professional association." Orrong submitted that as Mr Ziegler was at all times a Member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and a Fellow of the Society of Certified Practising Accountants, each of which was a "recognised professional association" within the meaning of s.251LA of the ITAA, he came within the "BAS service" exception. However, I do not consider that it was established that any of the work performed by Mr Ziegler was "a BAS service."
853 The inclusion of either the expression "taxation advice" or the expression "advice on tax issues" on all of the invoices referred to above is apt to be misleading, in my opinion. Just why those words were used was not explained, but I am not prepared to accept them as accurately describing the work done by Mr Ziegler in the period from July 1997 to June 2000. Although I find that Mr Ziegler did give taxation advice from time to time during this period, it cannot be correct that this was the only work performed by him pursuant to the retainer.
854 Moreover, although Mr Ziegler undoubtedly gave taxation advice from time to time I am not satisfied that it has been established that he did so as a solicitor engaged in legal practice in contravention of s.314 of the LPA. It seems to me that, with all of his accounting qualifications and experience, Mr Ziegler could have given, and probably did give, the taxation advice as an accountant. I note that in the evidence of Mr Foo quoted above the new role of "Specialist Tax Counsel" was seen by him as Mr Ziegler replacing the services previously provided by the accounting firm of Ernst & Young. The titles "Chief Tax Counsel" and "Group Counsel" really say nothing about the capacity in which Mr Ziegler was giving tax advice.
855 There was no reason why, in my opinion, the taxation advice given by Mr Ziegler, at least prior to 1 July 2000, could not have been given by him as an accountant, albeit not one registered as a tax agent. At that time he would not, in my opinion, have breached s.251L by giving taxation advice when he was not registered as a tax agent, because the section then was concerned with allowing only registered tax agents to be able to charge fees for or in relation to "the preparation of any income tax return or objection" and "the transaction of any business on behalf of a taxpayer in income tax matters." Neither of those expressions is apt, in my view, to include the giving of taxation advice.
856 That situation changed after the amendment of s.251L of the ITAA. It seems to me that it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, after the amendment, an accountant, who is not a registered tax agent, cannot charge a fee for giving taxation advice, however extraordinary that outcome might seem to be.
857 But even if I assume that, in giving taxation advice either before or after 1 July 2000, Mr Ziegler would have been contravening s.251L of the ITAA, I am not persuaded of the logic of VRL's submission that in order not to breach that section, Mr Ziegler must have been acting as a solicitor. It seems to me that equally it could be said that in order not to breach s.314 of the LPA, he must have been acting as an accountant. It could well be said that, apart from any other reason, this was more likely because of the much heavier civil and criminal penalties able to be imposed under the LPA.[137] The position is therefore far from clear and I am not satisfied, on the appropriate standard of proof, that the giving of taxation advice meant that this work was done by Mr Ziegler in such a way as to lead to the reasonable inference that he was acting as a solicitor and engaging in legal practice.
Briefing Counsel
858 I turn next to examine Mr Ziegler's role in the briefing of counsel. VRL submitted that it could hardly be denied that the briefing of counsel constituted the provision of legal services. It also relied, of course, on Mr Ziegler's admission that when counsel were briefed he did that "personally ... as a licensed practitioner." VRL identified the following examples of Mr Ziegler doing so in a variety of taxation and corporations matters:
(a) Briefs to advise to Mr Forsyth QC dated 14 July 1994; April 1995; 26 June 1995; December 1995; 26 January 1996; 29 January 1996; 27 February 1996 and 21 March 1996;
(b) Briefs to advise to Mr Beaumont QC dated 18 November 1994 and October 2000;
(c) Brief to advise to Dr Sundberg QC dated 20 June 1995; and
(d) Brief to advise to Mr Slater QC dated 3 August 1995.
859 VRL submitted that the content of the briefs demonstrated that Mr Ziegler was purporting to act as a solicitor. As Mr Ziegler himself admitted, they involved consideration of legal issues not accounting principles. For example, the brief to advise to Mr Forsyth QC dated 14 July 1994 contained a detailed review by Mr Ziegler of the applicable law under the heading "Relevant Taxation Law, Taxation Rulings and Case Law." VRL submitted that the extensive analysis by Mr Ziegler of the law (legislation, taxation rulings and case law) under this heading demonstrated that he was not briefing counsel as an accountant or a registered tax agent (because he was not registered) but as a solicitor. He was doing the work of a solicitor. Similarly, the brief to advise to Mr Slater QC dated 3 August 1995 contained an extensive consideration by Mr Ziegler of the Corporations Law, income tax legislation and case law applicable to the advice being sought. It was said that, again, it was clear from Mr Ziegler's legal analysis, stretching over 82 paragraphs of this brief, that he was briefing counsel as a solicitor, and not as some officer of VRL as claimed by Orrong.
860 Mr Ziegler was cross-examined about a number of these briefs to counsel. VRL submitted that his answers clearly constituted admissions of the provision of legal services, as illustrated by the following exchange:
"So it wasn't just the occasional brief to counsel that you gave in this period, Mr Ziegler, there were a lot of briefs to counsel, weren't there?
---I don't believe I said the occasional brief to counsel. Yesterday I said I'd briefed counsel frequently, and I did.
Not only did you brief them, you gave instructions for the brief which involved canvassing the law?---Yes.
And invited counsel to discuss it with you?---Yes.
And showed a knowledge of a lot of law, did you not - case law, statute law?---Yes_._"
861 Orrong observed that there was no reference in any of these briefs to Orrong and that, with one exception, all of the briefs purported to have been sent by: "Peter Ziegler LL.B (Hons)." This was then followed by the name and address of "Village Roadshow Group" or "Village Roadshow Limited" or "Village Roadshow Corporation Limited." The one exception was the brief latest in time which had no name or address at all on the back sheet.
862 Orrong submitted that Mr Ziegler, as a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and a Fellow of the Society of Certified Practising Accountants, was at all material times perfectly entitled at law to seek counsel's opinion, in relation to the non-contentions taxation or corporations matters the subject of the briefs, either as a chartered accountant or as an officer or agent of VRL. Indeed, the Rules of Conduct approved by the Victorian Bar Council had since 7 May 1994 expressly permitted such direct access briefs. Clause 1 of the Bar's Direct Access Rules provided that:
"Subject to these Rules, a barrister may accept instructions or a brief (without the intervention of a solicitor) from:-
(a) a member of an approved body acting on its own or on behalf of a client;
(b) a lay client in a matter in which the client is directly concerned; or
(c) the Legal Aid Commission in criminal matters."
The Institute of Chartered Accountants was at all times an approved body for the purpose of that Rule.
863 Thus, Orrong submitted that a reasonable inference was that Mr Ziegler briefed counsel not as a solicitor but as a chartered accountant on behalf of one or other parts of the Village Roadshow Group or as an officer of that "lay client in a matter in which the client [was] directly concerned."
864 Orrong also submitted that the fact that Mr Ziegler expressed his own views to counsel in the briefs was not reasonably, let alone solely, consistent with him engaging in unqualified legal practice. He was after all a Chartered and Certified Practising Accountant experienced in taxation matters.
865 Nevertheless, I agree with VRL's submission that Orrong's assertion that Mr Ziegler was briefing counsel as a chartered accountant or as an officer of VRL flew in the face of the paragraph from Mr Ziegler's witness statement quoted above, which was never retracted, and his description of himself on the brief (adding the words "LL.B (Hons)" after his name).
866 I also agree with VRL's submission that it was irrelevant whether VRL was entitled under the direct access rules of The Victorian Bar Inc to brief counsel through Mr Ziegler in his capacity as a chartered accountant or an officer or agent of VRL. That matter merely established that counsel was entitled to receive briefs from "lay clients" but did not say anything about the nature of the services that Mr Ziegler in fact provided to VRL by briefing counsel in the way he did or that he was entitled to charge for those services.
867 In the light of Mr Ziegler's admission that he briefed counsel "personally ... as a licensed practitioner", together with his description of himself on the back sheet as "Peter Ziegler LL.B (Hons)", without any reference to his accounting qualifications, and the contents of the briefs themselves, I am satisfied that the reasonable inference is that this work was done by Mr Ziegler as a solicitor.
868 I note, however, that all bar one of the briefs to counsel were dated on or prior to 21 March 1996, which means that not only were they prepared during the currency of the 1993 Agreement but also that they are not within the period in respect of which VRL is seeking repayment of the fees paid to Orrong because such a claim would be statute barred. I also note that the one remaining brief, to Mr Beaumont QC to advise Village Roadshow Group on the taxation implications associated with its Employee Share Acquisition Scheme, was dated October 2000 which also puts it outside the relevant period. Finally, I point out that on page 13 of that brief Mr Ziegler has used the expression "instructing solicitor", which can only be, in my opinion, a reference to himself.
Other Examples of Legal Services
869 VRL referred to several more instances of what it maintained were examples of legal services provided by Mr Ziegler or where he was otherwise engaged in legal practice whilst at VRL. They were:
(a) an internal memorandum from Mr Ziegler to Mr Richard Potter (of the Roadshow Distributors Group) dated 19 October 1993;
(b) the preparation in 1994 of the Village Roadshow Creative Trust Deed and the associated Film Co-production Joint Venture Agreement; and
(c) the drafting of the tri-partite 1993 Employment Agreement between VRC, Mr Ziegler and VRL.
870 Orrong emphasised that out of a nine year relationship, apart from the questions of taxation advice and briefing counsel (dealt with above) and the issue of legal professional privilege (dealt with below), VRL could only identify these few alleged specific instances of Mr Ziegler purportedly engaging in legal practice. In any event, Orrong submitted that none of these instances supported VRL's claim. Again I note that all of these events occurred during the currency of the 1993 Agreement.
871 The memorandum from Mr Ziegler to Mr Potter dated 19 October 1993 contained "advice regarding possible intellectual property right infringements" by a board game. Although it reads like a solicitor's letter of advice, I consider that an isolated instance such as this does not prove that Mr Ziegler was engaging in legal practice.
872 The only legal documents put to Mr Ziegler in this context were the Village Roadshow Creative Trust Deed and the Film Co-production Joint Venture Agreement between VRL and the trustee of the Creative Trust. Mr Ziegler's evidence was that, although he was involved in preparing the Joint Venture Agreement, it was Herbert Geer & Rundle who drew the Village Roadshow Creative Trust Deed. No evidence was called from Herbert Geer & Rundle disputing that statement. Mr Ziegler also gave evidence that he drafted the tripartite Employment Agreement between VRC and VRL and himself in 1993.
873 No other instances of the drafting of documents were put to Mr Ziegler as being purported examples of him engaging in legal practice. Orrong contended that it would be an absurd assertion for VRL to submit that the mere drafting of an agreement would by itself without more render a person guilty of engaging in unqualified legal practice.
874 Again, I am not satisfied that this evidence proves that Mr Ziegler was engaging in legal practice. Drafting an agreement does not, in my opinion, mean that it is a reasonable inference that the person carrying out that task is acting as a solicitor.
875 As I have pointed out above, most of the briefing of counsel and all of the other instances relied on by VRL occurred during the currency of the 1993 Agreement. This is not surprising, in my opinion, because Mr Ziegler's role undoubtedly changed after the making of the 1995 Agreement. This was reflected in his new title of "Director, Fiscal, Legal and Strategic Objectives." Moreover, I do not consider that the inclusion of the word "Legal" in that title signified that Mr Ziegler was "engaging in legal practice." It could have simply indicated, for example, that he was the person responsible for the solicitors who were doing so. Were it not for the next matter, VRL's argument about "engaging in legal practice" would, therefore, be very thin.
The Claim for Legal Professional Privilege
876 VRL submitted that compelling evidence that Mr Ziegler had been engaged in legal work was the fact that, following an "access visit" by the ATO, he was instrumental in VRL claiming legal professional privilege for documents which related to his work. On 6 August 2002, the ATO raided VRL's offices, Mr Ziegler's home and his accountant's office. Although Orrong's consultancy agreement had come to an end on 30 June 2002, Mr Ziegler was still assisting VRL with ongoing issues at this time. After the raid had commenced, Herbert Geer & Rundle (VRL's lawyers) attended VRL's offices and Mr Ziegler's home. Many documents were seized. There followed negotiations between the ATO and the lawyers concerning the procedure for dealing with claims for legal professional privilege in respect of the documents seized. Due to a possible conflict of interest, Mr Ziegler retained his own solicitors, Clayton Utz, to act on his behalf and on behalf of his wife.
877 VRL subpoenaed documents from Clayton Utz and called evidence from Mr Richard Mereine and Mr Dane McLeod, respectively a partner and a former solicitor of Clayton Utz, as to the circumstances surrounding this claim by VRL for legal professional privilege.
878 Mr Mereine met with Mr Ziegler on 8 August 2002. Arrangements were subsequently made with the Australian Government Solicitor ("the AGS"), acting on behalf of the ATO, for the 54 boxes of documents and computer equipment initially stored at the office of Herbert Geer & Rundle to be moved to Clayton Utz's office. There the contents of the boxes were to be inspected and documents in respect of which a claim for legal professional privilege was to be made were to be identified. These documents were to be copied and the originals then to be placed in sealed envelopes. Lists of the documents in respect of which a claim for legal professional privilege was to be made were to be prepared containing certain details of the documents, including the grounds upon which the claim for legal professional privilege was made and the person in whose name the claim was made. Terms of Inspection dated 12 August 2002 were signed by Mr and Mrs Ziegler and on behalf of the ATO. Mr Ziegler was involved in the negotiations of those terms. He conferred with Mr Mereine about them on 9 August 2002.
879 As part of these arrangements it was necessary to obtain the consent of the parties on whose behalf the claim for legal professional privilege would be made. On 26 August 2002 Mr McLeod prepared a list of 23 names whose consent would be necessary. He sent it to Mr Mereine and Mr Ziegler. At the foot of the list he sent to Mr Ziegler, Mr McLeod wrote: "Please send all the signed consent forms to us before Friday 30 August 2002." Mr Ziegler made a number of corrections to the list in his own handwriting. After taking into account a number of repetitions, there were by my calculations 16 separate persons, companies or firms in the settled list, including VRL, two directors of VRL, the Fowles Auction Group, and two companies associated with Mr Ziegler.
880 At the same time Mr McLeod prepared a draft of the "consent form" to be signed by the person on whose behalf the claim for legal professional privilege would be made. Mr McLeod thought that this draft was based on a proforma document provided by the ATO. The first typed draft letter prepared by Mr McLeod was addressed to the ATO and read as follows:
"From time to time we have retained Mr Peter Ziegler to give us legal advice. Consequently, in the course of those retainers there have been:
1. confidential communications between us and Mr Ziegler for the dominant purpose of seeking or giving legal advice;
2. confidential communications between us and Mr Ziegler for the dominant purpose of preparing for actual or contemplated litigation; and
3. confidential communications between Mr Peter Ziegler and third parties on our behalf which communications were made either for the dominant purpose
(a) of actual or contemplated litigation; or
(b) of Mr Ziegler giving us legal advice.
We maintain our privilege in relation to each of these communications."
881 A copy of that draft was altered by Mr Ziegler by hand so that the above references to himself, instead read "Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd." The second typed draft letter incorporated these changes together with a change of addressee from the ATO to "Mr Peter Ziegler, Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd." This letter was emailed by Mr McLeod to Mr Ziegler at his VRL email address at 3.07 p.m. on 27 August 2002, together with a message confirming that the letter had been amended "as you have suggested so that the replies will be directed to you rather than to the Australian Tax Office." At 4.46 p.m. on the same day the same email and attachment was sent by Mr McLeod to Ms Neree Long, Mr Ziegler's former secretary at VRL, who was continuing to assist him with VRL work even though his formal connection with the Group had ended. Mr McLeod said in evidence that he did so "based on Mr Ziegler's instructions to me on the telephone where best to send these documents so he could have a look at them."
882 According to Mr McLeod's handwritten note, the third form of the letter of consent was discussed in a telephone conversation between Mr Ziegler and Mr Mereine and Mr McLeod on 28 August 2002. This amendment involved all of the above personal references reading "Peter Ziegler of Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd" where previously they had been first "Mr Peter Ziegler" and then "Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd." However, from the emails sent out by Ms Long, which most clients signed without amendment, in the final form of the letter of consent the reference to a retainer was to a retainer of "Peter Ziegler of Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd" whereas the references to the giving of legal advice and the privileged confidential communications was simply to "Peter Ziegler." Ms Long sent out the letters of consent, together with a covering letter from Mr Ziegler, on 28 August 2002. Unlike the letter of consent, the covering letter bore no Clayton Utz footer, although Mr Ziegler said that he believed that it was also prepared by Clayton Utz. By a letter dated 30 August 2002, most of the signed letters of consent were sent by Ms Sharon Yewers, on behalf of Mr Ziegler, to Mr Mereine. Ms Yewers was Mr Pane's secretary at VRL. Clayton Utz forwarded them on to the ATO on the same day. Mr Ziegler said that he might have dictated the letter signed by Ms Yewers but he could not recall. He could not understand why Ms Yewers would be doing this for him, when Ms Long sat very close to Ms Yewers.
883 It seems to me that these events show that Mr Ziegler was closely involved in the arranging of these claims for legal professional privilege. He was involved in settling the list of persons and in drafting the form of the letter of consent; the contact with the clients was made on his behalf by Ms Long; Mr Ziegler probably drafted the proforma covering letter; and the signed letters of consent were returned to him and were then sent to Clayton Utz by Ms Yewers on his behalf. Thus, as VRL submitted, it was Mr Ziegler who clearly facilitated these claims for legal professional privilege from a number of people in respect of work which he alone could have provided and, as the letters suggest, was provided by him. This was, VRL submitted, clear evidence of Mr Ziegler doing legal work (without the proper qualifications) for these people, including VRL. The changes made by Mr Ziegler to the letter of consent also showed that he was conscious that his work had been done on behalf of Orrong.
884 One of the letters of consent was emailed by Ms Long to Mr Tony Pane, the VRL Chief Tax Counsel. Mr Foo signed that letter on behalf of VRL "and certain of its related and associated entities (the 'Group')." It was dated 29 August 2002. Like all of the letters of consent it was headed:
"In the matter of Mr Peter Alexander Ziegler and Mrs Andrea Patricia Ziegler and the Australian Tax Office ('ATO'). Claim for Legal Professional Privilege."
It concluded with a request that Mr Ziegler "assert our privilege" in respect of the privileged communications "in your dealings with the ATO."
885 Mr Ziegler's evidence about these events was unsatisfactory. When he was first taken to the topic of Mr Foo's letter of 29 August 2002, Mr Ziegler said that Mr Foo had requested "that I assert legal professional privilege over certain documents and I did." He said that he thought the wording of the standard form letter was "just a catch-all provision." When asked whether he had given legal advice the Village Roadshow Group, Mr Ziegler said:
"What I have said is that I briefed counsel and in that regard that could be seen to be legal advice. I didn't give legal advice to the Village Group per se."
886 The impression which I consider Mr Ziegler sought to convey, at this stage of his evidence, was that he had had little involvement with the preparation of the letter. Mr Ziegler said that:
"Richard Mereine had been requested to find out by the ATO whether privilege was going to be claimed with respect to certain documents pertaining to Village Roadshow or some of the personnel involved. I then spoke to Village, they wrote this letter. I gave it to Mr Mereine."[138]
When asked why the claim for legal professional privilege would involve his wife, Mr Ziegler said that Mr Foo would have to be asked that question. He then added "I don't know, it is his letter"[139] (emphasis added). When pressed about whether he was involved in the preparation of the letter Mr Ziegler said that he did not believe that he had "drafted this letter." He thought that it was either:
"a Village Roadshow drafted letter, a letter drafted by Village Roadshow's lawyers Herbert Geer & Rundle presumably, or it could have been drafted by my lawyer, Clayton Utz, for sending to Village Roadshow in response to the request that they received from the ATO pertaining to legal professional privilege on Village documents."[140]
887 I also consider that in a further effort to distance himself from the suggestion of any involvement in the preparation of the draft letter of consent, Mr Ziegler gave evidence that he believed Mr Mereine had sent the covering letter and the letter of consent to Ms Long for forwarding on to Mr Pane. It is far more likely, in my opinion, that Mr McLeod sent the letter of consent to Mr Ziegler on 27 August 2002, and then later on the same day to Ms Long, at Mr Ziegler's request, and that on 28 August 2002, at Mr Ziegler's request, Ms Long sent the further amended letter of consent and the covering letter to Mr Pane (and the other clients).
888 When confronted with his handwritten alterations to the first draft of the letter of consent, after Clayton Utz's file had been subpoenaed, Mr Ziegler said that he now recollected having seen the document before because it had his handwriting on it. However, he denied playing any role in the further changes. He agreed that he had "input" into the form of the letter of consent, but said: "Mr Mereine acting on my behalf settled it, I believe."
889 The fact that Mr Ziegler participated in this way in the making of a claim for legal professional privilege on behalf of some 16 different persons, companies or firms, including VRL, in respect of their retainer of "Peter Ziegler of Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd" and the giving of legal advice to them by "Mr Peter Ziegler" and privileged confidential communications involving "Mr Peter Ziegler" (as it was finally expressed), seems to me to make it impossible for Orrong to deny that at least on occasions during this period Mr Ziegler did "engage in legal practice" on behalf of VRL. Otherwise, how could the claim be made? The giving of taxation advice, for example, which could lawfully be done by either a lawyer or an accountant, could not give rise to a claim to legal professional privilege if the advice was given by someone in his or her capacity as an accountant. It is only if the lawyer is acting as lawyer in giving that advice that such a claim could arise. This indicates to me, therefore, that the person giving the advice in respect of which privilege was claimed was "engaging in legal practice." On the face of the letter dated 29 August 2002 signed by Mr Foo, Mr Ziegler of Peter Ziegler & Co Pty Ltd had performed some legal work for VRL. That is, Mr Ziegler was acting in this respect on behalf of Orrong in contravention of s.314 of the LPA.
890 What is not at all clear, however, is just what work was involved in the claim for legal professional privilege asserted in the letter of 29 August 2002.
Exhibit 119
891 In an apparent attempt by VRL to overcome this uncertainty, Mr McLeod was recalled to give evidence about what happened to the lists of documents in respect of which legal professional privilege was claimed by the Village Roadshow Group. He said that, according to his file notes, on 3 September 2002 he handed to the ATO's representatives four lists of documents and that on 9 September 2002 he handed over five additional lists of documents. The letter from Clayton Utz accompanying the delivery of the four lists of documents stated as follows:
"Enclosed are four lists of documents over which Herbert Geer & Rundle Lawyers wish to maintain and assert legal professional privilege on behalf of Village Roadshow Limited. Herbert Geer & Rundle have requested that we provide copies of these lists to you under the Peter Ziegler Terms of Inspection."
The letter from Clayton Utz accompanying the delivery of the five lists of documents stated as follows:
"We enclose five additional lists of documents over which Village Roadshow Limited assert legal professional privilege. These additional lists were prepared by Herbert Geer & Rundle and are provided to you under the Peter Ziegler Terms of Inspection. These lists represent the balance of the documents in respect of which Village Roadshow Limited claims legal professional privilege."
The relevant file notes and correspondence became Exhibit 118.
892 Clayton Utz were subpoenaed to produce the nine lists from their file, but only four complete lists and one partial list had been retained. They became Exhibit 119.
893 VRL submitted that the documents for which legal professional privilege was claimed by it included documents relating to Projects Ballarat, Bendigo and Castlemaine and other matters in respect of which Orrong had been paid by VRL or in respect of which claims were being made in this proceeding. It submitted that some of the claims for legal professional privilege were on the basis that Mr Ziegler was providing legal advice. It further submitted that the claims made by Orrong in this proceeding could be shown by the evidence to be made in respect of at least some legal work.
894 VRL further submitted that it was Mr Ziegler who instructed Clayton Utz to make these claims on behalf of VRL on the basis that he was the legal advisor whose communications or advice gave rise to the privilege claim. It submitted that the Court should find (by irresistible inference if necessary) that Mr Ziegler would have been well aware of the nature of the documents for which legal professional privilege was being claimed, even though the lists were prepared by Herbert Geer & Rundle, and that Mr Ziegler provided legal advice in respect of those matters. Before these sweeping assertions could be accepted, it is necessary to examine in some detail just what evidence there was about the preparation of the lists, Mr Ziegler's role in that preparation, the contents of the lists, the claims for legal professional privilege and the validity of those claims.
895 Orrong submitted that even though Mr Ziegler was subjected to many days of cross-examination neither VRL's original versions of Herbert Geer & Rundle's lists nor their contents were put to him in any detail. Nor did VRL seek to recall Mr Ziegler for further cross- examination after the tender of Exhibit 119.
896 Orrong emphasised that the relevant lists claiming legal professional privilege were prepared by Herbert Geer & Rundle on behalf of VRL. They were not prepared by Mr Ziegler or by Clayton Utz on his behalf. No witness was called from Herbert Geer & Rundle to give evidence as to the preparation of those lists, the actual basis upon which claims had been made by VRL for legal professional privilege and any actual connection between Herbert Geer & Rundle's lists and the proposition that this somehow indicated that Mr Ziegler or Orrong was engaging in unqualified legal practice. Orrong drew attention, in particular, to the fact that no evidence was called from Mr Peter Nankivell of Herbert Geer & Rundle, who was the draftsman of the lists constituting Exhibit 119, and that VRL proffered no explanation for the absence of such evidence. Presumably, Mr Nankivell would have been able to produce all nine lists.
897 Similarly, VRL failed to call its own employed lawyer, Mr Simon Phillipson, the author of Exhibit 56, and also failed to explain his absence as a witness. Exhibit 56 was a memorandum by Mr Phillipson, in part, discussing the arrangements between Herbert Geer & Rundle on behalf of VRL and Clayton Utz on behalf of Mr Ziegler. Part of that memorandum read:
"In relation to documents taken from Peter Ziegler's house and the office of his accountant, they will be physically located at the offices of Peter Ziegler's lawyers, Clayton Utz. HGR [Herbert Geer & Rundle] will inspect those documents on behalf of VRL (with the consent of Peter Ziegler), reviewing them for claims of legal privilege, relevance etc. HGR will take any action considered appropriate by VRL in order to protect VRL's interests in relation to those documents. VRL will pay the reasonable costs of Clayton Utz in relation to the initial review of the documents by HGR and Clayton Utz and other reasonable costs associated with the liaison between Clayton Utz and HGR in relation to protecting VRL's privilege of other interests [sic]."
Orrong submitted that it could only be presumed, therefore, that the evidence of Mr Nankivell and Mr Phillipson would not have assisted VRL.
898 Orrong submitted that the file notes and correspondence constituting Exhibit 118 entirely refuted the assertion by VRL that Exhibit 119 gave rise to an inference that Orrong adopted the contents of Herbert Geer & Rundle's lists as being correct. Rather than Clayton Utz purporting to adopt the contents of Herbert Geer & Rundle's lists when it forwarded them on to the ATO, it expressly described the four lists enclosed with the letter dated 30 August, 2002 as being "lists of documents over which Herbert Geer & Rundle wish to maintain and assert legal professional privilege on behalf of Village Roadshow Limited" and said that Herbert Geer & Rundle had requested that copies of the lists be provided "under the Peter Ziegler Terms of Inspection." The subsequent letter dated 5 September 2002, enclosing the remaining five lists was in very similar but not identical terms. Importantly, this letter made it clear that the lists "were prepared by Herbert Geer & Rundle."
899 When one turns to examining the lists constituting Exhibit 119, the first point to note about them is that although each is headed "Peter Ziegler Legal Professional Privilege" they relate to documents obtained from Mr Ziegler's possession and not necessarily to documents in respect of which Mr Ziegler was personally involved in the matters giving rise to the claim for legal professional privilege. This much is obvious from the fact that many documents were neither prepared by nor addressed to Mr Ziegler. Examples are the first entry on page 1 of the list for Box 5 which was an email from Mr Basser to Mr Boxer dated 28 May 2002 attaching legal advice by Mr Pane; the fifth entry on page 1 of the list for Box 7, which was legal advice dated 16 January 2002 provided by Mr John Mendes of Skadden Arps to Mr Basser; the eighth entry on page 2 of the list for Box 8, which was a letter of advice dated 5 November 1997 concerning an attached draft agreement from Pinheiro Guimaraes to VRL; and the fourth entry on page 3 of the list for Box 9, which was a letter of advice regarding related party transactions dated 11 August 2000 from Minter Ellison to Mr Basser.
900 That VRL accepted that many of the documents in the lists had nothing to do with Mr Ziegler is illustrated by the contents of the document entitled "Chapter 13, Annexure 2", which formed part of VRL's written closing submissions. This purported to be a list of "Documents referred to in Exhibit 119 demonstrating LPP claims based on legal work by Ziegler." The 182 documents in Exhibit 119 had been reduced in Annexure 2 to 65, or a reduction of about a third.
901 Next, of the 65 documents in Annexure 2 only 29 documents are said to be communications to Mr Ziegler "for the purpose of obtaining legal advice", or documents prepared by Mr Ziegler "for the purpose of giving legal advice" or documents containing Mr Ziegler's "legal advice." There is no such claim with respect to the remaining 36 documents in Annexure 2. Examples are the first entry in the list for Box 5, which was a bundle of documents said to be communications between Mr Ziegler and Mr Fletcher of CIBC from 8 April 2002 to 7 June 2002 concerning the "proposed variation of the Master Agreement"; the third entry in the list for Box 7, which was an email from Mr Stephen Foster to Mr Boxer, Mr Basser and Mr Ziegler dated 7 June 2002 concerning "revenue timing profiles"; the fourth entry in the list for Box 8, which was a bundle of documents said to be communications between Mr Basser, Mr Ziegler and others from 24 August 2000 to 23 November 2000 concerning Project Popcorn; and the twenty-sixth entry in the list for Box 9, which was an inter-office memorandum from Mr Ziegler to the VRL Board dated 28 April 1999 concerning Project Popcorn.
902 Of the 29 documents which are said to be either communications to Mr Ziegler "for the purpose of obtaining legal advice", or documents said to have been prepared by Mr Ziegler "for the purpose of giving legal advice", or documents containing Mr Ziegler's "legal advice", it is often difficult to discern exactly what were the topics in respect of which the legal advice was said to have been sought or given. Examples of the first category are the first entry in the list for Box 6 which was described as an "email re projects" dated 6 July 1998 from Ms Raffe to Mr Ziegler, Mr Charbel Nader and Mr Foo, and the second entry in the same list which was described as a "letter regarding ESAS" dated 2 March 1998 from Mr Buzzard to Mr Ziegler. Examples of the second category are the first entry in the list for Box 9 which was described as undated "notes" prepared by Mr Ziegler and the second entry in the same list which was described as an undated "structure diagram" prepared by Mr Ziegler. An example of the third category is the sixteenth entry in the list for Box 9 which was described as an "E-mail" dated 20 August 2001 from Mr Ziegler to Mr Burke, Mr John Kirby and Mr Foo.
903 In my opinion, there are only five of the 29 documents which, if accurately described, could be said to relate unequivocally to the work the subject matter of Orrong's remaining claims or of VRL's counterclaim for repayment. They are the second entry in the list for Box 7, which was an inter-office memorandum from Mr Ziegler to Mr Kirby, Mr Burke and Mr Foo dated 23 November 2001 said to contain a legal advice or opinion of Mr Ziegler concerning "Village Roadshow Films (BVI) Ltd capital raising"; the thirteenth entry in the list for Box 9, which was an email from Ms Raffe to Mr Ziegler dated 22 July 1998 concerning "Ballarat" said to have been sent to Mr Ziegler "for the purpose of obtaining legal advice"; the fourteenth entry in the same list, which was a facsimile from Mr Streeter to Mr Ziegler dated 23 February 1998 concerning "Ballarat" said to have been sent to Mr Ziegler "for the purpose of obtaining legal advice"; the fifth last entry in the same list, which was Mr Ziegler's letter to Mr Wilson of Salomon Smith Barney dated 24 May 1999 concerning "Project Bendigo" and, an attached review of structure, said to be "legal advice prepared by" Mr Ziegler; and the fourth last entry on the same list which was a letter from Mr Ziegler to Mr Wilson dated 24 June 1999 concerning "Project Bendigo", and an attached "Warner Village co-production arrangements", which was again said to be "legal advice prepared by" Mr Ziegler.
904 Finally, it has to be said that some of the claims for legal professional privilege in respect of these 29 documents appear to be quite unlikely to be justifiable. Examples are the eleventh entry in the list for Box 9 which was Mr Ziegler's letter to Mr Jackman dated 16 February 1999 concerning Project Bendigo; and the fifth and fourth last entries in the same list, referred to in the previous paragraph. In this context I note that in tendering Exhibits 118 and 119 senior counsel for VRL made the statement that "It doesn't matter if the documents are honestly described or not. They may well be dishonestly described."
905 In a further attempt to make out its case under the LPA, VRL prepared as part of its written closing submissions a document entitled "Chapter 13 - Annexure 1." The sub-heading read: "Evidence of legal work by Ziegler referable to payments made to Ziegler, Orrong and others." In my opinion, Annexure 1 did not advance VRL's case one iota. Listing alleged examples of legal work performed by Mr Ziegler alongside invoices from Orrong where the dates of the two documents more or less coincided achieved nothing. Apart from all of the above criticisms of Exhibit 119, there was rarely any relationship between the work described on the invoice and that described in the document contained in one of the lists constituting Exhibit 119. For example, many of the monthly retainer invoices between September 1997 and December 1998 which contained the work description: "Taxation advice pertaining to Cinema Financing" had placed alongside them the document being the last entry in the list for Box 9 in Annexure 2/Exhibit 119 which was described as "Communication between PZ and Board of Directors, HGR and GWB [Mr Burke] and supporting documents re Project Bendigo" in the period from 5 May 1997 to 18 November 1999 and in respect of which legal professional privilege had been claimed on the ground expressed as follows: "Communication between PZ and HGR and supporting documents." Apart from the dubious claim for legal professional privilege, "Cinema Financing" surely referred to Project Popcorn not Project Bendigo. Therefore, the juxtaposition of these documents revealed nothing about the work the subject of the invoices or the work the subject of the claim for legal professional privilege.
906 Another example is the February 1998 invoice for $300,000 for: "Annual Bonus for Financial Year Ending 30 June 1997 in connection with Advice on Tax Issues." Placed alongside this invoice in the tables in Annexure 1 were the document being the third entry on page 3 of the list for Box 9 in Exhibit 119, which was described as "Facsimile re Ballarat" dated 23 February 1998 from Mr Streeter to Mr Ziegler and said to be a "Communication to PZ made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice", and the same document referred to in the previous paragraph and described as "Communication between PZ and Board of Directors, HGR and GWB and supporting documents re Project Bendigo" in the period from 5 May 1997 to 18 November 1999. Again, the juxtaposition of these documents revealed nothing about the work the subject of the particular invoice or the work the subject of the claim for legal professional privilege.
907 An early example of what was set out in Annexure 1 in respect of "Retainer payments" is Orrong's monthly retainer invoice for February 1996 in the sum of $26,250. That charge was expressed to be:
"To: Professional Fees for taxation advice
Re: Taxation advice pertaining to Multiplex cinema expansion."
The evidence of related legal work was said by VRL to be: "Brief to advise from Peter Ziegler to Neil Forsyth QC dated 27 February 1996." However, that brief was to advise about the taxation consequences of a proposed transaction concerning the Entertainment & Film Unit Trust and appears to have nothing to do with "Multiplex cinema expansion." It seems to me, therefore, that the only relationship is one of time and that otherwise the example does not advance VRL's argument at all.
908 More relevantly, I turn to look at examples of payments made in the period between 23 September 1997 and 27 June 2000.
909 Given the problems I have identified concerning Exhibit 119 and Annexures 1 and 2 and Orrong's valid criticisms of the lack of explanatory or supporting evidence, I am not prepared to place reliance on the contents of the lists, including in particular the descriptions of how legal professional privilege was said to arise. I am not satisfied that Exhibit 119 or Annexures 1 or 2 is a reliable basis on which to make findings adverse to Mr Ziegler and Orrong. If anything was to be made of Exhibit 119 to assist VRL, then that could only have occurred if VRL had adequately explored the relevant transactions the subject of Herbert Geer & Rundle's claim for legal professional privilege to ascertain whether those transactions cast light on the question of whether Mr Ziegler had engaged in legal practice. This evidence was simply not before the Court. Further, I am not satisfied that it was established by the evidence, let alone by "irresistible inference", that Mr Ziegler was "well aware" or even simply aware, of the contents of the lists or that he played any part in their preparation. Therefore, I put to one side the contents of Exhibit 119.
Section 314 and Orrong's Claims and VRL's Counterclaims
910 As set out above, it is my opinion that Mr Ziegler must be taken to have been "engaging in legal practice" in contravention of s.314 of the LPA on occasions in the relevant period. I say on occasions because it seems to me that it is obvious that Mr Ziegler did far more work for the Village Roadshow Group apart from what could be considered to be the provision of legal services. He was far more than simply a lawyer for VRL. As Orrong pointed out, none of the reported cases on this topic come close to the facts of Orrong's relationship with, and activities undertaken for, VRL. The two Nagle cases involved a person holding himself out to the world at large as an attorney. Murray involved an illicit will making franchise business. Bailey involved an unqualified industrial relations advocate describing himself as a solicitor. Felman involved an unqualified law clerk with dishonesty convictions working in his brother's practice and representing that he was a fully qualified solicitor. The New South Wales cases of Seymour and Kekatos both involved disqualified former solicitors continuing to engage in legal practice.
911 Thus, I consider that, in order to decide whether, because of s.314(6) of the LPA, Orrong is "not entitled to recover" the amounts it seeks or "must repay any amount received" from VRL, it is necessary to look at the particular work for which the fees were charged, including how it was described in the relevant invoices.
912 The sub-section provides that an unqualified person is "not entitled to recover any amount in respect of anything done during the course of" (emphasis added) the contravention of the legislation, and that the amount in respect of which repayment must be made extends to payment of "any amount in respect of anything done during the course of" the contravention. In my opinion, an example of a fee charged for something done "during the course of" the contravention would be where an unqualified person has "engaged in legal practice" by purporting to represent a client in court and has charged a fee for the appearance plus the costs of a taxi to the court and photocopying charges. None of those three amounts would be recoverable or, if the account has been paid, all three amounts would have to be repaid. But if on the same day as the court appearance the person who purported to be a lawyer also drew some house plans for the same client and charged for that work, that fee would not be an amount "in respect of anything done during the course of" the contravention and the fee would be recoverable.
913 VRL conceded that Orrong's invoices did not specifically refer to the provision of legal advice. It submitted, however, that the evidence established that Mr Ziegler did significant legal work over a lengthy period of time involving taxation advice, briefing counsel, drafting agreements, settling agreements and advising on a raft of issues including documentation in relation to Projects Ballarat, Bendigo and Castlemaine, and that there could be no doubt that the invoices incorporated significant amounts for legal work. I reject that submission. The only legal work which I consider was done by Mr Ziegler whilst "engaging in legal practice" was briefing counsel and advising VRL "from time to time" on unspecified matters in circumstances giving rise to the claim for legal professional privilege made in the letter of 29 August 2002 signed by Mr Foo. Accordingly, I also reject the submission by VRL that the variety of descriptions of the work on Orrong's invoices were euphemisms for what was a retainer to do legal work.
914 The first claim by Orrong to consider is the two years of the 7.5% share of VRP's profits. In my opinion, it cannot be said that it has been proven that anything done by Mr Ziegler to earn this remuneration was done in contravention of s.314. In working on Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo Mr Ziegler was not "engaging in legal practice." He was attempting to set up a complicated financing structure which would enable the Group to raise large amounts of money on a limited recourse basis. Despite the lengthy cross-examination of Mr Ziegler about his role in those projects, it was never put to him that a particular task involved him in legal work or that he gave legal advice about a particular aspect of the projects. Further, even if, for example, from time to time during this period Mr Ziegler did contravene s.314 by briefing counsel when he did not hold the appropriate practising certificate, that does not mean that the work on Project Ballarat and Project Bendigo was "done during the course of that contravention."
915 The same applies, in my opinion, to the Roadshow Distributors Group's performance bonus claim, if it were otherwise recoverable by Orrong. Nothing done by Mr Ziegler in respect of that claim involved him in "engaging in legal practice."
916 Orrong's claim for the two unpaid "taxes saved" performance bonuses raise other issues. Although no invoices were rendered for the performance bonus in the 2001 and 2002 financial years, the wording of the invoices for the earlier years referred to "advice on tax issues." As previously discussed, I am not satisfied that this was a sufficiently clear indication that Mr Ziegler was "engaging in legal practice." He could well have been acting in his capacity as an accountant, without contravening s.251L of the ITAA. However, the scope of that section was considerably broadened by the amendment to its wording, with effect from 1 July 2000. Nevertheless, I still do not consider that the giving of advice about a range of tax matters contravened the current form of s.251L. In any event, even if I am wrong, there is still the point that there is no logical reason why it must be concluded that Mr Ziegler would breach the LPA in order not to breach the ITAA. The inference cannot be drawn. Moreover, as no cause of action for breach of the ITAA has been pleaded, if indeed Mr Ziegler was acting as an accountant in breach of the ITAA, then this does not assist VRL either to resist Orrong's claim or pursue its own counterclaim.
917 The same reasoning applies, in my opinion, to all of the other work done in raising finance, even though it might have been described on the relevant invoices as "advice on tax issues" associated with the particular type of finance raised. This is important when it comes to considering whether Orrong would be prevented by s.314 of the LPA from recovering the termination bonus, if it were otherwise found to be payable. I do not consider that it would be, because the reason it would be payable and the means of quantifying it would not be associated with "anything done during the course of" the occasional contravention.
918 What I have said so far deals with the question of VRL's recovery of the "taxes saved" performance bonuses and the "finance raised" performance bonuses. There remains the question of the retainer payments. Although it might be arguable that the legal work done by Mr Ziegler could have been charged for in these invoices, I do not reach this conclusion. In my opinion, the retainer amounts were payable by VRL whether or not Mr Ziegler briefed counsel or gave legal advice on some particular topic. It cannot therefore be said that there has been any charge by Orrong for anything constituting the occasional "engaging in legal practice" by Mr Ziegler. VRL was not correct, in my opinion, when it submitted that there was material showing charges were made for legal work.
919 This means that VRL's argument, based on authorities such as Watts v Rake[141] and Purkess v Crittendoen[142], that once VRL has established that there was some material showing charges were made for legal work the evidentiary onus shifted to Orrong to show how much of the amount charged was for non-legal work, is not relevant. Neither is the argument, based on authorities such as Blatch v Archer[143], Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd[144] and Tyco Australia Pty Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd[145], that a court assessing damages is entitled to draw inferences against a party who, although it had the capacity to offer proof, has by its actions made an accurate determination problematic.[146] Nor did I find the many authorities cited by VRL, relating to the topic of the proper approach to cases involving a difficulty of assessing damages in contractual claims, to be of assistance in considering the issue raised by s.314.
920 For all of the above reasons I have, therefore, concluded that VRL's argument based on s.314 of the LPA fails. That section does not prevent Orrong from recovering amounts to which it is otherwise entitled, nor does it require that any of the amounts totalling $5,979,511 be repaid to VRL as sought in its counterclaim.
Alternative Cash Claim
921 In paragraph 32 of the second further amended statement of claim filed on 18 November 2004 Orrong pleaded, as an alternative claim, that, if the 1997 Agreement and 2000 Agreement were found to be void, unenforceable or liable to be set aside, it was entitled under the 1995 Agreement, in part, to:
(a) a performance bonus of US$10 million or A$14,212,620, being 5% of the US$200 million of limited recourse finance raised by reason of the Project Ballarat transaction;
(b) a performance bonus of US$15 million or A$25,278,134, being 5% of the US$300 million of limited recourse finance raised by reason of the Project Bendigo transaction;
(c) a performance bonus of US$12.5 million or A$26,076,237 being 5% of the US$250 million of limited recourse finance raised by reason of the Project Castlemaine transaction; and
(d) a termination bonus of A$44,792,270 (calculated using the first two of the above alternative cash amounts and other performance bonuses received in the financial years ended 30 June 1998, 1999, and 2000).
These amounts totalled $110.359 million.
922 In paragraph 32 of the fifth further amended statement of claim filed on 15 April 2005 Orrong pleaded, as an alternative claim, using slightly difference exchange rate calculations that, if the 1997 Agreement and 2000 Agreement were found to be void, unenforceable or liable to be set aside, it was entitled under the 1995 Agreement, in part, to:
(a) a performance bonus of US$10 million or A$14,212,620, being 5% of the US$200 million of limited recourse finance raised by reason of the Project Ballarat transaction;
(b) a performance bonus of US$15 million or A$22,942,795, being 5% of the US$300 million of limited recourse finance raised by reason of the Project Bendigo transaction;
(c) a performance bonus of US$12.5 million or A$22,563,176, being 5% of the US$250 million of limited recourse finance raised by reason of the Project Castlemaine transaction; and
(d) a termination bonus of A$42,456,930 (calculated using the first two of the above alternative cash amounts and other performance bonuses received in the financial years ended 30 June 1998, 1999, and 2000).
These amounts totalled $102.176 million.
923 As has been seen, in its final submissions Orrong varied the amount of the termination bonus, calculated using the same alternative cash amounts, to $42.598 million. Thus, the final total alternative claim was $102.317 million.
924 It was common ground between the parties that on 8 September 1997 (or subsequently) Orrong agreed with VRL that Orrong would forego its claim to a 5% performance bonus in relation to the Project Ballarat transaction in exchange for a 5.25% interest in VRP, although there were disputes as to the precise nature of that interest and as to whether the new benefit was a performance bonus for the purposes of calculating a termination bonus. Similarly, it was common ground that by the letter of 21 June 2000 Orrong agreed with VRL that Orrong would forego its claim to a 5% performance bonus in relation to the Project Bendigo and Project Castlemaine transactions in exchange for an upfront payment of US$3 million plus a deferred payment of US$2 million together with a further 2.25% interest in VRP, although there was a dispute as to the precise nature of that interest.
925 In response to the various defences raised by VRL that neither the grant of the 5.25% interest nor the 2.25% interest in VRP was enforceable by Orrong, it was submitted by Orrong that it was nevertheless entitled to enforce its rights to receive a 5% performance bonus for each of the Project Ballarat, Project Bendigo and Project Castlemaine transactions under the provisions of the original 1995 Agreement.
926 In its written closing submissions, Orrong explained for the first time how this alternative cash claim was put. It submitted that these amounts were recoverable under causes of action such as "a total failure of consideration", "restitution", "unjust enrichment", "mistake" or something that was described as "directly equivalent to, or at least strongly analogous with, VRL having and receiving the sums otherwise payable for the 5% performance bonus" to the use of Orrong. Given the conclusion I reach below, it is unnecessary to examine the validity of the claim that these purported causes of action were open to Orrong.
927 Orrong submitted that it was not enough for VRL to establish some basis upon which Orrong was not entitled to receive the 7.5% interest in VRP to exclude any liability by VRL to pay the 5% performance bonuses otherwise due to Orrong on Projects Ballarat, Bendigo and Castlemaine. Orrong submitted that VRL would otherwise have to establish a change of position defence (which it submitted would be contradictory of its entire case challenging the validity and enforceability of Orrong's claimed 7.5% equity interest in VRP) to entitle it to retain the benefit of Orrong's promise to forego the 5% performance bonuses otherwise due to Orrong on those Projects. It submitted that there was simply no evidence of any material change of position by VRL.
928 Orrong further submitted that where a court was fashioning a remedy by way of restitution, it had a wide discretion to provide a remedy procuring substantial and practical justice in the circumstances. In such circumstances, the Court had the power, for instance in the present case, to uphold VRL's application to set aside the grant of a 7.5% equity interest in VRP to Orrong on the express condition that VRL otherwise pay to Orrong the sum representing the value of the 5% performance bonus otherwise payable by it for Projects Ballarat, Bendigo and Castlemaine.
929 VRL repeated its earlier submissions that Orrong had never pleaded or explained how the alternative claims were said to arise. It submitted that none of the causes of action relied upon in Orrong's closing submissions were pleaded. Orrong had amended its statement of claim several times, but had not sought to introduce any of these causes of action. VRL submitted that if Orrong had done so, it would have been required to plead the material facts upon which it relied in relation to each cause of action, and VRL would have been able to plead its case. Evidence would have been necessary in relation to the material facts. None of this occurred, and this was a direct result of Orrong's failure to plead these causes of action.
930 In any event, VRL submitted that the alternative cash claim could not succeed. It submitted that it was clear on the evidence that Orrong was never going to receive the claimed cash bonuses. VRL had refused to proceed with Project Ballarat while Mr Ziegler maintained his claim for a US$10 million performance bonus. That was why Mr Ziegler felt "bruised and battered." If Project Ballarat had been aborted, there would have been no Project Bendigo and no Project Castlemaine. Thus the alternative claims were based upon the completely false premise that these projects would have proceeded with Mr Ziegler being paid 5% performance bonuses. Further, VRL had in fact changed its position by entering into Project Ballarat after the US$10 million claim was abandoned.
931 In my opinion, the alternative cash claim must fail. Not only was it never properly pleaded by Orrong, it also would make nonsense of my earlier findings to allow Orrong to succeed on this alternative basis. I have already found that each of the 1995, 1997 and 2000 Agreements should have been approved by the shareholders and that because they were not, the Court should not enforce these Agreements. This conclusion applies with equal force to the performance bonuses payable under the 1995 Agreement now sought to be relied on by Orrong.
932 It is therefore unnecessary to resolve the further minor dispute between the parties concerning the amounts calculated by Orrong with respect to the alternative claims. VRL pleaded in its defence and counterclaim that the exchange rates applied by Orrong (being the Reserve Bank of Australia rates for the relevant dates) were incorrect. It said that the applicable exchange rate should be the commercial rates of exchange available for the conversion of United States dollars into Australian dollars at the relevant dates and referred to the telegraphic transfer rate of the Commonwealth Bank on the relevant dates. Orrong submitted that VRL had not provided any basis supporting the use of "the commercial rates of exchange" instead of the Reserve Bank of Australia rates. As the following table by VRL shows, use of one rate rather than another does not always favour the same party. Nevertheless, in the overall scheme of things, the difference is relatively small. The two rates of exchange resulted in the following calculations:
933 A further point concerning this alternative claim which it is unnecessary to examine would be whether credits would have to be allowed to VRL for payments already made to Orrong under the replacement benefits.
The Monetary Claims in VRL's Counterclaim
934 In its counterclaim VRL sought repayment by one or more of Orrong, Mr Ziegler and Remut of a variety of amounts based on a variety of grounds. As previously stated the figures changed during the course of the hearing. Further, as some of VRL's claims have already been rejected, I deal below only with those monetary claims of VRL which I consider remain outstanding.
The Corporations Legislation
935 VRL claimed that as a result of the breaches of the related party financial benefits provisions in the corporations legislation, the following payments should be repaid:
Performance bonus on $16 million Project Ballarat equity raising
936 It would appear that the number of payments claimed had been reduced in order to avoid any limitation issue. As can be seen, all six payments were made within the period of six years before the commencement of this proceeding on 23 September 2003. All of these payments were invoiced by, and made to, either the "Remuneration Unit Trust" or "Remut Pty Ltd as trustee for the Remuneration Unit Trust." They can all be treated as payments to Remut. However, the three largest of the above payments, totalling $11,407,912.48, were made not by VRL but by Village Roadshow Production Limited, according to Ms Raffe's schedule.
937 I have already concluded that the entry by Orrong into the 1995 and 1997 Agreements without shareholder approval contravened s.243H of the Corporations Law 1995-1999. The first question is whether the payment of the performance bonus of $601,504 on 15 September 1998 in respect of the $16 million Project Ballarat equity raising pursuant to the terms of the 1995 Agreement is recoverable by VRL. The next question is whether the payment of the profit shares of $612,937 and $1,137,038 on 10 December 1998 and 22 October 1999 respectively pursuant to the terms of the 1997 Agreement, or the 1995 Agreement as varied by the 1997 Agreement, is recoverable by VRL.
938 Section 243ZE of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 relevantly provided:
"(1) This section applies if:
(a) a related party of a public company receives a financial benefit from the public company, or from a child entity of the public company; and
(b) the public company contravenes subsection 243H(1), or the child entity contravenes subsection 243H(2), by giving the benefit.
(2) The related party contravenes this subsection.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a person contravenes this subsection if the person:
(a) is involved (as defined in section 79) in; or
(b) is by act or omission, directly or indirectly, recklessly concerned in, or party to;
the contravention of subsection 243H(1) or (2), of the contravention of subsection (2) of this section.
(4) Neither the public company nor the child entity:
(a) is guilty of an offence because of contravention of subsection 243H(1) or (2);
...
(5) Subsection (2) and (3) are civil penalty provisions as defined by subsection 1317DA, so Part 9.4B provides for civil and criminal consequences of contravening, or of being involved in a contravention of, either of them.
(a) contravention of subsection (2);
...
it is a defence if it is proved that the person was unaware of a fact or circumstance essential to the contravention of subsection 243H(1) or (2) as the case requires."
"... a person is involved in a contravention if, and only if, the person:
(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention;
(b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention;
(c) has been in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or
(d) has conspired with others to effect the contravention."
"(1) Where a person contravenes a civil penalty provision in relation to a corporation, the corporation may recover from the person, as a debt due to the corporation:
(a) if that or another person has made a profit because of the act or omission constituting the contravention - an amount equal to the amount of that profit; and
(b) if the corporation has suffered loss or damage as a result of that act or omission - an amount equal to the amount of that loss or damage;
whether or not:
(a) the first-mentioned person has been convicted of an offence in relation to the contravention; or
(b) a civil penalty order has been made against the first mentioned person in relation to the contravention."
941 In my opinion, VRL can recover two of these three amounts from Mr Ziegler. As the related party, Mr Ziegler contravened s.243ZE(2), which by s.243ZE(5) is a civil penalty provision, and thus pursuant to s.1317HD(1)(a) VRL may recover from him the amount of the "profit" made by him or another person because of the failure to obtain shareholder approval. I consider that the amount of any payments made pursuant to the terms of the Agreements which have been held to be "unreasonable" or "uncommercial" is the amount of the "profit" made because of the failure to obtain shareholder approval. In this case, the contractual obligation was to make those payments to or, at the direction of, Orrong and thus it is Orrong which has made the profit. Further, it is irrelevant for this purpose that the payment of $1,137,038 was made not by VRL but by Village Roadshow Production on behalf of VRL.
942 Apart from one matter, VRL would therefore be able to recover these three amounts from Mr Ziegler. In my opinion, VRL cannot now recover the payment of $601,504 because that was made following the compromise of a dispute between VRL and Orrong about the latter's entitlement to any fee for the $16 million Project Ballarat equity raising. Therefore, VRL's claim for repayment of that amount cannot succeed under any circumstances.
943 Similarly, pursuant to s.1317HD(1)(b) VRL could recover from Mr Ziegler the amount of the "loss or damage" it suffered as a result of the failure to obtain shareholder approval. Again, payments made by VRL pursuant to the terms of the Agreements which have been held to be "unreasonable" or "uncommercial" is the amount of its "loss or damage". However, as the payment of $1,137,038 was not made by VRL it cannot be included in the calculation of the loss or damage. From VRL's point of view, this particular problem with the payment of $1,137,038 does not matter because it can be recovered under s.1317HD(1)(a), as discussed above.
944 In my opinion, VRL can also recover the amounts of $612,937 and $1,137,038 from Orrong and Remut. Each of them was "party" to the contravention of s.243H and thereby contravened s.243ZE(3), which by s.243ZE(5) is a civil penalty provision, and thus pursuant to s.1317HD(1)(a) VRL may recover from both Orrong and Remut the amount of Orrong's profit made by it because of the failure to obtain shareholder approval.
945 I turn then to the next three payments sought to be recovered by VRL. I have already concluded that the entry by Orrong into the 2000 Agreement without shareholder approval contravened s.208 of the Corporations Law 2000. The question is whether the payment of the profit share of $283,000 on 17 October 2000 and the payment of the performance bonuses of $5,055,627 and $5,215,247 on 5 July 2000 and 8 March 2001 respectively pursuant to the terms of the 2000 Agreement, or the 1995 Agreement as varied by the 1997 and 2000 Agreements, is recoverable by VRL.
946 I have previously quoted s.209 of the Corporations Law 2000 in full. It is sufficient here to repeat sub-section (2) which stated:
"(2) A person contravenes this sub-section if they are involved in a contravention of section 208 by a public company or entity."
The same definition of "involved" is again set out in s.79.
947 Section 1317E(1) stated that s.209(2) is a civil penalty provision. Section 1317H relevantly provided that:
"(1) A Court may order a person to compensate a corporation or registered scheme for damage suffered by the corporation or scheme if:
(a) the person has contravened a civil penalty provision in relation to the corporation or the scheme; and
(b) the damage resulted from the contravention.
(2) In determining the damage suffered by the corporation or scheme for the purposes of making a compensation order, include profits made by any person resulting from the contravention or the offence.
...
(5) A compensation order may be enforced as if it were a judgement of the Court."
948 In my opinion, VRL can recover two of these three amounts from Mr Ziegler, Orrong and Remut. Each of them was "party" to the contravention of s.208 and thereby contravened s.209(2), which by s.1317E(1) is a civil penalty provision, and thus pursuant to s.1317H(1) VRL may recover the "damage" suffered by it resulting from the failure to obtain shareholder approval and which "damage" , pursuant to s.1317(2), includes any "profits" made by Orrong resulting from the failure to obtain shareholder approval. The "profits" made by Orrong include payments made pursuant to the terms of the Agreements which have been held to be "reasonable" or "uncommercial". Again, it is irrelevant for this purpose that the payments of $5,055,627 and $5,215,247 were made not by VRL but by Village Roadshow Production on behalf of VRL.
949 The payment of $283,000 has previously been held by me to have been made in full and final settlement of a dispute over the method of calculating the profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 2000. Again, I therefore conclude that VRL's claim for repayment of that amount cannot succeed under any circumstances.
950 The result is, therefore, that VRL is entitled under its counterclaim to recover from each of Mr Ziegler, Orrong and Remut the sum of $12,020,849, being the total of the four amounts referred to above.
951 VRL also seeks in the alternative damages pursuant to s.1324 of the Corporations Law 1995-1999 and of the Corporations Law 2000. As the quantum of those damages could not exceed the above figure, and could possibly be substantially less, it is unnecessary to consider this claim further.
Unjust Enrichment
952 VRL claimed that it was entitled to claim back from Remut by way of unjust enrichment the following payments which, it alleged, were all made to Remut:
Performance bonus on $16 million Project Ballarat equity raising
953 I do not consider that VRL made out its claim for unjust enrichment against Remut in respect of these twelve amounts. They were paid to Remut on behalf of, and at the direction of, Orrong. Apart from the question of contravention of the corporations legislation, there is, in my opinion, no basis for VRL to recover these amounts from Orrong and therefore from Remut. I have already held that four of the last six of these payments can be recovered from Remut (and Orrong and Mr Ziegler) on this basis. I have also held that the remaining two payments cannot be recovered because each of them was made following a compromise of a dispute between Orrong and VRL about the entitlement. Whether or not the first six of these payments could have been recovered from Orrong and/or Remut as a result of the failure to obtain shareholder approval of the agreements between Orrong and VRL is a question I do not have to answer because VRL made it quite clear in its final submissions on this aspect of the counterclaim what repayments were sought in respect of which cause of action.
The Advance Payment
954 In case I am wrong about the effect of the corporations legislation and it is subsequently held that the 2000 Agreement is valid and enforceable, it is necessary to consider the remaining part of the counterclaim, namely VRL's claim to repayment of part of what it described as the "advance payment."
955 Pursuant to the 2000 Agreement, if there was an increase in the facility for what was now called Project Castlemaine, Orrong was entitled to a fee of 1%. In October 2000, VRL obtained a further US$250 million funding facility for the production division, which increased the limit of the facility from US$500 million to US$750 million. According to Mr Ziegler, although this transaction settled in October 2000, the conditions subsequent to the settlement were not satisfied until around December 2000. Mr Foo seemed to agree that there were issues still outstanding well after October 2000. By an invoice dated February 2001 from Remut, Orrong sought payment of a fee of US$2.5 million, plus GST of $250,000, for the raising of the extra US$250 million.
956 This apparently straightforward issue became the subject of some disputation because the parties disagreed about what amount the 1% was to be calculated on, which also involved the question of when the fee was payable. There was also the question of whether there was a US$2 million limit on the fee, as pleaded by VRL in its defence and counterclaim.
957 The further facts giving rise to the dispute were as follows. According to Mr Foo, in March 2000 Mr Ziegler telephoned him from Tokyo and said that he had made a "purchase commitment" and needed his fee in respect of the further US$250 million funding paid immediately. Mr Foo said that he told Mr Ziegler he was not entitled to the fee as the funds had not been drawn down at that stage. However, Mr Foo said to Mr Ziegler he would "prepay" the fee "on the basis that it could be repaid or deducted from other entitlements in the event that funds were not drawn down or if there were other problems with the facility requirements, such as the insurance." Mr Foo then sent Mr Ziegler a cheque for $5,215,247.49, being the equivalent of US$2.75 million attached to a memorandum dated 8 March 2001 in which Mr Foo stated:
"As discussed, the attached cheque is an advance against the payment you have requested until we sort out the issues with respect to when the fee is earned and billable; ie: drawdown and completion of all legalities and ancillary prerequisites in relation to the production deal."
The cheque, which was made payable to the "Remuneration Unit Trust", was banked into the Remut account.
958 Mr Ziegler agreed that, when he had not received a cheque for some days after sending the invoice, he telephoned Mr Foo from Tokyo. Mr Ziegler said that he disagreed strongly when Mr Foo said that the fee had not yet been earned. Mr Ziegler did not deny that he had made some substantial "purchase commitments" in the early part of 2001 and, indeed, in cross-examination he said that he "might" have told Mr Foo that, but he just could not "recall." Mr Ziegler agreed that Mr Foo said that he would treat the payment of the fee "as an advance." Mr Ziegler said that he could not recall whether he had a further conversation with Mr Foo after he received the memorandum and the cheque.
959 I accept Mr Foo's evidence that the US$2.75 million was paid "as an advance." That was what he said in his memorandum accompanying the cheque. If Mr Ziegler was not prepared to accept the payment on that basis then he should have returned the cheque and not banked it. However, that conclusion does not resolve the disputed issue about whether VRL is entitled to repayment of part of the advance payment. At the time the invoice was sent and the cheque was banked the amount owing under the facility was less than $500 million. (As at 31 December 2000, the amount owing was $264 million but by 31 March 2001 it had increased to $310 million.) It was not until the end of October 2001 that the amount owing under the facility increased above US$500 million, to US$530 million. In the end, only US$139,577,077 of the extended US$250 million facility was ever drawn down on the terms and conditions negotiated by Mr Ziegler.
960 In these circumstances, VRL submitted that neither Orrong nor Mr Ziegler accrued an entitlement to the full fee paid and that it or he had been paid US$1,104,229 more than its or his entitlement. Relying on what was said in paragraph 2 of Mr Foo's memorandum of 21 June 2000, VRL submitted that the 1% fee was only payable "upon the draw down of the facility" up to a maximum amount of US$2 million.
961 Orrong, on the other hand, submitted that paragraph 8 of Mr Foo's memorandum was also relevant to this issue. It was as follows:
"Loan facilities in relation to Bendigo type facilities up to and beyond the US$500-700m level would be at 1% and it was agreed that this would be on the facility increase as opposed to the rolling of the facility balance."
Thus, Orrong submitted that what the parties agreed was that Orrong would be entitled to a fee of 1% of the amount of any increase in the facility beyond US$500 million, regardless of the maximum sum actually drawn down or "the rolling of the facility balance", payable on the first draw down after the increased facility was finalised, whatever level that brought the actual sum then drawn down to be. Orrong further submitted that there was no cap of US$2 million on that fee.
962 I can deal with that last issue first. In my opinion, there was no limit of US$2 million on the fee in question. The US$2 million referred to in paragraph 2 of Mr Foo's memorandum of 21 June 2000 related to the "either/or" proposal. The US$2 million, being the unpaid balance of "the previously agreed up front US$5m fee", was to be paid either "upon completion" of the 40 pictures or as part of the fee of 1% on any increase in the facility "required to finish the 40 movies." But the US$2 million was not to be paid twice. This was not to say that the 1% fee would not be payable on any additional financing in excess of US$200 million. That is how I construe the parties' agreement on this issue. Certainly Mr Foo never seemed to consider that there was any such limit and his payment of the amount of US$2.5 million "in advance" is telling, in my opinion. If there had been an agreed maximum then there would not have been any question of paying more than US$2 million in advance.
963 I turn then to the other issues. In my opinion, what the parties agreed by paragraphs 2 and 8 of Mr Foo's memorandum of 21 June 2000 was that a fee of 1% of the amount of any increase in the facility beyond US$500 million was payable following the first draw down on the increased facility. I do not agree with VRL's submission that the fee was only payable in respect of the amount of the funding actually utilised by VRL. That is not said anywhere in Mr Foo's memorandum. The reference in Mr Foo's example to Orrong receiving "US$1m upon the draw down of the facility (now totalling US$600 m)" does not mean, in my opinion, that the funds have to be actually drawn down before that amount can be used in calculating the 1% fee. The reference to a draw down is to indicate when the fee is payable. That could be either the first draw down on the increased facility or the first draw down taking the amount owing over the old limit of US$500 million. I favour the former construction but it does not matter which is correct because by 31 October 2001 at the latest that event had occurred and the fee of US$2.5 million was therefore payable in full.
964 It follows from this conclusion that I do not accept the serious criticisms made of Mr Ziegler, contained in the detailed analysis by VRL of his evidence on this topic. VRL submitted that Mr Ziegler adopted three inconsistent positions on when the fee was payable - first, on the completion of the facility; secondly, after the draw down of some part of the additional US$250 million; and thirdly, after the first draw down under the increased facility, whether or not it took the amount owing over the previous limit of US$500 million.
965 Mr Ziegler was clearly not sure, and gave incorrect answers to questions about, how much was owing under the facility from time to time. But I consider that, accepting that he made an error in that respect, he nevertheless maintained throughout his evidence his position that the fee was payable on the first draw down under the increased facility, regardless of the amount then owing.
966 First, I do not accept VRL's submission that when Mr Ziegler said in his witness statement that he had sent the invoice in February 2001 "requesting payment of the agreed 1% fee on the US$250 million upsizing then just completed" he was asserting that the mere completion of the facility (irrespective of whether it had been drawn down or not) entitled him to a fee. (I note, however, that this was exactly what Mr Ziegler asserted in his memorandum to Mr Foo dated 19 October 2001.) Mr Ziegler was cross-examined over two days on this issue. On the first day Mr Ziegler said the following:
"This was the bonus as a result of the 21 June 2000 agreement I reached with Peter Foo, which was instead of 5% of the non/limited recourse finance raised, it was 1%. This was the up-sizing of the facility from [US]$500 million to [US]$750, 1% of US$250 million was US$2.5 million.
Now, we can go to the letter if we need to, but it was payable on the draw down, was it not?---Yes, it was.
Was this in anticipation of the draw down, was it?---No, the draw down had already happened.
Had it?---Yes, it had. The draw down of the facility.
...
And this is an invoice before the money had actually been drawn down isn't it?---No, the draw down, the fee for the facility was paid on draw down of the facility, there was only one facility, and that went from [US$]200 to [US$]500, [to US$]750, and upon the next draw down of that facility which happened prior to February 2001 I rendered my invoice because of the draw down on the facility.
Mr Ziegler, had 750,000 US been drawn down from the facility at this stage?---$750 million, no.
No. How much had in fact been drawn down from the facility at this point in time?---I can't recall, but it was in excess of $500 million.
So you rendered an invoice for the whole of the facility and only 750 million US?---I rendered an invoice for whole of the up-sizing of the facility, yes." (Emphasis added)
967 In my opinion, Mr Ziegler was here asserting that the fee was payable on the draw down of the facility. Although the evidence was not clear on this point, I see no reason not to accept Mr Ziegler's evidence that by February 2001 there had been a further draw down on the increased facility following its finalisation in October or December 2000. After all, the evidence does show that the amount owing increased by US$46 million between 31 December 2000 and 31 March 2001. What is clear is that Orrong did not render an invoice in October or December 2000, on completion of the facility.
968 Further, I do not consider that there was any contradiction of this position by Mr Ziegler in the other passage of cross-examination relied on by VRL, which was as follows:
"Now, at that particular juncture [February 2001] no money had physically been drawn down in respect of that extra $250 million, isn't that so?---I believe it had.
Well, you don't know that it had, do you?---I believe it had, that is why I rendered the invoice.
I suggest that is not the case at all, that you rendered the invoice because the facility had been put in place, isn't that so? That's so, isn't it?---No, I rendered the invoice because I thought the facility had been drawn down, and the precondition had been satisfied under the 21 June agreement.
And what do you mean by drawn down in that sentence?---As in there had been a subsequent draw of the facility after it had been upsized from 500 million to 750 million.
The whole 250 million?---So there had been a, sorry, not a drawdown of the whole 250 million, but there had been a drawdown of the facility which was now in total $750 million."
969 There is a further reason why I consider that Orrong was entitled to a fee of 1% of the amount of any increase in the facility beyond US$500 million, regardless of how much of the extra US$250 million was drawn down. Unless that was what was agreed, there was a very real possibility that disputes could occur about how much had actually been drawn down, as repayments were made and advances were drawn down from time to time. It seems to me that paragraph 8 of Mr Foo's memorandum was inserted to avoid this situation. Thus, the 1% fee was to be calculated "on the facility increase" and not "the rolling of the facility balance."
970 Thus, my conclusion is that VRL's claim to repayment US$1,104,229, being that part of the advance payment which Orrong was not entitled to, fails. It is therefore not necessary to go on to consider which, if any, of the numerous causes of action pleaded by VRL would have formed the legal basis for the recovery of the amount in question.
The Valuation of the Termination Bonus
971 Although I have held in the above reasons for judgment that no termination bonus was payable to Orrong on the expiration of the 1995 Agreement on 30 June 2001, and that even if such termination bonus was payable the Court would not enforce the contractual obligation because no shareholder approval of the 1995 Agreement, or of that particular payment to a related party, was ever obtained, it is appropriate to briefly consider the conflicting evidence about the value of the claimed termination bonus in case I am wrong in one or more of my conclusions.
972 The calculation of the amount of the termination bonus claimed by Orrong depends upon the value of the 5.25% ownership interest in VRP as at 31 October 1997 and the 2.25% ownership interest in VRP as at 31 December 1999. I note in passing that I have held that the financial year ended 30 June 1998 was not one of the "three preceding financial years" within the meaning of this term of the 1995 Agreement so that in any event the giving of the 5.25% ownership interest in VRP was not a performance bonus which should be taken into account. Nevertheless, the expert valuation evidence addressed the question of the respective values of Orrong's interest in VRP at the two dates referred to above.
973 Mr Paul Lom was the expert forensic accountant called by Orrong. In his report dated 24 February 2005, Mr Lom calculated that the value of VRP was:
(a) as at 31 October 1997 the amount of $501.7 million or $1,408.8 million, depending on whether VRL or VRP gearing was used, and
(b) as at 31 December 1999 the amount of $1,750 million or $5,515.9 million, again depending on which gearing was used.
974 Mr Lom then calculated that the value of Orrong's interest in VRP was:
(a) as at 31 October 1997 the amount of $26.34 million or $73.96 million, or after a 40% discount for minority interest/lack of marketability the amount of $15.8 million or $44.38 million, depending in both cases on which gearing was used, and
(b) as at 31 December 1999 the amount of $39.37 million or $124.11 million, or after the 40% discount the amount of $23.63 million or $74.46 million, again depending in both cases on which gearing was used.
975 Mr Cullimore Gower was the expert accountant called by VRL. He was an impressive witness. In his report, Mr Gower calculated that the value of VRP was:
(a) as at 31 October 1997 the amount of $24.59 million, and
(b) as at 31 December 1999 the amount of $146.8 million.
After a 75% discount for minority interest/lack of marketability Mr Gower calculated that the value of Orrong's interest in VRP was:
(c) as at 31 October 1997 the amount of $0.32 million, and
(d) as at 31 December 1999 the amount of $0.83 million.
976 Both Mr Lom and Mr Gower used the discounted cash flow method of valuation. That is, they both sought to determine what future cashflows of VRP would have been reasonably forecast as at 31 October 1997 and 31 December 1999.
977 VRL made submissions extremely critical of Mr Lom's independence. First, it pointed out that it was clear from Mr Lom's evidence that his principal report did not reflect his opinion as to the value of VRP. When asked why he put forward the two different values depending on the gearing used, Mr Lom said that he was "instructed to adopt... two particular gearings which produced widely different results". He said that he had never stated in his report that it was his opinion that it was correct to use the VRP gearing. He considered that it produced "commercially nonsensical" results. Mr Lom conceded in cross-examination that this meant that he had breached the provisions in the Expert Witness Code of Conduct ("the Code") requiring him to state his opinion[148] and not to withhold from the Court matters of significance which the expert regarded as relevant.[149] VRL submitted that these matters also meant that Mr Lom had breached the Code by not assisting the Court impartially[150] and by acting as an advocate for Orrong.[151] Further, it submitted that he had not arrived at his opinion "independently" contrary to paragraph 11.2 of Practice Note No 4 of 2004 (Commercial List). VRL also submitted that this conduct breached paragraph 19 of APS11 - Statement of Forensic Accounting Standards published by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and CPA Australia, because Mr Lom's report omitted material information.
978 Secondly, VRL submitted that similar criticisms applied to Mr Lom's handling of the issue of the minority discount. In his report, Mr Lom stated that he had been instructed to value Orrong's interest on the basis that no minority discount applied and on the basis that a minority discount, of whatever size he considered appropriate, applied. This, he did. However, nowhere in the report did he state which of these alternative bases he considered to be correct. In cross-examination Mr Lom eventually conceded that he had not stated his opinion on this question, which was that a minority discount should be applied, and that he had known that his report was going to be used by Orrong to argue against a minority discount.
979 Thirdly, VRL submitted that Mr Lom's evidence was seriously compromised as a result of both his extensive contact with Mr Ziegler and the instructions he received from Mr Ziegler and his solicitor. Prior to Mr Lom finalising his principal report on 24 February 2005, he met with Mr Ziegler on at least 16 occasions, according to Mr Ziegler, or between 15 and 20 occasions, according to Mr Lom. In addition, Mr Lom said that he spoke with Mr Ziegler on the telephone on another 15 to 20 occasions.
980 VRL drew attention to the numerous differences between Mr Lom's first draft of his principal report dated 5 February 2005 ("draft 1(a)") and the final version. The changes to the inputs used by Mr Lom in his valuation of VRP as at 31 October 1997 included the surplus cash available to VRP; the corporate tax rate used in the calculation of the discount rate; the beta used in the calculation of the discount rate; the terminal value; and the net present value of VRP's projected future cash flows. The result was that Mr Lom's valuation of VRP as at 31 October 1997 increased from $227 million in draft 1(a) to $501.7 million or $1,408.8 million in his final report.
981 The changes to the inputs used by Mr Lom in his valuation of VRP as at 31 December 1999 included the corporate tax rate; the beta; the gearing (debt/equity) ratio used in calculating the discount rate; the weighted average cost of capital ("WACC"); the terminal value; and the net present value of VRP's projected future cash flows. The result was that Mr Lom's valuation of VRP as at 31 December 1999 increased from $1,136.6 million in draft 1(a) to $1,750 million or $5,515.9 million in his final report.
982 Mr Lom gave evidence that draft 1(a) was not a "draft" but a working document that did not record his opinion. He also said that although draft 1(a) was dated 5 February 2005, it incorporated changes made by him up until 17 February 2005. A copy of draft 1(a) was discussed with Mr Ziegler at a lengthy meeting on 18 February 2005. Mr Lom and Mr Ziegler also had lengthy meetings on 17, 23 and 24 February 2005. Mr Lom agreed that his addition of $80 million to the surplus cash available to VRP in his final 1997 valuation came about because of something Mr Ziegler told him "at some time between the two drafts."
983 VRL pointed out that Mr Lom's time records showed that between 25 October 2004 and 16 February 2005 Mr Lom had spent 125.3 hours on this matter. In the period between 17 and 24 February 2005 he spent a further 47.8 hours on it. VRL submitted that this meant that draft 1(a) was not an insignificant "working document" prepared prior to Mr Lom having properly considered his valuation. It said that draft 1(a) was not really a first draft.
984 In its response, Orrong pointed out that Mr Lom's reduction of the growth rate for terminal value, reduced the value; and that the changed corporate tax rate and beta were the same as those used by Mr Gower. It therefore submitted that these changes were non-controversial. It further submitted that experts are entitled to be informed about factual matters and that provided the facts and assumptions on which an expert's opinion was based were stated, and established by the evidence, it did not matter how the expert had been informed.
985 I agree with the general thrust of this submission. I also consider that experts should be entitled to think through the issues and change their mind without being castigated for giving into pressure from the client or lawyers. Nevertheless, the changes in the amount of the valuations are extraordinary. If this particular criticism stood alone I would be more prepared to accept Mr Lom's evidence that the earlier figures did not represent his opinion. But it does not stand alone.
986 In my opinion, the first two criticisms of Mr Lom's lack of independence are devastating. I do not understand how a person of Mr Lom's standing could have allowed his report to go forward without any qualification to, or expression of his opinion about, the values obtained using the VRP gearing. As it stood, the report was quite misleading and the true picture only emerged during cross-examination. Equally, I consider that Mr Lom was derelict in not stating in his report that it was his opinion that a minority interest/lack of marketability discount should be applied in valuing Orrong's interest. Once again, the true picture only emerged during cross-examination. My concerns about this situation are confirmed by Mr Lom's frank evidence that he "was very unhappy about the instructions at the time" and that he "seriously considered refusing to issue the report".
987 VRL also submitted that Mr Lom did not have the relevant expertise. Mr Lom acknowledged that he had no experience in valuing film cash flows or film production companies. He said that he raised this matter with Orrong's solicitor and was told that "there was sufficient material available" and that Mr Ziegler could provide the explanations needed to put him "in a position to complete the required valuation".
988 Mr Gower also said that he did not have the expertise to project the cash flows from films. He said that another expert was needed to perform the task of valuing the "Film Exploitation Business". Mr Gower confined his work to what he called the "Non Film Exploitation Business". In his report Mr Gower made a number of criticisms of Mr Lom's valuation. Mr Gower was particularly critical of the "fundamentally flawed" way in which Mr Lom had derived his valuations of VRP as at 31 December 1999. Further, he pointed out that at that date the value of VRL was approximately $1.25 billion based on the price of the ordinary and preferential shares quoted on the Australian Stock Exchange. Yet Mr Lom's valuation of VRP alone, which was only one of the five main divisions of VRL, was between $1.75 billion and $5.5 billion. These valuations of VRP therefore represented between 140% and 440% of the equity value of VRL itself. In my opinion, this important comparison casts doubt on the validity of Mr Lom's methodology.
989 Mr Roy Salter was the expert called by VRL to give evidence concerning the projected cash flows from the films acquired as a result of Projects Ballarat and Bendigo. His company, The Salter Group, LLC, was based in Los Angeles in the USA. It was described as an independent financial and strategic advisory firm which specialised in the entertainment and media industry. Mr Salter said that he had valued and advised on over 90 media and entertainment projects with an aggregate value in excess of US$8 billion. I accept that Mr Salter had the necessary qualifications and expertise to give evidence about the projected cash flows from the Ballarat and Bendigo films.
990 At the time of the hearing, Mr Leigh Butterworth was the senior business analyst for VRP and Mr Bryce Wolfe was the finance director of VRP. They prepared two computer models which calculated on a quarterly basis how much of the projected cash flows from the Ballarat and Bendigo films (as determined by Mr Salter) accrued to VRP. No challenge was made to the relevant qualifications and expertise of either Mr Butterworth or Mr Wolfe.
991 The result of the work by Messrs Salter, Butterworth and Wolfe was that Mr Gower placed a nil value on the Film Exploitation Business at both 31 October 1997 and 31 December 1999.
992 Before dealing with some of the more important individual issues, I note for completion that after taking into account a number of matters raised during the course of his evidence, Mr Lom put forward recalculated valuations. He valued VRP:
(a) as at 31 October 1997 in the amount of $495.28 million, and
(b) as at 31 December 1999 in the amount of $1,798 million.
It will be noted that these changes by Mr Lom resulted in a slight decrease in the valuation of VRP as at 31 October 1997 and a slight increase in the valuation of VRP as at 31 December 1999, using the VRL gearing. After the 40% minority interest/lack of marketability discount, Mr Lom valued Orrong's interest in VRP:
(c) as at 31 October 1997 in the amount of $15.6 million, and
(d) as at 31 December 1999 in the amount of $24.73 million.
993 In making their calculation of the value of VRP as at 31 October 1997, both Mr Lom and Mr Gower started with a March 1998 business plan. One of the importance differences between them was the upward adjustment made to these figures by Mr Lom in respect of the private investor income component of the projection. In the March 1998 projection, private investor income of US$10.2 million was forecast for the year ended 30 June 1998 and US$3.5 million for the following year. Thereafter, it was assumed that there would be no private investor income. Mr Lom assumed additional private investor income of US$6.5 million (on top of the existing projection of US$3.5 million) for the year ended 30 June 1999 and an additional US$10 million for each of the subsequent years. On the other hand, Mr Gower was instructed to assume that "by 31 December 1999 VRP had decided to cease activities generating private investor income" and that such activities had ceased in about June 1999.
994 Mr Lom said that based on the higher levels of private investor income (A$14.4 million and A$21.5 million for the years ended 30 June 1996 and 1997 respectively) and the advice to him by Mr Ziegler that there were as no plans by VRP to cease tax based financing activities, he decided on the above increases. He said that he told Mr Ziegler of the adjustment he proposed to make and that Mr Ziegler told him that it was not unreasonable. Orrong referred in its submissions to documents which it said supported Mr Lom's position, but I am doubtful if they do much more than confirm the reliability of the projections in the March 1998 business plan for the 1998 and 1999 financial years. Orrong also pointed out that private investor income in fact continued in 1999 and 2000 and possibly even 2001. In my opinion, Mr Ziegler's acceptance of Mr Lom's figure as "not unreasonable" does not square with his evidence about what Mr Kirby said to him back in 1995.
995 Both Ms Raffe and Mr Foo gave evidence which supported the instruction to Mr Gower that activities generating private investor income ceased in about June 1999. Ms Raffe said that only where there had been a commitment given prior to June 1999 did the activities continue after that time. Ms Raffe also referred to an email from her to Mr Ziegler and others dated 13 August 2000 which showed ongoing private investor income of only A$4 million. She said that the figure of A$4 million had been provided by Mr Ziegler.
996 In the circumstances, it seems to me that Mr Lom's adjustments to the private investor income figures were not justified, apart perhaps from the addition of something approaching the US$6.5 million figured for the 1999 financial year. Thereafter, there should been no adjustments, certainly not an addition of US$10 million per year.
997 Another importance difference between Mr Lom and Mr Gower was the rate of discount for the minority interest/lack of marketability. Both of them agreed that there should be a discount for such factors. Mr Gower said that they should be viewed separately, whereas Mr Lom considered that they overlapped. As I have said, Mr Lom's combined figure was 40% and Mr Gower's figure, which in the end he did not separate into the two components, was 75%.
998 Undoubtedly there would be difficulties for Orrong in attempting to sell its unusual interest in VRP. Both of the experts appropriately recognised this in their discussion of this question. As Mr Gower said in evidence in a difficult situation such as this it is a matter of "personal professional judgement". Although I have been very critical of Mr Lom's report I do respect his valuation expertise and I therefore pay due regard to his suggested discount rate of 40%. On the other hand, I have found it difficult to fault Mr Gower's evidence and I therefore pay due regard to his suggested rate of 75%. If I had been required to decide the value of the termination bonus I believe that I would have used a discount rate of 60%, as 75% seems just a little too high in all the circumstances.
999 The next importance difference between Mr Lom and Mr Gower was after tax WACC discount rate. Mr Gower calculated a rate of 15% in relation to the 31 October 1997 valuation and a rate of 12% for the 31 December 1999 valuation. Mr Lom's rates were 12.1% and 10.8% respectively. The main reason for this difference seemed to flow from their differing views at to whether VRP was a start up venture at 31 October 1997. Mr Gower gave persuasive evidence as to why he considered that the "new VRP" should be regarded as a start up venture. In my opinion, he correctly stated that:
"the Ballarat arrangements were not simply an 'upscaled' version of the old 'theatrical' business. It was a new business that radically transformed and reorganised substantially loss making existing business operations of VRP into a Los Angeles based business..."
Mr Lom's comments on this issued displayed, in my opinion, an inadequate understanding of the differences between the "old VRP" and the "new VRP". I am therefore satisfied that Mr Gower's discount rates are to be preferred.
1000 In making their calculations of the value of VRP as at 31 December 1999 Mr Gower and Mr Lom used different source documents. Mr Gower referred to a five year business plan projection dated 22 December 1999, which was circulated to members of the Executive Committee. The document was entitled "Group Five Year Financial Plan - Executive Summary - Most Likely Case". Mr Lom, on the other hand, used three projections prepared by VRL (a five year cash flow forecast, a five year profit and loss forecast and a five year balance sheet forecast).
1001 The provenance of the documents relied on by Mr Lom was unclear. Mr Ziegler believed that they were produced by VRL in April 2000 to be given to the Telemunchen Group and D G Bank. Ms Raffe said that she believed that the document was prepared in August 2000. She said that the underlying figures were prepared by staff under Mr Ziegler's co-ordination and that she performed the mechanical task of putting them into a profit and loss, balance sheet and cash flow format. What is clear about these documents is that Mr Lom did not know what assumptions underpinned the documents and whether or not they were reasonable. I consider that the reliability of a valuation produced in these circumstances must be doubtful. Thus, I would not be prepared to give any weight to Mr Lom's valuation of VRP as at 31 December 1999.
1002 Although criticisms were made of the December 1999 projection, I consider that the Mr Gower was correct in using it as his starting point rather than the undated three page document. A document dated 22 December 1999 is, of course, contemporaneous with the stated dated of 31 December 1999. A document produced in April 2000 is less relevant and even more so if it were not produced until August 2000.
1003 Before leaving the 31 December 1999 valuation, I must refer to the criticism made by Mr Gower of Mr Lom's method of deriving "annualised" VRP net profits for the year ending 30 June 2000. I agree that it was simply not correct to take the difference between the actual results for the six months to 31 December 1999 and the forecast twelve months to 30 June 2000 as representing the expected results for the six months to June 2000 and then doubling that figure in order to reflect annualised expected results. Mr Lom's calculation assumed that earnings were at consistent levels in each of the two six month periods. That was not correct, but if it were then the annualised figure could have been obtained simply by doubling the actual results for the first six months. Obviously, this error had the effect of overstating the maintainable earnings. However, as I have said, I am not relying in any way on Mr Lom's 1999 valuation.
1004 Thus, in deciding the value of the termination bonus, I would be prepared to accept Mr Gower's calculations in his valuation of the "Non Film Exploitation Business" of VRP as at both 31 October 1997 and 31 December 1999, except in respect of the minority discount rate and to a small extent the private investor income, as discussed above.
1005 In its final submissions, Orrong made a number of criticisms of the work of Messrs Salter, Butterworth and Wolfe both as to their overall methodology and particular issues. I do not accept any of these criticisms and, in the circumstances, I do not propose to extend this already lengthy judgement by discussing each of the issues. This is because even if I rejected the results obtained by Messrs Salter, Butterworth and Wolfe, that outcome would not assist Orrong because there is no other material before the Court which could be relied on in its place in respect of the valuation of VRP as at 31 December 1999. And as I have said previously, it is only the valuation of Orrong's 2.25% interest in VRP as at that date which would fall within the formula for calculating the termination bonus.
1006 It is therefore unnecessary to revive the issue of whether or not I should have allowed Mr Salter to rely on the whole of a further witness statement filed just before he gave evidence at the end of hearing, when Orrong was objecting because it raised matters which had not been put in cross-examination to earlier witnesses. Mr Salter's further evidence was attempting to meet a criticism of his use of the figure of 20 films in his calculations rather than a possibly higher number. But in the absence of any contradictory evidence, it was only speculation as to how a higher number of films would have altered the financial outcome.
Conclusion
1007 I have previously held that subject to issues such as the defences raised by VRL under the corporations legislation, the following amounts would be payable to Orrong:
(a) $927,750 for its 7.5% profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 2000;
(b) $1,996,650 for its 7.5% profit share for the financial year ended 30 June 2002;
(c) $275,395 for its "taxes saved" performance bonus for the financial year ended 30 June 2001; and
(d) $255,505 for its "taxes saved" performance bonus for the financial year ended 30 June 2002.
1008 However, I then concluded that the Court should refuse to enforce the claims made by Orrong because they arose out of Agreements entered into in contravention of the applicable related party financial benefit provisions. Further, I held that VRL was
1009 entitled under its counterclaim to recover from each of Mr Ziegler, Orrong and Remut the sum of $12,020,849. Because the Court is refusing to enforce Orrong's claims, it seems to me that no question of set-off arises.
1010 The question of the appropriate orders and declarations can, however, be deferred until the parties have had the opportunity to read and consider my reasons for judgment.
[1] Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298.
[2] [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
[3] [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-362
[4] [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170-171
[5] Adler v ASIC [2003] NSWCA 131; (2003) 179 FLR 1 at [146] per Giles JA. See also Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 49; (2003) 216 CLR 161 at [135]- [136] per Hayne J, with whom Gleeson CJ and McHugh J agreed; Whitlam v ASIC [2003] NSWCA 183; (2003) 57 NSWLR 559 at [117] per Hodgson, Ipp and Tobias JJA; ASIC v Plymin [2003] VSC 123; (2003) 175 FLR 124 at [363]- [367] per Mandie J; on appeal Elliott v ASIC [2004] VSCA 54; (2004) 10 VR 369 at [161] per Warren CJ, Charles JA and O'Bryan AJA.
[6] Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA 35; (2004) 218 CLR 451 at [22] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at [40] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.
[7] Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA 35; (2004) 218 CLR 451 at [22] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at [40] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.
[8] [1962] AC 600 at 620
[10] [1973] 2 All ER 104 at 106
[11] [1973] 2 All ER 104 at 107
[12] (1993) 49 IR 149 at 155
[14] (1996) 187 CLR 416
[15] (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 520
[17] (1997) 72 IR 464 at 472 per Lee, Marshall and North JJ
[19] (1998) 155 ALR 369 at 373 per Spender J and at 381 per von Doussa J. Marshall J dissented.
[21] (1967) 10 FLR 426 at 429 per Dunphy and Joske JJ.
[22] See Chitty on Contracts, 29th ed. para.39-164
[23] Newton Housing Trust v Alsulaimen [1998] UKHL 35; [1999] 1 AC 313 at 317 per Lord Hoffmann with whom Lords Goff, Lloyd, Hope and Saville agreed.
[25] [1914] 2 Ch 376 at 381
[26] (1961) 111 CLR 264 at 278
[27] [1965] HCA 20; (1965) 113 CLR 662
[28] [1965] HCA 20; (1965) 113 CLR 662 at 667
[29] [1965] HCA 20; (1965) 113 CLR 662 at 669-670
[31] [1985] 1 NSWLR 577 at 579-580
[32] [1848] EngR 67; (1848) 12 QB 960
[33] [1895] 2 QB 264 at 269
[34] [1965] HCA 20; (1965) 113 CLR 662 at 668
[35] Mackenzie v Coulson [1869] LR 8 Eq 368 at 375.
[36] Slee v Warke [1949] HCA 57; (1949) 86 CLR 271; Maralinga Pty Ltd v Major Enterprises Pty Ltd [1973] HCA 23; (1973) 128 CLR 336 at 349-350.
[37] Pukalis v Cameron [1982] HCA 63; (1982) 43 ALR 243 at 247 per Wilson J
[38] Other expressions used include: "strong irrefragable evidence" (Countess of Shelburne v Earl of Inchiguin [1784] EngR 38; (1784) 1 Bro CC 338 at 341); "something more than the highest degree of probability" and "evidence of the clearest and most satisfactory description" (Fowler v Fowler [1859] EngR 598; (1859) 4 De G & J 250 at 265).
[39] Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Peters [1960] HCA 16; (1960) 102 CLR 537; Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling and Freezing Co [1968] HCA 8; (1968) 118 CLR 429; Vroon BV v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd [1994] VicRp 53; (1994) 2 VR 32.
[40] [1994] VicRp 53; (1994) 2 VR 32 at 67-68
[41] (2000) VSCA 239 at [56] per Eames AJA, with whom Batt JA agreed. Callaway JA dissented.
[42] Toyota Motor Corp v Ken Morgan Motors [1994] VicRp 55; (1994) 2 VR 106, at 130, per Brooking J; see too York Air Conditioning and Refrigeration (A/Asia) Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1949] HCA 23; (1949) 80 CLR 11 at 26 per Williams J
[43] Scammell And Nephew Ltd v Ouston (1941) AC 251 at 268 per Lord Wright
[44] Thorby v Goldberg [1964] HCA 41; (1964) 112 CLR 597 at 605 per Kitto J
[45] Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling and Freezing Co Ltd [1968] HCA 8; (1968) 118 CLR 429 at 436 per Barwick CJ
[46] Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling and Freezing Co Ltd, at 436-437, per Barwick CJ; see too, at 441, per Menzies J
[47] Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52; (2001) 206 CLR 459 at [13] per Gleeson CJ.
[48] I & L Securities Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 41; (2002) 210 CLR 109 at [57] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
[49] "Preliminary Statement" (1) and Section 2.
[50] Section 3.
[51] Section 8(d).
[52] Preliminary Statements (1) and (2), and Sections 1 and 2.
[53] Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44 at [104] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. Each of Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ agreed with the joint judgment on this issue.
[54] Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44 at [107] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ.
[55] [2002] 56 NSWLR 512 at 529.
[56] (2002) 56 NSWLR 512 at 533
[57] [1991] 9 ACLC 1511 at 1524
[58] [2005] NSWSC 83; (2005) 52 ACSR 470 at [239]
[59] [1989] VicRp 72; [1989] VR 821
[60] [1980] Ch 138 at 144
[61] [1989] VicRp 72; [1989] VR 821 at 830.
[62] [1994] FCA 1117; (1991) 51 FCR 425.
[63] [1994] FCA 1117; (1991) 51 FCR 425 at 441.
[64] "Company Directors: Principles of Law and Corporate Governance". 2005. para 2.47.
[65] Dadeeton Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Taxation (2004) 88 SASR 109 at [28] per Debelle J, with whom Mullighan J agreed. Gray J dissented.
[66] [2005] NSWSC 83; (2005) 52 ACSR 470
[67] [1964] VicRp 27; [1964] VR 193 at 199
[68] [2005] NSWSC 83; (2005) 52 ACSR 470 at [250].
[69] Lincoln Mills (Aust) v Gough [1964] VicRp 27; [1964] VR 193 at 199 per Hudson J.
[70] (1988) 6 ACLC 271 at 275
[73] [2004] NSWCA 448; (2004) 213 ALR 574 at 640-641 per McColl JA, with whom Handley and Santow JJA agreed.
[74] [2004] NSWSC 411 at [567]
[76] [1990] HCA 58; (1990) 171 CLR 88 at 119.
[77] [1955] HCA 19; (1955) 91 CLR 512 at 519 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ.
[78] ibid.
[79] [1990] HCA 11; (1990) 169 CLR 279 at 285 per Mason CJ and Gaudron J.
[80] [1987] 75 ALR 287 at 291 per Beaumont, Wilcox and Burchett JJ.
[81] 6th ed., p.32
[82] 5th ed., p.100
[84] [1993] 26 ATR 327 at 349. See also Trustee of the Estate of the late AW Furse (No. 5) Will Trust v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1990] 21 ATR 1123 at 1132 per Hill J.
[85] [1990] 21 ATR 1123 at 1132
[87] [2005] VSC 201 at [201]- [226]
[88] Granby Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 129 ALR 503 at 506.
[89] [2005] VSC 201 at [223]- [226].
[90] [2003] NSWCA 131; (2003) 46 ACSR 504 at [285]. Mason P and Beazley JA agreed with Giles JA.
[91] (2005) NSWSC 267 at [455]- [458]
[92] [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
[93] ibid at [64]
[94] ibid at [85]
[95] [2002] FCAFC 157; (2002) 55 IPR 354 at [87].
[96] R v Palmer (1981) 1 NSWLR 209 at 214 per Glass JA.
[97] Naxakis v Western General Hospital [1999] HCA 22; (1999) 197 CLR 269 at [110] per Callinan J.
[98] Murphy v The Queen [1989] HCA 28; (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 110-111 per Mason CJ and Toohey J and at 126-127 per Deane J.
[99] R v Palmer (1981) 1 NSWLR 209 at 214 per Glass JA.
[100] [1775] EngR 58; (1775) 1 Cowp 341 at 343; [1775] EngR 58; 98 ER 1120 at 1121.
[101] [1978] HCA 42; (1978) 139 CLR 410.
[102] [1978] HCA 42; (1978) 139 CLR 410 at 423.
[103] [1978] HCA 42; (1978) 139 CLR 410 at 426-427.
[104] [1995] HCA 25; (1995) 184 CLR 538 at 594-595
[105] PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 643 at 654 per Giles J.
[107] [2001] NSWCA 427; (2001) 166 FLR 144
[108] [2001] NSWCA 427; (2001) 166 FLR 144 at [61]. Beazley JA and Davies AJA agreed with Giles JA
[109] [2001] NSWCA 427; (2001) 166 FLR 144 at [60] per Giles JA
[110] See s. 30 of the Limitations of Actions Act 1958
[111] (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 at 525
[112] (2003) 47 ACSR 418 at [29]
[113] (1991) 5 ACSR 115 at 198
[114] ibid at 196
[115] Re Wave Capital Ltd (2003) 47 ACSR 418 at [29] per French J
[116] See ss.5(1)(d) and 30 of the Limitations of Actions Act 1958.
[117] [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-362 per Dixon J
[118] (1999) NSWCA 288 at [19] per Giles JA, with whom Handley and Powell JJA agreed.
[119] The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Seymour (1999) NSWCA 117 at [19] per Fitzgerald JA, with whom Priestly and Stein JJA agreed.
[121] See, for example, Cornall v Nagle [1995] VicRp 50; [1995] 2 VR 188 at 193 per JD Phillips J and Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v Nagle [2005] VSC 35 at [15] per Gillard J.
[122] [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 67 ALJR 170
[123] [1998] 4 VR 324 at 352 per Kenny JA
[124] At p.40
[125] [1927] VicLawRp 57; [1927] VLR 394
[126] [1927] VicLawRp 57; [1927] VLR 394 at 397
[127] [1995] VicRp 50; [1995] 2 VR 188
[128] [1995] VicRp 50; [1995] 2 VR 188 at 210
[130] [1999] NSWCA 117 at [15]- [18]
[131] [1999] NSWCA 288 at [14]-[18]
[134] [2002] FCA 1252; (2002) 121 FCR 428
[135] [2002] FCA 1252; (2002) 121 FCR 428 at [94]
[137] Compare s.314(1) and (6) of the LPA with s.251L(1) and (5) of the ITAA.
[138] T.1697
[139] T.1694
[140] T.1717
[141] [1960] HCA 58; [1960] 108 CLR 158
[142] [1965] HCA 34; [1965] 114 CLR 164
[143] [1774] EngR 2; [1774] 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969
[144] [2004] HCA 3; [2004] 216 CLR 388; (2004) 78 ALJR 324
[146] Tyco Australia Pty Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 333 at [96] per Handley JA and at [264] per Hodgson JA
[147] According to VRL's final claim these figures added up to $16,725,371.
[148] See para 3 of Form 44A in the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005.
[149] Para 3(h) of the Code.
[150] Para 1 of the Code.
[151] Para 2 of the Code.
Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd
Village Roadshow Ltd [2007] VSC 1
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(1992) 67 ALJR 170
(2003) 179 FLR 1
(2003) 216 CLR 161
(2003) 57 NSWLR 559
(2003) 175 FLR 124
(2004) 10 VR 369
(2004) 218 CLR 451
(2004) 219 CLR 165
(1993) 49 IR 149
(1996) 187 CLR 416
(1997) 72 IR 464
(1998) 155 ALR 369
(1967) 10 FLR 426
(1961) 111 CLR 264
(1965) 113 CLR 662
(1949) 86 CLR 271
(1973) 128 CLR 336
(1982) 43 ALR 243
(1960) 102 CLR 537
(1968) 118 CLR 429
(1994) 2 VR 32
(1994) 2 VR 106
(1949) 80 CLR 11
(1964) 112 CLR 597
(2001) 206 CLR 459
(2002) 210 CLR 109
(2002) 56 NSWLR 512
(1991) 51 FCR 425
(2004) 88 SASR 109
(1983) 2 Qd R 508
(2004) 213 ALR 574
(1990) 171 CLR 88
(1955) 91 CLR 512
(1990) 169 CLR 279
(1995) 129 ALR 503
(2001) 52 NSWLR 705
(2002) 55 IPR 354
(1981) 1 NSWLR 209
(1999) 197 CLR 269
(1989) 167 CLR 94
(1978) 139 CLR 410
(1995) 184 CLR 538
(1992) 25 NSWLR 643
(2001) 166 FLR 144
(1995) 37 NSWLR 438
(2002) 121 FCR 428
(2004) 78 ALJR 324