Orr v Burgess Earthmoving Pty Ltd

Hamiltons Blasting Services

1. Prior to 10 April 2018 Burgess engaged Hamiltons Blasting Services Pty Ltd ("Hamiltons") to provide blasting services at both the Quarry and Kapooka Quarry.
2. Hamiltons is a registered corporation which operates as a blasting service provider. Mr David Steven Hamilton was a Director. Mr Hamilton was the sole shotfirer with Hamiltons and was responsible for work health and safety. He held a Blasting Explosive Users Licence to use, possess and dispose of explosives and a NSW Security Clearance to handle explosives and secure sensitive dangerous substances.

Blasting Operation on 10 April 2018

1. In March 2018 Burgess engaged Hamiltons to conduct a blast at the Quarry on 10 April 2018.
2. Burgess requested: 1. A small toe shot to break up oversize rocks on the Quarry floor, beneath the face of the proposed blast area ("Toe Shot"). 2. A larger overburden blast along a large bench in the south-western area of the Quarry ("Blast").
3. While Burgess retained responsibility for mining operations at the Quarry, because of the lack of experience and expertise of Mr Judd in drilling and blasting operations, heavy reliance was placed by him on Mr Hamilton's competence and experience in his capacity as a specialist contractor.
4. Hamiltons engaged a subcontractor, Edge Drilling (also known as Edge Drill & Blast), to drill the blast holes at the Quarry in accordance with the instructions and Blast Details provided by Hamiltons.
5. In March 2018 Mr Hamilton requested that Orica supply 20,000kg of the bulk explosive product known as "Centra Gold" with a density of 1.2 g/cm³. Centra Gold is an Orica explosive product that consists of more than 60% ammonium nitrate.

The Morning of the Incident

1. Between 6.30am and 7.00am on 10 April 2018, Mr Judd conducted a morning toolbox meeting for Burgess employees at the weighbridge in the north-east of the Quarry. The attendees included all Burgess employees on site that day including Mr Power, Mr Ragobert, Mr Brown, Mr Darby and Mr Newman. The purpose of the meeting included allocating employees with their work for the day.
2. At this meeting the fact that a blast would occur that day was discussed. However there was no discussion about the details of the Blast, any exclusion zones, the firing location, the risks associated with blasting or any documents in relation to the Blast.
3. Mr Judd told Mr Power and Mr Ragobert to assist Mr Hamilton to load and stem the blast holes. Neither Mr Power nor Mr Ragobert had been trained in any blasting-related work and neither were informed of the risks of explosives such as the under-stemming or overloading of explosives.
4. The remaining workers were told to perform their usual duties such as operating a loader or a bulldozer. No-one was told by Mr Judd to perform duties as a sentry for the Blast.

Blast Hole Loading

1. At 7.00am on 10 April 2018, Mr Hamilton arrived at the Quarry. Mr Hamilton met with Mr Power and Mr Ragobert. Mr Hamilton had never previously met or worked with either Mr Power or Mr Ragobert.
2. At 7.00am, three workers from Orica, Andrew Williams, Lee McIntyre and John Cramp, arrived at the Quarry to supply and load explosives into the blast holes in accordance with Mr Hamilton's instructions. The Orica workers attended a pre-load toolbox talk conducted by Mr Hamilton. No Quarry employees attended the toolbox talk.

Blast Hole Stemming

1. Once the blast holes were loaded with explosives, Mr Power and Mr Ragobert assisted Mr Hamilton with stemming the blast holes and inserting detonators in the blast holes. Mr Judd was not involved in this work and did not provide any supervision.
2. Mr Power and Mr Ragobert then rolled out two lead-in lines from the two initiation holes for the Toe Shot and the Blast to the firing location identified by Mr Hamilton.

Selection of Firing Location

1. The firing location is the location from which a shotfirer initiates the blasting/firing sequence for a blast. Mr Hamilton chose a firing location in front of the Blast area so that he had good visibility of the Toe Shot. Mr Hamilton did not measure the distance between the Blast and the firing location.

Members of the Public

1. At 2.00pm on 10 April 2018 Mr Judd's partner, Ms Bronwyn Singleton, arrived at the Quarry in a red Nissan Patrol ("Red Patrol") with Ms Vicki Stiler, Mr John Stiler and Ms Lesley Binding (together referred to as "the four public observers").
2. The four public observers attended the Quarry because Ms Singleton was delivering some office items she picked up in Albury at the request Mr Judd. They were not aware of any proposed blasting at the time they arrived at the Quarry.
3. The four public observers in the Red Patrol met Mr Judd at the weighbridge. Mr Judd informed them of the proposed blasts. After obtaining Mr Hamilton's consent, Mr Judd then permitted the four public observers to stay to watch the Blast.
4. The four public observers were not wearing any personal protective equipment such as a hard hat, hi-visibility clothing, or steel-cap boots (other than Ms Singleton wearing safety boots).
5. Visitors to the Quarry are required to sign-in at the weighbridge and undertake a site induction. The four public observers did not sign any visitors' book or have their attendance recorded.
6. Mr Judd and the four public observers then drove into the Quarry to the pad where Mr Hamilton was preparing for the firing of the Blast, south of the crushing plant. The Red Patrol was parked next to Mr Hamilton's grey Volkswagen Amarok ("Grey Amarok") on the pad.
7. At 2.00pm on 10 April 2018 Mr Bryce Davies, a truck driver with Abbott Constructions, arrived at the Quarry in a truck to load gravel. Mr Davies drove through the weighbridge without stopping and drove to the loading area (north-west of the crushing plant) where Mr Newman was operating a loader.
8. Mr Newman said to Mr Davies that the blasting was to soon take place and that he (Mr Newman) wanted to watch the Blast. Mr Davies expressed an interest in also watching the Blast. Mr Newman and Mr Davies then walked up to the pad to watch the Blast.
9. At 2.15pm Mr Darby returned to the Quarry after going into town to pick up parts. Mr Darby was driving a white Nissan Navara ("White Navara"). When Mr Darby returned, he observed that a group of people were located on top of the pad south of the crushing plant including Mr Davies, Mr Newman, Mr Power, Mr Ragobert, Mr Judd, Ms Singleton and Mr Hamilton. Mr Darby drove the White Navara to the pad.

Pre-Blast Briefing

1. Shortly prior to the Blast, Mr Hamilton conducted a pre-blast briefing near the firing location with some of those present including the four public observers. Immediately following the pre-blast briefing at 2.30pm: 1. Mr Davies, Mr Darby and Mr Newman were standing in a location between the Blast area and the proposed firing location, adjacent to an excavator and 275 metres from the Blast area (together referred to as "Group 1"). 2. Mr Hamilton, Mr Judd, Mr Brown, Mr Ragobert, and the four public observers were standing within 10 metres of three vehicles (the Red Patrol, White Navara and Grey Amarok) and 320 metres from the Blast area (together referred to as "Group 2"). 3. Mr Power climbed onto the roof of a nearby CAT excavator parked to the east of the three light vehicles.
2. Mr Hamilton was standing with Group 2. This was the firing location. However, Mr Hamilton had intended for the firing location to be approximately 10 to 30 metres further east at the back of the pad.
3. A diagram indicating the location of Group 1, Group 2, the Blast area, the intended firing location and the weighbridge at the Quarry is depicted below:
4. Mr Judd asked Mr Hamilton if the location where persons were standing to observe the Blast was a safe location and Mr Hamilton confirmed that it was. Mr Ragobert also asked Mr Hamilton if the location was safe and Mr Hamilton confirmed that it was.
5. Shortly prior to the Blast Mr Darby said to Mr Davies and Mr Newman words to the effect of "We're not meant to be here. Rocks have hit that hill beside us [on a previous blast]". Mr Darby made that comment because the Blast face was east-facing and he had previously observed flyrock hit the water in the direction of the location where people were standing, and occasionally clear the water.

The Incident

1. Immediately prior to the Toe Shot, Mr Hamilton sounded a warning siren from his Grey Amarok. In order to sound the siren, the bonnet on the Grey Amarok was raised.
2. At 2.30pm Mr Hamilton initiated the firing sequence for the Toe Shot. Some of the rock from the Toe Shot was ejected a considerable distance into the air and landed in the dam, but it did not reach the location of Group 1 or Group 2.
3. At 2.32pm Mr Hamilton said "Alright, ok, is everyone ready? Alright. 1. 2. 3. Firing". Mr Hamilton then initiated the firing sequence for the Blast.
4. The Blast projected rocks into the air and towards Group 1 and Group 2. The majority of projected rock landed in the dam located between the Blast area and the firing location. However, approximately 5 to 10 rocks were ejected with sufficient force to clear the dam and fall around Group 1 and Group 2.
5. Members of Group 1 and Group 2 took evasive action including to move out of the path of the flyrock and to shelter in and behind the excavators.
6. Mr Newman observed rock pass over him.
7. Mr Power, who was standing on the roof of the CAT excavator at the time of the Blast, observed flyrock heading towards him, and jumped down off the excavator.
8. Mr Ragobert heard Mr Power shout "Incoming!" and looked up to see a rock heading towards him. Mr Ragobert ducked down and covered his head.
9. Mr Hamilton video recorded both the Toe Shot and the Blast.
10. As a result of the Blast: 1. A rock hit the bullbar of the Grey Amarok, knocked its raised bonnet off its mounts and then part of that rock (estimated to measure approximately 400mm x 200mm x 200mm) went through the windscreen and landed on the driver's seat. 2. A rock ricocheted into and broke the rear right window of the Red Patrol. 3. A rock bounced off the roof of the Red Patrol damaging its roof and roof racks. 4. A rock ricocheted into and smashed the windscreen of the White Navara. 5. A rock hit the CAT's excavator's air-cleaner. 6. A rock passed within several inches of Mr Power's head, then hit the boom of the CAT excavator and cracked a hydraulic pipe.

Injuries

1. As a result of the Blast, Mr Power suffered symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and has been treated by mental health professionals.

Systems of Work Before the Incident

1. Conventional drilling and blasting operations were conducted at the Quarry to extract granite-based materials for the production of aggregate, rock and road base. Drilling and blasting was conducted at the Quarry about every four to six months.

Safety Management Plan

1. In November 2017, Burgess engaged an external consultant, Mr Craig Tickner of Safety Compliance Resources, to develop a new mine safety management plan for both the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry.
2. Mr Tickner carried out a number of formal risk assessments for both the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry, including the "Burgess Quarries Site Risk Assessment - Broadbrush Risk Assessment" dated 5 December 2017.
3. In relation to explosives, this assessment identified the hazard of flyrock and the potential risk of fatality, burns, broken limbs, skin tissue damage, crush injury, musculoskeletal injury, psychological disorders, environmental impact, noise pollution and damage to equipment.
4. On 1 February 2018 Burgess implemented a new safety management system for the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry ("New SMS") that had been developed by Mr Tickner. The New SMS replaced the Quarry's previous "Safety Management Plan Albury Quarry Reviewed November 2013" dated 13 June 2014.
5. The New SMS included: 1. Mine Safety Management Plan dated 1 February 2018. 2. Explosives Management Plan dated 1 February 2018. 3. Contractor Management Plan dated 1 February 2018.
6. The purpose of the Explosives Management Plan was to provide the framework for controlling and managing the safety of explosives and blasting activities undertaken at the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry.
7. The Explosives Management Plan provided that: 1. The shotfirer must make all decisions on all matters relating to site safety during a blast and their decisions are final. 2. Any breach of exclusion zone perimeters during a blast process must cause the process to be aborted immediately by the transmission of the words "Abort, Abort, Abort" over the UHF radio. 3. Red flags and signage must be located at each end of the blast area. 4. Personnel not involved in the loading and preparation of the explosives area must be excluded from the area unless approved by the shotfirer. 5. The Quarry is to be cleared of personnel and plant prior to blasting. 6. Blast sentries must be utilised and briefed prior to taking up their positions. 7. Site clearance and readiness for blasting must be confirmed prior to the hand-over of the blasting zone from the Quarry's or Kapooka Quarry's Production Manager to the explosives contractor's shotfirer. 8. Blast sentries must block their positions, confirm that they are in position and confirm that their area is secured.
8. The Contractor Management Plan required that all contractors "formally comply with the Albury/Wagga Quarries SMS or provide a copy of their Safety Management System". The Contractor Management Plan also provided that: 1. The "Production Manager" was responsible for, among other things, reviewing the contractor's Safety Management System to ensure suitability and compliance, participating in incident investigations where required, and conducting regular safety observations. 2. The "Supervisor" was responsible for, among other things, promoting and conducting hazard identification and reporting and providing safety and environment information as required.

Supervision

1. Mr Judd replaced Mr Dale Burgess as Quarry Manager on 8 November 2017 after a period of 12 months working away from the Quarry. As the Quarry Manager, Mr Judd was responsible for the day to day operations of the Quarry and reported to Mr Russell Burgess.
2. Although Mr Judd had been present at the Quarry when blasting activities had occurred under the supervision of Mr Dale Burgess, he had no previous experience in supervising blasting activities and Mr Russell Burgess did not conduct an adequate assessment of the competence of Mr Judd to perform the role of Quarry Manager. Mr Judd did not participate in any handover with Mr Dale Burgess in relation to the role of Quarry Manager and Mr Judd was not provided with any instruction in relation to his role as a Quarry Manager.
3. The role held by Mr Judd as Quarry Manager was a "statutory function" under the Work Health and Safety (Mines and Petroleum Sites) Regulation 2014 (NSW) ("WHSMPS Regulation") that could only be exercised at the Quarry by an individual: 1. Who was nominated to exercise that function by the mine operator, Burgess. 2. Who met certain requirements for nomination specified in Sch 10 of the WHSMPS Regulation.
4. One of the requirements of Sch 10 of the WHSMPS Regulation was that the individual hold a current Practising Certificate authorising the exercise of the statutory function of Quarry Manager.
5. As at the date of the incident, Mr Judd: 1. Did not hold a current Practising Certificate to be a Quarry Manager. 2. Did not possess the necessary qualifications or experience to fulfil the role of Quarry Manager or obtain a Practising Certificate for that role. 3. Lacked the competence necessary to manage the Quarry.
6. On 2 November 2017 Mr Russell Burgess called Senior Mine Safety Officer Ron Dillon ("SMSO Dillon") to enquire about nominating a new Quarry Manager for the Quarry. Later that day SMSO Dillon emailed Mr Russell Burgess stating that the Quarry must nominate a person who is competent to supervise the Quarry and attached an internet link to a document titled "Form - Quarry Manager Class Exemption - Notification that nominee is a competent person" ("Exemption Form").
7. On 11 December 2017 Mr Russell Burgess emailed a completed Exemption Form to SMSO Dillon seeking an exemption under cl 185 of the WHSMPS Regulation to allow Mr Judd to perform the role of Quarry Manager despite not having the necessary qualifications. SMSO Dillon forwarded the Exemption Form to the designated email address. However, the application for an exemption was not processed or approved by the regulator as defined in the WHSMPS Regulation.
8. The exemption sought by Burgess on 11 December 2017, if granted, could only have been granted for a period not exceeding two months.
9. Between 1 November 2017 and the incident, Burgess did not: 1. Notify the regulator that Mr Judd had commenced acting in the role of Quarry Manager. 2. Apply for Mr Judd to be granted a Practising Certificate entitling him to perform a statutory function under the WHSMPS Regulation such as a production or Quarry Manager permit.
10. Mr Judd understood his role was "mainly production and telling the boys what to do", as well as organising trucks and sales at the Quarry. Mr Judd was not aware that his title was "Quarry Manager" but was aware that he was responsible for supervising mining operations at the Quarry.
11. Mr Judd, Mr Warnes and Mr Tickner participated in at least two days of workshops where the procedures that comprised the New SMS were developed. A copy of the New SMS was available at the Quarry prior to the incident. However, no assessment was done of Mr Judd's understanding of the New SMS and Mr Judd did not access the New SMS that included the Mine Safety Management Plan, Explosives Management Plan or any SWMS prior to the incident. Mr Judd first saw the finalised Explosives Management Plan after the incident.

Training of Employees

1. Mr Judd received Quarry Induction Training on 5 May 2016.
2. Other than to the extent that Mr Judd participated in the development of the New SMS, Mr Judd was not provided with any formal training in relation to: 1. His employment at the Quarry. 2. Safety management systems at the Quarry. 3. How to manage blasting activities at the Quarry. 4. The establishment of exclusion zones when blasting at the Quarry. 5. Selecting suitable firing locations for blasting at the quarry.
3. Mr Judd was provided a laptop computer or tablet ("the computer") at the time that he commenced the role of Quarry Manager. The computer had safety system documentation on it, however, Mr Judd was not given any instructions in relation to its use nor was he told that the computer had safety system documentation. Mr Judd was given a USB that contained a copy of the Mine Safety Management Plan.
4. Mr Judd was never asked to familiarise himself with the contents of the computer and Mr Judd never reviewed any of Burgess' SWMSs for the Quarry between 1 November 2017 and 10 April 2018.
5. Mr Judd was responsible for providing training to other Burgess employees at the Quarry. However, Mr Judd was not provided any training or other support by Burgess to ensure that the Burgess employees at the Quarry were adequately trained.
6. Between 1 November 2017 and the incident, Burgess and Mr Judd did not: 1. Provide workers with copies of any relevant policies, procedures or management plans, or show workers where any relevant policies, procedures or management plans could be accessed. 2. Provide workers with any formal training or instructions in relation to explosives, blasting or firing locations. He did not inform or instruct Mr Ragobert or Mr Power in relation to the risks associated with drilling and blasting activities and did not provide them with the Explosives Management Plan. 3. Provide workers with a copy of the documents that formed the New SMS or provide training to workers in relation to the New SMS.
7. Prior to the incident a number of Burgess' employees, including Mr Power and Mr Darby, had not seen, or been trained, in the Explosives Management Plan. However, both Mr Darby and Mr Power were aware of the practice at the Quarry when blasts were undertaken while Mr Dale Burgess was Quarry Manager. The practice required personnel to be stationed at the front or rear gate or weighbridge.
8. No suitably competent person from Burgess attended the Quarry for the blasting on 10 April 2018.

Managing the Risk of Flyrock - Industry Standards

1. By cl 31(2)(b) of the WHSMPS Regulation Burgess was required to ensure that any dealing with an explosive or explosive precursors at the Quarry was in compliance with the Explosives Act 2003 (NSW) and Australian Standard AS 2187.2 2006 "Explosives - Storage, transport and use" ("Explosives Standard").
2. Part 2, Appendix E of the Explosives Standard outlines the risks associated with flyrock. Flyrock is defined in the Explosives Standard as "The undesirable projection of rock as a result of a blast".
3. Part 2, Appendix E, Section E1 of the Explosives Standard states: "Because the potential for severe injury or property damage exists, precautions against flyrock and fly should be foremost in the mind of any shotfirer."
4. Part 2, Appendix L of the Explosives Standard provides information regarding the requirement to establish exclusion zones for blasting operations. It includes the following guidance: 1. All blasts require the establishment of an exclusion zone or evacuation zone prior to firing the shot. 2. The size of the exclusion zone shall be such that all fly and associated debris is contained within the zone. 3. An exclusion zone can comprise an inner zone. The inner zone shall be identified by being cordoned off with flagging tape, flags, hazard blast cones, berms, signage or other suitable means visible at all times to restrict unauthorized entry. 4. The requirements for an exclusion zone shall be a component of the blast management plan. 5. The shotfirer and authorised persons may remain in the exclusion zone, at a predetermined location during firing. Final approval for persons to observe or monitor the shot from within an exclusion zone remains with the shotfirer, who should not be subject to any external pressure. 6. It is important that control is established and maintained at all levels of the project and the blasting should not be promoted as a public display.
5. The Explosives Standard also requires that an "overall blast management plan" be prepared in accordance with Appendix A of the Explosives Standard and prescribes blast design content for that blast management plan.

Hamiltons' Operations at the Quarry

1. In November 2016 Burgess conducted an Assessment of Contractors Safety Management in respect of Hamiltons which included a review of a Blast Management Plan for a blast on 10 November 2016 and four SWMSs. The Blast Management Plan is a template document the contents of which are tailored to each blast. A similar Blast Management Plan was completed by Mr Hamilton for each blast.
2. On 12 December 2016, when Hamiltons first started conducting blasting services for Burgess, Mr Russell Burgess and Mr Hamilton discussed blasting at the Quarry. In the course of those discussions Mr Russell Burgess told Mr Hamilton, among other things, that: 1. The exclusion zone for blasting was bounded by the double gates at the Quarry perimeter. 2. The firing location was to be 300m to 400m and "back of the shot".
3. Mr Russell Burgess' reference to "back of the shot" was a reference to the fact that blasts are directional and a shotfirer should position themselves at a firing location that is behind the direction of a blast, rather than in front of it.
4. While on site at the Quarry, Hamiltons was required to operate under Burgess' New SMS. However, Hamiltons had not been provided with a copy of the New SMS.
5. On the occasions that Hamiltons provided blasting services at the Quarry prior to the incident: 1. Mr Hamilton was responsible for managing the blasting including loading and firing a blast. 2. Mr Hamilton had established an exclusion zone around a blast area bounded by the weighbridge and front and rear gates of the Quarry (at the south-east and north-west edges of the Quarry). 3. Sentries were placed at the front gate and the back gate to stop people from entering the Quarry during a blast. 4. Workers not involved in a blast or acting as a sentry would be located at the weighbridge, the farmhouse at the Quarry or behind a blast. 5. The firing location would be: 1. near the weighbridge at the Quarry; 2. near the shed at the Quarry (on the corner of Sawyer Road and Hulme Lane); 3. north-west of the blast on Sawyer Road; or 4. the back (eastern) edge of the pad south of the crushing plant at the Quarry.
6. The Blast faces that Burgess had requested Hamiltons to blast were relatively high, which increased drill hole depth and therefore the risk of drill hole deviation.
7. It was common in the mining industry and shotfiring industry to apply a minimum 500m exclusion zone around a blast for personnel and a minimum 300m exclusion zone around a blast for plant and equipment.

Burgess' Failures in Relation to the Incident

1. Burgess' failures in relation to the Explosives Management Plan are as follows: 1. Any blast exclusion zone for a blast, if it existed, was not demarcated. 2. No flags or signage had been installed at a blast area warning of dangers and no-go zones. 3. Neither Mr Hamilton nor Mr Judd cleared the Quarry of personnel and plant prior to blasting. 4. No blast sentries or blast guards were briefed or in position at the front or rear gates to the Quarry or elsewhere to ensure the blast exclusion zone was evacuated prior to blasting. 5. The blast process was not aborted after there was a breach of the exclusion zone. 6. Blast monitors were not located at designated locations a minimum of 30 minutes before blasting occurred. 7. Workers were not prohibited from observing a blast from a location that was inside an adequate exclusion zone.
2. The excavators, and the other light vehicles, were the only cover or shelter available to persons in the firing location.
3. Hamiltons and Mr Hamilton had management and control of the blasting activities. However, Burgess and Mr Judd also retained the authority to halt any blasting at the Quarry for safety reasons regardless of the fact that blasting was being conducted by Hamiltons and Mr Hamilton.

Later Inspection of the Quarry

1. On 30 April 2018 SMSO Dillon attended the Quarry for the purpose of conducting an unannounced inspection of the Quarry ("the inspection"). During the inspection SMSO Dillon was informed that Mr Dale Burgess had ceased working at the Quarry between August and October 2017.
2. SMSO Dillon telephoned Mr Russell Burgess to discuss the lack of any qualified Quarry Manager at the Quarry. Mr Russell Burgess agreed that Mr Warnes would attend the Quarry and act as the temporary Quarry Manager.
3. SMSO Dillon then issued Burgess with three Improvement Notices including an Improvement Notice directing Burgess to nominate an individual within seven days to exercise the key statutory function of Quarry Manager in accordance with cl 137 of the WHSMPS Regulation.

Changes Introduced After the Incident

1. From 1 May 2018 Mr Warnes started visiting the Quarry more regularly and overseeing the Quarry as the Acting Quarry Manager. Mr Warnes began visiting the Quarry two to three times per week.
2. In July or August 2018 Mr Ragobert and Mr Darby informed Mr Warnes of the incident and showed him a video of the Blast.
3. Mr Warnes raised the incident with Mr Russell Burgess who then asked Mr Warnes to investigate the incident. Mr Warnes subsequently conducted an investigation into the incident.
4. In August 2018, another blasting operation was conducted at the Quarry. Mr Hamilton was the only person present at the firing location. Mr Judd acted as a sentry blocking the entry road. Mr Newman acted as a sentry at the back gate. All other personnel at the Quarry were located in the farmhouse of the Quarry for the blast. These measures could have been implemented on 10 April 2018.
5. On 5 September 2018, Mr Warnes prepared a new SWMS and Risk Assessment for Drilling and Blasting at both the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry. The "Controls to be Implemented" included "…exclusion zones and where personnel are to be stationed at the time of the shot".
6. Burgess employed Mr John Navybox as the new Quarry Manager at the Quarry.

Evidence for the Defendant

1. Mr Russell Leslie Burgess swore an affidavit on 7 October 2021. Mr Burgess is the Managing Director and Sole Director of Burgess.

Background to the Business

1. Burgess has been in operation in New South Wales for over 35 years and is a family-owned and operated company.
2. Mr Russell Burgess' daughter, Ms Chelsea Burgess, and son, Mr Jay Burgess, are employed by Burgess as Business Managers. Mr Jay Burgess also assists with WHS related matters as he holds a Diploma of Occupational Health and Safety.
3. Mr Russell Burgess started his own business in 1977 with the purchase of a tip truck. Mr Burgess gradually expanded his business into what is now Burgess Earthmoving. Burgess' current operations include three mobile crushing plants, the Quarry, Kapooka Quarry and a concrete plant. Mr Burgess is a qualified shotfirer and undertook the blasting activities at the Quarry and Kapooka Quarry from 1994 to 2016. In 2016 Mr Burgess started engaging contractors to undertake the blasting activities due to his workload.
4. A lot of time and hard work was required to build Burgess into a sustainable business. This required Mr Russell Burgess to work 12 hours a day 7 days a week. Mr Burgess has only recently been able to scale back his working hours to 10-11 hours a day 6 days a week.
5. Burgess employs 39 people in the Wagga Wagga and Albury regions. In addition, Burgess has engaged 1,710 suppliers that are either local or operate out of local branches in the Wagga Wagga or Albury regions. Burgess continues to engage a number of these suppliers on a regular basis.
6. Burgess has no previous convictions and donates to several local charities and organisations. It has co-operated with the NSW Resources Regulator during its investigations of the incident in an appropriate and proper manner and entered a plea of guilty immediately after the Amended Summonses and Agreed Statement of Facts were filed.

Mr Hayden Judd

1. Mr Judd was appointed to the role of Quarry Manager on 8 November 2017 after the previous Quarry Manager, Mr Dale Burgess, resigned due to health issues.
2. Mr Judd had previously worked at the Quarry between 11 May 2016 and 10 March 2017 in the capacity of Operator and Mr Dale Burgess' second in charge. Mr Judd had significant experience working in the quarrying industry. Between 2006 and 2016 Mr Judd worked at Hanson Lysterfield Quarry and Culcairn Quarry. His experience included maintenance activities and working as a fixed and mobile plant operator which included the operation of crushing and screening machinery.
3. Before appointing Mr Judd to the role of Quarry Manager, Mr Russell Burgess considered Mr Judd to be competent to perform the role of Quarry Manager based on an assessment of his training and experience. Mr Burgess acknowledged that his assessment at the time was inaccurate.
4. As Mr Judd was new to the role of Quarry Manager he was supervised by Mr Russell Burgess. Mr Burgess spoke to Mr Judd almost daily over the phone in relation to operational and safety matters. Mr Burgess attended the Quarry two to three times a week in the months leading up to the incident to ensure that the Quarry was being managed in accordance with Burgess' Mine Safety Management System ("MSMS").

Mine Safety Management System Prior to the Incident

1. In November 2017 Burgess engaged Safety Compliance Resources ("SCR") to conduct a review and improve Burgess' safety policies and procedures. SCR was engaged to undertake a desktop audit and gap analysis of the MSMS and develop the necessary updates to the current system to provide compliance with the latest legislation.
2. On 5 December 2017 Mr Craig Tickner, WHS Manager at SCR, led a workshop with Ms Sue Eagle, WHS Manager at SCR, Mr Judd and Mr Newman to facilitate a BroadBrush Risk Assessment and other risk assessments specific to the Quarry.
3. In addition to the development of the risk assessments, SCR, with the assistance of Mr Judd and Mr Warnes, updated the MSMS which comprised of the: 1. Mine Safety Management Plan. 2. Principal Mining Hazard Management Plans (including the Fire and Explosion Management Plan). 3. Principal Control Plans (including the Explosives Management Plan). 4. Contractor Management Plan.
4. Because Mr Judd and Mr Warnes were involved in the development of the new MSMS, Mr Russell Burgess held an expectation that Mr Judd and Mr Warnes would effectively implement the new MSMS at the quarries that they were responsible for managing.
5. Prior to the incident it was not Mr Russell Burgess' usual practice to observe all blasting activities at the Quarries as he considered Hamiltons to be a safe operator. Mr Burgess expected the Quarry Manager to report any issues regarding blasting activities to him. Up until the incident, Mr Burgess did not have any concerns about Mr Hamilton's blasting work or safety practices.
6. Mr Warnes told Mr Russell Burgess that on the occasions that Hamiltons undertook blasting activities at the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry prior to the incident, Hamiltons had established exclusion zones around a blast area and ensured that workers not involved in a blast or acting as sentries were located at the weighbridge (at the Quarry) or the gates (at the Kapooka Quarry).
7. Mr Russell Burgess stated that as a qualified shotfirer, he is aware of the importance of blasting exclusion zones and that members of the public are not permitted to observe blasts.

Acknowledgment

1. Mr Russell Burgess accepts that Burgess should have: 1. Enforced compliance with the Explosives Management Plan, being a safe system of work for blasting at the Quarry. 2. Provided adequate training and instructions to its workers in relation to blasting operations by providing training on the Explosives Management Plan. 3. Provided adequate supervision for its mining operations at the Quarry in that it should have ensured that the person appointed to the position of Quarry Manager held a current Practising Certificate.

Changes Introduced After the Incident

1. On 30 April 2018 Mr Russell Burgess telephoned SMSO Dillon and told him that he intended to appoint Mr Warnes as the Acting Quarry Manager. Mr Warnes commenced employment at Burgess in March 2010 as Plant Operator and in 2011 commenced in the role of Quarry Manager at the Kapooka Quarry. Mr Warnes held a Quarry Manager Practising Certificate and a Security Clearance issued by SafeWork NSW.
2. Mr Judd commenced in the role of Operator and remained in that role until resigning two to three months later.
3. On 15 October 2018 Mr Navybox commenced as the new Quarry Manager of the Quarry. Mr Navybox held a Quarry Manager Practising Certificate for a tier 1 quarry which exceeded the requirement for the Quarry as it is deemed a tier 2 quarry. Mr Navybox ceased working for Burgess on 7 January 2021. Currently, Mr Warnes is Acting Quarry Manager at the Quarry.
4. Burgess introduced a new role to provide an additional layer of supervision above the Quarry Manager. When Mr Warnes is not Acting Quarry Manager at the Quarry, he oversees the operations of the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry. A large component of Mr Warnes' role is supervising activities at the quarries and ensuring their safe operations. Mr Warnes attends every blast at the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry to ensure that the relevant safety rules are being followed. Mr Warnes is also responsible for Burgess' safety documentation and implementing Burgess' safety documentation.
5. Burgess has introduced the following further safety measures: 1. On 17 November 2018 Burgess introduced a Blast Management Plan which provides the basis for ensuring that safe practices and procedures for blasting are adopted. The Blast Management Plan was updated on 5 May 2021 and again on 8 June 2021. 2. On 11 January 2019 and again on 13 September 2021, Burgess updated the Explosives Control Plan ("ECP") which references and is read in conjunction with the Blast Management Plan. 3. On 22 January 2021 Burgess introduced a new SWMS and Risk Assessment for Drilling and Blasting which provides an overall risk assessment of the risks associated with blasting operations at the Quarry. 4. Burgess has introduced three checklists, each of which must be completed prior to a blast. 5. Burgess introduced a process of the quarries formally completing and submitting Daily Production Reports. 6. Pursuant to the ECP, Burgess engages MAXAM Terra Solutions ("MAXAM") for all blasts undertaken on site. MAXAM or its contractor Edge Drilling undertakes all drilling and loading of explosives. 7. Before a blast is conducted there is a toolbox talk and discussion of the blast, the exclusion zone, the firing location and the risks associated with blasting. 8. A blast exclusion zone of 800 metres must be evacuated prior to blasting. Only the shotfirer, blast guard and sentries are permitted to stand at the 800 metre mark. Any other Burgess worker must remain outside the Quarry gates and members of the public are not permitted to be on site.
6. On 22 June 2021 Mr Warnes trained all the Burgess employees who work at the Quarry and the Kapooka Quarry in the latest version of the Blast Management Plan and Explosives Control Plan, the SWMS and Risk Assessment for "Drilling and Blasting", and the three checklists.
7. Burgess employees Mr Warnes, Mr Leitch, Mr Christopher Frater and Mr Daniel Melbourne are currently completing a Certificate IV in Surface Extraction.
8. Burgess is in the process of reviewing and updating its MSMS to simplify it as part of its commitment to continuously improving its safety management systems.

Remorse

1. Mr Russell Burgess made the following apology: "On behalf of Burgess, I apologise to the Court for the offence. Burgess is remorseful that the Incident occurred, that individuals were exposed to risks to their health and safety and that Mr Power suffered a psychological injury, experiencing symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder."

Consideration

1. I have had regard to the objects in s 3 of the Act and the purposes of sentencing set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).

Objective Seriousness of the Offence

1. The proportionality principle requires that a sentence should neither exceed nor be less than the gravity of the crime having regard to the objective circumstances: Veen v The Queen (No. 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472, 485-6, 490-1 and 496. At common law, the term "objective circumstances" was used to describe the circumstances of the crime. The gravity of the offence was assessed by reference to its objective seriousness: R v McNaughton [2006] NSWCCA 242; (2006) 66 NSWLR 566 at [15].
2. The task requires the court to consider where in the range of conduct covered by the offence the conduct of the offender falls: Baumer v R [1988] HCA 67; (1988) 166 CLR 51 at 57. This assessment will generally indicate the appropriate range of sentences available which will reflect the objective seriousness of the offence committed, and set the limits within which a sentence proportional to the criminality of the offender will lie: BW v R [2011] NSWCCA 176 at [70].
3. In Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [27] the High Court said: "The objective seriousness of an offence is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders. It is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending."
4. The sentencing judge should take into account not only the conduct which actually constitutes the crime, but also such of the surrounding circumstances as are directly related to that crime and are properly regarded as circumstances of aggravation or mitigation: R v Wilkinson (No. 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 at [61].
5. The existence of a reasonably foreseeable risk to safety that is likely to result in serious injury or death is a factor relative to the gravity of the offence: Capral Aluminium Limited v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2000] NSWIRComm 71; (2000) 49 NSWLR 610 at [82]. The question of foreseeability of the risk is to be determined objectively.
6. The court must identify all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discuss their significance and then make a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case: Muldrock. This approach to sentencing, known as the "instinctive synthesis" approach, involves the making of a global judgment without any attempt to state precisely how any given factor has influenced the judgment.
7. The Court of Criminal Appeal has examined the sentencing process with regard to the Act in the matter of Nash v Silver City Drilling (NSW) Pty Limited; Attorney General for NSW v Silver City Drilling (NSW) Pty Limited [2017] NSWCCA 96. Justice Basten at [34], under the heading "Assessment of Risk" said: "The sentencing judge commenced his consideration with the proposition that 'greater culpability attaches to the failure to guard against an event the occurrence of which is probable rather than an event the occurrence of which is extremely unlikely'. However the truth of that proposition depends upon other considerations including (a) the potential consequences of the risk, which may be mild or catastrophic, (b) the availability of steps to lessen, minimise or remove the risk, and (c) whether such steps are complex and burdensome or only mildly inconvenient. Relative culpability depends on assessment of all those factors."
8. Further at [42] his Honour continued: "The culpability of the Respondent is not necessarily to be determined by the remoteness of the risk occurring, nor by a step‑by‑step assessment of the various elements. Culpability will turn upon an overall evaluation of various factors, which may pull in different directions. Culpability in this case is reasonably high because, even if the [event] which occurred might not be expected to occur often, the seriousness of the foreseeable resultant harm is extreme and the steps to be taken to avoid it, which were not even assessed, were straightforward and involved only minor inconvenience and little, if any, costs."
9. At [53] his Honour dealt with the proper approach to considering the objective seriousness of offences under the Act, saying: "It is important to note that the risk to be assessed is not the risk of the consequence, to the extent that a worker is in fact injured, but is the risk arising from the failure to take reasonably practicable steps to avoid the injury occurring. To discount the seriousness of the risk by reference to the unlikelihood of injury resulting is apt to lead to error. The conduct in question is the failure to respond to a risk of injury, conduct which will be more serious, the more serious the potential injuries, whether or not they are likely to materialize. The objective seriousness of the conduct will also be affected by the ease with which mitigating steps could have been taken."
10. My findings about the defendant's level of culpability are based upon the following: 1. Burgess through its Director and Managers knew of the risk. In any event the risk was foreseeable and there was guidance material directed to this particular risk. 2. The likelihood of the risk occurring was significant. 3. The potential consequences of the risk were death or serious injury. 4. Simple and well-known steps were readily available to eliminate or minimise the risk. Indeed had Burgess followed its own safety system for blasting, most of the workers and other people put at risk would have been well outside the Quarry. Instead they were permitted by Burgess to stand in harm's way treating the Blast as some sort of entertainment. 5. There was no great burden or inconvenience in these steps being implemented. Burgess took remedial measures quickly after the incident. 6. Only through good luck most spectators at the Blast were uninjured. However Mr Power suffered Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Six workers (most of whom should not have been there) and five members of the public were exposed to the risk of death or serious injury, for no reason. 7. The maximum penalty for each offence is a fine of $1,500,000, which reflects the legislature's view of the seriousness of the offence. 8. Burgess did have a documented safety system in place. That was of little use when personnel were not trained, supervised or even suitably qualified. 9. Hamiltons was the specialist shotfirer and clearly had its own duties. However Burgess was the owner and operator of the Quarry and had the power, and a non-delegable duty, to keep persons away from the Blast site.
11. I find that the level of culpability of Burgess is in the upper half of the mid range.

Deterrence

1. The penalty imposed in relation to this offence must provide for general deterrence. Employers must take the obligations imposed by the Act very seriously. The community is entitled to expect that both small and large employers will comply with safety requirements. General deterrence is a significant factor when safety obligations are breached: Bulga Underground Operations Pty Limited v Nash [2016] NSWCCA 37; (2016) 93 NSWLR 338 at [180].
2. The penalty must reflect the need for specific deterrence. Burgess is still conducting a business. Its operations involve drilling and blasting and the continuing engagement of workers.

Aggravating Factors

1. Counsel for the prosecutor conceded that there were no aggravating factors.

Mitigating Factors

1. Burgess has no previous convictions: s 21A(3)(e) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
2. Burgess is otherwise of good character: s 21A(3)(f) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The steps which it took after the Incident demonstrate this. Mr Russell Burgess has been in business for over 35 years. Burgess has been a good corporate citizen by making substantial donations to charitable causes.
3. Burgess is unlikely to re-offend: s 21A(3)(g) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
4. Burgess has good prospects of rehabilitation: s 21A(3)(h) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. It has taken positive steps to guard against the risk of an incident such as this ever happening again. It has brought its documentation and its procedures into line with those which, on all the evidence, should have been in place, and should have been observed, before this incident occurred.
5. Burgess has shown remorse for the offence: s 21A(3)(i) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. It has provided evidence that it has accepted responsibility for its actions and has acknowledged that the injury to Mr Power was caused by its actions.
6. Burgess entered a plea of guilty: s 21A(3)(k) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The court must take into account the fact that the offender has pleaded guilty, when the offender pleaded guilty, and the circumstances in which the offender indicated an intention to plead guilty: s 22(1) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. It is appropriate to give Burgess a 25% discount for an early plea.
7. Burgess gave assistance to law enforcement authorities: s 21A(3)(m) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. It co-operated at all times with the prosecutor and provided all documents requested in a prompt fashion.

Capacity to Pay a Fine

1. I am required to have regard to s 6 of the Fines Act 1996 (NSW) before imposing a fine. Where an offender seeks to have a fine reduced on the basis of a limited capacity to pay, it bears the evidentiary onus of convincing the court that it should exercise its discretion to limit the amount of the fine. The offender's capacity to pay is relevant but not decisive: Mahdi Jahandideh v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 178 at [16]. A substantial fine may still be warranted as a result of the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence.
2. In Unity Pty Limited v SafeWork NSW [2018] NSWCCA 266 at [79] the Court of Criminal Appeal said: "First, and more generally, questions of specific deterrence should take into account the size and scope of the operations of the defendant; a fine which may be crippling to a small business may have virtually no impact on the financial operations of a large corporation. The maximum penalty for the offence is undoubtedly set having regard to such a factor. Secondly, the Court is required to have regard to 'the means' of the defendant, pursuant to s 6 of the Fines Act 1996."
3. There was no submission about capacity to pay, so this issue does not arise.

Costs

1. The parties have agreed to an order that the defendant is to pay the prosecutor's costs in the total amount of $55,000. I will split this amount equally between the two proceedings.

Totality

1. The charges in the two Amended Summonses arise out the same set of facts. The s 19(1) charge relates to the six workers who were exposed to risk during the blast. The s 19(2) charge relates to the five members of the public who were exposed to the same risk. The failure by Burgess to take reasonably practicable steps to guard against the risk is the same in both charges. I must therefore have regard to the principle of totality when imposing sentence. Where a court sentences an offender for more than one offence, the aggregate or overall sentence must be "just and appropriate" to the totality of the offending behaviour: Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 63. The principle of totality is applicable where the penalty imposed is by way of fine: Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v EPA (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 704.
2. In Johnson v The Queen [2004] HCA 15; (2004) 78 ALJR 616 the High Court expressed a preference for what should be regarded as the orthodox, but not necessarily immutable, practice of fixing a sentence for each offence and aggregating them before taking the next step of determining concurrency. In Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 the High Court said at [45]: "A judge sentencing an offender for more than one offence must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of cumulation or concurrence, as well, of course, as questions of totality."
3. In EPA v Barnes [2006] NSWCCA 246 at [50] the Court of Criminal Appeal said that if the sentencer believes that the totality principle requires an adjustment to the fines which may otherwise be appropriate, the court should first fix a sentence for each offence and then consider questions of totality.
4. A recent example of a case under the Act in which this was done is the decision of Judge Scotting SafeWork NSW v Elgas Ltd [2021] NSWDC 101. His Honour found that the appropriate fine for breach of the s 19(2) duty was $425,000 and the appropriate fine for breach of the s 19(1) duty was $340,000. Taking into account the principle of totality his Honour imposed a fine of $100,000 for the s 19(1) offence. The total fines payable for the two offences amounted to $525,000.
5. At [89] his Honour said: "I have taken into account the principle of totality. The two offences arise from the same incident. For the breach of the s 19(2) duty, the establishment of an exclusion zone for other persons on the premises was an additional matter that should have been specified in the SOP and the tanker drivers trained on it. In my view, this offence was more serious because there were more people exposed to a risk of death or serious injury. For transparency in the sentencing exercise, I will nominate the appropriate fine for each offence but will reduce the fine for the s 19(1) offence to reflect the just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved."
6. In accordance with the authorities referred to above I will take the same approach.
7. I regard the s 19(2) offence as more serious since five citizens who had no inkling of the possible risks and who had no protective equipment were exposed to the risk. They should not have even been inside the Quarry, let alone near the Blast.

Section 19(2) District Court proceedings 2020/254706 1. Burgess Earthmoving Pty Ltd is convicted. 2. The appropriate fine is $180,000 but that will be reduced by 25% to reflect the early plea of guilty. 3. Order Burgess Pty Ltd to pay a fine of $135,000. 4. Order pursuant to Section 122(2) of the Fines Act 1996 (NSW) that 50% of the fine is to be paid to the prosecutor. 5. Order Burgess Pty Ltd to pay the prosecutor's costs agreed in the amount of $27,500.

Section 19(1) District Court proceedings 2020/254706 1. Burgess Earthmoving Pty Ltd is convicted. 2. The appropriate fine is $140,000 but that will be reduced by 25% to $105,000 to reflect the early plea of guilty, and further reduced to $45,000 having regard to the totality of the offending behaviour. 3. Order Burgess Pty Ltd to pay a fine of $45,000. 4. Order pursuant to Section 122(2) of the Fines Act 1996 (NSW) that 50% of the fine is to be paid to the prosecutor. 5. Order Burgess Earthmoving Pty Ltd to pay the prosecutor's costs agreed in the amount of $27,500. 6. Note that the total fines are $180,000 and the total costs are $55,000.

Amendments 29 October 2021 - Amended representation details DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 29 October 2021