Consideration
14The ground of appeal agitated on behalf of the applicant relates, given the immediately proceeding paragraph, to an error in the process said to have been undertaken by the sentencing judge. Not only did the applicant, in the course of submissions on appeal, not rely on any denial of procedural fairness and any argument relating to manifest excess or a sentence that is more severe than is appropriate, but counsel for the applicant, quite properly, concedes that the fine has, in all likelihood, no practical impact upon the applicant.
15There are a number of matters that require comment. First, s 16C(1) of the Commonwealth Crimes Act requires a sentencing judge to take financial circumstances into account. It does not dictate that the financial circumstances will determine the fine that is to be imposed.
16The financial circumstances of the offender is a mandatory consideration, but, expressly, there are other considerations. In Darter v Diden [2006] SASC 152; (2006) 94 SASR 505, Doyle CJ said:
"[29] I consider that a substantial fine was called for, even after making allowance for the loss of the vessel and the period of detention. A substantial fine was called for because, in particular, of the seriousness of the offence and its prevalence. Deterrence remains a factor, even if it is attenuated by the unlikelihood of recovery of the fine in future like cases.
[30] Treating the offender's capacity to pay as relevant, but not decisive, is consistent with the approach at common law. In Flego v Lanham (1983) 32 SASR 361 at 365-367 Wells J considered this issue. He said at 366:
But the offender's capacity to pay should always be kept in mind as a factor worthy of consideration; it cannot be decisive (see generally Reid v Liersch unreported, Walters J, 23 September 1970), but it is likely to be of some moment.
Legoe J came to a similar conclusion in Winkler v Cameron (1981) 33 ALR 663. This approach is consistent with the view of Finlay J in Rahme (1989) 43 A Crim R 81 at 86-88, although that case was complicated by the fact that the sentencing Judge had been urged to impose a substantial fine rather than a sentence of imprisonment. In Smith v R (1991) 25 NSWLR 1 Kirby P (at 21) expressed opposition to the imposition of a fine which was beyond the means of the person fined. That case also was complicated by its particular circumstances. It was a case involving contempt of court by a prisoner serving life imprisonment, the response of the Judge having been to impose a very substantial fine. The matter was complicated by the life sentence being served, which rendered other forms of punishment impractical, but likewise made the prospect of payment of the fine illusory. Nevertheless, Mahoney JA (at 23-24) and Meagher JA (at 24) both upheld the fine, recognising that it was unlikely ever to be collected.
[31] I have considered these cases and remain of the view that the defendants' capacity to pay was a relevant consideration, but not decisive. There is nothing in the Crimes Act to suggest that it is a decisive factor. Nor, in my opinion, does ordinary sentencing principle require that it be so treated.
[32] The impact of s 16C of the Crimes Act was considered by Mullighan J in Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Rota Tech Pty Ltd & Ors [1999] SASC 64 ; (1999) 201 LSJS 390. He considered a number of the reported cases and (at 397) said:
It follows that the capacity of the offender to pay cannot be the dominant factor when fixing the fine to be imposed. It is an important factor along with the other matters which the Court must take into account pursuant to s 16A. Where the offence involves large scale drug importation for the illicit drug trade in this country, the financial circumstances of the offender, whilst relevant, should not assume prominence in the exercise of the sentencing discretion.
I agree with his approach."
17I also agree with the foregoing approach and add only that consideration of the financial circumstances may increase, rather than decrease, a fine in order for it to be a deterrent for the offender.
18Secondly, the terms of s 16C(2) of the Commonwealth Crimes Act seek to make clear that the court is still capable of imposing a financial penalty in circumstances where the financial circumstances of the offender cannot be ascertained by the court.
19A sentencing court is not in a position to investigate financial circumstances or to call evidence. The sentencing judge relies upon the material that is put before the Court during the course of sentencing proceedings.
20In this case, the sentencing judge (Transcript, 21 May 2013, page 5) raised with counsel for the offender the possibility of a fine, as well as imprisonment, in terms that asked counsel what she said about the fine and made clear that his Honour was referring to a fine over and above any period of imprisonment. His Honour then asked:
"I am just asking whether you have any submissions about the fine?"
21Counsel replied:
"Your Honour, my instructions are that [the applicant] has limited means to pay a fine, and his business activities were somewhat limited, although he might have been travelling for business he was paid on a commission basis, so in terms of his financial position it was not a healthy position and remains obviously, since he has been in custody, unhealthy. His wife is currently working, I am told, to support the family given that he is not bringing in an income, so in my submission a fine for this particular offender would not be appropriate. He is of limited means."
22That is the totality of the submission made in relation to the question asked by his Honour. No attempt was made to adduce evidence in relation to that question or that issue. And no evidence was adduced directed to financial circumstances.
23However, during the course of the sentencing proceeding, evidence was adduced from the applicant's brother, which was answered by way of comparison with the brother's financial circumstances. The exchange was to the effect that the brother saw the applicant in Korea where he was working; that the applicant was married; that he has a family; that he has two children, aged five and seven; and that he, the applicant, financially supports his family and financially supports his parents, including medical and support payments for his mother, who, it was said, has a disability. In contrast, the applicant's brother is not expected to contribute to his parents' health expenses, because he does not have the income and/or assets so to do (see Transcript, 16 May 2013, page 10-11).
24Lastly, the applicant's brother was asked whether he was aware of any of the financial circumstances of the applicant and he answered:
"Actually he told me 'I have a little bit', but I didn't ask him much. He told me he has some problem but I didn't ask him much.
Question: Do you know how much he earned or was that something he didn't talk about?
Answer: I don't know I didn't talk."
25The only other material before the Court that was relevant to this issue was material that suggested the applicant was engaged in business, interested in business ventures associated with livestock and mining and that he had undertaken something in the order of 100 to 130 overseas trips in the preceding period of approximately 2 years. There is nothing in the material accepted by his Honour to suggest that the applicant did not have financial circumstances that were sufficient to enable him to pay the fine imposed.
26It must be said that very little material was put to his Honour, notwithstanding his Honour's request. It is difficult for a judge to enquire into the financial circumstances of a person upon whom it is anticipated a fine is to be imposed, other than by asking what, if anything, is to be put in relation to such a fine or such a penalty. Notwithstanding the request, no material was adduced on behalf of the applicant.
27It is fair to say that his Honour did not have a high regard for the truthfulness and accuracy of that which emanated from the applicant. It is, therefore, not surprising that the submission, put on instructions, that the applicant had little resources should not be accepted by his Honour.
28The applicant cannot point, as earlier stated, to any practical effect or prejudice associated with the fine that was imposed. The applicant does not say that the fine is manifestly excessive, or that the overall penalty, being the combination of the term of imprisonment and fine, are manifestly excessive or inappropriately severe.
29Given the terms of s 16C of the Commonwealth Crimes Act, it is at least prudent for a sentencing judge contemplating the imposition of a fine to enquire of counsel for the offender as to the financial circumstances of the offender and, where a submission is made which is not to be accepted, to put such matters to counsel. Further, it is necessary to address both issues in the remarks on sentence.
30Nevertheless, given the attitude of the sentencing judge to that which emanated from the applicant, it is unsurprising that the submission made as to the lack of financial resources would not be accepted.
31The sentencing judge, in determining to impose a fine, expressly refers to the need for general deterrence and the appropriateness of a financial penalty in circumstances where a crime is committed for financial gain. The sentencing judge does not, in terms, state reasons for rejecting the explanation of counsel. Nor does the sentencing judge make clear that he is in a position where he could not ascertain the financial circumstances of the applicant. Nevertheless, the applicant does not complain about the lack of reasons.
32His Honour did refer to the evidence about the applicant's business interests and the overseas travel. His Honour did not include in his remarks the express statement that these financial circumstances have been considered in fixing the fine. Nor did the sentencing judge express the view that he could not ascertain those financial circumstances. It would have been prudent to have done so.
33Given that the applicant does not complain about a lack of procedural fairness; was asked, below, as to matters pertaining to the imposition of a penalty and put submissions, expressly, on instructions; does not complain about the lack of reasons for rejecting the explanation or for imposing a fine; and cannot point to any practical or legal prejudice associated with the imposition of the fine, it seems to me that the current application for leave to appeal is not an appropriate vehicle for discussing the requirements and process to be adopted when applying s16C of the Commonwealth Crimes Act.
34Further, given the necessity of the Court to be satisfied that a lesser sentence is warranted, there are insufficient prospects of success in the appeal.
35In my opinion, the matter is not one in which the Court ought to grant leave and I propose that the Court refuses leave.
36BEECH-JONES J: Subsection 16C(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) when read with subsection 16C(2), or even without it, only obliges a sentencing court to take into account the financial circumstances of the relevant offender so far as they are established to the relevant satisfaction of that court. If the material before a court is not sufficient to satisfy it of the existence of any particular financial circumstance pertaining to an offender then s 16C(1) is engaged in respect of it.
37In this case, to the extent that the sentencing judge was satisfied about any matter pertaining to the applicant that might have answered the description of a financial circumstance, and there was not many, they were referred to in his Honour's sentencing judgment. Thus his Honour noted some evidence about the applicant's work history, his travel and his assumption of responsibility to pay his parents medical bills. In circumstances where his Honour noted those matters I do not consider the applicant has not come close to demonstrating that his Honour failed to comply with s 16C(1) even if His Honour did not expressly state he took them into account at the particular point in the judgment where he referred to the imposition of a fine.
38Ordinarily I would be minded to grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal. However, in view of the position taken by the other two members of the Court, I am content to agree with the orders proposed by Rothman J.