The applicant requested copies of, or alternatively access to inspect, all body corporate records which explicitly or impliedly refer to her witin a broad date range. The body corporate manager invited the applicant to attend its office to inspect the records. The applicant declined because she says her disability prevents her from attending the office. The body corporate manager suggested the applicant appoint an agent to attend on her behalf. The applicant declined that also, saying that it should not be necessary; that she is being discriminated against because the requirement to inspect the records at the body corporate manager's office treats her differently; and that she should be given electronic access to the database remotely, as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. She also requests the elecronic records be converted to another format, and that the body corporate certify that no other documents relating to her exist. The applicant says the body corporate is acting unreasonably in contravention of the Act and is also contravening the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).

The questions for determination are: whether the requested documents are body corporate records; whether the applicant's request is in a form with which the body corporate must comply; whether the discrimination allegation can be decided in this jurisdiction; and whether the body corporate acted unresonably in declining to arrange electronic access for her to inspect the documents remotely.

Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld)

ss 94(2), 100(5), 204, 205

Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020

ss 220

• [1] The applicant, Coral Reed, is a lot owner in Ormiston Manor CTS 20494 and she wishes to access body corporate records and other documents within a particular date range which name or impliedly refer to her. Underlying that request is a dispute between her and the body corporate (respondent) which, although not directly relevant to this application, explains her to desire to see those documents.
• [2] The applicant made her request to the body corporate pursuant to section 205 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act). It obliges a body corporate to give information to certain persons, including by allowing them to inspect and have copies of body corporate records.
• [3] In response to the applicant's request, the respondent's body corporate manager invited the applicant to attend its office to look through the database of records and locate any emails of interest to her. The applicant declined that invitation because she says her disability does not enable her to attend the office in person. The body corporate manager then suggested that the applicant arrange for an agent to attend and look through the records on her behalf. The applicant declined that invitation also, saying that it should not be necessary for her to do that, especially at her own expense, in order to exercise her right to access the records.
• [4] The body corporate manager then provided the applicant with a list of the emails within the requested date range, for her to identify the potentially relevant records. The body corporate manager then sent to the applicant a USB drive containing the emails the applicant identified, in their original electronic format.
• [5] However, the applicant says, the body corporate still did not comply with its section 205 obligation because many of the files on the USB drive were corrupted and unreadable. The applicant also says that she is being discriminated against, because the requirement to inspect the records at the body corporate manager's office treats her differently from a person who is physically able to do so. She also says that she should be given access to inspect the records database remotely by electronic means, as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. The applicant says the body corporate is therefore acting unreasonably in contravention of the Act and is also contravening anti-discrimination legislation.
• [6] The applicant took this up with the body corporate but it declined to take any further action in relation to her access request. The body also decline to take part in a conciliation session the applicant applied for through this office, saying it would wait to see the outcome of this adjudication application.
• [7] The applicant therefore requests an adjudicator's order requiring the respondent to give her electronic access to documents held by the body corporate which name or refer to her within a certain date range, and also to confirm whether any additional such records exist.
• [8] In summary, I have declined to grant the applicant's requested order, because I am not satisfied that the applicant's initial section 205 request, and now her request for orders in relation to that dispute, conform to the statutory obligation on the body corporate to give access to body corporate records.

• [9] Ormiston Manor CTS 20494 is governed by the Act. Its community management statement specifies that the Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module) is the applicable regulation module.
• [10] I am satisfied that the nature of the dispute is within my jurisdiction, that the requested remedy is generally within my power, and that the applicant, being a lot owner in dispute with their body corporate, has standing to bring the application against the respondent.[1]

Access to body corporate records and other documents

• [11] The application is founded on an alleged failure of the body corporate to comply with a request for access to body corporate records.
• [12] Section 204 of the Act requires a body corporate to keep 'rolls, registers and other documents', and to give access to them, 'in the way, and to the extent, provided for in the regulation module applying to the scheme', which in this instance is the Accommodation Module.
• [13] Section 205 of the Act then provides the machinery for requesting and giving access to information, including documents:

205 Information to be given to interested persons

(1) This section provides for the giving of information by the body corporate for a community titles scheme from the body corporate's records to an interested person.

_(2) Within 7 days after receiving a written request from the interested person accompanied by the fee prescribed under the regulation module applying to the scheme, the body corporate must do either or both of the following as requested by the interested person - _

_(a) permit the person to inspect the body corporate's records - _

(i) if the person and the body corporate agree on a way to inspect the records - in accordance with the agreement; or

(ii) otherwise - in person at a reasonable time and place nominated by the body corporate;

_(b) give the person a copy of a record kept by the body corporate - _

(i) if the person and the body corporate agree on the way the copy will be given - in accordance with the agreement; or

(ii) otherwise - in the way prescribed under the regulation module applying to the scheme.

(3) However, the body corporate is not required to allow a person to inspect or obtain a copy of a part of a record under subsection (2) if the body corporate reasonably believes the part contains defamatory material.

(5) The request must be in writing and accompanied by the fee prescribed by the regulation module applying to the scheme.

interested person_, for a lot included in a scheme, means - _

(c) a buyer under a contract for the sale of the lot; or

(d) a person to whom an owner of the lot has given a disclosure statement under the Property Law Act 2023, section 99(1)(a); or

(e) another person who satisfies the body corporate of a proper interest in the information sought by the person under this section; or

(f) an agent of a person mentioned in any of paragraphs (a) to (e).'

• [14] Section 205 itself contains only one exemption, being for a document the body corporate reasonably believes contains defamatory material. At common law, a body corporate will also be entitled to withhold from access records over which it has legal professional privilege.[2]
• [15] As to the logistics of complying with a request, it has regularly been a source of uncertainty as to how certain aspects the section 205 obligations are met in practice in the electronic age. The prescribed fees for access to records are (in this case) set out in section 222 of the Accommodation Module, presently equating to $20.00 for inspection (by an owner) and $0.70 per page for copies.[3] The legislation seems to contemplate only hard copy documents. That cannot sensibly apply to charging for a copy of a video file, for example.
• [16] If there has not been some other agreement between the parties about the inspection of documents, the body corporate may nominate a 'reasonable time and place'. That seems to give the body corporate flexibility to arrange remote electronic access, but does not in itself compel the body corporate to offer anything other than inspection at a physical location.
• [17] If there has not been some other agreement between the parties about delivery for copies of records, that is governed by (in this case) section 222A of the Accommodation Module: that is, by post or by delivering the copies personally. I see no reason to consider that personal delivery could not include delivery by electronic means, and in any event sections 94(2) and 100(5) of the Act would require a body corporate and its committee (respectively) to make reasonable accommodation for an access-seeker's preference in that regard (see that discussion further below).

• [18] Although the section 205(2)(a) and (b) obligations are worded somewhat differently as to the relevant documents, I cannot see any reason to give different meanings to the phrases 'the body corporate's records' and 'a record kept by the body corporate'.
• [19] A body corporate record is defined in Schedule 6 of the Act:

records, for a body corporate, means the rolls, registers and other documents kept by the body corporate under this Act (including under the regulation module applying to the scheme)

• [20] That then (for this scheme) points to section 220 of the Accommodation Module.[4] It specifies the records which must be kept and the minimum retention period for different types of records:

220 Keeping and disposal of records - Act, s 204 [SM, s 231]

_(1) The body corporate must keep the following, subject to the operation of subsections (3) and (4) permitting their disposal - _

(a) the body corporate's accounting records and statements of account for each financial year;

(b) notices given in relation to the community titles scheme by a public authority, local government or other authority;

(c) orders made against the body corporate, or in relation to the scheme, by a judicial or administrative authority;

(d) each policy of insurance the body corporate puts in place;

(e) documents evidencing each engagement of a body corporate manager or service contractor, and each authorisation of a letting agent;

(f) each agreement between the body corporate and the owner of a lot included in the scheme about the giving of rights, or the imposing of conditions, under an exclusive use by-law;

(g) documents evidencing each engagement of a service contractor or authorisation of a letting agent to occupy a part of the common property, and each authorisation of access to, or use of, part of the common property by someone else;

(h) correspondence received by the body corporate, and correspondence sent by the body corporate;

(i) all minutes of meetings of the committee and all associated committee meeting material;

(j) all minutes of general meetings of the body corporate, and all associated general meeting material;

(k) reports given to members of the body corporate by a body corporate manager acting under a chapter 3, part 5 engagement;

(l) any reconciliation statement prepared for an account kept for the sinking or administrative fund and the associated financial institution statement and invoices;

(m) notices for resolutions of the committee to be passed other than at a meeting, and the responses of committee members.

• [21] I will refer to the various categories of documents set out in subsections 220(1)(a) to (m) as the 'records categories'.
• [22] Section 205 provides for giving information 'from the body corporate's records'. It is uncontroversial that anything which records information is a 'document'[5] and that therefore 'document' and 'record' are essentially synonymous in ordinary usage. Adjudicators, including in the past me, have sometimes taken a wide view as to the scope of documents to which the section 205 obligation applies, considering it refers to all documents in the body corporate's possession; that is, taking the word 'kept' literally.
• [23] However, I now prefer a narrower meaning of a record to which access must be given under section 205, discussed by Adjudicator Ananda in Calmwater Shores.[6] The narrower view is arrived at by paying close attention to the words 'under this Act' in the definition of 'records'. The result, in short, is that a document is a body corporate record for section 205 access purposes if it is:
  1. a document required to be kept by a body corporate because it falls within a records category, for this scheme mentioned in s 220(1) Accommodation Module, or
  2. a roll, register or other document explicitly required to be kept by other provisions, or
  3. otherwise, a document that in the circumstances can be considered as being kept by the body corporate 'under this Act', given the nature of the document or the purpose of its retention.
• [24] The difference between the wider and narrower views is in relation to that third type of document: one not explicitly required to be kept but retained nonetheless by a body corporate 'under this Act'. Adjudicator Ananda surveyed various authorities and expressions of the test and noted that the law on the meaning of 'under this Act' and similar phrases is still unsettled, but ultimately focussed on tests discussed by the High Court in Griffith University v Tang[7](Tang) and Queensland's Supreme Court in Davis v City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd[8] (Davis). In deciding whether a document is a body corporate, those authorities require that:[9]
  1. attention be paid to the circumstances of each case considering the objects, scope, language and structure of the Act
  2. the document be created from something done, or be kept for a purpose, expressly or impliedly required or authorised under the Act, and
  3. on a proper characterisation of the circumstances, there is a nexus or connection between the Act and the circumstances by which the document was created or retained which is pursuant to more than just a general power given under the Act.
• [25] That narrower view pays attention not only to the words 'under this Act' in the definition of records but also to the fact that section 205 explicitly requires access to be given only to 'records' and does not instead say 'documents'. While that might appear to be a distinction without a difference, I note that the differentiation between body corporate records and mere documents in a body corporate's possession is explicitly acknowledged by other provisions of the legislation. For example, an adjudicator's investigation power is expressed to include a power to inspect a 'record or other document of the body corporate'.[10] Further, section 224 of the Accommodation Module[11] empowers a body corporate to require the return of 'a record or other document' of the body corporate from for certain persons. Applegarth J in Davis[12] cautioned that due attention must be given to such distinctions drawn in the language of legislation.
• [26] The wider view is usually unproblematic in practice, because documents to which people seek access often fall within the records categories or are otherwise explicitly required to be kept. However, it occasionally becomes an issue when the person holding the document has some reason to resist access to it, in which case the application of section 205 to the particular document needs to be decided.
• [27] As I noted above, the essence of the wider view is that body corporate records for section 205 purposes are all of the documents possessed by the body corporate (apart from exempted records). It is further based on a view that all documents in a body corporate's possession are property to which all owners (as body corporate members) thereby have an inherent right of access, as if the documents were akin to common property. But I do not consider that reasoning proceeds to a sound conclusion as simply and as uncontroversially as that.
• [28] Taking the latter point first, the inherent right argument thereby treats as different the access right of other types of interested persons who are not owners, when the legislation does not draw that distinction.[13]
• [29] As to the first point, it calls for consideration of what constitutes a body corporate's 'possession' of a document, when in practice that is not a simple matter. A body corporate is a legal fiction, created upon the establishment of a community titles scheme,[14] which is defined to be constituted by no more than a recorded community management statement and the scheme land to which it refers.[15] A body corporate must have an address for service of documents[16] but it has no place of business in any real sense.[17] If one were to demand inspection (say by warrant) of documents possessed by a typical incorporated enterprise, one would go to its registered office and search for documents in its cabinets, shelves, desks, electronic devices and data servers. But a body corporate might have none of those things in its name. In reality, a substantial amount of body corporate business is conducted by its volunteer committee members through their private residences, electronic devices, email addresses and mobile phone accounts.
• [30] A simple example indicates the difficulty in deciding whether a document is a body corporate record with reference to its possession by a body corporate. A email from one current committee member to another calling a committee meeting would be a body corporate record.[18] It is a body corporate record even if it exists only on the private electronic devices of those committee members and on the telecommunications provider's server. Now, consider another email sent just moments later between the same committee members using the same devices, about an upcoming social event. The email is in the same 'places' and controlled by the same people as the earlier committee meeting email, and so the characteristics of its possession are the same as the committee meeting email. But the email was not sent pursuant to an express or implied body corporate function, and there is no connection with body corporate affairs. I cannot imagine the legislature, nor any reasonable person, would expect those committee members to make that private email accessible to (say) a buyer under a contract for the sale of a lot.[19] One might then say that, even on the wider view, the private email can be exempted because it is not connected to the body corporate's affairs. But that is a resort to the test in the narrower view, and under the wider view the only explicit exclusions allowed by the legislation or the common law for access requests are for documents containing defamatory material or which are subject to legal privilege.[20] In other words, there is no legislative basis for saying that documents unrelated to the body corporate's affairs are exempted from a section 205 request unless one starts with the narrower view of what constitutes a record to which access must be given.
• [31] Of course that is not to say that a body corporate needs to keep its records and other documents separately, nor that it cannot choose to give access to documents which are not records. I also agree with Adjudicator Ananda[21] that an interested person may be entitled to access non-records documents held by their body corporate, pursuant to a body corporate's and a committee's general obligations to act reasonably pursuant to sections 94(2) and 100(5) of the Act. It would be lawful to refuse an access request only if it were objectively reasonable to do so, the reasonableness depending on all of the circumstances at the time the request is considered_._[22]
• [32] I also agree with Adjudicator Ananda that, while the fees prescribed under the legislation for section 205 access do not strictly apply in the case of documents given under section 94(2), a body corporate may reasonably require reimbursement of its reasonably-incurred costs in fulfilling that request.[23] I consider the same should apply if copies of body corporate records are given pursuant to section 205 but agreed or needing to be provided in electronic form.

Application of other legislation to records access

• [33] The applicant says the body corporate must also comply with Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) in the course of complying with its section 205 obligation. She refers specifically to the following provisions:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) discriminates against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if, because of the disability, the discriminator treats, or proposes to treat, the aggrieved person less favourably than the discriminator would treat a person without the disability in circumstances that are not materially different.

(2) For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) also discriminates against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if:

(a) the discriminator does not make, or proposes not to make, reasonable adjustments for the person; and

(b) the failure to make the reasonable adjustments has, or would have, the effect that the aggrieved person is, because of the disability, treated less favourably than a person without the disability would be treated in circumstances that are not materially different.

(3) For the purposes of this section, circumstances are not materially different because of the fact that, because of the disability, the aggrieved person requires adjustments.

(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) discriminates against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if:

(a) the discriminator requires, or proposes to require, the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition; and

(b) because of the disability, the aggrieved person does not or would not comply, or is not able or would not be able to comply, with the requirement or condition; and

(c) the requirement or condition has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons with the disability.

(2) For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) also discriminates against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if:

(a) the discriminator requires, or proposes to require, the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition; and

(b) because of the disability, the aggrieved person would comply, or would be able to comply, with the requirement or condition only if the discriminator made reasonable adjustments for the person, but the discriminator does not do so or proposes not to do so; and

(c) the failure to make reasonable adjustments has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons with the disability.

(3) Subsection (1) or (2) does not apply if the requirement or condition is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances of the case.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the burden of proving that the requirement or condition is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances of the case, lies on the person who requires, or proposes to require, the person with the disability to comply with the requirement or condition.

• [34] It is not a simple issue to decide how rights and obligations created by that and other legislation apply to bodies corporate, nor the extent to which an adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide disputes about those matters. The reasons for that are discussed for example by Adjudicator Ananda in Portside Noosa Waters.[24] The adjudicator in that case considered the application of anti-discrimination legislation to bodies corporate and concluded it was not clear when it did and did not apply, concluding that it seemingly applied to some body corporate activities and obligations but not necessarily to all.
• [35] The adjudicator also considered the limits of an adjudicator's jurisdiction, previous adjudications about the extent to which anti-discrimination legislation impinges upon bodies corporate, and the nature of those other legislated obligations. The consensus was that adjudicators do not have jurisdiction to decide whether anti-discrimination (or other) legislation had been contravened by a body corporate or to decide what a body corporate must do to comply with such legislation.[25] The adjudicator concluded, and I respectfully agree, that in any event the obligation on a body corporate to act reasonably would likely accommodate anything also required under that other legislation,[26] for example the obligation to make reasonable accommodation for a person's disability.

• [36] The applicant says, among other things:
  1. She made her request for access to documents by email on 24 March 2025 to the body corporate manager.
  2. Her request included that she be given electronic access to the records as a reasonable adjustment under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). Instead, the Body Corporate Manager (BCM) refused to provide electronic access, insisted that she attend their office in person, and offered only one fixed date and time, which was unsuitable given her disability. The BCM further advised that she could appoint a representative to attend on her behalf. The applicant advised that she could not afford to do so, and that requiring her to incur additional costs or appoint a representative created an unnecessary barrier to access.
  3. Such a requirement is inconsistent with section 205 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), which entitles an owner to inspect and obtain copies of body corporate records, and constitutes unlawful discrimination under sections 5 and 6 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, which prohibit less favourable treatment and the imposition of unreasonable requirements or conditions that disadvantage a person because of their disability.
  4. Between 28 March and 20 April 2025, she made multiple written attempts to resolve the issue, clarifying that in-person access was not viable, that her request was lawful, and that electronic provision imposed no disproportionate burden. Her requests for escalation to senior management were ignored. She submitted a formal complaint to the BCM firm on 20 April asking for a response by 29 April. After no response was received, she applied for conciliation, on 30 April 2025.
  5. On 1 May 2025 the BCM responded to the formal complaint she submitted. She had already pointed out that their repeated statements claiming they were willing to accommodate her were purely performative, as she had been consistently outlining her needs for weeks without any meaningful action being taken. On 12 May 2025, the BCM offered an email index which he initially promised would be provided within three working days.
  6. However, she did not receive the index until 15 June 2025, over a month later, and only then in an unsecured express post bag delivered to her letterbox. This handling of body corporate records was inappropriate and contrary to obligations under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), which requires that personal information be safeguarded against loss, unauthorised access, or disclosure.
  7. From the list of email titles provided, she selected the majority of records, as the content itself was not categorised or tagged, and these were subsequently sent to her on a USB stick.
  8. On 16 June 2025, she notified the BCM that the majority of the files were corrupted and unreadable, providing verification by way of examples of that, and again requested a secure, accessible copy of all relevant records, as well as confirmation of whether other records relevant to her request exist.
  9. On 18 June 2025, the BCM responded:

Thank you for your detailed email. We acknowledge your concerns and confirm that Whittles has provided all documents identified in your request and acted in good faith throughout.

As you have lodged an application for conciliation with the Office of the Commissioner for Body Corporate and Community Management on 30 April 2025, we will now await the outcome and comply with any instructions issued by the Adjudicator.

Glen has discussed this matter with the Committee, and they agree that, until a decision is made, this matter is considered closed.

1. The Body Corporate then failed to attend the scheduled conciliation conference on 20 June 2025, and a Conciliation Certificate was issued confirming there was no reasonable attempt at conciliation.'
2. As of 22 September 2025, her original request has been outstanding for 182 days. The Body Corporate remains in breach of its statutory obligations under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), has failed to make reasonable adjustments as required by the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), and has not complied with its responsibilities under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) to provide access to personal information in a complete and usable form.
3. These grounds support the outcome she is seeking, which is an order requiring the Body Corporate to provide her with access, in a format that complies with her disability access needs, to all records requested in her original section 205 request dated 24 March 2025, covering the period from 8 February 2024 up to the date the order is fulfilled, in accordance with section 205 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997, the requirement to make reasonable adjustments under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, and the right of access to personal information under the Information Privacy Act 2009.

• [37] The applicant says that her requested order would require the body corporate to:

1. provide either secure electronic access to the records, or electronic copies saved as uncorrupted, accessible PDFs, and 2. include all categories of records requested, namely: 1. notes or records from official conversations involving committee members, the property manager, or the body corporate manager 2. emails or other written communications exchanged between committee members, the property manager, the body corporate manager, or third parties that reference her 3. any records or documentation relevant to disputes, complaints, or discussions involving her 4. notes of phone calls or informal communications retained in any form, and

1. confirm, in writing, whether any additional records relating to me exist

• [38] The body corporate's committee says, among other things:
  1. The applicant's request would require the Body Corporate to search through the contents of every document within the requested date range to identify possible references to the applicant. It is the responsibility of the applicant to identify documents or to conduct a search. The Body Corporate cannot reasonably or lawfully be required to review the internal contents of hundreds of records in order to locate an unspecified number of internal references.
  2. There is no legislative requirement for the Body Corporate to certify the absence of further references within records or to provide remote access to secure electronic systems.
  3. Email records are securely stored on Whittles' internal server, accessible only to authorised employees using multi-factor authentication. Consistent with the Services Agreement, these records are available for inspection at the Whittles Cleveland office, located less than three kilometres from the applicant's residence. This arrangement complies with the Act and ensures that other owner data is not compromised.
  4. Following escalation through Whittles' complaints management system, the Body Corporate offered to provide a list of email records (date, time, and subject) to assist the applicant in identifying specific documents. Of the approximately 680 emails held between February 2024 and April 2025, the applicant selected nearly all, and these were copied by Whittles IT professionals onto a USB and sent by tracked Express Post. The USB was verified to be functional and not corrupted, and the records were in the email format as held.
  5. The legislation provides for identified documents to be copied or printed, but does not require reformatting of records into an owner's preferred medium.
  6. At no time prior to 28 March did the applicant indicate a disability or other reason preventing attendance at the office. Despite the offer to discuss accommodations, the applicant declined to engage on this issue. While matters under the Disability Discrimination Act fall outside the primary jurisdiction of this adjudication, the Body Corporate Manager nonetheless sought to identify and implement reasonable adjustments in good faith.
  7. From receipt of the request and payment of the prescribed fee, less than seven days elapsed before the records were made available - fully compliant with the timeframe required.
  8. The Body Corporate submits it therefore complied with the applicant's section 205 request, and that no orders are warranted.
• [39] The applicant says in response, among other things:
  1. Requiring her to engage and pay an agent to search the files on her behalf creates a significant barrier to equal access. Other owners without disabilities can access records directly without this additional cost or effort.
  2. Under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), organisations are required to make reasonable adjustments to ensure equitable access for people with a disability. Providing digital access to records is a clear and practical example of such an adjustment. It would not impose any unjustifiable hardship or undue burden on the BCM, as the functionality already exists within their standard business systems.
  3. Using tools such as Microsoft 365 SharePoint or OneDrive, the body corporate manager could have provided secure, time-limited access to the requested records. This would have allowed her to review the same materials available for in-person inspection while maintaining full control over who could view or download files. This approach is reasonable, cost-neutral, and consistent with both the intent of the DDA and section 205. Access permissions can be restricted and user activity can be fully audited. This not only preserves privacy and data integrity but also provides a transparent and secure record of compliance, far exceeding the security of an untracked physical USB.
  4. She described the records sought in as much detail as possible without access to the BCM's internal naming conventions. Section 205 does not require an applicant to specify document titles or file names.
  5. On 16 June, she informed the BCM that the files they provided were corrupted and supplied evidence to demonstrate this. It is unreasonable to suggest that she would invest this level of time and effort if she already had access to the records requested. Despite being fully aware of the issue, the body corporate declined to participate in conciliation, an appointment for which she had taken time off work, and instead stated they would wait for an adjudicator's decision.
  6. The BCM's stated concern for other owners' privacy was inconsistent with their actions. They sent a USB drive containing personal and sensitive information by express post without requiring a signature or providing a tracking number. As a result, the package remained unsecured in her mailbox for several days and could easily have been lost or stolen.
  7. The BCM repeatedly claimed they were willing to accommodate her, yet meaningful action only occurred once she lodged a formal complaint and their General Manager intervened, and even then, the accommodation was inadequate. The files provided were corrupted, and the BCM refused to confirm whether additional records existed beyond the limited index of emails they supplied.
  8. As a business, the BCM is legally obliged to maintain records that are accurate, complete, and capable of supporting or explaining governance decisions, consistent with corporate record-keeping principles under the (Cth).

Applicant's s 205 request and the requested order

• [40] I can deal briefly with that last submission by the applicant, that the body corporate manager is in non-compliance with certain obligations. The section 205 obligation falls entirely on the body corporate alone, and the body corporate manager is merely their agent in that regard. Whatever are its obligations under the Corporations Act 2001, they are not relevant here.
• [41] As to the body corporate's section 205 obligation, it arises only once a proper request has been made. It follows that the obligation is limited both by the legislation (for example, as to whether a requested document is a body corporate record) and the terms of the request made. Accordingly, an applicant is not entitled to an adjudicator's order for access to body corporate records which is beyond section 205's requirements or otherwise the section 94(2) obligation. Further, an applicant is not entitled to such an order which is substantially beyond the terms of the original request.[27]
• [42] The applicant made a written request for section 205 access and paid the fee quoted by the body corporate manager, in the amount of $20.75. It comprised an amount for providing a copy of the requested 'register of committee members' and the then-prescribed fee for inspecting records.[28] I am therefore satisfied that an ostensibly proper section 205 request was made, but subject to reservations I deal with below.
• [43] The applicant's section 205 request was expressed in the following terms:

Specifically, I am requesting copies of all correspondence, documentation, notes, or communication (written or recorded), whether by email, letter, text, meeting minutes, or internal memos, where I am mentioned or discussed by name or inference_. This includes, but is not limited to:_

• Notes or records from official conversations involving committee members, the property manager or the body corporate manager

• Emails or other written communication exchanged between committee members, the property manager, the body corporate manager, or third parties that reference me

• Any records or documentation relevant to disputes, complaints, or discussions involving me

• Notes of phone calls or informal communications retained in any form

I request access to any such records generated or held by the body corporate from 8 February 2024 to present.

Additionally, under Section 204 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), I request access to the register of committee members, including the names and addresses for service of each member currently serving on the committee, as recorded in the body corporate's records.

• [44] The applicant's requested order is expressed in the following terms:

An order requiring the Body Corporate for Ormiston Manor CTS 20494 to provide me with electronic access, in uncorrupted PDF format or another disability-compliant electronic form, to all records requested under section 205 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) on 24 March 2025, covering the period 8 February 2024 until the date the order is fulfilled, and to confirm whether any additional records relating to me exist, in compliance with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) and provide these as well.

• [45] I note the section 205 request was for copies of documents, and electronic copies of documents were provided, albeit that it seems the calculation of the fee paid by the applicant treated it as an inspection request.
• [46] In contrast, while the requested order purportedly repeats the section 205 request, it is for 'electronic access' to documents. One might take that to be a request to inspect records, but I note also that the requested order is for access 'in uncorrupted PDF format or another disability-compliant electronic form' which, if delivered to the applicant may equate to giving copies of those documents, a service for which the applicant has not (as yet) paid.
• [47] I will therefore consider the request for orders against the requirements for both types of access.
• [48] Accordingly, the relevant questions are whether the requested order:
  1. is for access to documents which are body corporate records
  2. corresponds to a proper request for copies, and
  3. corresponds to a proper request for inspection.
• [49] I will then discuss whether, in the circumstances, and regardless of the section 205 access provisions, the body corporate acted unreasonably by not meeting the applicant's requests for accommodation of her disability.

Are the requested documents body corporate records?

• [50] One difficulty I have with the requested order is that some documents within its scope may not be body corporate records.
• [51] The applicant requests copies of documents including (for example) emails between committee members in which she is 'mentioned or discussed by name or inference'. The fact that such an email refers to the applicant does not necessarily make it a document kept 'under this Act'. If such a document were associated with a committee meeting, it might be within the records category '(i) all minutes of meetings of the committee and all associated committee meeting material'. However, I do not consider such an email falls within, for example, the records category '(h) correspondence received by the body corporate, and correspondence sent by the body corporate', which in my view is not intended by itself to capture internal body corporate communications.[29] Such an email might also fail to meet the tests to characterise a voluntarily-kept document as a body corporate record, as discussed above at paragraph [24] above.
• [52] I am therefore not satisfied that an order cast in such wide terms is appropriate.

Was the request for copies properly specified?

• [53] I agree with the applicant that section 205 does not require an access-seeker to specifically identify document titles or file names to get copies of them. But adjudicators have regularly held that the onus is on them to identify the requested documents with sufficient particularity that they can be readily identified and located by the body corporate.[30] What that requires in practice will depend on the circumstances of the case. And so, for example, it is not necessarily impermissible for a request for copies to specify only that the document explicitly or impliedly refers to a person, but that may be an unreasonable burden if, as in this case, the number of documents to be searched is large because the specified date range is broad and if the applicant (being the subject of interest) might be referred to by a number of different words other than her name. A body corporate is not expected to, in effect, interrogate its records on the access-seeker's behalf. In the context of a party's application for a court-issued subpoena for documents (conceptually similar to a section 205 request for copies of records), it has been said that the description should be sufficiently specific to enable the person to put their hand on the documents without having to make a random search, [31] and that the right to access documents must be balanced against the burden it would impose on the entity answering the demand.[32]
• [54] The question fairly arises as to what an access-seeker can do if, as the applicant says, they do not know the name of a document. Given a body corporate is obliged to identify and keep documents corresponding to the various records categories, I would ordinarily (depending on the circumstances) accept that a request for a copy of a document would be sufficiently specific if the request were expressed in terms of a records category, for example a request for copies of committee meetings minutes and the associated meeting material.[33] However, it is unlikely a body corporate would keep separate or will have flagged those records which refer explicitly or by implication to a particular lot owner.
• [55] In my view, it is beyond the scope of the section 205 obligation, and would be unduly onerous, to require the body corporate to search the contents of numerous records - the body corporate manager says there were approximately 680 emails within the timeframe specified by the applicant - to identify all documents with the subject matter the applicant requests.
• [56] The applicant also requests an order that the body corporate inform her whether 'additional records relating to' her exist. It follows from what I have said above that the body corporate is not obliged to search all of its records for the purpose of satisfying the applicant that no records of a particular type or with a particular content exist. In any event, an order expressed in such vague and wide terms - 'relating to' is usually broadly construed under the law - would probably not be enforceable in practice, and for that reason alone ought not be made.
• [57] The applicant also wishes documents such as emails to be converted to a PDF or similar format if they are not already. There is no obligation on a body corporate to do that; the view taken by adjudicators is that the obligation to provide a copy extends only to providing it in its original format.[34] The applicant does not say that she cannot read email files, but rather that the problem was the corruption of some of those files.
• [58] Accordingly, if the applicant's requested order is to be taken as a request for copies of records, I do not consider it is in a form with which the body corporate was required to comply nor a form which I would be prepared to order.

Is the request for inspection properly specified?

• [59] If instead the requested order is taken to be a request for inspection, I have 3 concerns with the form of order sought.
• [60] As a preliminary point, I note that the original section 205 request was for copies, not inspection, but in the circumstances where the fee paid was appropriate to inspection and a hybrid inspection/copy regime was ultimately adopted, I will proceed as if the original request was (also) for inspection.
• [61] My first concern is that the applicant's requested order has an impermissible degree of specificity as to the records required for inspection: 'correspondence [etc] where I am mentioned or discussed by name or inference'. The inspection provision of section 205 simply requires the body corporate to 'permit the person to inspect the body corporate's records', and if there is no agreement about how that is to be done, then it is to be done 'at a reasonable time and place nominated by the body corporate'. The language and nature of subsection 205(2) indicates its purpose is to facilitate an inspection of the whole of the body corporate records.[35] As I have noted above in the case of a request for copies, the body corporate is not obliged to, in effect, inspect the records for the applicant and identify and set aside particular types of documents for inspection.
• [62] Secondly, the applicant is requesting an order that the body corporate convert documents to PDF or similar format. I cannot see that the inspection provision imposes such an obligation on a body corporate. That aspect of the requested order is, in any event, beyond the terms of the original section 205 request, and for that reason alone cannot be made.
• [63] Thirdly, the applicant requires the body corporate to facilitate inspection by way of remote electronic access to the database. However, as I have noted above, section 205 at most requires a body corporate to nominate a reasonable time and place for inspection, and presumably that means a place of its choosing, provided it is reasonable. The place where the records are physically kept or most easily accessible electronically is likely to be a reasonable choice. I do not see that section 205 necessarily obliges a body corporate to offer inspection access by remote electronic means. Whether it is unreasonable not to offer it when requested is discussed below.

Did the body corporate otherwise act unreasonably?

• [64] I have noted above that section 94(2) of the Act may require a body corporate to give reasonable consideration to giving access to documents which are not body corporate records. I see no reason why the same cannot be said about giving reasonable consideration to negotiating a different manner of access.
• [65] That said, given the burden it would put on the body corporate in this specific case, I do not consider it was unreasonable for the body corporate to decline to, in effect, conduct a wide-ranging inspection for the applicant of the many records in the specified date range in order to extract particular documents explicitly and implicitly referring to the applicant, nor to certify that no other such document exist elsewhere in the records, nor to convert them to another format, as requested in this case.
• [66] In any event, the applicant's argument in regard to the manner of access is that the body corporate was required to give reasonable consideration to her request for inspection by remote electronic means. The applicant contends the respondent's refusal to do so contravened the DDA. The applicant says that she is being treated differently from a person without a disability who is able to attend the body corporate manager's offices in person,[36] and the body corporate has failed to make reasonable accommodation for the applicant's disability by not directing the body corporate manager to provide remote electronic access to the records, instead of inspection in person.[37] I have noted above that I do not have jurisdiction to make findings about contraventions of the DDA.
• [67] As to the requirement to act reasonably in that regard, the body corporate's decisions about the applicant's access request have presumably been made by the committee, which brings section 100(5) of the Act into consideration. The leading authority on that section is Body Corporate For Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall.[38] Carmody J in that decision held that it is not an adjudicator's role to decide for themselves what is the appropriate or 'most reasonable' decision for the committee to make, but rather the question for determination is whether the committee could reasonably have come to the decision it made:[39]

The committee acted reasonably in the BCCM sense if a notionally reasonable committee faced with the same issue could (not would) have honestly and rationally reached the same conclusion on a proper consideration of all the available material.

• [68] From its point of view, the body corporate treated the applicant substantially the same as any other interested person, offering a time and place for inspection by her or her agent. I have noted that a body corporate is not reasonably required by section 205 to inspect the records for the applicant, certainly not when a very large volume of documents are involved. The only reasonable alternative to physical inspection was to consider providing the requested remote electronic access.
• [69] However, the body corporate manager seemingly does not have the capacity to do that, or at least in a secure way. The applicant contends otherwise, but I am not in a position to find that to be the case without evidence from an information technology specialist with specific knowledge of the body corporate manager's systems. There is ordinarily no onus on a respondent to disprove a fact alleged against them.[40] It seems inherently unlikely to me that the body corporate manager would not have given the applicant remote electronic access from the outset if that were already possible or a relatively simple matter organise. A body corporate manager surely has no interest in having a lot owner attend their office in person, using its facilities and taking up the time of its staff, if that could be avoided. It also seems unlikely that remote electronic access was viable because it is apparent that the body corporate through the body corporate manager went to not insignificant effort to accommodate the applicant's circumstances in another way, beyond the legislation's strict requirements, by generating a list of potentially relevant emails and then sending them to her on the USB, for an inspection fee of less than $20. The applicant says this is evidence that the body corporate's concern about the security of remote electronic access is disingenuous, because it was prepared to mail the USB containing the same records to her in an unsecured way, and I take her point. But that argument does not support her contention that the body corporate manager could readily give remote electronic access in a secure way, as she requests.
• [70] Accordingly, I am not satisfied that offering inspection only at the body corporate manager's office, refusing to inspect and extract the records for the applicant, refusing to convert the records to another format, and refusing to organise secure remote electronic access to the records for the applicant, was unreasonable in the circumstances.
• [71] It follows that I am not satisfied I should make the requested order.
• [72] It might be that the body corporate has offended the DDA in its decisions, but the applicant will need to take that complaint to the proper authority, which I understand to be the Australian Human Rights Commission in the first instance.[41]

• [73] The body corporate has not explained in its submission why it declined to take part in the conciliation session, which is disappointing. However, I can see from its submissions that its position accorded with its obligations under the law and in fact, as I have noted, it went beyond what it was required to do. I do not intend that to imply a criticism of the applicant, because I can understand why she takes the view that she does.
• [74] If the applicant still wishes to access the body corporate records and if she cannot afford or is not inclined to appoint an agent to attend the location where they are kept to search for them, she will need to request copies of reasonably identifiable documents to be sent to her. The request would need to be expressed with a substantially greater degree of specificity than the requested order, so that the body corporate could reasonably identify the relevant records - for example, minutes of committee meetings at which decisions were made about the applicant, and the committee meeting materials associated with that.
• [75] The body corporate may provide them in their original electronic format, or it may choose to convert them to another format or to print them out on paper. Its obligation to act reasonably extends to negotiating reasonably with the applicant in that regard. It will also be a matter for the body corporate whether it voluntarily complies with a request for either copies or inspection of documents which are not body corporate records, but again it must act reasonably in making a decision to exclude non-records documents. As I have also noted, the obligation to provide access will not extend to documents the body corporate reasonably believes contains defamatory material or over which it has legal professional privilege.

[1] See generally Act, ss 227(1), 229(3), 238(1), 276(1)

[2] See for eg The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49 at [11]; Princess Palm [2017] QBCCMCmr 571

[3] https://www.qld.gov.au/law/housing-and-neighbours/body-corporate/records/fees-for-access, as at the date of these reasons.

[4] The other regulation module contain similar provisions.

[5] Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 36, Sched 1

[6] [2025] QBCCMCmr 330, see [33]-[120], summarised at [88]-[90]

[7] [2005] HCA 7

[8] [2011] QSC 285 at [22]

[11] With equivalents in other regulation modules.

[13] See also Calmwater Shores at [103] and following

[15] Act, s 10

[18] See Accommodation Module, s 220(1)(i)

[19] Who is by definition an interested person entitled to section 205 access.

[21] Calmwater Shores at [103]-[116]

[22] Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40 at [56], [63], [101]

[23] Calmwater Shores at [119]-[120]

[24] [2025] QBCCMCmr 104

[27] To the extent the requested order exceeds the terms of the section 205 request, the applicant will not have established that there is a dispute to be resolved.

[28] Body corporate manager's email of 24 March 2025

[29] See also Clifton Views Luxury Beach Apartments [2024] QBCCMCmr 329 at [56]

[30] See for eg Tiffany [2022] QBCCMCmr 13 at [28]; The Groves No. Four Minyama [2017] QBCCMCmr 371

[31] Per Lord Denning in Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547 cited with approval in Attorney General for Western Australia v Fletcher [2023] WASC 346 at [101]

[32] Markisic v AEA Ethnic Publishers Pty Ltd & Ors [2006] NSWCA 241 per Giles JA at [13]

[33] The records category in section 220(1)(h).

[34] See for eg Warwick Tower [2021] QBCCMCmr 427 at [60]

[35] See for eg Tiffany [2022] QBCCMCmr 13 at [27]

[36] That allegation corresponds to DDA s 5(1)

[37] That allegation corresponds to DDA s 5(2)

[38] [2016] QCATA 177

[40] A respondent might provisionally carry the evidentiary burden, for example where they plead a defence or exception, but not in a circumstances such as this. See for eg Brown v Rolls Royce Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 210 per Lord Denning at 581-582; also Leader Computers P/L v Hakim and Wilson [2009] SADC 94 at [92]- [93]

[41] https://humanrights.gov.au/complaints/complaints/complaints-under-disability-discrimination-act