austlii:cth/ARTA/2026/479
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2026-03-24
Original judgment source is linked above.
The Tribunal may dismiss an application made to the Tribunal if the applicant fails to do either of the following within a reasonable time: > > (a) proceed with the application; > > (b) comply with this Act or an order of the Tribunal in relation to the proceeding in relation to the application.
The Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing an independent mechanism of review that: > > (a) is fair and just; and > > (b) ensures that applications to the Tribunal are resolved as quickly, and with as little formality and expense, as a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permits; and > > (c) is accessible and responsive to the diverse needs of parties to proceedings; and > > (d) improves the transparency and quality of government decision-making; and > > (e) promotes public trust and confidence in the Tribunal.
The power to dismiss under s 42A(5) is "plainly a valuable discretionary power", as Burchett J observed in Guse v Comcare (1997) 49 ALD 288; [1997] FCA 140, 291 (ALD). Where the provision is engaged, the exercise of that power to dismiss summarily aids the Tribunal in fulfilling the objective in s 2A. The consequence of a failure by an applicant either to proceed with the application or to comply with a direction by the Tribunal in relation to the application within a "reasonable time" is that the applicant is liable to have his or her application dismissed without a hearing on the merits. Such an outcome may seem harsh but because the outcome is specifically provided for by the legislation, that outcome, in itself, is not one that is unreasonable in the legal sense. Thus, I do not accept the submission for Mr Berry that the exercise of power was unreasonable in the legal sense because it closed all avenues of review of the objection decision to Mr Berry.
The Tribunal is required to proceed in a way that is procedurally fair. But the obligation is not open-ended. As the High Court explained in AON Risk Management Services Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27, the review must keep in mind other objectives including the need to minimise costs, avoid unnecessary delay, and maintain public confidence in the competence, integrity and efficiency of decision-making processes. The Tribunal is also obliged to pursue the objective in s 2A.
[79] The discretion must only be exercised sparingly and as a matter of "last resort": Guse v Comcare [1997] FCA 140; (1997) 49 ALD 288 at 291. That is because it involves denying an applicant a hearing of the merits of the application. Because dismissal under s 42A(5) is a matter of last resort, the Tribunal must consider whether dismissal is the proper remedy, or whether it would be more appropriate to take some other course, such as adjourning the proceeding or making some other order to secure compliance: Guse v Comcare at 291. Again, a failure to do so would most likely constitute a misapplication of s 42A(5). > > [80] In exercising the discretion, the Tribunal must also afford the applicant procedural fairness: Guse v Comcare at 291. Procedural fairness would ordinarily require the Tribunal to give the applicant the opportunity to make submissions as to why the discretion should not be exercised. That would include giving the applicant an opportunity to put forward submissions concerning whether there had been a failure to comply with a direction and, if so, whether a reasonable time had elapsed since that failure. It would also ordinarily extend to giving the applicant an opportunity to explain or justify any failure, or to advance any reasons why, despite the failure, the application should not be dismissed. Depending on the particular circumstances, it might also extend to giving the applicant a further opportunity to comply or to remedy the default.
The question of what amounts to a reasonable time is, in a sense, impressionistic. There is no point offering synonyms for the words "reasonable time": they are ordinary English words that everyone understands. When determining whether an applicant has had reasonable time, one must have regard to the history of the matter, and the circumstances of the applicant, and determine whether the applicant has had a reasonable time. One undertakes that analysis in the shadow of the objective in s 2A, and having regard to the interests of the decision-maker that expends public resources in the review process. I must ask whether, in all the circumstances, the applicant has failed to do that which is required in the direction within a reasonable time or - where the contention is that they have failed to proceed - whether they have failed to make the progress they should have made within a reasonable time. Once the discretion is enlivened because a reasonable time has been exceeded, one must be conscious of the consequences for the applicant who would lose its right to review the reviewable decision in the Tribunal. The discretion will also be informed by the objective in s 2A. The power is not to be exercised punitively; one must consider what remains to be done to bring the matter on for a hearing. Sometimes, the best course is to just move on and list the matter for a hearing.
Applicant to provide sample 2013 year within 3 weeks from today - 6 August 2021. > > Respondent to provide feedback within 1 week - 13 August 2021 > > Applicant to provide response in full within 4 weeks - 10 September 2021. > > Respondent to provide response within 4 weeks - 8 October 2021
We are in the process of appointing a new barrister to represent Mr Ogden. > > ... > > Mr Ogden is engaging a forensic accountant to check and verify the detailed calculations provided by Mr McNeice. > > ... > > We are seeking clarification from the occupational health and safety officer in Telstra to clarify and confirm Telstra's policy on sunscreen, sunglasses and hats, and the application of Telstra's policy to Mr Ogden's situation. > > There has been some confusion as to the area of Mr Ogden's office and the access by Mr Ogden to the office in his home. We are asking a builder to check and verify the measurements using laser technology. > > ... > > We are asking an engineer employed by the electricity provider to confirm the costs of Mr Ogden working from his home office. ... > > Mr Ogden is preparing an amended Affidavit to include deductions omitted from the earlier affidavit, under instruction from Mr Ogden's barrister.
Gary did not accept the offer made by the Commissioner of Taxation. > > The records were reviewed by my barrister... > > It was recommended that we engage a Forensic Accountant. > > The Commissioner asked Mr Ogden and I to prepare a spreadsheet showing line by line, item by item, calculation of the interest paid and claimable... > > Shortly after our meeting with the Commissioner, I went into hospital ...I picked up a severe infection... It took ten months before the infection was cured. > > Since then, I have been back in hospital for another three operations. I am still going to ... Hospital one day a week for rehabilitation. > > I started working through the line of credit last year between operations. > > I am confident the issues will be resolved with the Commissioner of Taxation.
I certify that the preceding 95 [ninety-five] paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President G Lazanas.
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[1] On 14 October 2024 the AAT was abolished and the Administrative Review Tribunal was established. Any proceeding in the AAT which was not determined by 14 October 2024 continued in the ART and is to be determined by the application of the provisions of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth). Anything done in relation to the proceedings before 14 October 2024 is taken to have been done by the Tribunal under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential & Transitional Provisions No 1) Act 2024 (Cth).
Berry v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1244
Bolton and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] AATA 2022
Charara v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCA 451
Re Ogden and Commissioner of Taxation [2014] AATA 385
Re Ogden and Commissioner of Taxation [2016] AATA 32
Van Blitterswyk v Sons of Gwalia Ltd (Administrator Appointed) & Ors [2006] WASC 283
(2009) 239 CLR 175