Oboro v State of Queensland

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 11, s 130, s 138, s 175

Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 15, s 17, s 36

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 564

A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations) [2019] ICQ 16

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384

Commonwealth of Australia v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (No 11) (2017) 316 FLR 159; [2017] ACTSC 2

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 26; (1981) 147 CLR 297

Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd v South Australia [2023] HCA 22; (2023) 97 ALJR 575

Energy Australia Yallourn Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metal, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2018] FCAFC 146

Equititrust Ltd v Tucker (No 2) [2019] QSC 248

Esso Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2017] HCA 54; (2017) 263 CLR 551

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125

MZAEU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 100

North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory [2015] HCA 41; (2015) 256 CLR 569

Pakefx Pty Ltd v Dickson [2014] NSWSC 1424

Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees v Department of Corrective Services [2006] QIC 42

Roche v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) (No 2) [2024] QIRC 230

Rolfe v State of Queensland (Children's Health Queensland Hospital and Health Service) (No 2) ('Rolfe') [2021] QIRC 324

Rouvinetis v Knoll [2013] NSWCA 24

Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44

Wright v Industrial Relations Secretary obh of Dept of Primary Industries and Regional Development [2025] NSWIRComm 1007

[1] Dr Oboro worked as a provisionally registered health practitioner in the Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service ('Service') for 6 months from mid-2019. That was part of a process designed to formally recognise Dr Oboro's competence for registration in Australia as a health practitioner. Dr Oboro had practiced in the United Kingdom in 2017 and 2018, having qualified with degrees from the West African Post Graduate Medical College in 2000 and the National Post Graduate Medical College of Nigeria in 2001.

[2] Dr Oboro's 6-month work arrangement included two written reports prepared by doctors who supervised him during the term. One report was prepared at around the three-month mark in October 2019. The other report was prepared at the conclusion of the 6-month term.

[3] Dr Oboro alleges that whilst undergoing that process, he was the subject of unlawful race-based discrimination in contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ('AD Act') by employees of the Service. Most significantly, and speaking generally, the relevant reports were not glowing, and hampered Dr Oboro's subsequent attempts to qualify for unsupervised practice in Australia and gain employment. Dr Oboro alleges that the reports, and some other conduct, were acts of unlawful discrimination on the basis of his race. That is the substantive claim. However, two threshold issues have arisen that must be dealt with before Dr Oboro's case can be addressed.

[4] The first threshold issue is a question of jurisdiction. Dr Oboro filed his complaint over 2 years and 8 months after the abovementioned alleged discriminatory conduct by staff of the Service. The limitation period for filing such complaints is only a year.[1] The Queensland Human Rights Commission ('QHRC') initially accepted the claim. That was despite the Service formally raising its objection while the matter was still before the QHRC. However, unless the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('QIRC') grants an extension of time to Dr Oboro, the matter is without jurisdiction and cannot be heard.[2]

[5] The second threshold issue is that the Service has made a formal application to strike out the matter entirely. There are two parts to that application. First, because the complaint is out of time and without jurisdiction, and that no extension of time should be granted. Second, as an alternative, the Service seeks to strike out three parts of the complaint. Those parts are allegations of indirect discrimination, victimisation and breaches of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ('HR Act').

[6] One of Dr Oboro's primary submissions is that it is too late in the process for the Service to be seeking to strike out either parts of his pleadings, or alternatively, strike out the entirety of the claim because it was filed out of time.

[7] Dr Oboro relies on the decision of Bowskill J, as her Honour then was, in the matter of Tucker,[3] arguing that such "late procedural objections waste time and resources." I do not accept that submission because the current situation is not comparable with the one in Tucker. In Tucker, her Honour dealt with a long-running dispute over a plaintiff's pleadings in the statement of claim. The defendants had requested the plaintiff to amend and, eventually having exhausted that path, took the matter to the Court to seek orders striking it out. Although her Honour declined to strike the pleading out entirely, it was accepted that the pleadings needed to be re-drafted. The comments by her Honour that Dr Oboro relies on were passing remarks of disappointment that the matter had gotten to the stage it had, where the Court had to intervene and order the pleadings to be set out more clearly when both sides were legally represented. This is not such a case. The present situation is not comparable in any way to Tucker in my opinion.

[8] Dr Oboro also criticises the Service for what he claims is a late application, by having waited until after conciliation before taking the objection to the matter being out of time. Dr Oboro relies on the case of Pakefx,[4] arguing that the "modern judicial approach discourages late strike out applications, especially after disclosure of evidence."

[9] That submission by Dr Oboro must be rejected for several reasons. First, because this is not a "late" application in my opinion. It is not correct to say that the Service has waited until now before raising these objections. The objection about the application being out of time was formally raised very early when the matter was still before the QHRC. At that point there was no claim by Dr Oboro as to indirect discrimination, victimisation or a breach of the HR Act. The time issue was again raised early in these proceedings before the QIRC. Well before the Service brought it up at a directions hearing on 14 March 2025, the Service's statement of facts and contentions filed on 12 November 2024, raised the time issue and the issue in relation to the pleadings. That document was the Service's first opportunity to formally confront the new pleadings by Dr Oboro in his amended statement of facts and contentions. I therefore do not accept the characterisation of these objections as being "late".

[10] The second reason why I cannot accept Dr Oboro's submission on this point is that it seeks to penalise parties who put objections to one side so they can engage in conciliation. Conciliation is an opportunity to clarify the sorts of pleadings issues that are before me now, as well as the out of time issue. It seems to me that it would also be at odds with the objects of the IR Act to hold it against a party who seeks to conciliate, genuinely attempts to clarify a pleading and, when those efforts fail, decides to take the matter up formally by way of an application in existing proceedings. If I were to accept Dr Oboro's submission, that would set a precedent discouraging parties from engaging in conciliation without having first run their jurisdictional arguments formally.

[11] I also cannot accept the submission that Pakefx is a relevant precedent to this case. In Pakefx the Court found that the amended statement of claim was carefully drawn and detailed with no appearance on its face as being likely to cause unnecessary prejudice or delay. For reasons I discuss below, that is not the case with those parts of Dr Oboro's statement of facts and contentions that the Service seeks to be struck out. Also, in Pakefx, the Court observed that the defendant, who was applying to strike out the other side's pleading, had been able to fully plead to that pleading in reply. The Court concluded that the statement of claim could not have been that confusing. The Court also observed that there were parts of the pleading referring to some refinement of it being necessary after disclosure, which is not unusual in some cases. That was a case where the plaintiff had already served all of its evidence too. This is not such a case, although disclosure has occurred in the present case.

[12] Relying on Davis Samuel,[5] Dr Oboro also argued that the Service's delay in making this application constitutes a waiver of its right to raise the objection. However, this situation is not comparable to the one in Davis Samuel. That was a case with a lengthy history of combat over pleadings that the defendants sought to have struck out on the basis of an irregularity in early versions of the statement of claim. Essentially, the issue arose that three individual parties' names had been left off the list of parties in earlier versions of the amended pleadings. There were multiple changes to the statement of claim as new parties were added. Importantly, the defendants had filed an unconditional defence, a step not required in the QIRC process. Here, the Service has never unconditionally accepted the case pleaded by Dr Oboro as was the case in Davis Samuel. In the present case, the Service has argued the jurisdictional point regarding the application being out of time from the earliest opportunity in the QHRC, and again early in the proceedings before the QIRC. It has also raised the objection to Dr Oboro's pleadings on victimisation, indirect discrimination and breaches of the HR Act at the first available opportunity in its statement of facts and contentions. Accordingly, I do not accept that this case is comparable to the one in Davis Samuel.

[13] Much of the same can be said in relation to Dr Oboro's reliance on MZAEU.[6] That was a case where an appellant succeeded on appeal and the case was remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal to be re-heard by the same member who decided the matter in the first instance. After that member decided the case against the appellant, the appellant claimed apprehended bias. In MZAEU, the Court relevantly said that if the fact that it was the same member hearing the case again that was the only basis for the bias claim, the appellant would be taken to have waived his right to object because he had allowed the matter to proceed knowing it was the same member.[7] There is nothing the Service has done that is comparable to the situation discussed in MZAEU. As I have noted above, the objections by the Service were not late. Nor are there any circumstances that I can see in the Service's conduct in this matter that constitute an implied waiver of the right to raise either the jurisdiction issue or the pleadings issue. There has never been anything said or done by the Service that indicates it has accepted those things that it now seeks a ruling on.

[14] Dr Oboro additionally refers to in Knoll[8] and Kelly,[9] where the relevant party had waited to see the outcome before raising an objection. I find both these cases to not be like the present case. In the current facts, I find, the objections have been there from a very early stage and were pressed by the Service from early on in the proceedings. This is not a case where any waiver or even late objection occurred in my opinion.

[15] Dr Oboro also raises the argument of estoppel. However, in my view, that argument is misconceived and must be rejected. There is nothing in the process carried out by the Service that had the effect of misleading Dr Oboro into believing jurisdiction existed as alleged. Dr Oboro relies on the decision in Energy Australia.[10] But the present case is nothing like the situation in Energy Australia where the appellant had agreed to arbitration then later argued an objection to jurisdiction after the arbitration decision had been delivered. The estoppel in that case related to later arguing that a defined pay dispute did not actually exist when that party had earlier agreed to engage in an arbitration process on that very basis. The present situation is nothing like that in my opinion.

[16] Dr Oboro also argues that the Service is engaging in an abuse of process. He submits that the Service is delaying proceedings in order to frustrate the process. Again, having considered the basis of this argument and the cases that Dr Oboro relies on, I determine that this submission must be rejected. As noted above, I do not accept that this case involves objections that were raised late, which is the primary basis upon which Dr Oboro advances this argument. The out of time jurisdictional issue was raised early in the proceedings as I have noted above. The pleadings issues have been raised early and using the appropriate process in my opinion. I reject Dr Oboro's submissions in this regard for that reason.

[17] A sub-issue regarding the out of time component of this matter has arisen. Dr Oboro argues that part of his complaint is in time. In broad summary, the argument is that Dr Oboro's lack of success in winning an advertised job application was discrimination that fell within the relevant limitation period. The Service argues that it is not. For the following reasons, I find that the Service's submissions must be accepted.

[18] I accept the Service's submissions because it is the relevant conduct that is alleged to constitute a contravention of the AD Act that starts time running for the limitation period. In this case, broadly speaking, Dr Oboro alleges that the conduct of the Service staff in preparing the two relevant reports, as well as some statements and conduct in the workplace at around that time, contravened the AD Act. It is that alleged conduct, not any flow-on effect or consequences of it by a third party who relied on the contents of those reports, that constitutes a potential contravention of the AD Act. It is from that conduct, if proven to be unlawful, that the cause of action arises. It is that cause of action which is subject to the limitation period.

[19] Accordingly, Dr Oboro's submission must be rejected. His reliance on Wright v Industrial Relations Secretary ('Wright')[11] has incorrectly assumed that a consequence of unlawful conduct is actionable as if it were the initial alleged unlawful conduct. Unlike Wright, this is not a course of conduct case where some of the alleged contravening conduct falls outside the limitation period and some of it falls within. Someone relying later on the relevant report/s is not an actionable cause under the AD Act in my opinion.

The first threshold issue - should an extension of time be granted?

[20] In answering this question, I am guided by the decision in Rolfe v State of Queensland (Children's Health Queensland Hospital and Health Service) (No 2) ('Rolfe'). [12] In Rolfe, Hartigan IC, as her Honour then was, observed that the QIRC's discretion under section 175 of the AD Act (whether to allow extra time) is separate and independent from any earlier decision by the Human Rights Commissioner to deal with a complaint made outside the one-year limitation period in section 138 of the AD Act. Hartigan IC observed that once the issue is raised, it is up to the complainant to prove that on the balance of fairness an extension of time ought to be granted.[13] As to whether to exercise the discretion within section 175(2) of the AD Act, the relevant considerations are:

(c) any prejudice to the respondent should the discretion be exercised in the complainant's favour;

(d) any prejudice to the complainant should the discretion not be exercised in the complainant's favour; and

(e) whether there is a lack of merit in the complaint.[14]

[21] The length of the delay is significant in my opinion. The complaint was not made until more than a year and eight months after the one-year limitation period expired. Dr Oboro's submission is that it is 'perilous logic' to speak of the significance of a delay by mere reference to the period of time involved.[15] However, this case will turn on people's recollections of particular events and, importantly, what motivated those relevant acts or decisions. Recollections fade over time. Why either of the two individual respondents wrote a certain thing in one of the two relevant reports, for example, will be key. Whether alleged remarks were made is another key allegation of fact. If so, why a remark was made will be critical in establishing whether the alleged unlawful motives were operating at the time. With that in mind, I find that the delay is likely to significantly impact on the case as it is pleaded.

[22] Dr Oboro's explanation for the delay has several parts to it. Dr Oboro refers to his submissions to the Queensland Human Rights Commissioner dated 11 August 2023 and relies on those submissions to deal with the Service's objection currently before the QIRC. Dr Oboro sites seven reasons for the delay as an explanation.

[23] Primarily, Dr Oboro says that he only recently found out about the one-year limitation period. I understand this submission to simply be that until recently, Dr Oboro did not know there was a limitation period and that largely explains the delay in filing the complaint.

[24] Second, Dr Oboro submits that a fear of reprisal partly explains the delay. Dr Oboro says that he waited until job security was assured before seeking formal redress for the wrongs alleged in the reports and other conduct that makes up the complaint. Given the submission that knowledge of the limitation period was not gained until recently, I construe this part of the explanation to be that Dr Oboro chose to hold off exploring his legal rights until after he felt less at risk of alleged reprisal.

[25] Third, Dr Oboro says that emotional distress also contributed to the delay. This is not a claim that there was incapacity, however. Dr Oboro does not claim he was incapacitated to the extent that he was unable to exercise his rights or explore what rights he had by taking advice. Rather, I understand this submission to be that Dr Oboro suffered a degree of stress and anxiety associated with the circumstances that distracted him from acting sooner.

[26] Fourth, Dr Oboro submits that emotional strain led him to rely on others to navigate the complaint process which contributed to the delay. Dr Oboro does not take this point any further in that it is not developed or explained.

[27] Fifth, Dr Oboro says the delay was partly caused by complexity in the situation and the law. In developing that point, Dr Oboro says that the discrimination alleged was "intricate, encompassing multiple parties and layers of discrimination." He submits that this complexity posed a challenge in assembling evidence and formulating a complaint earlier. Dr Oboro's submission is that he was told later that he had not succeeded in a job application because of the abovementioned impugned work performance reports. Dr Oboro says that learning this prompted him to act. However, it is not explained as to how this is relevant to the heading of "complexity of the situation" as opposed to something that simply motivated Dr Oboro to act.

[28] Sixth, Dr Oboro says that he sought legal advice but there were delays in obtaining advice and representation. The submission about delays in obtaining advice is not developed. There is no submission as to how long it took to take advice and why that was so.

[29] Dr Oboro also argues that his advice was incomplete in that "the lawyers only drafted a letter that I was to submit to the respondent's; they did not advise me of the existence of the Commission." Dr Oboro has attached a draft letter to the Service from his then solicitor dated 11 February 2022. Also in his materials is an email to Dr Oboro from his then solicitor dated 28 February 2022. In it, the solicitor thanks Dr Oboro for his time over the phone that day and, in reference to what was discussed over the phone, seeks Dr Oboro's instructions in relation to whether he felt discriminated during the time he was supervised and if so could he provide examples and as much detail as possible in respect of any particular relevant interactions between him and the supervising doctor. It also invites Dr Oboro to contact the solicitor if he has any questions.

[30] The draft letter of demand written by Dr Oboro's lawyers dated 11 February 2022 advances three arguments: a breach of statutory duty (to complete the relevant reports), a breach of contract (as an alternative to the statutory duty arguments around completing the reports) and discrimination. The discrimination claim is specifically said to be in breach of the AD Act. It cites racial discrimination because of "colour, descent or ancestry, ethnicity or ethnic origin and nationality or national origin."

[31] It is unclear as to when the draft demand letter was actually sent and what amendments were made to it after it was reviewed and further instructions taken. I note that the above-mentioned email correspondence between Dr Oboro and his solicitor was over two weeks after the date on the initial draft of the demand letter.

[32] Dr Oboro does not provide any evidence of the scope of work that he engaged the solicitor to do. Dr Oboro does not say in his submissions or provide evidence of whether his solicitor was engaged to do anything more than prepare a letter to the Service containing arguments in support of a demand for compensation.

[33] Importantly, the draft letter and the subsequent email exchange are dated over a year after the limitation period had already expired. I am therefore not satisfied that this case is comparable to the sort of representative error cases that warrant an extension of time. In those cases, it is the representative error that causes the limitation period deadline to be missed through no fault of the client. In this case, on the evidence, the representative had nothing to do with missing the limitation period deadline and wasn't even on the scene until over a year later.

[34] As to the solicitor's advice (or alleged lack thereof) about the limitation period, I am not satisfied that Dr Oboro actually engaged the solicitor to advise him on what rights he had under the AD Act and how to action them, including how to deal with a limitation period that had passed a year or so before. I therefore do not accept that there was a representative error that explained why Dr Oboro failed to file his complaint about 7 months after working with his solicitors on the abovementioned demand letter.

[35] Seventh, Dr Oboro submits that he attempted mediation which extended the timeframe before proceeding with a formal complaint. It is unclear as to what form of mediation Dr Oboro is referring to. In the material before me there is another letter that Dr Oboro sent to one of the supervising doctors inviting her to take part in a "Direct Dispute Resolution." That letter is dated 27 February 2022, which is a little over a year after the limitation period expired. The invitation to mediate was not taken up and a response rejecting Dr Oboro's assertions was sent to Dr Oboro by lawyers acting for that supervising doctor.

[36] Dr Oboro's does not develop his submissions on mediation. I am therefore not satisfied that there was any real attempt at mediation beyond the abovementioned letters making demands and inviting a negotiated response. The difficulty for Dr Oboro with that is these all occurred well after the limitation period expired. None of this adequately explains the delay of a year after the limitation period expired. I also do not accept that the drafting of two letters of demand that were simply rejected is comparable to a process of formal mediation, or negotiation by correspondence, where delays were experienced because parties took time to prepare and respond to offers and arguments supporting them.

[37] It seems to me that the primary explanation for the delay was that Dr Oboro was unaware of the limitation period until a long time after it had expired. I do not accept that ignorance of the law on legal rights, or the law on the limitation period, to be an acceptable explanation for the delay.[16]

[38] I do not accept that there was any representative error behind most of the delay either. By the time Dr Oboro engaged a lawyer, the limitation period had passed more than a year before. I do not accept as adequate, the explanation proffered for waiting that long to seek help from a lawyer. Nor do I accept that there was any representative error adequately explaining the balance of the delay after Dr Oboro took advice from a lawyer that would warrant an exercise of the discretion to allow extra time.

[39] I do not accept that the employer held any duty or obligation to make Dr Oboro aware of the limitation period. There is no legal obligation for an employer to do so. The statutory limitation period is not hidden either, as Martin P (as his Honour then was) observed in relation to the limitation period for filing an appeal under section 564 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).[17]

[40] I accept that Dr Oboro was experiencing a difficult and stressful period from when the alleged contraventions occurred up to when he filed his complaint. However, there is no evidence as to incapacity and this does not constitute a satisfactory explanation for the delay in my opinion. I also accept Dr Oboro's submissions that the situation was both factually and legally complex. But this too does not explain the delay adequately.

[41] Having regard to each of the matters Dr Oboro raises, I am not satisfied that he has demonstrated a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

What prejudice will the Service suffer if I grant the extra time?

[42] As I have mentioned above, the delay in this case impacts significantly on the Service's ability to run a defence. Some documents exist, for example, the relevant reports themselves are still available. Some statements appear to also have been obtained as to clinical events that the supervising doctors were involved in. However, I accept the Service's submission that at the heart of this matter is a factual dispute. Recollections as to why things were written or not written in the case of an absence of feedback, is subject to the frailty of recollection in my opinion. Accuracy of recollection, even with the aid of being able to refer to previously recorded notes, will diminish over time. That, coupled with the substantial length of the delay in this instance, leads me to conclude that there will be prejudice to the Service if I grant the extension of time that Dr Oboro seeks.

What prejudice will the Dr Oboro suffer if I do not grant the extra time?

[43] The answer to this question is that without the extra time being granted, Dr Oboro will not be able to run his case. With the exception of some parts of his case that are the subject of the Service's strike-out application (discussed below), Dr Oboro's case would fall into the category of cases his Honour Hall P referred to when he observed that a limitation period should be respected even though doing so will sometimes defeat a perfectly good case.[18]

[44] It is not possible to predict with any certainty that Dr Oboro's direct discrimination claims are without merit. It is only the cases where merit can easily be seen to be lacking that weigh against extending time.

[45] For reasons I discuss further below in relation to the Service's application to strike parts of the complaint out, I find that the indirect discrimination claims, the victimisation claims, and the HR Act claims are all without merit. That is because in Dr Oboro's own pleadings, he has failed to make out an actionable cause under any of those headings.

[46] The direct discrimination claim is however not in the same category. It is clear enough that Dr Oboro alleges that it was his attribute of race/ethnicity that motivated the less than glowing reports at the three month and six-month mark of the employment, as well as other alleged conduct. That is a question of fact, which the Service has denied. Importantly, it is not a case that is obviously hopeless such that would tend towards refusing an application for an extension of time. For that reason, I have treated this consideration as a neutral one. It is not a something that tends towards refusing the extra time sought, nor does it tend towards granting extra time.

[47] The delay is significant at over a year and 8 months after the one-year limitation period expired. In my view, that has been made into a weightier consideration because this case will turn on its facts. Witness recollection will fail over time despite there appearing to be some records that may assist with recollection. That causes a prejudice to the Service if extra time were allowed. Against that, there is a substantial prejudice to Dr Oboro in refusing his application for extra time. Weighing heavily in the balance, in my opinion, is Dr Oboro's failure to adequately explain such a lengthy delay as this one. Not knowing about the limitation period does not constitute a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Nor do I accept that a representative error, stress or anxiety, or letters of demand said to constitute mediation attempts adequately explain the delay.

[48] For those reasons, I conclude that Dr Oboro has not made out a case for an extension of time. Accordingly, the application for extra time is refused. The matter cannot proceed as it is without jurisdiction.

Would the strike out application have succeeded had more time been allowed?

[49] The answer to this question is 'yes' for the following reasons.

Why would the indirect discrimination pleadings have been struck out?

[50] The indirect discrimination claim from Dr Oboro relies on section 11 of the AD Act. Dr Oboro argues that the "term" requiring him to discuss each patient with his supervisors was unreasonable because it was the sort of supervision level befitting less experienced doctors on a different pathway to qualification.

[51] Dr Oboro has failed to plead a case as to what it was about his race/ethnicity/etc that meant persons with that attribute could not comply with the "term" of having to discuss each patient with his supervisors. Dr Oboro also fails to plead the alternative, that a higher proportion of persons without that attribute were able to comply with that "term".

[52] Dr Oboro's pleading therefore fails to make out a cause of action in indirect discrimination. This is therefore one of those "clearest of cases" that are obviously untenable, manifestly faulty and cannot succeed, that would warrant using the discretion to strike pleadings out, which I accept, should be a discretion used sparingly and rarely.[19] Had I granted an extension of time, I would have granted the Service's application to strike this part of Dr Oboro's pleadings out. It has no prospects of success and would cause unnecessary cost and delay.

Why would the victimisation pleadings have been struck out?

[53] It is important to note that victimisation is different to discrimination. Dr Oboro has simply pleaded another direct discrimination claim under the heading of "victimisation". The essential ingredient to a victimisation claim is missing from Dr Oboro's pleadings. None of the section 130(1)(a) AD Act elements are pleaded as the reason why any detriment was alleged to have been visited by the Service upon Dr Oboro. No victimisation case is made out. This part of Dr Oboro's case would therefore fail if the matter were to proceed. It is abundantly clear that this is a claim that would cause undue delay and unnecessary cost. For that reason, I would have struck the victimisation claim out had I decided to allow extra time.

Why would the HR Act claims have been struck out?

[54] Dr Oboro's pleading claims that his human right that was limited was 'recognition and equality before the law pursuant to section 15 of the HR Act.' Dr Oboro's pleading goes on to say that Service refused to treat him equally with 'white doctors' in completion of one of the abovementioned work performance reports. Dr Oboro appears to have conflated several of the different concepts within section 15 of the HR Act.

[55] There are five subsections to section 15 of the HR Act. Dr Oboro appears to argue that subsection 15(1) is enlivened, and perhaps subsection 15(3), and also perhaps subsection 15(4). Subsection 15(1) of the HR Act says that 'Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.' Subsection 15(3) says that 'Every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination.' Subsection 15(4) says that 'Every person has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.'

[56] The Explanatory Note ('EN') for the Bill that became the HR Act describes this section generally as providing for 'the right to recognition and equality before the law.'[20] Subsection 15(1) is simply restated in the EN. That is doubtless because the concept within it is as simple as it seems on any reasonable reading of it. However, there is nothing in Dr Oboro's pleadings that addresses how anything the Service did, or anything a Service employee did, impinged his right to recognition as a person before the law.

[57] As to subsection 15(3), the EN says ''Subclause (3) provides the right to legal personality. This is based on article 16 of the ICCPR, which provides that every person is equal before the law and entitled to equal protection of the law without discrimination. It is closely linked to the principle of non-discrimination.''[21] Dr Oboro does not plead how any relevant law has the effect of depriving him of legal personality or equal protection without discrimination. It needs to be remembered that these provisions are not simply prohibitions on discrimination. They address the casting of legislation itself, as well as the administrative actions of government at a higher level than it appears Dr Oboro has aimed this part of his claim. Whilst it seems clear enough that Dr Oboro claims that a government entity has not treated him equally (in comparison to 'white doctors'), the pleading does not engage subsection 15(3) of the HR Act in my opinion.

[58] As to subsection 15(4), it is not disputed that Dr Oboro has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination. His use of the AD Act seems to indicate that he appreciated this as a legal construct. But Dr Oboro's claim does not plead how any law, or other relevant protection, fails to provide equal and effective protection from discrimination.

[59] On my assessment, Dr Oboro's pleading seems to confuse section 15 of the HR Act as being a restatement of the prohibition on direct discrimination as defined in the AD Act. That is not so. The claim is misconceived and does not make out a cause of action under the HR Act as it purports to.

[60] Dr Oboro also claims that an absence of feedback in the work performance reports constituted a breach of the right to education contained in section 36 (2) of the HR Act. That too is misconceived in my opinion. The right to education within section 36(2) of the HR Act is not breached by work performance feedback that the relevant employee feels is not sufficiently educational. This part of his claim is also bound to fail because it fails to make out a cause of action under the HR Act.

[61] Dr Oboro further claims that his right, pursuant to section 17 of the HR Act, to protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment was breached. Dr Oboro's claim here is that by not receiving a reply to a letter, and junior doctors being encouraged to disrespect him or change his counselling behind his back, was degrading treatment. There are no particulars to the pleading. Even so, it appears to misconstrue the meaning of 'treated ... in a degrading way' by overlooking the context within which it appears alongside the words 'punished' and 'cruel and inhuman'. Dr Oboro does not plead how his sense of inequity constitutes a breach of a right to be protected from degrading treatment. His case seems to me to disregard to the plain meaning of the phrase 'treated in a degrading way' because it ignores the context of that phrase as it used in section 17.[22] Also, and as the Service points out, all of that conduct pre-dated the HR Act coming into force on 1 January 2020.

[62] Since the HR Act was not in force until 1 January 2020, any conduct pre-dating that could not be captured by it. However, the second report was signed on 24 January 2020. Therefore, I do not accept the Service's submission that everything under this heading of the complaint must fail because the HR Act captured none of it. The alleged lack of feedback in the first report would not be captured because the HR Act was not in force at the time the first report was created in October 2019. But the claim of a lack of feedback in the second report would be captured. That is a moot point though. As I have noted above, the pleaded claim that this absence of feedback amounts to a breach of the HR Act's right to education is misconceived and ought to be struck out.

1. The application for an extension of time is refused.
2. The matter is not to be heard as it is without jurisdiction.

[1] Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ('AD Act') s 138 (1).

[2] AD Act s 175.

[3] Equititrust Ltd v Tucker (No 2) [2019] QSC 248.

[4] Pakefx Pty Ltd v Dickson [2014] NSWSC 1424.

[5] Commonwealth of Australia v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (No 11) (2017) 316 FLR 159; [2017] ACTSC 2.

[6] MZAEU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 100.

[8] Rouvinetis v Knoll [2013] NSWCA 24.

[9] Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44.

[10] Energy Australia Yallourn Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metal, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2018] FCAFC 146.

[11] Wright v Industrial Relations Secretary obh of Dept of Primary Industries and Regional Development [2025] NSWIRComm 1007 [6].

[12] [2021] QIRC 324.

[13] Ibid [15], citing Donchi v Broadhead and AMP Shopping Centres Pty Ltd [2001] QADT 14 [1]; Marijanovic v Chalmers Industries Pty Ltd and Davis [2008] QADT 4 [12].

[14] Ibid, citing Wong v Medical Board of Queensland & Ors [2006] QADT 41.

[15] Citing Ryle v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) & Pitt [2021] QIRC 307 [130].

[16] Roche v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) (No 2) [2024] QIRC 230 [23], citing and following Duck v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 347 [26]-30].

[17] A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations) [2019] ICQ 16.

[18] Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees v Department of Corrective Services [2006] QIC 42.

[19] Relied on by Dr Oboro, citing General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 129-130.

[20] Explanatory Note, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) 18.

[22] Herzfeld & Prince_, Interpretation_ (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2024) [1.160] citing Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 26; (1981) 147 CLR 297, 305 (Gibbs CJ), 320 (Mason and Wilson JJ); CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ); North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory [2015] HCA 41; (2015) 256 CLR 569 [11] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ) [76] [79]-[80] (Gageler J); Esso Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2017] HCA 54; (2017) 263 CLR 551 [52] (Kiefel CJ, Keene, Nettle and Edelman JJ); Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd v South Australia [2023] HCA 22; (2023) 97 ALJR 575 [15] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gleeson and Jagot JJ; Steward J agreeing).