[1990] HCA 21
Attorney-General (NT) v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1989) 23 FCR 536
[1989] FCA 202
Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd v Minister for Primary Industries & Energy (1992) 27 ALD 633
[1992] FCA 529
Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446
[2005] FCA 1707
Azriel v NSW Land & Housing Corporation [2006] NSWCA 372
Cachia v Colaco (2003) 132 LGERA 62
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
[1990] HCA 21
Attorney-General (NT) v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1989) 23 FCR 536[1989] FCA 202
Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd v Minister for Primary Industries & Energy (1992) 27 ALD 633[1992] FCA 529
Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446[2005] FCA 1707
Azriel v NSW Land & Housing Corporation [2006] NSWCA 372
Cachia v Colaco (2003) 132 LGERA 62[2003] NSWLEC 364
Caldera Environment Centre Inc v Tweed Shire Council [1993] NSWLEC 102
Chandra v Webber (2010) 187 FCR 31[2010] FCA 705
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 397 ALR 1[2022] FCAFC 3
Drake-Brockman v Minister for Planning (2007) 158 LGERA 349[2012] NSWLEC 113
Fullerton Cove Residents Action Group Inc v Dart Energy Ltd (No 2) (2013) 195 LGERA 229[2013] NSWLEC 38
Gloucester Resources Ltd v Minister for Planning (2019) 234 LGERA 257[2019] NSWLEC 7
KEPCO Bylong Australia Pty Ltd v Independent Planning Commission (No 2) (2020) 247 LGERA 130[2020] NSWLEC 179
King v Great Lakes Shire Council (1986) 58 LGRA 366
Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39[1989] FCA 518
McCormack v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation Large Business & International (2001) 114 FCR 574[2001] FCA 1700
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
[1986] HCA 40
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541
[2018] HCA 30
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
[2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
[1995] HCA 20
Minister for Primary Industries & Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381
[1993] FCA 46
Moolarben Coal Mines Pty Ltd v Director-General of the (former) Department of Industry and Investment NSW (Agriculture Division)
Moolarben Coal Mines Pty Ltd v Director-General of the Department Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services (2011) 186 LGERA 342
[2004] NSWLEC 33
Notaras v Waverley Council (2007) 161 LGERA 230
[2014] NSWCA 141
Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348
[2011] NSWCA 195
Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 107
Telstra Corporation Ltd v ACCC (2008) 176 FCR 153
[2008] FCA 1758
Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183
[1993] FCA 208
Walsh v Parramatta City Council (2007) 161 LGERA 118
r-General of the Department Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services (2011) 186 LGERA 342; [2011] NSWLEC 191
Mullaley Gas and Pipeline Accord Inc v Santos NSW (Eastern) Pty Ltd [2021] NSWLEC 110
Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association Inc v Minister for Natural Resources (2005) 138 LGERA 11; [2005] NSWCA 10
Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association v Minister for Natural Resources [2004] NSWLEC 122
Muswellbrook Shire Council v Hunter Valley Energy Coal Pty Ltd [2017] NSWLEC 184
Nature Conservation Council of New South Wales Inc v Minister for Sustainable Natural Resources (2004) 133 LGERA 168; [2004] NSWLEC 33
Notaras v Waverley Council (2007) 161 LGERA 230; [2007] NSWCA 333
Pilato v Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 364
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155; [1985] FCA 47
Randren House Pty Ltd v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation (No 3) [2018] NSWLEC 106
Ross v Lane [2021] NSWLEC 61
Ruangrong v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1988] FCA 87
Shellharbour and Botany Bay City Council v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure (2014) 201 LGERA 367; [2014] NSWCA 141
Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348; [2011] NSWCA 195
Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 107
Telstra Corporation Ltd v ACCC (2008) 176 FCR 153; [2008] FCA 1758
Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183; [1993] FCA 208
Walsh v Parramatta City Council (2007) 161 LGERA 118; [2007] NSWLEC 255
Woolworths Ltd v Pallas Newco Pty Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 707; [2004] NSWCA 422
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Nature Conservation Council of NSW Incorporated (ABN 96 716 360 601) (Applicant)
Minister for Water, Property and Housing (First Respondent)
Minister for Energy and Environment (Second Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
R Beasley SC and J Taylor (Applicant)
A Mitchelmore SC, A Shearer and C Trahanas (First and Second Respondents)
[2]
Solicitors:
Environmental Defenders Office (Applicant)
Department of Planning and Environment, Legal Branch (First and Second Respondents)
File Number(s): 2021/282599
[3]
Judgment
The Applicant has commenced judicial review proceedings challenging the making of the Water Sharing Plan for the NSW Border Rivers Region Regulated River Water Source 2021 (NSW) (Border Rivers Plan) by the Minister for Water, Property and Housing (First Respondent) with the concurrence of the Minister for Energy and Environment (Second Respondent) on 2 July 2021. The Applicant's first ground of review alleges a failure of the respective Ministers to consider mandatory relevant considerations of climate change and climate change impacts, inter alia. Its second ground of review is based on irrationality or unreasonableness.
By Notice Of Motion (NOM) dated 4 February 2022 supported by an affidavit of Mr Huw Calford solicitor affirmed on 4 February 2022 the Applicant seeks an order that it be able to file three categories of expert evidence pursuant to r 31.19 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR). The three categories are climate science, hydrology and freshwater ecology. The Respondents oppose the order sought by the Applicant.
I should note that I am determining whether evidence can be adduced as the Applicant seeks. I am not ruling finally on the admissibility of any evidence. That will ultimately be a matter for decision by the judge hearing the substantive proceedings.
[4]
Water Management Act 2000
The following sections of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (WM Act) are relevant to the parties' arguments:
Chapter 1 Preliminary
…
3 Objects
The objects of this Act are to provide for the sustainable and integrated management of the water sources of the State for the benefit of both present and future generations and, in particular -
(a) to apply the principles of ecologically sustainable development, and
(b) to protect, enhance and restore water sources, their associated ecosystems, ecological processes and biological diversity and their water quality, and
…
Chapter 2 Water management planning
Part 1 General
Division 1 Water management principles
5 Water management principles
…
(2) Generally -
(a) water sources, floodplains and dependent ecosystems (including groundwater and wetlands) should be protected and restored and, where possible, land should not be degraded, and
(b) habitats, animals and plants that benefit from water or are potentially affected by managed activities should be protected and (in the case of habitats) restored, and
(c) the water quality of all water sources should be protected and, wherever possible, enhanced, and
(d) the cumulative impacts of water management licences and approvals and other activities on water sources and their dependent ecosystems, should be considered and minimised, and
…
(h) the principles of adaptive management should be applied, which should be responsive to monitoring and improvements in understanding of ecological water requirements.
(3) In relation to water sharing -
(a) sharing of water from a water source must protect the water source and its dependent ecosystems, and
(b) sharing of water from a water source must protect basic landholder rights, and
(c) sharing or extraction of water under any other right must not prejudice the principles set out in paragraphs (a) and (b).
…
Division 2 State Water Management Outcomes Plan and water source classification
…
8 Environmental water
(1) For the purposes of this Act, environmental water comprises the following -
(a) water that is committed by management plans for fundamental ecosystem health or other specified environmental purposes, either generally or at specified times or in specified circumstances, and that cannot to the extent committed be taken or used for any other purpose (planned environmental water),
…
Division 3 General
9 Act to be administered in accordance with water management principles and State Water Management Outcomes Plan
(1) It is the duty of all persons exercising functions under this Act -
(a) to take all reasonable steps to do so in accordance with, and so as to promote, the water management principles of this Act, and
(b) as between the principles for water sharing set out in section 5 (3), to give priority to those principles in the order in which they are set out in that subsection.
…
Part 3 Management plans
…
Division 2 Water sharing
…
20 Core provisions
(1) The water sharing provisions of a management plan for a water management area or water source must deal with the following matters -
(a) the establishment of environmental water rules for the area or water source,
(b) the identification of requirements for water within the area, or from the water source, to satisfy basic landholder rights,
(c) the identification of requirements for water for extraction under access licences,
(d) the establishment of access licence dealing rules for the area or water source,
(e) the establishment of a bulk access regime for the extraction of water under access licences, having regard to the rules referred to in paragraphs (a) and (d) and the requirements referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(2) The bulk access regime referred to in subsection (1) (e) -
(a) must recognise and be consistent with any limits to the availability of water that are set (whether by the relevant management plan or otherwise) in relation to the water sources to which the regime relates, and
(b) must establish rules according to which access licences are to be granted and managed and available water determinations to be made, and
(c) must recognise the effect of climatic variability on the availability of water, and
(d) may establish rules with respect to the priorities according to which water allocations are to be adjusted as a consequence of any reduction in the availability of water, and
(e) may contain provisions with respect to the conditions that must (as mandatory conditions) be imposed on access licences under section 66 (1), including conditions providing for the variation, from time to time, of the share and extraction components of access licences, and
(f) must be consistent with the water management principles.
(3) The rules referred to in subsection (2) (d) must comply with the priorities established under section 58.
(4) The access licence dealing rules established under subsection (1) (d) -
(a) must comply with the access licence dealing principles, and
(b) must not deal with any matter for which the access licence dealing principles may make provision under section 71Z (2), and
(c) subject to paragraph (b) and the access licence dealing principles, may regulate or prohibit any dealing under Division 4 of Part 2 of Chapter 3.
21 Additional provisions
The water sharing planning provisions of a management plan for a water management area or water source may also deal with the following matters -
(a) the rates, times and circumstances under which water may be taken from any water source in the area, or the quantity of water that may be taken from any water source in the area or delivered through the area,
(b) the kinds of water supply works that may be constructed and used in the area,
(c) the operation of water accounts for the area or water source, such as the carrying over of credits from one accounting period to the next, the maximum credit that may be allowed to accumulate in any account and the withdrawal of water from any account by reason of evaporation or dam spill or in such other circumstances as may be prescribed by the regulations,
(d) water sharing measures for the protection and enhancement of the quality of water in the water sources in the area or for the restoration or rehabilitation of water sources or their dependent ecosystems,
(e) measures to give effect to the water management principles and the objects of this Act,
(e1) measures, not inconsistent with this Act, that are necessary because of requirements arising under the Water Act 2007 of the Commonwealth,
(f) such other matters as are prescribed by the regulations.
…
Part 4 Minister's plans
50 Minister's plan
(1) The Minister may, by order published on the NSW legislation website, make a plan (a Minister's plan) -
(a) for any part of the State that is not within a water management area, or
(b) for any water management area or water source, or part of a water management area or water source, for which a management plan is not in force, or
(c) for any water management area or water source, or part of a water management area or water source, for which a management plan is in force, but only so as to deal with matters not dealt with by the management plan.
…
(2) A Minister's plan must in general terms deal with any matters that a management plan is required to deal with, and may also deal with any other matters that a management plan is authorised to deal with, other than matters that are already dealt with by a management plan.
(2A) Part 3 (except sections 15 and 36-41) applies to a Minister's plan. However, the Minister -
(a) may adopt any of the provisions of sections 36-41 in a particular case, and
(b) may dispense with a particular requirement of Part 3 in the case of a Minister's plan referred to in subsection (1A).
(3) Before making a Minister's plan, the Minister must obtain the concurrence of the Minister for the Environment to the making of the plan.
(4) Except to the extent to which this Act otherwise provides, a Minister's plan has the same effect as a management plan.
(5) The Minister may decide whether to make a Minister's plan or a management plan in respect of any matter (whether or not any draft management plan has been submitted to the Minister).
[5]
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
The following rules in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) are relevant:
Part 31 Evidence
…
Division 2 Provisions applicable to expert evidence generally
Subdivision 1 Preliminary
31.17 Main purposes of Division
The main purposes of this Division are as follows -
(a) to ensure that the court has control over the giving of expert evidence,
(b) to restrict expert evidence in proceedings to that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings,
(c) to avoid unnecessary costs associated with parties to proceedings retaining different experts,
(d) if it is practicable to do so without compromising the interests of justice, to enable expert evidence to be given on an issue in proceedings by a single expert engaged by the parties or appointed by the court,
(e) if it is necessary to do so to ensure a fair trial of proceedings, to allow for more than one expert (but no more than are necessary) to give evidence on an issue in the proceedings,
(f) to declare the duty of an expert witness in relation to the court and the parties to proceedings.
…
Subdivision 2 Expert witnesses generally
31.19 Parties to seek directions before calling expert witnesses
(1) Any party -
(a) intending to adduce expert evidence at trial, or
(b) to whom it becomes apparent that he or she, or any other party, may adduce expert evidence at trial,
must promptly seek directions from the court in that regard.
(2) Directions under this rule may be sought at any directions hearing or case management conference or, if no such hearing or conference has been fixed or is imminent, by notice of motion or pursuant to liberty to restore.
(3) Unless the court otherwise orders, expert evidence may not be adduced at trial -
(a) unless directions have been sought in accordance with this rule, and
(b) if any such directions have been given by the court, otherwise than in accordance with those directions.
(4) This rule does not apply to proceedings with respect to a professional negligence claim.
…
[6]
Summons dated 1 October 2021
The lengthy summons identifies the parties, when the Border Rivers Plan was made, over what geographical areas it was made and describes the statutory context by reference to ss 3, 5 and 9 of the WM Act. The summons then sets out an extensive recitation of certain matters in pars 19-82 under the headings:
1. "Water sources and dependent ecosystems in the Border Rivers Region" (pars 19-26);
2. "The impacts of climate change on water resources in the Border Rivers" (pars 27-51). Subheadings specified are:
1. The assumption of stationarity is no longer valid.
2. Climate Change Modelling.
3. Climate Change Impacts.
4. Historical knowledge of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts.
5. Climate Change Impacts are likely already occurring.
6. Extractions [of water] and climate change.
1. "LTAAEL and SDL", in full, the 'Long-term Average Annual Extraction Limit' and 'Sustainable Diversion Limit' (pars 52-65). Topics covered are that the setting of the LTAAEL under cl 27 of the Border Rivers Plan fails to take into account Climate Change or Climate Change Impacts and that the Murray-Darling Basin wide SDL and the SDL for the Border Rivers Catchment have been set above the level required to protect water sources and water dependent ecosystems in the Border Rivers, with no incorporation of climate change considerations;
2. "Environmental flow rules and supplementary water events" (pars 66-70). The subject of this section of the summons is essentially that supplementary access rules and environmental flow rules have not been developed in light of Climate Change or Climate Change Impacts and may not protect the water source, water-dependent ecosystems and hydrologically connected systems in light of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts;
3. "Basic Landholder Rights" (pars 71-82). This section deals with inter alia:
1. the requirements that the Border Rivers Plan places on the operator of the water supply system in such a way that water would be able to be supplied during a repeat of the lowest accumulated inflows to the water source to meet domestic and stock rights and native title rights (basic landholder rights); available water determinations of share components for domestic and stock access licences and local water utility access licences; and available water determinations for unit shares of regulated river (high security) access licences;
2. the definition of reserves of water;
3. the most severe drought on record in the Border Rivers in 2017-2019;
4. the drought was partly attributable to Climate Change, and that if the most recent drought and Climate Change Impacts were taken into account under cl 57(2) of the Border Rivers Plan, greater volumes of water would be required to be set aside for uses set out in cl 57(2) than are currently required to be set aside and the volumes of water available to general security licence holders would be reduced correspondingly;
5. reliance on the historical record risks insufficient reserves being set aside for basic landholder rights.
[7]
Amended response to summons
The Respondents variously admit or deny pars or parts of pars in the summons. The Respondents were given leave to rely on an amended response to summons dated 30 March 2022 (amended response) adding a new par 18A, which states as follows:
Merits of the matters of fact and opinion alleged in the Summons
18A In answer to paragraphs 19-30, 32-51, 60, 62, 65, 69, 70, 76-82 and 90 of the Summons, the Respondents:
a. say that those paragraphs allege matters of fact or opinion;
b. say that, to the extent that the First Respondent considered those matters of fact or opinion to be relevant in deciding whether to make the Border Rivers Plan under s 50 of the WM Act:
i. it was open to her to consider and form a view about them; and
ii. the merits of any such view is not susceptible to challenge or contradiction as part of any challenge to that decision in these proceedings;
c. say that, to the extent that the Second Respondent considered those matters of fact or opinion to be relevant in deciding whether to provide concurrence to the Border Rivers Plan under s 50(3) of the WM Act:
i. it was open to him to consider and form a view about them; and
ii. the merits of any such view is not susceptible to challenge or contradiction as part of any challenge to that decision in these proceedings;
d. further to paragraphs (a)-(c) above, say that the matters of fact or opinion alleged in paragraphs 19-30, 32-51, 60, 62, 65, 69, 70, 76-82 and 90 of the Summons are:
i. irrelevant to the grounds of review to the extent that the applicant is seeking to defend the merits of those matters of fact or opinion; and
ii. embarrassing because of the generalised nature of the allegations in those paragraphs and because these proceedings are judicial review proceedings which cannot traverse the merits of those matters.
It is not necessary for the resolution of this NOM to further set out the Respondents' amended response.
[8]
Topics for expert evidence
The issues to be addressed by each of the areas of expertise cross-referenced with the summons were contained in a table marked "Annexure A" to the NOM. As a result of discussions during and following the hearing of the motion, the topics have been much reduced and are identified in a table marked "Further Amended Annex A to the Notice of Motion" dated 30 March 2022. The topics are broadly climate science, hydrology, and freshwater ecology.
The amended Annexure A is as follows with footnotes placed in square brackets:
Areas of expert evidence
Issue for expert consideration Relevant paragraph(s) of Applicant's Summons (AS)
Climate Science
a) 36-44, 47, 61,
The following concepts: 62, 67, 70, 80,
a) Climate Change Impacts [Defined at [36] of the AS]; and 87, 88, 90-94,
b) climatic variability. 97 & 98
b) 36(a)
The length of time for which there has been scientifically robust projections of the impact of Climate Change that could be incorporated into modelling of water availability in the Murray-Darling Basin, including the Border Rivers. 42
[9]
Border Rivers Plan
The Border Rivers Plan was tendered (Ex A).
The Border Rivers Plan contains, amongst other things:
1. environmental water provisions to commit, identify, establish and maintain planned environmental water: see Pt 4. "Planned environmental water" is water that is committed by management plans for fundamental ecosystem health or other specified environmental purposes, either generally or at specified times or in specified circumstances, and that cannot to the extent committed be taken or used for any other purpose: WM Act, s 8(1)(a);
2. rules for managing the availability of water for extraction in accordance with (i) a long-term average annual extraction limit (LTAAEL) and (ii) a long-term average annual sustainable diversion limit (SDL): see Pt 6;
3. the circumstances in which the taking of water pursuant to supplementary water access licences is authorised: see Pt 8, Div 2;
4. rules regarding daily environmental releases and stimulus flow: see Pt 10, Div 1; and rules relating to the maintenance of water supply: see Pt 10, Div 3.
Various sections of the Border Rivers Plan were referred to and are extracted as follows:
…
2 Nature and status of Plan
(1) This Plan is made under section 50 of the Water Management Act 2000 (the Act).
(2) This Plan is a replacement management plan for the purposes of subsection 43(4) of the Act in relation to the NSW Border Rivers Regulated River Water Source and replaces the Water Sharing Plan for the NSW Border Rivers Regulated River Water Source 2009.
(3) This Plan is a plan for water sharing and generally deals with the matters set out in sections 20 and 21 of the Act, as well as other sections of the Act.
…
4 Application of Plan
…
(2) The water in the water source consists of the water between the bed and banks of all rivers that have been declared by the Minister to be regulated rivers and that is available to New South Wales under the terms of the New South Wales - Queensland Border Rivers Act 1947, the Border Rivers Agreement 1946 under the Schedule to that Act, and the New South Wales - Queensland Border Rivers Intergovernmental Agreement 2008 (the IGA), from:
(a) the Pindari Dam water storage downstream to the Pindari Dam wall,
(b) the Severn River from the Pindari Dam wall downstream to its junction with the Macintyre River,
(c) the Macintyre River from its junction with the Severn River downstream to the junction of the Barwon River,
(d) the Barwon River from its junction with the Macintyre River downstream to Mungindi Weir,
(e) the Dumaresq River from its junction with Pike Creek downstream to the junction of the Macintyre River.
…
7 Vision statement
The vision for this Plan is to provide for the following:
(a) the health and enhancement of the water source and its water-dependent ecosystems,
(b) the continuing productive extraction of surface water for economic benefit,
(c) the spiritual, social, customary and economic benefits of surface water to Aboriginal communities,
(d) social and cultural benefits to urban and rural communities that depend on surface water.
…
8 Environmental objectives
(1) The broad environmental objective of this Plan is to protect and contribute to the enhancement of the ecological condition of the water source and its water- dependent ecosystems over the term of this Plan.
(2) The targeted environmental objectives of this Plan are as follows:
(a) to protect and contribute to the enhancement of the following over the term of this Plan:
(i) the recorded distribution or extent, and the population structure of, target ecological populations,
(ii) the longitudinal and lateral connectivity within and between water sources to support target ecological processes,
(iii) water quality within target ranges for the water source to support water-dependent ecosystems and ecosystem functions,
(b) support environmental watering in the water source to contribute to maintaining or enhancing ecological condition in streams, riparian zones, dependent wetlands and floodplains.
(3) The strategies for reaching the targeted environmental objectives of this Plan are as follows:
(a) maintain compliance with the long-term average annual extraction limit and the long-term average sustainable diversion limit,
(b) reserve a share of water to partially mitigate alterations to natural flow regimes in the water source,
(c) reserve a share of water to maintain longitudinal and lateral connectivity within and between the water sources,
(d) reserve a share of water to support environmental watering events in streams, riparian zones, floodplains and wetlands connected to the water source.
…
Part 3 Bulk access regime
…
13 Climatic variability
This Plan recognises the effects of climatic variability on river flow in the water source through provisions contained in Part 6 that:
(a) manage the sharing of water within the limits of water availability on a long-term basis, and
(b) establish priorities according to which water allocations are to be adjusted as a consequence of any reduction in the availability of water due to an increase in extraction against the long-term average annual extraction limit or the long-term sustainable diversion limit, and
(c) manage the sharing of water between categories of access licences on an annual basis through available water determinations.
…
Part 6 Limits to availability of water
Division 1 Calculations under this Part
26 Exclusions, inclusions and variations in calculations
(1) This clause applies to the calculation of the following:
(a) the long-term average annual extraction limit under clause 27,
(b) long-term average annual extraction under clause 28,
(c) the annual permitted take under clause 31,
(d) the annual actual take under clause 31.
…
Division 2 Long-term average annual extraction limit
27 Calculation of the long-term average annual extraction limit
(1) Following the end of each water year, the Minister must calculate the long-term average annual extraction limit for the water source in accordance with this clause and clause 26.
(2) The long-term average annual extraction limit is the lesser of the following:
(a) long-term average annual extraction calculated based on the following:
(i) the water storages and water use development that existed in the 2001/2002 water year, excluding that which is the subject of subclause (v),
(ii) the basic landholder rights and access licence share components that existed on 1 July 2009,
(iii) the rules set out in the Water Sharing Plan for the NSW Border Rivers Regulated River Water Source 2009 as at 1 July 2009,
(iv) the level of development for plantation forestry that existed on 1 July 2009,
(v) the level of development for floodplain harvesting that existed in the 2001/2002 water year in connection with extractions from a regulated river in the water source, as assessed by the Minister,
(b) long-term average annual extraction calculated under Cap baseline conditions as agreed under the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement that was in place at the commencement of the Water Sharing Plan for the NSW Border Rivers Regulated River Water Source 2009.
(3) For the purposes of subclause (2), the long-term average annual extraction limit is to be calculated over the duration of available climate records using the plan limit hydrological computer model approved by the Minister.
…
Part 10 System operation rules
…
Division 3 General system operation rules
57 Maintenance of water supply
(1) In this clause, the period of lowest accumulated inflows to the water source is identified by flow information held by the Department prior to 1 July 2009.
(2) The operator must operate the water supply system in such a way that water would be able to be supplied during a repeat of the period of lowest accumulated inflows to the water source, to meet the following:
(a) the annual water requirements of persons exercising domestic and stock rights and native title rights,
(b) available water determinations of 100% of share components for domestic and stock access licences and local water utility access licences,
(c) available water determinations of 1 ML per unit share for regulated river (high security) access licences.
(3) For the purpose of subclause (2), the operator must set aside sufficient volumes of water from inflows into the water source and in reserves held in Pindari Dam and Glenlyon Dam water storages.
…
[10]
Affidavit of Mr Huw Calford
Mr Calford solicitor for the Applicant affirmed a brief affidavit in support of the NOM dated 4 February 2022. The affidavit described the procedural history of the proceedings including the filing of the summons on 1 October 2021, the response to summons on 3 December 2021, and directions I made on 17 December 2021 in preparation for the hearing of this motion.
[11]
Applicant's submissions
The two rationales for why expert evidence in three categories is reasonably necessary in the present proceedings are:
1. the need to explain the meaning of various technical terms used in the Applicant's summons and/or in the material that was before the Respondents; and
2. the grounds of review relating to unreasonableness and irrationality, which require an explanation of the effect of the Respondents' decisions.
By way of broad and general overview, the Applicant's case is that:
1. likely climate change impacts are projected to result in, inter alia, less water flowing into streams and rivers in the Border Rivers Catchment and increased evapotranspiration, resulting in less water being captured in public storages and less water being available for consumptive and environmental uses. Lower water availability throughout the Border Rivers Catchment will in turn negatively affect water dependent ecosystems and hydrological connectivity, and will result in a threat of irreversible environmental damage to water sources and dependent ecosystems in the Border Rivers catchment and hydrologically connected systems;
2. these climate change impacts have been modelled by the then NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment;
3. the climate change impacts were not, however, taken into account - as they were bound to be - by the First Respondent when making the Border Rivers Plan or by the Second Respondent in providing concurrence to the making of the Border Rivers Plan; or alternatively,
4. if climate change impacts were taken into account, and having regard to ss 5 and 9 of the WM Act in particular, the Respondents could not rationally or reasonably have made the Border Rivers Plan in its current form, including because:
1. the Border Rivers Plan calculates the amount of "planned environmental water", supplementary access rules and environmental flow rules using the assumption of stationarity and based on historical climate records rather than future or likely climate change impacts, with the result that they are unlikely to protect the water source and water dependent ecosystems in the Border Rivers and hydrologically connected systems; and
2. the Border Rivers Plan requires an amount of water to be reserved in water storages to fulfil basic landholder rights, which amount is calculated based on the period of lowest accumulated inflows to the water source predating 1 July 2009 (i.e. excluding the most severe drought on record in the Border Rivers which occurred in 2017-2020 or likely future severe droughts caused by climate change), which risks insufficient reserves being set aside for basic landholder rights; and
1. the Respondents had the means to calculate likely climate change impacts as these had been modelled by the then Department of Planning, Industry and Environment.
[12]
Expert evidence can be admitted in judicial review proceedings in certain circumstances
The Applicant accepts that expert evidence is not automatically available in judicial review proceedings. Nevertheless, there is no general rule against the admission of expert evidence in judicial review cases: Muswellbrook Shire Council v Hunter Valley Energy Coal Pty Ltd [2017] NSWLEC 184 (Musswellbrook) at [42] (Preston CJ of LEC). Expert evidence has been admitted in a large number of judicial review cases, including Attorney-General (NT) v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1989) 23 FCR 536; [1989] FCA 202 at 540 (Lockhart J); Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd v Minister for Primary Industries & Energy (1992) 27 ALD 633; [1992] FCA 529 (O'Loughlin J), affirmed on appeal in Minister for Primary Industries & Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381; [1993] FCA 46; Farley Environment care Inc. v HL Fry Properties Pty Ltd [2021] NSWLEC 77 (Farley) at [22], [40]-[41] (Pain J); Friends of King Edward Park Inc v Newcastle City Council (2012) 194 LGERA 226; [2012] NSWLEC 113 (Friends of King Edward Park) at [90] (Biscoe J).
As UCPR r 31.17 and case law makes plain, in some instances expert evidence is "reasonably required to resolve" the proceeding (r 31.17(b)): see, for example, Friends of King Edward Park at [90] (Biscoe J). While case law sheds light on when such expert evidence may be reasonably required, each case will turn on its own unique facts and circumstances, the nature of the evidence proposed to be called as well as the grounds of review: Arnold v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 6) [2013] NSWLEC 73 (Arnold No 6) at [123] (Biscoe J), cited with approval in Muswellbrook at [42] (Preston CJ of LEC); McCormack v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation Large Business & International (2001) 114 FCR 574; [2001] FCA 1700 at [38] (Sackville J); Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446; [2005] FCA 1707 (Weinberg J) (ARA v RBA) at [457]-[459]; Chandra v Webber (2010) 187 FCR 31; [2010] FCA 705 (Chandra v Webber) at [40]-[42] (Bromberg J).
Expert evidence is reasonably needed because of the highly scientific, technical and complex nature of water management and the WM Act, the nature of the Applicant's pleaded case and the amended response. Expert evidence has previously been admitted in relation to judicial review cases dealing with the WM Act: see Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association v Minister for Natural Resources [2004] NSWLEC 122 (Murrumbidgee Groundwater) (McClellan CJ), although this case did not expressly address the issues of admissibility of expert evidence in judicial review proceedings; affirmed on appeal in Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association Inc v Minister for Natural Resources (2005) 138 LGERA 11; [2005] NSWCA 10; Randren House Pty Ltd v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation (No 3) [2018] NSWLEC 106 (Randren House) at [27], [34] (Molesworth AJ). In one case, this Court noted that in the context of the statutory scheme of the WM Act, including the Act's objects in s 3 and the water management principles in s 5 (in that case, s 5(2)), the Court would "be assisted when considering the contextual decision-making process issues": Randren House at [27] (Molesworth AJ). The Applicant placed particular emphasis on Arnold No 6 (Biscoe J) at [123]-[130] (Tcpt, 21 February 2021, p20(24-46)).
[13]
Technical terms make expert evidence necessary
Expert evidence explaining factors, principles or materials relevant to the decision has in some circumstances been allowed to be adduced: Caldera Environment Centre Inc v Tweed Shire Council [1993] NSWLEC 102 (Caldera) (Talbot J); Muswellbrook at [25], [41]. Evidence concerning technical terms in material before the decision-maker can be allowed: ARA v RBA at [467] (Weinberg J), cited with approval in Arnold No 6 at [128] (Biscoe J); Chandra v Webber at [45]; Telstra Corporation Ltd v ACCC (2008) 176 FCR 153; [2008] FCA 1758 at [50]-[51] (Rares J).
The Court of Appeal's decision in Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348; [2011] NSWCA 195 (Shellharbour CA) does not stand in the way of allowing expert evidence to explain technical terms in this case. In Shellharbour CA the expert evidence was allegedly needed to explain what was meant by expressions in a State Environmental Planning Policy. In this case, the terms sought to be explained are scientific terms that cannot sensibly be addressed by a court without expert evidence (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p16(8-30)).
Courts have allowed expert evidence in relation to the judicial review ground of unreasonableness: Arnold No 6 at [120], [124] (Biscoe J); Muswellbrook at [42] [44] (Preston CJ). Evidence may be admissible to establish what a decision-maker ought reasonably to have done in the course of the decision-making process and if it is relevant to the proposition that on the material before the decision-maker, the decision was manifestly unreasonable: King v Great Lakes Shire Council (1986) 58 LGRA 366 (Great Lakes) at 371 (Cripps CJ); Arnold No 6 at [124].
In Friends of King Edward Park at [75], Biscoe J made clear that the limited exceptions to the general rule depending on the circumstances of the case include where the ground of review is manifest unreasonableness, within which exception the Applicant's case falls (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p22(1-3)). Molesworth AJ in Randren House at [27], paraphrasing Talbot J in Caldera made a similar observation that expert evidence to show what a decision-maker acting reasonably ought to have done falls within an exception to the rule disallowing expert evidence in judicial review proceedings. Preston CJ in Muswellbrook allowed expert evidence in judicial review proceedings in relation to the same ground of review.
All of these reasons apply to the Applicant's case. In order to understand the unreasonableness ground, the Court needs to understand for example, whether the Border Rivers Plan protects, or whether the Respondents could reasonably have believed that the Border River Plan would protect, the water source and its dependent ecosystems (see s 5(3)(a)) and basic landholder rights (see s 5(3)(b)). This requires a consideration of climate change and climate change impacts on the Border Rivers Region. The nature of these likely climate change impacts, and their interaction with the likely impacts of the Border Rivers Plan, on the relevant water sources and dependent ecosystems are complex matters which require an understanding of the matters discussed below, including the extent to which various aspects of the Border Rivers Plan are based on the assumption of stationarity and whether that assumption is valid in the face of climate change, and a range of interrelated likely environmental impacts and consequences.
Moolarben Coal Mines Pty Ltd v Director-General of the (former) Department of Industry and Investment NSW (Agriculture Division); Moolarben Coal Mines Pty Ltd v Director-General of the Department Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services (2011) 186 LGERA 342; [2011] NSWLEC 191 (Moolarben) was a decision of Moore AJ in which his Honour rejected expert evidence tendered in relation to manifest unreasonableness. Biscoe J in Arnold No 6 at [134], [137] did not consider Moore AJ to be correct and Biscoe J's conclusion is correct (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p21(1-14)).
[15]
Specific requirement for expert evidence on each item pressed
Item 1 proposes that expert evidence be adduced to elucidate the concepts of "climate change impacts" and "climatic variability" (as opposed to climate change). These terms (and similar, such as "climate impacts") were used in documents before the Respondents, including the Draft NSW Water Strategy dated February 2021 (Draft Water Strategy). These concepts are also picked up and relied on in the summons. An explanation of these technical terms will assist the Court in understanding both the material before the Respondents and the nature of the Applicant's case.
Item 6 is directed to the length of time for which there has been scientifically robust projections of the impact of climate change that could be incorporated into modelling of water availability. The Applicant alleges that there has been sufficiently robust projections for at least the past decade (summons par 42), which the Respondents do not admit. This is necessary to understanding the reasonableness (or otherwise) of the approach taken by the Respondents in relation to various aspects of the Border Rivers Plan.
Item 7 proposes that expert evidence be adduced to elucidate the concept of "stationarity". "Stationarity" is a central concept to the Applicant's case and is used in the summons. An explanation of that technical term will assist the Court in understanding both the material before the Respondents and the nature of the Applicant's case.
Item 8 is directed to the extent to which climate change renders the assumption of stationarity redundant for the purpose of hydrological modelling. The Respondents deny that climate change means that historical patterns in the climate record cannot be relied on to predict future climatic patterns (amended response par 29). Issues relating to stationarity were raised in the materials before the Respondents, including in the First Respondent's commissioned review of the relevant climate change modelling (summons par 33(e)). This issue is central to the Applicant's unreasonableness ground and the Court would be assisted in understanding the complexities of it, particularly as it relates to hydrological modelling.
Item 9 is directed to the extent to which the Long-term Average Annual Extraction Limit (LTAAEL) as set out in cl 27 of the Border Rivers Plan is based on an assumption of stationarity (summons par 58(d)).
[16]
Respondents' pleadings underscore need for expert evidence
The Respondents have in their amended response admitted the text of the various documents pleaded as particulars in the summons, but to not admit the fundamental evidentiary basis upon which the Applicant puts its claim. This is another reason expert evidence is required as there is a difference between an admission of text and an admission of the underlying claim in the summons (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p6(46-50)-7(1-15)).
[17]
The documents do not speak for themselves
In reply to the Respondents' submissions below in [55], [72], [79], the Applicant submitted that the documents particularised at par 83 of the summons do not speak for themselves. The documents speak of highly complex and technical concepts and the Court will find it difficult to make determinations without the assistance of expert evidence (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p50(25-44)).
Moreover, many items in the amended Annexure A pick up pars in the summons where no document has been particularised and to which no admission was made by the Respondents (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p51(3-50), p52(1-31)). For example, Item 6, picking up summons par 42, was not admitted and not particularised by reference to a document. The same can be said for Item 7 (stationarity), 8 and 9. In relation to Item 9, picking up summons par 58(d), this was not particularised by reference to a document and the Respondent. Item 11, picking up summons par 64, is similar. The same applies to Item 12, picking up the summons pars 57-61, Item 21, picking up summons pars 40, 48 and 50, and Item 23, picking up summons pars 26 and 47.
I note that the Applicant's submission above in [48] appears not entirely correct in some respects. It is true that Items 6, 9, 11, 12, and 21 as pleaded do not particularise documents before the Respondents. Nevertheless Item 7(e) relating to stationarity picks up inter alia pars 29, 30 and 33(e) of the summons, which do particularise documents. Item 8 picks up pars 29 and 33(e) of the summons, which as just noted particularise documents. Item 23 picks up par 26, which particularises a document.
[18]
Respondents' submissions
Ordinarily, evidence and documents that do not form part of the record before the original decision-maker are not admissible in subsequent judicial review proceedings: see, eg, ARA v RBA at [442], [454] (Weinberg J); Chandra v Webber at [40]. This constraint has been recognised in judicial review proceedings in this Court, including recently in Ross v Lane [2021] NSWLEC 61 (Ross) at [19] (Pepper J) and Farley at [36] (Pain J). The constraint is a necessary concomitant to the principle that judicial review is not concerned with the merits of the decision but with the lawfulness of the decision made: Azriel v NSW Land & Housing Corporation [2006] NSWCA 372 at [49]; Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; [1990] HCA 21 at 35-36.
Where expert evidence in judicial review proceedings is not reasonably required to resolve the grounds of review leave under r 31.19 should not be given: Shellharbour CA; Botany Bay City Council v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure (2014) 201 LGERA 367; [2014] NSWCA 141 (Botany Bay). In Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 107 Pain J rejected an application for leave to rely upon expert evidence in judicial review proceedings in Class 4 of this Court's jurisdiction. The expert evidence in question was technical, scientific evidence as to the meaning of certain terms. In so doing, her Honour referred to the purpose of the requirement for leave in r 31.19 of the UCPR, and to authority indicating that "the expert evidence has to be reasonably required to resolve the issue in the proceedings": at [6]. At [7], Pain J made the observation that "[t]he experience of the Court generally is that expert evidence in judicial review proceedings... is of very limited assistance".
In Shellharbour CA, the Court of Appeal unanimously refused leave to appeal the decision of Pain J. Justice Hodgson (Giles and Campbell JJA agreeing) observed at [29] that the primary judge "could properly take the view that a substantial contest of experts would be a waste of time and money, having regard to her assessment of the unlikelihood that it could be of assistance". In concurring supplementary reasons, Giles JA (Campbell JA agreeing) rejected a submission that, for leave to be granted under r 31.19, it need only be demonstrated that the evidence in question might be relevant and admissible. His Honour stated at [35] (emphasis added):
It should be made clear that this is not the correct approach to directions under r 31.19 of the UCPR. The primary purpose of the rule is to control the calling of expert evidence, restricting it to that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings having regard to the admonition of just, quick and cheap. That evidence may be relevant and admissible is not enough, let alone that it is possible to argue that it is relevant and admissible.
[19]
Framing of summons means expert evidence not reasonably required
The Applicant has framed the summons in a manner that (appropriately, given the nature of the claims) does not reasonably require expert evidence. Summons pars 19-81 pleads numerous matters of fact or opinion. Summons par 83 states that "[t]he Respondents had available to them, or ought to have had available to them, information setting out the matters pleaded at paragraphs [19]-[81] above" and particularises 21 documents. On the Applicant's case, the contentions in summons pars 19-81 are answered by the documents particularised, noting that the purpose of particulars is to confine the allegations in the pleadings and define the scope of evidence to be led at trial: Cachia v Colaco (2003) 132 LGERA 62; [2003] NSWLEC 364 at [32] (McClellan CJ, citing Pilato v Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 364 at 364).
Summons pars 19-81 are identified as "relevant paragraphs" for the topics in the Expert Issues List. However, having regard to the allegation in summons par 83, on the basis of which the Applicant contends the Respondents should have been aware of the matters in summons par 19-81, the Applicant has not explained why expert evidence would also be required in relation to those matters.
[20]
Applicant has not provided specificity in relation to propositions that expert evidence will support
The Applicant has not provided evidence or submissions as to the propositions that any expert evidence is expected to support. Rather, the Applicant indicates topics in respect of which it anticipates obtaining expert evidence, and seeks to justify the topic by referring to a pinpoint in the pleadings and submitting that the Court would be assisted by understanding the topic more and/or that the topic is relevant to unreasonableness. That level of detail is insufficient for an application of this kind. In Shellharbour CA, which concerned an application to adduce expert evidence as to technical terms, Hodgson JA (Giles and Campbell JJA agreeing) said at [26]-[27]:
[W]here, as in this case, it may very reasonably seem highly unlikely that expert evidence will be relevant to an issue, it may be necessary for an applicant for directions for expert evidence to provide some specificity as to the proposition or propositions that the expert evidence is expected to support, rather than merely give a vague indication of the area in which the expert evidence will be given.
In my opinion, it was well open to the primary judge, having regard to the way the application was put and in the absence of any specificity as to the propositions which the expert evidence was expected to support, to take the view that the prospect that such evidence could assist the Court was so remote that directions should not be given.
[21]
The Court can understand technical evidence without expert evidence
In so far as the applicant relies on the need to explain technical terms, this Court is a specialist court and well able to understand many expressions of a technical nature: Shellharbour CA at [28]. It has experience in cases relating to the WM Act and plans for water sharing: Randren House; Murrumbidgee Groundwater; Nature Conservation Council of New South Wales Inc v Minister for Sustainable Natural Resources (2004) 133 LGERA 168; [2004] NSWLEC 33. The Court also has experience dealing with climate change cases: Gloucester Resources Ltd v Minister for Planning (2019) 234 LGERA 257; [2019] NSWLEC 7; KEPCO Bylong Australia Pty Ltd v Independent Planning Commission (No 2) (2020) 247 LGERA 130; [2020] NSWLEC 179; Mullaley Gas and Pipeline Accord Inc v Santos NSW (Eastern) Pty Ltd [2021] NSWLEC 110. The Court is likely to be familiar with a number of the terms or concepts proposed to be the subject of expert evidence.
[22]
Expert evidence is not needed for unreasonableness ground as pleaded
Focus and attention needs to be directed at the grounds of review and the way in which they are articulated.
The two grounds of review of failure to consider mandatory considerations and legal unreasonableness are based on alleging the Respondents failed to consider or consider sufficiently Climate Change (as defined in the summons at par 27) and Climate Change impacts (as defined in the summons at par 36) which failure is said to be evidenced by various features of the Border Rivers Plan. These grounds require construction of the WM Act and the Border Rivers Plan, the matters the Respondents had regard to in making that plan pursuant to s 50 of the WM Act (First Respondent), and in providing concurrence pursuant to s 50(3) of the WM Act (Second Respondent). The merits of the Border Rivers Plan are not reviewable.
The Applicant does not generally advance an argument that expert evidence is reasonably required to determine the mandatory considerations ground. No doubt this is because whether the Respondents were required to consider given matters is a question of law dependent on the exercise of statutory construction: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 at 39. The particularity of the matter which must be considered is also dependent upon that same exercise of statutory construction and not the facts of a given case (or expert evidence): Notaras v Waverley Council (2007) 161 LGERA 230; [2007] NSWCA 333 at [120] (Tobias JA, citing Walsh v Parramatta City Council (2007) 161 LGERA 118; [2007] NSWLEC 255; at [59]-[60]; Mason P and Hodgson JA agreeing); Drake-Brockman v Minister for Planning (2007) 158 LGERA 349; [2007] NSWLEC 490; at [126], [132(1)-(5)] (Jagot J). Whether or not the respondents considered the given matters is then determined by reference to the record before them: Ruangrong v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1988] FCA 87 at [11] (Davies J); Fullerton Cove Residents Action Group Inc v Dart Energy Ltd (No 2) (2013) 195 LGERA 229; [2013] NSWLEC 38; at [45], [115]-[157] (Pepper J); Ross at [22].
The unreasonableness ground is determined similarly, by determining the legal standard of unreasonableness depending on the metes and bounds of the statute (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18; (Li) at [23], [28] (French CJ), [67] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ)). In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 397 ALR 1; [2022] FCAFC 3, the Full Court of the Federal Court observed at [34] that:
[t]he task in assessing illogicality is not an exercise in logical dialectic", but rather "the ascertainment, through understanding the approach of the decision-maker and characterising the reasoning process, of whether the decision (or state of satisfaction) is so lacking a rational or logical foundation that the decision (or relevant state of satisfaction) was one that no rational or logical decision-maker could reach, such that it was not a decision (or state of satisfaction) contemplated by the provision in question.
[23]
Additional submissions
A large number of the allegations in the summons, which are picked up in topics in the amended Annexure A to the motion, are particularised by reference to various identified documents, expert elaboration of which is unnecessary and irrelevant: see, e.g. summons pars 29, 33 picked up in Item 8; summons par 51 picked up in Item 10. This submission is made in relation to Items 1, 7, 8, 10 and 16 (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p40(38-50)-41(14-15)). The very role of the particulars is to confine the allegation and the evidence the applicant can adduce in respect of it. The amended response, in part, acknowledges what is stated in the particularised documents. That is appropriate having regard to the nature of judicial review proceedings and the manner in which the Applicant has articulated the contentions which do not require broader, at-large admissions. One example is the amended response at par 32, where the Respondents note that the then NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment, Draft Regional Water Strategy, Border Rivers: Strategy, (October 2020) (Draft Regional Strategy) states something. No expert evidence is reasonably required to elaborate on the statement admitted to be in the Draft Regional Strategy. It and other documents speak for themselves and the parties can seek to tender the documents into evidence if they consider them to be relevant to the issues in dispute.
Various of the allegations are framed by reference to the position of a particular person or body. Expert evidence cannot address what some other person has recognised: see summons par 33 picked up in Item 8.
Although some allegations are not particularised, the absence of particulars does not provide a basis for expert evidence on open-ended topics. For example, see summons par 62 picked up in Item 17 concerning whether there will be a disproportionate impact on planned environmental water and the environment if Climate Change Impacts eventuate in the Border Rivers Region. Also see summons pars 40, 48, 50 picked up in Item 21 concerning the likely environmental impact of the Border Rivers Plan.
Item 23 referring to summons pars 26, 47 concerns matters admitted by the Respondents: see the amended response pars 26, 47. The Applicant does not explain why, in these circumstances, expert evidence is reasonably required to determine the unreasonableness ground.
[24]
Consideration
These are judicial review proceedings to which Pt 31 'Evidence' of the UCPR applies. Rule 31.17 of the UCPR states that the purpose of Div 2 which applies to expert evidence is to ensure the court has control over the giving of expert evidence, to restrict expert evidence to that which is reasonably required to resolve proceedings and to avoid unnecessary costs in parties retaining experts. Rule 31.19 of the UCPR enables the court to control the calling of expert evidence. Such evidence is limited to what is reasonably required to resolve proceedings in light of the case management principles in ss 56-60 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CP Act): Shellharbour CA at [35]; Botany Bay at [5].
The Applicant is challenging the making of the Border Rivers Plan under the WM Act. That plan is made under s 50 of the WM Act and is intended to deal with the matters set out in ss 20 and 21 of the WM Act. Section 20 states that a water sharing plan must deal with matters specified in ss (1)-(2). Additional provisions with which a water sharing plan may deal are identified in s 21 of the WM Act. Parts of the plan are extracted above in [20], including cl 7 'Vision Statement' and cl 8 identifying environmental objectives and the broad strategies to achieve these. Clause 13 refers to the effects of climactic variability on river flow through specified measures. Part 6 refers to the application of the LTAAEL.
The Applicant's motion must be considered in light of the case identified in the summons. While this is not a court of strict pleading the summons is the means by which applicants particularise their case so that respondents are aware of the case they must meet. As is apparent from the summary of the summons in [6]-[13] above and the parties' submissions summarised above in [22]-[48], [50]-[79] the matters identified by the Applicant in pars 19-82 of the summons are expansive. These reflect in part the legislative scheme under the WM Act for the making of water sharing plans in light of the management principles in s 5 and the obligation identified in s 9 in relation to these, the requirement to consider core provisions in s 20 in making a water sharing plan and to provide for environmental water as defined in s 8. The summons identifies that the planned environmental water component is identified by means of the LTAAEL and the SDL, in paragraphs 55 and 56. One allegation in the summons is the alleged failure in formulating supplementary access rules and in the provision of environmental flow rules to take into account changes in flows and the flow regime likely to be caused by Climate Change Impacts, in paragraphs 66-70. A further allegation in the summons is that reserves of water for basic landholder rights under the Border Rivers Plan are likely inadequate under cl 57(2), as identified in pars 71-82 of the summons.
[25]
Consideration of each Item in amended Annexure A
In relation to Item 1, the topic of expert evidence sought is broad namely Climate Change Impacts, identified as seven impacts likely to occur in the Border Rivers in par 36(a) of the summons. A large number of paragraphs of the summons (23) are referred to as relevant. Item 1(b) refers to climatic variability, referring to par 36(a) of the summons, which is in turn an aspect of how the summons defines Climate Change Impacts. Some of these paragraphs particularise documents, namely pars 37, 38, 41 and 44. The Applicant admits that the terms sought to be the subject of expert evidence in Item 1 were used in the documents before the Respondents (see above in [34]) and the Respondents are right to submit above in [78] that the concept of "climatic variability" is referred to in the Border Rivers Plan. It is difficult to assess the extent to which such broad evidence is needed to elucidate to the Court the Applicant's case without having the evidence before the Court. On balance given that the concept of Climate Change Impacts in relation to the Border Rivers Plan are foundational to the Applicant's case evidence in relation to this topic will be allowed.
Item 6 refers to par 42 of the summons and seeks expert evidence on the length of time for which there has been scientifically robust projections of the impact of climate change that could be incorporated into modelling of water availability in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB), including the Border Rivers. The preceding par 41 states that Climate Change Impacts have been predicted to occur in the MDB including the Border Rivers region and acknowledged in government publications since at least 2002. Two CSIRO reports are particularised, one dealing with future impacts of climate variability, climate change and land use change on water resources in the MDB, one with water availability in the Border Rivers. No specific document is particularised in par 42. Whether an expert view on this topic is warranted in light of the reports particularised is difficult to judge in the absence of evidence. On balance given that it is potentially foundational to the Applicant's case I will allow expert evidence on this topic to be adduced.
Items 7, 8, and 9 all deal with stationarity in different contexts and it is difficult to separate them out. The technical term stationarity in the context of hydrological modelling in Item 7 (stationarity) cannot be assumed to be known to the Court to the extent necessary for the Applicant's case. Expert evidence on that topic may be adduced.
[26]
Costs of the NOM
The parties agreed that it would be appropriate for costs of this application to be reserved. I will make an order in those terms.
[27]
Orders
The Court orders:
1. Pursuant to r 31.19 of the UCPR expert evidence responsive to the topics identified in the amended Annexure A to the Applicant's Notice of Motion dated 30 March 2022 at Items 1, 6, 7(e), 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16(c) and (e), 17, 21, and 23 may be adduced by the Applicant.
2. Costs are reserved.
[28]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 14 June 2022
'Climate Change Impacts' are identified at par 36 of the summons as follows:
Climate Change Impacts
36 Within the Border Rivers, Climate Change is likely to have the following impacts (together, Climate Change Impacts):
a. increased climatic variability;
b. increased average temperature;
c. increasing frequency, severity and duration of drought periods;
d. seasonal shifts in rainfall patterns;
e. increased average annual levels of evapotranspiration;
f. reduced average annual inflows into water sources; and
g. increasingly severe extreme weather events.
Stationarity is referred to in par 28 of the summons as:
28… the idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability (Stationarity).
Planned environmental water is referred to at par 53 as follows:
53 Planned environmental water is water that is committed for fundamental ecosystem health or other specified environmental purposes, either generally or at specified times or in specified circumstances and that cannot, to the extent committed, be taken or used for any other purpose.
Particulars
i. Border Rivers Plan, cl 14.
ii. WM Act, s 8(1)(a).
Paragraph 83 identifies information available or that ought to have been available to the Respondents when the Border Rivers Plan was made and 21 documents are identified by name, being a mix of Commonwealth and NSW government reports, and CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology reports inter alia.
The grounds of review commence at par 84. Ground 1 (pars 84-96) alleges the failure to consider mandatory considerations by the Respondents in exercising their respective functions under s 50 and s 50(3) of the WM Act through failing to consider and apply the principles of ecologically sustainable development as required by s 3(a) of the WM Act by failure to consider the precautionary principle, and intragenerational and intergenerational equity. It is also alleged that, in order to comply with s 3(b) of the WM Act, take reasonable steps to comply with the water management principles in ss 5(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (h) and s 5(3)(a), (b), and (c) of the WM Act, and ensure that sharing or extraction of water will not prejudice the principles in ss 5(3)(a) and s 5(b) of the WM Act, in accordance with the duty in s 9 of the WM Act, the Respondents were required to give consideration to the sufficiency of environmental water in the Border Rivers Catchment and hydrologically connected systems, which in turn required consideration of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts as defined. It is therefore pleaded at par 94 that the Respondents failed to take into account Climate Change, Climate Change Impacts, the precautionary principle (insofar as it required consideration of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts) and intra and inter-generational equity (insofar as it required consideration of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts) when exercising their functions.
Ground 2 (par 97) alleges the following:
97 Further or in the alternative, by:
a. calculating the LTAAEL in a way that excludes consideration of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts;
b. using the SOL which does not take into account Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts;
c. specifying Supplementary Access Rules and Environmental Flow Rules which do not allow for Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts; and/or
d. requiring operators to rely upon a restricted historical climate record when ensuring that full allocations are available for holders of basic landholder rights;
the Respondents, in exercising their Respective Functions:
e. failed to give any or sufficient weight to Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts; and
f. therefore could not rationally or reasonably have attempted to give effect to the Priority of Use Provisions in section 5(3) of the WM Act as required by the Section 9 Duty.
Further or in the alternative (par 98), it is alleged that to the extent that the Respondents did take into account Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts as defined the Respondents acted so unreasonably that no reasonable persons in their positions could have exercised the Respective Functions (referring to earlier premises established in the summons at pars 61, 64, 70, 75, 80-83) in that manner, and acted in a manner that lacks an evident and intelligible justification.
Hydrology
The following concepts:
7. ... e) 28-30, 33(e) & 58(d)
e) Stationarity [Defined at [28] of the AS] (in the context of hydrological modelling).
...
8. The extent to which Climate Change renders the assumption of Stationarity redundant for the purpose of hydrological modelling. 29, 33(e)
9. The extent to which the LTAAEL [The Long-Term Average Annual Extraction Limit as set out in cl 27 of the Water Sharing Plan for the NSW Border Rivers Regulated River Water Source 2021] is based on an assumption of Stationarity. 58(d)
10. The consequences of the predicted Climate Change Impacts in relation to changes to inflows and the flow regime in the Border Rivers Region and the extent to which the magnitude, direction and timeframe of these impacts is known. 39, 51
11. Whether consideration of Climate Change and the Climate Change Impacts were incorporated into the determination of the SDL [SDL means the long-term average sustainable diversion limit as defined at cl 1.07 of the Basin Plan 2012 (Cth)]. 64
12. Whether the LTAAEL has been calculated in a way that excludes consideration of Climate Change and the Climate Change Impacts. 57-61, 97(a)
Freshwater Ecology
The following concepts:
… c) 53
16. c) fundamental ecosystem health; e) 40
e) irreversible environmental damage to water sources and water dependent ecosystems.
…
17. Whether Planned Environmental Water [Defined at [53] of the AS], and the environment (including the water source and its water- dependent ecosystems) will be disproportionately impacted if the Climate Change Impacts eventuate in the Border Rivers Region. 62
The likely environmental impact of the Border Rivers Plan, including:
21. 1. the impact upon the health of river systems and water-dependent ecosystems, habitats and species; 40, 48, 50
2. the impact of alterations to the flow regime on conditions for survival of native fish; and
3. whether there is a threat of irreversible damage to the water source and its dependent ecosystems, habitats and species.
23. The extent to which environmental water helps ecosystems to establish and maintain their basic function and resilience, including the resilience required to withstand the Climate Change Impacts. 26, 47
The emphatic language of s 5(3) ("must"), coupled with the language of s 9 requiring a person exercising functions under the WM Act to take "all reasonable steps" to give priority to the principles set out in s 5(3) in the order in which they appear, makes plain that the Respondents were required to consider climate change and climate change impacts in exercising their functions, and that they had to do so in a manner which gave sufficient weight to climate change and climate change impacts so as to take all reasonable steps to give priority to certain water sharing principles. It is the Applicant's case that the Respondents did not do so.
Item 10 is directed to the consequences of the predicted climate change impacts in relation to changes to inflows and the flow regime in the Border Rivers Region and the extent to which the magnitude, direction and timeframe of these impacts is known. The Respondents do not admit that climate change impacts are "likely" to result in less water flowing into the Border Rivers Catchment with less water being available for consumptive and environmental uses (amended response par 39). The Respondents say that the magnitude, direction or timeframe of the impacts is unknown (amended response par 51). Given the dispute as to the state of knowledge, expert evidence addressing the conclusions to be drawn from information before the Respondents (such as the climate change modelling) or generally available is necessary to assist the Court to understand the Applicant's unreasonableness ground.
Item 11 is directed to whether consideration of climate change and the climate change impacts was incorporated into the determination of the Sustainable Diversion Limit (SDL), which is defined by reference to the Basin Plan 2012 (Cth) and which forms part of the Border Rivers Plan (insofar as the Border Rivers Region is concerned). The Respondents deny that climate change or climate change impacts were not taken into consideration in the setting of the SDL. Given the complexities of the Commonwealth water legislation and instruments made under it, the Court would be assisted by an explanation of how the SDL was calculated.
Item 12 is directed to whether the LTAAEL has been calculated in a way that excludes consideration of climate change and climate change impacts (summons pars 57-61). Given the complexities of the relevant hydrological models, the Court would be assisted by an explanation of the key assumptions underpinning the relevant models. The Court needs to understand this issue in order to address the Applicant's unreasonableness ground as well as the relevant consideration ground (the latter only to the extent that there is debate as to whether the hydrological model used in the making of the Border Rivers Plan was in fact based on an assumption of stationarity).
Item 16 proposes that expert evidence be adduced to elucidate the concepts of "fundamental ecosystem health" and "irreversible environmental damage to water sources and water dependent ecosystems", Some of these terms were used in documents before the respondents, including the Draft Water Strategy. Others are relied on in the summons. An explanation of these technical terms will assist the Court in understanding both the material before the Respondents and the nature of the Applicant's case. Assuming that the additional items of proposed expert evidence are allowed below, an explanation of these terms will also be essential in answering the additional questions.
Item 17 is directed to whether planned environmental water (as defined) and the environment (including the water source and its water-dependent ecosystems) will be disproportionately impacted if the climate change impacts eventuate in the Border Rivers Region (summons par 62). This is denied by the Respondents (amended response par 62). Expert evidence would assist the Court to understand the interrelationship of climate change impacts and the operation of the Border Rivers Plan, both matters of some complexity. An understanding of this complex interrelationship is directly relevant to, and necessary to understand, the Applicant's unreasonableness ground.
Item 21 is directed to the likely environmental impact of the Border Rivers Plan, including 1) the impact upon the health of river systems and water-dependent ecosystems, habitats and species; 2) the impact of alterations to the flow regime on conditions for survival of native fish; and 3) whether there is a threat of irreversible damage to the water source and its dependent ecosystems, habitats and species. The Respondents generally admit that there have been "impacts" but not the nature or extent of these impacts (amended response par 50). The likely environmental impacts of the Border Rivers Plan are complex, particularly as an assessment as to future matters is required. The Court would be assisted by expert evidence on this topic. The likely impacts of the Border Rivers Plan are central to the Applicant's unreasonableness ground.
Item 23 is directed to the extent to which environmental water helps ecosystems to establish and maintain their basic function and resilience, including the resilience required to withstand the climate change impacts. The Respondents admit that the provision of environmental water is "one of a number of factors that may help ecosystems to establish and maintain their basic function and resilience" (amended response par 47), but do not admit the extent to which this is critical. The Court would be assisted by expert evidence on this topic. An understanding of the importance of environmental water to function and resilience is necessary to understand the Applicant's unreasonableness ground.
The Court of Appeal cited the above paragraph with approval in Botany Bay, in refusing leave to appeal from a first instance decision declining to grant leave to rely upon expert evidence: Botany Bay at [5] (Beazley P, Ward and Gleeson JJA).
Consideration of whether the expert evidence is reasonably required to resolve the grounds of review requires regard to the grounds of review, the relevant issues and the nature of the evidence: Ross at [20] (Pepper J); Muswellbrook at [42]. That evidence was adduced in other WM Act cases such as Randren House is not determinative of this application. However, as noted above, the issue of leave is not answered by whether evidence might arguably be relevant or admissible. It involves a broader inquiry. The proposed evidence is not reasonably required and leave should not be granted.
Ultimately, the question is whether the satisfaction was irrational or illogical "such that it cannot be said to be possible for the conclusion to be made or the satisfaction reached logically or rationally on the available material": at [35].
A decision is not legally unreasonable just because reasonable minds (or just because an expert) may reach a different conclusion about a matter: Li at [72]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30 at [12], [58], and so expressed the unreasonable ground is narrow.
The Applicant seeks to adduce expert evidence on whether Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts were considered in certain features of the Border Rivers Plan, or whether other features of the Border Rivers Plan achieve certain objectives: see, Items 11, 12. For the reasons above, this is a question to be determined by the Court by construing the WM Act and the Border Rivers Plan, and by reference to the matters considered by the Respondents.
The lengthy introduction to the summons does not call for a different conclusion. Contrary to what might be suggested by the Expert Issues List in the amended Annexure A to the NOM, these proceedings are not a vehicle to debate whether the Border Rivers Plan guards sufficiently against risks associated with climate change and the grounds should be focused within the judicial review prism.
The Applicant is correct (see above in [33]) that in Moolarben Moore AJ was too absolute in his view about the admissibility of expert evidence in judicial review proceedings (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p43(47-49)). The Respondents nevertheless rely on Moore AJ's observation at [71].
The Applicant's reliance on Friends of King Edward Park at [75] (see above in [31]) is misplaced because that was a case of manifest unreasonableness based on a failure to make inquiries (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p47(4-16)) based on the line of authorities including Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155; [1985] FCA 47; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39; [1989] FCA 518; Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183; [1993] FCA 208; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; [1995] HCA 20, and in this Court Great Lakes.
Similarly, in the line of cases beginning with Austral Fisheries expert evidence not before the decision-maker could be relied upon because it showed a decision was fallacious in so far as it operated by way of a particular formula (Tcpt 21 February 2022, p47(18-23)).
In this case, the unreasonableness ground is pleaded in such a way that it does not rest upon further expert evidence but seeks to explain, elaborate and traverse material in front of the decision-maker. It is an over-simplification of the circumstances in which unreasonableness cases have permitted expert evidence to simply say this is an unreasonableness case therefore expert evidence is required (Tcpt 21 February 2022, p48(1-10)).
This is not a case concerning failure to make inquiries where expert evidence might be admissible to prove what would have been available had the inquiries been made. The Court does not need expert evidence in an unreasonableness case which relates to failure to consider particular further matters that were or should have been before the Minister in the information that was available. Such a case is a straightforward orthodox unreasonableness ground which can be determined on the basis of the material before the decision-maker (Tcpt, 21 February 2022, p37(1-15)).
Asking an expert to opine on technical concepts or to elucidate technical concepts is an open-ended task, which has the potential to lead to wasted time and expense: See Items 1, 7, 16. The limits of the task of explaining or elucidating a technical concept are unclear.
The Applicant also proposes to adduce expert evidence on the meaning of concepts even though there is no apparent dispute about their meaning: see, e.g. amended response par 28(b) (stationarity). Expert elucidation is unlikely to add to the Court's understanding of these concepts for the purpose of determining the grounds of review.
The concept of "climatic variability" identified for expert elucidation in Item 1 is referred to in the Border Rivers Plan: see cl 13. To the extent necessary, the Court can construe this term applying the ordinary principles of construction applicable to such instruments.
A large number of the terms that the Applicant proposes for expert elucidation are referred to in documents, some of which contain glossaries: see e.g. Guide to the Regional Water Strategies dated September 2020 published by the then NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment Attachment 1 (defining the term "climate variability"). To the extent necessary, the Court can also ascertain the meaning of concepts used in documents from reading the document.
Paragraph 83 of the summons states that the Respondents had available to them or should have the information setting out the matters pleaded at pars 19-81 of the summons with 21 documents specified therein. The first ground of review at pars 84-94 of the summons alleges a failure to consider mandatory considerations of Climate Change, Climate Change Impacts, the precautionary principle (insofar as it required consideration of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts) and intra and inter-generational equity (insofar as it required consideration of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts). The second ground of review alleging unreasonableness in par 97 of the summons identifies four matters the Respondents carried out in exercising their respective functions which failed to give any or sufficient weight to Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts and consequently could not have rationally or reasonably attempted to give effect to the priority of use provisions in s 5(3) of the WM Act as required by the s 9 duty.
Further and alternatively, if Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts were taken into account, then it is alleged that the Respondents acted so unreasonably that no reasonable person in their positions could have so exercised their functions in that manner (in the Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 sense) and also acted without an evident and intelligible justification (in the Li sense). Consequently the Respondents did not carry out their functions in accordance with law. This expression of Ground 2 is based on previously asserted premises that: the LTAAEL did not take into account Climate Change or Climate Change Impacts; Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts considerations were not incorporated into the determination of the SDL; the Supplementary Access Rules and Environmental Flow Rules were not developed in light of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts; and ascertaining of the period of 'lowest accumulated inflows', the identification of which is governed by cl 57 of the Border Rivers Plan, was based on pre-July 2009 data which meant that there was a risk of over-allocation of water to lower priority licences and insufficient reserves. Consequently the Respondents did not carry out their functions in accordance with law. The Applicant's motion concerns the unreasonableness ground set out in full above in [12], [13], which is complex in that numerous matters are identified in relation to which the Respondents failed in carrying out their functions in a complex statutory scheme for a water sharing plan that has a number of components.
Contrary to the Respondents' submissions concerning par 83, the grounds of review are not linked explicitly to the documents in par 83. I do not accept that the list of 21 documents specified in par 83 can be assumed to encapsulate all the matters the Applicant seeks to raise.
The Respondents' par 18A in its amended response alleges that many pars in the summons identify matters of fact and opinion; that the Respondents' consideration of matters specified was open to them under the WM Act and that the merits of that view are not susceptible to judicial review; that the matters of fact and opinion are irrelevant to the grounds of review and are embarrassing because of their generalised nature and their attempt to traverse matters of merit. I am not being asked to rule presently on whether such a pleading is justified in relation to the summons. I of course accept that matters of merit are not able to be argued in judicial review proceedings.
In judicial review proceedings concerning general fact-finding and reasoning in the course of decision-making, or the decision itself, a court determines lawfulness generally on the material before a decision-maker: Arnold No 6 at [121]. As relied on by the Applicant, expert evidence has been allowed in judicial review proceedings in limited contexts: see above in [25]. Particular reliance was placed by the Applicant on judicial review cases dealing with the WM Act: see above in [27]. Particular support was said to arise from Arnold No 6, Muswellbrook and Randren House. Each case in which expert evidence is sought in judicial review proceedings must be determined on its own circumstances, mindful of the grounds of review, the relevant issue and the nature of the evidence: Arnold No 6 at [123]; Muswellbrook at [42]; Farley at [37].
In Caldera Talbot J identified the following six grounds as conceivably enabling expert evidence in judicial review proceedings, at 10:
In exercising its function of judicial review this Court is not entitled to go beyond the material before the consent authority… The limited extent to which the Court can go beyond the material actually before the council might be summarised as follows:-
1. Where there is a failure to make inquiries, receive reports or consult with authorities, evidence is admissible as to what inquiries, reports or consultations would have revealed.
2. To show what a council acting reasonably ought to have done.
3. To achieve an understanding of the environmental consequences of the action or inaction of the council.
4. To explain factors, principles or materials relevant to the determination.
5. In a challenge to the reasonableness of the decision where all of the relevant material before the council is in the possession of the witnesses to explain what was before the council.
6. As to the existence and nature of information said to be relevant to the decision where council proceeds to a decision without making any attempt to obtain that information. (Prasad v The Minister for Immigration 65 ALR 549 at 563, Jacfin Pty Ltd v The Taft Entertainment Company Pty Ltd & Ors No. 40033 of 1985 Stein J 3 October 1985 Unreported and Hale).
In Arnold No 6, Biscoe J stated at [124]:
Judicial review cannot survive if it tolerates all expert evidence; it does not follow, however, that it will collapse if it tolerates some. In principle and on the authorities, expert evidence can be tolerated in some circumstances, including at the edge of judicial review, at the high and usually insurmountable barrier of the ground of manifest unreasonableness, if it is relevant to the proposition that, on the material before the decision-maker, the decision was manifestly unreasonable. No violence is done to the general principle that judicial review grounds (other than jurisdictional fact) are determined by reference to the material before the decision-maker if it is acknowledged that expert evidence may be required to show that that material was fallacious and operated to produce an absurd result that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached. The precise limit of the admissibility of expert evidence for this purpose is not a bright line. But expert evidence is likely to be admissible where, for example, the technical nature of the material before the decision-maker requiring review is such that it may not be fully understood by the court without expert evidence. The admissibility of expert evidence for this purpose is a different question to whether, at the end of the day, the court is satisfied that the hard to prove ground of manifest unreasonableness has been established. It is insufficient to establish mere factual error.
Justice Biscoe later stated that expert opinion not before the decision-maker may be admitted as to the meaning of technical terms in material before the decision-maker, citing ARA v RBA at [467]. Moolarben was distinguished. Competing hydrogeological evidence from two experts about a hydrogeological model was admitted subject to the respondents' objections in relation to a ground of review alleging manifest unreasonableness in the making of a water sharing plan under the WM Act which reduced groundwater extraction entitlements for a large number of farmers. In considering the respondents' objections Biscoe J rejected the contention that expert evidence is inadmissible in judicial review proceedings and found that the evidence of one of the experts may have been admissible only in relation to the irrationality or manifest unreasonableness ground. Its actual admissibility was to be determined by the content of the ground and the expert's evidence. Ultimately, part of the expert's evidence was not admitted as to do so would be to engage the Court in merits review: at [195].
In Muswellbrook the local council sought to rely on the evidence of a mine rehabilitation engineer in relation to a civil enforcement claim, a judicial review ground based on the absence of a jurisdictional fact about the existence of a certain state of affairs relevant to the application of consent conditions, and a judicial review ground of manifest unreasonableness, inter alia. Expert evidence was allowed to be served in relation to judicial review grounds concerning unreasonableness and the existence of a jurisdictional fact, at [44]-[45], and the civil enforcement ground, at [46].
In Randren House evidence of an expert irrigation specialist/water engineer was admitted in relation to the unreasonableness ground impugning decisions made in relation to a water sharing plan inter alia. Molesworth AJ at [27] cited Talbot J in Caldera and his reasoning has some resonance in this matter.
As the Respondents submitted, in Friends of King Edward Park and Great Lakes which were relied on by the Applicant, expert evidence was allowed in relation to a ground of review alleging unreasonableness on a discrete issue, a failure to make inquiries. No such ground exists in this case.
It is fair to describe the Applicant's submissions concerning the need for evidence in relation to technical terms as broad brush, the assertion being made in relation to numerous matters in the amended Annexure A that such evidence will assist the Court with little detail about why. Judicial review cases where evidence has been allowed in relation to technical terms are relatively few. Such an application was unsuccessful in Shellharbour LEC concerning an application to adduce expert ecological evidence as to the meaning of the expressions 'high biodiversity significance' and 'high conservation value' in two environmental planning instruments, upheld on appeal in Shellharbour CCA. These cases are summarised above in the Respondents' submissions at [51]-[52] with emphasis on the Court of Appeal's finding as quoted. I observe that at issue in that case was the statutory construction of the specified terms and the application to rely on expert evidence about technical terms was rejected in that context. This application to rely on technical terms relating to scientific matters and matters arising from the manifest unreasonableness ground as pleaded varies in significant respects from Shellharbour LEC.
Evidence is more likely to be admissible where the technical nature of the material before the decision-maker requiring review is such that it may not be fully understood by the court without expert evidence (Arnold No 6 at [124]) or to achieve an understanding of the environmental consequences of an action: Caldera.
While the Court is a specialist environmental court and has broad familiarity with climate change issues as the Respondents submitted, the wide-ranging nature of the allegations in the summons are directed to the Border Rivers Plan, a specific instrument. The ground of judicial review concerning manifest unreasonableness identified in the summons is complex in nature and appears to raise issues not considered by the Court in earlier cases challenging the making of water sharing plans.
The evidence sought is of a character that has been permitted to be prepared in the cases relied on by the Applicant outlined above. It is also highly relevant to note that the Applicant substantially reduced the topics of expert evidence sought to be adduced from 23 topics to the current 12 topics over the course of the NOM hearing.
Item 8, the extent to which Climate Change renders the assumption of stationarity redundant for the purposes of hydrological modelling, refers to pars 29 and 33(e) of the summons. Paragraph 29 states that climate change means that historical patterns in the climate record cannot be relied on to predict future climatic patterns and cites the NSW Government report headed "New climate analysis informs NSW's regional water strategies". Paragraph 33(e) is particularised by reference to a CSIRO independent review report which reviewed the risk method for the NSW Regional Water Strategies Program. While particularised by reference to documents this topic is linked to Item 9 which I consider can be the subject of expert evidence. Expert evidence on Item 8 can be adduced.
Item 9 (extent LTAAEL based on stationarity) cites par 58d of the summons to the effect that the calculation required by cl 27(2)(a) is based on the assumption of stationarity and uses historic climate records inappropriately. One of the actions specified in the second ground is calculating the LTAAEL in a way that excludes considerations of Climate Change and Climate Change Impacts. Expert evidence on this topic appears essential to the unreasonableness ground and can be adduced.
Item 10 refers to the consequences of predicted Climate Change Impacts in relation to changes in inflows and the flow regime for the Borders Rivers region and refers to pars 39 and 51. Paragraph 39 refers to less water being available in the Border Rivers Catchment and its consequences. No document is particularised in relation to par 39. Paragraph 51 refers to the likely change in the flow regime resulting from Climate Change, particularised by the then NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment report on risk assessment. While partly particularised by reference to a document, expert evidence on this topic appears foundational to the unreasonableness ground and can be adduced.
Item 11 refers to whether Climate Change and Climate Change impacts were incorporated into the determination of the SDL (defined in cl 1.07 of the Basin Plan 2012 (Cth)) and is one of the actions identified in the unreasonableness ground at par 97(b). That paragraph is not particularised by a document or report and does not refer to matters necessarily known to the Court. Expert evidence on this topic can be adduced as it is reasonably required given the case pleaded.
Item 12 is linked to Item 9 and expert evidence is permitted to be adduced in light of the action of the Respondents specified in par 97(a) in the summons in Ground 2. None of the paragraphs in the summons cited in Item 12 are particularised by a document.
The concepts in Item 16 are fundamental matters to the Applicant's case as articulated in the summons. While the Court has broad familiarity with the terms specified in amended Annexure A these are raised in a particular legislative circumstance and expert evidence may be adduced on these.
Item 17 concerns whether Planned Environmental Water will be disproportionately impacted if Climate Change Impacts eventuate in the Border Rivers Region, referring to par 62. That topic is fundamental to the Applicant's case, no document is particularised and expert evidence on that topic may be adduced.
The unreasonableness ground as expressed in par 97 is also underpinned by Items 21 and 23 and expert evidence on these topics may be adduced as these appear to be reasonably required for the Applicant's case.
In relation to Item 23, while the Respondents submitted above in [75] that the pars in the summons referred to were admitted by the Respondents and therefore expert evidence was unnecessary, I note that those admissions were qualified, and expert evidence may be adduced responsive to Item 23.
I will order pursuant to r 31.19 of the UCPR that expert evidence concerning the topics identified in the amended Annexure A to the Applicant's NOM dated 30 March 2022 at Items 1, 6, 7(e), 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16(c) and (e), 17, 21, and 23 may be adduced by the Applicant. Further discussion with the Applicant about ways this can be limited in length will be undertaken. I also observe again that a final determination of what can be admitted in evidence will ultimately be a matter for the trial judge, informed by actual evidence.
Nature Conservation Council of NSW Inc. v Minister for Water, Property and Housing - [2022] NSWLEC 69 - NSWLEC 2022 case summary — Zoe