s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - no appearance for Respondent - dismissal found to be unfair - reinstatement not appropriate - compensation ordered.

• [1] On 22 May 2025 Mr Saiyam Midha filed an application pursuant to s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) seeking a remedy in relation to unfair dismissal with respect to his former employer, D365.Global Pty Ltd (D365).

The failure by D365 to participate in this proceeding

• [2] The Commission attempted to serve Mr Midha's application on D365 on 29 May 2025 by sending it to the contact details provided in the application, including several email addresses. On 28 May 2025 the Commission registry attempted to contact D365 on phone numbers that had been provided and on a phone number obtained through a google search. A person who answered told the registry that an attempt had been made to contact "David" who was unavailable. The application was allocated to the Commission's staff conciliation service, and a conciliation conference was arranged. Notification of the conference was provided to a Mr David Blumentals who was advised of the conference by the email addresses provided and also by SMS text message sent on 18 June 2025.
• [3] D365 did not file a Form F3 response to the Application despite having been alerted in correspondence sent by the Commission's registry that it was required to do so pursuant to rule 66 of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2024.
• [4] The conciliation conference took place on 19 June 2025. Mr Midha said that there was initially no appearance for D365 but then a phone call was made to Mr Blumentals who joined the conference and participated.
• [5] On 19 June 2025, following the conference, a conciliation summary was sent to the parties. Mr Midha said that part of the outcome of the conference was that Mr Bulmentals was to prepare and send a settlement agreement. On 27 June 2025, when this did not occur, Mr Midha sent Mr Blumentals a reminder email and later that day Mr Blumentals sent Mr Midha a copy of a settlement agreement. Mr Midha sent via email some proposed changes to the document. There was no response, and on 1 July 2025 Mr Midha sent to Mr Blumentals a follow up email. On 7 July 2025 Mr Blumentals sent Mr Midha a reply, saying he was reviewing the changes. At this point, Mr Blumentals had begun to use an email address which I will describe as the "csp email address". Mr Midha sent a reply to the "csp email address" on 8 July 2025 stating he was looking forward to Mr Blumentals prompt response. This was the last contact Mr Midha (or the Commission) received from Mr Blumentals.
• [6] The matter was allocated to my chambers on 1 August 2025. At no point following the allocation of this matter to my chambers did D365 participate in the proceeding, despite being directed on several occasions to do so in the manner set out below.
• [7] On 6 August 2025 I listed the matter for mention to occur on 11 August 2025. When there was no appearance at the mention for D365, my chambers phoned the mobile phone number which had previously been used by the Commission to communicate with Mr Blumentals, leaving a message. Another call, made to another number was answered by someone who said the call would be transferred to Mr Blumentals, but he did not answer the transfer and so a message was left asking Mr Blumentals to join the mention urgently (which did not occur).
• [8] I issued Directions for the conduct of the matter on 11 August 2025. D365 was directed to file and serve an Outline of Argument and Statements of Evidence by 4:00PM on 25 August 2025. The email sent containing the Directions alerted Mr Blumental to the fact that his continued failure to participate in the proceeding could result in the matter being determined in D365's absence. I conducted another mention on 18 August 2025 and again, there was no appearance for D365 despite phone reminders from my chambers. On 18 August 2025 my chambers sent an email to D365 which said that its continued failure to comply with Directions could mean the matter would be determined in its absence, and on the basis of Mr Midha's material. D365 failed to file or serve any material by its return date - 25 August 2025. On 1 September 2025 my chambers sent another email to D365 further reminding it that, having failed to comply with orders that it file and serve material by 25 August 2025, its failure to attend before the Commission at the hearing of the matter would mean it would be determined in its absence, and on the basis of Mr Midha's material.
• [9] The application was the subject of hearings on 23 September 2025 and 29 September 2025 conducted by way of Microsoft Teams.
• [10] Mr Midha was self-represented at the hearings. There was no appearance on either occasion for D365.
• [11] On 23 September 2025 there being no appearance prior to the hearing by D365 an email was sent at 2:55PM asking that a representative urgently join the Teams link. A phone call was also made to D365 and the person who answered the phone said that they were also not able to contact Mr Blumentals and a message would be left for him.
• [12] Shortly after the hearing commenced, it became evident to me that the last email address to which Mr Blumentals had responded was the "csp email address". I also realised that the "csp email address" was not one that my chambers had been using to attempt to correspond with D365. This is not to say that the other email addresses supplied for D365 were inactive - I consider it is likely they are active and emails sent to those addresses were received. However, I considered it appropriate to adjourn the hearing and to attempt to communicate with D365 using the csp email address.
• [13] On 23 September 2025 my chambers sent an email to D365 on the various email addresses provided, including the csp email address. The said email the matter would be determined in its absence unless a reply was received by 4:00PM 25 September 2025. When no reply to this correspondence was received, the matter was listed for further hearing on 29 September 2025.
• [14] Mr Midha was again self represented at the hearing and there was no appearance for D365. The hearing was conducted by way of determinative conference.
• [15] For completeness, I have considered it appropriate inform myself in relation to this matter by obtaining from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) a Company Extract Current and Historical for D365.Global Pty Ltd, a corporate entity with the same Australian Business Number as that displayed on pay slips provided to Mr Midha during his employment. These searches were conducted on 22 August 2025 and 29 September 2025. Both searches show that Mr David Blumentals is the sole Director and Secretary of the Company. The sole shareholder is Ms Joan Marion Disney. Neither search shows any documents lodged with ASIC with respect to insolvency or any such process.

Ordering a remedy in relation to unfair dismissal.

• [16] Section 390 of the Act provides that the Commission may order remedy if:
  1. the Commission is satisfied that the Applicant was protected from unfair dismissal at the time of being dismissed; and
  2. the person has been unfairly dismissed.
• [17] Section 396 of the Act requires that the Commission decide several matters relating to an application for an unfair dismissal remedy before considering the merits of the application. Those matters are:
  1. whether the application was made within the period required in s 394(2) of the Act;
  2. whether the person was protected from unfair dismissal;
  3. whether the dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code;
  4. whether the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy.
• [18] Mr Midha's application was made within the period required in s 394(2) of the Act, based on the date upon which he said his dismissal took effect (which was not contradicted). There is no suggestion before me the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy, nor was there any evidence before me that D365 is a small business within the meaning of s 23 of the Act.
• [19] Section 382 of the Act provides that a person is protected from unfair dismissal if, at the time of being dismissed:
  1. the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and
  2. one or more of the following apply:
     1. a modern award covers the person;
     2. an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;
     3. the sum of the person's annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the regulations, is less than the high income threshold.
• [20] At the time of his dismissal, Mr Midha had been employed for seven months on a full time permanent basis (more than the minimum employment period where the employer is not a small business employer[1]) and his annual rate of earnings was less than the high income threshold. I find that Mr Midha was a person protected by unfair dismissal at the time he was dismissed.

• [21] D365 Global provides services to clients relating to Microsoft products such as customer relationship management systems (CRM's) and enterprise relationship planning (ERM) products. Mr Midha said that D365 is a Microsoft partner and presumably has a commercial relationship with Microsoft.
• [22] Mr Midha commenced working for D365 on 30 September 2024 in a role described as a "Microsoft Dynamics Team Leader / Project Manager". Mr Midha was responsible for carrying out project duties with clients - engaging with customers to configure "out of the box" products to their needs. The job was entirely remote, working from home. The Company is based in Sydney.
• [23] Mr Midha said that he was not provided with any negative critique or warnings in relation to his work performance prior to his dismissal.
• [24] Mr Midha said that he was paid on Wednesday every fortnight for a period ending a Friday before the Wednesday pay cycle day.
• [25] Mr Midha said that he did not receive any contribution into his superannuation fund during the entirety of his employment. He said he raised this issue with Mr Blumentals in late February 2025, and on 31 March 2025 and did not receive any reply to these emails. He said he did not receive his fortnight pay on Wednesday 30 April 2025 for the period worked between 13 April 2025 to 26 April 2025. He said he emailed Mr Blumentals about the pay not being processed and also about his superannuation contribution in two separate emails on 30 April 2025.
• [26] Mr Midha said he did not receive any reply to my emails, so next morning, on 1 May 2025, he asked Mr Blumentals about them in a meeting held via Microsoft Teams. Mr Midha said Mr Blumentals replied saying he did see the emails and scheduled a meeting with him later than morning to discuss them.
• [27] A meeting was held later on 1 May 2025 via Microsoft Teams. Mr Midha said that rather than discussing the two issues raised, Mr Blumentals said "he wanted to talk to me because he doesn't feel we are moving together in the same direction ... he further added, my work does not reflect the professional experience or skills and competencies described in my resume, and we have reached the end of the road". In response Mr Midha disputed this and said he was not offered the tasks for role and responsibilities that he was promised in his job interview.
• [28] Mr Midha said Mr Blumentals also alleged that he had not worked 40 hours every week. He said Mr Blumentals said Mr Midha had not been paid for the last fortnight because he had not been working his required 40 hours per week. Mr Midha says that this was not true. Mr Midha said he was given a spreadsheet from Mr Blumentals relating to his hours of work which he said did not take into account the fact that he had taken some days off due to public holidays and paid annual leave.
• [29] Mr Midha said he told Mr Blumentals that he was entitled to be paid for paid annual leave and public holidays. He said Mr Blumentals did not appear to accept that Mr Midha was entitled to paid time off work on public holidays and while on paid annual leave. He said Mr Blumentals said "he will look into both today and will be sending a deed of release letter". He said the Deed of Release would include the reason why it was "the end of the road" for Mr Midha and would involve a "settlement" in relation to the unpaid work. Mr Midha said Mr Blumentals said he would need to sign and return the document on the same day.
• [30] A document was sent to Mr Midha later that day but he considered the numbers in the document were not correct, and he did not sign the document.
• [31] Mr Midha says to the best of his recollection his access to D365's systems was stopped within a few days following 1 May 2025 and his email access to the system was stopped 3 to 4 weeks later. He did not perform any work for D365 after 1 May 2025 and ceased work on this day. He says he was not paid for the hours worked between 13 April 2025 to 1 May 2025, nor was he paid superannuation contributions at all.

• [32] Section 387 of the Act provides that, in considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the Commission must take into account:
  1. whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person's capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
  2. whether the person was notified of that reason; and
  3. whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
  4. any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
  5. if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person - whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
  6. the degree to which the size of the employer's enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
  7. the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
  8. any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.
• [33] I am required to consider each of these factors, to the extent they are relevant to the factual circumstances before me[2].

Was there a valid reason for dismissal related to Mr Midha's capacity or conduct?

• [34] It is well established that order to be a valid reason, the reason for the dismissal should be "sound, defensible or well founded" and should not be "capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced" [3].
• [35] Mr Midha was simply told by Mr Blumentals that he felt they were not moving together in the same direction and that Mr Midha's work did not reflect the professional experience or skills and competencies described in his resume, and they had reached the end of the road. However, on the evidence before me, there had been no prior criticism levelled at Mr Midha's work.
• [36] A temporal connection exists between Mr Midha raising discrepancies in his pay and superannuation entitlements and Mr Blumentals sudden and unsubstantiated decision to terminate Mr Midha's employment. Mr Midha asked me to find that his having raised employment entitlements with Mr Blumentals was the reason, or one of the reasons for the termination of his employment. Taking into account that on the evidence before me, the criticism of Mr Midha's skills and competencies were not justified and there had been no issues previously raised with his performance, I consider it likely that the reason, or a reason for the decision to terminate his employment was retaliatory, in response to Mr Midha raising these employment rights issues.
• [37] This being, in my view, a reason for the termination of Mr Midha's employment, and in the absence of any other apparent reason save for Mr Blumentals expressing the view that "they were not moving together in the same direction", I find D365 did not have a valid reason for dismissal relating to Mr Midha's capacity or conduct. On the evidence before me, Mr Blumentals' cursory comment that Mr Midha's work did not reflect the professional experience or skills and competencies described in his resume was not sound, defensible or well founded. The circumstances weigh heavily in favour of a finding that the termination of Mr Midha's employment was harsh, unjust and unreasonable.

Was Mr Midha notified of the reason for dismissal?

• [38] Notification of the valid reason for dismissal must be given to the employee explicitly and in plain and clear terms. And crucially, this must occur before the decision to terminate the employment is made[4].
• [39] There is no evidence before me that Mr Midha was informed of a valid reason in respect to his dismissal before he was told of the decision to terminate his employment on 1 May 2025.
• [40] This factor weighs in favour of a finding that the termination of Mr Midha's employment was unfair.

Was Mr Midha given an opportunity to respond to the valid reason?

• [41] An employee protected from unfair dismissal should be notified of a valid reason for the termination of their employment before a decision is taken to terminate that employment so that they can provide a response before the decision is final[5]. In this case, this did not occur - there is no evidence before me that Mr Midha was given an opportunity to respond to the decision to terminate his employment before he was told about it.
• [42] I find Mr Midha was not provided with an opportunity to respond to the reason for his dismissal. This factor weighs in favour of a finding that the termination of Mr Midha's employment was unfair.

Did D365 unreasonably refuse to allow Mr Midha to have a support person present to assist at discussions relating to the dismissal?

• [43] There is no evidence before me that D365 refused to allow Mr Midha to have a support person present at discussions relating to his dismissal. This is a neutral factor in this matter.

Was Mr Midha warned about unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal?

• [44] Mr Blumentals made a cursory comment to Mr Midha that his work did not reflect the professional experience or skills and competencies described in his resume. In so far as this was a comment directed at unsatisfactory performance there is no evidence before me that Mr Midha was warned about unsatisfactory performance at any stage prior to dismissal. This factor weighs in favour of a finding that the termination of Mr Midha's employment was unfair.

To what degree would the size of D365's enterprise or the absence of human resources management specialists be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal?

• [45] In considering whether a termination of employment is harsh, unjust or unreasonable, ss 387(f) and (g) of the Act requires that I give consideration to the degree to which the size of D365's business or the absence of human resources management specialisation or expertise was likely to have impacted on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal.
• [46] Mr Midha said D365 employed 20 - 25 people at the time of his dismissal, including a team based outside of Australia. Mr Midha said that when he started there was a person in an acting HR role - "Heather" - he said this person left the company in January 2025. After this, there was another person called "Genevive" who was in a sales capacity who performed some HR functions in addition to Mr Blumentals himself.
• [47] Accordingly, it is possible the size of D365 and the apparent absence of human resources specialisation impacted upon the procedures Mr Blumentals used to effect the termination of Mr Midha's employment.
• [48] However, there is a difference between the ignorance which may result from a small business not having access to human resources expertise, and a failure to adhere to basic standards of decency with respect to an employee[6]. I do not consider the size of the business, or the absence of human resources expertise excuses the abrupt and cursory manner in which Mr Blumentals effected the termination of Mr Midha's employment. I do not consider this factor weighs against a finding that the termination of Mr Midha's employment was unfair.

• [49] Above, I observed that on the evidence before me, there is a temporal connection between Mr Midha raising with Mr Blumentals issues relating to the failure to pay him his salary, and his superannuation entitlements, and the sudden decision to terminate his employment. In circumstances where, on the evidence before me, there is no other sound, defensible or well-founded reason for the termination of Mr Midha's employment, I consider it likely that one of the reasons for the termination of his employment was retaliation against his having raised, by way of a complaint, their failure to afford him his workplace rights. I note further that on the evidence before me, it appears D365 failed to make contributions in favour of Mr Midha in respect of superannuation and did not pay him his salary in the final few weeks of his employment. The Commission may take into account matters such as conduct apparently in contravention of the Act in assessing whether a dismissal is harsh, unjust or unreasonable[7] and I do so. These matters weigh in favour of a finding that the termination of Mr Midha's employment was unfair.

Is the Commission satisfied that the dismissal of Mr Midha was harsh, unjust or unreasonable?

• [50] I have made findings in relation to each matter specified in s 387 of the Act. I must consider and give due weight to each as a fundamental element in determining whether the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable[8]. The weight of these considerations bears in favour of a finding that the dismissal of Mr Midha was harsh, unjust and unreasonable and I find Mr Midha was unfairly dismissed.

• [51] Being satisfied that Mr Midha
  1. made an application for an order granting a remedy under s 394;
  2. was a person protected from unfair dismissal;

and was unfairly dismissed within the meaning of s 385 of the Act, I may, subject to the Act, order Mr Midha's reinstatement, or the payment of compensation to Mr Midha.

• [52] Under s 390(3) of the Act, I must not order the payment of compensation to Mr Midha unless: (a) I am satisfied that reinstatement of Mr Midha is inappropriate; and (b) I consider an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

• [53] Mr Midha does not seek reinstatement. I find in these circumstances that reinstatement is inappropriate.

Is an order for payment of compensation appropriate in all the circumstances of the case?

• [54] In circumstances where reinstatement is not appropriate, s 390(3)(b) of the Act requires that an order for payment of compensation must not be made unless I am satisfied it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. The amount of compensation, if any, is also be determined taking into account all of the circumstances of the case, including the matters set out in s 392(2). In this matter, as I discuss further below, taking into account all of the circumstances of the case and some of the matters set out in s 392(2), I consider there are several factors which limit the amount of compensation it is appropriate to award Mr Midha. However, taking into account all of the circumstances of the case I do consider it appropriate to make an order for payment of compensation to Mr Midha.

Compensation - what must be taken into account in determining an amount?

• [55] Section 392(2) of the Act requires all of the circumstances of the case to be taken into account when determining an amount to be paid as compensation to Mr Midha in lieu of reinstatement including:
  1. the effect of the order on the viability of D365's enterprise;
  2. the length of Mr Midha's service;
  3. the remuneration that Mr Midha would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if he had not been dismissed;
  4. the efforts of Mr Midha (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered because of the dismissal;
  5. the amount of any remuneration earned by Mr Midha from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation;
  6. the amount of any income reasonably likely to be earned by Mr Midha during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation; and
  7. any other matter that the Commission considers relevant.
• [56] I consider each of these matters below.
• [57] For completeness, I note that s 392(4) of the Act provides that the amount ordered must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation or other analogous hurt caused to the person by the manner of the person's dismissal.
• [58] The amount must not exceed the lesser of half the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal, which was $87,500.00, or the amount of total remuneration received by the person or to which the person was entitled for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal. Mr Midha was paid $38.46, working 40 hours each week. He had been paid a total of $43,076.88 up until the date of dismissal, since commencement on 30 September 2024. In the six months prior to dismissal, he was entitled to have earned about $39,998.40

Effect of the order on the viability of D365's enterprise

• [59] Mr Midha confirmed that he believes D365 is still viable. The Company extracts obtained from ASIC do not disclose any reason to think otherwise. Mr Midha said the Company is still functioning, and he knows this because he had a conversation with a colleague he worked with at D365 who recently left employment - a few weeks or month ago. Mr Midha said this person told him the Company was still operating at that time. While this evidence is hearsay, the Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence[9] and in the circumstances I consider it appropriate to have some regard to Mr Midha's second-hand information because it is consistent with what is otherwise apparently the case. On Mr Midha's own evidence D365 was a Microsoft partner and likely party to that and other lucrative commercial arrangements including with clients who Mr Midha said are reasonable sized commercial operations. I do not consider there is any evidence before me such that the Order of compensation I intend to make in this matter should be adjusted because of its effect on the viability of the enterrise.

• [60] Mr Midha was employed by D365 for about seven months. This is not a particularly significant period of time and does not weigh heavily in favour in a significant award of compensation in this matter.

Remuneration that Mr Midha would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if Mr Midha had not been dismissed

• [61] In determining the remuneration that Mr Midha would have received, or would have been likely to receive, I am required to address myself to the question of whether if Mr Midha's employment had not been terminated, the employment would have been likely to continue or would have been terminated at some time by another means, and in doing so, make an assessment as to the anticipated period of employment[10].
• [62] I suggested to Mr Midha that in circumstances where D365 were not providing him with his correct legal entitlements, and where the allocation of work to him was not entirely consistent with what he expected from the job, that but for the termination of his employment, it may be the employment would not have continued for a significant further period of time. To some extent Mr Midha accepted this, and said he may not have tolerated things for more than another month or two.
• [63] Having said this, Mr Midha should have been entitled to expect that D365 would comply with its obligation to provide him with basic legal entitlements like his salary, and superannuation contributions.
• [64] I consider that in all the circumstances, Mr Midha's employment would have continued for at least a further two months.

Efforts of Mr Midha to mitigate the loss suffered by Mr Midha because of the dismissal

• [65] Mr Midha's evidence was that he has applied for hundreds of jobs without success. I accept that Mr Midha has sought to mitigate his loss by making numerous and genuine attempts to obtain a new job and this does not weigh against an Order of compensation being made in this matter.

Amount of remuneration earned by Mr Midha from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation

• [66] Mr Midha said he has not been successful in obtaining a new job and has not earned any remuneration since the dismissal. This does not weigh against an Order of compensation being made in this matter and, as I observe below, the resultant effect of the dismissal in this matter is significant for Mr Midha because he has not since been able to obtain other employment.

Amount of income reasonably likely to be so earned by Mr Midha during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation

• [67] There is no evidence before me that during the period between the making of an order for compensation in this matter and the actual compensation, Mr Midha will earn any further income.

• [68] The evidence in this matter supports the conclusion that D365 failed to provide Mr Midha with significant employment entitlements, including unpaid wages, unpaid annual leave and any superannuation contributions whatsoever. I am not empowered to make Orders to redress these matters. However, I am fortified in relation to the Order of compensation I intend to make in this matter that, in addition to the unfairness of the dismissal, D365 inexplicably failed to provide Mr Midha with significant employment entitlements.
• [69] I also note that despite his best efforts, Mr Midha has been out of work since the dismissal of his employment for a period of about four months. The effect of the dismissal over Mr Midha where he has experienced this period without income is therefore significant. I consider this a relevant consideration in relation to the Order of compensation I will make in this matter.

• [70] Often the methodology used in Sprigg v Paul Licensed Festival Supermarket[11] is used to calculate the order of compensation that might be made, although it is not mandatory this formula be used[12]. In this matter, I consider that, taking into account the considerations set out in s 392(2) (as I have) the calculation of compensation I intend to order D365 to pay Mr Midha is straightforward. First, I consider that it is reasonable to forecast that Mr Midha's employment would have continued for at least a further two months. Secondly, I also consider that the significant effect of the dismissal over Mr Midha's personal and financial circumstances warrants a further amount of compensation equivalent to one month's pay. I therefore intend to Order that D365 pay Mr Midha three month's pay, calculated at $1,538.40 per week, or $18,460.80 less taxation as required by law, plus an amount of superannuation as set out below. I consider this level of compensation is appropriate having regard to all the circumstances of the case[13].

• [71] Given my findings above, I will make an Order that D365 must pay Mr Midha $18,460.80 less taxation as required by law, plus a superannuation contribution into his nominated fund of $2,215.30, within 14 days of the date of this decision. An Order[14] will issue to that effect.

[1] Fair Work Act 2009 s 383(a)

[2] Sayer v Melsteel Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 7498 [14]

[3] Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 333; (1995) 62 IR 371 [373]

[4] Newton v Toll Transport [2021] FWCFB 3457 [182]

[5] Crozier v Palazzo Corporation (1996) 98 IR 137 [73]

[6] Pecker Maroo Verano Pty Ltd v Stevens [2024] FWCFB 147 [110]

[7] See for example Mr Gabriel Augustin v AgUnity [2025] FWC 1601 [33]; Ben White v J Harding & P.A Harding T/A Trend Construction NQ [2022] FWC 752 [12]

[8] ALH Group Pty Ltd t/a The Royal Exchange Hotel v Mulhall (2002) IR 117 357 [51]; Edwards v Giudice [1999] FCA 1836 [6] - [7]

[9] Fair Work Act 2009 s 591

[10] He v Lewin [2004] FCAFC 161 [58]

[11] [1998] AIRC 989; (1998) 88 IR 21

[12] Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Darren Pericich [2018] FWCFB 5960 [39]

[13] Fair Work Act 2009 s 392(2); Double N Equipment Hire Pty Ltd t/a A1 Distributions v Humphries [2016] FWCFB 7206 [17]

[14] PR791748

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