[2026] FWC 554
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2026-02-20
Original judgment source is linked above.
The attached document replaces the document previously issued with the above code on 20 February 2026
Appearances at the end of the decision have been amended to include the Respondent's Counsel.
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - whether there was a valid reason related to capacity to perform inherent requirements of the applicant's substantive role at the date of dismissal - valid reason found - other factors in section 387 considered - dismissal otherwise not unfair - application dismissed.
[1] Mr Peter Rennick (the Applicant) was a workplace health and safety inspector for the Victorian WorkCover Authority, operating as WorkSafe Victoria (the Respondent), for twenty six years until his dismissal on 8 July 2025. It is not in dispute that Mr Rennick suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that incapacitated him for work at various times from approximately late 2022.
[4] Mr Rennick filed an application for an unfair dismissal remedy. The matter proceeded to a hearing on 2 October 2025. The Applicant represented himself in the proceeding and gave evidence on his own behalf. Mr Simon Brown, a colleague of the Applicant, provided a witness statement for the Applicant, but the Respondent did not require him for cross examination. The Respondent, with permission, was represented by Counsel. Ms Moore, Director Regional Operations North, Ms Barker, Executive Director People and Culture and Ms Ruiz, People and Culture Business Partner all gave evidence for the Respondent.
[5] There is no dispute that Mr Rennick was a person protected from unfair dismissal or that he was not dismissed from his employment at the initiative of the Respondent.
[6] For the reasons set out in this decision, I have determined that Mr Rennick's dismissal is not harsh, unjust or unreasonable considering the matters I am required to consider under section 387 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act).
[7] At the time the Respondent terminated Mr Rennick's employment, it had a valid reason for dismissal. The Respondent relied on medical evidence to form its view that Mr Rennick had a current, and likely, permanent incapacity to perform the inherent requirements of his role. Mr Rennick agrees that he was unable to meet the inherent requirements of his substantive role as at the date of his dismissal. There was no obligation for the Respondent to consider options for redeployment into another role or to consider whether the Applicant had capacity for any other role other than his substantive role. Mr Rennick's total incapacity for work at the time of his dismissal, and a lengthy period preceding his dismissal, was inconsistent with any assertion that the Respondent should have considered other roles for him to perform. Mr Rennick was told of the reason for his termination prior to his dismissal and was given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for his proposed termination. Mr Rennick was allowed to bring a support person to each discussion regarding his dismissal.
[13] Mr Rennick did not again attempt to return to work after 15 November 2023. He began treatment with Mr Barassi, a psychologist and was formally diagnosed with complex PTSD on 29 April 2024. He then lodged a workers compensation claim and consulted with independent medical examiners as part of the investigation process. I address the medical evidence which emerged from that process below.
[18] The following medical reports in evidence are set out below:
[19] Several of the medical reports were obtained as required for Mr Rennick's workers' compensation claim. They provide a history of the development of his injury. Mr Rennick did not dispute any of the medical evidence and none of the doctors were further required to give evidence in this matter.
[23] Mr Barassi provided the Respondent with an additional report on 14 October 2024 where he restated a number of views addressed in his earlier report of July 2024. He added:
"[W]hile I harbour reservations about Mr Rennick's confidence and capacity to return to his current employer, I am of the opinion that, with appropriate accommodations, he could attempt to resume his pre-injury role if a well-devised return-to-work plan is in place.' He expresses hope that 'with the right support, Mr Rennick could safely transition back to his preinjury role' but '[a]t this stage I do not believe that Mr Rennick is ready or has the capacity to engage in employment tasks and may not be suitable for at least another 6 to 12 months."
(a) Mr Rennick presents with symptoms of PTSD, a major depressive disorder and a historical adjustment disorder.
(b) He partially disagrees with Dr O'Daly's assessment in that he considers Mr Rennick's primary disorder is PTSD and was of the view that Mr Rennick's PTSD symptoms met the full criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD, as well as a comorbid depressive disorder.
(c) Mr Rennick was experiencing multiple symptoms of PTSD that had not yet been successfully addressed and which he expected to persist in the same manner for the foreseeable future.
(d) Mr Rennick was also experiencing pronounced symptoms of a major depressive disorder which, at that time, had not been successfully treated , which were also expected to persist for the foreseeable future.
(e) Mr Rennick was unable to return to work "at this point" as he was "fundamentally unfit for his role due to the impact of mental illness."
(f) As Mr Rennick's condition is "fundamentally related to his experiences at work", he is "highly likely to be unable to cope with similar circumstances at work," and is "permanently unfit for his previous role." Specifically, because:
- There is a "high risk of the worsening of his illness or recurrence" if he returns to work and "is again exposed to potentially traumatic experiences which are part" of his role;
- He is vulnerable to significant or serious psychological decline from exposure to an inspector's routine experiences of attending to serious accidents and fatalities; and
- He has ongoing and intrusive experiences of PTSD.
(g) With ongoing treatment Mr Rennick's depression may lift which may enable Mr Rennick to return to a different role, however, that was not the case at the time the report was prepared.
(h) Without successfully addressing his symptoms, Mr Rennick may be permanently unfit for all work. His temporary unfitness for all work "might prove over time to be permanently unfit for all work given the severity and entrenched nature of the psychological disorder he is experiencing."
[27] The Respondent predominantly relied on the reports of Dr Keenan of November 2024 and Dr Doyle of May 2025 in its decision to terminate Mr Rennick's employment in July 2025.
Whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable
[28] The criteria for determining harshness is set out in section 387 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act):
In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person's capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person - whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer's enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant."
[29] There is no suggestion that Mr Rennick's dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance, so section 387(e) is not relevant to this matter. There is also no dispute that the Respondent is a sizable employer with human resources expertise and consequently sections 387(f) and (g) have no bearing on this decision.
Whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to Mr Rennick's capacity or conduct
[33] The Respondent submits that the following principles are relevant for the Commission to determine whether there was a valid reason for Mr Rennick's termination from employment:
[34] I concur with the Respondent's summary of the relevant principles necessary to determine whether there was a valid reason for dismissal in a case where the Respondent relies on the applicant's inability to meet the inherent requirements of their role as the valid reason.
[36] In his oral evidence, Mr Rennick conceded that, in his view, he believed he is permanently incapacitated for his role as an inspector. In cross-examination, Counsel for the Respondent asked Mr Rennick to refer to the report of Dr Doyle and asked him: "Mr Rennick, you'd agree with me that says you are permanently unfit for your role?" Mr Rennick responded: "Yeah, I'd agree with that one hundred per cent." Counsel then referred to a fitness for work summary in Dr Doyle's report and asked Mr Rennick: "It also says Mr Rennick that you are permanently unfit for your role as an inspector at WorkSafe. You would agree with that?" Mr Rennick responds "Yes," and Counsel again stated: "And you agree with that conclusion?" and Mr Rennick responded: "Oh yeah."[43]
[37] Despite Mr Rennick's submissions that the Respondent should have engaged in efforts to rehabilitate or facilitate a return to work from when he was first incapacitated, there is no evidence that Mr Rennick had capacity to engage in pre-injury duties at work or in rehabilitation from at least November 2023. Mr Rennick agreed in cross examination that the certificates of capacity submitted to the Respondent and prepared by Dr Keenan, under a section titled 'Treatment Plan', it stated: "including injury management, strategies to increase capacity for work, address to return to work barriers and/or prevent the recurrence/ aggravation of injury'". Mr Rennick agreed that these were left blank in the certificates he submitted.[44] Further, Mr Rennick acknowledged that the sections addressing the estimated timeframe to return to work were also left blank and the certificates noted he had no capacity for employment. In my view, this absence of medical evidence would have been a significant inhibitor to the Respondent engaging in any form of rehabilitation.
[38] Mr Rennick had attempted and failed to return on a number of occasions between July and November 2023. The medical evidence shows a continual decline in Mr Rennick's PTSD corresponding with an increase in symptoms and incapacity over the relevant period. Mr Rennick's diagnosis of moderately severe or significant PTSD from April 2024 had not changed and his total incapacity for work was reinforced in each medical report.
[39] The medical evidence from the majority of the practitioners was consistent that Mr Rennick was unfit for his role as an inspector with the Respondent and his inability to return to his pre-injury role as an inspector was permanent. This was not only the opinion of independent medical examiners, but also the opinion of his treating general practitioner. Mr Barassi was more hopeful in his prognosis and opined that Mr Rennick may be able to return to work provided there was adequate adjustments of reduced hours and lighter duties and adequate support but was still of the view that it would not be for 6 to 12 months as of October 2024. It appears that despite that assessment, at the time of his dismissal, which was approximately 9 months' after the report was authored, Mr Rennick had not regained any capacity for rehabilitation or work.
[40] The prognosis of Mr Rennick's medical condition from each of the practitioners was guarded. They each left open the possibility that Mr Rennick may return to work at a later time but also had expressed concern that Mr Rennick's symptoms of mental illness may lead to permanent incapacity for any form of employment.
[41] I accept that Mr Rennick did not have capacity for any work from at least November 2023 and had remained incapacitated to not only perform his role but perform any work at all at the time of the dismissal.
[42] I do not agree with Mr Rennick's submission that the Respondent had "engineered a situation in which the Applicant would never be able to return to work, as he was deprived of the opportunity to attempt to resume his pre-injury role under a properly devised return-to-work plan." This submission is inconsistent with the medical evidence that Mr Rennick did not have capacity to engage in work duties, rehabilitation or other employment-related tasks for any sustained periods of time from when he commenced numerous episodes of leave in July 2023. Mr Rennick, in fact, had no capacity for any kind of work or rehabilitation from the time he was certified as totally unfit for work from November 2023 until his dismissal in July 2025.
[43] Mr Rennick's submissions that he should have been re-deployed into an alternative role, assuming he regained capacity for some work, does not assist in determining whether Mr Rennick had the capacity to perform the inherent requirements of his position at the time his employment was terminated. It is only necessary that I consider his capacity to perform the inherent requirements of his role as an inspector.
[45] In this case, it was Mr Rennick's incapacity to perform his role as an inspector for a significant period prior to, and at the date of his dismissal that provided the valid reason for his termination. The valid reason for dismissal is also reinforced by the medical evidence that found a likelihood of a permanent incapacity for his substantive role. Mr Rennick conceded in his evidence that it is also his view he is permanently incapacitated for his substantive role.
Whether Mr Rennick was afforded an opportunity to respond to the reason
[48] I am sympathetic to Mr Rennick's submission in this regard. His particular circumstances should have been considered in determining a reasonable timeframe in which he could respond to a proposal with such significance to him. Considering his condition alone, Mr Rennick should have been offered to additional time to make a considered response.
Was there any unreasonable refusal by the Respondent to allow Mr Rennick to have a support person present in any discussions about his dismissal?
[52] Mr Rennick does not assert that there was any unreasonable refusal to allow him to have a support person present in discussions about his dismissal. As referenced earlier, the meeting scheduled to put the proposal of termination to Mr Rennick was scheduled to accommodate his son attending as his support person.
[54] Again, for the reasons previously set out, this is not a relevant matter to my consideration of whether there was a valid reason for the termination of Mr Rennick's employment at the time of the dismissal. It is not necessary, nor appropriate, for me to comment on what the Respondent should or should not have done with respect to any rehabilitation or return to work processes for the management of what Mr Rennick says is a work-related injury. It is not relevant to whether there was a valid reason for his termination in July 2025.
[55] Mr Rennick also argues that I should consider in determining that his dismissal was harsh, unjust and unreasonable that the Respondent should have exercised alternatives to dismissal. In particular, Mr Rennick says that the Respondent should have extended his existing leave without pay for up to two years in accordance with an option available to it under the Enterprise Agreement. Mr Rennick had been on a period of leave without pay from 10 January 2025 when his employment was terminated in July 2025.
[56] Even if this option was available to the Respondent, I find that the Respondent's decision to terminate Mr Rennick's employment instead of extending his leave without pay did not make the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable. I make this finding because the medical evidence of Mr Barassi, Dr Keenan and Dr Doyle consistently stated Mr Rennick was wholly incapacitated to return to his substantive role. Dr Keenan had expressed a view that Mr Rennick was "quite probably" unfit for his role as an inspector on a permanent basis and Dr Doyle was unequivocal in his opinion that Mr Rennick was totally and permanently incapacitated for his substantive role.
[57] Extending Mr Rennick's leave without pay would have been of no utility in these circumstances. The medical evidence of current and permanent incapacity for work as an inspector provided the Respondent with a valid reason to terminate Mr Rennick's employment, instead of considering extending his leave without pay.
[59] In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that re-deployment was appropriate in any event. The Respondent not offering re-deployment in this case does not otherwise render the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
[60] Mr Rennick's prolonged incapacity to perform his substantive role as an inspector for the Respondent, and the likely permanence of that incapacity, supported by medical evidence, provided the Respondent with a valid reason for the termination of Mr Rennick's employment. The other factors relevant to this matter that I am obliged to consider under to section 387 of the Act also do not persuade me that the termination of Mr Rennick's employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
A Thomas instructed by A Frydenberg and E Purdue of Lander & Rogers with permission, on behalf of the Victorian WorkCover Authority.
[1] Letter from Respondent to Applicant dated 16 June 2025; Annexure 8 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[2] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 6.
[5] See the detailed list in the statement of the Applicant at paragraph 11.
[6] Statement of the Applicant at paragraphs 24 - 26.
[7] Annexure 8 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure LR-3 to the Statement of Ms Ruiz.
[8] Statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraph 14.
[9] Statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraph 17.
[10] Statement of the Applicant at paragraph 34.
[11] Statement of the Applicant at paragraphs 35-36.
[12] Statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraph 19.
[13] Annexure PR-8 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure JB-2 to the Statement of Ms Barker.
[14] Annexure PR-8 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[15] Annexure PR-9 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure JB-3 to the Statement of Ms Barker.
[16] Annexure PR-9 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[17] Annexure PR-9 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[18] Annexure PR-11 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[19] Annexure PR-11 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[20] Annexure JR-1 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure LR-5 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz.
[22] Annexure JR-2 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[24] Annexure JR-2 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[25] Annexure JR-4 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[26] Annexure JR-4 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[28] Annexure JR-5 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[29] Annexure JR-5 to the Statement of the Applicant.
[30] Annexure LR-22 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz.
[31] Annexure LR-22 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz.
[32] Annexure JR-7 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure LR-26 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz.
[33] Annexure JR-7 to the Statement of the Applicant; Witness statement of Ms Moore at paragraph 9; Annexure LR-25 to the Statement of Ms Ruiz.
[34] Annexure JR-7 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure LR-25 to the Statement of Ms Ruiz.
[35] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 17.
[36] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 48.
[37] Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 333; (1995) 62 IR 371 at 373.
[38] Submissions of the Respondent at paragraph 19.
[39] J Boag and Son Brewing Pty Ltd v Button [2010] FWAFB 4022 at [29].
[40] J Boag and Son Brewing Pty Ltd v Button [2010] FWAFB 4022 at [22].
[41] CSL Ltd T/A CSL Behring v Papaioannou [2018] FWCFB 1005 at [77].
[42] See: medical certificate of 17 June 2025 confirming no capacity for employment from 19 June 2025 to 16 July 2025.
[43] Audio recording of hearing Part 1 2:11:15 - 2:12:25.
[44] Audio recording of hearing Part 1 1:47:18 - 1:50:22.
[45] Rowe v V/Line Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 1437 at [56].
[46] Letter from Respondent to Applicant dated 16 June 2025.
[47] Statement of Ms Moore at paragraphs 15 and 16.
[48] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraphs 56 - 61.
[49] Application by Victorian Workcover Authority Trading AS Worksafe Victoria [2025] FWCA 1081 ('the Agreement').
[50] See submission of Respondent at paragraph 34.
[51] Statement of Ms Barker at paragraphs 6 - 23; Annexures JB-1 and JB-4; Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraphs 68 - 78; Annexures LR-27 and LR-30.
[52] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 66.
[53] Submissions of the Respondent at paragraph 38.
[54] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 77.
[55] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 77
[56] See statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraph 17. I note the evidence of an attempted return to work in November 2023, that was not sustained for more than a day.
[57] Annexure LR-5 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Mr Peter Rennick
Victorian WorkCover Authority [2026] FWC 554
(1995) 62 IR 371