s.365 - Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal

Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal - request for an extension of time - no exceptional circumstances - application dismissed

• [1] On 16 May 2025, Mr Mohd Zair Rizvi (the Applicant) lodged an application pursuant to s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) alleging his employment was terminated by PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (the Respondent) on 13 July 2022 in contravention of the general protections provisions of the Act.

• [2] The Act provides that an application alleging contravention of general protections made pursuant to s.365 of the Act must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect, however, the Fair Work Commission (FWC) may allow a further period for the application to be made in exceptional circumstances.

• [3] The application was lodged on 16 May 2025, 1017 days out of time.

• [4] In his Form F8, the Applicant identified the Application was made beyond the 21 days from the date of dismissal. The Applicant explained the reason for delay as follows:

"The form may be late. Why is it being lodged late?

I have been suffering from a serious intellectual disability known as Schizophrenia for the past many years. When

my employment ended at PwC Australia on 13 July 2022, I was unwell, stressed, in depression, I was not aware that the Fair Work Commission can help me in my mental illness unfair dismissal matter. I have never been to the Fair Work Commission in relation to unfair dismissal under general protections form F8 due to mental illness except only recently in the past 6 months related to another employer.

Due to lack of knowledge and lack of right information about the Fair Work Commission for the past many years and my ongoing serious intellectual disability (Schizophrenia), I was unable to lodge my application online.

I have emailed the Chief People Officer Catherine Walsh in 2022 to seek help in my employment matter, she promised to find me another suitable position inside the company but in the end it was a lie, she betrayed me.

PwC Australia has cheated me for many months and years in hope to get me suitable employment. When I tried to contact other HR managers such as Deborah Thompson at PwC Australia then she threatened to complain about me to the South Australian Police and asked me to stop harassing them via emails and asking for jobs otherwise they will take legal action against me.

In 2022, I contacted via email the CEO of PwC Australia, Kevin Burrows and asked me to help me get reinstated at

PwC but he declined to help me to get a job at the company.

Since the last couple of years my mental health condition has been getting better under the treatment of a Psychiatrist, I have been on medication regularly everyday for many years. This is why all my past employment termination matters are coming back to mind and now I can carefully think and understand that many employers in the past have unfairly ended my employment only because of my poor mental illness.

Please Help me Fair Work Commission, For the past 8 years I have been suffering from an intellectual disability or a mental illness and I was unfairly kicked out from many jobs in the past few years. Employers have taken advantage of my mental illness and formed a view to never employ me again and ban me permanently. This is a mental health discrimination under the Fair Work Act 2009.

Please accept my case and please make PwC Australia accountable for their wrongdoings. I am a vulnerable

Australian on Centrelink Jobseeker payments, I need serious assistance and justice from you."

• [5] On 5 June 2025, my Chambers issued a Notice of Listing to the parties advising a Hearing was listed on 20 June 2025 in respect of the extension of time issue and provided Directions for the filing of material.

• [6] On 20 June 2025, the Respondent lodged a Form F8A Employer Response which raised two jurisdictional objections, the first being that the application was lodged out-of-time and the second being that the Applicant was not dismissed.

• [7] This decision deals with the out of time objection only.

• [8] The Applicant filed a submission/statement and supporting material in respect of the extension of time jurisdictional objection made by the Respondent. The Respondent filed submissions only.

• [9] The Applicant submitted the following material:

• Letter related to Mental Health and reply to the Respondent claims in Form F8A 2025
• Gabriel Harris, Partner, PwC Letter 2022
• Dr. Sasa Todorovic Medical Practitioner, G.P., Letter 10th June 2025
• Dr. Emmy Bretag Medical Practitioner, G.P. Letter 10th June 2025
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi 3rd June 2025
• Dr. Emmy Bretag, Medical Practitioner, G.P., Letter 8th May 2025
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi May 2025
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi December 2024
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi September 2024
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi May 2024
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi November 2023
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi September 2023
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi July 2023
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi June 2023
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi Februar2023
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi April 2022
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi November 2021
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi August 2021
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi May 2021
• Psychiatrist Dr Praveen Tripathi April 2020
• Psychiatrist Dr Ravi Kumar Prescription June 2016
• Psychiatrist Dr Ravi Kumar Prescription March 2016
• Psychiatrist Dr Ravi Kumar Prescription December 2015
• Dr. Zara Latif, Medical Practitioner, G.P.Letter, 6th June 2025
• Head of HR Catherine Walsh PwC Australia 18 August 2022
• CEO Kevin Burrows Letter PwC Australia 6th August 2023
• Dr Zara Latif Medical Practitioner, G.P. Letter 4th June 2025
• Medical Practitioner, G.P, Dr. Prashant Pareek, June 2024 Verification of Medical assessment Form SU684
• High Court of Australia Decision 11 December 2024

• [10] The material filed by the parties was collated into a Digital Court Book (DCB) and sent to the parties on 18 June 2025. I have received all of the material contained in the DCB and afforded relevant weight to the material based on its relevance and admissibility.

• [11] A Determinative Conference (in order to ameliorate my decision with respect to s.596 permission below) was conducted via telephone at 2:30pm (SA) Friday, 20 June 2025 and was recorded. The Applicant represented himself, the Respondent was represented by Mr Meagher of Counsel, permission granted pursuant to s.596(2) of the Act.

• [12] The relevant evidence is summarised below (in chronological order):

• The Commission's records indicate that on 31 July 2018, the Applicant lodged a general protections application (within 21-days) in respect of his period of employment with the Department of Human Services T/A Centrelink. The Applicant protested the relevance of this information and could not recall any information as to the 2018 application. This is relevant as to the Applicant's knowledge of the general protections process and his capacity to submit an application.
• On 15 June 2022, the Applicant was offered employment to commence on 18 July 2022. The Applicant accepted the offer.

• On 13 July 2022, the Respondent withdrew its offer of employment to the Applicant. The Applicant never commenced his employment and was never paid by the Respondent.

• The Applicant contends he was dismissed on 13 July 2022. The Respondent disputes this.

• The Applicant appears to have corresponded with the Respondent after the 13 July 2022 until it appears his email address was blocked by the Respondent.

• The Applicant performed work for the following employers post dismissal:

• Origin Energy (LPG services): 20 March 2023 to 21 July 2023

Karlka Recruiting 8 January 2024 to 16 January 2024

National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) 15 September 2024 to 18 December 2024.

• On 20 December 2024 the Applicant lodged a general protections application in respect of his employment with NDIA (C2024/9290). This is relevant as to the Applicant's knowledge of the general protections process and his capacity to submit an application.

• The Applicant advised he contacted the FWC on 4 April 2025 at which time he was informed about the 21-day timeframe and capacity to seek an extension of time.

• With respect to the delay from 4 April 2025 to 16 May 2025, the Applicant advised he was attending medical appointments and engaging with other applications.

• On 16 May 2025, the Applicant filed his general protections application.

• To explain the delay, the Applicant relied upon his diagnosis and associated symptoms of schizophrenia. The Applicant submitted a raft of medical documentation. The only diagnosis of schizophrenia was made by a psychiatrist in India (Dr Tripathi) in November 2020. The document containing that diagnosis is marked 'not valid for medicolegal purposes.' Dr Tripathi was not called to give evidence. The Applicant gave evidence that his medical condition resulted in cognitive impairment, distributed mindset and being perplexed.

• The Applicant contended he was not aware of his capacity to lodge a general protections application until 4 April 2025. This position appeared to morph into a position that the Applicant was not aware of his capacity to seek an extension of time when it became evident that he had filed a general protections application with the FWC in relation to another matter on 31 July 2018 (C2018/4229) and 20 December 2024 (C2024/9290).

• The provision of general information about the impact of Schizophrenia from unnamed sources did not assist me in determining the impact of the Applicant's medical condition on him.

• [13] Section 366(2) of the Act states:

(1) An application under section 365 must be made:

(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or

(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (2).

(2) The FWC may allow a further period if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(b) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and

(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position."

• [14] The test of "exceptional circumstances" establishes a "high hurdle" for an applicant.[1]

• [15] I have considered the provisions of s.366(2) of the Act in the context of the Full Bench decision in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[2] which stated:

"[10] It is convenient to deal first with the meaning of the expression "exceptional circumstances" in s.366(2). In Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers a Full Bench of FWA considered the meaning of the expression "exceptional circumstances" in s.394(3) and held:

"[5] The word "exceptional" is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as "forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary." We can apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act."

[11] Given that s.366(2) is in relevantly identical terms to s.394(3), this statement of principle is equally applicable to s.366(2).

[13] In summary, the expression "exceptional circumstances" has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe "exceptional circumstances" as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural "circumstances" as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of "exceptional circumstances" includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon."

• [16] The delay required to be considered is the period beyond the prescribed 21-day period for making an application. It does not include the period from the date of the dismissal to the end of the 21-day period. However, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered when assessing whether there is a credible reason for the delay, or any part of the delay, beyond the 21-day period.[3] In Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic,[4] the Full Bench explained the correct approach by reference to the following example:

"[31] For example if an applicant is in hospital for the first 20 days of the 21-day period this would be a relevant consideration if the application was filed 2 days out of time as occurred in this matter."

• [17] An acceptable explanation for the entirety of the delay is not required to make a finding of exceptional circumstances. However, in considering the reason for the delay in accordance with s.366(2) of the Act, it is relevant to have regard to whether the applicant has provided an acceptable explanation for the entirety or any part of the delay. The correct approach to be taken was explained by the Full Bench in Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters:[5]

"[38] As we have mentioned, the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exist requires a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. No one factor (such as the reason for the delay) need be found to be exceptional in order to enliven the discretion to extend time. This is so because even though no one factor may be exceptional, in combination with other factors the circumstances may be such as to be regarded as exceptional.

[39] So much is clear from the structure of s.366(2), each of the matters needs to be taken into account in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances. The individual matters might not, viewed in isolation, be particularly significant, so it is necessary to consider the matters collectively and to ask whether collectively the matters disclose exceptional circumstances. The absence of any explanation for any part of the delay, will usually weigh against an applicant in such an assessment. Similarly a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay, will usually weigh in the applicant's favour, though, as we mention later, it is a question of degree and insight. However the ultimate conclusion as to the existence of exceptional circumstances will turn on a consideration of all of the relevant matters and the assignment of appropriate weight to each.

[44] As mentioned earlier, the 'reasons for the delay' is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether there are exceptional circumstances. There is no statutory basis for the adoption of a decision rule whereby if the applicant does not provide a credible explanation for the entire period of the delay then the matter in s.366(2)(a) tells against the finding of exceptional circumstances. Common sense would suggest otherwise, it is plainly a question of degree and weight.

[45] What if the period of the delay was 30 days and the applicant had a credible explanation for 29 of those days? It seems to us that such circumstances may weigh in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances. Of course, as mentioned earlier if there was a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay that would weigh more heavily in favour of such a finding. Conversely, if the applicant failed to provide a credible explanation for any part of the delay that would tend to weigh against a finding of exceptional circumstances."

• [18] The Applicant's employment (if any) ended on 13 July 2022. The Applicant was aware of the 'dismissal' on the day it occurred. The application is 1017 days out-of-time and can only be pursued if an extension of time is granted.

• [19] The reason relied upon by the Applicant to explain the delay relate to the impact of his medical condition and lack of knowledge about general protections and in particular, the 21-day time frame to lodge a general protections application and the existence of exceptional circumstances.

• [20] Whilst I am prepared to accept the Applicant was diagnosed with schizophrenia in November 2020, there is scant medical evidence as to how it prevented the filing of the general protections application within a timely manner. In the absence of the relevant doctors being called, I am not prepared to rely on their assertions as to impacts of the on the applicant and his capacity to file. I note that the Applicant's treating Psychiatrist (Dr Tripathi) advised that he had responded well to treatment and had stabilised by July 2023 and was in remission in September 2024.

• [21] The best evidence as to the impact of his medical condition came from the Applicant's oral evidence and written material which appeared to be limited to Google search of schizophrenia generally. However, it is difficult to reconcile this self-serving evidence, against the Applicant's capacity to successfully apply for alternative roles and perform the role requirements for months at a time, and his ability to lodge a general protections application on 20 December 2024. I have ignored the filing of the 2018 general protections application as this appears to predate the Applicant's medical condition.

• [22] The Applicant's claim of being unable to file an application is also inconsistent with his capacity to engage with his employer by email post 'dismissal'.

• [23] I now turn to the Applicant's knowledge of the general protections provisions and his ability to seek an extension of time.

• [24] The Applicant contended in his written material that whilst he was aware of the unfair dismissal provisions (and the impact of the minimum employment period on his capacity to file), he was unaware of the ability to argue that adverse action taken as a result of his medical condition could be the subject of a general protections application and that he could seek an extension of time for a late application. His evidence as to his awareness of the general protections provision varied during his evidence, particularly after it became evident that he had made two prior general protections applications in 2018 and 2024.

• [25] In any event, ignorance of the existence of a legal right or the timeframe for lodgement associated with that right is not an exceptional circumstance.[6]

• [26] Finally, having become aware of the general protections in the Act, and his capacity to seek an extension of time on 4 April 2025 the Applicant waited a further 42 days until his application was filed on 16 May 2025. Whilst I accept that the Applicant was making multiple applications, they appear to be largely a cut and paste and I am not persuaded 42 days was reasonably required to complete this process.

• [27] The Applicant provided general information about the impact of Schizophrenia from unnamed sources, this did not assist me in determining the impact of the Applicant's medical condition on him.

• [28] The summary of the High Court's decision in Elisha v Vison Australia[7] related to a personal injury claim and did not assist my determination of this matter.

• [29] The determination of extension of time matters largely turn on the facts, the cases the Applicant referred me to were distinguishable on the facts.

• [30] I am not satisfied the Applicant has explained the delay. This consideration does not support a finding of exceptional circumstances.

Paragraph 366(2)(b) - any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal

• [31] Action taken by the employee to contest the dismissal, other than lodging an unfair dismissal application, may favour granting an extension of time.[8]

• [32] I accept the Applicant corresponded with the Respondent post dismissal and disputed what he considered to be his dismissal.

• [33] This factor is a consideration in favour of the granting of an extension of time.

Paragraph 366(2)(c) - prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)

• [34] Prejudice to the employer will weigh against granting an extension of time.[9] However, the "mere absence of prejudice to the employer is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time".[10]

• [35] Given that the application is 1017 days out of time, the period will undoubtedly have a significant impact on the capacity of witnesses to recall the relevant events. I am persuaded there is prejudice to the Respondent.

• [36] This factor is a consideration against the granting of an extension of time.

Paragraph 366(2)(d) - merits of the application

• [37] In terms of the merits of the application, there does not appear to be any dispute the Applicant did not commence his employment with PWC and was never paid by PWC.

• [38] Despite acceptance, the Applicant's offer of employment was withdrawn. The Applicant did not perform work nor was he paid by the Respondent. On this basis, the Applicant appears not have been employed by the Respondent, therefore there can be no dismissal.

• [39] This factor is a consideration against the granting of an extension of time.

Paragraph 366(2)(e) - fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position

• [40] The Full Bench in Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd[11] considered this criterion and said:

"[41] Cases of this kind will generally turn on their own facts. However, this consideration is concerned with the importance of the application of consistent principles in cases of this kind, thus ensuring fairness as between the Appellant and other persons in a similar position. This consideration may relate to matters currently before the Commission or matters previously decided by the Commission."

• [41] There is insufficient information to satisfy me the issue of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position is a relevant consideration in this matter. As a result, it is a neutral consideration in determining whether to grant an extension of time.

• [42] Having taken into account each of the factors referred to in s.366(2)(a)-(e), I am not persuaded that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of my discretion to allow a further period within which an application for an unfair dismissal remedy may be lodged by the Applicant, and I so order.

[1] Lombardo v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2014] FWCFB 2288 at [21].

[2] [2011] FWAFB 975.

[3] Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank [2015] FWCFB 287 at [12]; Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149 at [31]; Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic [2016] FWCFB 349 at [29]- [31].

[4] [2016] FWCFB 349.

[5] [2018] FWCFB 3288 at [35]- [45].

[6] Miller v Allianz Insurance Australia Ltd (t/a Allianz) [2016] FWCFB 5472; cited by Marsland v Rasier Pacific

Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 829 and Mensur v Ferguson Environmental Consulting Pty Ltd (t/as Metro Heating and

Cooling) [2025] FWC 557.

[7] [2024] HCA 50.

[8] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at 299-300.

[11] Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd [2016] FWCFB 6963.

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